[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13026-13030]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-05522]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0095; Notice 2]
NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015-01: Recommended Best
Practices for Protective Orders and Settlement Agreements in Civil
Litigation
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Final notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: NHTSA's ability to identify and define safety-related motor
vehicle defects relies in large part on manufacturers' self-reporting.
However, although federal regulations may require them to report
certain information to NHTSA, manufacturers do not always do so, or do
not do so in a timely manner. Additionally, the information a
manufacturer is required to report varies greatly depending on the
product and company size and purpose. Given these constraints, safety-
related information developed or discovered in private litigation is an
important resource for NHTSA.
This Enforcement Guidance Bulletin sets forth NHTSA's recommended
guiding principles and best practices to be utilized in the context of
private litigation. To the extent protective orders, settlement
agreements, or other confidentiality provisions prohibit information
obtained in private litigation from being transmitted to NHTSA, such
limitations are contrary to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, its state corollaries, and sound principles of public
policy. Although such restrictions are generally prohibited by
applicable rules and law, the Agency recommends that litigants include
a specific provision in any protective order or settlement agreement
that provides for disclosure of relevant motor vehicle safety
information to NHTSA, regardless of any other restrictions on the
disclosure or dissemination of such information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kara Fischer, Office of the Chief
Counsel, NCC-100, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-366-8726).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On September 21, 2015, NHTSA published a
proposed Enforcement Guidance Bulletin setting forth what the Agency
had identified as best practices for private litigants utilizing
protective orders and settlement agreements with confidentiality
provisions. Recognizing the public interest in this topic, the Agency
solicited public comment before issuing a final Enforcement Guidance
Bulletin. In response to this request for comment, the Agency received
124 public submissions. Although several comments were submitted after
the stated closing date of October 19, 2015, all comments submitted to
the Federal Register were considered in formulating this final
Enforcement Guidance Bulletin regarding the use of confidentiality
provisions in private litigation.
While the majority of comments fully supported the Enforcement
Guidance as drafted, some opined that the guidance was unnecessary as
manufacturers are already required to report certain information to the
Agency, and noted that NHTSA possesses the power to request additional
information from manufacturers through its investigative authority.
However, in order to fully exercise its regulatory authorities and
powers, the Agency must be made aware of the need to do so in the first
instance. Both Agency experience and that of several other commenters
provide several examples of a manufacturer failing to accurately and
timely report relevant safety-related information to NHTSA. The Agency
cannot request such information from the manufacturer if it is not
first made aware of potential underlying safety-related issues.
Several comments also suggested that NHTSA adopt specific language
that could be utilized in protective orders and settlement agreements.
Because the facts and circumstances leading to
[[Page 13027]]
protective orders and settlement agreements vary, the Agency realizes
that best practices may likewise vary depending on circumstance.
Therefore, to the extent this Guidance contains any ``suggested'' or
exemplar language, it is just that--suggested. The Agency is not
endorsing any specific format or language that could be utilized. Such
a determination is best made by the parties based on the particular
facts and circumstances of a case. In addition, it also falls squarely
within the ambit of judicial discretion to determine whether a
confidentiality provision meets the requirements embodied by applicable
law and policy.
A number of comments also discussed a legitimate concern regarding
the dissemination of proprietary information. Preliminarily, it should
be noted that protective orders and settlement agreements are not used
solely to prevent the dissemination of alleged proprietary information.
Although certain commenters disclaimed knowledge of such situations, a
number of commenters provided the Agency with specific statements and
examples from individuals who have been precluded from sharing any
information at all with NHTSA due to overbroad confidentiality
restrictions. Indeed, settlement agreements often require that the
parties not discuss the underlying facts or allegations of the case.
Therefore, the Agency respectfully disagrees with any notion that NHTSA
could request the information from the manufacturer after a plaintiff
or other party informs NHTSA of potential safety defects or concerns.
In issuing this guidance, the Agency is not requesting or
advocating for the submission or provision of any particular
information or documentation in every case. However, in matters that
concern the safety of the American driving public and pedestrians,
entities and individuals must be permitted to disclose relevant
information to the Agency commanded by Congress to ensure that safety.
Private litigants should tailor the use of confidentiality provisions
in a way that protects legitimate proprietary interests while still
allowing for the provision of relevant information to NHTSA; the
parties themselves are in the best position to determine how that can
be accomplished. Should the parties reach an impasse, they can of
course make application to the court for appropriate relief. Given the
global interest in protecting and promoting public safety, the Agency
is confident that private litigants can and will agree on appropriate
processes or procedures that may be implemented to address any concerns
regarding the dissemination of proprietary information.
Several commenters also proposed expanding this guidance to allow
for broader sharing of information and documents discovered through
litigation. While it is true that entities and individuals other than
NHTSA may have an interest in safety-related information generated in
litigation, the focus of this guidance is solely the disclosure of
safety information to NHTSA pursuant to its authority and
responsibility. This Enforcement Guidance does that and, hence, is
appropriately tailored.
The Agency reiterates that in issuing this Enforcement Guidance,
NHTSA is not imposing new or additional reporting requirements. As
previously explained, this Enforcement Guidance Bulletin is fully
supported by existing law and policy. This Guidance communicates the
Agency's position that confidentiality provisions should not be used to
prevent safety-related information from reaching NHTSA. The Agency is
not endorsing or condoning any particular approach--judicial,
legislative, regulatory, or otherwise.
In light of the foregoing, and after giving full consideration to
the concerns and views expressed in the submitted comments, and as
informed by the Agency's judgment and expertise, NHTSA provides the
following Enforcement Guidance for private litigants pertaining to the
use of confidentiality provisions in protective orders and settlement
agreements:
Enforcement Guidance
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (``NHTSA'' or
``the Agency'') is tasked with, among other things, setting Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (``FMVSS''), identifying and ensuring
the remedy of safety-related defects, and monitoring and enforcing
compliance with these standards to safeguard the well-being of the
American public. The only way the Agency can fully achieve these
objectives is if it has access to all necessary information, including
information discovered or identified in private litigation.
NHTSA's ability to identify and define safety-related motor vehicle
defects relies in large part on timely and accurate reporting by
manufacturers, suppliers, and various parties throughout the industry,
whether by statutory or regulatory requirement or pursuant to
compulsory process. Although federal law may require industry
participants to report certain information to NHTSA, they do not always
do so, or do not do so in a timely manner. Additionally, the type of
information an industry participant is required to report varies
greatly depending on the product and company size and purpose. While
certain entities are required to report both deaths and injuries
resulting from the use of their products, others only must report
deaths. In those cases, in the absence of a fatal incident a
potentially defective product may not come to NHTSA's attention until
numerous people have sustained serious injury--if it ever reaches NHTSA
at all.
Given these constraints, safety-related information developed or
discovered in private litigation is an important resource for NHTSA.
Yet confidentiality restrictions imposed as part of a protective order
or settlement agreement in private litigation--whether court-sanctioned
or privately negotiated--often prevent parties from providing
information about potentially dangerous products to the Agency. As many
scholarly articles have noted, and as history has borne out, such
restrictions have kept critical safety information out of the hands of
both regulators and the public. As a matter of law and sound public
policy, NHTSA cannot countenance this situation.
It is well-established that confidentiality provisions, protective
orders, and the sealing of cases are appropriate litigation tools in
some circumstances. In most instances, however, the interests of public
health and safety will trump any confidentiality interests that might
be implicated. In matters that concern the safety of the American
driving public and pedestrians, it is important that entities and
individuals are not prevented from providing relevant information to
the very Agency tasked with ensuring that safety.
To the extent protective orders, settlement agreements, or other
confidentiality provisions prohibit motor vehicle safety-related
information from being transmitted to NHTSA, such limitations are
contrary to established principles of public policy and law, including
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state
corollaries which require a showing of good cause to impose
confidentiality. The recent General Motors ignition switch and Takata
airbag recalls are but two examples of how vital early identification
of motor vehicle risks or defects is for the safety and welfare of the
American public.
To further the important public policies discussed above, the
Agency encourages and recommends that parties and courts seek to
include a
[[Page 13028]]
provision in any protective order or settlement agreement that--despite
other restrictions on confidentiality-- specifically allows for
disclosure of relevant motor vehicle safety information to NHTSA and
other appropriate government authorities.
I. Legal and Policy Background
``Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no
longer solely the parties' case, but also the public's case.'' Brown v.
Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992). As a
general rule, the public is permitted ``access to litigation documents
and information produced during discovery.'' Phillips v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there is a
presumptive right of public access under the federal rules, courts have
discretion upon a showing of ``good cause'' to restrict access to
documents or information ``to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.'' Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c)(1). As the Seventh Circuit has stated, Rule 26(c)'s good cause
requirement means that, ``[a]s a general proposition, pretrial
discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist
for denying the public access to the proceedings.'' Am. Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978); see also,
Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir.
1988). Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining when to issue
a protective order and the degree and scope of protection required.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).
General allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples
or articulated reasoning, however, are insufficient to warrant such an
order. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th
Cir. 1992); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d
Cir. 1986). Rather, the burden is on the party seeking protection from
disclosure to ``allege specific prejudice or harm'' that will result if
the protective order is not granted. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1867 (2012); In re Terra Intern., Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th
Cir. 1998) (good cause requirement contemplates a particular and
specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from conclusory
statements); Glenmeade Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir.
1995) (generalized allegations of injury insufficient to satisfy the
good cause requirement for issuance of protective order); Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949, 954 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1979)
(party seeking protective order bears burden of making ``good cause''
showing that the information being sought falls within scope of Rule
26(c) and that moving party will be harmed by its disclosure).
Even if a court concludes that such harm will result from
disclosure, it still must proceed to balance ``the public and private
interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.''
Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. See Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 308
(3d Cir. 2005) (``[A] court always must consider the public interest
when deciding whether to impose a protective order.''); Glenmede Trust
Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (``[T]he analysis [of
good cause] should always reflect a balancing of private versus public
interests.''). In doing so, courts consider a number of factors,
including:
(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2)
whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or
for an improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information
will cause a party embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is
being sought over information important to public health and safety;
(5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote
fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party benefitting from the
order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and (7)
whether the case involves issues important to the public.
Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483. See also In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d at 424.
The public's interest in access to court records is strongest when
the records concern public health or safety. See, e.g., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180-81 (6th Cir.
1983) (vacating district court's sealing of court records involving the
content of tar and nicotine in cigarettes and emphasizing that the
public had particularly strong interest in the court records at issue
because the ``litigation potentially involves the health of citizens
who have an interest in knowing the accurate `tar' and nicotine content
of the various brands of cigarettes on the market''); see also United
States v. General Motors, 99 FRD. 610, 612 (D.D.C. 1983) (the ``greater
the public's interest in the case the less acceptable are restraints on
the public's access to the proceedings''); In re Air Crash at
Lexington, Ky., August 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2009 WL 16836289,
at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 16, 2009) (noting the ``public has an interest in
ascertaining what evidence and records the . . . Court [has] relied
upon in reaching [its] decisions,'' and that ``the public interest in a
plane crash that resulted in the deaths of forty-nine people is quite
strong, as is the public interest in air safety''). In balancing the
privacy interests of the party seeking protection, a court ``must
consider the need for public dissemination, in order to alert other
consumers to potential dangers posed by the product.'' Koval v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 694, 699, 610 NE.2d 1199, 1202 (Com. Pl.
1990) (citing Hendricks v. Jeep Corp. (D. Mont. June 3, 1986), case No.
CV-82-092-M-PGH (unreported) and United States v. Hooker Chemicals &
Plastics Corp., 90 FRD. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)).
A number of states have enacted ``Sunshine in Litigation'' acts,
which thrust the interests of public health and safety into the
forefront by preventing parties from concealing safety hazards through
settlement agreements or protective orders. Some, such as Florida,
broadly forbid courts from entering protective orders that may have the
``purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any information
concerning a public hazard'' or that ``may be useful to members of the
public in protecting themselves from injury.'' Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec.
69.081 (West 2015). Others, such as Texas, establish a presumption that
court records--including all documents filed with the court, unfiled
settlement agreements, and unfiled discovery documents ``concerning
matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public
health or safety''--are open to the general public; records may be
sealed only upon a showing that there is a specific, serious, and
substantial interest in nondisclosure which clearly outweighs the
presumption of public access and any probable effect on public health
or safety. Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a.
A federal corollary introduced on May 14, 2015, currently pending
before the House of Representatives, H.R. 2336 (114th Congress, 2015-
2017), would create a presumption against protective orders and the
sealing of settlements and cases ``in which the pleadings state facts
that are relevant to the protection of public health or safety.'' The
presumption would control unless a party asks a judge to find that a
specific and substantial interest in maintaining secrecy outweighs the
public health and safety interest and that the order is no broader than
necessary to protect the privacy interest asserted. Id. It would also
prohibit a court from approving or enforcing a provision that restricts
a party from disclosing public health or safety information to any
federal or state agency with authority to enforce laws regulating an
activity related to such information. Id.
[[Page 13029]]
Several states have taken a broader approach, enacting statutes and
court rules to address the question of whether or not courts should
enforce confidentiality agreements, regardless of the subject matter.
The common theme of these statutes is a balancing of interests. For
example, drawing upon federal precedent requiring consideration of the
public interest at stake, Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32 directs
courts considering shielding requests to first determine whether the
interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates and to ``fashion
the least restrictive exception from disclosure consistent with privacy
interests.'' Idaho R. Admin. 32(f). See also Mich. Ct. R. 8.119(F)
(records may be sealed upon showing of good cause and that no less
restrictive means are available to protect the interest asserted);
D.S.C. LCivR 5.03 (party must state why sealing is necessary and
explain why less restrictive alternatives will not afford adequate
protection). Indiana's legislature went a step further, requiring an
affirmative showing that a public interest will be protected by sealing
a record, and mandating that records shall be unsealed as soon as
possible after the reason for sealing them no longer exists. Ind. Code
Sec. 5-14-3-5.5 (2011). See also, Richard Rosen, Settlement Agreements
in Com. Disputes, n. 103 Sec. 10.04 (2015) (citing to statutory
provisions in California, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah). Although the
specifics of each provision vary, all are consistent with the notion
that the safety of the public should be given considerable weight in
determining whether to restrict access to information.
Basic contract principles also dictate that the public health and
safety concern should be of paramount significance in drafting and
approving protective orders and settlement agreements. While parties
are generally free to contract as they see fit, ``courts will not
hesitate to declare void as against public policy contractual
provisions which clearly tend to the injury of the public in some
way.'' 17A C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 281 (2015) (internal citations
omitted); see Thomas James Associates, Inc. v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60, 66
(2d Cir. 1996) (``[C]ourts must not be timid in voiding agreements
which tend to injure the public good or contravene some established
interest of society.'') (internal quotations and citations omitted);
see also Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass'n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86, 415 A.2d
1156 (1980) (citing text for general proposition that courts have broad
power to declare agreements violative of public policy).
``While the term `public policy' lacks precise definition, . . . it
may be stated generally as a legal principle which holds that no one
may lawfully do that which has a tendency to injure the public welfare.
. . . '' O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld and Kempster, 537 NE.2d 730
(Ill. 1989). ``An agreement is against public policy if it is injurious
to the interests of the public, contravenes some established interest
of society, violates some public statute, is against good morals, tends
to interfere with the public welfare or safety, or is at war with the
interests of society or is in conflict with the morals of the time.'' E
& B Mktg. Enterprises, Inc. v. Ryan, 568 NE.2d 339, 209 Ill. App. 3d
626 (1st Dist. 1991). See also Johnson v. Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc., 438
NW.2d 162 (N.D. 1989) (``Public policy, with respect to contract
provisions, is a principle of law whereby a contract provision will not
be enforced if it has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good.''). An agreement is unenforceable if the
interest in its enforcement is outweighed by the public policy harmed
by enforcement of the agreement. 17A C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 281
(citation omitted).
In fact, the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act specifically
codifies this concept: ``Any portion of an agreement or contract which
has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any
information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be
useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury
which may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public
policy, and may not be enforced.'' Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 69.081(4). See
also Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 16-55-122 (2011) (rendering void any
settlement provision purporting to restrict disclosure of an
environmental hazard). Although the Florida provision broadly addresses
any contract, this notion is particularly applicable in the context of
protective orders or settlement agreement terms that prevent litigants
from disclosing information to NHTSA.
The good cause requirements found in Rule 26 and related state
provisions, and the doctrines underlying NHTSA's own regulations all
advance the important public policy of maintaining and preserving the
health and welfare of the public. This strong policy has been realized
and enforced by the refusal of many courts and litigants to engage in
protective orders or settlement agreements that keep regulators and the
public in the dark about potential safety hazards. See Culinary Foods,
Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ill.), clarified 153 F.R.D.
614 (1993) (any information as to whether products liability
defendant's products were dangerous, and whether defendant knew of
dangers and either failed to take action or attempted to conceal
information, would not be encompassed by protective order under
discovery rule); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 87
(D.N.J. 1986) (``Discovery may well reveal that a product is defective
and its continued use dangerous to the consuming public. . . . It is
inconceivable to this court that under such circumstances the public
interest is not a vital factor to be considered in determining whether
to further conceal that information and whether a court should be a
party to that concealment.''); Toe v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (Iowa
District Court, Polk County, No. CL 106914) (Order on Defendant's
Motion to Continue Protective Order, Jan. 18, 2012) (unsealing
transcript where confidential documents related to tire defect were
discussed). See also, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Elk Run Coal Co.,
Inc., 291 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.W.Va. 2013) (good cause did not exist for
issuance of protective order in environmental group's suit against
company because there was no specific showing of identifiable harm
company would suffer and case involved issues of importance to public
health and safety); In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in
Oregon, 661 F.3d 417 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1867 (2011)
(private interest in nondisclosure was not outweighed by public
interests in protecting public safety).
II. Recommended Best Practices
Consistent with the foregoing legal and policy background, it is
NHTSA's position that protective orders and settlement agreements
should not be used to withhold critical safety information from the
Agency, either intentionally or unintentionally. This is not to say
that parties should not enter into these agreements. To the contrary,
these tools are often necessary to promote full and complete
disclosure, to prevent abuses of the discovery process, and to protect
legitimate privacy and proprietary interests. However, as explained
above, they cannot be used to preclude the disclosure of relevant
safety-related information to regulatory agencies and other government
authorities. To do so is contrary to the underlying law and policies
inherent in Rule 26 and state corollaries, and against sound public
policy.
NHTSA recommends that all parties seek to include a provision in
any protective order or settlement agreement
[[Page 13030]]
that--despite whatever other restrictions on confidentiality are
imposed, and whether entered into by consent or judicial fiat--
specifically allows for disclosure of relevant motor vehicle safety
information to NHTSA and other applicable governmental authorities.
Such a provision could be stated generically, providing that nothing in
the order or agreement shall be construed to prohibit either party from
disclosing information to a regulatory agency or governmental entity
who has an interest in the subject matter of the underlying suit. For
example, the provision could state that ``discovery material may only
be disclosed to . . . governmental entities with an interest in the
public safety hazards involving [description of product/vehicle].'' Or,
it could specifically address NHTSA's interest, as contemplated by the
recent NHTSA Consent Order requiring Chrysler to ``develop and
implement a plan ensuring that, in safety-related litigation, FCA US
uses its best efforts to include in any protective order, settlement
agreement, or equivalent, a provision that explicitly allows FCA US to
provide information and documents to NHTSA.'' See In re: FCA US LLC,
AQ14-003, July 24, 2015 Consent Order, Attachment A, p. 27 at ]
(B)(12), available at www.safercar.gov/rs/chrysler/pddfs/FCA_Consent_Order.pdf. Private litigants should tailor the use of
confidentiality provisions in a way that protects legitimate
proprietary interests while still allowing for the provision of
relevant information to NHTSA. The Agency is not endorsing any
particular language that should be utilized; the parties themselves are
in the best position to determine how that can be accomplished. Given
the global interest in protecting and promoting public safety, the
Agency is confident that in employing the use of confidentiality
provisions, private litigants can and will agree on appropriate
processes or procedures that may be implemented to address any concerns
regarding the dissemination of proprietary information.
Whatever the language, confidentiality agreements and protective
orders should not be utilized to prevent the parties from providing
information that implicates public safety to the very entity charged
with ensuring and protecting that safety. Instead, such orders and
agreements should clearly authorize and facilitate the disclosure of
safety-related information to NHTSA. Such a provision is consistent
with, and in some cases mandated by, federal and state statutory
schemes and regulations and applicable case law, and is wholly in line
with principles of sound public policy.
Applicability/Legal Statement: This Enforcement Guidance Bulletin
sets forth NHTSA's current interpretation and thinking on this topic
and guiding principles and best practices to be utilized in the context
of private litigation. This Bulletin is not a final agency action and
is intended as guidance only. This Bulletin is not intended, nor can it
be relied upon, to create any rights enforceable by any party against
NHTSA, the Department of Transportation, or the United States.
Moreover, these recommended practices do not establish any defense to
any violations of the statutes and regulations that NHTSA administers.
This Bulletin may be revised in writing without notice to reflect
changes in NHTSA's evaluation and analysis, or to clarify and update
text.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30101, et seq.; delegations of authority at
49 CFR 1.95(a), 501.2(a)(1), 501.5.
Issued: February 29, 2016.
Mark R. Rosekind,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2016-05522 Filed 3-10-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P