[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 62 (Thursday, March 31, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18652-18656]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07305]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-302; NRC-2016-0048]
Duke Energy Florida, Inc. Crystal River, Unit 3
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption from the requirement to maintain a specified level of onsite
property damage insurance in response to a request from Duke Energy
Florida, Inc. (DEF or the licensee) dated December 17, 2015. This
exemption would permit the licensee to reduce its onsite property
damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million at the Crystal River
Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Station (CR-3) based on the reduced risks and
consequences of a nuclear incident at a decommissioning nuclear power
reactor.
DATES: March 31, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0048 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0048. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents on-line in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by
[[Page 18653]]
email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced in this document (if that document is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John B. Hickman, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3017; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The CR-3 facility is a decommissioning power reactor located in
Citrus County, Florida. The licensee, DEF, is the holder of CR-3
Facility Operating License No. DPR-72. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations,
and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13056A005), DEF submitted to the NRC a certification in accordance
with section 50.82(a)(1)(i) of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) indicating it would permanently cease power
operations, and with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently
defueled the reactor vessel at CR-3. On May 28, 2011, DEF completed the
final removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at CR-3. Because CR-3 is
a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and in accordance with
section 50.82(a)(2), DEF is no longer authorized to operate the reactor
or emplace nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. The licensee is still
authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel.
The spent fuel is currently being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool
(SFP).
II. Request/Action
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' DEF requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by a letter dated December 17, 2015
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15351A490). The exemption from the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit DEF to reduce the amount of its
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident.
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk and consequences of an accident
at a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor are much less than the
risk and consequences from an accident at an operating power reactor.
In addition, since reactor operation is no longer authorized at CR-3,
no events could occur that would require the stabilization of reactor
conditions after an accident. Similarly, the risk of an accident that
would result in significant onsite contamination at CR-3 is also much
lower than the risk of such an event at operating reactors. Therefore,
DEF is requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million,
commensurate with the reduced risk of an accident at the permanently
shutdown and defueled CR-3 site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 out of concern
that licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs
in the event of a major nuclear accident. The NRC based the $1.06
billion coverage amount requirement on an analysis of an accident at a
nuclear reactor operating at power that results in a large fission
product release and requires significant resource expenditures to
stabilize the reactor conditions and ultimately decontaminate and
remediate the site. These activities would be similar to the
stabilization and cleanup activities at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power facility following the damage from a severe earthquake and
tsunami.
The NRC developed these cost estimates based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor and the
consequences of a release of radioactive material from the reactor.
Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor is very low,
the consequences can be large. In an operating plant, the high
temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant system (RCS), as well
as the inventory of relatively short-lived radionuclides, contribute to
both the risk and consequences of an accident. With the permanent
cessation of reactor operations at CR-3 (i.e., the reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate) and the permanent removal of the
fuel from the reactor core, postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer
possible. Additionally, these systems and components cannot support the
storage of the irradiated fuel.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its December
17, 2015, exemption request, DEF discusses both design-basis and
beyond-design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
The licensee states that there are no possible design-basis events at
CR-3 that could result in a radiological release exceeding the limits
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) early-
phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) of 1 Roentgen Equivalent Man
(REM) at the exclusion area boundary. The only accident that might lead
to a significant radiological release at the decommissioning reactor is
a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but
highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident scenario that involves
loss of all water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant
heat-up of the spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in
the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue
to decrease as a function of the time that CR-3 has been permanently
shut down.
The licensee provided a detailed analysis of hypothetical beyond-
design-basis accidents that could result in a radiological release at
CR-3 in its September 6, 2013, emergency planning-related license
amendment and exemption requests (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584). One
of these beyond-design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP
water inventory, where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily
accomplished by natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent
fuel assemblies. The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that as
of September 26, 2013, air-cooling of the spent fuel assemblies will be
sufficient to keep the fuel within a safe temperature range
indefinitely without fuel damage or radiological
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release. This is important because the NRC staff has previously
authorized a lesser amount of onsite property damage insurance coverage
based on analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes
to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear
Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December
17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483), the staff recommended
changes to the power reactor insurance regulations that would allow
licensees to lower onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon
demonstration that the fuel stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its
Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), the Commission supported the staff's
recommendation that, among other things, would allow permanently
shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property
damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the licensee was able to
demonstrate the technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-
cooled if the SFP was drained of water. The staff has used this
technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to other
decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64 FR
2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal Register on
December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); and Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant,
published in the Federal Register on April 13, 2015 (80 FR 19697)). The
NRC based these prior exemptions on the licensees' demonstrating that
the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent with the technical criterion
discussed above.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC
staff discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for
onsite property damage insurance. As discussed in SECY-00-0145,
providing an analysis of when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is
capable of air-cooling is one measure that a licensee can use to
demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is exceedingly
low. More recently, as discussed in SECY-01-0100, the staff has used an
additional analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP
water or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of
the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is often referred to as an adiabatic
heatup analysis.
The DEF analyses, as referenced in DEF's December 15, 2015,
exemption request, demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP
water inventory has drained and only air-cooling of the stored
irradiated fuel is available, there is reasonable assurance that as of
September 26, 2013, the CR-3 spent fuel will remain at temperatures far
below those associated with a significant radiological release. In
addition, the licensee has also provided an adiabatic heatup analysis,
demonstrating that as of September 26, 2013, there will be at least
19.7 hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or
water) before the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where
the potential for a significant offsite radiological release could
occur. The licensee states that should all means to cool the spent fuel
be lost, 19.7 hours is sufficient time for personnel to respond with
additional resources, equipment, and capability to restore cooling to
the SFP, even after a non-credible, catastrophic event.
In the NRC's March 30, 2015, safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15058A906) of the licensee's request for exemptions from certain
emergency planning requirements, the NRC staff assessed the DEF
accident analyses associated with the radiological risks from a
zirconium fire at the permanently shutdown and defueled CR-3 site. The
staff has confirmed that under conditions where cooling airflow can
develop, suitably conservative calculations indicate that as of
September 26, 2013, the fuel will remain at temperatures where the
cladding will be undamaged for an unlimited period. For the very
unlikely beyond-design-basis accident scenario, where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal
from the spent fuel are no longer available, there will be a minimum of
19.7 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding
reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur.
The staff found that 19.7 hours was sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Even more time would be
available now, given that more than two years have passed since the
analysis was performed and the risks from a zirconium fire scenario
continue to decrease as a function of the time that the fuel has cooled
since CR-3 permanently shut down.
In response to a request for additional information related to the
licensee's request for exemptions from certain emergency planning
requirements, the licensee also provided an analysis of a postulated
airborne dispersal of radioactive waste resin upon dropping a High
Integrity Container (HIC) outside the power block. Although an airborne
release is not expected to occur with a drop, or while in storage
awaiting shipment, due to the low flammability and reactivity of the
spent resin, a release is nevertheless postulated. The event is based
on a release of radioactive material with activity and isotopic mix
taken from the resin shipments that occurred during a recent 5\1/2\
year period. The licensee reviewed resin shipments made from 2008
through June 2013 and obtained the isotopic distribution (except for
Cobalt-60) from the shipment with the highest overall activity. Cobalt-
60 activity was taken from a different shipment to assure that the
highest activity was used and the dose was maximized. This created a
composite maximum shipment having a total activity of approximately 116
curies, which is approximately twice the activity of the average
shipment made during this period. The analysis assumed a release of 10
percent of the total radioactive material inventory and that the
release would occur outside of the CR-3 site's Auxiliary Building on
the south berm. The analysis of the dropped spent resin HIC
consequences indicates that the dose would be 40 mrem total effective
dose equivalent at the site boundary over a 2-hour period, which is
well below the PAG limit of 1 rem.
In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff provided its basis as to why it
considers $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property damage
insurance for a decommissioning reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP
is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. The staff has postulated
that there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff
cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank, causing
soil contamination
[[Page 18655]]
and potential groundwater contamination, as the most costly postulated
event to decontaminate and remediate (other than a SFP zirconium fire).
The NRC determined that the postulated large liquid radiological waste
storage tank rupture event would have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of
approximately $50 million.
The NRC staff has found that DEF's proposed reduction in onsite
property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million is
consistent with SECY-96-256. In addition, the staff notes that there is
a precedent of granting a similar exemption to other permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactor licensees. As previously stated,
the staff concluded that as of September 26, 2013, sufficient
irradiated fuel decay time has elapsed at CR-3 to decrease to
negligible levels the probability of an onsite radiological release
from a postulated zirconium fire accident. In addition, the licensee's
proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is
consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery
from the rupture of a large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
IV. Regulatory Requirements
A. Authorized by Law
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may grant exemptions from the
regulations in 10 CFR part 50 that the Commission determines are
authorized by law. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the
licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or other laws. Therefore, the
exemption is authorized by law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The NRC established the onsite property damage insurance
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for CR-
3 are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, CR-3 is a permanently shutdown and defueled facility. As
explained in section III of this document, the permanently defueled
status of the facility has resulted in a significant reduction in the
number and severity of potential accidents, and correspondingly, a
significant reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite
property damage. The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite
insurance coverage does not impact the probability or consequences of
potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance coverage is
commensurate with the reduced risk and reduced cost consequences of
potential nuclear accidents at CR-3. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes
that granting the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to
the health and safety of the public.
C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect DEF's ability to physically secure the site or protect special
nuclear material. Physical security measures at CR-3 are not affected
by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption is
consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present if
the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable assurance that adequate
funds will be available to stabilize conditions and cover onsite
cleanup costs associated with site decontamination, following an
accident that results in the release of a significant amount of
radiological material. As explained in section III of this document,
because CR-3 is permanently shut down and defueled, the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents or other credible events at CR-3
cannot possibly exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. The licensee has performed site-specific analyses of highly
unlikely, beyond-design-basis zirconium fire accidents involving the
stored irradiated fuel in the SFP. The analyses show that as of
September 26, 2013, the probabilities of such an accident are minimal.
The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirm this
conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that DEF's proposed $50 million level of
onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
CR-3 site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the staff concludes
that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary
to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the permanently
shutdown and defueled CR-3 reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated. The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee
were required to continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of
$1.06 billion, the associated insurance premiums would be in excess of
those necessary and commensurate with the radiological contamination
risks posed by the site. In addition, such insurance levels would be
significantly in excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities
that have been granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that DEF's compliance with the existing rule
would result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly
in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC approval of the exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion from
further environmental analysis, after first finding that the category
of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment. Specifically, the exemption is
categorically excluded from further analysis under Sec. 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation in Chapter I of 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (1) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (2) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (3) there is no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (4) there is no
significant construction impact; (5) there is no significant increase
in the potential for or consequences from
[[Page 18656]]
radiological accidents; and (6) the requirements from which an
exemption is sought involve: Surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements.
Utilizing the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the NRC has
determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration because reducing the licensee's
onsite property damage insurance for CR-3 does not: (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted
financial protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of CR-3.
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite;
and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not
associated with construction, so there is no significant construction
impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e.,
potential amount of radiation in an accident), nor mitigation.
Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would be
no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties,
cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region. The
requirement for onsite property damage insurance may be viewed as
involving surety, insurance, or indemnity matters.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
V. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the requested exemption is authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEF
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), to permit the
licensee to reduce its onsite property damage insurance to a level of
$50 million.
The exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of March 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John R. Tappert,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016-07305 Filed 3-30-16; 8:45 am]
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