[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 5, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19588-19594]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07738]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Surplus Plutonium Disposition

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On May 8, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
issued a Federal Register notice (80 FR 26559) announcing the 
availability of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (DOE/NNSA's) Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final SPD Supplemental 
EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2, April 2015). Among the proposed actions 
considered in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/NNSA analyzed the 
potential environmental impacts of alternatives for the disposition of 
13.1 metric tons (MT) (14.4 tons) of surplus plutonium for which a 
disposition path is not assigned, including 7.1 MT (7.8 tons) of 
surplus pit plutonium and 6 MT (6.6 tons) of surplus non-pit plutonium. 
At the time the Final SPD Supplemental EIS was issued, DOE/NNSA did not 
have a Preferred Alternative for any of the proposed actions considered 
in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. Subsequently, on December 24, 2015, 
DOE/NNSA issued a Federal Register notice (80 FR 80348) identifying the 
Preferred Alternative for disposition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium analyzed in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. In its Federal 
Register notice, DOE/NNSA announced that its Preferred Alternative is 
to prepare 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for disposal at the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a geologic 
repository for disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste generated by atomic 
energy defense activities.
    DOE/NNSA is announcing a decision to implement its Preferred 
Alternative for the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium, 
as described in DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities 
of Plutonium Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Supplemental EIS. Shipments of this surplus non-pit plutonium to WIPP, 
after it is operational,\1\ will be placed in the queue of waste to be 
shipped to WIPP. This plutonium will be prepared and packaged to meet 
the WIPP waste acceptance criteria for contact-handled TRU waste and 
other applicable regulatory requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ DOE suspended disposal activities at WIPP in February 2014 
following a salt truck fire and unrelated radiological event 
underground. Waste emplacement operations at WIPP are expected to 
commence in late 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The scope of DOE/NNSA's current decision pertains only to the 6 MT 
of surplus non-pit plutonium that is a subset of the 13.1 MT of surplus 
plutonium considered in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. DOE/NNSA does 
not have a preferred alternative and is not making any decisions, at 
the present time, for other alternatives considered in the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS. These other alternatives include alternatives for the 
disposition of 7.1 MT of surplus pit plutonium for which a disposition 
path is not assigned and various options for providing the capability 
to disassemble surplus pits and convert the plutonium from pits into a 
form suitable for disposition.
    Additionally, DOE/NNSA reaffirms its commitment to the Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and 
Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Needed for Defense 
Purposes (Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement or PMDA), 
which calls for the United States and the Russian Federation to each 
dispose of at least 34 MT (37.5 tons) of weapon-grade plutonium 
withdrawn from nuclear weapon programs. DOE/NNSA's previous decisions 
related to surplus plutonium disposition, including copies of the 
applicable Federal Register notices, may be found in Appendix A of the 
Final SPD Supplemental EIS.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the surplus 
plutonium disposition program, please contact Ms. Sachiko W. McAlhany, 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Document Manager, U.S. 
Department of Energy at [email protected].
    For information on DOE's NEPA process, please contact Ms. Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 
20585-0103; Telephone: (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756.
    This Record of Decision, the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, and 
related NEPA documents are available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/nepa/spdsupplementaleis and http://energy.gov/nepa/nepa-documents.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    DOE/NNSA's purpose and need for action remains as stated in the 
1999 SPD EIS (DOE/EIS-0283, November 1999) to reduce the threat of 
nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting disposition of 
surplus plutonium in the United States in an environmentally safe and 
timely manner, ensuring that it can never again be readily used in 
nuclear weapons.
    Based on a series of NEPA reviews beginning with the SPD EIS and 
described in Appendix A, Section A.1, of the Final SPD Supplemental 
EIS, DOE/NNSA has determined disposition paths for most of the current 
U.S. inventory of surplus, weapons-usable plutonium; however, 13.1 MT 
of surplus weapons-usable plutonium (7.1 MT of pit plutonium and 6 MT 
of non-pit plutonium) did not have an assigned disposition path. DOE/
NNSA prepared the SPD Supplemental EIS to evaluate alternatives for 
disposition of this 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium.

[[Page 19589]]

Alternatives Considered

    In the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/NNSA analyzed the potential 
environmental impacts for the No Action Alternative and four action 
alternatives for disposition of 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium that do 
not have a disposition path assigned, of which the 6 MT of non-pit 
plutonium is a subset. These four alternatives are: (1) Immobilization 
at SRS (Immobilization to Defense Waste Processing Facility [DWPF] 
Alternative); (2) fabrication into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel at SRS with 
subsequent irradiation in one or more domestic commercial nuclear power 
reactors (MOX Fuel Alternative); (3) vitrification with high-level 
radioactive waste (HLW) at SRS (H-Canyon/HB-Line and DWPF Alternative); 
and, (4) potential disposal as contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) 
waste at WIPP (WIPP Disposal Alternative). These alternatives are 
composed of a combination of pit disassembly and conversion options and 
plutonium disposition options. The plutonium disposition options that 
are applicable to the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium are described 
in Section S.9.2 of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2, 
April 2015). For the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, the scope of analysis 
for the WIPP Disposal Alternative was increased, in response to public 
comment, to include the full 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium for which a 
disposition path is not assigned. In the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS, 
the scope of analysis for the WIPP Disposal Alternative was limited to 
6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium (described in Section S.8.2.4 of DOE/
EIS-0283-S2, July 2012). The disposition decision announced today 
addresses 6 MT of surplus, weapons-usable, non-pit plutonium, not the 
entire 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium analyzed in the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS.
    Within each action alternative, DOE/NNSA evaluated options to 
disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium metal to an 
oxide form for disposition. DOE/NNSA has not identified a Preferred 
Alternative for the disposition of the remaining 7.1 MT of surplus 
plutonium (surplus pit plutonium) for which a disposition path has not 
been assigned, or for any option(s) for providing the capability to 
disassemble surplus pits and convert the plutonium from pits to a form 
suitable for disposition. Once DOE/NNSA identifies a Preferred 
Alternative for the remaining 7.1 MT of surplus pit plutonium and/or 
the disassembly and conversion options, DOE/NNSA will announce its 
preference in a Federal Register notice and publish a Record of 
Decision no sooner than 30 days after its announcement of a Preferred 
Alternative.

Preferred Alternative

    As announced on December 24, 2015, in a Federal Register notice (80 
FR 80348), DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative with regard to the 6 MT of 
surplus non-pit plutonium is to prepare this plutonium for disposal at 
WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a geologic repository for disposal of 
TRU waste generated by atomic energy defense activities. This would 
allow DOE/NNSA to continue progress on the disposition of surplus 
weapons-usable plutonium in furtherance of the policies of the United 
States to ensure that surplus plutonium is never again readily used in 
a nuclear weapon, and to remove surplus plutonium from the Savannah 
River Site (SRS) in the State of South Carolina. Surplus non-pit 
plutonium would be prepared and packaged at SRS using H-Canyon/HB-Line 
and/or K-Area facilities to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and 
all other applicable regulatory requirements. Shipments of this surplus 
plutonium to WIPP, after it is operational, will be placed in the queue 
of waste to be shipped to WIPP.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    After considering the potential impacts on each resource area, DOE/
NNSA identified the No Action Alternative as the environmentally 
preferable alternative in the near-term, for the 6 MT of surplus non-
pit plutonium evaluated in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and that is 
the subject of this Record of Decision. Under the No Action 
Alternative, the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium would be stored at 
the K-Area Complex at SRS, consistent with the 2002 Amended Record of 
Decision: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (67 FR 19432); the 
Supplement Analysis, Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the 
Savannah River Site (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-4) and an amended Record of 
Decision issued in 2007 (72 FR 51807). No new facilities would be 
constructed and no processing for disposal or off-site transportation 
of this material would take place with the exception of a small amount 
of plutonium required for the material surveillance program. 
Surveillance activities would be performed on the plutonium and 
plutonium packages, including destructive and non-destructive 
examinations, to ensure safe storage (DOE/EA-1538, Revised Finding of 
No Significant Impact for Safeguards and Security Upgrades for Storage 
of Materials at the Savannah River Site dated December 2005, and 
Interim Action Determinations approved in December 2008, September 
2009, and March 2011). Although the No Action Alternative is the 
environmentally preferable alternative, this alternative would not 
result in the disposition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium.

Potential Environmental Impacts of Preferred Alternative

    For each alternative, the SPD Supplemental EIS analyzed the 
potential impacts on air quality, human health, socioeconomics, waste 
management, transportation, environmental justice, land resources, 
geology and soils, water resources, noise, ecological resources, 
cultural resources, and infrastructure. DOE/NNSA also evaluated the 
potential impacts of the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of 
resources, the short-term uses of the environment, and the maintenance 
and enhancement of long-term productivity. These analyses and results 
for the entire 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium are described in the 
Summary and Chapter 4 of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. Table S-3 of 
the Final SPD Supplemental EIS Summary provides a summary of potential 
environmental impacts associated with each alternative as well as a 
means for comparing the potential impacts among alternatives.
    In the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS, the scope of analysis for the 
WIPP Disposal Alternative was limited to 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium (described in Section S.8.2.4 of DOE/EIS-0283-S2, July 2012). 
The analyses and results for the disposition of 6 MT can be found in 
the Summary, Chapter 4, and Appendix G ``Impacts of Plutonium 
Disposition Options'' of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS.
    In identifying its Preferred Alternative for disposition of 6 MT of 
surplus non-pit plutonium and making the decision announced in this 
Record of Decision, DOE/NNSA considered the potential environmental 
impacts that would result from operations conducted at SRS to prepare 
and package this quantity (6 MT) of material for disposition at WIPP, 
those related to transporting the material from SRS to WIPP, and 
disposal at WIPP. Implementing the WIPP Disposal Alternative relies on 
existing facilities, structures and pads at SRS to prepare the surplus 
non-pit plutonium for disposal. This would reduce the potential for 
additional land disturbance, and reduce the need for additional 
deactivation and decommissioning in the future. Some

[[Page 19590]]

staging of packages at E-Area at SRS prior to shipping may be required. 
This would result in negligible incremental impacts on both workers and 
the public. The pace of environmental restoration activities at SRS, as 
well as the requirements for environmental monitoring and protection at 
SRS and WIPP, would generally remain unchanged from current levels.
    The potential impacts from transporting surplus plutonium to WIPP 
are also addressed in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. The Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS indicated that under all alternatives (including the 
WIPP Disposal Alternative) no latent cancer fatalities are expected in 
the general public along the transportation routes and in the 
transportation crews due to incident-free transport of radioactive 
wastes and materials from SRS. The potential environmental impacts of 
TRU waste disposal at WIPP are evaluated in the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement 
(WIPP SEIS-II) (DOE/EIS-0026-S-2, September 1997) and subsequent 
Supplement Analyses from 2005 (DOE/EIS-0026-SA-05) and 2009 (DOE/EIS-
0026-SA-07) and are briefly described in Appendix A, Section A.2, of 
the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.

Public Involvement

    Since the announcement of the first notice of intent to prepare the 
SPD Supplemental EIS in 2007 (72 FR 14543), DOE/NNSA has provided three 
scoping periods during which DOE/NNSA held public scoping meetings and 
actively solicited scoping comments from Federal agencies, state and 
local governmental entities, American Indian tribal governments, and 
members of the public. The public scoping periods extended from March 
28, 2007 through May 29, 2007; July 19, 2010 through September 17, 
2010; and January 12, 2012 through March 12, 2012. Meetings were held 
in Aiken, Columbia, and North Augusta, South Carolina; Tanner, Alabama; 
Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Carlsbad, Santa Fe, Espanola, and Pojoaque, 
New Mexico.
    On July 27, 2012, EPA and DOE/NNSA published notices in the Federal 
Register announcing the availability of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS 
(77 FR 44234 and 77 FR 44222, respectively). A 60-day comment period 
was provided from July 27 to September 25, 2012. In response to public 
requests, DOE/NNSA extended the public comment period by 15 days 
through October 10, 2012. During the public comment period, DOE/NNSA 
held seven public hearings to provide interested members of the public 
with opportunities to learn more about the content of the Draft SPD 
Supplemental EIS, to hear DOE/NNSA representatives present the results 
of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS analyses, to ask questions; and to 
provide oral and/or written comments. The hearings were held in Los 
Alamos, Santa Fe, Carlsbad, and Espanola, New Mexico; North Augusta, 
South Carolina; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Tanner, Alabama.
    DOE/NNSA received 432 comment documents containing approximately 
1,050 comments during the comment period for the Draft SPD Supplemental 
EIS. DOE/NNSA responded to these comments in the Comment Response 
Document, Volume 3, of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.

Comments on the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and Preferred Alternative

    DOE/NNSA distributed the Final SPD Supplemental EIS to 
Congressional members and committees; State and local governments; 
other Federal agencies, culturally affiliated American Indian tribal 
governments, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders 
including members of the public who requested the document. Also, the 
Final SPD Supplemental EIS was made available via the Internet.
    On December 24, 2015, DOE/NNSA announced its Preferred Alternative 
in the Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of Plutonium 
Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (80 FR 80348) with regard to the 6 MT of 
non-pit plutonium. DOE/NNSA considered all comments received on the 
Final SPD Supplemental EIS and the Preferred Alternative and concluded 
that those comments do not identify a need for further NEPA analysis. 
The Appendix to this Record of Decision summarizes DOE/NNSA's 
consideration of these comments.

Decision

    DOE/NNSA has decided to implement its Preferred Alternative as 
described in DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of 
Plutonium Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (80 FR 80348) with regard 
to the disposition of 6 MT of surplus, weapons-usable, non-pit 
plutonium; DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative is to prepare that 
plutonium for disposal at WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a geologic 
repository for disposal of TRU waste generated by atomic energy defense 
activities. All practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental 
harm for the decision identified have been adopted.
    Under this alternative, the non-pit plutonium will be prepared for 
disposal in facilities at HB-Line or K-Area at SRS for disposal at 
WIPP. The non-pit plutonium containers will be opened in an existing 
glovebox or newly- constructed glovebox capability in HB-Line or K-
Area. Plutonium metal will be converted to oxide. Plutonium oxide will 
be repackaged into suitable containers, mixed/blended with inert 
material and loaded into pipe overpack containers (POCs) or criticality 
control overpacks (CCOs). (DOE/NNSA plans to move toward the use of the 
CCO containers in lieu of the POC to maximize the amount of plutonium 
that can be packaged in each container, thereby reducing the number of 
shipments and volume emplaced at WIPP.) The inert material will be 
added to inhibit plutonium recovery. Loaded POCs or CCOs will be 
characterized for WIPP disposal in E-Area at SRS including non-
destructive assay, digital radiography, and headspace gas sampling. 
Waste packages containing surplus plutonium that have been successfully 
characterized and meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria will be 
placed in the queue of waste to be shipped to WIPP after WIPP is 
operational. The packages will be shipped to WIPP in TRUPACT-II or 
HalfPACT shipping containers
    Unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) reactor fuel is 
included in this 6 MT of non-pit plutonium. If the FFTF fuel cannot be 
disposed of by direct disposal at WIPP, it will be disassembled at SRS 
and packaged for disposal at WIPP. H-Canyon at SRS will be used to 
disassemble the fuel bundles, remove the pellets from the fuel pins, 
and package the pellets into suitable containers. HB-Line or K-Area 
will be used to prepare and mix/blend the fuel pellet material with 
inert material, then package it for shipment to WIPP.
    Disposition decisions announced in this Record of Decision address 
only the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium. DOE/NNSA has no Preferred 
Alternative at this time for the disposition of the remaining 7.1 MT of 
surplus plutonium from pits for which a disposition pathway has not 
been assigned, or for the capability to disassemble surplus pits and 
convert the plutonium from pits to a form suitable for disposition. 
Once a Preferred Alternative is identified, DOE/NNSA will announce its 
preference in a Federal Register notice and publish a Record of 
Decision no sooner than 30 days after its announcement of a Preferred 
Alternative.

[[Page 19591]]

Basis for Decision

    In making its decision, DOE/NNSA considered potential environmental 
impacts of construction and operations, current and future mission 
needs, technical and security considerations, availability of 
resources, and public comments on the Draft and Final SPD Supplemental 
EIS, and the notice of Preferred Alternative. Implementing the WIPP 
Disposal Alternative for disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium allows DOE/NNSA to take advantage of existing facilities, 
infrastructure and expertise at SRS and WIPP. The decision builds on 
the existing capabilities, infrastructure, and skilled workforce 
trained in safe operation of nuclear facilities. Environmental impacts 
and costs (DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) Report of the Plutonium 
Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus Weapon[hyphen]Grade 
Plutonium Disposition Options, Washington, DC, April 2014) would be 
less than some of the other alternatives that would require the 
construction of new facilities. In addition, DOE/NNSA will make use of 
existing facilities, resulting in efficient use of the facilities. 
Blending for disposal at WIPP is a proven process that is ongoing at 
SRS for disposition of plutonium material from the DOE-STD-3013 
surveillance process and other non-pit plutonium. In addition, disposal 
of this surplus non-pit plutonium will avoid long-term impacts, risks, 
and costs associated with storage.
    DOE/NNSA also considered acceptability of the surplus non-pit 
plutonium at WIPP and WIPP's performance in making this decision. DOE 
has previously disposed of similar surplus plutonium at WIPP from SRS, 
the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and the Hanford Site 
(the Rocky Flats and Hanford materials were packaged and shipped 
directly from those sites). As was the case for previous SRS activities 
requiring the processing of surplus plutonium for disposal at WIPP, the 
surplus plutonium identified in this decision will be packaged to meet 
the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and all applicable regulatory 
requirements. Compliance with the WIPP waste acceptance criteria is one 
factor that will help ensure that any TRU waste emplaced in WIPP will 
not exceed the 40 CFR part 191 performance standards and will meet 
other applicable requirements. Additionally, the WIPP TRU waste 
inventory--which includes radionuclide activity--is revised annually 
and reviewed by DOE for compliance. DOE's currently projected WIPP TRU 
waste inventory with the addition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium suggests that WIPP would continue to comply with 40 CFR 191. 
These projections from the TRU Waste Inventory and other information 
are submitted every five years to the EPA, as part of the Compliance 
Recertification Application, under 40 CFR part 194, Criteria for the 
Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's 
Compliance with the 40 CFR part 191 Disposal Regulations. Following 
issuance of this ROD, the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium will be 
reflected in the TRU Waste Inventory and inform the next compliance re-
certification application to be submitted to EPA in 2019.
    Implementing the Preferred Alternative will allow the DOE/NNSA to 
continue its progress on the disposition of surplus weapon-usable 
plutonium in furtherance of the policies of the United States to ensure 
that surplus plutonium is never again readily used in a nuclear weapon, 
and to remove surplus plutonium from the State of South Carolina.

Mitigation Measures

    SRS facility operations would result in airborne emissions of 
various pollutants, including radionuclides, and organic and inorganic 
constituents. These emissions would continue to be controlled using 
Best Available Control Technology to ensure that emissions are 
compliant with applicable standards. Impacts would be controlled by use 
of glovebox confinement, packaging as applicable, building confinement 
and air filtration systems to remove radioactive particulates before 
discharging process exhaust air to the atmosphere, and internal 
scrubbers to reduce chemical gas concentrations. Occupational safety 
risks to workers would be limited by adherence to Federal and state 
laws; Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations; DOE/
NNSA requirements including regulations and orders; and plans and 
procedures for performing work. DOE/NNSA facility operations adhere to 
programs to ensure the reduction of human health and safety impacts. 
Workers are protected from specific hazards by use of engineering and 
administrative controls, use of personal protective equipment, and 
monitoring and training. The Radiological Protection Program limits 
impacts by ensuring that radiological exposures and doses to all 
personnel are maintained As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and by 
providing job specific instructions to the facility workers regarding 
the use of personal protective equipment. The Emergency Preparedness 
Program mitigates potential accident consequences by ensuring that 
appropriate organizations are available to respond to emergency 
situations and take appropriate actions to recover from accident 
events, while reducing the spread of contamination and protecting 
facility personnel and the public.

    Issued at Washington, DC on March 29, 2016.
Frank G. Klotz,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.

Appendix: Public Comments Received on the Final SPD Supplemental EIS 
and the Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of Plutonium 
Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement

    DOE/NNSA received eight letters and emails regarding the Final 
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact 
Statement (Final SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2, April 2015) 
(80 FR 26559) and Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of 
Plutonium Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (80 FR 80348). DOE/NNSA 
considered all comments contained in the letters and emails. Some of 
the comments included issues already raised during the comment 
period for the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement. All prior comments submitted on the 
Draft SPD Supplemental EIS and DOE/NNSA responses to those comments 
have been published in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, Volume 3, 
Comment Response Document, and are not being revisited.
    In announcing its Preferred Alternative for the disposition of 6 
MT of surplus non-pit plutonium, DOE/NNSA stated that it had no 
Preferred Alternative for other potential actions considered in the 
Final SPD Supplemental EIS. Specifically, DOE/NNSA stated that it 
had no Preferred Alternative for the disposition of the remaining 
7.1 MT of surplus plutonium from pits and that it did not have a 
Preferred Alternative among the pathways analyzed for providing the 
capability to disassemble surplus pits and convert the plutonium 
from pits to a form suitable for disposition. Further, some of the 
comments were beyond the scope of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. 
DOE/NNSA did not address such comments.
    DOE/NNSA received comments on the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and 
the notice of Preferred Alternative from The Governing Body of the 
City of Carlsbad, New Mexico; Shelly Wilson, Permitting and Federal 
Facilities Liaison of the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control; Rick McLeod, Executive Director of the 
Savannah River Site Community Reuse

[[Page 19592]]

Organization; Tom Clements of Savannah River Site Watch; Edwin Lyman 
and Frank von Hippel of the Union of Concerned Scientists; Andrew 
Kadak; Michael High; and Don Hancock of Southwest Research and 
Information Center. The topics below summarize the concerns 
expressed within those comments and provides DOE/NNSA's responses.
    Topic A--National Environmental Policy Act Compliance: 
Commentors were concerned that analyses of the potential 
environmental impacts of processing, packaging, and disposal of 
surplus non-pit plutonium, which could include some quantity of 
``gap'' plutonium retrieved from foreign countries, had not been 
performed as required by the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and new or supplemental EISs should be prepared. A commentor 
also stated that in March 2015, President Obama authorized DOE to 
pursue a defense high level radioactive waste (HLW) repository; 
therefore, it is a reasonable alternative for defense surplus 
plutonium that must be considered, but is not included in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS, nor the Draft or Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS.
    Discussion: DOE believes sufficient information exists, 
including NEPA documentation, to support a Record of Decision for 
the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for which a 
disposition path was not assigned. DOE has completed appropriate 
tiered NEPA analyses related to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
program including the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable 
Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229) in 1996, Surplus 
Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE-
EIS-0283) in 1999, and Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-
S2) in 2015.
    DOE/NNSA's need to store and disposition surplus plutonium, in 
accordance with U.S. nonproliferation and export control policies in 
a safe, reliable, cost effective and timely manner, has not changed 
since the Storage and Disposition PEIS was prepared in 1996. DOE/
NNSA did, however, become aware of new circumstances and information 
relevant to the 1999 SPD EIS that did warrant re-examination of some 
of the analyses provided in that NEPA document.
    Consequently, the SPD Supplemental EIS was prepared in 
accordance with applicable Council on Environmental Quality and DOE 
NEPA regulations to examine the potential environmental impacts of 
reasonable alternatives for the disposition of 13.1 MT of surplus 
plutonium for which a disposition path was not assigned, including 6 
MT of surplus non-pit plutonium. The SPD Supplemental EIS also 
analyzed options to provide the appropriate capability to 
disassemble surplus pits and convert surplus plutonium to a form 
suitable for disposition. In preparing the Final SPD Supplemental 
EIS, DOE/NNSA considered the analyses in the related NEPA documents 
identified above. The Final SPD Supplemental EIS addresses all of 
the relevant issues and analysis related to the proposed action and 
updates the analyses where necessary.
    Appropriate NEPA analyses exist for processing 6 MT of surplus 
non-pit plutonium at SRS and transportation and disposal of the 
resulting CH-TRU waste at WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a 
geologic repository for disposal of TRU waste generated by atomic 
energy defense activities. Chapter 4 and Appendix G of the SPD 
Supplemental EIS, describe the potential environmental impacts of 
plutonium disposition options, including preparing surplus non-pit 
plutonium at facilities at SRS for disposal at WIPP. Appendix E of 
the SPD Supplemental EIS, describes the potential environmental 
impacts of transportation of surplus plutonium for disposal at WIPP. 
Section 4.5.3.6.3, of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS describes the 
capacity and ability of WIPP to accept 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium 
as analyzed under the WIPP Disposal Alternative in the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS. The potential environmental impacts of TRU waste 
disposal at WIPP are evaluated in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement 
(WIPP SEIS-II) (DOE/EIS-0026-S2, September 1997) and subsequent 
Supplement Analyses from 2005 (DOE/EIS-0026-SA-05) and 2009 (DOE/
EIS-0026-SA-07). Also, see Topic B--WIPP Capacity, and Topic C--WIPP 
Acceptance, for further discussion of these topics.
    Certain plutonium recovered from foreign sources may have 
originated from atomic energy defense activities. Up to 0.9 MT of 
such plutonium may be included in the 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2 of the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS in the event that the plutonium from foreign 
sources is received at SRS. Thus, the potential environmental 
impacts from the processing and disposition of surplus plutonium 
recovered from foreign countries, also referred to as ``gap material 
plutonium'', through NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative are 
evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS. NEPA analysis for the 
transportation, receipt, and processing of gap material plutonium in 
preparation for disposition is provided in DOE/NNSA's Environmental 
Assessment for the U.S. Receipt and Storage of Gap Material 
Plutonium (DOE/EA-1771) May 2010 \2\ and DOE/NNSA's Environmental 
Assessment for Gap Material Plutonium--Transport, Receipt, and 
Processing (Gap Material Plutonium EA) (DOE/EA-2024), December 2015. 
DOE determined that the potential environmental impacts of 
implementing the proposed action are not significant, and in May 
2010 and December 2015, issued Findings of No Significant Impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ While this EA is for Official Use Only, the Finding of No 
Significant Impact can be viewed on the DOE NEPA Web site (http://energy.gov/nepa/downloads/ea-1771-finding-no-significant-impact).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In President Obama's March 24, 2015, ``Presidential Memorandum--
Disposal of Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste in a Separate 
Repository'' to the Secretary of Energy, President Obama found, in 
accordance with Section 8 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
that ``the development of a repository for the disposal of high-
level radioactive waste resulting from atomic energy defense 
activities only is required.'' DOE is now authorized to move forward 
with planning for a separate repository for HLW resulting from 
atomic energy defense activities. At present, no site has been 
identified or proposed and no funds have been appropriated for 
designing, constructing and operating such a repository.
    Topic B--The Blending Process and Implementing the Preferred 
Alternative at SRS: Commentors expressed concern that many hurdles 
would remain affecting DOE/NNSA's ability to carry out this decision 
once the ROD is issued. Commentors also expressed the view that no 
additional surplus plutonium should be received at SRS until surplus 
plutonium currently in storage at SRS is removed from the State of 
South Carolina. Commentors requested information about facilities 
and infrastructure for blending and packaging the 6 MT of surplus 
non-pit plutonium at SRS, a description of the processes to be used 
in blending and packaging and the schedule for processing and 
shipping to WIPP.
    Discussion: As described in this Record of Decision, DOE/NNSA 
has decided to prepare 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for 
disposal at WIPP. This would allow the DOE/NNSA to continue progress 
on the disposition of surplus weapon-usable plutonium in furtherance 
of the policies of the United States to ensure that surplus 
plutonium is never again readily used in a nuclear weapon, and to 
remove surplus plutonium from the State of South Carolina.
    This Record of Decision summarizes how DOE/NNSA intends to 
prepare the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for disposition at 
WIPP. For additional information, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4, and 
Appendix B, Section B.1.3, of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS 
describe how plutonium would be blended with inert materials and 
packaged at SRS. Blending these types of materials for disposal at 
WIPP is a proven process that is ongoing at SRS for disposition of 
plutonium material from the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance process and 
other non-pit plutonium. Implementing the WIPP Disposal Alternative 
for this surplus non-pit plutonium relies on existing SRS facilities 
(with additional glovebox capability in an existing facility), 
structures, and pads to prepare the material for disposal. Surplus 
non-pit plutonium would be prepared and packaged at SRS using H-
Canyon/HB-line and/or K-Area Complex facilities and would be 
temporarily stored in E-Area at SRS until shipped to WIPP. DOE/
NNSA's assumptions associated with the schedule for equipping and 
operating facilities at SRS are described in Table B-2 in the Final 
SPD Supplemental EIS.
    This Record of Decision identifies DOE/NNSA's intent to place 
the 6 MT of non-pit plutonium in POCs or CCOs for disposition 
following its conversion to plutonium oxide and blending with inert 
materials. (DOE/NNSA plans to move toward the use of the CCO 
containers in lieu of the POC to maximize the amount of plutonium 
that can be packaged in each container, thereby reducing the number 
of shipments and

[[Page 19593]]

volume emplaced at WIPP.) For additional information, see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.4, and Appendix B, Section B.3, of the SPD Supplemental 
EIS which describe the POC and CCO containers that would be used for 
disposal of surplus plutonium at WIPP.
    The details of the inert materials with which plutonium would be 
blended and applicable safeguards for the plutonium are classified 
or official use only. The termination of safeguards process is part 
of DOE/NNSA's Material Control and Accountability Program and is 
outside the scope of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and this Record 
of Decision.
    A schedule for shipment of the 6 MT of plutonium to WIPP has not 
been established (limited waste emplacement operations at WIPP are 
expected to commence in late 2016). Shipments of this surplus non-
pit plutonium to WIPP, after it is operational, will placed in the 
queue of waste to be shipped to WIPP.
    Topic C--WIPP Capacity: Commentors were concerned that the WIPP 
unsubscribed capacity had been incorrectly calculated and that the 
available volume is less than the volume described in the SPD 
Supplemental EIS; thus, the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium could not be accomplished within the unsubscribed capacity 
of WIPP.
    Discussion: The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act establishes a total 
WIPP capacity for TRU waste disposal of 175,600 cubic meters (6.2 
million cubic feet). Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3.6.3, of the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS describes the capacity and ability of WIPP to 
accept 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium as analyzed under the WIPP 
Disposal Alternative. This analysis considered past and projected 
disposal amounts at WIPP of TRU waste from across the DOE complex 
and as a result of these considerations, an unsubscribed disposal 
capacity of 24,700 cubic meters (872,000 cubic feet) of CH-TRU waste 
was assumed for purposes of analysis in the Final SPD Supplemental 
EIS.
    The estimate of unsubscribed disposal capacity in the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS was made using DOE's Annual Transuranic Waste 
Inventory Report for 2012. The TRU waste volumes reported in the 
Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Reports are based on final 
(containerized) TRU waste forms. Projections from the Annual 
Transuranic Waste Inventory Reports for 2014 and 2015, suggests that 
although TRU waste disposal projections vary somewhat from year to 
year, the information in these documents would not change the 
conclusions reached in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
    All of the TRU waste projected from the activities addressed in 
the Final SPD Supplemental EIS is expected to be CH-TRU waste. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3.6.3 of the Draft SPD 
Supplemental EIS, disposal of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium at 
is estimated to result in 15,000 to 17,000 cubic meters of CH-TRU 
waste, using pipe overpack containers (POCs) for packaging the 6 MT 
of surplus non-pit plutonium. These estimated volumes can be 
substantially reduced if criticality control overpacks (CCOs) are 
used for packaging the surplus plutonium for WIPP disposal rather 
than the assumed POCs and the unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility 
(FFTF) fuel is disposed of by direct disposal at WIPP. (If the FFTF 
fuel cannot be disposed of by direct disposal at WIPP, it will be 
disassembled at SRS and packaged for disposal at WIPP.)
    The WIPP underground is composed of disposal rooms or ``panels'' 
mined from the salt beds. Disposal panels at WIPP can be enlarged 
and/or additional panels can be created to accommodate the 175,600 
cubic meters (6.2 million cubic feet) of TRU waste allowed under the 
WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. Future waste disposal at WIPP could 
involve new disposal panels that could be larger (with more capacity 
per panel) or more numerous than the 10 panels that were included in 
the nominal conceptual design of the WIPP underground that one of 
the commentors references.
    Topic D--WIPP Acceptance: Commentors requested information on 
the process and procedures for acceptance of drums containing 
surplus plutonium at WIPP. In addition, commentors were concerned 
that disposal of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium at WIPP exceeds 
previously evaluated amounts of plutonium increasing criticality 
risk, and that it exceeds plutonium amounts included in previous 
Compliance Certification Applications to the U. S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).
    Discussion: The process and procedures for acceptance of surplus 
plutonium blended with inert materials are the same as the process 
and procedures for acceptance of any CH-TRU waste at WIPP as 
described in Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (DOE/WIPP-02-3122). As required by DOE Order 
420.1, Facility Safety, criticality was considered in the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant Documented Safety Analysis (DOE/WIPP 07-3372, 
November 2013) and determined to be an ``incredible event'' at WIPP.
    DOE has previously disposed of similar surplus plutonium at WIPP 
from SRS, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and the 
Hanford Site; the Rocky Flats and Hanford materials were packaged 
and shipped directly from those sites (Los Alamos National 
Laboratory Carlsbad Operations Performance Assessment Inventory 
Report 2012, INV-PA-12, Revision 0). As was the case for previous 
SRS activities requiring the processing of surplus plutonium for 
disposal at WIPP, the surplus plutonium identified in this decision 
will be packaged to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and all 
applicable regulatory requirements.
    As described above, there are statutory limits on the total 
volume of TRU waste that may be disposed of at WIPP. There are also 
statutory limits on the total curies of remote-handled TRU waste, 
but there are no statutory limits on the total curies of CH-TRU 
waste, such as the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium. The 
regulations at 40 CFR part 191, subparts B and C, Environmental 
Standards for Disposal and Environmental Standards for Ground-Water 
Protection, applicable to WIPP, provide release limits to the 
accessible environment and the regulations in Subpart B require 
reasonable expectation that the individual protection (dose) 
standard will be met for 10,000 years after disposal, based on a 
performance assessment and other applicable information, which takes 
into account the potential release of radionuclides to the 
accessible environment from the TRU Waste Inventory emplaced and 
projected to be emplaced in WIPP. The TRU waste inventory--which 
includes radionuclide activity--is revised annually and reviewed by 
DOE for compliance. DOE's projections of its TRU waste inventory 
with the addition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium suggest 
that WIPP would continue to comply with applicable 40 CFR part 191 
requirements. These projections from the TRU Waste Inventory Report 
and other information are submitted every five years to EPA, as part 
of the Compliance Recertification Application, under 40 CFR part 
194, Criteria for the Certification and Re-Certification of the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR part 191 
Disposal Regulations. Following issuance of this Record of Decision, 
the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium will be reflected in the TRU 
Waste Inventory Report and inform the next re-certification 
application to be submitted to EPA in 2019.
    The WIPP waste acceptance criteria help ensure, with an 
appropriate margin, that any TRU waste emplaced in WIPP will not 
exceed the 40 CFR part 191 performance standards and will meet other 
applicable requirements. The 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium will 
be packaged to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria, thereby 
providing further assurance that the additional inventory will not 
challenge the 40 CFR part 191 repository performance standards.
    During the disposal phase of WIPP repository operations, 
criticality is controlled by the packaging requirements imposed by 
the waste acceptance criteria. As required by DOE Order 420.1, 
Facility Safety, criticality was considered in the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant Documented Safety Analysis (DOE/WIPP 07-3372) and 
determined to be an ``incredible event'' at WIPP. Furthermore, in 
2000, Sandia National Laboratories was commissioned to conduct a 
conservative analysis of the possibility of a criticality event over 
the required 10,000-year performance period for WIPP. In 
Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic 
Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (SAN 099-2898), Sandia 
National Laboratories concluded that criticality is not a credible 
event. The analysis evaluated conditions within the WIPP repository 
itself including the possibility of a criticality event in adjacent 
geologic media into which fissile material could be assumed to 
migrate.
    Topic E--Consideration of the February 2014 Incidents and 
Restart of Operations at WIPP: Commentors were concerned that the 
WIPP operational history and the February 2014 incidents were not 
considered in developing the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and this 
Record of Decision.
    Discussion: The ``Foreword'' of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS 
includes information on the February 2014 incidents at WIPP. DOE has 
considered WIPP''s performance in

[[Page 19594]]

making this decision to send 6 MT of surplus plutonium to WIPP for 
disposal. A schedule for shipment of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium to WIPP has not been established. Shipments of this 
surplus non-pit plutonium to WIPP, after it is operational, will be 
placed in the queue of waste to be shipped to WIPP. DOE anticipates 
resuming limited waste disposal operations at WIPP in 2016 when it 
is safe to do so. Significant improvements are being implemented to 
enhance the safety environment at WIPP including enhancements to 
fire suppression and unground ventilation and improvements in 
underground stability. DOE provides regular updates and detailed 
information on the status of recovery activities at WIPP on the WIPP 
Web site (http://www.wipp.energy.gov/wipprecovery/recovery.html). 
These safety changes and improvements are being implemented 
regardless of the decision to dispose of 6 MT of surplus plutonium 
at WIPP.
    Topic F--Cost: Commentors were concerned about the cost of the 
surplus plutonium disposition alternatives and that adequate funding 
be provided such that DOE can move forward with disposition of the 6 
MT of surplus non-pit plutonium at WIPP.
    Discussion: As described in this Record of Decision, DOE/NNSA 
has decided to prepare 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for 
disposal at WIPP. This would allow the DOE/NNSA to continue progress 
on the disposition of surplus weapon-usable plutonium in furtherance 
of the policies of the United States to ensure that surplus 
plutonium is never again readily used in a nuclear weapon, and to 
remove surplus plutonium from the State of South Carolina. 
Scheduling and implementation of surplus plutonium disposition 
activities are subject to the availability of funds as appropriated 
by Congress.
    With respect to cost considerations, implementing the WIPP 
Disposal Alternative for the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit 
plutonium would rely on existing facilities (with additional 
glovebox capability in an existing facility), structures, and pads, 
and when compared to the other alternatives evaluated in the SPD 
Supplemental EIS, would reduce the potential need for constructing 
and equipping additional facilities, and consequently reduce the 
need for future facility deactivation and decommissioning at SRS. 
Blending with inert materials for disposal at WIPP is a proven 
process that is ongoing at SRS for disposition of plutonium material 
from the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance process and other non-pit 
plutonium.
[FR Doc. 2016-07738 Filed 4-4-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6450-01-P