[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 242 (Thursday, December 17, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78776-78788]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-31808]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-271; NRC-2015-0111]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting 
exemptions in response to a request from Entergy Nuclear Operations, 
Inc. (ENO or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP) 
requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to 
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and reduce the 
scope of the onsite EP activities at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station (VY), based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result 
in an offsite radiological release at the decommissioning nuclear power 
reactor. Provisions would still exist for offsite agencies to take 
protective actions, using a comprehensive emergency management plan 
(CEMP) to protect public health and safety, if protective actions were 
needed in the event of a very unlikely accident that could challenge 
the safe storage of spent fuel.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0111 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0111. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each

[[Page 78777]]

document referenced (if that document is available in ADAMS) is 
provided the first time that a document is referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Kim, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-4125; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The VY facility is a decommissioning power reactor located in the 
town of Vernon, Windham County, Vermont. The licensee, ENO, is the 
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for VY. The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in 
effect.
    By letter dated January 12, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15013A426), 
ENO submitted, to the NRC, a certification in accordance with sections 
50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.82(a)(1)(ii) of title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR), indicating that it had permanently ceased power 
operations at VY and had permanently defueled the VY reactor vessel, 
respectively. The licensee has not operated the VY plant since December 
29, 2014. As a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and pursuant 
to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), ENO is no longer authorized to operate the VY 
reactor or emplace fuel into the VY reactor vessel, but is still 
authorized to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel at the site. 
Irradiated fuel is currently stored onsite at VY in a spent fuel pool 
(SFP) and in an independent spent fuel storage installation.
    During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water 
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the 
reactor by generating steam. The steam system, operating at high 
temperatures and pressures, transfers this heat to the main turbine 
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios 
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports for operating power 
reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems, which could 
affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe 
postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of 
fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at 
VY and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such 
accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, steam system, 
turbine generator, and supporting systems are no longer in operation 
and have no function related to the storage of the spent fuel. 
Therefore, EP provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or 
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, steam system, turbine generator, or 
supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    Since VY is permanently shutdown and defueled, the only design 
basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological 
release at VY is the fuel handling accident (FHA). Analysis performed 
by ENO showed that 17 days after shutdown, the radiological consequence 
of the FHA would not exceed the limits established by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines 
(PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. Based on the time that VY has 
been permanently shutdown (approximately 11 months), there is no longer 
any possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis 
accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed 
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory 
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is 
permanently shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is 
authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are 
no longer necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, 
ENO must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then can ENO 
modify the VY emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated 
with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of VY.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated March 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14080A141), 
``Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E,'' ENO requested exemptions from certain EP requirements 
of 10 CFR part 50 for VY. More specifically, ENO requested exemptions 
from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and 
offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power reactors; from 
certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment 
of plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for 
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, which establish the elements that make up 
the content of emergency plans. In letters dated August 29, 2014 and 
October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14246A176, and ML14297A159, 
respectively), ENO provided responses to the NRC staff's requests for 
additional information concerning the proposed exemptions.
    The information provided by ENO included justifications for each 
exemption requested. The exemptions requested by ENO would eliminate 
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency 
plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under 
the requirements of 44 CFR part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite EP 
activities. The licensee stated that the application of all of the 
standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 
CFR part 50, appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response 
capability, based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite 
radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the 
permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared to an operating 
facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for a very unlikely 
accident that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at VY, 
provisions exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using 
a CEMP under the National Preparedness System to protect the health and 
safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an 
emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and Maintaining Emergency 
Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the 
foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United 
States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-
informed planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels 
of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use 
in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be 
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific 
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and 
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be

[[Page 78778]]

coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards 
planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel 
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are 
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, 
current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor 
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release 
from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. The reduced 
risk is largely the result of the low frequency of credible events that 
could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced decay heat and 
reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay. The NRC's 
NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR 
[Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently 
Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 31, 1997 (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML082260098) and NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 
28, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for 
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by 
the assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite 
radiological release is significantly less than that for an operating 
power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by ENO, have 
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power 
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, for previous permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors, the basis for the NRC staff's approval of the 
exemptions from certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's 
demonstration that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis 
accidents would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, and (2) 
in the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a 
loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, 
there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, 
and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective 
actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the 
public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at VY, the licensee provided 
analysis demonstrating that 17 days following permanent shutdown, the 
radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident 
with potential for offsite radiological release (the FHA) will not 
exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
Therefore, because VY has been permanently shutdown for approximately 
11 months, there is no longer any design-basis accident that would 
warrant an offsite radiological emergency plan meeting the requirements 
of 10 CFR Part 50.
    With respect to beyond design-basis accidents at VY, the licensee 
analyzed a drain down of the spent fuel pool water that would 
effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates 
that at 15.4 months after shutdown, there would be at least 10 hours 
after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting fuel 
assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900 
degrees Celsius, the temperature used to assess the potential onset of 
fission product release. The analysis conservatively assumed the heat 
up time starts when the spent fuel pool has been completely drained, 
although it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an 
incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider 
the period of time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water 
inventory until cooling is lost.
    Based on precedent exemptions, the site-specific analysis should 
show that there is sufficient time following a loss of SFP coolant 
inventory until the onset of fuel damage to implement onsite mitigation 
of the loss of SFP coolant inventory and if necessary, to implement 
offsite protective actions. To meet this criterion, the staff accepted, 
in precedent exemptions, that the time should exceed 10 hours from the 
loss of coolant until the fuel temperature reaches 900 degrees Celsius 
([deg]C), assuming no air cooling.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and 
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) 
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of 
the ENO EP exemptions is described in SECY-14-0125, ``Request by 
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency 
Planning Requirements,'' dated November 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14227A711). The Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to 
grant the exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-14-
0125, dated March 2, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15061A516). 
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by ENO and the NRC 
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-14-0125 
and summarized in a table at the end of this document. The staff's 
detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP 
exemptions, requested by ENO, are provided in the NRC staff's safety 
evaluation, which is enclosed in an NRC letter dated December 10, 2015 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15180A054).

A. Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, 
section IV, which would allow ENO to revise the VY Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station. 
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, 
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, 
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff 
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will 
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by 
law.

[[Page 78779]]

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    ENO provided analyses that show the radiological consequences of 
design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 
the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, formal offsite radiological 
emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are no longer needed for 
protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on 
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents that are still 
possible at VY.
    Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis 
accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the 
event sequences important to risk, at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors, are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to 
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different 
sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738, 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under 10 CFR part 50, a few 
months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The 
report further concludes that the change in risk, due to relaxation of 
offsite EP requirements, is small because the overall risk is low, and 
because even under current EP requirements for operating power 
reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation 
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All 
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological 
emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in 
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to 
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety.

C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by ENO only involve EP requirements under 
10 CFR part 50 and will allow ENO to revise the VY Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at VY are not affected by the 
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite 
EP activities at VY will not adversely affect ENO's ability to 
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. 
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common 
defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, are to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these 
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with the 
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These 
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite 
radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section III of this document, because VY 
is permanently shutdown and defueled, there is no longer a risk of 
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident; and the risk 
of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-
basis accident is greatly reduced, when compared to the risk at an 
operating power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks 
at VY, by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in 
NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions at VY; and has determined that 
the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented by VY. As 
indicated by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738 and 
more recently, for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 
Boiling Water Reactor'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), while other 
consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant 
decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, 
even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed. 
The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident involving a 
complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup 
analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows that 
within 15.4 months after shutdown, the time for the limiting fuel 
assembly to reach 900 degrees Celsius is 10 hours after the assemblies 
have been uncovered.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur, involves the very unlikely event where the SFP drains in such a 
way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heatup of 
the spent fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis 
accident shows that within 15.4 months after shutdown, more than 10 
hours would be available between the time the fuel is initially 
uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to 
begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees 
Fahrenheit (900 degrees C), which is the temperature associated with 
rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant 
radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include the 
period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water 
inventory until all cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified ENO's analyses and its calculations. The 
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested 
exemptions to ENO, there is no design-basis accident that will result 
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis 
accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat 
removal via all modes of heat transfer, there will be well over 10 
hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, 
at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore 
a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release 
were projected to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 
hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to 
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the 
health and safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours are available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the zirconium rapid

[[Page 78780]]

oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously 
granted exemptions, as it does with the ENO-requested EP exemptions, 
that if a minimum of 10 hours are available to initiate mitigative 
actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite 
authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then 
formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 
50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled power 
reactors.
    Additionally, in its letter to the NRC dated March 14, 2014, ENO 
described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in the event of 
a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for 
providing makeup water to the SFP include: Using existing plant systems 
for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on installed 
fire water pumps (one motor-driven and one diesel-driven) and service 
water; or an external strategy that uses an engine-driven emergency 
makeup pump to provide makeup to the SFP from the Cooling Tower No. 2 
deep basin. ENO further provides that designated on-shift staff is 
trained to implement such strategies and they have plans in place to 
mitigate the consequences of an event involving a catastrophic loss-of-
water inventory concurrently from the VY SFP. ENO will maintain its 
License Condition 3.N, ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition,'' for 
VY. This license condition requires VY to maintain its SFP inventory 
makeup strategies as discussed above. Considering the very low 
probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these 
diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and time to provide 
additional makeup or spray water to the SFP before the onset of any 
postulated offsite radiological release.
    For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff concludes that 
application of certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, as summarized in the table 
at the end of this document, is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of these regulations and, therefore, satisfies the special 
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). The staff further concludes 
that the exemptions granted by this action will maintain an acceptable 
level of emergency preparedness at VY and provide reasonable assurance 
that adequate offsite protective measures, if needed, can and will be 
taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP approach, in 
the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at the VY facility. 
Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue 
to be achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and 
the reduction in the scope of the onsite EP activities at VY, the 
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC 
staff's Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 
which was published on August 10, 2015 (80 FR 47960).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), that ENO's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end 
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants ENO exemptions from certain EP 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, as discussed and evaluated, in detail, in 
the staff's safety evaluation dated December 10, 2015. The exemptions 
are effective as of April 15, 2016.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of December, 2015.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
George A. Wilson,
Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

     Table of Exemptions Granted to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              10 CFR 50.47
10 CFR 50.47(b). The U.S. Nuclear        In the Statement of
 Regulatory Commission (NRC) is           Considerations (SOC) for the
 granting exemption from portions of      final rule for emergency
 the rule language that would otherwise   planning (EP) requirements for
 require offsite emergency response       independent spent fuel storage
 plans.                                   installations (ISFSIs) and for
                                          monitor retrievable storage
                                          (MRS) facilities (60 FR 32430;
                                          June 22, 1995), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning offsite EP for
                                          ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded
                                          that, ``the offsite
                                          consequences of potential
                                          accidents at an ISFSI or an
                                          MRS would not warrant
                                          establishing Emergency
                                          Planning Zones.''

[[Page 78781]]

 
                                         In a nuclear power reactor's
                                          permanently defueled state,
                                          the accident risks are more
                                          similar to an ISFSI or an MRS
                                          than an operating nuclear
                                          power plant. The EP program
                                          would be similar to that
                                          required for an ISFSI under
                                          section 72.32(a) of Title 10
                                          of the Code of Federal
                                          Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel
                                          stored in the spent fuel pool
                                          (SFP) has more than 5 years of
                                          decay time and would not
                                          change substantially when all
                                          the fuel is transferred from
                                          the SFP to an onsite ISFSI.
                                          Exemptions from offsite EP
                                          requirements have previously
                                          been approved when the site-
                                          specific analyses show that at
                                          least 10 hours are available
                                          from a partial drain-down
                                          event where cooling of the
                                          spent fuel is not effective
                                          until the hottest fuel
                                          assembly reaches the zirconium
                                          ignition temperature of 900
                                          degrees Celsius ([deg]C). The
                                          technical basis that underlies
                                          the approval of the exemption
                                          request is based partly on the
                                          analysis of a time period in
                                          which spent fuel stored in the
                                          SFP is unlikely to reach the
                                          zirconium ignition temperature
                                          in less than 10 hours. This
                                          time period is based on a
                                          heatup calculation, which uses
                                          several simplifying
                                          assumptions. Some of these
                                          assumptions are conservative
                                          (adiabatic conditions), while
                                          others are non-conservative
                                          (no oxidation below 900
                                          [deg]C). Weighing the
                                          conservatisms and non-
                                          conservatisms, the NRC staff
                                          judges that this calculation
                                          reasonably represents
                                          conditions that may occur in
                                          the event of an SFP accident.
                                         The NRC staff concluded that if
                                          10 hours were available to
                                          initiate mitigative actions,
                                          or if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          comprehensive emergency
                                          management plan (CEMP), formal
                                          offsite radiological emergency
                                          plans are not necessary for
                                          these permanently defueled
                                          nuclear power reactor
                                          licensees.
                                         As supported by the licensee's
                                          SFP analysis, the NRC staff
                                          believes an exemption from the
                                          requirements for formal
                                          offsite radiological emergency
                                          plans is justified for a
                                          zirconium fire scenario,
                                          considering the low likelihood
                                          of this event together with
                                          time available to take
                                          mitigative or protective
                                          actions between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire.
                                         The Entergy Nuclear Operations,
                                          Inc. (ENO or the licensee)
                                          analysis has demonstrated that
                                          17 days after shutdown the
                                          radiological consequences of
                                          design-basis-accidents (DBAs)
                                          will not exceed the limits of
                                          the U.S. Environmental
                                          Protection Agency's (EPA's)
                                          Protective Action Guides
                                          (PAGs) at the exclusion area
                                          boundary. This analysis also
                                          shows that 15.4 months after
                                          shutdown for an unlikely event
                                          of a beyond-DBA where the
                                          hottest fuel assembly
                                          adiabatic heatup occurs, 10
                                          hours are available to take
                                          mitigative or, if needed,
                                          offsite protective actions,
                                          using a CEMP from the time the
                                          fuel is uncovered until it
                                          reaches the auto-ignition
                                          temperature of 900 [deg]C.
                                         ENO furnished information
                                          concerning its SFP inventory
                                          makeup strategies. Several
                                          sources of makeup to the pool
                                          are available, such as the
                                          service water (SW) system,
                                          which has redundant pumping
                                          capability and power supplies
                                          to ensure alternative fuel
                                          pool makeup function. The SW
                                          system runs continuously, thus
                                          allowing for constant
                                          monitoring. Additionally,
                                          there are electric-driven and
                                          diesel-driven fire pumps that
                                          can supply makeup water to the
                                          SFP via the SW system or the
                                          fire water system. All sources
                                          discussed above take suction
                                          from the Connecticut River.
                                          The Vermont Yankee Nuclear
                                          Power Station (VY) also has an
                                          engine-driven emergency makeup
                                          pump capable of taking suction
                                          from the Cooling Tower No. 2
                                          deep basin to provide an
                                          alternate source of makeup
                                          water to the SFP.
                                         ENO further provides that
                                          designated on-shift staff is
                                          trained to implement such
                                          strategies and they have plans
                                          in place to mitigate the
                                          consequences of an event
                                          involving a catastrophic loss-
                                          of-water inventory
                                          concurrently from the VY SFP.
                                          ENO will maintain its License
                                          Condition 3.N, ``Mitigation
                                          Strategy License Condition,''
                                          for VY. This license condition
                                          requires VY to maintain its
                                          SFP inventory makeup
                                          strategies as discussed above.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 the need for Emergency Planning Zones
 (EPZs).

[[Page 78782]]

 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). The NRC is granting  Decommissioning power reactors
 exemption from portions of the rule      present a low likelihood of
 language that would otherwise require    any credible accident
 the need for an emergency operations     resulting in a radiological
 facility (EOF).                          release together with the time
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire. As such, an
                                          EOF would not be required. The
                                          ``nuclear island,'' control
                                          room, or other onsite location
                                          can provide for the
                                          communication and coordination
                                          with offsite organizations for
                                          the level of support required.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC is granting  Decommissioning power reactors
 exemption from portions of the rule      present a low likelihood of
 language that would otherwise require    any credible accident
 reference to formal offsite              resulting in a radiological
 radiological emergency response plans.   release together with the time
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire. As such,
                                          formal offsite radiological
                                          emergency response plans are
                                          not required.
                                         The Nuclear Energy Institute
                                          (NEI) document NEI 99-01,
                                          ``Development of Emergency
                                          Action Levels for Non-Passive
                                          Reactors'' (Revision 6), was
                                          found to be an acceptable
                                          method for development of
                                          emergency action levels (EALs)
                                          and was endorsed by the NRC in
                                          a letter dated March 28, 2013
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML12346A463). NEI 99-01
                                          provides EALs for non-passive
                                          operating nuclear power
                                          reactors, permanently defueled
                                          reactors and ISFSIs.
                                         The ENO requested a license
                                          amendment to revise its EAL
                                          scheme to NEI 99-01, Revision
                                          6 in a letter dated June 12,
                                          2014, ``Vermont Yankee
                                          Permanently Defueled Emergency
                                          Plan and Emergency Action
                                          Level Scheme'' (ADAMS
                                          Accession No. ML14168A302).
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 early notification of the public and a
 means to provide instructions to the
 public within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 prompt communications with the public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 information to be made available to
 the public on a periodic basis about
 how they will be notified and what
 their initial protective actions
 should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 the capability for monitoring offsite
 consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The NRC is          In the unlikely event of a SFP
 granting exemption from portions of      accident, the iodine isotopes,
 the rule language that would reduce      which contribute to an offsite
 the range of protective actions          dose from an operating reactor
 developed for emergency workers and      accident, are not present, so
 the public. Consideration of             potassium iodide distribution
 evacuation, sheltering, or the use of    would no longer serve as an
 potassium iodide will no longer be       effective or necessary
 necessary. Evacuation time estimates     supplemental protective
 (ETEs) will no longer need to be         action.
 developed or updated. Protective        In the SOC for the final rule
 actions for the ingestion exposure       for EP requirements for ISFSIs
 pathway EPZ will not need to be          and for MRS facilities (60 FR
 developed.                               32430), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning site-specific EP
                                          that includes evacuation of
                                          surrounding population for an
                                          ISFSI not at a reactor site,
                                          and concluded, ``The
                                          Commission does not agree that
                                          as a general matter emergency
                                          plans for an ISFSI must
                                          include evacuation planning.''
                                         The Commission also concluded
                                          that, ``the offsite
                                          consequences of potential
                                          accidents at an ISFSI or an
                                          MRS would not warrant
                                          establishing Emergency
                                          Planning Zones.'' (60 FR
                                          32435).
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b)(10).
 language that would otherwise require
 the establishment of a 10-mile radius
 plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50-
 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
 

[[Page 78783]]

 
 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV
 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      The EP rule published in the
 IV.1. The NRC is granting exemption      Federal Register (76 FR 72560;
 from portions of the rule language       November 23, 2011) amended
 that would otherwise require onsite      certain requirements in 10 CFR
 protective actions during hostile        part 50. Among the changes,
 action.                                  the definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' was added as an act
                                          directed toward a nuclear
                                          power plant or its personnel.
                                          This definition is based on
                                          the definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' provided in NRC
                                          Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
                                          Preparedness and Response
                                          Actions for Security-Based
                                          Events,'' dated July 18, 2005
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML051740058). NRC Bulletin
                                          2005-02 is not applicable to
                                          nuclear power reactors that
                                          have permanently ceased
                                          operations and have certified
                                          that fuel has been removed
                                          from the reactor vessel. ENO
                                          certified that it had
                                          permanently ceased operations
                                          at VY and that all fuel had
                                          been removed from the reactor
                                          vessel. Therefore, the
                                          enhancements for hostile
                                          actions required by the 2011
                                          EP Final Rule are not
                                          necessary for VY in its
                                          permanently shutdown and
                                          defueled status.
                                         Additionally, the NRC excluded
                                          non-power reactors from the
                                          definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' at the time of the
                                          2011 rulemaking because, as
                                          defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-
                                          power reactor is not
                                          considered a nuclear power
                                          reactor and a regulatory basis
                                          had not been developed to
                                          support the inclusion of non-
                                          power reactors in the
                                          definition of ``hostile
                                          action.'' Similarly, a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          or ISFSI is not a ``nuclear
                                          reactor,'' as defined in the
                                          NRC's regulations. Like a non-
                                          power reactor, a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          also has a lower likelihood of
                                          a credible accident resulting
                                          in radiological releases
                                          requiring offsite protective
                                          measures, than does an
                                          operating reactor.
                                         Although this analysis provides
                                          a justification for exempting
                                          VY from ``hostile action''
                                          related requirements, some EP
                                          requirements for security-
                                          based events are maintained.
                                          The classification of security-
                                          based events, notification of
                                          offsite authorities and
                                          coordination with offsite
                                          agencies under a CEMP concept
                                          are still required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.2. The NRC is granting exemption      50.47(b)(10).
 from portions of the rule language
 concerning the evacuation time
 analyses within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ for the licensee's initial
 application.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.3. The NRC is granting exemption      50, appendix E, section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require use of
 NRC-approved ETEs and updates to State
 and local governments when developing
 protective action strategies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.4. The NRC is granting exemption      50, appendix E, section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require licensees
 to update ETEs based on the most
 recent census data and submit the ETE
 analysis to the NRC prior to providing
 it to State and local governments for
 developing protective action
 strategies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.5. The NRC is granting exemption      50, appendix E, section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require licensees
 to estimate the EPZ permanent resident
 population changes once a year between
 decennial censuses.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.6. The NRC is granting exemption      50, appendix E, section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require the
 licensee to submit an updated ETE
 analysis to the NRC based on changes
 in the resident population that result
 in exceeding specific evacuation time
 increase criteria.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Based on the permanently
 IV.A.1. The NRC is granting exemption    shutdown and defueled status
 from the word ``operating'' in the       of the VY reactor, a
 requirement to describe the normal       decommissioning reactor is not
 plant organization.                      authorized to operate under 10
                                          CFR 50.82(a). Because the
                                          licensee cannot operate the
                                          reactor, the licensee does not
                                          have a ``plant operating
                                          organization.''
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      The number of staff at
 IV.A.3. The NRC is granting exemption    decommissioning sites is
 from the requirement to describe the     generally small but is
 licensee's headquarters personnel sent   commensurate with the need to
 to the site to augment the onsite        safely store spent fuel at the
 emergency response organization.         facility, in a manner that is
                                          protective of public health
                                          and safety. Decommissioning
                                          sites typically have a level
                                          of emergency response that
                                          does not require response by
                                          the licensee's headquarters
                                          personnel.

[[Page 78784]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Although the likelihood of
 IV.A.4. The NRC is granting exemption    events that would result in
 from portions of the rule language       doses in excess of the EPA
 that would otherwise require the         PAGs to the public beyond the
 licensee to identify a position and      exclusion area boundary is
 function within its organization,        extremely low based on the
 which will carry the responsibility      permanently shutdown and
 for making offsite dose projections.     defueled status of the
                                          reactor, the licensee is still
                                          required to determine if a
                                          radiological release is
                                          occurring. If a release is
                                          occurring, then the licensee
                                          staff should promptly
                                          communicate that information
                                          to offsite authorities for
                                          their consideration. The
                                          offsite organizations are
                                          responsible for deciding what,
                                          if any, protective actions
                                          should be taken based on a
                                          CEMP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      VY has performed an on-shift
 IV.A.5. The NRC is granting exemption    staffing analysis, addressing
 from the requirement for the licensee    SFP mitigating strategies,
 to identify individuals with special     including review of collateral
 qualifications, both licensee            duties. The specific event
 employees and non-employees, for         scenario utilized for the
 coping with emergencies.                 staffing analysis involves a
                                          catastrophic loss-of-water
                                          inventory in the SFP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.A.7. The NRC is granting exemption    50, appendix E, section IV.1.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require a
 description of the assistance expected
 from State, local, and Federal
 agencies for coping with a hostile
 action.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Offsite emergency measures are
 IV.A.8. The NRC is granting exemption    limited to support provided by
 from the requirement to identify the     local police, fire
 State and local officials for ordering   departments, and ambulance and
 protective actions and evacuations.      hospital services, as
                                          appropriate. Due to the low
                                          probability of DBAs or other
                                          credible events to exceed the
                                          EPA PAGs, protective actions
                                          such as evacuation should not
                                          be required, but could be
                                          implemented at the discretion
                                          of offsite authorities using a
                                          CEMP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      The duties of the on-shift
 IV.A.9. The NRC is granting exemption    personnel at a decommissioning
 from the requirement for the licensee    reactor facility are not as
 to provide an analysis demonstrating     complicated and diverse as
 that on-shift personnel are not          those for an operating power
 assigned responsibilities that would     reactor. Responsibilities
 prevent performance of their assigned    should be well defined in the
 emergency plan functions.                emergency plan and procedures,
                                          regularly tested through
                                          drills and exercises audited
                                          and inspected by the licensee
                                          and the NRC.
                                         The NRC staff considered the
                                          similarity between the
                                          staffing levels at a
                                          permanently shutdown and
                                          defueled reactor and staffing
                                          levels at an operating power
                                          reactor site. The minimal
                                          systems and equipment needed
                                          to maintain the spent nuclear
                                          fuel in the SFP or in a dry
                                          cask storage system in a safe
                                          condition require minimal
                                          personnel and is governed by
                                          Technical Specifications. In
                                          the EP final rule published in
                                          the Federal Register (76 FR
                                          72560; November 23, 2011), the
                                          NRC concluded that the
                                          staffing analysis requirement
                                          was not necessary for non-
                                          power reactor licensees due to
                                          the small staffing levels
                                          required to operate the
                                          facility.
                                         The NRC staff also examined the
                                          actions required to mitigate
                                          the very low probability of
                                          beyond-design-basis events for
                                          the SFP. In a letter dated
                                          April 24, 2014, ``Technical
                                          Specification Proposed Changes
                                          No. 309, Defueled Technical
                                          Specifications and Revised
                                          License Conditions for
                                          Permanently Defueled
                                          Condition--Supplement 1''
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML14119A101), ENO withdrew the
                                          proposed changes to the
                                          Mitigating Strategies License
                                          Condition 3.N. This license
                                          condition requires VY to
                                          maintain its SFP inventory
                                          makeup strategies as discussed
                                          above.
                                         VY has performed an on-shift
                                          staffing analysis, addressing
                                          SFP mitigating strategies,
                                          including review of collateral
                                          duties. The specific event
                                          scenario utilized for the
                                          staffing analysis involves a
                                          catastrophic loss-of-water
                                          inventory in the SFP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          part 50, appendix E, section
                                          IV.1.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      NEI 99-01 was found to be an
 IV.B.1. The NRC is granting exemption    acceptable method for the
 from portions of the rule language       development of EALs. No
 that would otherwise require offsite     offsite protective actions are
 EALs and offsite protective measures     anticipated to be necessary,
 and associate offsite monitoring for     so classification above the
 the emergency conditions.                alert level is no longer
In addition, the NRC is granting          required, which is consistent
 exemption from portions of the rule      with ISFSI facilities.
 language that would otherwise require   As discussed previously, ENO
 EALs based on hostile action..           requested a license amendment
                                          to revise its EAL scheme to
                                          NEI 99-01, Revision 6, in a
                                          letter dated June 12, 2014,
                                          ``Vermont Yankee Permanently
                                          Defueled Emergency Plan and
                                          Emergency Action Level
                                          Scheme'' (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML14168A302). Before ENO can
                                          amend its EAL scheme to
                                          reflect the risk commensurate
                                          with power reactor that has
                                          been permanently shut down and
                                          defueled, ENO needs an
                                          exemption from the requirement
                                          for the site area emergency
                                          and general emergency
                                          classifications.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          part 50, appendix E, section
                                          IV.1.

[[Page 78785]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Containment parameters do not
 IV.C.1. The NRC is granting exemption    provide an indication of the
 from portions of the rule language       conditions at a defueled
 that would otherwise require EALs        facility and emergency core
 based on operating reactor concerns,     cooling systems are no longer
 such as offsite radiation monitoring,    required. Other indications,
 pressure in containment, and the         such as SFP level or
 response of the emergency core cooling   temperature, can be used at
 system.                                  site where there is spent fuel
In addition, the NRC is striking          in the SFP.
 language that would otherwise require   In the SOC for the final rule
 offsite EALs of a site area emergency    for EP requirements for ISFSIs
 and a general emergency..                and for MRS facilities (60 FR
                                          32430), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning a general emergency
                                          at an ISFSI and MRS, and
                                          concluded that, ``. . . an
                                          essential element of a General
                                          Emergency is that a release
                                          can be reasonably expected to
                                          exceed EPA PAGs exposure
                                          levels off site for more than
                                          the immediate site area.''
                                         The probability of a condition
                                          at a defueled facility
                                          reaching the level above an
                                          emergency classification of
                                          alert is very low. In the
                                          event of an accident at a
                                          defueled facility that meets
                                          the conditions for exemption
                                          from formal EP requirements,
                                          there will be available time
                                          for event mitigation and, if
                                          necessary, implementation of
                                          offsite protective actions
                                          using a CEMP.
                                         NEI 99-01 was found to be an
                                          acceptable method for
                                          development of EALs. No
                                          offsite protective actions are
                                          anticipated to be necessary,
                                          so classification above the
                                          alert level is no longer
                                          required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      In the EP rule published in the
 IV.C.2. The NRC is granting exemption    November 23, 2011, Federal
 from portions of the rule language       Register (76 FR 72560),
 that would otherwise require the         nuclear power reactor
 licensee to assess, classify, and        licensees were required to
 declare an emergency condition within    assess, classify and declare
 15 minutes.                              an emergency condition within
                                          15 minutes. Non-power reactors
                                          do not have the same potential
                                          impact on public health and
                                          safety as do power reactors,
                                          and as such, non-power reactor
                                          licensees do not require
                                          complex offsite emergency
                                          response activities and are
                                          not required to assess,
                                          classify and declare an
                                          emergency condition within 15
                                          minutes. An SFP and an ISFSI
                                          are also not nuclear power
                                          reactors, as defined in the
                                          NRC's regulations and do not
                                          have the same potential impact
                                          on public health and safety,
                                          as do power reactors. A
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          has a low likelihood of a
                                          credible accident resulting in
                                          radiological releases
                                          requiring offsite protective
                                          measures. For these reasons,
                                          the NRC staff concludes that a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          should not be required to
                                          assess, classify and declare
                                          an emergency condition within
                                          15 minutes.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.D.1. The NRC is granting exemption    50.47(b) and 10 CFR
 from portions of the rule language       50.47(b)(10).
 that would otherwise require the
 licensee to reach agreement with
 local, State, and Federal officials
 and agencies for prompt notification
 of protective measures or evacuations.
In addition, the NRC is granting
 exemption from identifying the
 associated titles of officials to be
 notified for each agency within the
 EPZs.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.D.2. The NRC is granting exemption    50, appendix E, section
 from the requirement for the licensee    IV.D.1.
 to annually disseminate general
 information on EP and evacuations
 within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
In addition, the NRC is granting
 exemption for the need for signage or
 other measures to address transient
 populations in the event of an
 accident.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      While the capability needs to
 IV.D.3. The NRC is granting exemption    exist for the notification of
 from portions of the rule language       offsite government agencies
 that would otherwise require the         within a specified time
 licensee to have the capability to       period, previous exemptions
 make notifications to State and local    have allowed for extending the
 government agencies within 15 minutes    State and local government
 of declaring an emergency.               agencies' notification time up
                                          to 60 minutes, based on the
                                          site-specific justification
                                          provided.
                                         ENO's license amendment request
                                          to approve its Permanently
                                          Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP)
                                          dated June 12, 2014, (ADAMS
                                          Accession No. ML14168A302),
                                          provides that VY will make
                                          notifications to the State of
                                          Vermont within 60 minutes of
                                          declaration of an event.
                                          Considering the very low
                                          probability of beyond-design-
                                          basis events affecting the
                                          SFP, and with the time
                                          available to initiate
                                          mitigative actions consistent
                                          with plant conditions or, if
                                          needed, for offsite
                                          authorities to implement
                                          appropriate protective
                                          measures using a CEMP (all-
                                          hazards) approach between the
                                          loss of both water and air
                                          cooling to the spent fuel and
                                          the onset of a postulated
                                          zirconium cladding fire,
                                          formal offsite radiological
                                          response plans are not needed.
                                          Therefore, decommissioning
                                          reactors are not required to
                                          notify State and local
                                          governmental agencies within
                                          15 minutes. For similar
                                          reasons, the requirement for
                                          alerting and providing prompt
                                          instructions to the public
                                          within the plume exposure
                                          pathway EPZ using an alert and
                                          notification system is not
                                          required.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b) and 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).

[[Page 78786]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.D.4. The NRC is granting exemption    50, appendix E, section IV.D.3
 from the requirement for the licensee    regarding the alert and
 to obtain U.S. Federal Emergency         notification system
 Management Agency (FEMA) approval of     requirements.
 its backup alert and notification
 capability.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Due to the low probability of
 IV.E.8.a.(i). The NRC is granting        DBAs or other credible events
 exemption from portions of the rule      to exceed the EPA PAGs at the
 language that would otherwise require    site boundary, the available
 the licensee to have an onsite           time for event mitigation at a
 technical support center (TSC) and EOF.  decommissioning power reactor
                                          and, if needed, to implement
                                          offsite protective actions
                                          using a CEMP, an EOF would not
                                          be required to support offsite
                                          agency response. In addition,
                                          an onsite TSC with part 50,
                                          appendix E requirements would
                                          not be needed. ENO proposes in
                                          its PDEP that onsite actions
                                          would be directed from the
                                          control room.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      NUREG-0696, ``Functional
 IV.E.8.a.(ii). The NRC is granting       Criteria for Emergency
 exemption from portions of the rule      Response Facilities,''
 language that would otherwise require    provides that the OSC is an
 the licensee to have an onsite           onsite area separate from the
 operational support center (OSC).        control room and the TSC,
                                          where licensee operations
                                          support personnel will
                                          assemble in an emergency. For
                                          a decommissioning power
                                          reactor, an OSC is no longer
                                          required to meet its original
                                          purpose of an assembly area
                                          for plant logistical support
                                          during an emergency. The OSC
                                          function can be incorporated
                                          into the control room, as
                                          proposed by ENO.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.E.8.b. and subpart sections           50.47(b)(3).
 IV.E.8.b.(1)-E.8.b.(5). The NRC is
 granting exemption from the
 requirements related to an offsite EOF
 location, space and size,
 communications capability, access to
 plant data and radiological
 information, and access to copying and
 office supplies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV   Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 E.8.c. and sections IV E.8.c.(1)-        50.47(b)(3).
 E.8.c.(3). The NRC is granting
 exemption from the requirements to
 have an EOF with the capabilities to
 obtain and display plant data and
 radiological information; the
 capability to analyze technical
 information and provide briefings; and
 the capability to support events
 occurring at more than one site (if
 the emergency operations center
 supports more than one site).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV   Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 E.8.d. The NRC is granting exemption     50, appendix E, section IV.1
 from the requirements to have an         regarding hostile action.
 alternate facility that would be
 accessible even if the site is under
 threat of or experiencing hostile
 action, to function as a staging area
 for augmentation of emergency response
 staff.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.E.8.e. The NRC is granting            50.47(b)(3).
 exemption from the requirement
 regarding the need for the licensee to
 comply with paragraph 8.b of this
 section.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.E.9.a. The NRC is granting            50.47(b) and 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b)(10).
 language that would otherwise require   The State and the local
 the licensee to have communications      governments in which the
 with contiguous State and local          nuclear facility is located
 governments that are within the plume    need to be informed of events
 exposure pathway EPZ (which is no        and emergencies, therefore,
 longer required by the exemption         lines of communication are
 granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)).         required to be maintained.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Because of the low probability
 IV.E.9.c. The NRC is granting            of DBAs or other credible
 exemption from the requirements for      events that would be expected
 communication and testing provisions     to exceed the EPA PAGs and the
 between the control room, the onsite     available time for event
 TSC, State/local emergency operations    mitigation and, if needed,
 centers, and field assessment teams.     implementation of offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP, there is no need for the
                                          TSC, EOF, or offsite field
                                          assessment teams.
                                         Also refer to justification for
                                          10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).
                                          Communication with State and
                                          local emergency operations
                                          centers is maintained to
                                          coordinate assistance on site
                                          if required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      The functions of the control
 IV.E.9.d. The NRC is granting            room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be
 exemption from portions of the rule      combined into one or more
 language that would otherwise require    locations at a permanently
 provisions for communications from the   shutdown and defueled facility
 control room, onsite TSC, and EOF with   due to its smaller facility
 NRC Headquarters and appropriate         staff and the greatly reduced
 Regional Operations Center.              required interaction with
                                          State and local emergency
                                          response facilities, as
                                          compared to an operating
                                          reactor.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).

[[Page 78787]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Decommissioning power reactor
 IV.F.1. and section IV F.1.viii. The     sites typically have a level
 NRC is granting exemption from           of emergency response that
 portions of the rule language that       does not require additional
 would otherwise require the licensee     response by the licensee's
 to provide training and drills for the   headquarters personnel.
 licensee's headquarters personnel,       Therefore, the NRC staff
 Civil Defense personnel, or local news   considers exempting licensee's
 media.                                   headquarters personnel from
                                          training requirements to be
                                          reasonable.
                                         Due to the low probability of
                                          DBAs or other credible events
                                          to exceed the EPA PAGs,
                                          offsite emergency measures are
                                          limited to support provided by
                                          local police, fire
                                          departments, and ambulance and
                                          hospital services, as
                                          appropriate. Local news media
                                          personnel no longer need
                                          radiological orientation
                                          training since they will not
                                          be called upon to support the
                                          formal Joint Information
                                          Center. The term ``Civil
                                          Defense'' is no longer
                                          commonly used; references to
                                          this term in the examples
                                          provided in the regulation
                                          are, therefore, not needed.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Because of the low probability
 IV.F.2. The NRC is granting exemption    of DBAs or other credible
 from portions of the rule language       events that would be expected
 that would otherwise require testing     to exceed the limits of EPA
 of a public alert and notification       PAGs and the available time
 system.                                  for event mitigation and, if
                                          necessary, offsite protective
                                          actions from a CEMP, the
                                          public alert and notification
                                          system will not be used and,
                                          therefore, requires no
                                          testing.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Due to the low probability of
 IV.F.2.a. and sections IV.F.2.a.(i)      DBAs or other credible events
 through IV.F.2.a.(iii). The NRC is       that would be expected to
 granting exemption from the              exceed the limits of EPA PAGs,
 requirements for full participation      the available time for event
 exercises and the submittal of the       mitigation and, if necessary,
 associated exercise scenarios to the     implementation of offsite
 NRC.                                     protective actions using a
                                          CEMP, no formal offsite
                                          radiological response plans
                                          are required. Therefore, the
                                          need for the licensee to
                                          exercise onsite and offsite
                                          plans with full participation
                                          by each offsite authority
                                          having a role under the
                                          radiological response plan is
                                          not required.
                                         The intent of submitting
                                          exercise scenarios at an
                                          operating power reactor site
                                          is to check that licensees
                                          utilize different scenarios in
                                          order to prevent the
                                          preconditioning of responders
                                          at power reactors. For
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          sites, there are limited
                                          events that could occur and,
                                          as such, the previously
                                          routine progression to general
                                          emergency in an operating
                                          power reactor site scenario is
                                          not applicable.
                                         The licensee would be exempt
                                          from 10 CFR part 50, appendix
                                          E, section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii)
                                          because the licensee would be
                                          exempt from the umbrella
                                          provision of 10 CFR part 50,
                                          appendix E, section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.F.2.b. The NRC is granting            50, appendix E, section
 exemption from portions of the rule      IV.F.2.a.
 language that would otherwise require   The low probability of DBAs or
 the licensee to submit scenarios for     other credible events that
 its biennial exercises of its onsite     would exceed the EPA PAGs, the
 emergency plan. In addition, the NRC     available time for event
 is granting exemption from portions of   mitigation and, if necessary,
 the rule language that requires          implementation of offsite
 assessment of offsite releases,          protective actions using a
 protective action decision making, and   CEMP, render a TSC, OSC, and
 references to the TSC, OSC, and EOF.     EOF unnecessary. The principal
                                          functions required by
                                          regulation can be performed at
                                          an onsite location that does
                                          not meet the requirements of
                                          the TSC, OSC or EOF.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.F.2.c. and sections IV F.2.c.(1)      50, appendix E, section
 through F.2.c.(5). The NRC is granting   IV.F.2.a.
 exemption from the requirements
 regarding the need for the licensee to
 exercise offsite plans biennially with
 full participation by each offsite
 authority having a role under the
 radiological response plan. The NRC is
 also granting exemptions from the
 conditions for conducting these
 exercises (including hostile action
 exercises) if two different licensees
 have facilities on the same site or on
 adjacent, contiguous sites, or share
 most of the elements defining
 co[dash]located licensees.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.F.2.d. The NRC is granting            50, appendix E, section IV.2.
 exemption from the requirements to
 obtain State participation in an
 ingestion pathway exercise and a
 hostile action exercise, with each
 State that has responsibilities, at
 least once per exercise cycle.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.F.2.e. The NRC is granting            50, appendix E, section IV.2.
 exemption from portions of the rule
 language that would otherwise require
 the licensee to allow participation
 exercise in licensee drills by any
 State and local government in the
 plume exposure pathway EPZ when
 requested.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      FEMA is responsible for
 IV.F.2.f. The NRC is granting            evaluating the adequacy of
 exemption from portions of the rule      offsite response during an
 language that would otherwise require    exercise. Because the NRC is
 FEMA to consult with the NRC on          granting exemptions from the
 remedial exercises. The NRC is           requirements regarding the
 granting exemption from portions of      need for the licensee to
 the rule language that discuss the       exercise onsite and offsite
 extent of State and local                plans with full participation
 participation in remedial exercises.     by each offsite authority
                                          having a role under the
                                          radiological response plan,
                                          FEMA will no longer evaluate
                                          the adequacy of offsite
                                          response during remedial or
                                          other exercises.

[[Page 78788]]

 
                                         No action is expected from
                                          State or local government
                                          organizations in response to
                                          an event at a decommissioning
                                          power reactor site other than
                                          firefighting, law enforcement
                                          and ambulance/medical services
                                          support. A memorandum of
                                          understanding should be in
                                          place for those services.
                                          Offsite response organizations
                                          will continue to take actions
                                          on a comprehensive EP basis to
                                          protect the health and safety
                                          of the public as they would at
                                          any other industrial site.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Due to the low probability of
 IV.F.2.i. The NRC is granting            DBAs or other credible events
 exemption from portions of the rule      to exceed the EPA PAGs, the
 language that would otherwise require    available time for event
 the licensee to drill and exercise       mitigation and, if needed,
 scenarios that include a wide spectrum   implementation of offsite
 of radiological release events and       protective actions using a
 hostile action.                          CEMP, the previously routine
                                          progression to general
                                          emergency in power reactor
                                          site scenarios is not
                                          applicable to a
                                          decommissioning site.
                                          Therefore, the licensee is not
                                          expected to demonstrate
                                          response to a wide spectrum of
                                          events.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          part 50, appendix E, section
                                          IV.1 regarding hostile action.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.F.2.j. The NRC is granting            50, appendix E, section
 exemption from the requirements          IV.F.2.
 regarding the need for the licensee's
 emergency response organization to
 demonstrate proficiency in key skills
 in the principal functional areas of
 emergency response.
In addition, the NRC is granting
 exemption during an eight calendar
 year exercise cycle, from
 demonstrating proficiency in the key
 skills necessary to respond to such
 scenarios as hostile actions,
 unplanned minimal radiological
 release, and scenarios involving rapid
 escalation to a site area emergency or
 general emergency.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
 IV.I. The NRC is granting exemption      50, appendix E, section
 from the requirements regarding the      IV.E.8.d.
 need for the licensee to develop a
 range of protective actions for onsite
 personnel during hostile actions.
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[FR Doc. 2015-31808 Filed 12-16-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P