[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 68 (Friday, April 8, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20946-21002]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07924]



[[Page 20945]]

Vol. 81

Friday,

No. 68

April 8, 2016

Part V





Department of Labor





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





Employee Benefits Security Administration





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





29 CFR Parts 2509, 2510, and 2550





Definition of the Term ``Fiduciary''; Conflict of Interest Rule--
Retirement Investment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption; Class 
Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets between 
Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRA; 
Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 75-1, Part V, 
Exemptions From Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions 
Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting 
Dealers and Banks; Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited 
Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24 for Certain Transactions Involving 
Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, 
and Investment Company Principal Underwriters; Amendments to and 
Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 86-128 for 
Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-
Dealers; Amendment to and Partial Revocation of PTE 75-1, Exemptions 
From Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions Involving 
Employee Benefits Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting Dealers 
and Banks; Amendments to Class Exemptions 75-1, 77-4, 80-83 and 83-1; 
Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2016 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 20946]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employee Benefits Security Administration

29 CFR Parts 2509, 2510, and 2550

RIN 1210-AB32


Definition of the Term ``Fiduciary''; Conflict of Interest Rule--
Retirement Investment Advice

AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document contains a final regulation defining who is a 
``fiduciary'' of an employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or the Act) as a result of giving 
investment advice to a plan or its participants or beneficiaries. The 
final rule also applies to the definition of a ``fiduciary'' of a plan 
(including an individual retirement account (IRA)) under the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (Code). The final rule treats persons who provide 
investment advice or recommendations for a fee or other compensation 
with respect to assets of a plan or IRA as fiduciaries in a wider array 
of advice relationships.

DATES: Effective date: The final rule is effective June 7, 2016.
    Applicability date: April 10, 2017. As discussed more fully below, 
the Department of Labor (Department or DOL) has determined that, in 
light of the importance of the final rule's consumer protections and 
the significance of the continuing monetary harm to retirement 
investors without the rule's changes, an applicability date of April 
10, 2017, is adequate time for plans and their affected financial 
services and other service providers to adjust to the basic change from 
non-fiduciary to fiduciary status. The Department has also decided to 
delay the application of certain requirements of certain of the 
exemptions being finalized with this rule. That action, described in 
more detail in the final exemptions published elsewhere in this issue 
of the Federal Register, will allow firms and advisers to benefit from 
the relevant exemptions without having to meet all of the exemptions' 
requirements for a limited time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For Questions Regarding the Final 
Rule: Contact Luisa Grillo-Chope, Office of Regulations and 
Interpretations, Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), 
(202) 693-8825. (Not a toll-free number). For Questions Regarding the 
Final Prohibited Transaction Exemptions: Contact Karen Lloyd, Office of 
Exemption Determinations, EBSA, 202-693-8824. (Not a toll free number). 
For Questions Regarding the Regulatory Impact Analysis: Contact G. 
Christopher Cosby, Office of Policy and Research, EBSA, 202-693-8425. 
(Not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

    Under ERISA and the Code, a person is a fiduciary to a plan or IRA 
to the extent that the person engages in specified plan activities, 
including rendering ``investment advice for a fee or other 
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other 
property of such plan . . . [.]'' ERISA safeguards plan participants by 
imposing trust law standards of care and undivided loyalty on plan 
fiduciaries, and by holding fiduciaries accountable when they breach 
those obligations. In addition, fiduciaries to plans and IRAs are not 
permitted to engage in ``prohibited transactions,'' which pose special 
dangers to the security of retirement, health, and other benefit plans 
because of fiduciaries' conflicts of interest with respect to the 
transactions. Under this regulatory structure, fiduciary status and 
responsibilities are central to protecting the public interest in the 
integrity of retirement and other important benefits, many of which are 
tax-favored.
    In 1975, the Department issued regulations that significantly 
narrowed the breadth of the statutory definition of fiduciary 
investment advice by creating a five-part test that must, in each 
instance, be satisfied before a person can be treated as a fiduciary 
adviser. This regulatory definition applies to both ERISA and the Code. 
The Department created the five-part test in a very different context 
and investment advice marketplace. The 1975 regulation was adopted 
prior to the existence of participant-directed 401(k) plans, the 
widespread use of IRAs, and the now commonplace rollover of plan assets 
from ERISA-protected plans to IRAs. Today, as a result of the five-part 
test, many investment professionals, consultants, and advisers \1\ have 
no obligation to adhere to ERISA's fiduciary standards or to the 
prohibited transaction rules, despite the critical role they play in 
guiding plan and IRA investments. Under ERISA and the Code, if these 
advisers are not fiduciaries, they may operate with conflicts of 
interest that they need not disclose and have limited liability under 
federal pension law for any harms resulting from the advice they 
provide. Non-fiduciaries may give imprudent and disloyal advice; steer 
plans and IRA owners to investments based on their own, rather than 
their customers' financial interests; and act on conflicts of interest 
in ways that would be prohibited if the same persons were fiduciaries. 
In light of the breadth and intent of ERISA and the Code's statutory 
definition, the growth of participant-directed investment arrangements 
and IRAs, and the need for plans and IRA owners to seek out and rely on 
sophisticated financial advisers to make critical investment decisions 
in an increasingly complex financial marketplace, the Department 
believes it is appropriate to revisit its 1975 regulatory definition as 
well as the Code's virtually identical regulation. With this regulatory 
action, the Department will replace the 1975 regulations with a 
definition of fiduciary investment advice that better reflects the 
broad scope of the statutory text and its purposes and better protects 
plans, participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners from conflicts of 
interest, imprudence, and disloyalty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ By using the term ``adviser,'' the Department does not 
intend to refer only to investment advisers registered under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or under state law. For example, as 
used herein, an adviser can be an individual or entity who is, among 
other things, a representative of a registered investment adviser, a 
bank or similar financial institution, an insurance company, or a 
broker-dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has also sought to preserve beneficial business 
models for delivery of investment advice by separately publishing new 
exemptions from ERISA's prohibited transaction rules that would broadly 
permit firms to continue to receive many common types of fees, as long 
as they are willing to adhere to applicable standards aimed at ensuring 
that their advice is impartial and in the best interest of their 
customers. Rather than create a highly prescriptive set of transaction-
specific exemptions, the Department instead is publishing exemptions 
that flexibly accommodate a wide range of current types of compensation 
practices, while minimizing the harmful impact of conflicts of interest 
on the quality of advice.
    In particular, the Department is publishing a new exemption (the 
``Best Interest Contract Exemption'') that would provide conditional 
relief for common compensation, such as commissions and revenue 
sharing, that an adviser and the adviser's employing firm might receive 
in connection with

[[Page 20947]]

investment advice to retail retirement investors.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ For purposes of the exemption, retail investors generally 
include individual plan participants and beneficiaries, IRA owners, 
and plan fiduciaries not described in section 2510.3-21(c)(1)(i) of 
this rule (banks, insurance carriers, registered investment 
advisers, broker-dealers, or independent fiduciaries that hold, 
manage, or control $50 million or more).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to protect the interests of the plan participants and 
beneficiaries, IRA owners, and plan fiduciaries, the exemption requires 
the Financial Institution to acknowledge fiduciary status for itself 
and its Advisers. The Financial Institutions and Advisers must adhere 
to basic standards of impartial conduct. In particular, under this 
standards-based approach, the Adviser and Financial Institution must 
give prudent advice that is in the customer's best interest, avoid 
misleading statements, and receive no more than reasonable 
compensation. Additionally, Financial Institutions generally must adopt 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to mitigate any harmful 
impact of conflicts of interest, and disclose basic information about 
their conflicts of interest and the cost of their advice. Level Fee 
Fiduciaries that receive only a level fee in connection with advisory 
or investment management services are subject to more streamlined 
conditions, including a written statement of fiduciary status, 
compliance with the standards of impartial conduct, and, as applicable, 
documentation of the specific reason or reasons for the recommendation 
of the Level Fee arrangements.
    If advice is provided to an IRA investor or a non-ERISA plan, the 
Financial Institution must set forth the standards of fiduciary conduct 
and fair dealing in an enforceable contract with the investor. The 
contract creates a mechanism for IRA investors to enforce their rights 
and ensures that they will have a remedy for advice that does not honor 
their best interest. In this way, the contract gives both the 
individual adviser and the financial institution a powerful incentive 
to ensure advice is provided in accordance with fiduciary norms, or 
risk litigation, including class litigation, and liability and 
associated reputational risk.
    This principles-based approach aligns the adviser's interests with 
those of the plan participant or IRA owner, while leaving the 
individual adviser and employing firm with the flexibility and 
discretion necessary to determine how best to satisfy these basic 
standards in light of the unique attributes of their business. The 
Department is similarly publishing amendments to existing exemptions 
for a wide range of fiduciary advisers to ensure adherence to these 
basic standards of fiduciary conduct. In addition, the Department is 
publishing a new exemption for ``principal transactions'' in which 
advisers sell certain investments to plans and IRAs out of their own 
inventory, as well as an amendment to an existing exemption that would 
permit advisers to receive compensation for extending credit to plans 
or IRAs to avoid failed securities transactions.
    This broad regulatory package aims to require advisers and their 
firms to give advice that is in the best interest of their customers, 
without prohibiting common compensation arrangements by allowing such 
arrangements under conditions designed to ensure the adviser is acting 
in accordance with fiduciary norms and basic standards of fair dealing. 
The new exemptions and amendments to existing exemptions are published 
elsewhere in today's edition of the Federal Register.
    Some comments urged the Department to publish yet another proposal 
before moving to publish a final rule. As noted elsewhere, the proposal 
published in the Federal Register on April 20, 2015 (2015 Proposal) \3\ 
benefitted from comments received on an earlier proposal issued in 2010 
(2010 Proposal),\4\ and this final rule reflects the Department's 
careful consideration of the extensive comments received on the 2015 
Proposal. The Department believes that the changes it has made in 
response to those comments are consistent with reasonable expectations 
of the affected parties and, together with the prohibited transaction 
exemptions being finalized with this rule, strike an appropriate 
balance in addressing the need to modernize the fiduciary rule with the 
various stakeholder interests. As a result, the Department does not 
believe a third proposal and comment period is necessary. To the 
contrary, after careful consideration of the public comments and in 
light of the importance of the final rule's consumer protections and 
the significance of the continuing monetary harm to retirement 
investors without the rule's changes, the Department has determined 
that it is important for the final rule to become effective on the 
earliest possible date. Making the rule effective will provide 
certainty to plans, plan fiduciaries, plan participants and 
beneficiaries, IRAs, and IRA owners that the new protections afforded 
by the final rule are now officially part of the law and regulations 
governing their investment advice providers. Similarly, the financial 
services providers and other affected service providers will also have 
certainty that the rule is final and that will remove uncertainty as an 
obstacle to allocating capital and resources toward transition and 
longer term compliance adjustments to systems and business practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ 80 FR 21928 (Apr. 20, 2015).
    \4\ 75 FR 65263 (Oct. 22, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent the public comments were based on concerns about 
compliance and interpretive issues arising after publication of the 
final rule, the Department fully intends to support advisers, plan 
sponsors and fiduciaries, and other affected parties with extensive 
compliance assistance activities. The Department routinely provides 
such assistance following its issuance of highly technical or 
significant guidance. For example, the Department's compliance 
assistance Web page, at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/compliance_assistance.html, provides a variety of tools, including 
compliance guides, tips, and fact sheets, to assist parties in 
satisfying their ERISA obligations. Recently, the Department added 
broad assistance for regulated parties on the Affordable Care Act 
regulations, at www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/. The Department also 
intends to be accessible to affected parties who wish to contact the 
Department with individual questions about the final rule. For example, 
this final rule specifically provides directions on contacting the 
Department for further information about the final rule. See ``For 
Further Information Contact'' at the beginning of this Notice. Although 
the Department expects advisers and firms to make reasonable and good 
faith efforts to comply with the rule and applicable exemptions, the 
Department expects to initially emphasize these sorts of compliance 
assistance activities as opposed to using investigations and 
enforcement actions as a primary implementation tool as employee 
benefit plans, plan sponsors, plan fiduciaries, advisers, firms and 
other affected parties make the transition to the new regulatory 
regime.

B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Final Rule

    After careful consideration of the issues raised by the written 
comments and hearing testimony and the extensive public record, the 
Department is adopting the final rule contained herein.\5\ The final 
rule contains modifications to the 2015 Proposal to address comments 
seeking clarification

[[Page 20948]]

of certain provisions in the proposal and delineating the differences 
between the final rule's operation in the plan and IRA markets. The 
final rule amends the regulatory definition of fiduciary investment 
advice in 29 CFR 2510.3-21 (1975) to replace the restrictive five-part 
test with a new definition that better comports with the statutory 
language in ERISA and the Code.\6\ Similar to the proposal, the final 
rule first describes the kinds of communications that would constitute 
investment advice and then describes the types of relationships in 
which such communications give rise to fiduciary investment advice 
responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ ``Comments'' and ``commenters'' as used in this Notice 
generally include written comments, petitions and hearing testimony.
    \6\ For purposes of readability, this rulemaking republishes 29 
CFR 2510.3-21 in its entirety, as revised, rather than only the 
specific amendments to this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, paragraph (a)(1) of the final rule provides that 
person(s) render investment advice if they provide for a fee or other 
compensation, direct or indirect, certain categories or types of 
advice. The listed types of advice are--
     A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, 
holding, disposing of, or exchanging, securities or other investment 
property, or a recommendation as to how securities or other investment 
property should be invested after the securities or other investment 
property are rolled over, transferred, or distributed from the plan or 
IRA.
     A recommendation as to the management of securities or 
other investment property, including, among other things, 
recommendations on investment policies or strategies, portfolio 
composition, selection of other persons to provide investment advice or 
investment management services, selection of investment account 
arrangements (e.g., brokerage versus advisory); or recommendations with 
respect to rollovers, distributions, or transfers from a plan or IRA, 
including whether, in what amount, in what form, and to what 
destination such a rollover, transfer or distribution should be made.
    Paragraph (a)(2) establishes the types of relationships that must 
exist for such recommendations to give rise to fiduciary investment 
advice responsibilities. The rule covers: Recommendations by person(s) 
who represent or acknowledge that they are acting as a fiduciary within 
the meaning of the Act or the Code; advice rendered pursuant to a 
written or verbal agreement, arrangement, or understanding that the 
advice is based on the particular investment needs of the advice 
recipient; and recommendations directed to a specific advice recipient 
or recipients regarding the advisability of a particular investment or 
management decision with respect to securities or other investment 
property of the plan or IRA.
    Paragraph (b)(1) describes when a communication, based on its 
context, content, and presentation, would be viewed as a 
``recommendation,'' a fundamental element in establishing the existence 
of fiduciary investment advice. Paragraph (b)(1) provides that 
``recommendation'' means a communication that, based on its content, 
context, and presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion 
that the advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular 
course of action. The determination of whether a ``recommendation'' has 
been made is an objective rather than subjective inquiry. In addition, 
the more individually tailored the communication is to a specific 
advice recipient or recipients about, for example, a security, 
investment property, or investment strategy, the more likely the 
communication will be viewed as a recommendation. Providing a selective 
list of securities as appropriate for an advice recipient would be a 
recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring securities even if 
no recommendation is made with respect to any one security. 
Furthermore, a series of actions, directly or indirectly (e.g., through 
or together with any affiliate), that may not constitute 
recommendations when viewed individually may amount to a recommendation 
when considered in the aggregate. It also makes no difference whether 
the communication was initiated by a person or a computer software 
program.
    Paragraph (b)(2) sets forth non-exhaustive examples of certain 
types of communications which generally are not ``recommendations'' 
under that definition and, therefore, are not fiduciary communications. 
Although the proposal classified these examples as ``carve-outs'' from 
the scope of the fiduciary definition, they are better understood as 
specific examples of communications that are non-fiduciary because they 
fall short of constituting ``recommendations.'' The paragraph describes 
general communications and commentaries on investment products such as 
financial newsletters, which, with certain modifications, were 
identified as carve-outs under paragraph (b) of the 2015 Proposal, 
certain activities and communications in connection with marketing or 
making available a platform of investment alternatives that a plan 
fiduciary could choose from, and the provision of information and 
materials that constitute investment education or retirement education. 
With respect to investment education in particular, the final rule 
expressly describes in detail four broad categories of non-fiduciary 
educational information and materials, including (A) plan information, 
(B) general financial, investment, and retirement information, (C) 
asset allocation models, and (D) interactive investment materials. 
Additionally, in response to comments on the proposal, the final rule 
allows educational asset allocation models and interactive investment 
materials provided to participants and beneficiaries in plans to 
reference specific investment alternatives under conditions designed to 
ensure the communications are presented as hypothetical examples that 
help participants and beneficiaries understand the educational 
information and not as investment recommendations. The rule does not, 
however, create such a broad safe harbor from fiduciary status for such 
``hypothetical'' examples in the IRA context for reasons described 
below.
    Paragraph (c) describes and clarifies conduct and activities that 
the Department determined should not be considered investment advice 
activity, even if the communications meet the regulation's definition 
of ``recommendation'' and satisfy the criteria established by paragraph 
(a). As noted in the proposal, the regulation's general definition of 
investment advice, like the statute, sweeps broadly, avoiding the 
weaknesses of the 1975 regulation. At the same time, however, as the 
Department acknowledged in the proposal, the broad test could sweep in 
some relationships that are not appropriately regarded as fiduciary in 
nature and that the Department does not believe Congress intended to 
cover as fiduciary relationships. Thus, included in paragraph (c) is a 
revised version of the ``counterparty'' carve-out from the proposal 
that excludes from fiduciary investment advice communications in arm's 
length transactions with certain plan fiduciaries who are licensed 
financial professionals (broker-dealers, registered investment 
advisers, banks, insurance companies, etc.) or plan fiduciaries who 
have at least $50 million under management. Other exclusions in the 
final rule include a revised version of the swap transaction carve-out 
in the proposal, and an expanded version of the carve-out in the 
proposal for plan sponsor employees.
    Because the proposal referred to all of the instances of non-
fiduciary communications set forth in (b)(2) and

[[Page 20949]]

(c) as ``carve-outs,'' regardless of whether the communications would 
have involved covered recommendations even in the absence of a carve-
out, a number of commenters found the use of the term confusing. In 
particular, they worried that the provisions could be read to create an 
implication that any communication that did not technically meet the 
conditions of a specific carve-out would automatically meet the 
definition of investment advice. This was not the Department's 
intention, however, and the Department no longer uses the term ``carve-
out'' in the final regulation. Even if a particular communication does 
not fall within any of the examples and exclusions set forth in (b)(2) 
and (c), it will be treated as a fiduciary communication only if it is 
an investment ``recommendation'' of the sort described in paragraphs 
(a) and (b)(1). All of the provisions in paragraphs (b) and (c) 
continue to be subject to conditions designed to draw an appropriate 
line between fiduciary and non-fiduciary communications and activities, 
consistent with the statutory text and purpose.
    Except for minor clarifying changes, paragraph (d)'s description of 
the scope of the investment advice fiduciary duty, and paragraph (e) 
regarding the mere execution of a securities transaction at the 
direction of a plan or IRA owner, remained mostly unchanged from the 
1975 regulation. Paragraph (f) also remains unchanged from the two 
prior proposals and articulates the application of the final rule to 
the parallel definitions in the prohibited transaction provisions of 
Code section 4975. Paragraph (g) includes definitions. Paragraph (h) 
describes the effective and applicability dates associated with the 
final rule, and paragraph (i) includes an express provision 
acknowledging the savings clause in ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) for 
state insurance, banking, or securities laws.
    In the Department's view, this structure is faithful to the 
remedial purpose of the statute, but avoids burdening activities that 
do not implicate relationships of trust.
    As noted elsewhere, in addition to the final rule in this Notice, 
the Department is simultaneously publishing a new Best Interest 
Contract Exemption and a new Exemption for Principal Transactions, and 
revising other exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules of 
ERISA and the Code.

C. Benefit-Cost Assessment

    Tax-preferred retirement savings, in the form of private-sector, 
employer-sponsored retirement plans, such as 401(k) plans, and IRAs, 
are critical to the retirement security of most U.S. workers. 
Investment professionals play an important role in guiding their 
investment decisions. However, these professional advisers often are 
compensated in ways that create conflicts of interest, which can bias 
the investment advice that some render and erode plan and IRA 
investment results.
    Since the Department issued its 1975 rule, the retirement savings 
market has changed profoundly. Individuals, rather than large 
employers, are increasingly responsible for their investment decisions 
as IRAs and 401(k)-type defined contribution plans have supplanted 
defined benefit pensions as the primary means of providing retirement 
security. Financial products are increasingly varied and complex. 
Retail investors now confront myriad choices of how and where to 
invest, many of which did not exist or were uncommon in 1975. These 
include, for example, market-tracking, passively managed and so-called 
``target-date'' mutual funds; exchange traded funds (ETFs) (which may 
be leveraged to multiply market exposure); hedge funds; private equity 
funds; real estate investment trusts (both traded and non-traded); 
various structured debt instruments; insurance products that offer 
menus of direct or formulaic market exposures and guarantees from which 
consumers can choose; and an extensive array of derivatives and other 
alternative investments. These choices vary widely with respect to 
return potential, risk characteristics, liquidity, degree of 
diversification, contractual guarantees and/or restrictions, degree of 
transparency, regulatory oversight, and available consumer protections. 
Many of these products are marketed directly to retail investors via 
email, Web site pop-ups, mail, and telephone. All of this creates the 
opportunity for retail investors to construct and pursue financial 
strategies closely tailored to their unique circumstances--but also 
sows confusion and increases the potential for very costly mistakes.
    Plan participants and IRA owners often lack investment expertise 
and must rely on experts--but are unable to assess the quality of the 
expert's advice or guard against conflicts of interest. Most have no 
idea how advisers are compensated for selling them products. Many are 
bewildered by complex choices that require substantial financial 
expertise and welcome advice that appears to be free, without knowing 
that the adviser is compensated through indirect third-party payments 
creating conflicts of interest or that opaque fees over the life of the 
investment will reduce their returns. The consequences are growing as 
baby boomers retire and move money from plans, where their employer has 
both the incentive and the fiduciary duty to facilitate sound 
investment choices, to IRAs, where both good and bad investment choices 
are more numerous and much advice is conflicted. These rollovers are 
expected to approach $2.4 trillion cumulatively from 2016 through 
2020.\7\ Because advice on rollovers is usually one-time and not ``on a 
regular basis,'' it is often not covered by the 1975 standard, even 
though rollovers commonly involve the most important financial 
decisions that investors make in their lifetime. An ERISA plan investor 
who rolls her retirement savings into an IRA could lose 6 to 12 and 
possibly as much as 23 percent of the value of her savings over 30 
years of retirement by accepting advice from a conflicted financial 
adviser.\8\ Timely regulatory action to redress advisers' conflicts is 
warranted to avert such losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Cerulli Associates, ``Retirement Markets 2015.''
    \8\ For example, an ERISA plan investor who rolls $200,000 into 
an IRA, earns a 6 percent nominal rate of return with 2.3 percent 
inflation, and aims to spend down her savings in 30 years, would be 
able to consume $11,034 per year for the 30-year period. A similar 
investor whose assets underperform by 0.5, 1, or 2 percentage points 
per year would only be able to consume $10,359, $9,705, or $8,466, 
respectively, in each of the 30 years. The 0.5 and 1 percentage 
point figures represent estimates of the underperformance of retail 
mutual funds sold by potentially conflicted brokers. These figures 
are based on a large body of literature cited in the 2015 NPRM 
Regulatory Impact Analysis, comments on the 2015 NPRM Regulatory 
Impact Analysis, and testimony at the DOL hearing on conflicts of 
interest in investment advice in August 2015. The 2 percentage point 
figure illustrates a scenario for an individual where the impact of 
conflicts of interest is more severe than average. For details, see 
U.S. Department of Labor, Fiduciary Investment Advice Regulatory 
Impact Analysis, (2016), Section 3.2.4 at www.dol.gov/ebsa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the retail IRA marketplace, growing consumer demand for 
personalized advice, together with competition from online discount 
brokerage firms, has pushed brokers to offer more comprehensive 
guidance services rather than just transaction support. Unfortunately, 
their traditional compensation sources--such as brokerage commissions, 
revenue shared by mutual funds and funds' asset managers, and mark-ups 
on bonds sold from their own inventory--can introduce acute conflicts 
of interest. What is presented to an IRA owner as trusted advice is 
often paid for by a financial product vendor in the form of a sales 
commission or shelf-space fee, without adequate counter-balancing 
consumer protections to ensure that the advice is in the investor's 
best interest.

[[Page 20950]]

Likewise in the plan market, pension consultants and advisers that plan 
sponsors rely on to guide their decisions often avoid fiduciary status 
under the five-part test in the 1975 regulation, while receiving 
conflicted payments. Many advisers do put their customers' best 
interest first and there are many good practices in the industry. But 
the balance of research and evidence indicates the aggregate harm from 
the cases in which consumers receive bad advice based on conflicts of 
interest is large.
    As part of the 2015 Proposal, the Department conducted an in-depth 
economic assessment of current market conditions and the likely effects 
of reform and conducted and published a detailed regulatory impact 
analysis, U.S. Department of Labor, Fiduciary Investment Advice 
Regulatory Impact Analysis, (Apr. 2015), pursuant to Executive Order 
12866 and other applicable authorities. That analysis examined a broad 
range of evidence, including public comments on the 2010 Proposal; a 
growing body of empirical, peer-reviewed, academic research into the 
effect of conflicts of interest in advisory relationships; a recent 
study conducted by the Council of Economic Advisers, The Effects of 
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings (Feb. 2015), at 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf; 
and some other countries' early experience with related reform efforts, 
among other sources. Taken together, the evidence demonstrated that 
advisory conflicts are costly to retail and plan investors.
    The Department's regulatory impact analysis of its final rulemaking 
finds that conflicted advice is widespread, causing serious harm to 
plan and IRA investors, and that disclosing conflicts alone would fail 
to adequately mitigate the conflicts or remedy the harm. By extending 
fiduciary status to more advice and providing flexible and protective 
PTEs that apply to a broad array of compensation arrangements, the 
final rule and exemptions will mitigate conflicts, support consumer 
choice, and deliver substantial gains for retirement investors and 
economic benefits that more than justify its costs.
    Advisers' conflicts of interest take a variety of forms and can 
bias their advice in a variety of ways. For example, advisers and their 
affiliates often profit more when investors select some mutual funds or 
insurance products rather than others, or engage in larger or more 
frequent transactions. Advisers can capture varying price spreads from 
principal transactions and product providers reap different amounts of 
revenue from the sale of different proprietary products. Adviser 
compensation arrangements, which often are calibrated to align their 
interests with those of their affiliates and product suppliers, often 
introduce serious conflicts of interest between advisers and retirement 
investors. Advisers often are paid substantially more if they recommend 
investments and transactions that are highly profitable to the 
financial industry, even if they are not in investors' best interests. 
These financial incentives sometimes bias the advisers' 
recommendations. Many advisers do not provide biased advice, but the 
harm to investors from those that do can be large in many instances and 
is large on aggregate.
    Following such biased advice can inflict losses on investors in 
several ways. They may choose more expensive and/or poorer performing 
investments. They may trade too much and thereby incur excessive 
transaction costs. They may chase returns and incur more costly timing 
errors, which are a common consequence of chasing returns.
    A wide body of economic evidence supports the Department's finding 
that the impact of these conflicts of interest on retirement investment 
outcomes is large and negative. The supporting evidence includes, among 
other things, statistical comparisons of investment performance in more 
and less conflicted investment channels, experimental and audit 
studies, government reports documenting abuse, and economic theory on 
the dangers posed by conflicts of interest and by the asymmetries of 
information and expertise that characterize interactions between 
ordinary retirement investors and conflicted advisers. In addition, the 
Department conducted its own analysis of mutual fund performance across 
investment channels and within variable annuity sub-accounts, producing 
results broadly consistent with the academic literature.
    A careful review of the evidence, which consistently points to a 
substantial failure of the market for retirement advice, suggests that 
IRA holders receiving conflicted investment advice can expect their 
investments to underperform by an average of 50 to 100 basis points per 
year over the next 20 years. The underperformance associated with 
conflicts of interest--in the mutual funds segment alone--could cost 
IRA investors between $95 billion and $189 billion over the next 10 
years and between $202 billion and $404 billion over the next 20 years.
    While these expected losses are large, they represent only a 
portion of what retirement investors stand to lose as a result of 
adviser conflicts. The losses quantified immediately above pertain only 
to IRA investors' mutual fund investments, and with respect to these 
investments, reflect only one of multiple types of losses that 
conflicted advice produces. The estimate does not reflect expected 
losses from so-called timing errors, wherein investors invest and 
divest at inopportune times and underperform pure buy-and-hold 
strategies. Such errors can be especially costly. Good advice can help 
investors avoid such errors, for example, by reducing panic-selling 
during large and abrupt downturns. But conflicted advisers often profit 
when investors choose actively managed funds whose deviation from 
market results (i.e., positive and negative ``alpha'') can magnify 
investors' natural tendency to trade more and ``chase returns,'' an 
activity that tends to produce serious timing errors. There is some 
evidence that adviser conflicts do in fact magnify timing errors.
    The quantified losses also omit losses that adviser conflicts 
produce in connection with IRA investments other than mutual funds. 
Many other products, including various annuity products, among others, 
involve similar or larger adviser conflicts, and these conflicts are 
often equally or more opaque. Many of these same products exhibit 
similar or greater degrees of complexity, magnifying both investors' 
need for good advice and their vulnerability to biased advice. As with 
mutual funds, advisers may steer investors to products that are 
inferior to, or costlier than, similar available products, or to 
excessively complex or costly product types when simpler, more 
affordable product types would be appropriate. Finally, the quantified 
losses reflect only those suffered by retail IRA investors and not 
those incurred by plan investors, when there is evidence that the 
latter suffer losses as well. Data limitations impede quantification of 
all of these losses, but there is ample qualitative and in some cases 
empirical evidence that they occur and are large both in instance and 
on aggregate.
    Disclosure alone has proven ineffective to mitigate conflicts in 
advice. Extensive research has demonstrated that most investors have 
little understanding of their advisers' conflicts of interest, and 
little awareness of what they are paying via indirect channels for the 
conflicted advice. Even if they understand the scope of the advisers' 
conflicts, many consumers are not financial experts and therefore, 
cannot distinguish good advice or

[[Page 20951]]

investments from bad. The same gap in expertise that makes investment 
advice necessary and important frequently also prevents investors from 
recognizing bad advice or understanding advisers' disclosures. Some 
research suggests that even if disclosure about conflicts could be made 
simple and clear, it could be ineffective--or even harmful.
    This final rule and exemptions aim to ensure that advice is in 
consumers' best interest, thereby rooting out excessive fees and 
substandard performance otherwise attributable to advisers' conflicts, 
producing gains for retirement investors. Delivering these gains will 
entail some compliance costs,--mostly, the cost incurred by new 
fiduciary advisers to avoid prohibited transactions and/or satisfy 
relevant PTE conditions--but the Department has attempted to minimize 
compliance costs while maintaining an enforceable best interest 
standard.
    The Department expects compliance with the final rule and 
exemptions to deliver large gains for retirement investors by reducing, 
over time, the losses identified above. Because of data limitations, as 
with the losses themselves, only a portion of the expected gains are 
quantified in this analysis. The Department's quantitative estimate of 
investor gains from the final rule and exemptions takes into account 
only one type of adviser conflict: the conflict that arises from 
variation in the share of front-end loads that advisers receive when 
selling different mutual funds that charge such loads to IRA investors. 
Published research provides evidence that this conflict erodes 
investors' returns. The Department estimates that the final rule and 
exemptions, by mitigating this particular type of adviser conflict, 
will produce gains to IRA investors worth between $33 billion and $36 
billion over 10 years and between $66 and $76 billion over 20 years.
    These quantified potential gains do not include additional 
potentially large, expected gains to IRA investors resulting from 
reducing or eliminating the effects of conflicts in IRA advice on 
financial products other than front-end-load mutual funds or the effect 
of conflicts on advice to plan investors on any financial products. 
Moreover, in addition to mitigating adviser conflicts, the final rule 
and exemptions raise adviser conduct standards, potentially yielding 
additional gains for both IRA and plan investors. The total gains to 
retirement investors thus are likely to be substantially larger than 
these particular, quantified gains alone.
    The final exemptions include strong protections calibrated to 
ensure that adviser conflicts are fully mitigated such that advice is 
impartial. If, however, advisers' impartiality is sometimes 
compromised, gains to retirement investors consequently will be reduced 
correspondingly.
    The Department estimates that the cost to comply with the final 
rule and exemptions will be between $10.0 billion and $31.5 billion 
over 10 years with a primary estimate of $16.1 billion, mostly 
reflecting the cost incurred by affected fiduciary advisers to satisfy 
relevant consumer-protective PTE conditions. Costs generally are 
estimated to be front-loaded, reflecting a substantial amount of one-
time, start-up costs. The Department's primary 10-year cost estimate of 
$16.1 billion reflects the present value of $5.0 billion in first-year 
costs and $1.5 billion in subsequent annual costs. These estimates 
account for start-up costs in the first year following the final 
regulation's and exemptions' initial applicability. The Department 
understands that in practice some portion of these start-up costs may 
be incurred in advance of or after that year. These cost estimates may 
be overstated insofar as they generally do not take into account 
potential cost savings from technological innovations and market 
adjustments that favor lower-cost models. They may be understated 
insofar as they do not account for frictions that may be associated 
with such innovations and adjustments.
    Just as with IRAs, there is evidence that conflicts of interest in 
the investment advice market also erode the retirement savings of plan 
participants and beneficiaries. For example, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that defined benefit pension plans 
using consultants with undisclosed conflicts of interest earned 1.3 
percentage points per year less than other plans. Other GAO reports 
have found that adviser conflicts may cause plan participants to roll 
plan assets into IRAs that charge high fees or 401(k) plan officials to 
include expensive or underperforming funds in investment menus. A 
number of academic studies find that 401(k) plan investment options 
underperform the market, and at least one study attributes such 
underperformance to excessive reliance on funds that are proprietary to 
plan service providers who may be providing investment advice to plan 
officials that choose the investment options.
    The final rule and exemptions' positive effects are expected to 
extend well beyond improved investment results for retirement 
investors. The IRA and plan markets for fiduciary advice and other 
services may become more efficient as a result of more transparent 
pricing and greater certainty about the fiduciary status of advisers 
and about the impartiality of their advice. There may be benefits from 
the increased flexibility that the final rule and related exemptions 
will provide with respect to fiduciary investment advice currently 
falling within the ambit of the 1975 regulation. The final rule's 
defined boundaries between fiduciary advice, education, and sales 
activity directed at independent fiduciaries with financial expertise 
may bring greater clarity to the IRA and plan services markets. 
Innovation in new advice business models, including technology-driven 
models, may be accelerated, and nudged away from conflicts and toward 
transparency, thereby promoting healthy competition in the fiduciary 
advice market.
    A major expected positive effect of the final rule and exemptions 
in the plan advice market is improved compliance and the associated 
improved security of ERISA plan assets and benefits. Clarity about 
advisers' fiduciary status will strengthen the Department's ability to 
quickly and fully correct ERISA violations, while strengthening 
deterrence.
    A large part of retirement investors' gains from the final rule and 
exemptions represents improvements in overall social welfare, as some 
resources heretofore consumed inefficiently in the provision of 
financial products and services are freed for more valuable uses. The 
remainder of the projected gains reflects transfers of existing 
economic surplus to retirement investors, primarily from the financial 
industry. Both the social welfare gains and the distributional effects 
can promote retirement security, and the distributional effects more 
fairly allocate a larger portion of the returns on retirement 
investors' capital to the investors themselves. Because quantified and 
additional unquantified investor gains from the final rule and 
exemptions comprise both welfare gains and transfers, they cannot be 
netted against estimated compliance costs to produce an estimate of net 
social welfare gains. Rather, in this case, the Department concludes 
that the final rule and exemptions' positive social welfare and 
distributional effects together justify their cost.
    A number of comments on the Department's 2015 Proposal, including 
those from consumer advocates, some independent researchers, and some 
independent financial advisers, largely endorsed its accompanying 
impact analysis, affirming that adviser conflicts cause avoidable harm 
and that the

[[Page 20952]]

proposal would deliver gains for retirement investors that more than 
justify compliance costs, with minimal or no unintended adverse 
consequences. In contrast, many other comments, including those from 
most of the financial industry (generally excepting only comments from 
independent financial advisers), strongly criticized the Department's 
analysis and conclusions. These comments collectively argued that the 
Department's evidence was weak, that its estimates of conflicts' 
negative effects and the proposal's benefits were overstated, that its 
compliance cost estimates were understated, and that it failed to 
anticipate predictable adverse consequences including increases in the 
cost of advice and reductions in its availability to small investors, 
which the commenters said would depress saving and exacerbate rather 
than reduce investment mistakes. Some of these comments took the form 
of or were accompanied by research reports that collectively offered 
direct, sometimes technical critiques of the Department's analysis, or 
presented new data and analysis that challenged the Department's 
conclusions. The Department took these comments into account in 
developing this analysis of its final rule and exemptions. Many of 
these comments were grounded in practical operational concerns which 
the Department believes it has alleviated through revisions to the 2015 
Proposal reflected in this final rule and exemptions. At the same time, 
however, many of the reports suffered from analytic weaknesses that 
undermined the credibility of some of their conclusions.
    Many comments anticipating sharp increases in the cost of advice 
neglected the costs currently attributable to conflicted advice 
including, for example, indirect fees. Many exaggerated the negative 
impacts (and neglected the positive impacts) of recent overseas reforms 
and/or the similarity of such reforms to the 2015 Proposal. Many 
implicitly and without support assumed rigidity in existing business 
models, service levels, compensation structures, and/or pricing levels, 
neglecting the demonstrated existence of low-cost solutions and 
potential for investor-friendly market adjustments. Many that predicted 
that only wealthier investors would be served appeared to neglect the 
possibility that once the fixed costs of serving wealthier investors 
was defrayed, only the relatively small marginal cost of serving 
smaller investors would remain for affected firms to bear in order to 
serve these consumers.
    The Department expects that, subject to some short-term frictions 
as markets adjust, investment advice will continue to be readily 
available when the final rule and exemptions are applicable, owing to 
both flexibilities built into the final rule and exemptions and to the 
conditions and dynamics currently evident in relevant markets, 
Moreover, recent experience in the United Kingdom suggests that 
potential gaps in markets for financial advice are driven mostly by 
factors independent of reforms to mitigate adviser conflicts. 
Commenters' conclusions that stem from an assumption that advice will 
be unavailable therefore are of limited relevance to this analysis. 
Nonetheless, the Department notes that these commenters' claims about 
the consequences of the rule would still be overstated even if the 
availability of advice were to decrease. Many commenters arguing that 
costlier advice will compromise saving exaggerated their case by 
presenting mere correlation (wealth and advisory services are found 
together) as evidence that advice causes large increases in saving. 
Some wrongly implied that earlier Department estimates of the potential 
for fiduciary advice to reduce retirement investment errors--when 
accompanied by very strong anti-conflict consumer protections--
constituted an acknowledgement that conflicted advice yields large net 
benefits.
    The negative comments that offered their own original analysis, and 
whose conclusions contradicted the Department's, also are generally 
unpersuasive on balance in the context of this present analysis. For 
example, these comments collectively neglected important factors such 
as indirect fees, made comparisons without adjusting for risk, relied 
on data that are likely to be unrepresentative, failed to distinguish 
conflicted from independent advice, and/or presented as evidence median 
results when the problems targeted by the 2015 Proposal and the 
proposal's expected benefits are likely to be concentrated on one side 
of the distribution's median.
    In light of the Department's analysis, its careful consideration of 
the comments, and responsive revisions made to the 2015 Proposal, the 
Department stands by its analysis and conclusions that adviser 
conflicts are inflicting large, avoidable losses on retirement 
investors, that appropriate, strong reforms are necessary, and that 
compliance with this final rule and exemptions can be expected to 
deliver large net gains to retirement investors. The Department does 
not anticipate the substantial, long-term unintended consequences 
predicted in the negative comments.
    In conclusion, the Department's analysis indicates that the final 
rule and exemptions will mitigate adviser conflicts and thereby improve 
plan and IRA investment results, while avoiding greater than necessary 
disruption of existing business practices. The final rule and 
exemptions will deliver large gains to retirement investors, reflecting 
a combination of improvements in economic efficiency and worthwhile 
transfers to retirement investors from the financial industry, and a 
variety of other economic benefits, which, in the Department's view, 
will more than justify its costs.
    The following accounting table summarizes the Department's 
conclusions:

                                        Table I--Partial Gains to Investors and Compliance Costs Accounting Table
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Primary                                                      Discount rate
                 Category                      estimate      Low estimate    High estimate    Year dollar         (%)              Period covered
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Partial Gains to Investors (Includes Benefits and Transfers)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized................................          $3,420          $3,105  ..............            2016               7  April 2017-April 2027.
Monetized ($millions/year)................           4,203           3,814  ..............            2016               3  April 2017-April 2027.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20953]]

 
Gains to Investors Notes: The DOL expects the final rulemaking to deliver large gains for retirement investors. Because of limitations of the literature
 and other available evidence, only some of these gains can be quantified: up to $3.1 or $3.4 billion (annualized over Apr. 2017-Apr. 2027 with a 7
 percent discount rate) or up to $3.8 or $4.2 billion (annualized over Apr. 2017-Apr. 2027 with a 3 percent discount rate). These estimates focus only
 on how load shares paid to brokers affect the size of loads IRA investors holding load funds pay and the returns they achieve. These estimates assume
 the rule will eliminate (rather than just reduce) underperformance associated with the practice of incentivizing broker recommendations through
 variable front-end-load sharing. If, however, the rule's effectiveness in reducing underperformance is substantially below 100 percent, these estimates
 may overstate these particular gains to investors in the front-end-load mutual fund segment of the IRA market. However, these estimates account for
 only a fraction of potential conflicts, associated losses, and affected retirement assets. The total gains to IRA investors attributable to the rule
 may be higher than the quantified gains alone for several reasons. For example, the proposal is expected to yield additional gains for IRA investors,
 including potential reductions in excessive trading and associated transaction costs and timing errors (such as might be associated with return
 chasing), improvements in the performance of IRA investments other than front-load mutual funds, and improvements in the performance of ERISA plan
 investments.
The partial-gains-to-investors estimates include both economic efficiency benefits and transfers from the financial services industry to IRA holders.
The partial gains estimates are discounted to April 2016.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Compliance Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized................................          $1,960          $1,205          $3,847            2016               7  April 2017-April 2027.
Monetized ($millions/year)................           1,893           1,172           3,692            2016               3  April 2017-April 2027.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: The compliance costs of the final include the cost to BDs, Registered Investment Advisers, insurers, and other ERISA plan service providers for
 compliance reviews, comprehensive compliance and supervisory system changes, policies and procedures and training programs updates, insurance
 increases, disclosure preparation and distribution to comply with exemptions, and some costs of changes in other business practices. Compliance costs
 incurred by mutual funds or other asset providers have not been estimated.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Insurance Premium Transfers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized................................             $73  ..............  ..............            2016               7  April 2017-April 2027.
Monetized ($millions/year)................              73  ..............  ..............            2016               3  April 2017-April 2027.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From/To...................................      From: Insured service providers without
                                                                claims.
                                              To: Insured service providers with claims--
                                                funded from a portion of the increased
                                                          insurance premiums.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. RULEMAKING BACKGROUND

A. The Statute and Existing Regulation

    ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to protect the rights and 
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries, the integrity of 
employee benefit plans, and the security of retirement, health, and 
other critical benefits. The broad public interest in ERISA-covered 
plans is reflected in the Act's imposition of stringent fiduciary 
responsibilities on parties engaging in important plan activities, as 
well as in the tax-favored status of plan assets and investments. One 
of the chief ways in which ERISA protects employee benefit plans is by 
requiring that plan fiduciaries comply with fundamental obligations 
rooted in the law of trusts. In particular, plan fiduciaries must 
manage plan assets prudently and with undivided loyalty to the plans, 
their participants, and beneficiaries.\9\ In addition, they must 
refrain from engaging in ``prohibited transactions,'' which the Act 
does not permit, absent an applicable statutory or administrative 
exemption, because of the dangers posed by the transactions that 
involve significant conflicts of interest.\10\ Prohibited transactions 
include sales and exchanges between plans and parties with certain 
connections to the plan such as fiduciaries, other service providers, 
and employers of the plan's participants. They also specifically 
include self-dealing and other conflicted transactions involving plan 
fiduciaries. ERISA includes various exemptions from these provisions 
for certain types of transactions, and administrative exemptions on an 
individual or class basis may be granted if the Department finds the 
exemption to be in the interests of plan participants, protective of 
their rights, and administratively feasible.\11\ When fiduciaries 
violate ERISA's fiduciary duties or the prohibited transaction rules, 
they may be held personally liable for any losses to the investor 
resulting from the breach.\12\ Violations of the prohibited transaction 
rules are subject to excise taxes under the Code or civil penalties 
under ERISA.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ ERISA section 404(a).
    \10\ ERISA section 406 and Code section 4975.
    \11\ ERISA section 408 and Code section 4975.
    \12\ ERISA section 409; see also ERISA section 405.
    \13\ Code section 4975 and ERISA section 502(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Code also protects individuals who save for retirement through 
tax-favored accounts that are not generally covered by ERISA, such as 
IRAs, through a more limited regulation of fiduciary conduct. Although 
ERISA's statutory fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty do not 
govern the fiduciaries of IRAs and other plans not covered by ERISA, 
these fiduciaries are subject to prohibited transaction rules under the 
Code. The statutory exemptions in the Code apply and the Department of 
Labor has been given the statutory authority to grant administrative 
exemptions under the Code.\14\ In this context, however, the sole 
statutory sanction for engaging in the illegal transactions is the 
assessment of an excise tax enforced by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). Thus, unlike participants in plans covered by Title I of ERISA, 
IRA owners do not have a statutory right to bring suit against

[[Page 20954]]

fiduciaries under ERISA for violation of the prohibited transaction 
rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Under Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 1, 
92 Stat. 3790, the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
issue regulations, rulings, opinions, and exemptions under section 
4975 of the Code has been transferred, with certain exceptions not 
here relevant, to the Secretary of Labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under this statutory framework, the determination of who is a 
``fiduciary'' is of central importance. Many of ERISA's and the Code's 
protections, duties, and liabilities hinge on fiduciary status. In 
relevant part, section 3(21)(A) of ERISA provides that a person is a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent he or she (i) exercises 
any discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to 
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control with 
respect to management or disposition of its assets; (ii) renders 
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, 
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any 
authority or responsibility to do so; or, (iii) has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such 
plan. Section 4975(e)(3) of the Code identically defines ``fiduciary'' 
for purposes of the prohibited transaction rules set forth in Code 
section 4975.
    The statutory definition contained in section 3(21)(A) of ERISA 
deliberately casts a wide net in assigning fiduciary responsibility 
with respect to plan assets. Thus, ``any authority or control'' over 
plan assets is sufficient to confer fiduciary status, and any person 
who renders ``investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct 
or indirect'' is an investment advice fiduciary, regardless of whether 
they have direct control over the plan's assets, and regardless of 
their status as an investment adviser or broker under the federal 
securities laws. The statutory definition and associated fiduciary 
responsibilities were enacted to ensure that plans can depend on 
persons who provide investment advice for a fee to make recommendations 
that are prudent, loyal, and untainted by conflicts of interest. In the 
absence of fiduciary status, persons who provide investment advice 
would neither be subject to ERISA's fundamental fiduciary standards, 
nor accountable under ERISA or the Code for imprudent, disloyal, or 
tainted advice, no matter how egregious the misconduct or how 
substantial the losses. Plans, individual participants and 
beneficiaries, and IRA owners often are not financial experts and 
consequently must rely on professional advice to make critical 
investment decisions. The broad statutory definition, prohibitions on 
conflicts of interest, and core fiduciary obligations of prudence and 
loyalty all reflect Congress' recognition in 1974 of the fundamental 
importance of such advice to protect savers' retirement nest eggs. In 
the years since then, the significance of financial advice has become 
still greater with increased reliance on participant-directed plans and 
self-directed IRAs for the provision of retirement benefits.
    In 1975, the Department issued a regulation, at 29 CFR 2510.3-
21(c), defining the circumstances under which a person is treated as 
providing ``investment advice'' to an employee benefit plan within the 
meaning of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA (the ``1975 regulation''), and 
the Department of the Treasury issued a virtually identical regulation 
under the Code.\15\ The regulation narrowed the scope of the statutory 
definition of fiduciary investment advice by creating a five-part test 
that must be satisfied before a person can be treated as rendering 
investment advice for a fee. Under the regulation, for advice to 
constitute ``investment advice,'' an adviser who is not a fiduciary 
under another provision of the statute must--(1) render advice as to 
the value of securities or other property, or make recommendations as 
to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities 
or other property (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding with the plan or a plan 
fiduciary that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for 
investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that (5) the 
advice will be individualized based on the particular needs of the plan 
or IRA. The regulation provides that an adviser is a fiduciary with 
respect to any particular instance of advice only if he or she meets 
each and every element of the five-part test with respect to the 
particular advice recipient or plan at issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The 1975 regulation provides in relevant part:
    (c) Investment advice. (1) A person shall be deemed to be 
rendering ``investment advice'' to an employee benefit plan, within 
the meaning of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act) and this paragraph, only if:
    (i) Such person renders advice to the plan as to the value of 
securities or other property, or makes recommendation as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or 
other property; and
    (ii) Such person either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or 
together with any affiliate)--
    (A) Has discretionary authority or control, whether or not 
pursuant to agreement, arrangement or understanding, with respect to 
purchasing or selling securities or other property for the plan; or
    (B) Renders any advice described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
section on a regular basis to the plan pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement or understanding, written or otherwise, 
between such person and the plan or a fiduciary with respect to the 
plan, that such services will serve as a primary basis for 
investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that such 
person will render individualized investment advice to the plan 
based on the particular needs of the plan regarding such matters as, 
among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall 
portfolio composition, or diversification of plan investments.
    40 FR 50842 (Oct. 31, 1975). The Department of the Treasury 
issued a virtually identical regulation, at 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c), 
which interprets Code section 4975(e)(3). 40 FR 50840 (Oct. 31, 
1975). Under section 102 of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, the 
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to interpret section 4975 
of the Code has been transferred, with certain exceptions not here 
relevant, to the Secretary of Labor. References in this document to 
sections of ERISA should be read to refer also to the corresponding 
sections of the Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The market for retirement advice has changed dramatically since the 
Department promulgated the 1975 regulation. Perhaps the greatest change 
is the fact that individuals, rather than large employers and 
professional money managers, have become increasingly responsible for 
managing retirement assets as IRAs and participant-directed plans, such 
as 401(k) plans, have supplanted defined benefit pensions. In 1975, 
private-sector defined benefit pensions--mostly large, professionally 
managed funds--covered over 27 million active participants and held 
assets totaling almost $186 billion. This compared with just 11 million 
active participants in individual account defined contribution plans 
with assets of just $74 billion.\16\ Moreover, the great majority of 
defined contribution plans at that time were professionally managed, 
not participant-directed. In 1975, 401(k) plans did not yet exist and 
IRAs had just been authorized as part of ERISA's enactment the prior 
year. In contrast, by 2013 defined benefit plans covered just over 15 
million active participants, while individual account-based defined 
contribution plans covered nearly 77 million active participants--
including about 63 million active participants in 401(k)-type plans 
that are at least partially participant-directed.\17\ By 2013, 97 
percent of 401(k) participants were responsible for directing the 
investment of all or part of their own account, up from 86 percent as 
recently as 1999.\18\ Also, in mid-2015, more than 40 million 
households owned IRAs.\19\ At the same time, the variety and complexity 
of financial products have increased, widening the information gap 
between advisers and their clients. Plan

[[Page 20955]]

fiduciaries, plan participants, and IRA investors must often rely on 
experts for advice, but are often unable to assess the quality of the 
expert's advice or effectively guard against the adviser's conflicts of 
interest. This challenge is especially true of small retail investors 
who typically do not have financial expertise and can ill-afford lower 
returns to their retirement savings caused by conflicts. As baby 
boomers retire, they are increasingly moving money from ERISA-covered 
plans, where their employer has both the incentive and the fiduciary 
duty to facilitate sound investment choices, to IRAs where both good 
and bad investment choices are myriad and advice that is conflicted is 
commonplace. As noted above, these rollovers are expected to approach 
$2.4 trillion over the next 5 years. These trends were not apparent 
when the Department promulgated the 1975 rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ U.S. Department of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin 
Historical Tables and Graphs, (Dec. 2014), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf.
    \17\ U.S. Department of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin 
Abstract of 2013 Form 5500 Annual Reports, (Sep. 2015), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2013pensionplanbulletin.pdf.
    \18\ U.S. Department of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin 
Historical Tables and Graphs, 1975-2013, (Sep. 2015), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf.
    \19\ Holden, Sarah, and Daniel Schrass. The Role of IRAs in US 
Households' Saving for Retirement, 2015. ICI Research Perspective 
22, no. 1 (Feb. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These changes in the marketplace, as well as the Department's 
experience with the rule since 1975, support the Department's efforts 
to reevaluate and revise the rule through a public process of notice 
and comment rulemaking. As the marketplace for financial services has 
developed in the years since 1975, the five-part test now undermines, 
rather than promotes, the statute's text and purposes. The narrowness 
of the 1975 regulation allows advisers, brokers, consultants, and 
valuation firms to play a central role in shaping plan and IRA 
investments, without ensuring the accountability that Congress intended 
for persons having such influence and responsibility. Even when plan 
sponsors, participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners clearly rely on 
paid advisers for impartial guidance, the regulation allows many 
advisers to avoid fiduciary status and disregard ERISA's fiduciary 
obligations of care and prohibitions on disloyal and conflicted 
transactions. As a consequence, these advisers can steer customers to 
investments based on their own self-interest (e.g., products that 
generate higher fees for the adviser even if there are identical lower-
fee products available), give imprudent advice, and engage in 
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by ERISA and the Code 
without fear of accountability under either ERISA or the Code.
    Instead of ensuring that trusted advisers give prudent and unbiased 
advice in accordance with fiduciary norms, the 1975 regulation erects a 
multi-part series of technical impediments to fiduciary responsibility. 
The Department is concerned that the specific elements of the five-part 
test--which are not found in the text of the Act or Code--work to 
frustrate statutory goals and defeat advice recipients' legitimate 
expectations. In light of the importance of the proper management of 
plan and IRA assets, it is critical that the regulation defining 
investment advice draws appropriate distinctions between the sorts of 
advice relationships that should be treated as fiduciary in nature and 
those that should not. The 1975 regulation does not do so. Instead, the 
lines drawn by the five-part test frequently permit evasion of 
fiduciary status and responsibility in ways that undermine the 
statutory text and purposes.
    One example of the five-part test's shortcomings is the requirement 
that advice be furnished on a ``regular basis.'' As a result of the 
requirement, if a small plan hires an investment professional on a one-
time basis for an investment recommendation on a large, complex 
investment, the adviser has no fiduciary obligation to the plan under 
ERISA. Even if the plan is considering investing all or substantially 
all of the plan's assets, lacks the specialized expertise necessary to 
evaluate the complex transaction on its own, and the consultant fully 
understands the plan's dependence on his professional judgment, the 
consultant is not a fiduciary because he does not advise the plan on a 
``regular basis.'' The plan could be investing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in plan assets, and it could be the most critical investment 
decision the plan ever makes, but the adviser would have no fiduciary 
responsibility under the 1975 regulation. While a consultant who 
regularly makes less significant investment recommendations to the plan 
would be a fiduciary if he satisfies the other four prongs of the 
regulatory test, the one-time consultant on an enormous transaction has 
no fiduciary responsibility.
    In such cases, the ``regular basis'' requirement, which is not 
found in the text of ERISA or the Code, fails to draw a sensible line 
between fiduciary and non-fiduciary conduct, and undermines the law's 
protective purposes. A specific example is the one-time purchase of a 
group annuity to cover all of the benefits promised to substantially 
all of a plan's participants for the rest of their lives when a defined 
benefit plan terminates or a plan's expenditure of hundreds of millions 
of dollars on a single real estate transaction with the assistance of a 
financial adviser hired for purposes of that one transaction. Despite 
the clear importance of the decisions and the clear reliance on paid 
advisers, the advisers would not be fiduciaries. On a smaller scale 
that is still immensely important for the affected individual, the 
``regular basis'' requirement also deprives individual participants and 
IRA owners of statutory protection when they seek specialized advice on 
a one-time basis, even if the advice concerns the investment of all or 
substantially all of the assets held in their account (e.g., as in the 
case of an annuity purchase or a rollover from a plan to an IRA or from 
one IRA to another).
    Under the five-part test, fiduciary status can also be defeated by 
arguing that the parties did not have a mutual agreement, arrangement, 
or understanding that the advice would serve as a primary basis for 
investment decisions. Investment professionals in today's marketplace 
frequently market retirement investment services in ways that clearly 
suggest the provision of tailored or individualized advice, while at 
the same time disclaiming in fine print the requisite ``mutual'' 
understanding that the advice will be used as a primary basis for 
investment decisions.
    Similarly, there appears to be a widespread belief among broker-
dealers that they are not fiduciaries with respect to plans or IRAs 
because they do not hold themselves out as registered investment 
advisers, even though they often market their services as financial or 
retirement planners. The import of such disclaimers--and of the fine 
legal distinctions between brokers and registered investment advisers--
is often completely lost on plan participants and IRA owners who 
receive investment advice. As shown in a study conducted by the RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice for the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), consumers often do not read the legal documents and do not 
understand the difference between brokers and registered investment 
advisers, particularly when brokers adopt such titles as ``financial 
adviser'' and ``financial manager.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Hung, Angela A., Noreen Clancy, Jeff Dominitz, Eric Talley, 
Claude Berrebi, Farrukh Suvankulov, Investor and Industry 
Perspectives on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice, commissioned by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2008, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Even in the absence of boilerplate fine print disclaimers, however, 
it is far from evident how the ``primary basis'' element of the five-
part test promotes the statutory text or purposes of ERISA and the 
Code. If, for example, a prudent plan fiduciary hires multiple 
specialized advisers for an especially complex transaction, it should 
be able to rely upon all of the consultants' advice,

[[Page 20956]]

regardless of whether one could characterize any particular 
consultant's advice as primary, secondary, or tertiary. Presumably, 
paid consultants make recommendations--and retirement investors seek 
their assistance--with the hope or expectation that the recommendations 
could, in fact, be relied upon in making important decisions. When a 
plan, participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner directly or indirectly 
pays for advice upon which it can rely, there appears to be little 
statutory basis for drawing distinctions based on a subjective 
characterization of the advice as ``primary,'' ``secondary,'' or other.
    In other respects, the current regulatory definition could also 
benefit from clarification. For example, a number of parties have 
argued that the regulation, as currently drafted, does not encompass 
paid advice as to the selection of money managers or mutual funds. 
Similarly, they have argued that the regulation does not cover advice 
given to the managers of pooled investment vehicles that hold plan 
assets contributed by many plans, as opposed to advice given to 
particular plans. Parties have even argued that advice was 
insufficiently ``individualized'' to fall within the scope of the 
regulation because the advice provider had failed to prudently consider 
the ``particular needs of the plan,'' notwithstanding the fact that 
both the advice provider and the plan agreed that individualized advice 
based on the plan's needs would be provided, and the adviser actually 
made specific investment recommendations to the plan. Although the 
Department disagrees with each of these interpretations of the 1975 
regulation, the arguments nevertheless suggest that clarifying 
regulatory text would be helpful.
    As noted above, changes in the financial marketplace have further 
enlarged the gap between the 1975 regulation's effect and the 
congressional intent as reflected in the statutory definition. With 
this transformation, plan participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners 
have become major consumers of investment advice that is paid for 
directly or indirectly. Increasingly, important investment decisions 
have been left to inexpert plan participants and IRA owners who depend 
upon the financial expertise of their advisers, rather than 
professional money managers who have the technical expertise to manage 
investments independently. In today's marketplace, many of the 
consultants and advisers who provide investment-related advice and 
recommendations receive compensation from the financial institutions 
whose investment products they recommend. This gives the consultants 
and advisers a strong reason, conscious or unconscious, to favor 
investments that provide them greater compensation rather than those 
that may be most appropriate for the participants. Unless they are 
fiduciaries, however, these consultants and advisers are free under 
ERISA and the Code, not only to receive such conflicted compensation, 
but also to act on their conflicts of interest to the detriment of 
their customers. In addition, plans, participants, beneficiaries, and 
IRA owners now have a much greater variety of investments to choose 
from, creating a greater need for expert advice. Consolidation of the 
financial services industry and innovations in compensation 
arrangements have multiplied the opportunities for self-dealing and 
reduced the transparency of fees.
    The absence of adequate fiduciary protections and safeguards is 
especially problematic in light of the growth of participant-directed 
plans and self-directed IRAs, the gap in expertise and information 
between advisers and the customers who depend upon them for guidance, 
and the advisers' significant conflicts of interest.
    When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it made a judgment that plan 
advisers should be subject to ERISA's fiduciary regime and that plan 
participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners should be protected from 
conflicted transactions by the prohibited transaction rules. More 
fundamentally, however, the statutory language was designed to cover a 
much broader category of persons who provide fiduciary investment 
advice based on their functions and to limit their ability to engage in 
self-dealing and other conflicts of interest than is currently 
reflected in the 1975 regulation's five-part test. While many advisers 
are committed to providing high-quality advice and always put their 
customers' best interests first, the 1975 regulation makes it far too 
easy for advisers in today's marketplace not to do so and to avoid 
fiduciary responsibility even when they clearly purport to give 
individualized advice and to act in the client's best interest, rather 
than their own.

B. The 2010 Proposal

    On October 22, 2010, the Department published the 2010 Proposal in 
the Federal Register that would have replaced the five-part test with a 
new definition of what counted as fiduciary investment advice for a 
fee. At that time, the Department did not propose any new prohibited 
transaction exemptions and acknowledged uncertainty regarding whether 
existing exemptions would be available, but specifically invited 
comments on whether new or amended exemptions should be proposed. The 
2010 Proposal also provided exclusions or limitations for conduct that 
would not result in fiduciary status. The general definition included 
the following types of advice: (1) Appraisals or fairness opinions 
concerning the value of securities or other property; (2) 
recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, 
holding or selling securities or other property; and (3) 
recommendations as to the management of securities or other property. 
Reflecting the Department's longstanding interpretation of the 1975 
regulations, the 2010 Proposal made clear that investment advice under 
the proposal includes advice provided to plan participants, 
beneficiaries and IRA owners as well as to plan fiduciaries.
    Under the 2010 Proposal, a paid adviser would have been treated as 
a fiduciary if the adviser provided one of the above types of advice 
and either: (1) Represented that he or she was acting as an ERISA 
fiduciary; (2) was already an ERISA fiduciary to the plan by virtue of 
having control over the management or disposition of plan assets, or by 
having discretionary authority over the administration of the plan; (3) 
was already an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 (Advisers Act); or (4) provided the advice pursuant to an 
agreement, arrangement or understanding that the advice may be 
considered in connection with plan investment or asset management 
decisions and would be individualized to the needs of the plan, plan 
participant or beneficiary, or IRA owner. The 2010 Proposal also 
provided that, for purposes of the fiduciary definition, relevant fees 
included any direct or indirect fees received by the adviser or an 
affiliate from any source. Direct fees are payments made by the advice 
recipient to the adviser including transaction-based fees, such as 
brokerage, mutual fund or insurance sales commissions. Indirect fees 
are payments to the adviser from any source other than the advice 
recipient such as revenue sharing payments with respect to a mutual 
fund.
    The 2010 Proposal included specific provisions for the following 
actions that the Department believed should not result in fiduciary 
status. In particular, a person would not have become a fiduciary by--

[[Page 20957]]

    1. Providing recommendations as a seller or purchaser with 
interests adverse to the plan, its participants, or IRA owners, if the 
advice recipient reasonably should have known that the adviser was not 
providing impartial investment advice and the adviser had not 
acknowledged fiduciary status.
    2. Providing investment education information and materials in 
connection with an individual account plan.
    3. Marketing or making available a menu of investment alternatives 
that a plan fiduciary could choose from, and providing general 
financial information to assist in selecting and monitoring those 
investments, if these activities include a written disclosure that the 
adviser was not providing impartial investment advice.
    4. Preparing reports necessary to comply with ERISA, the Code, or 
regulations or forms issued thereunder, unless the report valued assets 
that lack a generally recognized market, or served as a basis for 
making plan distributions.

The 2010 Proposal applied to the definition of an ``investment advice 
fiduciary'' in section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Code as well as to the 
parallel ERISA definition. The 2010 Proposal, like this final rule, 
applies to both ERISA-covered plans and certain non-ERISA plans, such 
as individual retirement accounts.
    In the preamble to the 2010 Proposal, the Department also noted 
that it had previously interpreted the 1975 regulation as providing 
that a recommendation to a plan participant on how to invest the 
proceeds of a contemplated plan distribution was not fiduciary 
investment advice. Advisory Opinion 2005-23A (Dec. 7, 2005). The 
Department specifically asked for comments as to whether the final rule 
should cover such recommendations as fiduciary advice.
    The Department made special efforts to encourage the regulated 
community's participation in this rulemaking. The 2010 Proposal 
prompted a large number of comments and a vigorous debate. The 
Department received over 300 comment letters. A public hearing on the 
2010 Proposal was held in Washington, DC on March 1 and 2, 2011, at 
which 38 speakers testified. In addition to an extended comment period, 
additional time for comments was allowed following the hearing. The 
transcript of that hearing was made available for additional public 
comment and the Department received over 60 additional comment letters. 
The Department also participated in many meetings requested by various 
interested stakeholders. Many of the comments concerned the 
Department's conclusions regarding the likely economic impact of the 
2010 Proposal, if adopted. A number of commenters urged the Department 
to undertake additional analysis of expected costs and benefits 
particularly with regard to the 2010 Proposal's coverage of IRAs. After 
consideration of these comments and in light of the significance of 
this rulemaking to the retirement plan service provider industry, plan 
sponsors and participants, beneficiaries and IRA owners, the Department 
decided to take more time for review and to issue a new proposed 
regulation for comment. On September 19, 2011 the Department announced 
that it would withdraw the 2010 Proposal and propose a new rule 
defining the term ``fiduciary'' for purposes of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of 
ERISA and section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Code.

C. The 2015 Proposal

    On April 20, 2015, the Department published in the Federal Register 
a Notice withdrawing the 2010 Proposal and issuing the 2015 Proposal, a 
new proposed amendment to 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c). On the same date, the 
Department published proposed new and amended exemptions from ERISA's 
and the Code's prohibited transaction rules designed to allow certain 
broker-dealers, insurance agents and others that act as investment 
advice fiduciaries to nevertheless continue to receive common forms of 
compensation that would otherwise be prohibited, subject to appropriate 
safeguards.
    The 2015 Proposal made many revisions to the 2010 Proposal, 
although it also retained aspects of that proposal's essential 
framework. Paragraph (a)(1) of the 2015 Proposal set forth the 
following types of advice, which, when provided in exchange for a fee 
or other compensation, whether directly or indirectly, and given under 
circumstances described in paragraph (a)(2), would be ``investment 
advice'' unless one of the ``carve-outs'' in paragraph (b) applied. The 
listed types of advice were--(i) a recommendation as to the 
advisability of acquiring, holding, disposing of, or exchanging 
securities or other property, including a recommendation to take a 
distribution of benefits or a recommendation as to the investment of 
securities or other property to be rolled over or otherwise distributed 
from the plan or IRA; (ii) a recommendation as to the management of 
securities or other property, including recommendations as to the 
management of securities or other property to be rolled over or 
otherwise distributed from the plan or IRA; (iii) an appraisal, 
fairness opinion, or similar statement whether verbal or written 
concerning the value of securities or other property if provided in 
connection with a specific transaction or transactions involving the 
acquisition, disposition, or exchange, of such securities or other 
property by the plan or IRA; or (iv) a recommendation of a person who 
is also going to receive a fee or other compensation to provide any of 
the types of advice described in paragraphs (i) through (iii) above.
    As provided in paragraph (a)(2) of the 2015 Proposal, unless a 
carve-out applied, a category of advice listed in the proposal would 
constitute ``investment advice'' if the person providing the advice, 
either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any 
affiliate)--(i) represents or acknowledges that it is acting as a 
fiduciary within the meaning of the Act or Code with respect to the 
advice described in paragraph (a)(1); or (ii) renders the advice 
pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, arrangement or understanding 
that the advice is individualized to, or that such advice is 
specifically directed to, the advice recipient for consideration in 
making investment or management decisions with respect to securities or 
other property of the plan or IRA.
    The 2015 Proposal included several carve-outs for persons who do 
not represent that they are acting as ERISA fiduciaries, some of which 
were included in some form in the 2010 Proposal but many of which were 
not. Subject to specified conditions, these carve-outs covered--
    (1) statements or recommendations made to a ``large plan investor 
with financial expertise'' by a counterparty acting in an arm's length 
transaction;
    (2) offers or recommendations to plan fiduciaries of ERISA plans to 
enter into a swap or security-based swap that is regulated under the 
Securities Exchange Act or the Commodity Exchange Act;
    (3) statements or recommendations provided to a plan fiduciary of 
an ERISA plan by an employee of the plan sponsor if the employee 
receives no fee beyond his or her normal compensation;
    (4) marketing or making available a platform of investment 
alternatives to be selected by a plan fiduciary for an ERISA 
participant-directed individual account plan;
    (5) the identification of investment alternatives that meet 
objective criteria specified by a plan fiduciary of an ERISA plan or 
the provision of objective financial data to such fiduciary;
    (6) the provision of an appraisal, fairness opinion or a statement 
of value to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan

[[Page 20958]]

(ESOP) regarding employer securities, to a collective investment 
vehicle holding plan assets, or to a plan for meeting reporting and 
disclosure requirements; and
    (7) information and materials that constitute ``investment 
education'' or ``retirement education.''
    The 2015 Proposal applied the same definition of ``investment 
advice'' to the definition of ``fiduciary'' in section 4975(e)(3) of 
the Code and thus applied to investment advice rendered to IRAs. 
``Plan'' was defined in the proposal to mean any employee benefit plan 
described in section 3(3) of the Act and any plan described in section 
4975(e)(1)(A) of the Code. For ease of reference the proposal defined 
the term ``IRA'' inclusively to mean any account described in Code 
section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), such as an individual retirement 
account described under Code section 408(a) and a health savings 
account described in section 223(d) of the Code.\21\ Under paragraph 
(f)(1) of the proposal, a recommendation was defined as a communication 
that, based on its content, context, and presentation, would reasonably 
be viewed as a suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or 
refrain from taking a particular course of action. The Department 
specifically requested comments on whether the Department should adopt 
the standards that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
uses to define ``recommendation'' for purposes of the suitability rules 
applicable to brokers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The Department solicited comments on whether it is 
appropriate for the regulation to cover the full range of these 
arrangements. These non-ERISA plan arrangements are tax-favored 
vehicles under the Code like IRAs, but are not specifically intended 
like IRAs for retirement savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many of the differences between the 2015 Proposal and the 2010 
Proposal reflect the input of commenters on the 2010 Proposal as part 
of the public notice and comment process. For example, some commenters 
argued that the 2010 Proposal swept too broadly by making investment 
recommendations fiduciary in nature simply because the adviser was a 
plan fiduciary for purposes unconnected with the advice or an 
investment adviser under the Advisers Act. In their view, such status-
based criteria were in tension with the Act's functional approach to 
fiduciary status and would have resulted in unwarranted and unintended 
compliance issues and costs. Other commenters objected to the lack of a 
requirement for these status-based categories that the advice be 
individualized to the needs of the advice recipient. The 2015 Proposal 
incorporated these suggestions: An adviser's status as an investment 
adviser under the Advisers Act or as an ERISA fiduciary for reasons 
unrelated to advice were not explicit factors in the definition. In 
addition, the 2015 Proposal provided that unless the adviser 
represented that he or she is a fiduciary with respect to advice, the 
advice must be provided pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, 
arrangement, or understanding that the advice is individualized to, or 
that such advice is specifically directed to, the recipient for 
consideration in making investment or management decisions with respect 
to securities or other property of the plan or IRA.
    Furthermore, under the 2015 Proposal, the carve-outs that treat 
certain conduct as non-fiduciary in nature were modified, clarified, 
and expanded in response to comments to the 2010 Proposal. For example, 
the carve-out for certain valuations from the definition of fiduciary 
investment advice was modified and expanded. Under the 2010 Proposal, 
appraisals and valuations for compliance with certain reporting and 
disclosure requirements were not treated as fiduciary investment 
advice. The 2015 Proposal additionally provided a carve-out from 
fiduciary treatment for appraisal and fairness opinions for ESOPs 
regarding employer securities. Although, the Department remained 
concerned about valuation advice concerning an Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan's (ESOP's) purchase of employer stock and about a plan's reliance 
on that advice, the Department concluded, at the time, that the 
concerns regarding valuations of closely held employer stock in ESOP 
transactions raised issues that were more appropriately addressed in a 
separate regulatory initiative. Additionally, the carve-out for 
valuations conducted for reporting and disclosure purposes was expanded 
to include reporting and disclosure obligations outside of ERISA and 
the Code, and was applicable to both ERISA plans and IRAs.
    The Department took significant steps to give interested persons an 
opportunity to comment on the new proposal and proposed related 
exemptions. The 2015 Proposal and proposed related exemptions initially 
provided for 75-day comment periods, ending on July 6, 2015, but the 
Department extended the comment periods to July 21, 2015. The 
Department held a public hearing in Washington, DC on August 10-13, 
2015, at which over 75 speakers testified. The transcript of the 
hearing was made available on September 8, 2015, and the Department 
provided additional opportunity for interested persons to submit 
comments on the proposal and proposed related exemptions or transcript 
until September 24, 2015. A total of over 3,000 comment letters were 
received on the new proposals. There were also over 300,000 submissions 
made as part of 30 separate petitions submitted on the proposal. These 
comments and petitions came from consumer groups, plan sponsors, 
financial services companies, academics, elected government officials, 
trade and industry associations, and others, both in support of, and in 
opposition to, the proposed rule and proposed related exemptions.

III. Coordination With Other Federal Agencies and Other Regulators

    Many comments throughout the rulemaking have emphasized the need to 
harmonize the Department's efforts with potential rulemaking and 
rulemaking activities under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(Dodd-Frank Act), in particular, the SEC's standards of care for 
providing investment advice and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's (CFTC) business conduct standards for swap dealers. In 
addition, some commenters questioned the adequacy of coordination with 
other agencies regarding IRA products and services in particular. They 
argued that subjecting SEC-regulated investment advisers and broker-
dealers to a special set of ERISA rules for plans and IRAs could lead 
to additional costs and complexities for individuals who may have 
several different types of accounts at the same financial institution 
some of which may be subject only to the SEC rules, and others of which 
may be subject to both SEC rules and new regulatory requirements under 
ERISA.
    Other commenters questioned the extent to which the Department had 
engaged with federal and state securities, insurance and banking 
regulators to ensure that regulatory regimes already in place would not 
be adversely affected. They expressed concern that subjecting parties 
to overlapping regulatory requirements from multiple oversight 
organizations would make compliance difficult and costly. One commenter 
asserted, however, that when service providers are subject to different 
legal standards of conduct, the easiest compliance approach is to meet 
the higher standard of care, which would benefit consumers, even 
outside the context of plans and IRAs.

[[Page 20959]]

    In the course of developing the 2015 Proposal, the final rule, and 
the related prohibited transaction exemptions, the Department has 
consulted with staff of the SEC; other securities, banking, and 
insurance regulators, the U.S. Treasury Department's Federal Insurance 
Office, and FINRA, the independent regulatory authority of the broker-
dealer industry, to better understand whether the rule and exemptions 
would subject investment advisers and broker-dealers who provide 
investment advice to requirements that create an undue compliance 
burden or conflict with their obligations under other federal laws. As 
part of this consultative process, SEC staff has provided technical 
assistance and information with respect to the agencies' separate 
regulatory provisions and responsibilities, retail investors, and the 
marketplace for investment advice. Some commenters argued that the 
SEC's regulation of advisers and brokers is sufficient. Other 
commenters noted, however, that plans and IRAs invest in more products 
than those regulated by the SEC alone, and asserted that the regulatory 
framework under ERISA and the Code was more protective of retirement 
investors. Some commenters also questioned the extent to which the 
SEC's disclosure framework would adequately protect retirement 
investors. Others thought the Department should coordinate with the SEC 
on the initiative and some advocated for a uniform fiduciary standard 
to lessen confusion about various standards of care owed to investors.
    Commenters were also divided when it came to FINRA, with some 
commenters contending that FINRA sufficiently regulates brokers and 
that the Department should incorporate FINRA concepts or defer to FINRA 
and SEC regulation under the federal securities laws. Other commenters 
expressed concern about relying on FINRA and SEC regulations and 
guidance, in part, because FINRA's guidance would not be directly 
applicable to an array of ERISA investment advisers that are not 
subject to FINRA rules or SEC oversight.
    In pursuing its consultations with other regulators, the Department 
aimed to avoid conflict with other federal laws and minimize 
duplicative provisions between ERISA, the Code and federal securities 
laws. However, the governing statutes do not permit the Department to 
make the obligations of fiduciary investment advisers under ERISA and 
the Code identical to the duties of advice providers under the 
securities laws. ERISA and the Code establish consumer protections for 
some investment advice that does not fall within the ambit of federal 
securities laws, and vice versa. Even if each of the relevant agencies 
were to adopt an identical definition of ``fiduciary,'' the legal 
consequences of the fiduciary designation would vary between agencies 
because of differences in the specific duties and remedies established 
by the different federal laws at issue. ERISA and the Code place 
special emphasis on the elimination or mitigation of conflicts of 
interest and adherence to substantive standards of conduct, as 
reflected in the prohibited transaction rules and ERISA's standards of 
fiduciary conduct. The specific duties imposed on fiduciaries by ERISA 
and the Code stem from legislative judgments on the best way to protect 
the public interest in tax-preferred benefit arrangements that are 
critical to workers' financial and physical health. The Department has 
taken great care to honor ERISA and the Code's specific text and 
purposes.
    At the same time, the Department has worked hard to understand the 
impact of the 2015 Proposal and the final rule on firms subject to the 
federal securities and other laws, and to take the effects of those 
laws into account so as to appropriately calibrate the impact of the 
rule on those firms. The final rule reflects these efforts. In the 
Department's view, it neither undermines, nor contradicts, the 
provisions or purposes of the securities laws, but instead works in 
harmony with them. The Department has coordinated--and will continue to 
coordinate--its efforts with other federal agencies to ensure that the 
various legal regimes are harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
    The Department has also consulted with the Department of the 
Treasury, particularly on the subject of IRAs. Although the Department 
has responsibility for issuing regulations and prohibited transaction 
exemptions under section 4975 of the Code, which applies to IRAs, the 
IRS maintains general responsibility for enforcing the tax laws. The 
IRS' responsibilities extend to the imposition of excise taxes on 
fiduciaries who participate in prohibited transactions.\22\ As a 
result, the Department and the IRS share responsibility for combating 
self-dealing by fiduciary investment advisers to tax-qualified plans 
and IRAs. Paragraph (f) of the final regulation, in particular, 
recognizes this jurisdictional intersection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department received comments from the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA), whose membership includes all U.S. 
state securities regulators. NASAA generally supported the proposal and 
the Department's goal of enhancing the standard of care available to 
retirement investors, including those who invest through IRAs. NASAA 
said the proposal is an important step in raising the standard of care 
available to retirement investors, and paves the way for additional 
regulatory initiatives to raise the standard of care for investors in 
general. NASAA asked that the Department include language in its final 
rule that explicitly acknowledges that state securities laws are not 
superseded or preempted and remain subject to the ERISA section 
514(b)(2)(A) savings clause. NASAA also offered suggestions on 
individual substantive provisions of the proposal. For example, NASAA 
suggested the final rule prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration 
agreements with respect to individual contract claims.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The NASAA comment on pre-dispute binding arbitration 
concerns a provision in the Best Interest Contract Exemption, not 
this rule. The arbitration provision in the exemption and the 
comments on the provision are discussed in the preamble to the final 
exemption published elsewhere in today's Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) also 
submitted a comment stating that it recognizes that oversight of the 
retirement plans marketplace is a shared regulatory responsibility, and 
has been so for decades. The NAIC agreed that state insurance 
regulators, the DOL, SEC and FINRA, each have an important role in the 
administration and enforcement of standards for retirement plans and 
products within their jurisdiction. It said that state insurance 
regulators share the DOL's commitment to protect, educate and empower 
consumers as they make important decisions to provide for their 
retirement security. The NAIC noted that the states have acted to 
implement a robust set of consumer protection and education standards 
for annuity and insurance transactions, have extensive enforcement 
authority to examine companies, revoke producer and company licenses to 
operate, as well as to collect and analyze industry data, and have a 
strong record of protecting consumers, especially seniors, from 
inappropriate sales practices or unsuitable products. The NAIC pointed 
out that it is important that the approaches regulators take within 
their respective regulatory framework be as consistent as possible, and 
that it would carefully evaluate the stakeholder input on the proposal 
submitted during the

[[Page 20960]]

comment period and looked forward to further discussions with DOL.
    Comments were submitted by the National Conference of Insurance 
Legislators and the National Association of Governors suggesting 
further dialogue with the NAIC, insurance legislators, and other state 
officials to ensure the federal and state approaches to consumer 
protection in this area are consistent and compatible.
    The Department carefully considered the comments that were 
submitted by interested state regulators, and had meetings during the 
comment period on the 2015 Proposal with NASAA staff and with the NAIC 
(including insurance commissioners and NAIC staff). The Department also 
received input on the interaction between state and federal regulation 
of investment advice from various groups and organizations that are 
subject to state insurance or securities regulations. The Department's 
obligation and overriding objective in developing regulations 
implementing ERISA (and the relevant prohibited transaction provisions 
in the Code) is to achieve the consumer protection objectives of ERISA 
and the Code. The Department believes the final rule reflects that 
obligation and objective while also reflecting that care was taken to 
craft the rule so that it does not require people subject to state 
banking, insurance or securities regulation to take steps that would 
conflict with applicable state statutory or regulatory requirements. 
The Department notes that ERISA section 514 expressly saves state 
regulation of insurance, banking, or securities from ERISA's express 
preemption provision. The Department agrees that it would be 
appropriate for the final rule to include an express provision 
acknowledging the savings clause in ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) for 
state insurance, banking, and securities laws to emphasize the fact 
that those state regulators all have important roles in the 
administration and enforcement of standards for retirement plans and 
products within their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the final rule 
includes a new paragraph (i).

IV. The Provisions of the Final Rule and Public Comments

    After carefully evaluating the full range of public comments and 
extensive record developed on the proposal, the final rule as described 
below amends the definition of investment advice in 29 CFR 2510.3-21 
(1975) to replace the restrictive five-part test with a new definition 
that better comports with the statutory language in ERISA and the Code. 
Some commenters offered general support for, or opposition to, the 
Department's proposal to replace the 1975 regulation's five-part test. 
The Department did not attempt to separately identify or discuss these 
general comments in this Notice, although the preamble, in its 
entirety, addresses the reasons for undertaking this regulatory 
initiative and the rationales for the Department's specific regulatory 
choices. Most commenters, however, gave the Department feedback on the 
specific provisions of the proposal and whether they believed them to 
be preferable to the 1975 regulation.
    Several commenters argued for withdrawal of the proposed rule 
stating that the proposal neither demonstrated a compelling need for 
regulatory action nor employed the least burdensome method to effect 
any necessary change. They believed that to make the rule and 
exemptions workable, such significant modifications were necessary that 
a second re-proposal was required. Some comments suggested that the 
Department should engage in extensive testing of the rule and 
exemptions before going final, for example, via focus groups or a 
negotiated rulemaking process. Some commenters complained that the 
Administrative Procedures Act requires that a decision to re-propose be 
based on the public record and that informal comments from the 
Department suggested that the Department had prejudged that issue 
before evaluating all the public comments. Another commenter disagreed 
and maintained that the proposal should be finalized since the 
Department had followed the proper regulatory process and no one, in 
testimony or comment, had made a credible argument for any change that 
is ``material'' enough to warrant a re-proposal. Moreover, a number of 
organizations also offered nearly unqualified support for the rule, and 
endorsed the Department's efforts in moving forward with the proposal. 
Although some organizations expressed concern about the rule's 
complexity and posited possible attendant high compliance costs and 
uncertain legal liabilities, they deemed these costs justified by 
moving to a higher standard for investors. Other commenters pointed to 
specific demographic groups and noted their need for the increased 
protections offered by the rule. One international organization 
articulated the hope that efforts in the United States may influence 
its government to similarly act to hold persons offering financial 
advice to a fiduciary duty. The Department believes it has engaged in 
sufficient public outreach to establish a valid and comprehensive 
public record as detailed above in discussions of the 2010 Proposal and 
the re-proposal in 2015 to substantiate promulgating a final rule at 
this time. In the Department's judgment, this final rulemaking, which 
follows a robust regulatory process, fulfills the Department's mission 
to protect, educate, and empower retirement investors as they face 
important choices in saving for retirement in their IRAs and employee 
benefit plans.
    The final rule largely adopts the general structure of the 2015 
Proposal but with modifications in response to commenters seeking 
changes or clarifications of certain provisions in the proposal. 
Similar to the proposal, the final rule in paragraph (a)(1) first 
describes the kinds of communications that would constitute investment 
advice. Then paragraph (a)(2) sets forth the types of relationships 
that must exist for such recommendations to give rise to fiduciary 
investment advice responsibilities. The rule covers: Recommendations by 
a person who represents or acknowledges that it is acting as a 
fiduciary within the meaning of the Act or the Code; advice rendered 
pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, arrangement or understanding 
that the advice is based on the particular investment needs of the 
advice recipient; and recommendations directed to a specific advice 
recipient or recipients regarding the advisability of a particular 
investment or management decision with respect to securities or other 
investment property of the plan or IRA. Paragraph (b)(1) describes when 
a communication based on its context, content, and presentation would 
be viewed as a ``recommendation,'' a fundamental element in 
establishing the existence of fiduciary investment advice. Paragraph 
(b)(2) sets forth examples of certain types of communications which are 
not ``recommendations'' under that definition. The examples include 
certain activities that were classified as ``carve-outs'' under the 
proposal, but which are better understood as not constituting 
investment ``recommendations'' in the first place. Paragraph (c) 
describes and clarifies conduct and activities that the Department 
determined should not be considered investment advice activity although 
they may otherwise meet the criteria established by paragraph (a). 
Thus, paragraph (c) includes communications and activities that were 
appropriately classified as ``carve-outs'' under the proposal. 
Paragraph (c) also

[[Page 20961]]

adds to, clarifies, or modifies certain of the ``carve-outs'' in 
response to public comments. Except for minor clarifying changes, 
paragraph (d)'s description of the scope of the investment advice 
fiduciary duty, and paragraph (e) regarding the mere execution of a 
securities transaction at the direction of a plan or IRA owner, remain 
unchanged from the 1975 regulation. Paragraph (f) also remains 
unchanged from paragraph (e) of the proposal and articulates the 
application of the final rule to the parallel definitions in the 
prohibited transaction provisions of Code section 4975. Paragraph (g) 
includes definitions. Paragraph (h) describes the effective and 
applicability dates associated with the final rule, and paragraph (i) 
includes an express provision acknowledging the savings clause in ERISA 
section 514(b)(2)(A) for state insurance, banking, and securities laws.
    Under the final rule, whether a ``recommendation'' has occurred is 
a threshold issue and the initial step in determining whether 
investment advice has occurred. The 2015 Proposal included a definition 
of recommendation in paragraph (f)(1): ``[A] communication that, based 
on its content, context, and presentation, would reasonably be viewed 
as a suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or refrain from 
taking a particular course of action.'' The Department received a wide 
range of comments that asked that the final rule include a clearer 
statement of when particular communications rise to the level of 
covered investment ``recommendations.'' As described more fully below, 
the Department, in response, has added a new section to the regulation 
that is intended to clarify the standard for determining whether a 
person has made a ``recommendation'' covered by the final rule.

A. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(a)(1)--Categories and Types of Fiduciary Advice

    Paragraph (a) of the final rule states that a person renders 
investment advice with respect to moneys or other property of a plan or 
IRA described in paragraph (g)(6) of the final rule if such person 
provides the types of advice described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) or (ii). 
The final rule revises and clarifies this provision from the 2015 
Proposal in the manner described below. Specifically, paragraph (a)(1) 
of the final rule provides that person(s) provide investment advice if 
they provide for a fee or other compensation certain categories or 
types of investment recommendations. The listed types of advice are--
    (i) A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, holding, 
disposing of, or exchanging, securities or other investment property or 
a recommendation as to how securities or other investment property 
should be invested after the securities or other investment property 
are rolled over, transferred, or distributed from the plan or IRA; and
    (ii) A recommendation as to the management of securities or other 
investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on 
investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of 
other persons to provide investment advice or investment management 
services; selection of investment account arrangements (e.g., brokerage 
versus advisory); or recommendations with respect to rollovers, 
transfers, or distributions from a plan or IRA, including whether, in 
what amount, in what form, and to what destination such a rollover, 
transfer or distribution should be made.
    The final rule thus maintains the general structure of the 2015 
Proposal, but the operative text of the rule includes several changes 
to clarify the provisions. In addition, the Department reserves the 
possible coverage of appraisals, fairness opinions, and similar 
statements for a future rulemaking project.
    In general, paragraph (a)(1)(i) covers recommendations regarding 
the investment of plan or IRA assets, including recommendations 
regarding the investment of assets that are being rolled over or 
otherwise distributed from plans to IRAs. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) covers 
recommendations regarding investment management of plan or IRA assets. 
In response to comments that the term ``management'' should be 
clarified, the Department included text from the 1975 regulation and 
added additional examples to clarify the scope of the definition. In 
particular, the management recommendations covered by (a)(1)(ii) 
include recommendations on rollovers, distributions, and transfers from 
a plan or IRA, including recommendations on whether to take a rollover, 
distribution, or transfer; recommendations on the form of the rollover, 
distribution, or transfer; and recommendations on the insurance issuer 
or investment provider to receive the rollover, distribution or 
transfer. Some commenters expressed concern that advice providers could 
avoid fiduciary responsibility for recommendations to roll over plan 
assets, for example, to a mutual fund provider by not including in that 
recommendation any advice on how to invest the assets after they are 
rolled over. The revisions to paragraph (a)(1)(ii) are intended to make 
clear that such recommendations would be investment advice covered by 
the rule.
    In addition, (a)(1)(ii) has been amended to include recommendations 
on the selection of persons to perform investment advice or investment 
management services. The proposal had contained a separate provision 
covering recommendations to hire investment advisers, but that 
provision has been merged into paragraph (a)(1)(ii) as one type of 
recommendation on management of investments. The Department may have 
contributed to some commenters' uncertainty about the breadth of the 
proposal and whether it covered recommendations of persons providing 
investment management services by setting forth the recommendation of 
fiduciary investment advisers as a separate provision of the rule, 
rather than as merely one example of a recommendation on investment 
management. The Department has always viewed the recommendation of 
persons to perform investment management services for plans or IRAs as 
investment advice. The final rule more clearly and simply sets forth 
the scope of the subject matter covered by the rule. Below is a more 
detailed discussion of various comments that relate to these changes.
(1) Recommendations With Respect to Moneys or Other Property
    Several commenters argued that the language of the proposal 
referring to advice regarding ``moneys or other property'' of the plan 
was sufficiently broad that it could be read to cover advice on 
purchasing insurance policies that do not have an investment component. 
Those commenters observed that such a reading of the proposal did not 
appear to be what the Department intended, and, moreover, asserted that 
a regulation defining ``investment advice'' as having such scope would 
likely exceed the Department's authority. Thus, they asked that the 
final rule confirm that advice as to the purchase of health, 
disability, and term life insurance policies to provide benefits to 
plan participants or IRA owners would not be fiduciary investment 
advice within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii). Other 
commenters asked whether the rule would apply to 403(b) plans, SIMPLE-
IRA plans, SEPs, fraternal benefit societies, and health savings 
accounts. Lastly, many commenters requested clarification as to whether 
and when traditional service

[[Page 20962]]

providers such as lawyers, actuaries, and accountants would become 
subject to the final rule and argued that such service providers should 
not become fiduciaries under the rule merely because they provide 
professional assistance in connection with a particular investment 
transaction.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Some commenters argued that the final rule should not apply 
to IRAs because the Department lacked regulatory authority over 
IRAs. The Department's authority to issue this final rule and to 
make it applicable to IRAs under section 4975 of the Code is 
discussed in detail elsewhere in this Notice and in the preamble to 
the final Best Interest Contract exemption published elsewhere in 
today's Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It was not the intent of the proposal to treat as fiduciary 
investment advice, advice as to the purchase of health, disability, and 
term life insurance policies to provide benefits to plan participants 
or IRA owners if the policies do not have an investment component. The 
Department believes it would depart from a plain and natural reading of 
the term ``investment advice'' to conclude that recommendations to 
purchase group health and disability insurance constitute investment 
advice. The definition of an ``investment advice'' fiduciary in ERISA 
itself, as adopted in 1974, uses the same terms as the proposal to 
define an investment advice fiduciary--a person that renders 
``investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan.'' 
The Department's 1975 regulation implementing that definition similarly 
covers ``investment advice'' regarding ``securities or other 
property.''
    The Department is not aware of any substantial concern or confusion 
regarding whether the 1975 regulation covered recommendations to 
purchase health, disability, or term life insurance policies. 
Additionally, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in section 3(a)(35) 
uses the term ``securities and other property'' to define ``investment 
discretion,'' and the Investment Company Act of 1940 in section 
2(a)(20) refers to ``securities or other property'' in defining an 
``investment adviser.'' The Department does not believe that these 
statutory provisions have created the type of confusion that commenters 
attached to the Department's proposal. Thus, although there can be 
situations in which a person recommending group health or disability 
insurance, for example, effectively exercises such control over the 
decision that he or she is functionally exercising discretionary 
control over the management or administration of the plan within the 
meaning of the fiduciary definition in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i) or 
section 3(21)(A)(iii), the Department does not believe that the 
definition of investment advice in ERISA's statutory text, the 
Department's 1975 regulation, or the prior proposals are properly 
interpreted or understood to cover a recommendation to purchase group 
health, disability, term life insurance or similar insurance policies 
that do not have an investment component.
    As a result, and to expressly make this point, the Department has 
modified the final rule to make it clear that, in order to render 
investment advice with respect to moneys or other property of a plan or 
IRA, the adviser must make a recommendation with respect to the 
advisability of acquiring, holding, disposing or exchanging securities 
or other ``investment'' property. The Department similarly modified the 
final rule to make it clear that the covered recommendation must 
concern the management or manager of securities or other ``investment'' 
property to fall under that prong of the investment advice fiduciary 
definition. Further, the Department added new paragraph (g)(4) to 
define investment property as expressly not including health or 
disability insurance policies, term life insurance policies, or other 
assets to the extent that they do not include an investment component.
    A few commenters argued that bank certificates of deposit (CDs) and 
other similar bank deposit accounts should not be treated as 
investments for purposes of the rule and communications regarding them 
should not be treated as investment advice because the purposes for 
which plan and IRA investors use them do not present the same concerns 
about conflicts of interest as other covered investment 
recommendations. The commenters also argued, similar to other 
commenters in other industries, that educational communications from 
bank branch personnel to customers about bank products will be impaired 
if possibly subject to ERISA rules governing fiduciary investment 
advice.
    In the Department's view, the definition of investment property in 
paragraph (g)(4) should include bank CDs and similar investment 
products. The Department does not see any basis for differentiating 
advice regarding investments in CDs, including investment strategies 
involving CDs (e.g., laddered CD portfolios), from other investment 
products. To the extent an adviser will receive a fee or other 
compensation as a result of a recommended investment in a CD, that 
communication presents the type of conflict of interest that is the 
focus of the rule. With respect to educational communications regarding 
bank products, just as with other investment products, the Department 
has emphasized in the final rule the fundamental requirement that a 
recommendation is necessary for a communication to be considered 
investment advice. Specifically, the Department has included a new 
paragraph (b)(1) defining recommendation for purposes of the rule, and 
paragraph (b)(2) provides detailed examples of communications involving 
investment education and general communications that do not constitute 
investment recommendations. Whether a recommendation occurs in any 
particular instance would be a determination based on facts and 
circumstances.
    Many commenters questioned the application of the proposal in 
connection with recommendations of proprietary investment products. 
These commenters objected that the proposal would make recommending 
proprietary products on a commission basis a per se violation of 
ERISA's fiduciary duties and the fiduciary self-dealing prohibitions, 
and contended the proposal was flawed by a ``bias'' against proprietary 
products. Some of these commenters raised specific issues related to 
insurers marketing their own insurance products and contended that 
subjecting insurers to fiduciary investment advice duties would impede 
their ability to give participants and IRA owners guidance about 
lifetime income guarantees and other insurance features in their 
proprietary products. Commenters suggested that some mechanism, for 
example, a requirement to disclose potential conflicts of interest or a 
specific carve-out for proprietary and/or insurance products, was 
needed to ensure that affected providers can market purely proprietary 
investment products. These commenters argued that the potential for 
``conflict of interest'' abuses is limited in the case of proprietary 
products because it is obvious to consumers that companies and their 
agents are marketing ``their'' products. Several other commenters, 
however, disagreed and argued that proprietary or affiliated investment 
products present substantial conflicts of interest resulting in biased 
advice that is detrimental to investors. These commenters argued that 
the Department should narrowly define provisions of the proposal 
designed to address advisers whose business involves proprietary or 
limited menu products to mitigate this potential conflict of interest.

[[Page 20963]]

    A couple of commenters recommended that the Department consider 
these proprietary product issues in the context of fraternal benefit 
societies exempt from tax under section 503(c)(8) of the Code, 
including those engaged in religious and benevolent activities, 
suggesting that a carve-out or similar exception is needed to protect 
these not-for-profit organizations because their religious and 
benevolent activities have been funded in large part through the sale 
of insurance and financial products to fraternal lodge members.
    The Department does not believe that it is appropriate for a rule 
defining fiduciary investment advice to provide special treatment for 
sales and marketing of proprietary products. The Department agrees that 
a person's status as a fiduciary investment adviser presents inherent 
conflicts with sales and marketing activities that restrict 
recommendations to only proprietary products. The fact that conflicts 
of interest may be inherent in the sale and marketing of proprietary 
products, in the Department's view, would not be a compelling basis for 
excluding those communications from a rule designed to protect 
consumers from just such conflicts of interest. Rather, the Department 
believes that the model reflected in the ERISA statutory structure is 
the way, at least in the retail market, to acknowledge and address the 
fact that providers of proprietary products will, in selling their 
products, engage in communications and activities that constitute 
fiduciary investment advice under the final rule.
    Specifically, just as ERISA contains broadly protective rules and 
prohibited transaction restrictions with carefully crafted exemptions, 
including conditions designed to mitigate possible abuses, the 
Department believes a generally applicable definition of fiduciary 
investment advice focused on investment ``recommendations,'' coupled 
with carefully crafted exemptions from the prohibited transaction 
rules, is also the appropriate solution in this context. In addition, 
with respect to institutional investors and plan fiduciaries with 
financial expertise, the Department has included in the final rule a 
special provision under which sales communications and activities in 
arm's length transactions with such persons would not constitute 
fiduciary investment advice. Insurers and others selling proprietary 
products can rely on that provision when dealing with such financially 
sophisticated plan fiduciaries. The Best Interest Contract Exemption 
also specifically addresses advice concerning proprietary products, and 
provides a means for firms and advisers to recommend such products, 
while safeguarding retirement investors from the dangers posed by 
conflicts of interest.
    With respect to fraternal benefit societies, the concerns raised by 
these commenters regarding the proposed rule largely mirrored the 
concerns raised by other sellers of proprietary products. The fact that 
an organization is exempt from tax under the Code or that it has an 
educational or charitable mission does not, in the Department's view, 
provide a basis for excluding investment advice provided to retirement 
investors by those organizations from fiduciary duties. Similarly, if 
fraternal benefit societies adopt business structures and compensation 
arrangements that present self-dealing concerns and financial conflicts 
of interest, the fact that revenues from sales may be used, in part, 
for religious and benevolent activities is not, in the Department's 
view, a basis for treating such sales differently from other sales 
under the prohibited transaction provisions of ERISA and the Code. 
Rather, those societies can avail themselves of the same provisions in 
the final rule and final exemptions as are available to other sellers 
of proprietary products.
    Some commenters similarly argued that advisers to SIMPLE-IRA plans 
and SEPs should be excluded from coverage under the rule. However, such 
arrangements established or maintained by a private sector employer for 
its employees are ``employee benefit plans'' within the meaning of 
section 3(3) of ERISA, and, as such, are subject to the protections of 
the prohibited transaction rules. Such plans use IRAs as their 
investment and funding vehicles. In light of the fact that the 2015 
Proposal covered investment advice with respect to the assets of 
employee benefit plans and IRAs, the Department does not see any basis 
for excluding employee benefit plans like SIMPLE-IRA plans and SEPs 
from the scope of the final rule. Nor is there any reason to believe 
that the small employers that rely upon such plans for the provision of 
benefits, and their employees, are any less in need of the rule's 
protections. The Department's authority to issue this rulemaking, 
including its application to IRAs is discussed more fully below.
    With respect to 403(b) plans, because the final rule defines 
investment advice fiduciary for ``plans'' covered under Title I of 
ERISA or Code section 4975 (e.g., IRAs), and because 403(b) plans are 
not included in the definition of ``plan'' under Code section 4975, 
only 403(b) plans covered under Title I of ERISA are within the scope 
of this final rule. Specifically, a plan under section 403(b) of the 
Code (``403(b) plan'') is a retirement plan for employees of public 
schools, employees of certain tax-exempt organizations, and certain 
ministers. Under a 403(b) plan, employers may purchase for their 
eligible employees annuity contracts or establish custodial accounts 
invested only in mutual funds for the purpose of providing retirement 
income. Under ERISA section 4(b)(1) and (2), ``governmental plans'' and 
``church plans'' generally are excluded from coverage under Title I of 
ERISA. Therefore, Code section 403(b) contracts and custodial accounts 
purchased or provided under a program that is either a ``governmental 
plan'' under section 3(32) of ERISA or a non-electing ``church plan'' 
under section 3(33) of ERISA are not subject to the final rule. 
Similarly, the Department in 1979 issued a ``safe harbor'' regulation 
at 29 CFR 2510.3-2(f) which states that a program for the purchase of 
annuity contracts or custodial accounts in accordance with section 
403(b) of the Code and funded solely through salary reduction 
agreements or agreements to forego an increase in salary are not 
``established or maintained'' by an employer under section 3(2) of the 
Act, and, therefore, are not employee pension benefit plans that are 
subject to Title I, provided that certain factors are present. Those 
non-Title I 403(b) plans would also be outside the scope of the final 
rule. A 403(b) plan established or maintained by a tax-exempt 
organization, however, would fall outside of the safe harbor regulation 
and would be a ``pension plan'' within the meaning of section 3(2) of 
ERISA that would be covered by Title I pursuant to section 4(a) of 
ERISA.
    Several commenters also asserted that it was unclear whether 
investment advice under the scope of the proposal would include the 
provision of information and plan services that traditionally have been 
performed in a non-fiduciary capacity. The Department agrees that 
actuaries, accountants, and attorneys, who historically have not been 
treated as ERISA fiduciaries for plan clients, would not become 
fiduciary investment advisers by reason of providing actuarial, 
accounting, and legal services. The Department does not believe 
anything in the 2010 or 2015 Proposals, or the final rule, suggested a 
different conclusion. Rather, in the Department's view, the provisions 
in the final rule defining investment advice make it clear that 
attorneys, accountants, and actuaries would not be treated as 
investment advice fiduciaries

[[Page 20964]]

merely because they provide such professional assistance in connection 
with a particular investment transaction. Only when these professionals 
act outside their normal roles and recommend specific investments in 
connection with particular investment transactions, or otherwise engage 
in the provision of fiduciary investment advice as defined under the 
final rule, would they be subject to the fiduciary definition. 
Similarly, the final rule does not alter the principle articulated in 
ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 75-8, D-2 at 29 CFR 2509.75-8 (1975). Under 
the bulletin, the plan sponsor's human resources personnel or plan 
service providers who have no power to make decisions as to plan 
policy, interpretations, practices or procedures, but who perform 
purely administrative functions for an employee benefit plan, within a 
framework of policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures 
made by other persons, are not thereby investment advice fiduciaries 
with respect to the plan.
(2) Recommendations on Rollovers, Benefit Distributions or Transfers 
From Plan or IRA
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i) and (ii) of the final rule specifically 
includes recommendations concerning the investment, management, or 
manager of securities or other investment property to be rolled over, 
transferred, or distributed from the plan or IRA, including 
recommendations how securities or other investment property should be 
invested after the securities or other investment property are rolled 
over, transferred, or distributed from the plan or IRA and 
recommendations with respect whether, in what amount, in what form, and 
to what destination such a rollover, transfer or distribution should be 
made. The final rule thus supersedes the Department's position in 
Advisory Opinion 2005-23A (Dec. 7, 2005) that it is not fiduciary 
advice to make a recommendation as to distribution options even if 
accompanied by a recommendation as to where the distribution would be 
invested.
    The comments on this issue tended to mirror the comments submitted 
on this same question the Department posed in its 2010 Proposal. Some 
commenters, mainly those representing consumers, stated that exclusion 
of recommendations on rollovers and benefit distributions from the 
final rule would fail to protect participant accounts from conflicted 
advice in connection with one of the most significant financial 
decisions that participants make concerning retirement savings. These 
comments particularly noted the critical nature of retirement and 
rollover decisions and the existence of incentives for advice and 
investment providers to steer plan participants into higher cost, 
subpar investments. Other commenters, mainly those representing 
financial services providers, argued that including such communications 
as fiduciary investment advice would significantly restrict the type of 
investment education that would be provided regarding rollover and plan 
distributions by employers and other plan service providers because of 
concerns about possible fiduciary liability and prohibited 
transactions. They argued that such potential fiduciary liability would 
disrupt the routine process that occurs when a worker leaves a job and 
contacts a financial services firm for help rolling over a 401(k) 
balance, and the firm explains the investments it offers and the 
benefits of a rollover. They also asserted that plan sponsors and plan 
service providers would stop assisting participants and beneficiaries 
with these important decisions, including recommendations to keep 
retirement savings in the plan or advice regarding lifetime income 
products and investment strategies. Some commenters claimed that the 
proposal would discourage or impede rollovers into IRAs or other 
vehicles that give them access to annuities and other lifetime income 
products that often are unavailable in their 401(k) plans. The 
commenters argued that such a result would conflict with the 
Department's recent guidance and initiatives designed to enhance the 
availability of lifetime income products in 401(k) and similar 
employer-sponsored defined contribution pension plans. Other commenters 
questioned the legal authority of the Department to classify rollover 
advice as fiduciary in nature. Others asked that the Department exclude 
rollover recommendations into IRAs when there is no accompanying 
recommendation on how to invest the funds once in the IRA. Other 
commenters asked for clarifications or broad exclusions in various 
specific circumstances, such as advice with respect to benefit 
distributions that are required by tax law such as required minimum 
distributions. Others asked that the principles of FINRA guidance on 
rollovers under Notice 13-45 be incorporated in the advice definition 
and suggested that compliance with the guidance could act as a safe 
harbor for rollover advice.
    The Department continues to believe that decisions to take a 
benefit distribution or engage in rollover transactions are among the 
most, if not the most, important financial decisions that plan 
participants and beneficiaries, and IRA owners are called upon to make. 
The Department also continues to believe that advice provided at this 
juncture, even if not accompanied by a specific recommendation on how 
to invest assets, should be treated as investment advice under the 
final rule. The final rule thus adopts the provision in the proposal 
and supersedes Advisory Opinion 2005-23A. The advisory opinion failed 
to consider that advice to take a distribution of assets from a plan is 
actually advice to sell, withdraw, or transfer investment assets 
currently held in a plan. Thus, a distribution recommendation involves 
either advice to change specific investments in the plan or to change 
fees and services directly affecting the return on those investments. 
Even if the assets will not be covered by ERISA or the Code when they 
are moved outside the plan or IRA, the recommendation to change the 
plan or IRA investments is investment advice under ERISA and the Code. 
Thus, recommendations on distributions (including rollovers or 
transfers into another plan or IRA) or recommendations to entrust plan 
or IRA assets to a particular IRA provider would fall within the scope 
of investment advice in this regulation, and would be covered by Title 
I of ERISA, including the enforcement provisions of section 502(a). 
Further, in the Department's view, recommendations to take a 
distribution or rollover to an IRA and recommendations not to take a 
distribution or to keep assets in a plan should be treated the same in 
terms of evaluating whether the communication constitutes fiduciary 
investment advice.
    The Department acknowledges commenters' concerns that some 
employers and service providers could restrict the type of investment 
education they provide regarding rollovers and plan distributions based 
on concerns about fiduciary liability. Accordingly, the final rule 
(like the 2015 Proposal) includes provisions that describe in detail 
the distinction between recommendations that are fiduciary investment 
advice and educational and informational materials. For example, the 
provisions specifically state that educational materials can describe 
the terms or operation of the plan or IRA, inform a plan fiduciary, 
plan participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner about the benefits of plan 
or IRA

[[Page 20965]]

participation, the benefits of increasing plan or IRA contributions, 
the impact of preretirement withdrawals on retirement income, 
retirement income needs, varying forms of distributions, including 
rollovers, annuitization and other forms of lifetime income payment 
options (e.g., immediate annuity, deferred annuity, or incremental 
purchase of deferred annuity), advantages, disadvantages and risks of 
different forms of distributions, or describe investment objectives and 
philosophies, risk and return characteristics, historical return 
information or related prospectuses of investment alternatives under 
the plan or IRA. The provisions also state that education includes 
information on general methods and strategies for managing assets in 
retirement (e.g., systematic withdrawal payments, annuitization, 
guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits), including those offered 
outside the plan or IRA. Similarly, the rule states that education 
includes interactive materials, such as questionnaires, worksheets, 
software, and similar materials, that provide a plan fiduciary, plan 
participant or beneficiary, or IRA owner the means to: estimate future 
retirement income needs and assess the impact of different asset 
allocations on retirement income; or to use various types of 
educational information to evaluate distribution options, products, or 
vehicles. Accordingly, the Department believes that the rule enables 
employers and service providers to continue to provide important 
educational information without undue risk that the conduct could be 
characterized as fiduciary investment advice under the final rule.
    To the extent that an individual adviser goes beyond providing 
education and gives investment advice in a particular case, the 
Department does not believe it is appropriate to broadly exempt those 
communications from fiduciary liability. Moreover, the Department 
believes that such an exemption would be especially inappropriate in 
cases where a service provider offers educational services that 
systematically exceed the boundaries of education. In such cases, when 
firms or individuals make specific investment recommendations to plan 
participants, they should adhere to basic fiduciary norms of prudence 
and loyalty, and take appropriate measures to protect plan participants 
and beneficiaries from the potential harm caused by conflicts of 
interest.
    Comments from various sources also expressed concern about 
employers and plan sponsors becoming fiduciary investment advisers as a 
result of educational communications and activities designed to inform 
employees about plans, plan investments, distribution options, 
retirement planning, and similar subjects. In many cases, those 
comments were submitted by financial services companies that might be 
engaged by an employer as opposed to the employer itself.
    In the Department's view, in the case of an employer or other plan 
sponsor, an employer or plan sponsor would not become an investment 
advice fiduciary merely because the employer or plan sponsor engaged a 
service provider to provide investment advice or because a service 
provider engaged to provide investment education crossed the line and 
provided investment advice in a particular case. On the other hand, 
whether the service provider renders fiduciary advice or non-fiduciary 
education, the final rule does not change the well-established 
fiduciary obligations that arise in connection with the selection and 
monitoring of plan service providers. These issues were discussed in 
the 1996 Interpretive Bulletin (IB 96-1) on investment education (that 
many commenters urged the Department to adopt in full as the final 
rule). Specifically, as pointed out in the preamble to the proposal, 
although IB 96-1 would be formally removed from the CFR and replaced by 
the final rule, paragraph (e) of IB 96-1 provides generalized guidance 
under sections 405 and 404(c) of ERISA with respect to the selection by 
employers and plan fiduciaries of investment educators and the limits 
of their responsibilities. Specifically, paragraph (e) states:
    As with any designation of a service provider to a plan, the 
designation of a person(s) to provide investment educational services 
or investment advice to plan participants and beneficiaries is an 
exercise of discretionary authority or control with respect to 
management of the plan; therefore, persons making the designation must 
act prudently and solely in the interest of the plan participants and 
beneficiaries, both in making the designation(s) and in continuing such 
designation(s). See ERISA sections 3(21)(A)(i) and 404(a), 29 U.S.C. 
1002 (21)(A)(i) and 1104(a). In addition, the designation of an 
investment adviser to serve as a fiduciary may give rise to co-
fiduciary liability if the person making and continuing such 
designation in doing so fails to act prudently and solely in the 
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries; or knowingly 
participates in, conceals or fails to make reasonable efforts to 
correct a known breach by the investment advisor. See ERISA section 
405(a), 29 U.S.C. 1105(a). The Department notes, however, that, in the 
context of an ERISA section 404(c) plan, neither the designation of a 
person to provide education nor the designation of a fiduciary to 
provide investment advice to participants and beneficiaries would, in 
itself, give rise to fiduciary liability for loss, or with respect to 
any breach of part 4 of Title I of ERISA, that is the direct and 
necessary result of a participant's or beneficiary's exercise of 
independent control. 29 CFR 2550.404c-1(d). The Department also notes 
that a plan sponsor or fiduciary would have no fiduciary responsibility 
or liability with respect to the actions of a third party selected by a 
participant or beneficiary to provide education or investment advice 
where the plan sponsor or fiduciary neither selects nor endorses the 
educator or adviser, nor otherwise makes arrangements with the educator 
or adviser to provide such services.
    The Department explained in the preamble to the 2015 Proposal that, 
unlike the remainder of the IB 96-1, this text does not belong in the 
investment advice regulation, and since the principles articulated in 
paragraph (e) are generally understood and accepted, re-issuing the 
paragraph as a stand-alone IB does not appear necessary or appropriate. 
See 80 FR 21944.
    Although not specifically raised by these comments, it is important 
to emphasize that ERISA section 404(c) and the Department's regulations 
thereunder do not limit the liability of fiduciary investment advisers 
for the provision of investment advice regardless of whether or not 
they provide that advice pursuant to a statutory or administrative 
exemption. In fact, the statutory exemption in ERISA section 408(b)(14) 
and the administrative exemptions being finalized with this rule 
generally require the fiduciary investment adviser to specifically 
assume and acknowledge fiduciary responsibility for the provision of 
investment advice. ERISA section 404(c) provides relief for acts which 
are the direct and necessary result of a participant's or beneficiary's 
exercise of control. Although a participant or beneficiary may direct a 
transaction in his or her account pursuant to fiduciary investment 
advice, that direction would not mean that any imprudence in the advice 
or self-dealing violation by the fiduciary investment adviser in 
connection with the advice was the direct and necessary result of the 
participant's action. Accordingly, section 404(c) of ERISA would not 
provide any relief from liability for a

[[Page 20966]]

fiduciary investment adviser for investment advice provided to a 
participant or beneficiary. This position is consistent with the 
position the Department took regarding the application of section 
404(c) of ERISA to managed accounts in participant-directed individual 
account plans. See 29 CFR 2550.404c-1, paragraphs (f)(8) and (f)(9).
    Moreover, in the case of an employer or plan sponsor, neither the 
employer, plan sponsor, nor their employees ordinarily receive fees or 
other compensation in connection with the educational services and 
materials that they provide to plan participants and beneficiaries. 
Thus, even if they crossed the line from education to actual investment 
advice, the absence of a fee or other compensation would generally 
preclude a finding that the communication constituted fiduciary 
investment advice. It is important to note, however, that 
communications from the plan administrator or other person in a 
fiduciary capacity would be subject to ERISA's general prudence duties 
notwithstanding the fact that the communications may not result in the 
person also becoming a fiduciary under ERISA's investment advice 
provisions.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ The Department has acknowledged that a plan sponsor may 
wish merely to provide office space or make computer terminals 
available for use by a service provider that has been selected by a 
participant or beneficiary to provide investment education using 
interactive materials. The Department said that whether a plan 
sponsor or fiduciary has effectively endorsed or made an arrangement 
with a particular service provider is an inherently factual inquiry 
that depends upon all the relevant facts and circumstances. The 
Department explained, however, that a uniformly applied policy of 
providing office space or computer terminals for use by participants 
or beneficiaries who have independently selected a service provider 
to provide investment education would not, in and of itself, 
constitute an endorsement of or an arrangement with the service 
provider. See Preamble to Interpretative Bulletin 96-1, 61 FR 29586, 
29587-88, June 11, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the comments suggesting that the Department adopt 
FINRA Notice 13-45 as a safe harbor for communications on benefit 
distributions, the FINRA notice did not purport to define a line 
between education and advice. The final rule seeks to ensure that all 
investment advice to retirement investors adheres to fiduciary norms, 
particularly including advice as critically important as 
recommendations on how to manage a lifetime of savings held in a 
retirement plan and on whether to roll over plan accounts. Following 
FINRA and SEC guidance on best practices is a good way for advisers to 
look out for the interests of their customers, but it does not give 
them a pass from ERISA fiduciary status.
    With respect to the tax code provisions regarding required minimum 
distributions, the Department agrees with commenters that merely 
advising a participant or IRA owner that certain distributions are 
required by tax law would not constitute investment advice. Whether 
such ``tax'' advice is accompanied by a recommendation that constitutes 
``investment advice'' would depend on the particular facts and 
circumstances involved.
(3) Recommendations on the Management of Securities or Other Investment 
Property
    As in the 2015 Proposal, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of the final rule 
provides that a recommendation as to the ``management'' of securities 
or other investment property is fiduciary investment advice. Some 
commenters contended this provision could be read very broadly and 
asked for clarification as to the scope of activities covered by the 
term. These commenters were concerned that ``management'' could be read 
as duplicative of paragraph (a)(1)(i) of the proposal, which concerned 
recommendations on the ``investment'' of plan or IRA assets. The 
Department also received comments seeking clarification regarding this 
provision's impact on, for example, foreign exchange transactions, the 
internal operation of stable value funds, and options trading. Others 
questioned whether the recommendation of a general investment strategy 
or recommending use of a class of investment products fall within the 
meaning of the term ``management'' of plan or IRA assets, even in cases 
where a particular product is not recommended.
    The Department agrees that further clarification of the concept of 
``management'' in the final rule would be helpful. Accordingly, the 
final rule includes text from the 1975 regulation that gives examples 
of ``investment management'' that the Department believes will clarify 
the difference between investment recommendations and investment 
management recommendations. Specifically, the final rule includes text 
that describes management of securities or other investment property, 
as including, among other things, recommendations on investment 
policies or strategies, portfolio composition, or recommendations on 
distributions, including rollovers, from a plan or IRA. The final rule 
also adds another example to make it clear that recommendations to move 
from commission-based accounts to advisory fee based accounts would be 
fiduciary investment advice under this provision. As explained above 
and more fully below, the final rule also includes recommendations on 
the selection of other persons to provide investment advice or 
investment management services in this provision rather than in a 
separate provision.
    The new text is consistent with FINRA guidance that makes it clear 
that recommendations on investment strategy are subject to the federal 
securities laws' ``suitability'' requirements regardless of whether the 
recommendation results in a securities transaction or even references a 
specific security or securities. Specifically, FINRA explained this 
requirement in a set of FAQs on Rule 2111:
    The rule explicitly states that the term ``strategy'' should be 
interpreted broadly. The rule would cover a recommended investment 
strategy regardless of whether the recommendation results in a 
securities transaction or even references a specific security or 
securities. For instance, the rule would cover a recommendation to 
purchase securities using margin or liquefied home equity or to engage 
in day trading, irrespective of whether the recommendation results in a 
transaction or references particular securities. The term also would 
capture an explicit recommendation to hold a security or securities. 
While a decision to hold might be considered a passive strategy, an 
explicit recommendation to hold does constitute the type of advice upon 
which a customer can be expected to rely. An explicit recommendation to 
hold is tantamount to a ``call to action'' in the sense of a suggestion 
that the customer stay the course with the investment. The rule would 
apply, for example, when an associated person meets with a customer 
during a quarterly or annual investment review and explicitly advises 
the customer not to sell any securities in or make any changes to the 
account or portfolio. . . . (footnotes omitted)
    FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ (available at www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq). The Department agrees 
that recommendations on investment strategies for a fee or other 
compensation with respect to assets of an employee benefit plan or IRA 
should be fiduciary investment advice under ERISA. The final rule 
includes text that makes this clear.
    Some commenters suggested that the concept of ``management'' 
covered only proxy voting, and pointed to the preamble to the 2010 
Proposal which stated that the ``management of securities or other 
property'' would

[[Page 20967]]

include advice and recommendations as to the exercise of rights 
appurtenant to shares of stock (e.g., voting proxies). 75 FR 65266 
(Oct. 22, 2010). As discussed elsewhere in this Notice, the concept of 
investment management recommendations is not that limited. Nonetheless, 
the Department has long viewed the exercise of ownership rights as a 
fiduciary responsibility because of its material effect on plan 
investment goals. 29 CFR 2509.08-2 (2008). Consequently, 
recommendations on the exercise of proxy or other ownership rights are 
appropriately treated as fiduciary in nature. Accordingly, the final 
rule's inclusion of advice regarding the management of securities or 
other property within the term ``investment advice'' in paragraph 
(a)(1)(ii) covers recommendations as to proxy voting and the management 
of retirement assets. As with other types of investment advice, 
guidelines or other information on voting policies for proxies that are 
provided to a broad class of investors without regard to a client's 
individual interests or investment policy, and which are not directed 
or presented as a recommended policy for the plan or IRA to adopt, 
would not rise to the level of fiduciary investment advice under the 
final rule. Similarly, a recommendation addressed to all shareholders 
in an SEC-required proxy statement in connection with a shareholder 
meeting of a company whose securities are registered under Section 12 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example soliciting a 
shareholder vote on the election of directors and the approval of other 
corporate action, would not constitute fiduciary investment advice 
under the rule from the person who creates or distributes the proxy 
statement.
    With respect to the comments seeking clarification of this 
provision's application to foreign exchange transactions, the internal 
operation of stable value funds, and options trading, the Department 
does not believe there is a need for special clarification. For 
example, recommendations on foreign exchange transactions and options 
trading clearly can involve recommendations on investment policies or 
strategies and portfolio composition. Whether any particular 
communication rises to the level of a recommendation would depend, as 
with any other communication to a plan or IRA investor, on context, 
content, and presentation. Thus, merely explaining the general 
importance of maintaining a diversified portfolio or describing how 
options work would not generally meet the regulation's definition of a 
covered ``recommendation.'' But if, on the other hand, the adviser 
recommends that the investor change the composition of her portfolio or 
pursue an option strategy, the adviser makes a recommendation covered 
by the rule. Similarly, a recommendation to transition from a 
commissionable account to a fee-based account would constitute a 
recommendation on the management of assets covered by the rule, and 
compensation received as a result of that recommendation could be a 
prohibited transaction for which an exemption would be required. The 
impact of the final rule in this regard should largely be limited to 
retail retirement investors because, to the extent the communications 
involve sophisticated financial professional or large money managers, 
the final rule's provision that allows such communications to be 
excluded from fiduciary investment advice should address the 
commenters' request for clarification.
(4) Recommendations on Selection of an Investment Adviser or Investment 
Manager
    The proposal included paragraph (a)(1)(iv) that separately treated 
recommendations on the selection of investment advisers for a fee as 
fiduciary investment advice. In the Department's view, the current 1975 
regulation already covered such advice, as well as recommendations on 
the selection of other persons providing investment management 
services. The Department continues to believe that such recommendations 
should be treated as fiduciary in nature but concluded that presenting 
such hiring recommendations as a separate provision may have created 
some confusion among commenters, as discussed above.
    Many commenters expressed concern about the effect of the 
proposal's paragraph (a)(1)(iv) on a service or investment provider's 
solicitation efforts on its own (or an affiliate's) behalf to potential 
clients, including routine sales or promotion activity, such as the 
marketing or sale of one's own products or services to plans, 
participants, or IRA owners. These commenters argued that the provision 
in the proposal could be interpreted broadly enough to capture as 
investment advice nearly all marketing activity that occurs during 
initial conversations with plan fiduciaries or other potential clients 
associated with hiring a person who would either manage or advise as to 
plan assets. Service providers argued that the proposal could preclude 
them from being able to provide information and data on their services 
to plans, participants, and IRA owners, during the sales process in a 
non-fiduciary capacity. For example, commenters questioned whether the 
mere provision of a brochure or a sales presentation, especially if 
targeted to a specific market segment, plan size, or group of 
individuals, could be fiduciary investment advice under the 2015 
Proposal based on the express or implicit recommendation to hire the 
service provider. Commenters stated that a similar issue exists in the 
distribution and rollover context regarding a sales pitch to 
participants about potential retention of an adviser to provide 
retirement investment services outside of the plan.
    Many commenters were also concerned that the provision would treat 
responses to requests for proposal (RFP) as investment advice, 
especially in cases where the RFP requires some degree of 
individualization in the response or where specific representations 
were included about the quality of services being offered. For example, 
a service provider may include a sample fund line up or discuss 
specific products or services as part of its RFP presentation. 
Commenters argued that this or similar individualization should not 
trigger fiduciary status in an RFP context. A specific example of this 
issue is whether and how providers can respond to inquiries concerning 
the mapping of plan investments, in which case they often are asked to 
provide specific examples of alternative investments; a few commenters 
indicated that the Department should clarify application of the rule in 
this context. Other commenters stated that the proposed regulation 
conflates two separate acts--(i) the recommendation to hire the adviser 
and (ii) the recommendation to make particular investments or to pursue 
particular investment strategies. Some commenters said the proposal 
would create a fiduciary obligation for the adviser to tell the 
potential investor if some other adviser could provide the same 
services for lower fees, for example. They described such an obligation 
as unprecedented and not commercially viable.
    Some other commenters argued that recommendations on the engagement 
of an adviser is not ``investment'' advice at all, and suggested that 
the final rule should be limited to an adviser's recommendation on 
investments and services. These commenters explained that plan 
fiduciaries commonly look to existing consultants, attorneys, and other 
professionals for referrals to other service providers, and that 
service

[[Page 20968]]

providers should not be stifled in their ability to refer other service 
providers, including advisers. Commenters also offered suggestions for 
possible conditions that the Department could impose to ensure there is 
no abuse in this context, for example requiring that the plan fiduciary 
enter into a separate contract or arrangement with the other service 
provider, that the referring provider disclose that its referral is not 
a recommendation or endorsement, or that the referring party be far 
removed from the ultimate recommendation or advice. Finally, some 
commenters requested that the Department state that the provision would 
not apply to specific types of referrals, for example a recommendation 
to hire ``an'' adviser rather than any particular adviser, referrals to 
non-fiduciary service providers, and recommendations to a colleague.
    The Department continues to believe that the recommendation of 
another person to be entrusted with investment advice or investment 
management authority over retirement assets is often critical to the 
proper management and investment of those assets and should be 
fiduciary in nature. Recommendations of investment advisers or managers 
are no different than recommendations of investments that the plan or 
IRA may acquire and are often, by virtue of the track record or 
information surrounding the capabilities and strategies that are 
employed by the recommended fiduciary, inseparable from the types of 
investments that the plan or IRA will acquire. For example, the 
assessment of an investment fund manager or management is often a 
critical part of the analysis of which fund to pick for investing plan 
or IRA assets. That decision thus is clearly part of a prudent 
investment analysis, and advice on that subject is, in the Department's 
view, fairly characterized as investment advice. Failing to include 
such advice within the scope of the final rule carries the risk of 
creating a significant gap or loophole.
    It was not the intent of the Department, however, that one could 
become a fiduciary merely by engaging in the normal activity of 
marketing oneself or an affiliate as a potential fiduciary to be 
selected by a plan fiduciary or IRA owner, without making an investment 
recommendation covered by (a)(1)(i) or (ii). Thus, the final rule was 
revised to state, as an example of a covered recommendation on 
investment management, a recommendation on the selection of ``other 
persons'' to provide investment advice or investment management 
services. Accordingly, a person or firm can tout the quality of his, 
her, or its own advisory or investment management services or those of 
any other person known by the investor to be, or fairly identified by 
the adviser as, an affiliate, without triggering fiduciary obligations.
    However, the revision in the final rule does not, and should not be 
read to, exempt a person from being a fiduciary with respect to any of 
the investment recommendations covered by paragraphs (a)(1)(i) or (ii). 
The final rule draws a line between an adviser's marketing of the value 
of its own advisory or investment management services, on the one hand, 
and making recommendations to retirement investors on how to invest or 
manage their savings, on the other. An adviser can recommend that a 
retirement investor enter into an advisory relationship with the 
adviser without acting as a fiduciary. But when the adviser recommends, 
for example, that the investor pull money out of a plan or invest in a 
particular fund, that advice is given in a fiduciary capacity even if 
part of a presentation in which the adviser is also recommending that 
the person enter into an advisory relationship. The adviser also could 
not recommend that a plan participant roll money out of a plan into 
investments that generate a fee for the adviser, but leave the 
participant in a worse position than if he had left the money in the 
plan. Thus, when a recommendation to ``hire me'' effectively includes a 
recommendation on how to invest or manage plan or IRA assets (e.g., 
whether to roll assets into an IRA or plan or how to invest assets if 
rolled over), that recommendation would need to be evaluated separately 
under the provisions in the final rule.
    Some commenters stated that it is common practice for some service 
providers, such as recordkeepers, to be asked by customers to provide a 
list of names of investment advisers with whom the recordkeepers have 
existing relationships (e.g., systems interfaces). The commenters asked 
that the final rule expressly address when such ``simple referrals'' 
constitute a recommendation of an investment adviser or investment 
manager covered by the rule. The Department does not believe a specific 
exclusion for ``referrals'' is an appropriate way to address this 
concern. Rather, the issue presented by these comments, in the 
Department's view, is more properly treated as a question about when a 
``referral'' rises to the level of a ``recommendation,'' and whether 
the recommendation was given for a fee or other compensation as the 
rule requires. As described above, the final rule has a new provision 
that further defines the term ``recommendation.'' That definition 
requires that the communication, ``based on its content, context, and 
presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the 
advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular course 
of action.'' Whether a referral rises to the level of a recommendation, 
then, depends on the content, context, and manner of presentation. If, 
in context, the investor would reasonably believe that the service 
provider is recommending that the plan base its hiring decision on the 
specific list provided by the adviser, and the service provider 
receives compensation or referral fees for providing the list, the 
communication would be fiduciary in nature.
    With respect to the question about whether a general recommendation 
to hire ``an adviser'' would constitute fiduciary investment advice 
even if the recommendation did not identify any particular person or 
group of persons to engage, the Department does not intend to cover 
such a recommendation within the prong of the final rule that requires 
a recommendation of an unaffiliated person. While it is possible that 
such a communication could be presented in a way that constituted a 
recommendation regarding the management of securities or other 
investment property, it seems unlikely, in most circumstances, for such 
a general recommendation to result in the person's receipt of a fee or 
compensation that would give rise to a prohibited transaction requiring 
compliance with the conditions of an exemption.
    There was also concern that recommendations of service providers 
who themselves are not fiduciary investment advisers or investment 
managers, for example, because of a carve-out under the proposal, may 
be considered fiduciary advice whereas the underlying activity of the 
recommended service provider would not. The Department did not intend 
the proposal to reach recommendations of persons to provide services 
that did not constitute fiduciary investment advice or fiduciary 
investment management services. Although the Department agrees that 
potential conflicts of interest may exist with respect to 
recommendations to hire non-fiduciary service providers (e.g., 
recommendations to hire a particular firm to execute securities 
transactions on a non-discretionary basis or to act as a recordkeeper 
with respect to investments), the Department concluded that a more 
expansive definitional approach could result in coverage of 
recommendations that fell outside the

[[Page 20969]]

scope of investment ``management'' and cause undue uncertainty about 
the fiduciary definition's application to particular hiring 
recommendations. Accordingly, the final rule was not expanded to 
include recommendations of such other service providers within the 
scope of recommendations regarding management of plan or IRA assets.
(5) Appraisals and Valuations
    After carefully reviewing the comments, the Department has 
concluded that the issues related to valuations are more appropriately 
addressed in a separate regulatory initiative. Therefore, unlike the 
proposal, the final rule does not address appraisals, fairness 
opinions, or similar statements concerning the value of securities or 
other property in any way. Consequently, in the absence of regulations 
or other guidance by the Department, appraisals, fairness opinions and 
other similar statements will not be considered fiduciary investment 
advice for purposes of the final rule.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of the 2015 Proposal, like the 1975 
regulation, which included advice as to ``the value of securities or 
other property,'' covered certain appraisals and valuation reports. 
However, it was considerably more focused than the 2010 Proposal. 
Responding to comments to the 2010 Proposal, the 2015 Proposal in 
paragraph (a)(1)(iii) covered only appraisals, fairness opinions, or 
similar statements that relate to a particular investment transaction. 
Under paragraph (b)(5)(iii), the proposal also expanded the 2010 
Proposal's carve-out for general reports or statements of value 
provided to satisfy required reporting and disclosure rules under ERISA 
or the Code. In this manner, the proposal focused on instances where 
the plan or IRA owner is looking to the appraiser for advice on the 
market value of an asset that the investor is considering to acquire, 
dispose, or exchange. The proposal also contained a carve-out at 
paragraph (b)(5)(ii) specifically addressing valuations or appraisals 
provided to an investment fund (e.g., collective investment fund or 
pooled separate account) holding assets of various investors in 
addition to at least one plan or IRA. In paragraph (b)(5)(i) of the 
proposal, the Department decided not to extend fiduciary coverage to 
valuations, fairness opinions, or appraisals for ESOPs relating to 
employer securities because it concluded that its concerns in this 
space raise unique issues that would be more appropriately addressed in 
a separate regulatory initiative.
    Many commenters requested that the Department narrow the scope of 
this provision of the proposal, or alternatively, expand the carve-outs 
on valuations to clarify that routine or ministerial, non-discretionary 
valuation functions that are necessary and appropriate to plan 
administration or integral to the offering and reporting of investment 
products are not fiduciary advice. Commenters also requested an 
explanation of what was meant by ``in connection with a specific 
transaction'' and explained that many appraisals support fairness 
opinions that fiduciary investment managers render in connection with 
specific transactions. Some commenters asked that the Department remove 
valuations of all types from the definition of investment advice 
because, in their view, valuations and appraisals are conceptually 
different from investment advice in that they involve questions of fact 
as to what an investment ``is'' worth, rather than qualitative 
assessments of what investment ``should'' be held, how they ``should'' 
be managed, and who ``should'' be hired. Further these commenters 
believe that the Department had not established the abuse that it is 
attempting to curb with this provision. Other commenters suggest that 
the Department reserve the issue of valuations pending further study. 
Other commenters suggested that the Department make certain exceptions 
for valuations provided to ESOPs regardless of whether the valuation is 
conducted on a transactional basis or if independent plan fiduciaries 
engaged the valuation provider. Some others suggested that the current 
professional standards for appraisers are sufficient or that the 
Department should develop its own.
    Other commenters agree with the Department that appraisal and 
valuation information is extremely important to plans when acquiring or 
disposing of assets. Some also expressed concern that valuations can 
steer participants toward riskier assets at the point of distribution.
    It continues to be the Department's opinion that, in many 
transactions, a proper appraisal of hard-to-value assets is the single 
most important factor in determining the prudence of the transaction. 
Accordingly, the Department believes that employers and participants 
could benefit from the imposition of fiduciary standards on appraisers 
when they value assets in connection with investment transactions. The 
Department believes that this is particularly true in the employer 
security valuation context in which the Department has seen some 
extreme cases of abuse. In the case of closely-held companies, ESOP 
trustees typically rely on professional appraisers and advisers to 
value the stock, often do not proceed with a transaction in the absence 
of an appraisal, and sometimes engage in little or no negotiation over 
price. In these cases, the appraiser effectively determines the price 
the plan pays for the stock with plan assets. Unfortunately, in 
investigations and enforcement actions, the Department has seen many 
instances of improper ESOP appraisals--often involving most or all of a 
plan's assets--resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in losses.
    After carefully considering the comments, the Department is 
persuaded that ESOP valuations present special issues that should be 
the focus of a separate project. The Department also believes that 
piecemeal determinations as to inclusions or exclusions of particular 
valuations may produce unfair or inconsistent results. Accordingly, 
rather than single out ESOP appraisers for special treatment under the 
final rule, the Department has concluded that it is preferable to 
broadly address appraisal issues generally in a separate project so 
that it can ensure consistent treatment of appraisers under ERISA's 
fiduciary provisions. Given the common issues and problems appraisers 
face, it is quite likely that the comments and issues presented to the 
Department by ESOP appraisers will be relevant to other appraisers as 
well.

B. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(a)(2)--The Circumstances Under Which Advice Is 
Provided

    As provided in paragraph (a)(2) of the final rule, a person would 
be considered a fiduciary investment adviser in connection with a 
recommendation of a type listed paragraph (a)(1) of the final rule, if 
the recommendation is made either directly or indirectly (e.g., through 
or together with any affiliate) by a person who:
    (i) Represents or acknowledges that it is acting as a fiduciary 
within the meaning of the Act or Code with respect to the advice 
described in paragraph (a)(1);
    (ii) Renders the advice pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, 
arrangement or understanding that the advice is based on the particular 
investment needs of the advice recipient; or
    (iii) Directs the advice to a specific advice recipient or 
recipients regarding the advisability of a particular investment or 
management decision

[[Page 20970]]

with respect to securities or other investment property of the plan or 
IRA.
    As in the proposal, under paragraph (a)(2)(i) of the final rule, 
advisers who claim fiduciary status under ERISA or the Code are 
required to honor their words. They may not say they are acting as 
fiduciaries and later argue that the advice was not fiduciary in 
nature. Several commenters focused on the provision in the proposal 
covering investment recommendations ``if the person providing the 
advice, either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with 
an affiliate)'' acts in one of the three ways specified. With respect 
to representations of fiduciary status, comments said that the 
Department should change the final rule to require ``direct'' 
representations in this context. They argued that the representation 
should be made only by the person or entity that will be the investment 
advice fiduciary and that a loose reference by an affiliate should not 
suffice, nor should acknowledgement of fiduciary status by one party 
extend such status to such fiduciary's affiliates. One commenter 
suggested that this provision be clarified by requiring the 
representation or acknowledgement of fiduciary status to be ``with 
respect to a particular account and a particular recommendation or 
series of recommendations.'' A few commenters asked whether the 
provision requires the person to explicitly use the word ``fiduciary'' 
or to refer to ERISA or the Code in describing his or her status, or 
whether the Department intended to include characterizations that imply 
fiduciary status are included, for example words and phrases such as 
``trusted adviser,'' ``personalized advice,'' or that advice will be in 
the client's ``best interest.'' One commenter asked whether the 
acknowledgement of fiduciary status had to be in writing.
    The Department does not agree that the suggested changes are 
necessary or appropriate. In general, it has been the longstanding view 
of the Department that when an individual acts as an employee, agent or 
registered representative on behalf of an entity engaged to provide 
investment advice to a plan, that individual, as well as the entity, 
would be investment advice fiduciaries under the final rule. The 
Department's intent also is to ensure that persons holding themselves 
out as fiduciaries with respect to investment advice to retirement 
investors cannot deny their fiduciary status if a dispute subsequently 
arises, but rather must honor their words. There is no one formulation 
that must be used to trigger fiduciary status in this regard, but 
rather the question is whether the person was reasonably understood to 
hold itself out as a fiduciary with respect to communications with the 
plan or IRA investor. If a person or entity does not want investment-
related communications to be treated as fiduciary in nature, it should 
exercise care not to suggest otherwise. Moreover, some of the suggested 
changes with respect to affiliates could encourage ``bait and switch'' 
tactics where a person encourages individuals to seek fiduciary 
investment advice from an affiliate, but then later claims those 
communications are not relevant unless expressly ratified by the person 
in direct communications with an advice recipient. This is particularly 
true given the interrelated nature of affiliated financial service 
companies and their operations, and the likelihood that ordinary 
retirement investors will not know the details of a corporate family's 
legal structure or draw fine lines between different segments of the 
same corporate family. On the other hand, the mere fact that an 
affiliate acknowledged its fiduciary status for purposes other than 
rendering advice (for example, as a trustee) would not constitute a 
representation or acknowledgement that the person was acting as a 
fiduciary ``with respect to'' that person's investment-related 
communications.
    The proposal alternatively required that ``the advice be rendered 
pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, arrangement or understanding 
that the advice is individualized to, or that such advice is 
specifically directed to, the advice recipient for consideration in 
making investment or management decisions with respect to the plan or 
IRA.'' Commenters focused on several aspects of this provision. First, 
they argued that the ``specifically directed'' and ``individualized'' 
prongs were unclear, overly broad, and duplicative, because any advice 
that was individualized would also be specifically directed at the 
recipient. Second, they said it was not clear whether there had to be 
an agreement, arrangement, or understanding that advice was 
specifically directed to a recipient, and, if so, what would be 
required for such an agreement, arrangement or understanding to exist. 
They expressed concern about fiduciary status possibly arising from a 
subjective belief of a participant or IRA investor. And third, they 
requested modification of the phrase ``for consideration,'' believing 
the phrase was overly broad and set the threshold too low for requiring 
that recommendations be made for the purpose of making investment 
decisions. A number of other commenters explicitly endorsed the phrases 
``specifically directed,'' and ``individualized to,'' believing that 
these are appropriate and straightforward thresholds to attach 
fiduciary status.
    As explained in the preamble to the 2015 Proposal, the parties need 
not have a subjective meeting of the minds on the extent to which the 
advice recipient will actually rely on the advice, but the 
circumstances surrounding the relationship must be such that a 
reasonable person would understand that the nature of the relationship 
is one in which the adviser is to consider the particular needs of the 
advice recipient. 80 FR 21940. The Department agrees, however, that the 
provision in the proposal could be improved and clarified. The final 
rule changes this provision in two respects. First, the phrase ``for 
consideration'' has been removed from the provision. After reviewing 
the comments, the Department believes that clause as drafted was 
largely redundant to the provisions in paragraph (a)(1) of the proposal 
and that the final rule sets forth the subject matter areas to which a 
recommendation must relate to constitute investment advice. The final 
rule thus revises the condition to require that advice be ``directed 
to'' a specific advice recipient or recipients regarding the 
advisability of a particular investment or management decision.'' 
Second, although the preamble to the proposal stated that the 
``specifically directed to'' provision, like the individualized advice 
provision, required that there be an agreement, arrangement or 
understanding that advice was specifically directed to the recipient, 
the Department agrees that using that terminology for both the 
individualized advice prong and the specifically directed to prong 
serves no useful purpose for defining fiduciary investment advice. The 
point of the proposal's language concerning advice specifically 
directed to an individual was to distinguish specific investment 
recommendations to an individual from ``recommendations made to the 
general public, or to no one in particular.'' 75 FR 21940. Examples 
included general circulation newsletters, television talk show 
commentary, and remarks in speeches and presentations at conferences. 
The final rule now includes a new provision (paragraph (b)(2)) to make 
clear that such general communications generally are not advice because 
they are not recommendations within the meaning of the final rule. A 
showing that an adviser directed a specific investment recommendation 
to a specific person

[[Page 20971]]

necessarily carries with it a reasonable basis for both the adviser and 
the advice recipient to understand what the adviser was doing. The 
Department thus agrees with the commenters who said this element of the 
condition was unnecessary and could lead to confusion. The Department 
does not view this change as enlarging the definition of investment 
advice from what was set forth in the proposal.
    As the Department indicated in the preamble to the proposed 
regulation, advisers should not be able to specifically direct 
investment recommendations to individual persons, but then deny 
fiduciary responsibility on the basis that they did not, in fact, 
consider the advice recipient's individual needs or intend that the 
recipient base investment decisions on their recommendations. Nor 
should they be able to continue the practice of advertising advice or 
counseling that is one-on-one or tailored to the investor's individual 
needs and then use boilerplate language to disclaim that the investment 
recommendations are fiduciary investment advice.

C. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(b)--Definition of Recommendation

    Paragraph (b)(1) describes when a communication based on its 
context, content, and presentation would be viewed as a 
``recommendation,'' a fundamental element in establishing the existence 
of fiduciary investment advice. Paragraph (b)(2) sets forth examples of 
certain types of communications which are not ``recommendations'' under 
that definition. With respect to paragraph (b) in the final rule, the 
Department noted in the proposal that the proposed general definition 
of investment advice was intentionally broad to avoid weaknesses of the 
1975 regulation and to reflect the broad sweep of the statutory text. 
But, at the same time, the Department recognized that, standing alone, 
it could sweep in some relationships that are not appropriately 
regarded as fiduciary in nature. The proposal included ``carve-outs'' 
to exclude certain specified communications and activities from the 
scope of the definition of investment advice. Various public comments 
expressed concern or confusion regarding several of the carve-outs. The 
commenters said certain conduct under the carve-outs did not seem to 
fall within the scope of the general definition such that a ``carve-
out'' was not necessary. They also expressed concern that classifying 
such conduct as within a ``carve-out'' might carry an implication that 
anything that did not technically meet the conditions of the carve-out 
would automatically meet the definition of investment advice. The 
Department agrees that the ``carve-out'' approach, both as a structural 
matter and as a matter of terminology, was not the best way to address 
the issue of delineating the scope of fiduciary investment advice. 
Accordingly, the final rule in paragraphs (b) (and (c) discussed below) 
uses an alternative approach, more analogous to that used by FINRA in 
addressing a similar issue under the securities laws, that involves 
expanding the definition of what constitutes a ``recommendation.''
(1) Communications and Activities That Constitute Recommendations
    In the Department's view, whether a ``recommendation'' has occurred 
is a threshold issue and the initial step in determining whether 
investment advice has occurred. The proposal included a definition of 
recommendation in paragraph (f)(1): ``[A] communication that, based on 
its content, context, and presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a 
suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a 
particular course of action.'' For example, FINRA Policy Statement 01-
23 sets forth guidelines to assist brokers in evaluating whether a 
particular communication could be viewed as a recommendation, thereby 
triggering application of FINRA's Rule 2111 that requires that a firm 
or associated person have a reasonable basis to believe that a 
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or 
securities is suitable for the customer.\26\ In the proposal, the 
Department specifically solicited comments on whether it should adopt 
some or all of the standards developed by FINRA in defining 
communications that rise to the level of a recommendation for purposes 
of distinguishing between investment education and investment advice 
under ERISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ FINRA Rule 2111 requires, in part, that a broker-dealer or 
associated person ``have a reasonable basis to believe that a 
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security 
or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information 
obtained through the reasonable diligence of the [firm] or 
associated person to ascertain the customer's investment profile.'' 
In a set of FAQs on Rule 2111, FINRA explained that ``[i]n general, 
a customer's investment profile would include the customer's age, 
other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, 
investment objectives, investment experience, investment time 
horizon, liquidity needs and risk tolerance. The rule also 
explicitly covers recommended investment strategies involving 
securities, including recommendations to `hold' securities.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argued that the definition captured too broad a 
range of communications, citing as an example use of the term 
``suggestion'' in the proposed definition and argued that it could be 
read so broadly that nearly every casual conversation between an 
adviser and a client could constitute investment advice. The commenters 
suggested that the definition require a ``clear and affirmative 
endorsement'' of a particular course of action. Some argued that their 
concerns could be addressed by formally adopting and citing FINRA 
standards as the operative text in the rule because they consider 
FINRA's standards to be appropriate in the context of defining 
fiduciary investment advice. Further, this would create consistency for 
service providers who must comply with both ERISA's and FINRA's 
requirements. Other commenters opposed wholesale adoption of FINRA 
standards because the final rule then would be subject to future 
changes or interpretations of the FINRA guidance that might not be 
consistent with the purposes of the conflict of interest rule. They 
also argued that such an approach would introduce ambiguities into the 
final rule because the concepts and terminology in the FINRA guidance 
pertained primarily to transactions involving brokers and securities, 
and those concepts and terminology might not be easily applied to other 
types of investment advisers and other types of investment advice 
transactions. For example, the FINRA guidance applies to 
recommendations to invest in securities, but the ERISA rule would also 
cover recommendations regarding investment advisory services.
    In the final rule, the initial threshold of whether a person is a 
fiduciary by virtue of providing investment advice continues to be 
whether that person makes a recommendation as to the various activities 
described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii). Paragraph (b)(1) of the 
final rule continues to define ``recommendation'' for purposes of 
paragraph (a) as a communication that, based on its content, context, 
and presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the 
advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular course 
of action. Thus, communications that require the adviser to comply with 
suitability requirements under applicable securities or insurance laws 
will be viewed as a recommendation. The final rule also includes 
additional text intended to clarify the nature of communications that 
would constitute recommendations. The final rule makes

[[Page 20972]]

it clear that the determination of whether a ``recommendation'' has 
been made is an objective rather than subjective inquiry. The final 
rule mirrors the FINRA guidance in stating that the more individually 
tailored the communication is to a particular customer or customers 
about a specific security or investment strategy, the more likely the 
communication will be viewed as a recommendation. It also tracks SEC 
staff guidance in explaining that advice about securities for purposes 
of the Investment Advisers Act includes providing a selective list of 
securities as appropriate for an investor even if no recommendation is 
made with respect to any one security.\27\ Furthermore, the final rule 
conforms to the FINRA guidance under which a series of actions, 
directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any affiliate), 
that may not constitute recommendations when viewed individually may 
amount to a recommendation when considered in the aggregate. It also 
adopts the FINRA position that it makes no difference in determining 
the existence of a recommendation whether the communication was 
initiated by a person or a computer software program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See Report entitled ``Regulation of Investment Advisers by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,'' dated March 2013, 
prepared by the Staff of the Investment Adviser Regulation Office, 
Division of Investment Management, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (available at www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the comments that emphasized the breadth of the 
term ``suggestion,'' the Department notes that the same term is used in 
the FINRA guidance and securities laws and related regulations to 
define and establish standards related to investment recommendations. 
Accordingly, the Department does not believe the use of that term in 
the rule reasonably carries the risk alleged by some commenters. 
Nonetheless, the final rule includes new text to emphasize that there 
must be an investment ``recommendation'' as a threshold issue and 
initial step in determining whether investment advice has occurred, and 
clarifies that a recommendation requires that there be a call to action 
that a reasonable person would believe was a suggestion to make or hold 
a particular investment or pursue a particular investment strategy.
    With respect to comments that suggested adopting the FINRA standard 
for recommendation, in the Department's view, FINRA guidance does not 
specifically define the term recommendation in a way that can be 
directly incorporated into the final rule. The Department agrees with 
commenters that strictly adopting FINRA guidance would mean that the 
final rule could be subject to changes in FINRA interpretations 
announced in the future and not reviewed or separately adopted by the 
Department as the appropriate ERISA standard. The Department, however, 
as described both here and elsewhere in the preamble, has taken an 
approach to defining ``recommendation'' that is consistent with and 
based upon FINRA's approach.
(2) Communications and Activities That Do Not Constitute 
Recommendations
    To further clarify the meaning of recommendation, the Department 
has stated that the rendering of services or materials in conformance 
with paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (iv) would not be treated as a 
recommendation for purposes of the final rule. These paragraphs 
describe services or materials that provide general communications and 
commentary on investment products such as financial newsletters, which, 
with certain modifications, were identified as carve-outs under 
paragraph (b) of the proposal, such as marketing or making available a 
menu of investment alternatives that a plan fiduciary could choose 
from, identifying investment alternatives that meet objective criteria 
specified by a plan fiduciary, and providing information and materials 
that constitute investment education or retirement education.
    Before discussing the specific carve-outs themselves, many 
commenters suggested that the Department clarify the relationship 
between the fiduciary definition under paragraph (a)(1) and (2) of the 
proposal and the carve-outs. Some commenters suggested that conduct 
described in certain carve-outs would not have been fiduciary in nature 
to begin with under the general definition of investment advice in the 
proposal under paragraph (a)(1) and (2). Others suggested that the 
Department clarify that the carve-outs are interpretative examples and 
do not imply that any particular conduct is otherwise fiduciary in 
nature.
    As the Department described in the proposal, the purpose of the 
carve-outs was to highlight that in many circumstances, plan 
fiduciaries, participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners may receive 
recommendations that, notwithstanding the general definition set forth 
in paragraph (a) of the proposal, should not be treated as fiduciary 
investment advice. The Department believed that the conduct and 
information described in those carve-outs were beneficial for plans, 
plan fiduciaries, participants, beneficiaries and IRA owners and wanted 
to make it clear that the furnishing of the described information would 
not be considered investment advice. However, the Department agrees 
with many of the commenters that much of the conduct and information 
described in the proposal for certain of the carve-outs did not meet 
the technical definition of investment advice under paragraph (a)(1) 
and (2) of the proposal such that they should be excluded from that 
definition. Some were more in the nature of examples of education or 
other information which would not rise to the level of a recommendation 
to begin with. Thus, the final rule retains these provisions, with 
changes made in response to comments, but presents them as examples to 
clarify the definition of recommendation and does not characterize them 
as carve-outs.
(i) Platform Providers and Selection and Monitoring Assistance
    Paragraph (b)(2)(i) and (ii) of the final rule is directed to 
service providers, such as recordkeepers and third-party 
administrators, that offer a ``platform'' or selection of investment 
alternatives to participant-directed individual account plans and plan 
fiduciaries of these plans who choose the specific investment 
alternatives that will be made available to participants for investing 
their individual accounts. Paragraph (b)(2)(i) makes clear that such 
persons would not make recommendations covered under paragraph (b)(1) 
simply by making available, without regard to the individualized needs 
of the plan or its participants and beneficiaries, a platform of 
investment vehicles from which plan participants or beneficiaries may 
direct the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their 
individual accounts, as long as the plan fiduciary is independent of 
the person who markets or makes available the investment alternatives 
and the person discloses in writing to the plan fiduciary that they are 
not undertaking to provide impartial investment advice or to give 
advice in a fiduciary capacity. For purposes of this paragraph, a plan 
participant or beneficiary will not be considered a plan fiduciary. 
Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) additionally makes clear that certain common 
activities that platform providers may carry out to assist plan 
fiduciaries in selecting and monitoring the investment alternatives 
that they make available to plan participants are not recommendations. 
Under paragraph (b)(2)(ii), identifying offered investment alternatives 
meeting objective criteria specified by the plan fiduciary,

[[Page 20973]]

responding to RFPs, or providing objective financial data regarding 
available alternatives to the plan fiduciary would not cause a platform 
provider to be a fiduciary investment adviser.
    These two paragraphs address certain common practices that have 
developed with the growth of participant-directed individual account 
plans and recognize circumstances where the platform provider and the 
plan fiduciary clearly understand that the provider has financial or 
other relationships with the offered investment alternatives and is not 
purporting to provide impartial investment advice. They also 
accommodate the fact that platform providers often provide general 
financial information that falls short of constituting actual 
investment advice or recommendations, such as information on the 
historic performance of asset classes and of the investment 
alternatives available through the provider. The provisions also 
reflect the Department's agreement with commenters that a platform 
provider who merely identifies investment alternatives using objective 
third-party criteria (e.g., expense ratios, fund size, or asset type 
specified by the plan fiduciary) to assist in selecting and monitoring 
investment alternatives should not be considered to be making 
investment recommendations.
    As an initial matter, while the provisions in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) 
and (b)(2)(ii) of the final rule are intended to facilitate the 
effective and efficient operation of plans by plan sponsors, plan 
fiduciaries and plan service providers, the Department reiterates its 
longstanding view, recently codified in 29 CFR 2550.404a-5(f) and 
2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv) (2010), that ERISA plan fiduciaries selecting the 
platform or investment alternatives are always responsible for 
prudently selecting and monitoring providers of services to the plan or 
designated investment alternatives offered under the plan.
    Commenters requested confirmation that these provisions cover 
related services that are ``bundled'' with investment platforms. They 
claimed such services are an integral part of the platform offering. 
Some of these commenters focused on third-party administrative services 
and other assistance in connection with establishing a plan and its 
platform, such as standardized form 401(k) plans and information on 
investment options. Other commenters stated that platform providers 
must be able to communicate and explain services such as elective 
managed account programs, Qualified Default Investment Alternatives 
(QDIAs), investment adviser/manager options for participants, and non-
affiliated registered investment adviser services that will provide 
platform selection and monitoring services. In response, the Department 
believes that much of this information described by these commenters 
does not involve an investment recommendation within the meaning of the 
rule. Further, other provisions in the final rule, such as the 
provisions on education, and selection and monitoring assistance, more 
directly address the issues raised by the commenters. Accordingly, the 
Department did not make any change in this provision based on these 
comments.
    Several commenters also noted that the ``platform'' concept was not 
defined in the proposal, and stated that it was unclear, for example, 
whether the term ``platform'' encompassed a variety of lifetime income 
investment options, including group or individual annuities, or whether 
some other criteria also applied to the assessment of whether a 
proposed investment lineup constituted a platform (e.g., that the 
lineup not be limited to proprietary products or that it have a certain 
number of investment alternatives). In developing the final rule, the 
Department has neither limited the type of investment alternatives 
(e.g., by excluding lifetime income products) nor mandated a specific 
number of alternatives that may be offered by a platform provider on 
its platforms. The Department anticipates that the marketplace will 
influence both the investment alternatives and the size of platforms 
offered by platform providers to plans while plan fiduciaries retain 
their responsibility for selection of their plan's investment 
alternatives. The Department agrees with the commenters' 
acknowledgement that specific recommendations as to underlying 
investments on a platform would continue, of course, to be fiduciary 
investment advice.
    Commenters also sought clarification as to the persons who could 
rely on both of the carve-outs relating to platform providers. As 
finalized by the Department, the language of the provisions in 
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(2)(ii) of the final rule does not 
categorize or limit the persons who are engaged in the activities or 
communications. The language of these provisions deals with the 
activities themselves rather than classifying types of service 
providers that may evolve with market changes.
    Some commenters requested clarification of the language requiring 
that the platform must be ``without regard to the individual needs of 
the plan'' in paragraph (b)(3) of the proposal. Commenters believe that 
platform providers often beneficially offer to plan sponsors one or 
more sample investment platforms that are tailored to the needs of 
plans in different industries or market segments. They believe some 
level of customization or individualization (an act they referred to as 
``segmentation'') should be permitted as offering the full array of 
product alternatives to every plan could be counter-productive to 
helping plan sponsors, especially in the small employer segment of the 
market. The commenters claimed that these winnowed bundles are not 
individualized offerings for particular plans, but rather are targeted 
categories of investments for different general types of plans in 
different market segments.
    The Department generally agrees with these commenters that the 
marketing and making available of platforms segmented based on 
objective criteria would not result in providing fiduciary advice 
solely by virtue of the segmentation. Thus, for example, a platform 
provider who offers different platforms for small, medium, and large 
plans would not be providing investment advice merely because of this 
segmentation. In the Department's view, this type of activity is more 
akin to product development and is within the provider's discretion as 
a matter of business judgment, the same as if the provider decided not 
to offer platforms at all. Plan fiduciaries always are free to deal 
with vendors who do not design and offer platforms by market segment. 
Of course, a provider could find itself providing investment advice 
depending on the particular marketing technique used to promote a 
segmented platform. For example, if a provider were to communicate to 
the plan fiduciary of a small plan that a particular platform has been 
designed for small plans in general, and is appropriate for this plan 
in particular, the communication would likely constitute advice based 
on the individual needs of the plan and, therefore, very likely would 
be considered a recommendation.
    In response to the Department's request for comment on whether the 
platform provider provision as it appeared in the proposal should be 
limited to large plans, many commenters opposed such a limitation 
arguing that the platform provider provision was needed to preserve 
assistance to small plan sponsors with respect to the composition of 
investment platforms in 401(k) and similar individual account plans. 
The final rule does not limit the platform provider provision to large 
plans.

[[Page 20974]]

    Several commenters also asked the Department to clarify that the 
platform provider carve-out is available in the 403(b) plan 
marketplace. Since 403(b) plans are not subject to section 4975 of the 
Code, this issue is relevant only for 403(b) plans that are subject to 
Title I of ERISA. In the Department's view, a 403(b) plan that is 
subject to Title I of ERISA would be an individual account plan within 
the meaning of ERISA section 3(34) for purposes of the final rule. 
Thus, the platform provider provision is available with respect to such 
Title I plans.
    Other commenters asked that the platform provider provision be 
generally extended to apply to IRAs. In the IRA context, however, there 
typically is no separate independent fiduciary who interacts with the 
platform provider to protect the interests of the account owners, or 
who is responsible for selecting the investments included in the 
platform. In the Department's view, when a firm or adviser narrows the 
wide universe of potential investments in the marketplace to a limited 
lineup that it holds out for consideration by an individual IRA owner, 
the fiduciary status of the communication is best evaluated under the 
general ``recommendation'' test, rather than under the specific 
exclusion for platform providers communicating with independent plan 
fiduciaries. Without an independent plan fiduciary overseeing the 
investment lineup and signing off on any disclaimers of reliance on the 
advice, there is too great a danger that the exclusion would 
effectively shield fiduciary recommendations from treatment as such, 
even though the IRA owner reasonably understood the communications as 
constituting individualized recommendations on how to manage assets for 
retirement. The Department is of a similar view with respect to plan 
participants who have individually directed brokerage accounts. 
Consequently, the final rule declines to extend application of the 
platform provider provisions to plan participants and beneficiaries, 
and IRAs.
    Nonetheless, the Department notes that the separate provision in 
the final rule regarding transactions with independent plan fiduciaries 
with financial expertise would be available for persons providing 
advice to IRAs and plans regarding investment platforms. With respect 
to employee benefit plans in particular, the Department notes that the 
2014 ERISA Advisory Council recently conducted a study and issued a 
report on ``outsourcing'' employee benefit plan services with a 
particular focus on functions that historically have been handled by 
employers, such as ``named fiduciary'' responsibilities. The Council 
report includes the following observation:
    Outsourcing of benefit plan functions, administrative, investment 
and otherwise, is a practice that predates ERISA. However, its 
prevalence and scope have grown significantly since ERISA's passage, 
and has accelerated over the last ten years. Certain functions by their 
nature must be outsourced to a third party (e.g., auditing a plan's 
financial statements), while others for practical reasons have been 
outsourced by most plan sponsors (e.g., defined contribution 
recordkeeping). In addition, there appears to be an emerging trend 
toward outsourcing functions that have traditionally been exercised by 
plan sponsors or other employer fiduciaries (e.g., administrative 
committee, investment committee, etc.), including functions such as 
investment fund selection, discretionary plan administration, and 
investment strategy. There also have been trends towards using multiple 
employer plan arrangements as a mechanism to ``outsource'' the 
provision of retirement plan benefits, particularly in the small 
company market.
    The Council's report is available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2014ACreport3.html. Accordingly, the Department believes 
the provision in the final rule on transactions with independent plan 
fiduciaries with financial expertise is consistent with and could 
facilitate this trend in the fiduciary investment advice area, 
including transactions involving selection and monitoring of investment 
platforms.
    Several commenters asked the Department to clarify whether the 
platform provider carve-out would cover a response to a RFP if the 
response were to contain a sample plan investment line-up based on the 
existing investment alternatives under the plan, the size of the plan 
or sponsor, or some combination of both. According to the commenters, 
responding to RFPs in this manner is a common practice when the plan 
fiduciary does not specify any, or sufficient, objective criteria, such 
as fund expense ratio, size of fund, type of asset, market 
capitalization, or credit quality. The commenters essentially argued 
that the plan's current investment line-up effectively serves as a 
proxy for objective criteria specified by the plan fiduciary. The 
commenters did admit, however, that even though such RFP responses 
typically present the line-ups as just ``samples,'' the responses 
customarily identify specific investment alternatives by name and are 
quite individualized to the needs of the requesting plan. The 
commenters, of course, emphasized that the plan fiduciary is under no 
obligation to hire the platform provider or to adopt the sample line-up 
of investments even if hired.
    In response to these comments, minor changes were made to the 
proposal to accommodate such RFP responses, but with some protections 
for plan fiduciaries to prevent abuse. It was never the intent of the 
Department to displace common RFP practices related to platforms. The 
Department recognizes that RFPs can be a valuable cost-saving mechanism 
for plans by fostering competition among interested plan service 
providers, which can redound to the benefit of plan participants and 
beneficiaries in the form of lower costs for comparable services. 
Indeed, it is for this very reason that plan fiduciaries often use RFPs 
as part of the process of satisfying their duty of prudence under 
ERISA. On the other hand, without something more to counterbalance the 
RFP response with a sample line-up identifying investments by name, 
such communication could be viewed as suggesting the appropriateness of 
specific investments to the plan fiduciary--which, of course, would 
constitute a clear call to action to the fiduciary thereby triggering 
fiduciary status.
    As revised, the platform provider provisions now explicitly clarify 
that a RFP response with a sample line-up of investments is not a 
``recommendation'' for purposes of the final rule. Such treatment, 
however, is conditioned on written notification to the plan fiduciary 
that the person issuing the RFP response is not undertaking to provide 
impartial investment advice or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity. 
Further, the RFP response containing the sample line-up must disclose 
whether the person identifying the investment alternatives has a 
financial interest in any of the alternatives, and if so the precise 
nature of such interest. Collectively, these disclosures will put the 
plan fiduciary on notice that it should not have an expectation of 
trust in the RFP response and that composition of the sample line-up 
may be influenced by financial incentives not necessary aligned with 
the best interests of the plan and its participants.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ In the Department's view, platform providers may have a 
financial incentive to recommend proprietary funds or an otherwise 
limited menu based on such non-aligned financial interests. In fact, 
researchers have found evidence that platform providers act on this 
conflict of interest, and that plan participants suffer as a result. 
In a study examining the menu of mutual fund options offered in a 
large sample of defined contribution plans, underperforming non-
propriety funds are more likely to be removed from the menu than 
propriety funds. Similarly, the study found that platform providers 
are substantially more likely to add their own funds to the menu, 
and the probability of adding a proprietary fund is less sensitive 
to performance than the probability of adding a non-proprietary 
fund. The study also concluded that proprietary funds do not perform 
better in later periods, which indicates that they are left on the 
menu for the benefit of the service provider and not due to 
additional information the service provider would have about their 
own funds. See Pool, Veronika, Clemens Sialm, and Irina Stefanescu, 
It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(K) 
Plans (August 14, 2015) Journal of Finance, Forthcoming (avaialble 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract =2112263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2112263).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20975]]

    Commenters also requested that the platform provider carve-out be 
extended to allow the platform provider to furnish for the plan 
fiduciary's consideration the objective criteria that the plan 
fiduciary may wish to adopt. Commenters state that plan sponsors are 
often unsure of what criteria are appropriate and that a service 
provider's objective assistance is often critical by suggesting factors 
that may be considered in evaluating and selecting investments. 
Although the Department does not believe that general advice as to the 
types to qualitative and quantitative criteria that similarly situated 
plan fiduciaries might consider in selecting and monitoring investment 
alternatives will ordinarily rise to the level of a recommendation of a 
particular investment, the Department does not believe it can craft 
text for this example that adequately addresses the potential for abuse 
and steering that could arise, and, therefore, believes the issue of 
whether such communications are investment advice would best be left to 
an examination on a case-by-case basis under the definition of 
recommendation provided by paragraph (b)(1) and educational 
communications under paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv).
(ii) Investment Education
    The proposal under paragraph (b)(6) carved out investment education 
from the definition of investment advice. Paragraph (b)(6) of the 
proposal incorporated much of the Department's earlier Interpretive 
Bulletin, 29 CFR 2509.96-1 (IB 96-1), issued in 1996, but with 
important exceptions relating to communications regarding specific 
investment options available under the plan or IRA. Consistent with IB 
96-1, paragraph (b)(6) of the proposal made clear that furnishing or 
making available the specified categories of information and materials 
to a plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, or IRA 
owner does not constitute the rendering of investment advice, 
irrespective of who provides the information (e.g., plan sponsor, 
fiduciary or service provider), the frequency with which the 
information is shared, the form in which the information and materials 
are provided (e.g., on an individual or group basis, in writing or 
orally, via a call center, or by way of video or computer software), or 
whether an identified category of information and materials is 
furnished or made available alone or in combination with other 
categories of investment or retirement information and materials 
identified in paragraph (b)(6), or the type of plan or IRA involved. As 
a departure from IB 96-1, a condition of the carve-out was that the 
asset allocation models and interactive investment materials could not 
include or identify any specific investment product or specific 
investment alternative available under the plan or IRA. The Department 
understood that not incorporating these provisions of IB 96-1 into the 
proposal represented a significant change in the information and 
materials that may constitute investment education. Accordingly, the 
Department specifically invited comments on whether the change was 
appropriate. The final rule largely adopts the proposal's provision on 
investment education, but, as discussed below, differentiates between 
education provided in the plan and IRA markets and includes minor edits 
to expressly confirm that merely providing information to IRA and plan 
investors about features, terms, fees and expenses, and other 
characteristics of investment products available to the IRA or plan 
investor falls within the ``plan information'' category of investment 
education under the final rule.
    This subject received extensive input from a range of stakeholders 
with varying perspectives on how to draw the line between investment 
advice and investment education. Many commenters representing consumers 
and retail investors urged the Department not to create a carve-out 
that would allow investment advice to be presented as non-fiduciary 
``education.'' These commenters cautioned that the final rule should 
not create a carve-out that is so broad that it covers communications 
or behavior that may fairly be interpreted by plan participants as 
``advice'' rather than education. They cited the current practice by 
investment advice providers who present their services as individually 
tailored or ``one-on-one'' advice, but then use boilerplate disclaimers 
to avoid fiduciary responsibility for the advice under the Department's 
current ``five-part'' test regulation as a consumer protection failure 
that should not be repeated. Other commenters representing a range of 
interests and stakeholders expressed concern that the rule, and 
presumably the education carve-out, would adversely affect the 
availability of information to plan participants and beneficiaries, and 
IRA owners about the general characteristics and options available 
under the plan or IRA and general education about investments and 
retirement savings strategies.
    There was general consensus, however, that investment education and 
financial literacy tools are valuable resources for retail retirement 
investors, that there is a difference between educational 
communications and activities, and that certain communications and 
activities should be subject to fiduciary standards as investment 
advice. Commenters, however, held varying views as to how the final 
rule should define the line between investment education and investment 
advice. A substantial number of the comments expressing concern about 
the proposal's impact on the availability of investment education to 
retail retirement investors appeared to be based on a misunderstanding 
of the proposal. For example, some commenters expressed concern that 
product providers could not provide general descriptions or information 
about their products and services without the communication being 
treated as investment advice under the rule. The proposal, as noted 
above, adopted almost without change an Interpretive Bulletin issued by 
the Department in 1996. IB 96-1 had been almost uniformly supported by 
the financial services industry. Admittedly IB 96-1 was issued against 
the backdrop of the current five-part test so that some of the 
commenters may have been less interested in its specifics because the 
five-part test allowed them to avoid fiduciary status for 
communications that fell outside the scope of non-fiduciary 
``education'' as described in the IB 96-1. Nonetheless, IB 96-1 
received substantial support from commenters as drawing an appropriate 
line between investment advice and investment education. IB 96-1 and, 
by extension, the proposal which adopted the IB, recognized four 
categories of non-fiduciary education:
    [cir] Information and materials that describe investments or plan 
alternatives without specifically recommending particular investments

[[Page 20976]]

or strategies. Thus, for example, a firm/adviser would not act as an 
investment advice fiduciary merely by virtue of describing the 
investment objectives and philosophies of plan investment options, 
mutual funds, or other investments; their risk and return 
characteristics; historical returns; the fees associated with the 
investment; distribution options; contract features; or similar 
information about the investment.
    [cir] General financial, investment, and retirement information. 
Similarly, one would not become a fiduciary merely by providing 
information on standard financial and investment concepts, such as 
diversification, risk and return, tax deferred investments; historic 
differences in rates of return between different asset classes (e.g., 
equities, bonds, cash); effects of inflation; estimating future 
retirement needs and investment time horizons; assessing risk 
tolerance; or general strategies for managing assets in retirement. All 
of this is non-fiduciary education as long as the adviser doesn't cross 
the line to recommending a specific investment or investment strategy.
    [cir] Asset allocation models. Here too, without acting as a 
fiduciary, firms and advisers can provide information and materials on 
hypothetical asset allocations as long as they are based on generally 
accepted investment theories, explain the assumptions on which they are 
based, and don't cross the line to making specific investment 
recommendations or referring to specific products (i.e., recommending 
that the investor purchase specific assets or follow very specific 
investment strategies).
    [cir] Interactive investment materials. Again, without acting as a 
fiduciary, firms and advisers can provide a variety of questionnaires, 
worksheets, software, and similar materials that enable workers to 
estimate future retirement needs and to assess the impact of different 
investment allocations on retirement income, as long as the adviser 
meets conditions similar to those described for asset allocation 
models. These interactive materials can even consider the impact of 
specific investments, as long as the specific investments are specified 
by the investor, rather than the firm/adviser.

The Department, accordingly, disagrees with commenters who contended 
that the 2015 Proposal would make such communications and activities 
fiduciary investment advice. In the Department's view the proposal was 
clear that investment education included providing information and 
materials that describe investments or plan alternatives without 
specifically recommending particular investments or strategies. 
Nonetheless, some of the text in the proposal that covered this point 
appeared under the heading ``Plan Information'' and commenters may have 
failed to fully appreciate the fact that information about investment 
alternatives available under the plan or IRA was included in that 
section. Accordingly, the Department added text to that section to 
emphasize that element in the final rule.
    Furthermore, some comments from groups representing employers that 
sponsor plans, expressed concern that the proposal would lead employers 
to stop providing education about their plans to their employees. In 
the Department's view, since only investment advice for a fee or 
compensation falls within the fiduciary definition, the fact that 
employers do not generally receive compensation in connection with 
their educational communications provides employers with a high level 
of confidence that their educational activities would not constitute 
investment advice under the rule. In that regard, the Department does 
not believe that incidental economic advantages that may accrue to the 
employer by reason of sponsorship of an employee benefit plan would 
constitute fees or compensation within the meaning of the rule. For 
example, the Department does not believe that an employer would be 
receiving a fee or compensation under the rule merely because the plan 
is structured so the employer does not pay plan expenses that are paid 
out of an ERISA budget account funded with revenue sharing generated by 
investments under the plan.
    Related comments similarly expressed concern that employers may not 
engage service providers to provide investment education to their plan 
participants and beneficiaries because of concern that the vendors may 
be investment advice fiduciaries under the rule, and the employers 
would have a fiduciary obligations or co-fiduciary liability in 
connection with the activities of those vendors. They contended that, 
without a blanket carve-out for plan sponsors and service providers 
that operate call centers to assist participants and IRA owners, 
educational assistance or similar participant outreach would be 
dramatically reduced or eliminated because, notwithstanding appropriate 
training and supervision, the plan sponsors and service providers could 
not be certain that individual communications would not carry potential 
fiduciary liability if individual communications actually crossed the 
line to give fiduciary investment advice. They similarly recommended 
that a blanket carve-out was necessary to protect against investment 
advice claims and litigation from participants and IRA owners 
dissatisfied with decisions they made with the benefit of education 
provided by the plan sponsor or service provider.
    The Department notes that plan sponsors already have fiduciary 
obligations in connection with the selection and monitoring of plan 
service providers (both fiduciary and non-fiduciary service providers), 
including service providers that provide educational materials and 
assistance to plan participants and beneficiaries. In light of the 
investment education provisions in the final rule, the Department does 
not believe the rule significantly expands the obligations or potential 
liabilities of plan sponsors in this regard. It also bears emphasis 
that the chief consequence of making covered investment 
recommendations, rather than merely providing non-fiduciary education 
is that the fiduciary must give recommendations that are prudent and in 
the participants' best interest. The Department does not believe it 
would be appropriate to create a rule that relieves service providers 
from fiduciary responsibility when they in fact make such 
recommendations and thereby provide investment advice for a fee, nor 
would it be appropriate to have a rule that relieved plan sponsors or 
service providers from having to address complaints from participants 
and IRA owners that they in fact provided imprudent investment advice 
or provided investment advice tainted by prohibited self-dealing. The 
Department believes that such steps would be particularly inappropriate 
in the case of service providers who are paid to provide participant 
assistance services.
    The final rule is intended to reflect the Department's continued 
view that the statutory reference to ``investment advice'' is not meant 
to encompass general investment information and educational materials, 
but rather is targeted at more specific recommendations and advice on 
the investment of plan and IRA assets. Further, as explained above, the 
Department agrees with those commenters who argued that classifying 
this provision as a ``carve-out'' was a misnomer because the 
educational activity covered by the provision are not investment 
recommendations in the first place. As a result, although the substance 
of the proposal is largely unchanged in this final rule, the 
``investment education'' provision in

[[Page 20977]]

paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of the rule is presented as an example of what 
would not constitute a recommendation within the meaning of paragraph 
(b)(2).
    The final rule in paragraph (b)(2)(iv) divides investment education 
information and materials which will not be treated as recommendations 
into the same four general categories as set forth in the proposal: (A) 
Plan information; (B) general financial, investment, and retirement 
information; (C) asset allocation models; and (D) interactive 
investment materials. The final regulation also adopts the provision 
from the proposal (also in IB 96-1) stating that there may be other 
examples of information, materials and educational services which, if 
furnished, would not constitute investment advice or recommendations 
within the meaning of the final regulation and that no inference should 
be drawn regarding materials or information which are not specifically 
included in paragraph (b)(2)(iv).
    Paragraph (b)(2)(iv), like the proposal, makes clear that the 
distinction between non-fiduciary education and fiduciary advice 
applies equally to information provided to plan fiduciaries as well as 
information provided to plan participants and beneficiaries, and IRA 
owners, and that it applies equally to participant-directed plans and 
other plans. In addition, the provision applies without regard to 
whether the information is provided by a plan sponsor, fiduciary, or 
service provider.
    The Department did not receive adverse comments on the provisions 
in the proposal that were intended to make it clear that investment 
education included the provision of information and education relating 
to retirement income issues that extend beyond a participant's or 
beneficiary's date of retirement. Some commenters explicitly encouraged 
education in the context of fixed and variable annuities and other 
lifetime income products. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of the 
final rule, as with the proposal, includes specific language to make 
clear that the provision of certain general information that helps an 
individual assess and understand retirement income needs past 
retirement and associated risks (e.g., longevity and inflation risk), 
or explains general methods for the individual to manage those risks 
both within and outside the plan, would not result in fiduciary status.
    Similarly, the Department does not believe that any change in the 
regulatory text or addition of a specific safe harbor is necessary to 
address commenters' concerns regarding distinguishing advice from 
education in the context of benefit distribution decisions. As to the 
comments that suggested the Department expressly adopt FINRA's guidance 
in its Notice 13-45 as the standard for non-fiduciary educational 
information and materials, the Department does not agree that such an 
express incorporation of specific FINRA guidance into the regulation is 
advisable. In addition to the obvious problems that can arise from a 
federal agency adopting guidance from a self-regulatory organization as 
a formal regulation with the force of law, the Department is concerned 
that some of that guidance under the FINRA notice encompasses 
communications regarding individual investment alternatives or benefit 
distribution options that would be fiduciary investment advice under 
the final rule. Moreover, to the extent the commenters found the FINRA 
guidance useful because it allows descriptions of the typical four 
options available to participants when retiring--leaving the money in 
his former employer's plan, if permitted; rolling over the assets to 
his new employer's plan if available; rolling over to an IRA; or 
cashing out--those options, including discussions of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each are already clearly permitted under the education 
provision. The Department also believes the final rule contains 
appropriate examples of activities with respect to particular products 
sufficient to make it clear that education can convey information about 
investment concepts, such as annuities and lifetime income products, 
and does not believe amending the regulatory text to specifically 
emphasize or encourage particular classes of investment or benefit 
products would improve the provision.
    The main focus of the commenters expressing concern, many 
representing financial services providers, about the education 
provisions in the proposal was the one substantive change the proposal 
made to the Department's IB 96-1. Specifically, the proposal did not 
allow asset allocation models and interactive investment materials to 
identify specific investment alternatives and distribution options 
unless they were affirmatively inserted into the interactive materials 
by the plan participant, beneficiary or IRA owner. A few commenters 
supported this change. They argued that participants are highly 
vulnerable to subtle, but powerful, influences by advisers when they 
receive asset allocation information. They believe that ordinary 
participants may view these models, particularly when accompanied by 
references to specific investments, as investment recommendations even 
if the provider does not intend it as advice and even if the provider 
includes caveats or statements about the availability of other 
products. In contrast, other commenters argued--particularly with 
respect to ERISA-covered plans--that it is a mistake to prohibit the 
use of specific investment options in asset allocation models used for 
educational purposes. They said this information is a critical step to 
``connect the dots'' for retirement investors in understanding how to 
apply educational tools to the specific options or options available in 
their plan or IRA. They claimed that the inability to reference 
specific investment options in asset allocation models and interactive 
materials would greatly undermine the effectiveness of these models and 
materials as educational tools. They said that without the ability to 
include specific investment products, participants could have a hard 
time understanding how the educational materials relate to specific 
investment options. Further, some commenters argued that the Department 
had presented no evidence that there is actual abuse under the guidance 
in IB 96-1 that would support a change. With the change, the commenters 
asserted that the Department has effectively shifted the obligation to 
populate asset allocation models to plan participants, who for a 
variety of reasons are unlikely to do so, thereby significantly 
undermining what has become a valuable tool for participants.
    Many commenters suggested ideas for how to address this issue. Some 
told the Department that it should not depart from the original IB 96-1 
on this point. Some commenters argued that the value that plan 
participants and beneficiaries, and IRA owners, get from having 
specific investment options identified in asset allocation models and 
interactive materials was so important that the Department should adopt 
a safe harbor specifically for communications designed to assist plan 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners with decisions regarding 
investment alternatives and distribution options. Others suggested that 
the final rule should permit the identification of designated 
investment alternatives (DIAs) in asset allocation models with 
restrictions such as fee neutrality across the presented options, allow 
the selection of the investment options for the model by an independent 
third party, or require the model to offer at least three DIAs within 
each asset class (which may require some plans to

[[Page 20978]]

increase the number of DIAs available in each asset class).
    Some commenters drew a distinction between ERISA-covered plans and 
IRAs, and agreed with the Department's concern about permitting 
specific product references to be treated as non-fiduciary education 
when associated with asset allocation guidance for IRA customers. In 
the ERISA plan context, a separate fiduciary is responsible for 
overseeing the funds on the plan lineup and for making sure that the 
plan's designated investment alternatives are prudent and otherwise 
consistent with ERISA's standards. Potential ``steering'' by use of an 
asset allocation model can be effectively constrained by an already 
approved menu of DIAs, but no analogous protection exists for IRA 
investors. An adviser's limited explanation of how specific plan-
designated alternatives line up with particular asset categories, 
without more, is far less likely to be perceived by the investor as an 
investment recommendation--and far less prone to abuse--than is an IRA 
adviser's discussion of particular asset allocations tied to specific 
investment products chosen by the adviser or his firm. In the IRA 
context, the adviser both presents the customer with an allocation and 
populates the allocation with specific products that the adviser or his 
firm screened from the entire universe of investments. A broad safe 
harbor for such communications could permit advisers to steer customers 
by effectively making specific investment recommendations under the 
guise of education, with no fiduciary protection.
    Some commenters proposed different solutions for the presentation 
of specific investments to IRA owners. These proposed solutions tried 
to introduce somewhat analogous protections for IRA owners as for plan 
participants by making the identification of specific investment 
alternatives contingent on investment platforms selected or approved by 
independent third parties. Other commenters sought to eliminate the 
concern about asset allocation models and interactive materials being 
used to steer IRA investors to particular products that generated 
better fees for investment providers by requiring the available 
investment options to be ``fee neutral'' or paid for on a fixed basis.
    After evaluation of the comments and considerations above, the 
Department has made the following adjustments in the final rule. 
Paragraphs (b)(2)(iv)(C)(4) and (b)(2)(iv)(D)(6) now provide that asset 
allocation models and interactive investment materials can identify a 
specific investment product or specific alternative available under 
plans if (1) the alternative is a designated investment alternative 
under an employee benefit plan (as described in section 3(3) of the 
Act); (2) the alternative is subject to fiduciary oversight by a plan 
fiduciary independent of the person who developed or markets the 
investment alternative or distribution option; (3) the asset allocation 
models and interactive investment materials identify all the other 
designated investment alternatives available under the plan that have 
similar risk and return characteristics, if any; and (4) the asset 
allocation models and interactive investment materials are accompanied 
by a statement that identifies where information on those investment 
alternatives may be obtained; including information described in 
paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(A) of this regulation and, if applicable, 
paragraph (d) of 29 CFR 2550.404a-5. When these conditions are 
satisfied with respect to asset allocation or interactive investment 
materials, the communications can be appropriately treated as non-
fiduciary ``education'' rather than fiduciary investment 
recommendations, and the interests of plan participants are protected 
by fiduciary oversight and monitoring of the DIAs as required under 
paragraph (f) of 29 CFR 2550.404a-5 and paragraph (d)(2)(iv) of 29 CFR 
2550.404c-1.
    In this connection, it is important to emphasize that a responsible 
plan fiduciary would also have, as part of the ERISA obligation to 
monitor plan service providers, an obligation to evaluate and 
periodically monitor the asset allocation model and interactive 
materials being made available to the plan participants and 
beneficiaries as part of any education program.\29\ That evaluation 
should include an evaluation of whether the models and materials are in 
fact unbiased and not designed to influence investment decisions 
towards particular investments that result in higher fees or 
compensation being paid to parties that provide investments or 
investment-related services to the plan. In this context and subject to 
the conditions above, the Department believes such a presentation of a 
specific designated investment alternative in a hypothetical example 
would not rise to the level of a recommendation within the meaning of 
paragraph (b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See 29 CFR 2550.404a-5(f) and 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department does not agree that the same conclusion applies in 
the case of presentations of specific investments to IRA owners because 
of the lack of review and prudent selection of the presented options by 
an independent plan fiduciary, and because of the likelihood that such 
``guidance'' or ``education'' amounts to specific investment 
recommendations in the IRA context. The Department was not able to 
reach the conclusion that it should create a broad safe harbor from 
fiduciary status for circumstances in which the IRA provider 
effectively narrows the entire universe of investment alternatives 
available to IRA owners to just a few coupled with asset allocation 
models or interactive materials.
    When an adviser couples a suggestion of a particular asset 
allocation with specific investment options that the adviser has 
specifically selected from the entire universe of investments, he is 
doing more than explaining how the limited designated investment 
alternatives available under a plan's design fit the various categories 
in an asset allocation model. Instead, the adviser is pointing out 
particular investments for special consideration, and likely making a 
``recommendation'' within the meaning of the rule about an investment 
in which he has a financial interest. In the Department's view, such 
recommendations should be subject to a best interest standard, not 
treated as falling within a potential loophole for specific investment 
recommendations that need not adhere to basic fiduciary norms. If the 
adviser were treated as a non-fiduciary, the Department could not 
readily import the other protective conditions applicable to such plan 
communications to IRA communications. For example, there would not 
necessarily be any other fiduciary exercising oversight over the 
adviser's recommendation. Additionally, the Department was unable to 
conclude that disclosures analogous to the disclosures regarding DIAs 
under 29 CFR 2550.404a-5 could be made available about the vast 
universe of other comparable investment alternatives available under an 
IRA.
    Similarly, because the provision is limited to DIAs available under 
employee benefit plans, the use of asset allocation models and 
interactive materials with specific investment alternatives available 
through a self-directed brokerage account is not covered by the 
``education'' provision in the final rule. Such communications lack the 
safeguards associated with DIAs, and pose many of the same problems and 
dangers as identified with respect to IRAs.
    These tools and models are important in the IRA and self-directed 
brokerage account context, just as in the plan context more generally. 
An asset

[[Page 20979]]

allocation model for an IRA could still qualify as ``education'' under 
the final rule, for example, if it described a hypothetical customer's 
portfolio as having certain percentages of investments in equity 
securities, fixed-income securities and cash equivalents. The asset 
allocation could also continue to be ``education'' under the final rule 
if it described a hypothetical portfolio based on broad-based market 
sectors (e.g., agriculture, construction, finance, manufacturing, 
mining, retail, services, transportation and public utilities, and 
wholesale trade). The asset allocation model would have to meet the 
other criteria in the final and could not include particular 
securities. In the Department's view, as an allocation becomes narrower 
or more specific, the presentation of the portfolio gets closer to 
becoming a recommendation of particular securities.\30\ Although the 
Department is open to continuing a dialog on possible approaches for 
additional regulatory or other guidance in this area, when advisers use 
such tools and models to effectively recommend particular investments, 
they should be prepared to adhere to fiduciary norms and to make sure 
their investment recommendations are in the investors' best interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ In the Department's view, this approach in general terms is 
consistent with FINRA guidance on the application of the 
``suitability'' standard to asset allocation models. Compare FAQ 4.7 
in FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ (available at www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) General Communications
    Many commenters, as the Department noted above, expressed concern 
about the phrase ``specifically directed'' in the proposal under 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) and asked that the Department clarify the 
application of the final rule to certain communications including 
casual conversations with clients about an investment, distribution, or 
rollovers; responding to participant inquiries about their investment 
options; ordinary sales activities; providing research reports; sample 
fund menus; and other similar support activities. For example, they 
were concerned about communications made in newsletters, media 
commentary, or remarks directed to no one in particular. Commenters 
specifically raised the issue of whether on-air personalities like Dave 
Ramsey, Jim Cramer, or Suze Orman would be treated as fiduciary 
investment advisers based on their broadcast communications. The 
concern is unfounded. With respect to media personalities, the rule is 
focused on ensuring that paid investment professionals make 
recommendations that are in the best interest of retirement investors, 
not on regulating journalism or the entertainment industry. 
Nonetheless, and although the Department believes that the definition 
of ``recommendation'' in the proposal sufficiently distinguished such 
communications from investment advice, the Department has concluded 
that it would be helpful if the final rule more expressly addressed 
these types of communications to alleviate commenters' continuing 
concerns. Thus, the final rule includes a new ``general 
communications'' paragraph (b)(2)(iii) as an example of communications 
that are not considered recommendations under the definition. This 
paragraph affirmatively excludes from investment advice the furnishing 
of general communications that a reasonable person would not view as an 
investment recommendation, including general circulation newsletters; 
television, radio, and public media talk show commentary; remarks in 
widely attended speeches and conferences; research reports prepared for 
general distribution; general marketing materials; general market data, 
including data on market performance, market indices, or trading 
volumes; price quotes; performance reports; or prospectuses.
    In developing this paragraph, the Department adapted some terms 
from FINRA guidance addressing a similar issue under the suitability 
rules for brokers. See, for example, FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) 
(FAQs available at www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq#_edn3). The FAQs provide guidance on FINRA Rule 2111 
that consolidates the questions and answers in Regulatory Notices 12-
55, 12-25 and 11-25.\31\ See also RDM Infodustries, Inc., SEC Staff No-
Action Letter (Mar. 25, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Endnote 2 in the FAQs included the following citations: SEC 
Adoption of Rules Under Section 15(b)(10) of the Exchange Act, 32 FR 
11637, 11638 (Aug. 11, 1967) (noting that the SEC's now-rescinded 
suitability rule would not apply to ``general distribution of a 
market letter, research report or other similar material''); 
Suitability Requirements for Transactions in Certain Securities, 54 
FR 6693, 6696 (Feb. 14, 1989) (stating that proposed SEC Rule 15c2-
6, which would have required documented suitability determinations 
for speculative securities, ``would not apply to general 
advertisements not involving a direct recommendation to the 
individual''); DBCC v. Kunz, No. C3A960029, 1999 NASD Discip. LEXIS 
20, at * 63 (NAC July 7, 1999) (stating that, under the facts of the 
case, the mere distribution of offering material, without more, did 
not constitute a recommendation triggering application of the 
suitability rule), aff'd, 55 S.E.C. 551, 2002 SEC LEXIS 104 (2002); 
FINRA Interpretive Letter, Mar. 4, 1997 (``[T]he staff agrees that a 
reference to an investment company or an offer of investment company 
shares in an advertisement or piece of sales literature would not by 
itself constitute a `recommendation' for purposes of [the 
suitability rule].''). See also Regulatory Notice 10-06, at 3-4 
(providing guidance on recommendations made on blogs and social 
networking Web sites); Notice to Members 01-23 (announcing the 
guiding principles and providing examples of communications that 
likely do and do not constitute recommendations); Michael F. Siegel, 
Exchange Act Rel. No. 58737, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2459, at *21-27 (Oct. 6, 
2008) (applying the guiding principles to the facts of the case to 
find a recommendation), aff'd in relevant part, 592 F.3d 147 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3333 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department notes that the requirement that a reasonable person 
would not view the materials as a recommendation is a recognition that 
even though the list includes very common communications that we do 
think could fairly be interpreted to cover communications that are 
investment recommendations under paragraph (b)(1), the label on the 
document or communication is not determinative under the final rule 
because there may be circumstances in which a person uses a label for a 
communications from the list but the communication nonetheless clearly 
meets the requirements of a recommendation under paragraph (b)(1).\32\ 
The Department does not intend to suggest by this proviso that all 
general communications always present a question about whether a 
reasonable person could fairly view the communication as an investment 
recommendation. For example, even though on-air personalities may 
suggest that viewers buy or sell particular stocks or engage in 
particular investment courses of action, the Department does not 
believe that a reasonable person could fairly conclude that such 
communications constitute actionable investment advice or 
recommendations within the meaning of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See NASD (Predecessor to FINRA) Notice to Members 01-23, 
April 2001, which provided examples of electronic communications 
which may or may not be within the definition of recommendation for 
purposes of the suitability rule but concludes that ``many other 
types of electronic communications are not easily characterized . . 
. and changes to the factual predicates upon which these examples 
are based (or the existence of additional factors) could alter the 
determination of whether similar communications may or may not be 
viewed as `recommendations' for purposes of the suitability rule.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c)--Persons Not Deemed Investment Advice 
Fiduciaries

    Paragraph (c) of the final rule provides that certain 
communications and activities shall not be deemed to be fiduciary 
investment advice within the meaning of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the 
Act. This paragraph incorporates, with modifications, the ``carve-
outs'' from the proposal that addressed counterparty transactions, 
swaps transactions, and

[[Page 20980]]

certain employee communications. The final rule does not use the term 
``carve-outs,'' as in the proposal, but these provisions still 
recognize circumstances in which plans, plan fiduciaries, plan 
participants and beneficiaries, IRAs, and IRA owners may receive 
recommendations the Department does not believe should be treated as 
fiduciary investment advice notwithstanding the general definition set 
forth in paragraph (a) of the final rule. Each of the provisions has 
been modified from the proposal to address public comments and refine 
the provision.
(1) Transactions With Independent Plan Fiduciaries With Financial 
Expertise
    Paragraph (b)(1)(i) of the proposed rule provided a carve-out 
(referred to as the ``seller's'' or ``counterparty'' carve-out) from 
the general definition for incidental advice provided in connection 
with an arm's length sale, purchase, loan, or bilateral contract 
between an expert plan investor and the adviser. The exclusion also 
applied in connection with an offer to enter into such an arm's length 
transaction, and when the person providing the advice acts as a 
representative, such as an agent, for the plan's counterparty. In 
particular, paragraph (b)(1)(i) of the proposal provided a carve-out 
for incidental advice provided in connection with counterparty 
transactions with a plan fiduciary with financial expertise. As a proxy 
for financial expertise the rule required that the advice recipient be 
a fiduciary of a plan with 100 or more participants or have 
responsibility for managing at least $100 million in plan assets. 
Additional conditions applied to each of these two categories of 
sophisticated investors that were intended to ensure the parties 
understood the non-fiduciary nature of the relationship.
    Some commenters on the 2015 Proposal offered threshold views on 
whether the Department should include a seller's carve-out as a general 
matter or whether, for example, an alternative approach such as 
requiring specific disclosures would be preferable. Others strongly 
supported the inclusion of a seller's carve-out, believing it to be a 
critical component of the proposal. As explained in the proposal, the 
purpose of the proposed carve-out was to avoid imposing ERISA fiduciary 
obligations on sales pitches that are part of arm's length transactions 
where neither side assumes that the counterparty to the plan is acting 
as an impartial or trusted adviser. The premise of the proposed carve-
out was that both sides of such transactions understand that they are 
acting at arm's length, and neither party expects that recommendations 
will necessarily be based on the buyer's best interests, or that the 
buyer will rely on them as such.
    Consumer advocates generally agreed with the Department's views 
expressed in the preamble that it was appropriate to limit the carve-
out to large plans and sophisticated asset managers. These commenters 
encouraged the Department to retain a very narrow and stringent carve-
out. They argued that the communications to participants and retail 
investors are generally presented as advice and understood to be 
advice. Indeed, both FINRA and state insurance law commonly require 
that recommendations reflect proper consideration of the investment's 
suitability in light of the individual investor's particular 
circumstances, regardless of whether the transaction could be 
characterized as involving a ``sale.'' Additionally commenters noted 
that participants and IRA owners cannot readily ascertain the nuanced 
differences among different types of financial professionals (including 
differences in legal standards that apply to different professionals) 
or easily determine whether advice is impartial or potentially 
conflicted, or assess the significance of the conflict. Similar points 
were made concerning advice in the small plan marketplace.
    These commenters expressed concern, shared by the Department, that 
allowing investment advisers to claim non-fiduciary status as 
``sellers'' across the entire retail market would effectively open a 
large loophole by allowing brokers and other advisers to use 
disclosures in account opening agreements, investor communications, 
advertisements, and marketing materials to avoid fiduciary 
responsibility and accountability for investment recommendations that 
investors rely upon to make important investment decisions. Just as 
financial service companies currently seek to disclaim fiduciary status 
under the five-part test through standardized statements disclaiming 
the investor's right to rely upon communications as individualized 
advice, an overbroad seller's exception could invite similar statements 
that recommendations are made purely in a sales capacity, even as oral 
communications and marketing materials suggest expert financial 
assistance upon which the investor can and should rely.
    On the other hand, many commenters representing financial services 
providers argued for extending the ``seller's'' carve-out to include 
transactions in the market composed of smaller plans and individual 
participants, beneficiaries and IRA owners. These commenters contended 
that the lines drawn in the proposal were based on a flawed assumption 
that representatives of small plans and individual investors cannot 
understand the difference between a sales pitch and advice. They argued 
that failure to extend the carve-out to these markets will limit the 
ability of small plans and individual investors to obtain advice and to 
choose among a variety of services and products that are best suited to 
their needs. They also argued that there is no statutory basis for 
distinguishing the scope of fiduciary responsibility based on plan 
size. Some commenters suggested that the Department could extend the 
carve-out to individuals that meet financial or net worth thresholds or 
to ``accredited investors,'' ``qualified purchasers,'' or ``qualified 
clients'' under federal securities laws. Some commenters also requested 
that the Department expand the persons and entities that would be 
considered ``sophisticated'' fiduciaries for purposes of the carve-out, 
for example asking that banks, savings and loan associations, and 
insurance companies be explicitly covered. Others alternatively argue 
that the carve-out should be expanded to fiduciaries of participant-
directed plans regardless of plan size, which they said is not a 
reliable predictor for financial sophistication, or if the plan is 
represented by a financial expert such as an ERISA section 3(38) 
investment manager or an ERISA qualified professional asset manager. 
Other commenters asked that the carve-out be expanded to all 
proprietary products on the theory that investors generally understand 
that a person selling proprietary products is going to be making 
recommendations that are biased in favor of the proprietary product. 
Others suggested that the Department could address its concern about 
retail investor confusion by requiring specified disclosures, 
warranties, or representations to investors or small plan fiduciaries.
    Other commenters argued that communications by product 
manufacturers and other financial services providers directed to 
financial intermediaries who then directly advise plans, participants, 
beneficiaries or IRA owners should not be investment advice within the 
meaning of the rule. Some commenters referred to this as 
``wholesaling'' activities or ``daisy chain'' relationships. Some 
assert that a wholesaler's suggestions or recommendations about funds 
and sample plan line-ups, even if viewed as

[[Page 20981]]

specifically directed and provided to an acknowledged fiduciary, are 
distinguishable because they are made to non-discretionary 
intermediaries who have no discretion over a plan's or investor's 
investment choices. Other commenters similarly stressed that the 
intermediary is the person or entity with a nexus to the IRA owner or 
plan, which also benefits from an ERISA fiduciary to protect its 
participants, while the wholesaler has contractual privity with 
financial entities that may be investment advisers registered with the 
SEC, rather than with the ultimate plan or IRA owner. One commenter 
focused on whether the wholesaler's advice is provided to a 
professional investment adviser, whether acting in an ERISA section 
3(21) nondiscretionary or 3(38) discretionary capacity, rather than to 
a plan or IRA owner. Some commenters argued that the original preparer 
of model portfolios similarly should not be treated as a fiduciary 
investment adviser when the model is used by a financial intermediary 
with a direct relationship with the plan and its participants.
    Some commenters sought elimination of the requirement that 
counterparties obtain a representation concerning the plan fiduciary's 
sophistication. They argued that a counterparty's reasonable belief as 
to such sophistication should be sufficient or that there should be a 
presumption of such sophistication absent clear evidence otherwise. 
Finally, commenters questioned the requirement that no direct fee may 
be paid by the plan in connection with the transaction. Some argued 
that the condition should be removed, while others asked for 
clarification of what constitutes a fee for this purpose, for example 
whether it includes payments through plan assets and whether ``direct'' 
fees include the receipt of asset management or incentive fees received 
from a fund or other investment manager.
    The Department does not believe it would be consistent with the 
language or purposes of ERISA section 3(21) to extend this exclusion to 
advice given to small retail employee benefit plan investors or IRA 
owners. The Department explained its rationale in the preamble to the 
proposal. In summary, retail investors were not included in this carve-
out because (1) the Department did not believe the relationships fit 
the arm's length characteristics that the seller's carve-out was 
designed to preserve; (2) the Department did not believe disclaimers of 
adviser status were effective in alerting retail investors to nature 
and consequences of the conflicting financial interests; (3) IRA owners 
in particular do not have the benefit of a menu selected or monitored 
by an independent plan fiduciary; (4) small business sponsors of small 
plans are more like retail investors compared to large companies that 
often have financial departments and staff dedicated to running the 
company's employee benefit plans; (5) it would be inconsistent with 
congressional intent under ERISA section 408(b)(14) to create such a 
broad carve-out, as most recently reflected in enactment of a statutory 
provision that placed substantial conditions on the provision of 
investment advice to individual participants and IRA owners; and (6) 
there were other more appropriate ways to ensure that such retail 
investors had access to investment advice, such as prohibited 
transaction exemptions, and investment education. In addition, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, the Department rejects the purported 
dichotomy between a mere ``sales'' recommendation, on the one hand, and 
advice, on the other in the context of the retail market for investment 
products. As reflected in financial service industry marketing 
materials, the industry's comment letters reciting the guidance they 
provide to investors, and the obligation to ensure that recommended 
products are at least suitable to the individual investor, sales and 
advice go hand in hand in the retail market. When plan participants, 
IRA owners, and small businesses talk to financial service 
professionals about the investments they should make, they typically 
pay for, and receive, advice.
    The Department continues to believe for all of those reasons that 
it would be an error to provide a broad ``seller's'' exemption for 
investment advice in the retail market. Recommendations to retail 
investors and small plan providers are routinely presented as advice, 
consulting, or financial planning services. In fact, in the securities 
markets, brokers' suitability obligations generally require a 
significant degree of individualization. Most retail investors and many 
small plan sponsors are not financial experts, are unaware of the 
magnitude and impact of conflicts of interest, and are unable 
effectively to assess the quality of the advice they receive. IRA 
owners are especially at risk because they lack the protection of 
having a menu of investment options chosen by an independent plan 
fiduciary charged to protect their interests. Similarly, small plan 
sponsors are typically experts in the day-to-day business of running an 
operating company, not in managing financial investments for others. In 
this retail market, such an exclusion would run the risk of creating a 
loophole that would result in the rule failing to make any real 
improvement in consumer protections because it could be used by 
financial service providers to evade fiduciary responsibility for their 
advice through the same type of boilerplate disclaimers that some 
advisers use to avoid fiduciary status under the current ``five-part 
test'' regulation.
    The Department also is not prepared to conclude that written 
disclosures, including models developed by the Department, are 
sufficient to address investor confusion about financial conflicts of 
interest. Although some commenters urged the Department to focus on the 
delivery of comprehensive disclosures to investors as preferable to 
imposing a fiduciary duty with related exemptions and offered various 
views on format, content, e-disclosure, cost, and related issues, the 
Department was not persuaded. Other commenters, however, countered with 
the view that disclosure is not sufficient as a substitute for the 
establishment of an affirmative fiduciary duty. Disclosure alone has 
proven ineffective to mitigate conflicts in advice. Extensive research 
has demonstrated that most investors have little understanding of their 
advisers' conflicts of interest, and little awareness of what they are 
paying via indirect channels for the conflicted advice. Even if they 
understand the scope of the advisers' conflicts, many consumers are not 
financial experts and therefore, cannot distinguish good advice or 
investments from bad. The same gap in expertise that makes investment 
advice necessary and important frequently also prevents investors from 
recognizing bad advice or understanding advisers' disclosures. As noted 
above in the summary ``Benefit-Cost Assessment,'' some research 
suggests that even if disclosure about conflicts could be made simple 
and clear, it could be ineffective--or even harmful. In addition to 
problems with the effectiveness of such disclosures, the possibility of 
inconsistent oral representations raises questions about whether any 
boilerplate written disclosure could ensure that the person's financial 
interest in the transaction is effectively communicated as being in 
conflict with the interests of the advice recipient.
    Further, the Department is not prepared to adopt the approach 
suggested by some commenters that the provision be expanded to include 
individual retail investors through an accredited or sophisticated 
investor test that uses wealth as a proxy for the type of investor 
sophistication that was the

[[Page 20982]]

basis for the Department proposing some relationships as non-fiduciary. 
The Department agrees with the commenters that argued that merely 
concluding someone may be wealthy enough to be able to afford to lose 
money by reason of bad advice should not be a reason for treating 
advice given to that person as non-fiduciary.\33\ Nor is wealth 
necessarily correlated with financial sophistication. Individual 
investors may have considerable savings as a result of numerous factors 
unrelated to financial sophistication, such as a lifetime of thrift and 
hard work, inheritance, marriage, business successes unrelated to 
investment management, or simple good fortune.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ The Department continues to believe that a broad based 
``seller's'' exception for retail investors is not consistent with 
recent congressional action, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
(PPA). Specifically, the PPA created a new statutory exemption that 
allows fiduciaries giving investment advice to individuals (pension 
plan participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners) to receive 
compensation from investment vehicles that they recommend in certain 
circumstances. 29 U.S.C. 1108(b)(14); 26 U.S.C. 4975(d)(17). 
Recognizing the risks presented when advisers receive fees from the 
investments they recommend to individuals, Congress placed important 
constraints on such advice arrangements that are calculated to limit 
the potential for abuse and self-dealing, including requirements for 
fee-leveling or the use of independently certified computer models. 
The Department has issued regulations implementing this provision at 
29 CFR 2550.408g-1 and 408g-2. Thus, the PPA statutory exemption 
remains available to parties that would become investment advice 
fiduciaries because of the broader definition in this final rule, 
and the new and amended administrative exemptions published with 
this final rule (detailed elsewhere) provide alternative approaches 
to allow beneficial investment advice practices that are similarly 
designed to meet the statutory requirement that exemptions must be 
protective of the interests of retirement plan investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing this provision of the final rule, the Department 
carefully considered the comments from several financial services 
providers who argued that the Department's proposal violated 
traditional legal principles that they say recognize the right of 
businesses to market their products and services. These comments also 
argued that the proposal's protection for retail investors somehow 
disrespected the ability of retail investors to differentiate bad 
advice from good advice. The Department does not believe these comments 
have merit or require the adoption of a broad based ``seller's'' 
exception for the retail market. None of the commenters pointed to any 
provision in the federal securities laws containing a ``seller's'' 
carve-out or similar concept used to draw distinctions between advice 
relationships that are fiduciary from non-fiduciary under the federal 
securities laws. See also NAIC Model Regulation 275 on application of 
suitability standards to recommendations to retail investors involving 
annuity product transactions (available at www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-275.pdf). That fact too undermines the strength of the argument that 
investment recommendations provided to a retirement investor should be 
subject to a broad ``seller's'' exemption under Title I of ERISA.
    Moreover, the Department does not believe there is merit to the 
arguments that traditional legal principles support such a broad-based 
carve out from fiduciary status. The commenters' arguments, in the 
Department's view, essentially ask the Department to adopt a modified 
version of a ``caveat emptor'' or ``buyer beware'' principle that once 
prevailed under traditional contract law. That principle does not 
govern regulation of modern market relationships, particularly in 
regulated industries, and is incongruent to what, absent a regulatory 
exemption of the sort requested by the commenters, would be a fiduciary 
relationship subject to the highest legal standards of trust and 
loyalty. It is particularly incongruent with a statutory scheme that is 
designed to protect the interests of workers in tax-preferred assets 
that support their financial security and physical health, and that 
broadly prohibits conflicted transactions because of the dangers they 
pose, unless the Department grants an exemption based on express 
findings that the exemption is in the interest of participants and IRA 
owners and protective of their interests. Also, while some commenters 
supporting such a broad carve out have suggested that an enhanced 
disclosure regime would protect investors from conflicts of interest, 
as described elsewhere in this Notice in more detail, their arguments 
are not persuasive. A disclosure regime, standing alone, would not 
obviate conflicts of interest in investment advice even if it were 
possible to flawlessly disclose complex fee and investment structures.
    Nonetheless, the Department agrees with the commenters that 
criticized the proposal with arguments that the criteria in the 
proposal were not good proxies for appropriately distinguishing non-
fiduciary communications taking place in an arm's length transaction 
from instances where customers should reasonably be able to expect 
investment recommendations to be unbiased advice that is in their best 
interest. The Department notes that the definition of investment advice 
in the proposal expressly required a recommendation directly to a plan, 
plan fiduciary, plan participant, or IRA owner. The use of the term 
``plan fiduciary'' in the proposal was not intended to suggest that 
ordinary business activities among financial institutions and licensed 
financial professionals should become fiduciary investment advice 
relationships merely because the institution or professional was acting 
on behalf of an ERISA plan or IRA. The ``100 participant plan'' 
threshold was borrowed from annual reporting provisions in ERISA that 
were designed to serve different purposes related to simplifying 
reporting for small plans and reducing administrative burdens on small 
businesses that sponsor employee benefit plans. The ``$100 million in 
assets under management'' threshold was a better proxy for the type of 
financial capabilities the carve-out was intended to capture, but it 
failed to include a range of financial services providers that fairly 
could be said to have the financial capabilities and understanding that 
was the focus of the carve-out.
    Thus, after carefully evaluating the comments, the Department has 
concluded that the exclusion is better tailored to the Department's 
stated objective by requiring the communications to take place with 
plan or IRA fiduciaries who are independent from the person providing 
the advice and are either licensed and regulated providers of financial 
services or plan fiduciaries with responsibility for the management of 
$50 million in assets. This provision does not require that the $50 
million be attributable to only one plan, but rather allows all the 
plan and non-plan assets under management to be included in determining 
whether the threshold is met. Such parties should have a high degree of 
financial sophistication and may often engage in arm's length 
transactions in which neither party has an expectation of reliance on 
the counterparty's recommendations. The final rule revises and re-
labels the carve-out in a new paragraph (c)(1) that provides that a 
person shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary within the meaning of 
section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Act solely because of the provision of any 
advice (including the provision of asset allocation models or other 
financial analysis tools) to an independent person who is a fiduciary 
of the plan or IRA (including a fiduciary to an investment contract, 
product, or entity that holds plan assets as determined pursuant to 
sections 3(42) and 401 of the Act and 29 CFR 2510.3-101) with respect 
to an arm's length sale, purchase, loan, exchange, or other transaction 
involving the investment of

[[Page 20983]]

securities or other property, if the person knows or reasonably 
believes that they are dealing with a fiduciary of the plan or IRA who 
is independent from the person providing the advice and who is (1) a 
bank as defined in section 202 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
or similar institution that is regulated and supervised and subject to 
periodic examination by a State or Federal agency; (2) an insurance 
carrier which is qualified under the laws of more than one state to 
perform the services of managing, acquiring or disposing of assets of a 
plan \34\; (3) an investment adviser registered under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 or, if not registered as an investment adviser 
under such Act by reason of paragraph (1) of section 203A of such Act, 
is registered as an investment adviser under the laws of the State 
(referred to in such paragraph (1)) in which it maintains its principal 
office and place of business; (4) a broker-dealer registered under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or (5) any other person acting as an 
independent fiduciary that holds, or has under management or control, 
total assets of at least $50 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Exemption (PTE 84-14) permits transactions between parties 
in interest to a plan and an investment fund in which the plan has 
an interest provided the fund is managed by a qualified professional 
plan asset manager (QPAM) that satisfies certain conditions. Among 
the entities that can qualify as a QPAM is ``an insurance company 
which is qualified under the laws of more than one state to manage, 
acquire or dispose of any assets of a plan. . .'' 49 FR 9494.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Whether a party is ``independent'' for purposes of the final rule 
will generally involve a determination as to whether there exists a 
financial interest (e.g., compensation, fees, etc.), ownership 
interest, or other relationship, agreement or understanding that would 
limit the ability of the party to carry out its fiduciary 
responsibility to the plan or IRA beyond the control, direction or 
influence of other persons involved in the transaction. The Department 
believes that consideration must be given to all relevant facts and 
circumstances, including evidence bearing on all relationships between 
the fiduciary and the other party. For example, if a fiduciary has an 
interest in or relationship with another party that may conflict with 
the interests of the plan for which the fiduciary acts or which may 
otherwise affect the fiduciary's best judgment as a fiduciary, the 
Department would not regard the person as independent. The nature and 
degree of any common ownership or control connections would be a 
relevant circumstance. Thus, parties belonging to a controlled group of 
corporations as described in Internal Revenue Code section 414(b), 
under common control as described in Code section 414(c), or that are 
members of an affiliated service group within the meaning of Code 
section 414(m), generally would be sufficiently affiliated so that such 
relationships would affect the fiduciary's best judgment. The 
Department also would not view the fiduciary as independent if the 
transaction includes an agreement, arrangement, or understanding with 
other parties involved in the transaction that is designed to relieve 
the fiduciary from any responsibility, obligation or duty to the plan 
or IRA. In other cases, a disqualifying affiliation or other 
significant relationship may be established by a showing of substantial 
control and close supervision by a common parent. Similarly, the 
Department would not regard a person as independent if the person 
received compensation or fees in connection with the transaction that 
involved a violation of the prohibitions of section 406(b)(1) of the 
Act (relating to fiduciaries dealing with the assets of plans in their 
own interest or for their own account), section 406(b)(2) of the Act 
(relating to fiduciaries in their individual or in any other capacity 
acting in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or 
representing a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of 
the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries), or 
section 406(b)(3) of the Act (relating to fiduciaries receiving 
consideration for their own personal account from any party dealing 
with a plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of 
the plan). Moreover, if a fiduciary has an interest in or relationship 
with another party that may affect the fiduciary's best judgment, as 
described in 29 CFR 2550.408b-2, the Department would not regard the 
person as independent.
    Additional conditions are intended to ensure that this provision in 
the final rule is limited to circumstances that involve true arm's 
length transactions between investment professionals or large asset 
managers who do not have a legitimate expectation that they are in a 
relationship of trust and loyalty where they fairly can rely on the 
other person for impartial advice. Specifically, the person must also 
fairly inform the independent plan fiduciary that the person is not 
undertaking to provide impartial investment advice, or to give advice 
in a fiduciary capacity, in connection with the transaction and must 
fairly inform the independent plan fiduciary of the existence and 
nature of the person's financial interests in the transaction. The 
person must know or reasonably believe that the independent fiduciary 
of the plan or IRA is capable of evaluating investment risks 
independently, both in general and with regard to particular 
transactions and investment strategies. The final rule expressly 
provides that the person may rely on written representations from the 
plan or independent fiduciary to satisfy this condition. The person 
must know or reasonably believe that the independent fiduciary is a 
fiduciary under ERISA or the Code, or both, with respect to the 
transaction and is responsible for exercising independent judgment in 
evaluating the transaction (the person may rely on written 
representations from the plan or independent fiduciary to satisfy this 
requirement). In the Department's view, this condition is designed to 
ensure that the parties, including the plan or IRA, understand the 
nature of their relationships. Finally, the person must not receive a 
fee or other compensation directly from the plan, or plan fiduciary, 
for the provision of investment advice (as opposed to other services) 
in connection with the transaction. If a plan expressly pays a fee for 
advice, the essence of the relationship is advisory, and subject to the 
provisions of ERISA and the Code. Thus, the person may not charge the 
plan a direct fee to act as an adviser with respect to the transaction, 
and then disclaim responsibility as a fiduciary adviser by asserting 
that he or she is merely an arm's length counterparty.
    In formulating this provision in the final rule, the Department 
considered FINRA guidance on a similar issue under the federal 
securities laws. Specifically, FINRA guidance provides that the 
suitability rule in federal securities law applies to a broker-dealer's 
or registered representative's recommendation of a security or 
investment strategy involving a security to a ``customer.'' FINRA's 
definition of a customer in FINRA Rule 0160 excludes a ``broker or 
dealer.'' In explaining this exclusion, FINRA has noted that:

    [I]n general, for purposes of the suitability rule, the term 
customer includes a person who is not a broker or dealer who opens a 
brokerage account at a broker-dealer or purchases a security for which 
the broker-dealer receives or will receive, directly or indirectly, 
compensation even though the security is held at an issuer, the 
issuer's affiliate or a custodial agent (e.g., `direct application' 
business,

[[Page 20984]]

`investment program' securities, or private placements), or using 
another similar arrangement. (footnotes omitted) FINRA Rule 2111 
(Suitability) FAQ at www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq#_edn3.

The Department's final rule similarly says that recommendations to 
broker-dealers, registered investment advisers and other licensed 
financial professionals are not treated as fiduciary investment advice 
under ERISA and the Code when the rule's conditions are met.
    The $50 million threshold in the final rule for ``other plan 
fiduciaries'' is similarly based upon the definition of ``institutional 
account'' in FINRA rule 4512(c)(3) to which the suitability rules of 
FINRA rule 2111 apply and responds to the requests of commenters that 
the test for sophistication be based on market concepts that are well 
understood by brokers and advisers. Specifically, FINRA Rule 2111(b) on 
suitability and FINRA's ``books and records'' Rule 4512(c) both use a 
definition of ``institutional account,'' which means the account of a 
bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, registered 
investment company, registered investment adviser, or any other person 
(whether a natural person, corporation, partnership, trust or 
otherwise) with total assets of at least $50 million. Id. at Q&A 8.1. 
In regard to the ``other person'' category, FINRA's rule had used a 
standard of at least $10 million invested in securities and/or under 
management, but revised it to the current $50 million standard. Id. at 
footnote 80. In addition, the FINRA rule requires: (1) That the broker 
have ``a reasonable basis to believe the institutional customer is 
capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general 
and with regard to particular transactions and investment strategies 
involving a security or securities'' and (2) that ``the institutional 
customer affirmatively indicates that it is exercising independent 
judgment.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ FINRA has a separate advertising regulation with a 
different definition for ``institutional communications.'' Under 
FINRA Rule 2210, an institutional communication ``means any written 
(including electronic) communication that is distributed or made 
available only to institutional investors as defined but does not 
include a firm's internal communications. Institutional investors 
include banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, 
registered investment companies, registered investment advisors, a 
person or entity with assets of at least $50 million, government 
entities, employee benefit plans and qualified plans with at least 
100 participants, FINRA member firms and registered persons, and a 
person acting solely on behalf of an institutional investor.'' See 
www.finra.org/industry/issues/faq-advertising. The Department 
believes that the FINRA requirements for institutional customers 
under its suitability and books and records rules serve purposes 
more analogous to the exemption in the final for sophisticated 
fiduciary investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department intends that a person seeking to avoid fiduciary 
status under this exception has the burden of demonstrating compliance 
with all applicable requirements of the limitation. Whether the burden 
is met in any particular case will depend on the individual facts and 
circumstances. For example, with regard to comments asking for 
clarification regarding the timing of the required disclosures, in 
particular whether the required representations have to be made on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis or could be made more generally when 
establishing the relationship, nothing in the final rule requires the 
disclosures to be on an individual transaction basis or prohibits the 
disclosures from being framed to cover a broader range of transactions. 
Whether particular disclosures satisfy the conditions in the final rule 
would depend on the transaction or transactions involved and the 
substance and timing of the disclosures that are being proffered as 
satisfying the condition.
    Finally, although the seller's carve-out is not available under the 
final rule in the retail market for communications directly to retail 
investors, the Department notes that the final rule includes other 
provisions that are more appropriate ways to address some concerns 
raised by commenters and ensure that small plan fiduciaries, plan 
participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners would be able to obtain 
essential information regarding important decisions they make regarding 
their investments without the providers of that information crossing 
the line into providing recommendations that would be fiduciary in 
nature. Under paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule, platform providers 
(i.e., persons that provide access to securities or other property 
through a platform or similar mechanism) and persons that help plan 
fiduciaries select or monitor investment alternatives for their plans 
can perform those services without those services being labeled 
recommendations of investment advice. Similarly, under paragraph (b)(2) 
of the final rule, general plan information, financial, investment and 
retirement information, and information and education regarding asset 
allocation models would all be available to a plan, plan fiduciary, 
participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner and would not constitute the 
provision of an investment recommendation, irrespective of who receives 
that information.
    Further, in the absence of a recommendation, nothing in the final 
rule would make a person an investment advice fiduciary merely by 
reason of selling a security or investment property to an interested 
buyer. For example, if a retirement investor asked a broker to purchase 
a mutual fund share or other security, the broker would not become a 
fiduciary investment adviser merely because the broker purchased the 
mutual fund share for the investor or executed the securities 
transaction. Such ``purchase and sales'' transactions do not include 
any investment advice component. The final rule has a specific 
provision in paragraph (e) that expressly confirms that conclusion in 
connection with the execution of securities transactions by broker-
dealers, certain reporting dealers, and banks.
(2) Swap and Security-Based Swap Transactions
    The proposal included a ``carve-out'' intended to make it clear 
that communications and activities engaged in by counterparties to 
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans in swap and security-based swap 
transactions did not result in the counterparties becoming investment 
advice fiduciaries to the plan. As explained in the preamble to the 
2015 Proposal, swaps and security-based swaps are a broad class of 
financial transactions defined and regulated under amendments to the 
Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Section 4s(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 
6s(h)) and section 15F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78o-10(h) establish similar business conduct standards for 
dealers and major participants in swaps or security-based swaps. 
Special rules apply for swap and security-based swap transactions 
involving ``special entities,'' a term that includes employee benefit 
plans covered under ERISA. Under the business conduct standards in the 
Commodity Exchange Act as added by the Dodd-Frank Act, swap dealers or 
major swap participants that act as counterparties to ERISA plans, 
must, among other conditions, have a reasonable basis to believe that 
the plans have independent representatives who are fiduciaries under 
ERISA. 7 U.S.C. 6s(h)(5). Similar requirements apply for security-based 
swap transactions. 15 U.S.C 78o-10(h)(4) and (5). The CFTC has issued a 
final rule to implement these requirements and the SEC has issued a 
proposed rule that

[[Page 20985]]

would cover security-based swaps. 17 CFR 23.400 to 23.451 (2012); 70 FR 
42396 (July 18, 2011). In the Department's view, when Congress enacted 
the swap and security based swap provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
including those expressly applicable to ERISA covered plans, Congress 
did not intend that engaging in regulated conduct as part of a swap or 
security-based swap transaction with an employee benefit plan would 
give rise to additional fiduciary obligations or restrictions under 
Title I of ERISA.
    A commenter asked that the Department confirm in the final rule 
that this provision includes communications and activities in swaps and 
security-based swaps that are not cleared by a central counterparty. In 
the view of the Department, there are differences in the 
characteristics of cleared and uncleared swaps. For example, uncleared 
swaps can be highly-customizable, bespoke agreements subject to 
extensive negotiation. In contrast, we understand that cleared swaps 
and cleared security-based swaps tend to offer greater standardization 
and increased transparency of terms and pricing. In addition, cleared 
swaps and cleared security-based swaps may have other beneficial 
characteristics that may be important to ERISA plans, such as greater 
liquidity and centrally managed counterparty risk. Thus, there are 
issues that a plan fiduciary must consider in evaluating whether to 
engage in a swap transaction through a cleared or uncleared channel. 
However, the Dodd-Frank Act provisions apply the business conduct 
standards similarly to cleared and uncleared swap transactions 
involving employee benefit plans. Accordingly, notwithstanding the 
difference between cleared and uncleared swap transactions, the 
Department does not believe the potential consequences under this final 
rule should be different for cleared versus uncleared swap and 
security-based swap transactions with respect to whether compliance 
with the business conduct standards could result in swap dealers, 
security-based swap dealers, major swap participants, and major 
security-based swap participants becoming investment advice fiduciaries 
under the final rule.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The Department has provided assurances to the CFTC and the 
SEC that the Department is fully committed to ensuring that any 
changes to the current ERISA fiduciary advice regulation are 
carefully harmonized with the final business conduct standards, as 
adopted by the CFTC and the SEC, so that there are no unintended 
consequences for swap and security-based swap dealers and major swap 
and security-based swap participants who comply with the business 
conduct standards. See, e.g., Letter from Phyllis C, Borzi, 
Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. 
Department of Labor, to The Hon. Gary Gensler et al., CFTC (Jan. 17, 
2012). In this regard, we note that the disclosures required under 
the business conduct standards, including those regarding material 
information about a swap or security-based swap concerning material 
risks, characteristics, incentives and conflicts of interest; 
disclosures regarding the daily mark of a swap or security-based 
swap and a counterparty's clearing rights; disclosures necessary to 
ensure fair and balanced communications; and disclosures regarding 
the capacity in which a swap or security-based swap dealer or major 
swap participant is acting when a counterparty to a special entity, 
do not in the Department's view compel counterparties to ERISA-
covered employee benefit plans, other plans or IRAs to make a 
recommendation for purposes of paragraph (a) of the final rule or 
otherwise compel them to act as fiduciaries in swap and security-
based swap transactions conducted pursuant to section 4s of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and section 15F of the Securities Exchange 
Act. This section of this Notice discusses these issues in the 
context of the express provisions in the final rule on swap and 
security-based swap transactions and on transactions with 
independent fiduciaries with financial expertise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, paragraph (c)(2) of the final rule is intended to confirm 
that persons acting as swap dealers, security-based swap dealers, major 
swap participants, and major security-based swap participants do not 
become investment advice fiduciaries as a result of communications and 
activities conducted during the course of swap or security-based swap 
transactions regulated under the Dodd-Frank Act provisions in the 
Commodity Exchange Act or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
applicable CFTC and SEC implementing rules and regulations. The 
provision in the final rule requires in such transactions that (1) in 
the case of a swap dealer or security-based swap dealer, the person 
must not be acting as an advisor to the plan, within the meaning of the 
applicable business conduct standards under the Commodity Exchange Act 
or the Securities Exchange Act, (2) the employee benefit plan must be 
represented in the transaction by an independent plan fiduciary,\37\ 
(3) the person does not receive a fee or other compensation directly 
from the plan or plan fiduciary for the provision of investment advice 
(as opposed to other services) in connection with the transaction, and 
(4) before providing any recommendation with respect to a swap or 
security-based swap transaction or series of transactions, the person 
providing the recommendation must obtain from the independent fiduciary 
a written representation that the independent plan fiduciary 
understands that the person is not undertaking to provide impartial 
investment advice, or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity, in 
connection with the transaction and that the independent plan fiduciary 
is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See discussion above on what constitutes ``independence'' 
under the final rule in the case of provisions that require the plan 
to be represented by an independent plan fiduciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters indicated that the swaps and security-based swaps 
provision in the proposal was too narrow because it was limited to 
``counterparties,'' and, accordingly, did not include other parties 
with roles in cleared swap or cleared security-based swap transactions. 
The commenters said it is common for a clearing firm to provide its 
customers with information, such as valuations, pricing and liquidity 
information that is important to customers in deciding whether to 
execute, maintain, or liquidate swap or security-based swap positions, 
or the collateral supporting these positions. Clearing firms in this 
context means members of a derivatives clearing organization or members 
of a clearing agency as compared to the derivatives clearing 
organization or clearing agency itself. According to this commenter, if 
clearing firms are deterred from providing these services due to the 
risk of being a fiduciary under the final rule, customers may receive 
less information and make less-informed decisions, which decisions 
could also result in greater risks for the clearing firms. The 
commenter indicated that as a result, the clearing role, which Congress 
considered important, could be compromised. The Department understands 
that a central concern of the comments in this area focused on the 
possibility that providing valuation, pricing, and liquidity 
information would constitute fiduciary investment advice under the 
provision in the 2015 Proposal that included appraisals and valuations. 
As noted elsewhere in this Notice, that provision was not carried 
forward in the final rule, but was reserved for future consideration. 
Thus, providing such valuation, pricing, and liquidity information 
would not give rise to potential status as an investment advice 
fiduciary under the final rule. Nonetheless, the commenters asked that 
clearing firms be expressly included in the swap and security-based 
swap provision in the final rule. The final rule has been adjusted 
accordingly.
    The Department, however, is not prepared to include a more open-
ended class of ``other similar service providers'' in the swap and 
security-based swap provision in the final rule. It was not clear from 
the information submitted by the commenter who requested such an 
expansion of the provision who these service providers

[[Page 20986]]

were, what made them similar to other service providers listed in the 
provision, and why there was an issue regarding their activities or 
communications giving rise to potential fiduciary investment advice 
status. For example, based on the descriptions in the comments, the 
Department agrees that the provision of clearing services by, and 
communications that ordinarily accompany the provision of clearing 
services from, a derivatives clearing organization or clearing agency, 
or a member of a derivatives clearing organization or clearing agency, 
as those terms are defined in section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act 
and section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in connection with 
clearing a commodity interest transaction as defined in 17 CFR 1.3(yy), 
including swaps and futures contracts, or in connection with clearing a 
security-based swap, would not appear to require or typically involve a 
clearing organization or clearing firm making investment 
recommendations as that term is defined in the final rule. Rather, it 
appears that clearing services can be provided in compliance with the 
Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act without such 
compliance, by itself, causing a clearing organization or clearing firm 
to be an investment advice fiduciary under the final rule. Moreover, to 
the extent issues arise with respect to such ``other similar service 
providers,'' the provision of the final rule regarding transactions 
with independent plan fiduciaries with financial expertise would be 
available.
    This same commenter also questioned whether the provisions in the 
proposal were intended to change the conclusions of Advisory Opinion 
2013-01A regarding the fiduciary and party in interest status of 
certain parties involved in the clearing process, such as clearing 
firms and clearinghouses. The conclusions in Advisory Opinion 2013-01A 
did not involve interpretations of the investment advice fiduciary 
provision in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii). Rather, they involved other 
elements of the fiduciary definition under section 3(21). Accordingly, 
the final rule does not change the conclusions expressed in the 
advisory opinion.
    Some commenters argued that IRA owners should be able to engage in 
a swap and security-based swap transaction under appropriate 
circumstances, assuming the account owner is an ``eligible contract 
participant.'' The Department notes that IRAs and IRA owners would not 
appear to be ``special entities'' under the Dodd-Frank Act provisions 
and transactions with IRAs would not be subject to the business conduct 
standards that apply to cleared and uncleared swap and security-based 
swap transactions with employee benefit plans. Moreover, for the same 
reasons discussed elsewhere in this Notice that the Department declined 
to adopt a broad ``seller's'' exception for retail retirement 
investors, the Department does not believe extending the swap and 
security-based swap provisions to IRA investors is appropriate. Rather, 
as described below, the Department concluded that it was more 
appropriate to address this issue in the context of the ``independent 
plan fiduciary with financial expertise'' provision described elsewhere 
in this Notice.
    Some commenters requested that the swap and security-based swap 
provision include transactions involving pooled investment funds, and 
other alternative investments, including specifically futures 
contracts. The Department does not believe it has an adequate basis for 
a wholesale expansion of the swaps and security-based swap provision to 
other classes of investments that are not subject to the business 
conduct standards in the Dodd-Frank Act regarding swaps and security-
based swaps. Rather, the final rule's general provision relating to 
transactions with ``independent plan fiduciaries with financial 
expertise'' (paragraph (c)(1)) has been significantly adjusted and 
expanded from the so-called ``counterparty'' carve-out in the proposal. 
That provision in the final rule gives an alternative avenue for 
parties involved in futures, alternative investments, or other 
investment transactions to conduct the transaction in a way that would 
ensure they do not become investment advice fiduciaries under the final 
rule. With respect to pooled investment funds that hold plan assets, 
the same ``independent plan fiduciary'' provision is available for swap 
and security-based swap transactions involving pooled investment 
vehicles managed by independent fiduciaries.
(3) Employees of Plan Sponsors, Plans, or Plan Fiduciaries
    Paragraph (c)(3) of the final rule provides that a person is not an 
investment advice fiduciary if, in his or her capacity as an employee 
of the plan sponsor of a plan, as an employee of an affiliate of such 
plan sponsor, as an employee of an employee benefit plan, as an 
employee of an employee organization, or as an employee of a plan 
fiduciary, the person provides advice to a plan fiduciary, or to an 
employee (other than in his or her capacity as a participant or 
beneficiary of a plan) or independent contractor of such plan sponsor, 
affiliate, or employee benefit plan, provided the person receives no 
fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, in connection with the 
advice beyond the employee's normal compensation for work performed for 
the employer.
    This exclusion from the scope of the fiduciary investment advice 
definition addresses concerns raised by public comments seeking 
confirmation that the rule does not include as investment advice 
fiduciaries employees working in a company's payroll, accounting, human 
resources, and financial departments, who routinely develop reports and 
recommendations for the company and other named fiduciaries of the 
sponsors' plans. The exclusion was revised to make it clear that it 
covers employees even if they are not the persons ultimately 
communicating directly with the plan fiduciary (e.g., employees in 
financial departments that prepare reports for the Chief Financial 
Officer who then communicates directly with a named fiduciary of the 
plan). The Department agrees that such personnel of the employer should 
not be treated as investment advice fiduciaries based on communications 
that are part of their normal employment duties if they receive no 
compensation for these advice-related functions above and beyond their 
normal salary.
    Similarly, and as requested by commenters, the exclusion covers 
communications between employees, such as human resources department 
staff communicating information to other employees about the plan and 
distribution options in the plan subject to certain conditions designed 
to prevent the exclusion from covering employees who are in fact 
employed to provide investment recommendations to plan participants or 
otherwise becoming a possible loophole for financial services providers 
seeking to avoid fiduciary status under the rule. Specifically, the 
exclusion covers circumstances where an employee of the plan sponsor of 
a plan, or as an employee of an affiliate of such plan sponsor, 
provides advice to another employee of the plan sponsor in his or her 
capacity as a participant or beneficiary of the plan, provided the 
person's job responsibilities do not involve the provision of 
investment advice or investment recommendations, the person is not 
registered or licensed under federal or state securities or insurance 
laws, the advice they provide does not require the person to be 
registered or licensed under federal or state securities or insurance 
laws, and the person receives no fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, in

[[Page 20987]]

connection with the advice beyond the employee's normal compensation 
for work performed for the employer. The Department established these 
conditions to address circumstances where an HR employee, for example, 
may inadvertently make an investment recommendation within the meaning 
of the final rule. It also is designed so that it does not cover 
situations designed to evade the standards and purposes of the final 
rule. For example, the Department wanted to ensure that the exclusion 
did not create a loophole through which a person could be detailed from 
an investment firm, or ``hired'' under a dual employment structure, as 
part of an arrangement designed to avoid fiduciary obligations in 
connection with investment advice to participants or insulate 
recommendations designed to benefit the investment firm. For the 
reasons discussed elsewhere in this Notice in connection with call 
center employees, the Department does not believe this exclusion should 
extend beyond employees of the plan sponsor and its affiliates.

E. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(d), (e), and (f)--Scope, Execution of Securities 
Transactions, and Applicability Under Internal Revenue Code

(1) Scope of Investment Advice Fiduciary Duty
    Paragraph (d) confirms that a person who is a fiduciary with 
respect to the assets of a plan or IRA by reason of rendering 
investment advice defined in the general provisions of the final rule 
shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary regarding any assets of the plan 
or IRA with respect to which that person does not have or exercise any 
discretionary authority, control, or responsibility or with respect to 
which the person does not render or have authority to render investment 
advice defined by the final rule, provided that nothing in paragraph 
(d) exempts such person from the provisions of section 405(a) of the 
Act concerning liability for violations of fiduciary responsibility by 
other fiduciaries or excludes such person from the definition of party 
in interest under section 3(14)(B) of the Act or section 4975(e)(2) of 
the Code. This provision is unchanged from the current 1975 regulation 
and the 2015 Proposal. Although this is long-held guidance, there were 
a number of comments on this provision. Many commenters asked whether 
the Department could clarify whether parties may limit the scope and 
timeframe for a fiduciary relationship, including when the fiduciary 
relationship is terminated. Many commenters asked the Department to 
clarify the point in time during a transaction when investment advice 
takes place, such that the fiduciary standard is triggered. Some 
commenters argued that the parties to the advice arrangement should be 
able to define fiduciary relationships for themselves, including 
whether a fiduciary role is intended. Others suggested that there 
should be a time period during which an investor could reasonably rely 
upon the advice provided. Other commenters requested clarification as 
to whether there is an ongoing duty to monitor the advice once it was 
provided. Other commenters requested clarification on the interaction 
of the proposal with existing DOL guidance on fiduciary responsibility 
such as advisory opinions on fee neutrality or the use of independently 
designed computer models \38\ and existing statutory exemptions and 
regulations thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See Advisory Opinions 97-15A and 97-16A, May 22, 1997, and 
2001-09A, December 9, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule defines the circumstances when a person is providing 
fiduciary investment advice. Paragraph (d) merely confirms longstanding 
guidance that, except for co-fiduciary liability under section 405(a) 
of the Act, being an investment advice fiduciary for certain assets of 
a plan or IRA does not make that person a fiduciary for all of the 
assets of the plan or IRA. In response to comments regarding the use of 
an agreement to define the fiduciary relationship, the Department notes 
that parties cannot by contract or disclaimer alter the application of 
the final rule as to whether fiduciary investment advice has occurred 
in the first instance or will occur during the course of a 
relationship. In keeping with past guidance, whether someone is a 
fiduciary for a particular activity is a functional test based on facts 
and circumstances. The final rule amends the factors to be considered 
under a functional test for the provision of fiduciary investment 
advice, but it does not alter the ``facts and circumstances'' nature of 
the test.
    The Department notes that some questions involving temporal issues, 
such as when an advice recommendation becomes stale if not immediately 
acted upon, are addressed in the section below discussing the 
definition of advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect. With respect to commenters' questions about the ongoing duty 
to monitor advice recommendations, the Department notes that, if the 
recommendations relate to the advisability of acquiring or exchanging 
securities or other investment property in a particular transaction, 
the final rule does not impose on the person an automatic fiduciary 
obligation to continue to monitor the investment or the advice 
recipient's activities to ensure the recommendations remain prudent and 
appropriate for the plan or IRA.\39\ Instead, the obligation to monitor 
the investment on an ongoing basis would be a function of the 
reasonable expectations, understandings, arrangements, or agreements of 
the parties.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Nor does the Best Interest Contract Exemption, if 
applicable, impose such an obligation.
    \40\ The preamble to the Best Interest Contract Exemption 
explains that ``when determining the extent of the monitoring to be 
provided, as disclosed in the contract pursuant to Section II(e) of 
the exemption, Financial Institutions should carefully consider 
whether certain investments can be prudently recommended to the 
individual Retirement Investor, in the first place, without a 
mechanism in place for the ongoing monitoring of the investment. 
This is particularly a concern with respect to investments that 
possess unusual complexity and risk, and that are likely to require 
further guidance to protect the investor's interests. Without an 
accompanying agreement to monitor certain recommended investments, 
or at least a recommendation that the Retirement Investor arrange 
for ongoing monitoring, the Adviser may be unable to satisfy the 
exemption's Best Interest obligation with respect to such 
investments. In addition, the Department expects that the added cost 
of monitoring investments should be considered by the Adviser and 
Financial Institution in determining whether certain investments are 
in the Retirement Investors' Best Interest.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As has been made clear by the Department, there are a number of 
ways to provide investment advice without engaging in transactions 
prohibited by ERISA and the Code because of the conflicts of interest 
they pose. For example, the adviser can structure the fee arrangement 
to avoid prohibited conflicts of interest as explained in advisory 
opinions issued by the Department or the adviser can comply with a 
statutory exemption such as that provided by section 408(b)(14) of the 
Act. There is nothing in the final rule that alters these advisory 
opinions. Additionally, the Department notes that many of the issues 
raised by commenters in this area were seeking guidance on existing 
advisory opinions or statutory exemptions and were not comments on the 
2015 Proposal. The Department does not believe that this Notice is the 
appropriate vehicle to address such questions or issue new guidance on 
those advisory opinions or statutory exemptions. Rather, the Department 
directs those commenters to that the Advisory Opinion process under 
ERISA Procedure 76-1.
(2) Execution of Securities Transactions
    Paragraph (e) of the final rule provides that a broker or dealer

[[Page 20988]]

registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that executes 
transactions for the purchase of securities on behalf of a plan or IRA 
will not be a fiduciary with respect to an employee benefit plan or IRA 
solely because such person executes transactions for the purchase or 
sale of securities on behalf of such plan in accordance with the terms 
of paragraph (e). This provision is unchanged from the current 1975 
regulation and the 2015 Proposal. There were only a few comments on 
this provision. One commenter asked that the provision be extended to 
include trade orders to foreign broker-dealers and that the provision 
extend to specifically referenced transactions in fixed income 
securities, options and currency that are not executed on an agency 
basis.
    The Department has decided not to modify paragraph (e). In the 
proposal, the Department did not propose an exclusion for the 
activities requested. Further, this provision modifies all of the 
prongs of section 3(21)(A) of the Act, not merely section 3(21)(A)(ii) 
which is the subject of this final rule. Further, the Department 
believes that the exclusion under paragraph (c)(1) should cover, to a 
significant degree, the requested changes when the transactions are 
conducted with sophisticated fiduciaries.
(3) Application to Code Section 4975
    Certain provisions of Title I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1108, such 
as those relating to participation, benefit accrual, and prohibited 
transactions, also appear in the Code. This parallel structure ensures 
that the relevant provisions apply to ERISA-covered employee benefit 
plans, whether or not they are subject to the section 4975 provisions 
in the Code, and to tax-qualified plans, including IRAs, regardless of 
whether they are subject to Title I of ERISA. With regard to prohibited 
transactions, the ERISA Title I provisions generally authorize recovery 
of losses from, and imposition of civil penalties on, the responsible 
plan fiduciaries, while the Code provisions impose excise taxes on 
persons engaging in the prohibited transactions. The definition of 
fiduciary is the same in section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Code as the 
definition in section 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A)(ii). 
The Department's 1975 regulation defining fiduciary investment advice 
is virtually identical to the regulation that defines the term 
``fiduciary'' under the Code. 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c) (1975).
    To rationalize the administration and interpretation of the 
parallel provisions in ERISA and the Code, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 
1978 divided the interpretive and rulemaking authority for these 
provisions between the Secretaries of Labor and of the Treasury, so 
that, in general, the agency with responsibility for a given provision 
of Title I of ERISA would also have responsibility for the 
corresponding provision in the Code. Among the sections transferred to 
the Department of Labor were the prohibited transaction provisions and 
the definition of a fiduciary in both Title I of ERISA and in the Code. 
ERISA's prohibited transaction rules, 29 U.S.C. 1106-1108, apply to 
ERISA-covered plans, and the Code's corresponding prohibited 
transaction rules, 26 U.S.C. 4975(c), apply both to ERISA-covered 
pension plans that are tax-qualified pension plans, as well as other 
tax-advantaged arrangements, such as IRAs, that are not subject to the 
fiduciary responsibility and prohibited transaction rules in ERISA.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The Secretary of Labor also was transferred authority to 
grant administrative exemptions from the prohibited transaction 
provisions of the Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A provision of the final rule states that the final rule applies to 
the parallel provision defining investment advice fiduciary under 
section 4975(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, notwithstanding 
26 CFR 54.4975-9, the effective and applicability dates provided for in 
this rule apply to the definition of investment advice fiduciary under 
both Section 4975(e)(3) of the Code and Section 3(21) of ERISA, and the 
Department's changes to 29 CFR 2510.3-21 supersede 26 CFR 54.4975-9 as 
of the effective and applicability dates of this final rule. See below 
for a discussion of public comments on the scope of the Department's 
regulatory authority.

F. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(g)--Definitions

(1) For a Fee or Other Compensation, Direct or Indirect
    Paragraph (a)(1) of the proposal required that in order to be 
fiduciary advice, the advice must be in exchange for a fee or other 
compensation, whether direct or indirect. Paragraph (f)(6) of the 
proposal provided that fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, 
means any fee or compensation for the advice received by the person (or 
by an affiliate) from any source and any fee or compensation incident 
to the transaction in which the investment advice has been rendered or 
will be rendered. The proposal referenced the term fee or other 
compensation as including, for example, brokerage fees, mutual fund and 
insurance sales commissions.
    Some commenters expressed support for the definition arguing that 
it captured more of the indirect payments that pervade the current 
investment advice marketplace. Others criticized the definition as too 
broad and possibly sweeping in fees with no intrinsic connection to the 
advice or resulting transaction. Commenters asked that the Department 
state that a recommendation is not fiduciary advice until a transaction 
is entered into and fees have been received. Commenters also asked that 
the Department state that the advice must be acted upon within a 
reasonable time frame and that such a requirement be included in the 
rule. Those commenters expressed concern about possible fiduciary 
liability in such cases if the advice recipient acts on advice only 
after market conditions or other relevant facts have changed. Some 
commenters said the phrase ``incident to the transaction'' was 
ambiguous, especially in the rollover context where they argued that 
more than one ``transaction'' occurs during the rollover process. Other 
commenters expressed concerns that service providers, such as call 
center employees who receive a salary but are not compensated by an 
incremental fee based on actions taken by plan participants or IRA 
owners, would be considered investment advice fiduciaries if their 
communications included ``investment recommendations'' as defined in 
the rule. Several commenters focused on certain types of fees or 
compensation, with some asserting that revenue sharing, asset-based 
fees paid by mutual funds to their investment advisers, and profits 
banks earn on deposit and savings accounts should be excluded from the 
definition. Commenters asked whether the use of ``in exchange for'' was 
intended to change the Department's prior guidance under section 3(21) 
of the Act, which provided that any fee or compensation ``incident'' to 
the transaction was sufficient to establish fiduciary investment 
advice. Other questions involved issues of timing, such as whether 
advice that is provided in the hopes of obtaining business but that 
does not result in a transaction executed by the adviser or an 
affiliate should give rise to fiduciary status. According to the 
commenters, this may occur when the advice recipient walks away without 
engaging in a recommended transaction, but then follows the advice on 
his or her own and chooses some other way to execute it.
    The Department already addressed many of these issues in the 
preamble to

[[Page 20989]]

the 2015 Proposal.\42\ For example, the Department said that the term 
includes (1) any fee or compensation for the advice received by the 
advice provider (or by an affiliate) from any source and (2) any fee or 
compensation incident to the transaction in which the investment advice 
has been rendered or will be rendered. The preamble gave examples that 
included commissions, fees charged on an ``omnibus'' basis (e.g., 
compensation paid based on business placed or retained that includes 
plan or IRA business), and compensation received by affiliates. The 
preamble specifically noted that the definition included fees paid from 
a mutual fund to an investment adviser affiliate of the person giving 
advice. The preamble also expressly addressed call center employees who 
are paid only a salary and said that the Department did not think a 
general exception was appropriate for such call center employees if, in 
the performance of their jobs, they make specific investment 
recommendations to plan participants and IRA owners. Also, as is 
evident from the discussion in the preamble to the 2015 Proposal which 
expressly referenced any fee or compensation ``incident'' to the advice 
transaction, the Department clearly did not intend the proposal's use 
of the words ``in exchange for'' to limit our guidance under the 1975 
rule on the scope of the term ``fee or other compensation.'' Thus, 
neither the proposal nor the final rule is intended to narrow the 
Department's view expressed in Advisory Opinion 83-60A, (Nov. 21, 1983) 
that a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, includes all fees 
or compensation incident to the transaction in which investment advice 
to the plan has been or will be rendered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See 80 FR 21928, 21945 (Apr. 20, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To further emphasize these points, however, the Department has 
revised the text of the final rule. The final rule does not use the 
phrase ``in exchange for.'' Rather, consistent with the preamble to the 
2015 Proposal, the final rule provides that ``fee or other 
compensation, direct or indirect'' for purposes of this section and 
section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Act, means any explicit fee or compensation 
for the advice received by the person (or by an affiliate) from any 
source, and any other fee or compensation received from any source in 
connection with or as a result of the recommended purchase or sale of a 
security or the provision of investment advice services, including, 
though not limited to, commissions, loads, finder's fees, revenue 
sharing payments, shareholder servicing fees, marketing or distribution 
fees, underwriting compensation, payments to brokerage firms in return 
for shelf space, recruitment compensation paid in connection with 
transfers of accounts to a registered representative's new broker-
dealer firm, gifts and gratuities, and expense reimbursements. The 
final rule also expressly provides that a fee or compensation is paid 
``in connection with or as a result of'' advice if the fee or 
compensation would not have been paid but for the recommended 
transaction or advisory service or if eligibility for or the amount of 
the fee or compensation is based in whole or in part on the transaction 
or service.
    With respect to the timing issues presented by some commenters, in 
the Department's view, if a participant, beneficiary or IRA owner 
receives investment advice from an adviser, does not open an account 
with that adviser, but nevertheless acts on the advice through another 
channel and purchases a recommended investment that pays revenue 
sharing to the adviser or an affiliate, that revenue sharing would 
still be treated as paid to the adviser or an affiliate ``in connection 
with'' the advice for purposes of the final rule. As explained in more 
detail in the preamble to the Best Interest Contract Exemption, 
commenters expressed concern that this position could result in a 
prohibited transaction for which there was no relief because the 
adviser and financial institution would not be able to satisfy all of 
the conditions in the exemption. For example, they cited as an example 
an adviser who was affiliated with the mutual fund recommending an 
investment in that fund, which the investor followed by executing the 
transaction through a separate institution unaffiliated with the mutual 
fund. The Department has addressed this problem in the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption by providing a method of complying with the 
exemption in the event that the participant, beneficiary or IRA owner 
does not open an account with the adviser or otherwise conduct the 
recommended transaction through the adviser.
(2) Definition of Plan Includes IRAs and Other Non-ERISA Plans
    As discussed above, the Department received extensive comments on 
whether the proposal should apply to other non-ERISA plans covered by 
Code section 4975, such as Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), Archer 
Medical Savings Accounts and Coverdell Education Savings Accounts. The 
Department notes that these accounts are given tax preferences, as are 
IRAs. Further, some of the accounts, such as HSAs, may have associated 
investment accounts that can be used as long term savings accounts for 
retiree health care expenses. HSA funds may be invested in investments 
approved for IRAs (e.g., bank accounts, annuities, certificates of 
deposit, stocks, mutual funds, or bonds). The HSA trust or custodial 
agreement may restrict investments to certain types of permissible 
investments (e.g., particular investment funds).\43\ The Employee 
Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) estimates that as of December 31, 
2014 there were 13.8 million HSAs holding $24.2 billion in assets. 
Approximately 6 percent of the HSAs had an associated investment 
account, of which 37 percent ended 2014 with a balance of $10,000 or 
more.\44\ Based on tax preferences, EBRI observes that HSA owners may 
use the investment-account option as a means to increase savings for 
retirement, while others may be using it for shorter-term 
investing.\45\ EBRI notes that it has been estimated that about 3 
percent of HSA owners invest, and that HSA investments are likely to 
increase from an estimated $3 billion in 2015 to $40 billion in 
2020.\46\ These types of accounts also are expressly defined by Code 
section 4975(e)(1) as plans that are subject to the Code's prohibited 
transaction rules. Thus, although they generally hold fewer assets and 
may exist for shorter durations than IRAs, the owners of these accounts 
and the persons for whom these accounts were established are entitled 
to receive the same protections from conflicted investment advice as 
IRA owners. The Department does not agree with the commenters that the 
owners of these accounts are entitled to less protection than IRA 
investors. Accordingly, the final rule continues to include these 
``plans'' in the scope of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ IRS Notice 2004-50, Q&A 65, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196 (8/16/2004).
    \44\ Paul Fronstin, ``Health Savings Account Balances, 
Contributions, Distributions, and Other Vital Statistics, 2014: 
Estimates from the EBRI HSA Database,'' EBRI Issue Brief, no. 416, 
(Employee Benefit Research Institute, July 2015) at www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_416.July15.HSAs.pdf.
    \45\ EBRI Notes, August 2015, Vol. 36, No. 8, (www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_08_Aug15_HSAs-QLACs.pdf).
    \46\ http://www.devenir.com/research/2014-year-end-devenir-hsa-market-research-report/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Scope of Department's Regulatory Authority

    The Department received comments arguing that the proposal was 
inconsistent with the statutory text of ERISA, that the proposal 
exceeded the Department's regulatory authority under

[[Page 20990]]

ERISA, and that the Department should publish another proposal before 
moving to publish a final rule. One commenter argued that the proposed 
rule would make fiduciaries of broker-dealers whose relationships with 
customers do not have the hallmarks of a trust relationship. As 
discussed above, however, ERISA's statutory definition of fiduciary 
status broadly covers any person that renders investment advice to a 
plan or IRA for a fee, as broker-dealers frequently do. The final rule 
honors the broad sweep of the statutory text in a way that the 1975 
rule does not.
    As courts have recognized, ERISA attaches fiduciary status more 
broadly than trust law which generally reserves fiduciary status for 
express trustees. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 
248, 262 (1993) (distinguishing traditional trust law under which only 
the trustee had fiduciary duties from ERISA which defines ``fiduciary'' 
in functional terms); Smith v. Provident Bank, 170 F.3d 609, 613 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (definition of fiduciary is ``intended to be broader than 
the common-law definition and does not turn on formal designations or 
labels''); Beddall v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (``the statute also extends fiduciary liability to 
functional fiduciaries''); Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 
618 (9th Cir. 1991) (fiduciary status is determined by ``actions, not 
the official designation''); Sladek v. Bell Systems Mgmt. Pension Plan, 
880 F.2d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 305 
(5th Cir. 1984); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 458-59 (10th Cir. 1978).
    Thus, the statute broadly provides that a person is a fiduciary 
under ERISA if the person ``renders investment advice for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or 
other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to 
do so . . . .'' The statute neither requires an express trust, nor 
limits fiduciary status to an ongoing advisory relationship. A plan may 
need specialized advice for a single, unusual and complex transaction, 
and the paid adviser may fully understand the plan's dependence on his 
or her professional judgment. As the preamble points out, the ``regular 
basis'' requirement would mean that the adviser is not a fiduciary with 
respect to his one-time advice, no matter what the parties' 
understanding, the significance of the advice to the retirement 
investor, or the language of the statutory definition, which included 
no ``regular basis'' requirement.
    Nor is the Department bound by the Investment Advisers Act in 
defining a person's status as a fiduciary adviser under ERISA and the 
Code. The Investment Advisers Act specifically excludes from the 
definition of investment adviser ``any broker or dealer whose 
performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his 
business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation 
therefore.'' 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(11). Nothing in ERISA, or its legislative 
history, gives any indication that Congress meant to limit fiduciary 
investment advisers under Title I of ERISA or the Code to persons who 
meet the Investment Advisers Act's definition of investment adviser, 
and commenters have cited no such indication.
    Whether a securities broker will be a fiduciary under this 
regulation depends on the facts and circumstances. If the broker is 
only executing a purchase or sale at the client's request, then, as 
both the current rule and the final rule make clear, the broker is not 
a fiduciary.\47\ Additionally, as under the proposal, the broker may 
also provide general education without becoming a fiduciary. In this 
way, the final rule is consistent with cases such as Robinson v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 337 F. Supp. 107, 114 (N.D. Ala. 
1971) (a broker is not a fiduciary if the broker is merely executing 
the plaintiff's orders on an open market), and Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 
181 (1985) (publishers of bona fide newspapers, news magazines or 
business or financial publications of general and regular circulation 
are not investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act). It is 
also consistent with the current regime under which brokers can, and 
frequently do, act in a fiduciary capacity. See, e.g., SE.C. v 
Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 499-500 (D.N.J. 2008) (following McAdam 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 767 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
Accordingly, although the final rule would impose a higher duty of 
loyalty upon certain brokers when they are compensated in connection 
with investment actions they recommend, the rule is informed by the 
breadth of the statutory text and purposes and by those rules currently 
governing brokers and dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Subsection (d) of the 1975 regulation, which is preserved 
in paragraph (e) of the final rule, continues to provide that a 
broker dealer is not a fiduciary solely by reason of executing 
specific orders. 29 CFR 2510.3-21(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also disagrees with comments that argued that the 
Dodd-Frank Act somehow prevents the Department from defining the term 
``fiduciary investment advice.'' Section 913 of that Act directs the 
SEC to conduct a study on the standards of care applicable to brokers-
dealers and investment advisers, and issue a report containing, among 
other things:

an analysis of whether [sic] any identified legal or regulatory gaps, 
shortcomings, or overlap in legal or regulatory standards in the 
protection of retail customers relating to the standards of care for 
brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers 
or dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers for 
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail 
customers.

Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 913(d)(1)(B).
    Section 913 also authorizes, but does not require, the SEC to issue 
rules addressing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers for providing personalized investment advice about securities 
to retail customers. 15 U.S.C. 80b-11(g)(1). Nothing in the Dodd-Frank 
Act indicates that Congress meant to preclude the Department's 
regulation of fiduciary investment advice under ERISA or its 
application of such a regulation to securities brokers or dealers. To 
the contrary, Dodd-Frank Act specifically directed the SEC to study the 
effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care under 
other federal and state authorities. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 913(b)(1) and 
(c)(1). The SEC has also consistently recognized ERISA as an applicable 
authority in this area, noting ``that advisers entering into 
performance fee arrangements with employee benefit plans covered by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (``ERISA'') are subject 
to the fiduciary responsibility and prohibited transaction provisions 
of ERISA.'' SE.C. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1732, (July 17, 
1998), 63 FR 39022, 39024 (July 21, 1998).
    Other comments have stated that that the Department should publish 
yet another proposal before moving to publish a final rule. The 
Department disagrees. As noted elsewhere, the 2015 Proposal benefitted 
from comments received on a proposal issued in 2010. The changes in 
this final rule reflect the Department's careful consideration of the 
extensive comments received on both the 2010 Proposal and the second 
2015 Proposal. Moreover, the Department believes that such changes are 
consistent with reasonable expectations of the affected parties and, 
together with the prohibited transaction exemptions being finalized 
with this rule, strike an appropriate balance in addressing the need to 
modernize the fiduciary rule with the various

[[Page 20991]]

stakeholder interests. As a result a third proposal and comment period 
is not necessary.
    To the extent compliance and interpretive issues arise after 
publication of the final rule, the Department fully intends to provide 
advisers, plan sponsors and fiduciaries, and other affected parties 
with extensive compliance assistance and education, including guidance 
specifically tailored to small businesses as required under the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. Law 104-121 section 
212. The Department routinely provides such assistance following its 
issuance of highly technical or significant guidance. For example, the 
Department's compliance assistance Web page, at www.dol.gov/ebsa/compliance_assistance.html, provides a variety of tools, including 
compliance guides, tips, and fact sheets, to assist parties in 
satisfying their ERISA obligations. Recently, the Department added 
broad support for regulated parties on the Affordable Care Act 
regulations, at www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/. The Department also 
will provide informal assistance to affected parties who wish to 
contact the Department with questions or concerns about the final rule. 
See ``For Further Information Contact,'' at the beginning of this 
Notice.
    Some commenters argued that the Department does not have the power 
to regulate IRAs, and the broker-dealers who offer them. The Department 
disagrees. The Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 specifically gives the 
Department the authority to define ``fiduciary'' under both ERISA and 
the Code.\48\ Section 102(a) of the Reorganization Plan gives the 
Department ``all authority'' for ``regulations, rulings, opinions, and 
exemptions under section 4975 [of the Code]'' subject to certain 
exemptions not relevant here.\49\ This includes the definition of 
``fiduciary'' at Code section 4975(e)(3) which parallels ERISA section 
3(21). In President Carter's message to Congress regarding the 
Reorganization Plan, he made explicitly clear that as a result of the 
plan, ``Labor will have statutory authority for fiduciary obligations. 
. . . Labor will be responsible for overseeing fiduciary conduct under 
these provisions.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. (2000)).
    \49\ Id. at section 102.
    \50\ Reorganization Plan, Message of the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argued that because Congress has amended ERISA 
without changing the definition of ``fiduciary,'' Congress has 
implicitly endorsed the five-part test. The Department disagrees. ERISA 
is an extensive, complex statute that Congress has amended many times 
since its original enactment in 1974. It does not make sense to say 
that whenever Congress amended any part of ERISA, it was indicating its 
approval of all the Secretary's regulations and interpretations. On 
none of these occasions did Congress amend any part of the fiduciary 
definition in section 3(21) of ERISA.\51\ Courts have upheld agency 
changes to long-standing regulations as long as ``the new policy is 
permissible under the statute, . . . there are good reasons for it, and 
. . . the agency believes it to be better.'' \52\ Given the evolving 
retirement savings market--which Congress could not have imagined when 
it enacted ERISA and which created a significant regulatory gap that 
runs counter to the congressional purposes underlying ERISA--the 
Department has concluded that there are good reasons for this change, 
and that the amended definition is better.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Dep't of Health and Human 
Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 668 (2003) (the ratification doctrine has 
limited application when Congress has not re-enacted the entire 
statute at issue or significantly amended the relevant provision).
    \52\ FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 
(2009) ; see also Home Care Ass'n of America v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 
(D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed Nov. 24, 2015 (15-683); 
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1036-39 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Administrative Prohibited Transaction Exemptions

    In addition to the final rule in this Notice, the Department is 
also finalizing elsewhere in this edition of the Federal Register, 
certain administrative class exemptions from the prohibited transaction 
provisions of ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1106), and the Code (26 U.S.C. 
4975(c)(1)) as well as proposed amendments to previously adopted 
exemptions. The exemptions and amendments would allow, subject to 
appropriate safeguards, certain broker-dealers, insurance agents and 
others that act as investment advice fiduciaries to nevertheless 
continue to receive a variety of forms of compensation that would 
otherwise violate prohibited transaction rules and trigger excise 
taxes. The exemptions would supplement statutory exemptions at 29 
U.S.C. 1108 and 26 U.S.C. 4975(d), and previously adopted class 
exemptions.
    Investment advice fiduciaries to plans and plan participants must 
meet ERISA's standards of prudence and loyalty to their plan customers. 
Such fiduciaries also face excise taxes, remedies, and other sanctions 
for engaging in certain transactions, such as self-dealing with plan 
assets or receiving payments from third parties in connection with plan 
transactions, unless the transactions are permitted by an exemption 
from ERISA's and the Code's prohibited transaction rules. IRA 
fiduciaries do not have the same general fiduciary obligations of 
prudence and loyalty under the statute, but they too must adhere to the 
prohibited transaction rules or they must pay an excise tax. The 
prohibited transaction rules help ensure that investment advice 
provided to plan participants and IRA owners is not driven by the 
adviser's financial self-interest.
    The new exemptions adopted today are the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption and the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain 
Assets between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans 
and IRAs (the Principal Transactions Exemption). The Best Interest 
Contract Exemption is specifically designed to address the conflicts of 
interest associated with the wide variety of payments advisers receive 
in connection with retail transactions involving plans and IRAs. The 
Principal Transactions Exemption permits investment advice fiduciaries 
to sell or purchase certain debt securities and other investments out 
of their own inventories to or from plans and IRAs. These exemptions 
require, among other things, that investment advice fiduciaries adhere 
to certain Impartial Conduct Standards, which are fundamental 
obligations of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct, and include 
obligations to act in the customer's best interest, avoid misleading 
statements, and receive no more than reasonable compensation.
    At the same time that the Department has granted these new 
exemptions, it has also amended existing exemptions to ensure uniform 
application of the Impartial Conduct Standards.\53\ Taken together, the 
new exemptions and amendments to existing exemptions ensure that plan 
and IRA investors are consistently protected by Impartial Conduct 
Standards, regardless of the particular exemption upon which the 
adviser relies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ The amended exemptions, published elsewhere in this Federal 
Register, include Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 75-1, Parts 
II-V; PTE 77-4; PTE 80-83; PTE 83-1: PTE 84-24; and PTE 86-128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments also revoke certain existing exemptions, which 
provided little or no protections to IRA and non-plan participants, in 
favor of more uniform application of the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption in the market for

[[Page 20992]]

retail investments.\54\ With limited exceptions, it is the Department's 
intent that advice fiduciaries in the retail investment market rely on 
statutory exemptions or the Best Interest Contract Exemption to the 
extent that they receive conflicted forms of compensation that would 
otherwise be prohibited. The new and amended exemptions reflect the 
Department's view that retirement investors should be protected by a 
more consistent application of fundamental fiduciary standards across a 
wide range of investment products and advice relationships, and that 
retail investors, in particular, should be protected by the stringent 
protections set forth in the Best Interest Contract Exemption. When 
fiduciaries have conflicts of interest, they will uniformly be expected 
to adhere to fiduciary norms and to make recommendations that are in 
their customer's best interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ The revoked exemptions include PTE 75-1, Parts I(b) and 
(c); PTE 75-1, Part II(2); and parts of PTE 84-2 and PTE 86-128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters asked whether a fiduciary investment adviser 
would need to utilize the Best Interest Contract Exemption or other 
prohibited transaction exemptions if the only compensation the adviser 
receives is a fixed percentage of the value of assets under management. 
Whether a particular relationship or compensation structure would 
result in an adviser having an interest that may affect the exercise of 
its best judgment as a fiduciary when providing a recommendation, in 
violation of the self-dealing provisions of prohibited transaction 
rules under section 406(b) of ERISA, depends on the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. The Department believes that, by itself, the ongoing 
receipt of compensation calculated as a fixed percentage of the value 
of a customer's assets under management, where such values are 
determined by readily available independent sources or independent 
valuations, typically would not raise prohibited transaction concerns 
for the adviser. Under these circumstances, the amount of compensation 
received depends solely on the value of the investments in a client 
account, and ordinarily the interests of the adviser in making prudent 
investment recommendations, which could have an effect on compensation 
received, are consistent with the investor's interests in growing and 
protecting account investments.
    However, the Department notes that a recommendation to a plan 
participant to take a full or partial distribution from a plan to 
invest in recommended assets that will generate a fee for the adviser 
that he would not otherwise receive implicates the prohibited 
transaction rules, even if the fee going forward is based on a fixed 
percent of assets under management. In that circumstance, the adviser 
should use the Best Interest Contract Exemption or other applicable 
prohibited transaction exemption. Prohibited transaction rules would 
similarly be implicated by a recommendation to switch from a 
commission-based account to an account that charges a fixed percent of 
assets under management. Further, the Department notes that other 
remunerations (e.g., commissions or revenue sharing), beyond the fixed 
assets under management fee, received by the adviser or affiliates as a 
result of investments made pursuant to recommendations or instances of 
the self-valuation of the assets upon which the fixed management fee 
was based would potentially raise prohibited transaction issues and 
therefore require use of the Best Interest Contract Exemption or other 
prohibited transaction exemptions.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Although compensation based on a fixed percentage of the 
value of assets under management generally does not require a 
prohibited transaction exemption, certain practices raise violations 
that would not be eligible for the relief granted in the Best 
Interest Contract Exemption. In its ``Report on Conflicts of 
Interest'' (Oct. 2013), p. 29, FINRA suggests a number of 
circumstances in which advisers may recommend inappropriate 
commission- or fee-based accounts as means of promoting the 
adviser's compensation at the expense of the customer (e.g., 
recommending a fee-based account to an investor with low trading 
activity and no need for ongoing monitoring or advice; or first 
recommending a mutual fund with a front-end sales load, and shortly 
thereafter, recommending that the customer move the shares into an 
advisory account subject to asset-based fees). Fee selection and 
reverse churning continue to be an examination priority for the SEC 
in 2016. See www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2016.pdf. Such conduct designed to enhance the 
adviser's compensation at the Retirement Investor's expense would 
violate the prohibition on self-dealing in ERISA section 406(b)(1) 
and Code section 4975(c)(1)(E), and fall short of meeting the 
Impartial Conduct Standards required for reliance on the Best 
Interest Contract Exemption and other exemptions. The Department 
also notes that charging commissions or receiving revenue sharing in 
addition to an asset management fee may present other compliance 
issues. See, for example, In the Matter of Wunderlich Securities, 
Inc., available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64558.pdf, 
where the SEC found that clients were overcharged in a ``wrap fee'' 
investment advisory program because they contracted to pay one 
bundled or ``wrap'' fee for advisory, execution, clearing, and 
custodial services, but were charged commissions and other 
transactional fees that were contrary to the fees disclosed in the 
clients' written advisory agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Effective Date; Applicability Date

    The proposal stated that the final rule and amended and new 
prohibited transaction exemptions would be effective 60 days after 
publication in the Federal Register and the requirements of the final 
rule and exemptions would generally become applicable eight months 
after publication of a final rule and related administrative 
exemptions.
    Commenters asked the Department to provide sufficient time for 
orderly and efficient adjustments to, for example, recordkeeping 
systems; internal compliance, monitoring, education, and training 
programs; affected service provider contracts; compensation 
arrangements; and other business practices as necessary to make the 
transition to the new expanded definition of investment advice 
fiduciary. The commenters also asked that the Department make it clear 
that the final rule does not apply in connection with advice provided 
before the effective date of the final rule. Many commenters expressed 
concern with the provision in the proposal that the final rule and 
class exemptions would be effective 60 days after their publication in 
the Federal Register, and said the proposed eight month applicability 
date was wholly inadequate due to the time and budget requirements 
necessary to make required changes. Some commenters suggested that the 
effective and applicability dates should be extended to as much as 18 
to 36 months (and some suggested even longer, e.g., five years) 
following publication of the final rule to allow service providers 
sufficient time to make changes necessary to comply with the new rule 
and exemptions. Many other commenters asked that the Department provide 
a grandfather or similar rule for existing contracts or arrangements or 
a temporary exemption permitting all currently permissible transactions 
to continue for a certain period of time. As part of these concerns, a 
few commenters highlighted possible challenges with enforcement, asking 
that the Department state that good faith and reasonably diligent 
efforts to comply with the rule and related exemptions would be 
sufficient for compliance, and one commenter requested a stay on 
enforcement of the rule for 36 months. Other commenters who supported 
the rule thought that the effective and applicability dates in the 
proposal were reasonable and asked that the final rule go into effect 
promptly in order to reduce ongoing harms to savers.
    After careful consideration of the public comments, the Department 
has determined that it is important for the final rule to become 
effective on the earliest possible date. The Congressional Review Act 
provides that significant final rules can be effective 60 days after

[[Page 20993]]

publication in the Federal Register. The final rule, accordingly, is 
effective June 7, 2016. Making the rule effective at the earliest 
possible date will provide certainty to plans, plan fiduciaries, plan 
participants and beneficiaries, IRAs, and IRA owners that the new 
protections afforded by the final rule are now officially part of the 
law and regulations governing their investment advice providers. 
Similarly, the financial services providers and other affected service 
providers will also have certainty that the rule is final and not 
subject to further amendment or modification without additional public 
notice and comment. The Department expects that this effective date 
will remove uncertainty as an obstacle to regulated firms allocating 
capital and other resources toward transition and longer term 
compliance adjustments to systems and business practices.
    The Department has also determined that, in light of the importance 
of the final rule's consumer protections and the significance of the 
continuing monetary harm to retirement investors without the rule's 
changes, that an applicability date of one year after publication of 
the final rule in the Federal Register is adequate time for plans and 
their affected financial services and other service providers to adjust 
to the basic change from non-fiduciary to fiduciary status. The 
Department read the public comments as more generally requesting 
transition relief in connection with the conditions in the new and 
amended prohibited transaction exemptions. The Department agrees that 
is the appropriate place for transition provisions. Those transition 
provisions are explained in the final prohibited transaction exemptions 
being published with this final rule. Further, as noted above, 
consistent with EBSA's longstanding commitment to providing compliance 
assistance to employers, plan sponsors, plan fiduciaries, other 
employee benefit plan officials and service providers in understanding 
and complying with the requirements of ERISA, the Department intends to 
provide affected parties with significant assistance and support during 
the transition period and thereafter with the aim of helping to ensure 
the important consumer protections and other benefits of the final rule 
and final exemptions are implemented in an efficient and effective 
manner.

J. Regulatory Impact Analysis; Executive Order 12866

    This action is a significant regulatory action and was therefore 
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. The 
Department prepared an analysis of the potential costs and benefits 
associated with this action. This analysis is contained in the 
document, Fiduciary Investment Advice Final Rule (2016). A copy of the 
analysis is available in the rulemaking docket (EBSA-2010-0050) on 
www.regulations.gov and on EBSA's Web site at www.dol.gov/ebsa, and the 
analysis is briefly summarized in the Executive Summary section of this 
preamble, above.

K. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) imposes 
certain requirements with respect to Federal rules that are subject to 
the notice and comment requirements of section 553(b) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) and which are 
likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. Unless the head of an agency certifies that a final 
rule is not likely to have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities, section 604 of the RFA requires 
that the agency present a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) 
describing the rule's impact on small entities and explaining how the 
agency made its decisions with respect to the application of the rule 
to small entities.
    The Secretary has determined that this final rule will have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The Secretary has separately published a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) which contains the complete economic analysis for this rulemaking 
including the Department's FRFA for this rule and the related 
prohibited transaction exemptions also published this issue of the 
Federal Register. This section of this preamble sets forth a summary of 
the FRFA. The RIA is available at www.dol.gov/ebsa.
    As noted in section 6.1 of the RIA, the Department has determined 
that regulatory action is needed to mitigate conflicts of interest in 
connection with investment advice to retirement investors. The 
regulation is intended to improve plan and IRA investing to the benefit 
of retirement security. In response to the proposed rulemaking, 
organizations representing small businesses submitted comments 
expressing particular concern with three issues: The carve-out for 
investment education, the best interest contract exemption, and the 
carve-out for persons acting in the capacity of counterparties to plan 
fiduciaries with financial expertise. Section 2 of the RIA contains an 
extensive discussion of these concerns and the Department's response.
    As discussed in section 6.2 of the RIA, the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) defines a small business in the Financial 
Investments and Related Activities Sector as a business with up to 
$38.5 million in annual receipts. In response to a comment received 
from the SBA's Office of Advocacy on our Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis, the Department contacted the SBA, and received from them a 
dataset containing data on the number of firms by North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes, including the number of 
firms in given revenue categories. This dataset allows the estimation 
of the number of firms with a given NAICS code that fall below the 
$38.5 million threshold and would therefore be considered small 
entities by the SBA. However, this dataset alone does not provide a 
sufficient basis for the Department to estimate the number of small 
entities affected by the rule. Not all firms within a given NAICS code 
would be affected by this rule, because being an ERISA fiduciary relies 
on a functional test and is not based on industry status as defined by 
a NAICS code. Further, not all firms within a given NAICS code work 
with ERISA-covered plans and IRAs.
    Over 90 percent of broker-dealers, registered investment advisers, 
insurance companies, agents, and consultants are small businesses 
according to the SBA size standards (132 CFR 121.201). Applying the 
ratio of entities that meet the SBA size standards to the number of 
affected entities, based on the methodology described at greater length 
in the RIA, the Department estimates that the number of small entities 
affected by this rule is 2,414 BDs, 16,524 registered investment 
advisers, 395 insurers, and 3,358 other ERISA service providers.
    For purposes of the RFA, the Department continues to consider an 
employee benefit plan with fewer than 100 participants to be a small 
entity. Further, while some large employers may have small plans, in 
general small employers maintain most small plans. The definition of 
small entity considered appropriate for this purpose differs, however, 
from a definition of small business that is based on size standards 
promulgated by the SBA. These small pension plans will benefit from the 
rule, because as a result of the rule, they will receive non-conflicted 
advice from their fiduciary service providers. The 2013 Form 5500 
filings show nearly 595,000 ERISA covered retirement plans with less 
than 100 participants.

[[Page 20994]]

    Section 6.5 of the RIA summarizes the projected reporting, 
recordkeeping, and other compliance costs of the rule, which are 
discussed in detail in section 5 of the RIA. Among other things, the 
Department concludes that it is likely that some small service 
providers may find that the increased costs associated with ERISA 
fiduciary status outweigh the benefits of continuing to service the 
ERISA plan market or the IRA market. The Department does not believe 
that this outcome will be widespread or that it will result in a 
diminution of the amount or quality of advice available to small or 
other retirement savers, because other firms are likely to fill the 
void and provide services the ERISA plan and IRA market. It is also 
possible that the economic impact of the rule on small entities would 
not be as significant as it would be for large entities, because 
anecdotal evidence indicates that small entities do not have as many 
business arrangements that give rise to conflicts of interest. 
Therefore, they would not be confronted with the same costs to 
restructure transactions that would be faced by large entities.
    Section 5.3.1 of the RIA includes a discussion of the changes to 
the proposed rule and exemptions that are intended to reduce the costs 
affecting both small and large business. These include elimination of 
data collection and annual disclosure requirements in the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption, and changes to the implementation of the contract 
requirement in the exemption. Section 7 of the RIA discusses 
significant regulatory alternatives considered by the Department and 
the reasons why they were rejected.

L. Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)), the Department's amendment to its 
1975 rule that defines when a person who provides investment advice to 
an employee benefit plan or IRA becomes a fiduciary, solicited comments 
on the information collections included therein. The Department also 
submitted an information collection request (ICR) to OMB in accordance 
with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d), contemporaneously with the publication of the 
proposed regulation, for OMB's review. The Department received two 
comments from one commenter that specifically addressed the paperwork 
burden analysis of the information collections. Additionally comments 
were submitted which contained information relevant to the information 
collection costs and administrative burdens attendant to the proposal. 
The Department took into account such public comments in connection 
with making changes to the final rule, analyzing the economic impact of 
the proposal, and developing the revised paperwork burden analysis 
summarized below.
    In connection with publication of the Department's amendment to its 
1975 rule that defines when a person who provides investment advice to 
an employee benefit plan or IRA becomes a fiduciary, the Department is 
submitting an ICR to OMB requesting approval of a new collection of 
information under OMB Control Number 1210-0155. The Department will 
notify the public when OMB approves the ICR.
    A copy of the ICR may be obtained by contacting the PRA addressee 
shown below or at http://www.RegInfo.gov. PRA ADDRESSEE: G. Christopher 
Cosby, Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employee Benefits Security Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Room N-5718, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: (202) 693-8410; Fax: 
(202) 219-4745. These are not toll-free numbers.
    As discussed in detail above, paragraph (b)(2)(i) of the final rule 
provides that a person is not an investment advice fiduciary by reason 
of certain communications with plan fiduciaries of participant-directed 
individual account employee benefit plans described in section 3(3) of 
ERISA regarding platforms of investment vehicles from which plan 
participants or beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held 
in, or contributed to, their individual accounts. A condition of 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) is that the person discloses in writing to the plan 
fiduciary that the person is not undertaking to provide impartial 
investment advice or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(C) and (D) of the regulation make clear that 
furnishing and providing certain specified investment educational 
information and materials (including certain investment allocation 
models and interactive plan materials) to a plan, plan fiduciary, 
participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner would not constitute the 
rendering of investment advice within the meaning of the final rule if 
certain conditions are met. The investment education provision includes 
conditions that require asset allocation models or interactive 
materials to include certain explanations and that they be accompanied 
by a statement with certain specified information.
    Paragraph (c)(1) of the final rule provides that a person shall not 
be deemed to be an investment advice fiduciary within the meaning of 
the final rule by reason of advice to certain independent fiduciaries 
of a plan or IRA in connection with an arm's length sale, purchase, 
loan, exchange, or other transaction involving the investment of 
securities or other property if, before entering into the transaction, 
the independent fiduciary represents to the person that the fiduciary 
is exercising independent judgment in evaluating any recommendation, 
and the person fairly informs the independent plan fiduciary that the 
person is not undertaking to provide impartial investment advice, or to 
give advice in a fiduciary capacity and fairly informs the independent 
plan fiduciary of the existence and nature of the person's financial 
interests in the transaction.
    Paragraph (c)(2) of the final rule provides that, in the case of 
certain swap transactions required to be cleared under provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, certain counterparties, clearing members and 
clearing organizations are not deemed to be investment advice 
fiduciaries within the meaning of the final rule. A condition in the 
provision is that the plan fiduciary involved in the swap transaction, 
before entering into the transaction, represents that the fiduciary 
understands that the counterparty, clearing member or clearing 
organization are not undertaking to provide impartial investment advice 
and that the plan fiduciary is exercising independent judgment in 
evaluating any recommendations.
    The disclosures needed to satisfy the platform provider, investment 
education, independent plan fiduciary, and swap transaction provisions 
of the final rule are information collection requests (ICRs) subject to 
the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Department has made the following 
assumptions in order to establish a reasonable estimate of the 
paperwork burden associated with these ICRs:
     Approximately 2,000 service providers will produce the 
platform provider disclosures; \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ One commenter requested additional transparency regarding 
the source of this estimate. According to 2013 Form 5500 Schedule C 
filings, approximately 2,000 service providers provided 
recordkeeping services to plans. The Department believes that 
considerable overlap exists between the recordkeeping market and the 
platform provider market and between the large plan service provider 
market and the small plan service provider market. Therefore, the 
Department has chosen to use recordkeepers reported on the Schedule 
C as a proxy for platform providers due to data availability 
constraints.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20995]]

     Approximately 23,500 financial institutions and service 
providers will add the investment education disclosure to their 
investment education materials; \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ One commenter questioned the basis for the Department's 
assumption regarding the number of financial institutions likely to 
provide investment education disclosures. According to the ``2015 
Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey'', Investment 
Adviser Association, cited in the regulatory impact analysis for the 
accompanying rule, 63 percent of Registered Investment Advisers 
service ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. The Department conservatively 
interprets this to mean that all of the 113 large Registered 
Investment Advisers, 63 percent of the 3,021 medium Registered 
Investment Advisers (1,903), and 63 percent of the 24,475 small 
Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs) (15,419) work with ERISA-
covered plans and IRAs. The Department assumes that all of the 42 
large broker-dealers, and similar shares of the 233 medium broker-
dealers (147) and the 3,682 small broker-dealers (2,320) work with 
ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. According to SEC and FINRA data, cited 
in the regulatory impact analysis, 18 percent of broker-dealers are 
also registered as RIAs. Removing these firms from the RIA counts 
produces counts of 105 large RIAs, 1,877 medium RIAs, and 15,001 
small RIAs that work with ERISA-covered plans and IRAs and are not 
also registered as broker-dealers. SNL Financial data show that 398 
life insurance companies reported receiving either individual or 
group annuity considerations in 2014. The Department has used these 
data as the count of insurance companies working in the ERISA-
covered plan and IRA markets. Finally, 2013 Form 5500 data show 
3,375 service providers to ERISA-covered plans that are not also 
broker-dealers, Registered Investment Advisers, or insurance 
companies. Therefore, the Department estimates that approximately 
23,265 broker-dealers, RIAs, insurance companies, and service 
providers work with ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. The Department has 
rounded up to 23,500 to account for any other financial institutions 
that may provide covered investment education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Approximately 36,000 independent plan fiduciaries with 
financial expertise would receive the independent plan fiduciary with 
financial expertise disclosure; \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ According to the ``2015 Investment Management Compliance 
Testing Survey,'' Investment Adviser Association, cited in the 
regulatory impact analysis for the accompanying rule, 63 percent of 
Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs) service ERISA-covered plans 
and IRAs. The Department conservatively interprets this to mean that 
all of the 113 large RIAs, 63 percent of the 3,021 medium RIAs 
(1,903), and 63 percent of the 24,475 small RIAs (15,419) work with 
ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. The Department assumes that all of the 
42 large broker-dealers, and similar shares of the 233 medium 
broker-dealers (147) and the 3,682 small broker-dealers (2,320) work 
with ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. According to SEC and FINRA data, 
cited in the regulatory impact analysis, 18 percent of broker-
dealers are also registered as RIAs. Removing these firms from the 
RIA counts produces counts of 105 large RIAs, 1,877 medium RIAs, and 
15,001 small RIAs that work with ERISA-covered plans and IRAs and 
are not also registered as broker-dealers. SNL Financial data show 
that 398 life insurance companies reported receiving either 
individual or group annuity considerations in 2014. The Department 
has used these data as the count of insurance companies working in 
the ERISA-covered plan and IRA markets. Finally, 2013 Form 5500 data 
show 3,375 service providers to ERISA-covered plans that are not 
also broker-dealers, Registered Investment Advisers, or insurance 
companies. Therefore, the Department estimates that approximately 
23,265 broker-dealers, RIAs, insurance companies, and service 
providers work with ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. Additionally, the 
Department is using plans with assets of $50 million or more as a 
proxy for other persons who managed $50 million or more in plan 
assets. According to 2013 Form 5500 filings, 12,446 plans had assets 
of $50 million or more. These categories total 35,711. The 
Department rounded up to 36,000 to account for other entities that 
might produce the disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Service providers producing the platform provider 
disclosure already maintain contracts with their customers as a regular 
and customary business practice and the materials costs arising from 
inserting the platform provider disclosure into the existing contracts 
would be negligible;
     Materials costs arising from inserting the required 
investment education disclosure into existing models and interactive 
materials would be negligible;
     In transactions with independent plan fiduciaries covered 
by the provision in the final rule, the independent fiduciary would 
receive substantially all of the disclosures electronically via means 
already used in their normal course of business and the costs arising 
from electronic distribution would be negligible;
     Persons relying on these provisions in the final rule 
would use existing in-house resources to prepare the disclosures; and
     The tasks associated with the ICRs would be performed by 
clerical personnel at an hourly rate of $55.21 and legal professionals 
at an hourly rate of $133.61.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ For a description of the Department's methodology for 
calculating wage rates, see www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/labor-cost-inputs-used-in-ebsa-opr-ria-and-pra-burden-calculations-march-2016.pdf. The 
Department's methodology for calculating the overhead cost input of 
its wage rates was adjusted from the proposed regulation to the 
final regulation. In the proposed regulation, the Department based 
its overhead cost estimates on longstanding internal EBSA 
calculations for the cost of overhead. In response to a public 
comment stating that the overhead cost estimates were too low and 
without any supporting evidence, the Department incorporated 
published US Census Bureau survey data on overhead costs into its 
wage rate estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to a recommendation made during testimony at the 
Department's August 2015 public hearing on the proposed rule, the 
Department tasked several attorneys with drafting sample legal 
documents in an attempt to determine the hour burden associated with 
complying with the ICRs. Commenters did not provide time or cost 
estimates needed to draft these disclosures; the legal burden estimates 
in this analysis, therefore, use the data generated by the Department 
to estimate the time required to create sample disclosures.
    The Department estimates that it would require ten minutes of legal 
professional time to draft the disclosure needed under the platform 
provider provision; a statement that the person is not providing 
impartial investment advice or acting in a fiduciary capacity. 
Therefore, the platform provider disclosure would result in 
approximately 300 hours of legal time at an equivalent cost of 
approximately $45,000.
    The Department estimates that it would require one hour of legal 
professional time to draft the disclosure needed under the investment 
education provision. Therefore, this disclosure would result in 
approximately 23,500 hours of legal time at an equivalent cost of 
approximately $3.1 million.
    The Department estimates that it would require 25 minutes of legal 
professional time and 30 minutes of clerical time to produce the 
disclosure needed under the provision regarding transactions with 
independent plan fiduciaries. Therefore, the Department estimates that 
this disclosure would result in approximately 15,000 hours of legal 
time at an equivalent cost of approximately $2.0 million. It would also 
result in approximately 18,000 hours of clerical time at an equivalent 
cost of approximately $994,000. In total, the burden associated with 
producing the disclosure is approximately 33,000 hours at an equivalent 
cost of $3.0 million.
    Plan fiduciaries covered by the swap transactions provision must 
already make the required representation to the counterparty under the 
Dodd-Frank Act provisions governing cleared swap transactions. This 
rule adds a requirement that the representation be made to the clearing 
member and financial institution involved in the transaction. The 
Department believes that the incremental burden of this additional 
requirement would be de minimis. Plan fiduciaries would be required to 
add a few words to the representations required under the Dodd-Frank 
Act provisions reflecting the additional recipients of the 
representation. Due to the sophisticated nature of the entities 
engaging in swap transactions, the Department believes that all of 
these representations are transmitted electronically; therefore, the 
incremental burden of transmitting this representation to two 
additional parties is de minimis. Further, keeping records that the 
representation had been received is a usual and customary business 
practice. Accordingly, the

[[Page 20996]]

Department has not associated any cost or burden with this ICR.
    In total, the hour burden for information collections in this rule 
is approximately 57,000 hours at an equivalent cost of $6.2 million.
    Because the Department assumes that all disclosures would either be 
distributed electronically or incorporated into existing materials, the 
Department has not associated any cost burden with these ICRs.
    These paperwork burden estimates are summarized as follows:
    Type of Review: New collection.
    Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of 
Labor.
    Title: Conflict of Interest Final Rule, Fiduciary Exception 
Disclosure Requirements.
    OMB Control Number: 1210--0155.
    Affected Public: Business or other for profit.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 38,000.
    Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 61,500.
    Frequency of Response: When engaging in excepted transaction.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 56,833 hours.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $0.

M. Congressional Review Act

    The final rule is subject to the Congressional Review Act 
provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 (5 U.S.C. 801, et seq.) and, will be transmitted to Congress and 
the Comptroller General for review. The final rule is a ``major rule'' 
as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 804, because it is likely to result 
in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.

N. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one 
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by 
the private sector. Such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant 
regulatory action.'' The final rule is expected to have such an impact 
on the private sector, and the Department hereby provides such an 
assessment.
    The Department is issuing the final rule under ERISA section 
3(21)(A)(ii) (29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(a)(ii)).\60\ The Department is charged 
with interpreting the ERISA and Code provisions that attach fiduciary 
status to anyone who is paid to provide investment advice to plan or 
IRA investors. The final rule updates and supersedes the 1975 rule \61\ 
that currently interprets these statutory provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Under section 102 of the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 
the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to interpret section 
4975 of the Code has been transferred, with exceptions not relevant 
here, to the Secretary of Labor.
    \61\ 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department assessed the anticipated benefits and costs of the 
final rule pursuant to Executive Order 12866 in the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis for the final rule and concluded that its benefits would 
justify its costs. The Department's complete Regulatory Impact Analysis 
is available at www.dol.gov/ebsa. To summarize, the final rule's 
material benefits and costs generally would be confined to the private 
sector, where plans and IRA investors would, in the Department's 
estimation, reap both social welfare gains and transfers from the 
financial industry. The Department itself would benefit from increased 
efficiency in its enforcement activity. The public and overall U.S. 
economy would benefit from increased compliance with ERISA and the Code 
and increased confidence in advisers, as well as from more efficient 
allocation of investment capital. Together these welfare gains and 
transfers justify the associated costs.
    The final rule is not expected to have any material economic 
impacts on State, local or tribal governments, or on health, safety, or 
the natural environment. In fact, the North American Securities 
Administrators Association submitted a comment in support of the 
Department's 2015 Proposal that did not suggest a material economic 
impact on state securities regulators. The National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners also submitted a comment that recognized that 
oversight of the retirement plans marketplace is a shared regulatory 
responsibility, and indicated a shared commitment to protect, educate 
and empower consumers as they make important decisions to provide for 
their retirement security. They pointed out that it is important that 
the approaches regulators take within their respective regulatory 
frameworks are consistent and compatible as much as possible, but did 
not suggest the rule would require an expenditure of $100 million or 
more by state insurance regulators. Similarly, comments from the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators and the National 
Association of Governors suggested further dialogue with the NAIC, 
insurance legislators, and other state officials to ensure the federal 
and state approaches to consumer protection in this area are consistent 
and compatible, but did not identify a monetary impact on state or 
local governments resulting from the rule. As noted elsewhere in this 
Notice, the Department's obligation and overriding objective in 
developing regulations implementing ERISA (and the relevant prohibited 
transaction provisions in the Code) is to achieve the consumer 
protection objectives of ERISA and the Code. The Department believes 
the final rule reflects that obligation and objective while also 
reflecting that care was taken to craft the rule so it does not require 
state banking, insurance, or securities regulators to take steps that 
would impose additional costs on them or conflict with applicable state 
statutory or regulatory requirements. In fact, the Department noted 
that ERISA section 514 expressly saves state regulation of insurance, 
banking, and securities from ERISA's express preemption provision and 
has added a new paragraph (i) to the final rule to acknowledge that the 
regulation is not intended to change the scope or effect of ERISA 
section 514, including the savings clause in ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) 
for state regulation of insurance, banking, or securities. The 
Department also, in response to state regulator suggestions, agreed 
that it would be appropriate for the final rule to include an express 
provision acknowledging the savings clause in ERISA section 
514(b)(2)(A) for state insurance, banking, or securities laws to 
emphasize the fact that those state regulators all have important roles 
in the administration and enforcement of standards for retirement plans 
and products within their jurisdiction.

O. Federalism Statement

    Executive Order 13132 (August 4, 1999) outlines fundamental 
principles of federalism, and requires the adherence to specific 
criteria by Federal agencies in the process of formulating and 
implementing policies that have substantial direct effects on the 
States, the relationship between the national government and States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government. As discussed elsewhere in this Notice, the 
Department does not believe this final rule has federalism implications 
because it has no substantial direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the

[[Page 20997]]

various levels of government. Section 514 of ERISA provides, with 
certain exceptions specifically enumerated, that the provisions of 
Titles I and IV of ERISA supersede any and all laws of the States as 
they relate to any employee benefit plan covered under ERISA. As 
explained elsewhere in this Notice, the Department does not intend this 
regulation to change the scope or effect of ERISA section 514, 
including the savings clause in ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) for state 
regulation of securities, banking, or insurance laws. The final rule 
now includes an express provision to that effect in a new paragraph 
(i). The requirements implemented in the final rule do not alter the 
fundamental reporting and disclosure requirements of the statute with 
respect to employee benefit plans, and as such have no implications for 
the States or the relationship or distribution of power between the 
national government and the States.

Statutory Authority

    This regulation is issued pursuant to the authority in section 505 
of ERISA (Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 894; 29 U.S.C. 1135) and section 102 
of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 237, and under 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2011, 77 FR 1088 (Jan. 9, 2012).

List of Subjects in 29 CFR Parts 2509 and 2510

    Employee benefit plans, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
Pensions, Plan assets.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Department is 
amending parts 2509 and 2510 of subchapters A and B of Chapter XXV of 
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Subchapter A--General

PART 2509--INTERPRETIVE BULLETINS RELATING TO THE EMPLOYEE 
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974

0
1. The authority citation for part 2509 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 29 U.S.C. 1135. Secretary of Labor's Order 1-2011, 77 
FR 1088 (Jan. 9, 2012). Sections 2509.75-10 and 2509.75-2 issued 
under 29 U.S.C. 1052, 1053, 1054. Sec. 2509.75-5 also issued under 
29 U.S.C. 1002. Sec. 2509.95-1 also issued under sec. 625, Pub. L. 
109-280, 120 Stat. 780.


Sec.  2509.96-1  [Removed]

0
2. Remove Sec.  2509.96-1.

Subchapter B--Definitions and Coverage under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974

PART 2510--DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN SUBCHAPTERS C, D, E, F, AND 
G OF THIS CHAPTER

0
3. The authority citation for part 2510 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 29 U.S.C. 1002(2), 1002(21), 1002(37), 1002(38), 
1002(40), 1031, and 1135; Secretary of Labor's Order 1-2011, 77 FR 
1088; Secs. 2510.3-21, 2510.3-101 and 2510.3-102 also issued under 
Sec. 102 of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 237. 
Section 2510.3-38 also issued under Pub. L. 105-72, Sec. 1(b), 111 
Stat. 1457 (1997).


0
4. Revise Sec.  2510.3-21 to read as follows:


Sec.  2510.3-21  Definition of ``Fiduciary.''

    (a) Investment advice. For purposes of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Act) and section 
4975(e)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), except as provided 
in paragraph (c) of this section, a person shall be deemed to be 
rendering investment advice with respect to moneys or other property of 
a plan or IRA described in paragraph (g)(6) of this section if--
    (1) Such person provides to a plan, plan fiduciary, plan 
participant or beneficiary, IRA, or IRA owner the following types of 
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect:
    (i) A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, holding, 
disposing of, or exchanging, securities or other investment property, 
or a recommendation as to how securities or other investment property 
should be invested after the securities or other investment property 
are rolled over, transferred, or distributed from the plan or IRA;
    (ii) A recommendation as to the management of securities or other 
investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on 
investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of 
other persons to provide investment advice or investment management 
services, selection of investment account arrangements (e.g., brokerage 
versus advisory); or recommendations with respect to rollovers, 
transfers, or distributions from a plan or IRA, including whether, in 
what amount, in what form, and to what destination such a rollover, 
transfer, or distribution should be made; and
    (2) With respect to the investment advice described in paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section, the recommendation is made either directly or 
indirectly (e.g., through or together with any affiliate) by a person 
who:
    (i) Represents or acknowledges that it is acting as a fiduciary 
within the meaning of the Act or the Code;
    (ii) Renders the advice pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, 
arrangement, or understanding that the advice is based on the 
particular investment needs of the advice recipient; or
    (iii) Directs the advice to a specific advice recipient or 
recipients regarding the advisability of a particular investment or 
management decision with respect to securities or other investment 
property of the plan or IRA.
    (b)(1) For purposes of this section, ``recommendation'' means a 
communication that, based on its content, context, and presentation, 
would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the advice recipient 
engage in or refrain from taking a particular course of action. The 
determination of whether a ``recommendation'' has been made is an 
objective rather than subjective inquiry. In addition, the more 
individually tailored the communication is to a specific advice 
recipient or recipients about, for example, a security, investment 
property, or investment strategy, the more likely the communication 
will be viewed as a recommendation. Providing a selective list of 
securities to a particular advice recipient as appropriate for that 
investor would be a recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring 
securities even if no recommendation is made with respect to any one 
security. Furthermore, a series of actions, directly or indirectly 
(e.g., through or together with any affiliate), that may not constitute 
a recommendation when viewed individually may amount to a 
recommendation when considered in the aggregate. It also makes no 
difference whether the communication was initiated by a person or a 
computer software program.
    (2) The provision of services or the furnishing or making available 
of information and materials in conformance with paragraphs (b)(2)(i) 
through (iv) of this section is not a ``recommendation'' for purposes 
of this section. Determinations as to whether any activity not 
described in this paragraph (b)(2) constitutes a recommendation must be 
made by reference to the criteria set forth in paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section.
    (i) Platform providers. Marketing or making available to a plan 
fiduciary of a plan, without regard to the individualized needs of the 
plan, its participants, or beneficiaries a platform

[[Page 20998]]

or similar mechanism from which a plan fiduciary may select or monitor 
investment alternatives, including qualified default investment 
alternatives, into which plan participants or beneficiaries may direct 
the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their individual 
accounts, provided the plan fiduciary is independent of the person who 
markets or makes available the platform or similar mechanism, and the 
person discloses in writing to the plan fiduciary that the person is 
not undertaking to provide impartial investment advice or to give 
advice in a fiduciary capacity. A plan participant or beneficiary or 
relative of either shall not be considered a plan fiduciary for 
purposes of this paragraph.
    (ii) Selection and monitoring assistance. In connection with the 
activities described in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section with 
respect to a plan,
    (A) Identifying investment alternatives that meet objective 
criteria specified by the plan fiduciary (e.g., stated parameters 
concerning expense ratios, size of fund, type of asset, or credit 
quality), provided that the person identifying the investment 
alternatives discloses in writing whether the person has a financial 
interest in any of the identified investment alternatives, and if so 
the precise nature of such interest;
    (B) In response to a request for information, request for proposal, 
or similar solicitation by or on behalf of the plan, identifying a 
limited or sample set of investment alternatives based on only the size 
of the employer or plan, the current investment alternatives designated 
under the plan, or both, provided that the response is in writing and 
discloses whether the person identifying the limited or sample set of 
investment alternatives has a financial interest in any of the 
alternatives, and if so the precise nature of such interest; or
    (C) Providing objective financial data and comparisons with 
independent benchmarks to the plan fiduciary.
    (iii) General Communications. Furnishing or making available to a 
plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA, or IRA 
owner general communications that a reasonable person would not view as 
an investment recommendation, including general circulation 
newsletters, commentary in publicly broadcast talk shows, remarks and 
presentations in widely attended speeches and conferences, research or 
news reports prepared for general distribution, general marketing 
materials, general market data, including data on market performance, 
market indices, or trading volumes, price quotes, performance reports, 
or prospectuses.
    (iv) Investment Education. Furnishing or making available any of 
the following categories of investment-related information and 
materials described in paragraphs (b)(2)(iv)(A) through (D) of this 
section to a plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, 
IRA, or IRA owner irrespective of who provides or makes available the 
information and materials (e.g., plan sponsor, fiduciary or service 
provider), the frequency with which the information and materials are 
provided, the form in which the information and materials are provided 
(e.g., on an individual or group basis, in writing or orally, or via 
call center, video or computer software), or whether an identified 
category of information and materials is furnished or made available 
alone or in combination with other categories of information and 
materials, provided that the information and materials do not include 
(standing alone or in combination with other materials) recommendations 
with respect to specific investment products or specific plan or IRA 
alternatives, or recommendations with respect to investment or 
management of a particular security or securities or other investment 
property, except as noted in paragraphs (b)(2)(iv)(C)(4) and 
(b)(2)(iv)(D)(6) of this section.
    (A) Plan information. Information and materials that, without 
reference to the appropriateness of any individual investment 
alternative or any individual benefit distribution option for the plan 
or IRA, or a particular plan participant or beneficiary or IRA owner, 
describe the terms or operation of the plan or IRA, inform a plan 
fiduciary, plan participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner about the 
benefits of plan or IRA participation, the benefits of increasing plan 
or IRA contributions, the impact of preretirement withdrawals on 
retirement income, retirement income needs, varying forms of 
distributions, including rollovers, annuitization and other forms of 
lifetime income payment options (e.g., immediate annuity, deferred 
annuity, or incremental purchase of deferred annuity), advantages, 
disadvantages and risks of different forms of distributions, or 
describe product features, investor rights and obligations, fee and 
expense information, applicable trading restrictions, investment 
objectives and philosophies, risk and return characteristics, 
historical return information, or related prospectuses of investment 
alternatives available under the plan or IRA.
    (B) General financial, investment, and retirement information. 
Information and materials on financial, investment, and retirement 
matters that do not address specific investment products, specific plan 
or IRA investment alternatives or distribution options available to the 
plan or IRA or to plan participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners, or 
specific investment alternatives or services offered outside the plan 
or IRA, and inform the plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, 
or IRA owner about:
    (1) General financial and investment concepts, such as risk and 
return, diversification, dollar cost averaging, compounded return, and 
tax deferred investment;
    (2) Historic differences in rates of return between different asset 
classes (e.g., equities, bonds, or cash) based on standard market 
indices;
    (3) Effects of fees and expenses on rates of return;
    (4) Effects of inflation;
    (5) Estimating future retirement income needs;
    (6) Determining investment time horizons;
    (7) Assessing risk tolerance;
    (8) Retirement-related risks (e.g., longevity risks, market/
interest rates, inflation, health care and other expenses); and
    (9) General methods and strategies for managing assets in 
retirement (e.g., systematic withdrawal payments, annuitization, 
guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits), including those offered 
outside the plan or IRA.
    (C) Asset allocation models. Information and materials (e.g., pie 
charts, graphs, or case studies) that provide a plan fiduciary, plan 
participant or beneficiary, or IRA owner with models of asset 
allocation portfolios of hypothetical individuals with different time 
horizons (which may extend beyond an individual's retirement date) and 
risk profiles, where--
    (1) Such models are based on generally accepted investment theories 
that take into account the historic returns of different asset classes 
(e.g., equities, bonds, or cash) over defined periods of time;
    (2) All material facts and assumptions on which such models are 
based (e.g., retirement ages, life expectancies, income levels, 
financial resources, replacement income ratios, inflation rates, and 
rates of return) accompany the models;
    (3) The asset allocation models are accompanied by a statement 
indicating that, in applying particular asset allocation models to 
their individual

[[Page 20999]]

situations, plan participants, beneficiaries, or IRA owners should 
consider their other assets, income, and investments (e.g., equity in a 
home, Social Security benefits, individual retirement plan investments, 
savings accounts, and interests in other qualified and non-qualified 
plans) in addition to their interests in the plan or IRA, to the extent 
those items are not taken into account in the model or estimate; and
    (4) The models do not include or identify any specific investment 
product or investment alternative available under the plan or IRA, 
except that solely with respect to a plan, asset allocation models may 
identify a specific investment alternative available under the plan if 
it is a designated investment alternative within the meaning of 29 CFR 
2550.404a-5(h)(4) under the plan subject to oversight by a plan 
fiduciary independent from the person who developed or markets the 
investment alternative and the model:
    (i) Identifies all the other designated investment alternatives 
available under the plan that have similar risk and return 
characteristics, if any; and
    (ii) is accompanied by a statement indicating that those other 
designated investment alternatives have similar risk and return 
characteristics and identifying where information on those investment 
alternatives may be obtained, including information described in 
paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(A) of this section and, if applicable, paragraph 
(d) of 29 CFR 2550.404a-5.
    (D) Interactive investment materials. Questionnaires, worksheets, 
software, and similar materials that provide a plan fiduciary, plan 
participant or beneficiary, or IRA owner the means to: Estimate future 
retirement income needs and assess the impact of different asset 
allocations on retirement income; evaluate distribution options, 
products, or vehicles by providing information under paragraphs 
(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) of this section; or estimate a retirement income 
stream that could be generated by an actual or hypothetical account 
balance, where--
    (1) Such materials are based on generally accepted investment 
theories that take into account the historic returns of different asset 
classes (e.g., equities, bonds, or cash) over defined periods of time;
    (2) There is an objective correlation between the asset allocations 
generated by the materials and the information and data supplied by the 
plan participant, beneficiary or IRA owner;
    (3) There is an objective correlation between the income stream 
generated by the materials and the information and data supplied by the 
plan participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner;
    (4) All material facts and assumptions (e.g., retirement ages, life 
expectancies, income levels, financial resources, replacement income 
ratios, inflation rates, rates of return and other features, and rates 
specific to income annuities or systematic withdrawal plans) that may 
affect a plan participant's, beneficiary's, or IRA owner's assessment 
of the different asset allocations or different income streams 
accompany the materials or are specified by the plan participant, 
beneficiary, or IRA owner;
    (5) The materials either take into account other assets, income and 
investments (e.g., equity in a home, Social Security benefits, 
individual retirement plan investments, savings accounts, and interests 
in other qualified and non-qualified plans) or are accompanied by a 
statement indicating that, in applying particular asset allocations to 
their individual situations, or in assessing the adequacy of an 
estimated income stream, plan participants, beneficiaries, or IRA 
owners should consider their other assets, income, and investments in 
addition to their interests in the plan or IRA; and
    (6) The materials do not include or identify any specific 
investment alternative or distribution option available under the plan 
or IRA, unless such alternative or option is specified by the plan 
participant, beneficiary, or IRA owner, or it is a designated 
investment alternative within the meaning of 29 CFR 2550.404a-5(h)(4) 
under a plan subject to oversight by a plan fiduciary independent from 
the person who developed or markets the investment alternative and the 
materials:
    (i) Identify all the other designated investment alternatives 
available under the plan that have similar risk and return 
characteristics, if any; and
    (ii) Are accompanied by a statement indicating that those other 
designated investment alternatives have similar risk and return 
characteristics and identifying where information on those investment 
alternatives may be obtained; including information described in 
paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(A) of this section and, if applicable, paragraph 
(d) of 29 CFR 2550.404a-5;
    (c) Except for persons who represent or acknowledge that they are 
acting as a fiduciary within the meaning of the Act or the Code, a 
person shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary within the meaning of 
section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Act or section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Code 
solely because of the activities set forth in paragraphs (c)(1), (2), 
and (3) of this section.
    (1) Transactions with independent fiduciaries with financial 
expertise--The provision of any advice by a person (including the 
provision of asset allocation models or other financial analysis tools) 
to a fiduciary of the plan or IRA (including a fiduciary to an 
investment contract, product, or entity that holds plan assets as 
determined pursuant to sections 3(42) and 401 of the Act and 29 CFR 
2510.3-101) who is independent of the person providing the advice with 
respect to an arm's length sale, purchase, loan, exchange, or other 
transaction related to the investment of securities or other investment 
property, if, prior to entering into the transaction the person 
providing the advice satisfies the requirements of this paragraph 
(c)(1).
    (i) The person knows or reasonably believes that the independent 
fiduciary of the plan or IRA is:
    (A) A bank as defined in section 202 of the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 or similar institution that is regulated and supervised and 
subject to periodic examination by a State or Federal agency;
    (B) An insurance carrier which is qualified under the laws of more 
than one state to perform the services of managing, acquiring or 
disposing of assets of a plan;
    (C) An investment adviser registered under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 or, if not registered an as investment adviser under the 
Investment Advisers Act by reason of paragraph (1) of section 203A of 
such Act, is registered as an investment adviser under the laws of the 
State (referred to in such paragraph (1)) in which it maintains its 
principal office and place of business;
    (D) A broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934; or
    (E) Any independent fiduciary that holds, or has under management 
or control, total assets of at least $50 million (the person may rely 
on written representations from the plan or independent fiduciary to 
satisfy this paragraph (c)(1)(i));
    (ii) The person knows or reasonably believes that the independent 
fiduciary of the plan or IRA is capable of evaluating investment risks 
independently, both in general and with regard to particular 
transactions and investment strategies (the person may rely on written 
representations from the plan or independent fiduciary to satisfy this 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii));
    (iii) The person fairly informs the independent fiduciary that the 
person is not undertaking to provide impartial

[[Page 21000]]

investment advice, or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity, in 
connection with the transaction and fairly informs the independent 
fiduciary of the existence and nature of the person's financial 
interests in the transaction;
    (iv) The person knows or reasonably believes that the independent 
fiduciary of the plan or IRA is a fiduciary under ERISA or the Code, or 
both, with respect to the transaction and is responsible for exercising 
independent judgment in evaluating the transaction (the person may rely 
on written representations from the plan or independent fiduciary to 
satisfy this paragraph (c)(1)(iv)); and
    (v) The person does not receive a fee or other compensation 
directly from the plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or 
beneficiary, IRA, or IRA owner for the provision of investment advice 
(as opposed to other services) in connection with the transaction.
    (2) Swap and security-based swap transactions. The provision of any 
advice to an employee benefit plan (as described in section 3(3) of the 
Act) by a person who is a swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, 
major swap participant, major security-based swap participant, or a 
swap clearing firm in connection with a swap or security-based swap, as 
defined in section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a) and 
section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)) 
if--
    (i) The employee benefit plan is represented by a fiduciary under 
ERISA independent of the person;
    (ii) In the case of a swap dealer or security-based swap dealer, 
the person is not acting as an advisor to the employee benefit plan 
(within the meaning of section 4s(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act or 
section 15F(h) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) in connection 
with the transaction;
    (iii) The person does not receive a fee or other compensation 
directly from the plan or plan fiduciary for the provision of 
investment advice (as opposed to other services) in connection with the 
transaction; and
    (iv) In advance of providing any recommendations with respect to 
the transaction, or series of transactions, the person obtains a 
written representation from the independent fiduciary that the 
independent fiduciary understands that the person is not undertaking to 
provide impartial investment advice, or to give advice in a fiduciary 
capacity, in connection with the transaction and that the independent 
fiduciary is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the 
recommendation.
    (3) Employees. (i) In his or her capacity as an employee of the 
plan sponsor of a plan, as an employee of an affiliate of such plan 
sponsor, as an employee of an employee benefit plan, as an employee of 
an employee organization, or as an employee of a plan fiduciary, the 
person provides advice to a plan fiduciary, or to an employee (other 
than in his or her capacity as a participant or beneficiary of an 
employee benefit plan) or independent contractor of such plan sponsor, 
affiliate, or employee benefit plan, provided the person receives no 
fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, in connection with the 
advice beyond the employee's normal compensation for work performed for 
the employer; or
    (ii) In his or her capacity as an employee of the plan sponsor of a 
plan, or as an employee of an affiliate of such plan sponsor, the 
person provides advice to another employee of the plan sponsor in his 
or her capacity as a participant or beneficiary of the plan, provided 
the person's job responsibilities do not involve the provision of 
investment advice or investment recommendations, the person is not 
registered or licensed under federal or state securities or insurance 
law, the advice he or she provides does not require the person to be 
registered or licensed under federal or state securities or insurance 
laws, and the person receives no fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, in connection with the advice beyond the employee's normal 
compensation for work performed for the employer.
    (d) Scope of fiduciary duty--investment advice. A person who is a 
fiduciary with respect to an plan or IRA by reason of rendering 
investment advice (as defined in paragraph (a) of this section) for a 
fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any 
securities or other investment property of such plan or IRA, or having 
any authority or responsibility to do so, shall not be deemed to be a 
fiduciary regarding any assets of the plan or IRA with respect to which 
such person does not have any discretionary authority, discretionary 
control or discretionary responsibility, does not exercise any 
authority or control, does not render investment advice (as described 
in paragraph (a)(1) of this section) for a fee or other compensation, 
and does not have any authority or responsibility to render such 
investment advice, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be 
deemed to:
    (1) Exempt such person from the provisions of section 405(a) of the 
Act concerning liability for fiduciary breaches by other fiduciaries 
with respect to any assets of the plan; or
    (2) Exclude such person from the definition of the term ``party in 
interest'' (as set forth in section 3(14)(B) of the Act) or 
``disqualified person'' (as set forth in section 4975(e)(2) of the 
Code) with respect to any assets of the employee benefit plan or IRA.
    (e) Execution of securities transactions. (1) A person who is a 
broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
a reporting dealer who makes primary markets in securities of the 
United States Government or of an agency of the United States 
Government and reports daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
its positions with respect to such securities and borrowings thereon, 
or a bank supervised by the United States or a State, shall not be 
deemed to be a fiduciary, within the meaning of section 3(21)(A) of the 
Act or section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Code, with respect to a plan or IRA 
solely because such person executes transactions for the purchase or 
sale of securities on behalf of such plan in the ordinary course of its 
business as a broker, dealer, or bank, pursuant to instructions of a 
fiduciary with respect to such plan or IRA, if:
    (i) Neither the fiduciary nor any affiliate of such fiduciary is 
such broker, dealer, or bank; and
    (ii) The instructions specify:
    (A) The security to be purchased or sold;
    (B) A price range within which such security is to be purchased or 
sold, or, if such security is issued by an open-end investment company 
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1, 
et seq.), a price which is determined in accordance with Rule 22c1 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (17 CFR 270.22c1);
    (C) A time span during which such security may be purchased or sold 
(not to exceed five business days); and
    (D) The minimum or maximum quantity of such security which may be 
purchased or sold within such price range, or, in the case of a 
security issued by an open-end investment company registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, the minimum or maximum quantity of such 
security which may be purchased or sold, or the value of such security 
in dollar amount which may be purchased or sold, at the price referred 
to in paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(B) of this section.
    (2) A person who is a broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank 
which is a fiduciary with respect to a plan or IRA

[[Page 21001]]

solely by reason of the possession or exercise of discretionary 
authority or discretionary control in the management of the plan or 
IRA, or the management or disposition of plan or IRA assets in 
connection with the execution of a transaction or transactions for the 
purchase or sale of securities on behalf of such plan or IRA which 
fails to comply with the provisions of paragraph (e)(1) of this 
section, shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary regarding any assets of 
the plan or IRA with respect to which such broker-dealer, reporting 
dealer or bank does not have any discretionary authority, discretionary 
control or discretionary responsibility, does not exercise any 
authority or control, does not render investment advice (as defined in 
paragraph (a) of this section) for a fee or other compensation, and 
does not have any authority or responsibility to render such investment 
advice, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to:
    (i) Exempt such broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank from the 
provisions of section 405(a) of the Act concerning liability for 
fiduciary breaches by other fiduciaries with respect to any assets of 
the plan; or
    (ii) Exclude such broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank from the 
definition of the term ``party in interest'' (as set forth in section 
3(14)(B) of the Act) or ``disqualified person'' (as set forth in 
section 4975(e)(2) of the Code) with respect to any assets of the plan 
or IRA.
    (f) Internal Revenue Code. Section 4975(e)(3) of the Code contains 
provisions parallel to section 3(21)(A) of the Act which define the 
term ``fiduciary'' for purposes of the prohibited transaction 
provisions in Code section 4975. Effective December 31, 1978, section 
102 of the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 237 
transferred the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
promulgate regulations of the type published herein to the Secretary of 
Labor. All references herein to section 3(21)(A) of the Act should be 
read to include reference to the parallel provisions of section 
4975(e)(3) of the Code. Furthermore, the provisions of this section 
shall apply for purposes of the application of Code section 4975 with 
respect to any plan, including any IRA, described in Code section 
4975(e)(1).
    (g) Definitions. For purposes of this section--
    (1) The term ``affiliate'' means any person directly or indirectly, 
through one or more intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or 
under common control with such person; any officer, director, partner, 
employee, or relative (as defined in paragraph (g)(8) of this section) 
of such person; and any corporation or partnership of which such person 
is an officer, director, or partner.
    (2) The term ``control,'' for purposes of paragraph (g)(1) of this 
section, means the power to exercise a controlling influence over the 
management or policies of a person other than an individual.
    (3) The term ``fee or other compensation, direct or indirect'' 
means, for purposes of this section and section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the 
Act, any explicit fee or compensation for the advice received by the 
person (or by an affiliate) from any source, and any other fee or 
compensation received from any source in connection with or as a result 
of the purchase or sale of a security or the provision of investment 
advice services, including, though not limited to, commissions, loads, 
finder's fees, revenue sharing payments, shareholder servicing fees, 
marketing or distribution fees, underwriting compensation, payments to 
brokerage firms in return for shelf space, recruitment compensation 
paid in connection with transfers of accounts to a registered 
representative's new broker-dealer firm, gifts and gratuities, and 
expense reimbursements. A fee or compensation is paid ``in connection 
with or as a result of'' such transaction or service if the fee or 
compensation would not have been paid but for the transaction or 
service or if eligibility for or the amount of the fee or compensation 
is based in whole or in part on the transaction or service.
    (4) The term ``investment property'' does not include health 
insurance policies, disability insurance policies, term life insurance 
policies, and other property to the extent the policies or property do 
not contain an investment component.
    (5) The term ``IRA owner'' means, with respect to an IRA, either 
the person who is the owner of the IRA or the person for whose benefit 
the IRA was established.
    (6)(i) The term ``plan'' means any employee benefit plan described 
in section 3(3) of the Act and any plan described in section 
4975(e)(1)(A) of the Code, and
    (ii) The term ``IRA'' means any account or annuity described in 
Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), including, for example, an 
individual retirement account described in section 408(a) of the Code 
and a health savings account described in section 223(d) of the Code.
    (7) The term ``plan fiduciary'' means a person described in section 
(3)(21)(A) of the Act and 4975(e)(3) of the Code. For purposes of this 
section, a participant or beneficiary of the plan or a relative of 
either is not a ``plan fiduciary'' with respect to the plan, and the 
IRA owner or a relative is not a ``plan fiduciary'' with respect to the 
IRA.
    (8) The term ``relative'' means a person described in section 3(15) 
of the Act and section 4975(e)(6) of the Code or a brother, a sister, 
or a spouse of a brother or sister.
    (9) The term ``plan participant'' or ``participant'' means, for a 
plan described in section 3(3) of the Act, a person described in 
section 3(7) of the Act.
    (h) Effective and applicability dates--(1) Effective date. This 
section is effective on June 7, 2016.
    (2) Applicability date. Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g) 
of this section apply April 10, 2017.
    (3) Until the applicability date under this paragraph (h), the 
prior regulation under the Act and the Code (as it appeared in the July 
1, 2015 edition of 29 CFR part 2510 and the April 1, 2015 edition of 26 
CFR part 54) applies.
    (i) Continued applicability of State law regulating insurance, 
banking, or securities. Nothing in this part shall be construed to 
affect or modify the provisions of section 514 of Title I of the Act, 
including the savings clause in section 514(b)(2)(A) for state laws 
that regulate insurance, banking, or securities.

0
5. Effective June 7, 2016 to April 10, 2017, Sec.  2510.3-21 is further 
amended by adding paragraph (j) to read as follows:


Sec.  2510.3-21  Definition of ``Fiduciary.''

* * * * *
    (j) Temporarily applicable provisions. (1) During the period 
between June 7, 2016 and April 10, 2017, this paragraph (j) shall 
apply.
    (i) A person shall be deemed to be rendering ``investment advice'' 
to an employee benefit plan, within the meaning of section 3(21)(A)(ii) 
of the Act, section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Code and this paragraph (j), 
only if:
    (A) Such person renders advice to the plan as to the value of 
securities or other property, or makes recommendation as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or 
other property; and
    (B) Such person either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or 
together with any affiliate)--
    (1) Has discretionary authority or control, whether or not pursuant 
to agreement, arrangement or

[[Page 21002]]

understanding, with respect to purchasing or selling securities or 
other property for the plan; or
    (2) Renders any advice described in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this 
section on a regular basis to the plan pursuant to a mutual agreement, 
arrangement or understanding, written or otherwise, between such person 
and the plan or a fiduciary with respect to the plan, that such 
services will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with 
respect to plan assets, and that such person will render individualized 
investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan 
regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or 
strategy, overall portfolio composition, or diversification of plan 
investments.
    (2) Affiliate and control. (i) For purposes of paragraph (j) of 
this section, an ``affiliate'' of a person shall include:
    (A) Any person directly or indirectly, through one or more 
intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with such person;
    (B) Any officer, director, partner, employee or relative (as 
defined in section 3(15) of the Act) of such person; and
    (C) Any corporation or partnership of which such person is an 
officer, director or partner.
    (ii) For purposes of this paragraph (j), the term ``control'' means 
the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or 
policies of a person other than an individual.
    (3) Expiration date. This paragraph (j) expires on April 10, 2017.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 1st day of April, 2016.
Phyllis C. Borzi,
Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2016-07924 Filed 4-6-16; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-29-P