[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 230 (Tuesday, December 1, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 74982-74985]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-30274]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2015-5806; Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-083-AD; 
Amendment 39-18331; AD 2015-22-53]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: We are publishing a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters. This AD was sent 
previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these helicopters 
and supersedes Emergency AD 2015-22-52, dated October 28, 2015. This AD 
requires revising the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) to stop performing 
the yaw load compensator check during preflight procedures and instead 
perform it during post-flight procedures after rotor shut-down. This AD 
also requires the yaw servo hydraulic switch

[[Page 74983]]

to be in the ``ON'' position before taking off. This AD is prompted by 
two accidents and one incident of Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 
helicopters. From preliminary investigations, loss of tail rotor (T/R) 
control during takeoff was evident in each event. These actions are 
intended to prevent takeoff without hydraulic pressure in the T/R 
hydraulic system, loss of T/R flight control, and subsequent loss of 
control of the helicopter.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 16, 2015 to all persons 
except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by 
Emergency AD 2015-22-53, issued on October 30, 2015, which contains the 
requirements of this AD.
    We must receive comments on this AD by February 1, 2016.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Send comments to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to the ``Mail'' address between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-
5806; or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket 
contains this AD, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, the 
economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The 
street address for the Docket Operations Office (telephone 800-647-
5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD 
docket shortly after receipt.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus 
Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone 
(972) 641-0000 or (800) 232-0323; fax (972) 641-3775; or at http://www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub. You may review the referenced 
service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 
Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 
76177.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen Barbini, Flight Test Engineer, 
Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 
Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight 
safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to 
provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we 
invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written 
comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the 
economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted 
from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific 
portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain 
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written 
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should 
submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that 
we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public 
contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking during the 
comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may 
conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments.

Discussion

    On October 28, 2015 we issued Emergency AD 2015-22-52 for Airbus 
Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system that 
prohibited performing the yaw load compensator check (collective 
switch) during preflight procedures and instead required performing it 
during post-flight procedures. Emergency AD 2015-22-52 also required 
the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) to be in the ``ON'' 
(forward) position before taking off. Emergency AD 2015-22-52 was sent 
previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these helicopters. 
The actions in Emergency AD 2015-22-52 were intended to prevent takeoff 
without hydraulic pressure in the T/R hydraulic system, loss of T/R 
flight control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
    Emergency AD 2015-22-52 was prompted by two accidents and one 
incident of Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual 
hydraulic system installed. From preliminary investigations, loss of T/
R control during takeoff was evident in each event. Each event 
experienced a counterclockwise rotational yaw immediately after 
takeoff. It was also noted that the anti-torque pedals felt jammed or 
locked in the neutral position by the pilots in the two non-fatal 
events. The conditions in the events are indicative of takeoffs without 
hydraulic T/R assistance caused by a lack of pressure in the T/R 
hydraulic system. When taking off without T/R hydraulic assistance with 
the switch on the collective grip in the ``OFF'' (aft) position, the 
yaw load compensator remains discharged and degrades the T/R hydraulic 
system, which significantly increases the pilot T/R control load and 
prevents sufficient T/R thrust for takeoff.
    Based on the accidents and incident, EASA, which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Union, issued EASA AD No. 
2015-0178, dated August 26, 2015, to correct an unsafe condition for 
Airbus Helicopters Model AS 350 B3 helicopters, equipped with a dual 
hydraulic system identified as modification OP 3082 or OP 3346. EASA 
advises of a perceived loss of T/R control that mimics jamming during 
take-off if the T/R hydraulic preflight checks are not performed in 
accordance with the checklist in the RFM. According to EASA, performing 
the T/R hydraulic preflight checks improperly may result in reduced 
function of the T/R hydraulic system, thereby significantly increasing 
the T/R control load for the pilot.
    After we issued Emergency AD 2015-22-52, we received comments 
noting an error in terminology and a defect in reporting compliance 
that resulted in confusion in how to comply with Emergency AD 2015-22-
52. Specifically, we referred to the collective switch for the yaw load 
compensator check, when we should have referred to the ACCU TST switch. 
Activating the collective switch after rotor shut-down will have no 
effect due to the absence of hydraulic pressure in the system. We also 
omitted a method of recording compliance. Therefore, on October 30, 
2015, we issued Emergency AD 2015-22-53 to supersede Emergency AD 2015-
22-52 to correct the error in terminology and the defect in recording 
compliance. Emergency AD 2015-22-53 requires revising the normal 
operating procedures section of the RFM to prohibit performing the yaw 
load compensator check (ACCU TST switch) during preflight procedures 
and instead require performing it during post-flight procedures after 
rotor shut-down. Emergency AD 2015-22-53 also requires revising the RFM 
to state that

[[Page 74984]]

the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) must be in the 
``ON'' (forward) position before taking off. Emergency AD 2015-22-53 
was also sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of 
these helicopters.

FAA's Determination

    This helicopter has been approved by the aviation authority of 
France and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to 
our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its technical 
representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in 
the EASA AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all 
information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists 
and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of this same 
type design.

Related Service Information

    Airbus Helicopters issued Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, 
Revision 1, dated October 22, 2015 (SB AS350-67.00.66), which specifies 
inserting specific pages of the bulletin into the RFM. These pages 
revise the preflight and post-flight hydraulic checks by moving the T/R 
yaw load compensator check from preflight to post-flight. These pages 
also revise terminology within the flight manuals for the different 
engine configurations.
    Airbus Helicopters also issued Safety Information Notice No. 2944-
S-29, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015 (SIN 2944-S-29), which warns 
that attempting to take off without T/R hydraulic assistance (which may 
be caused by the yaw servo hydraulic switch on the collective grip in 
the ``OFF'' (aft) position) might be incorrectly perceived as T/R 
control failure (jam), which could lead to loss of control of the 
helicopter if not quickly identified and corrected. SIN 2944-S-29 also 
advises of the RFM update that revises the run-up hydraulic check 
starting procedures to no longer specify ``pressing'' the yaw servo 
hydraulic switch. To mitigate this potential error, the yaw load 
compensator check has been moved from preflight to post-flight 
procedures. Further, SIN 2944-S-29 states the yaw servo hydraulic 
switch, which is located on the collective grip, is also called the 
hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch in various RFMs.

AD Requirements

    This AD requires, before further flight, revising the RFM to stop 
performing the yaw load compensator check (ACCU TST switch) during 
preflight procedures and instead perform the yaw load compensator check 
during post-flight procedures after rotor shut-down. This AD also 
requires revising the RFM to state that the yaw servo hydraulic switch 
(collective switch) must be in the ``ON'' (forward) position before 
taking off.

Differences Between This AD and the EASA AD

    The EASA AD requires revising the RFM by incorporating procedures 
contained in Airbus Helicopters Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, 
Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015, and informing all flight crew of the 
RFM changes. This AD requires revising the RFM by inserting a copy of 
this AD or by making pen and ink changes.

Interim Action

    We consider this AD to be an interim action. The design approval 
holder is currently developing a terminating action that will address 
the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this terminating 
action is developed, approved, and available, we might consider 
additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 427 helicopters of U.S. Registry. 
We estimate that operators may incur the following costs in order to 
comply with this AD at an average labor rate of $85 per work-hour. It 
takes about 0.5 work-hour to revise an RFM for a cost of $43 per 
helicopter and $18,361 for the U.S. fleet.

FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

    Providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adopting 
these AD requirements would delay implementing the safety actions 
needed to correct this known unsafe condition. Therefore, we found and 
continue to find that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving 
notice and comment prior to the adoption of this rule because the 
previously described unsafe condition can adversely affect the 
controllability of the helicopter and the initial required action must 
be accomplished before further flight.
    Since it was found that immediate corrective action was required, 
notice and opportunity for prior public comment before issuing this AD 
were impracticable and contrary to public interest and good cause 
existed to make the AD effective immediately by Emergency AD 2015-22-
53, issued on October 30, 2015, to all known U.S. owners and operators 
of these helicopters. These conditions still exist and the AD is hereby 
published in the Federal Register as an amendment to section 39.13 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13) to make it effective to 
all persons.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
    3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that 
it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
    4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply 
with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

[[Page 74985]]

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

     Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2015-22-53 Airbus Helicopters: Amendment 39-18331; Docket No. FAA-
2015-5806; Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-083-AD.

(a) Applicability

    This AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters 
with a dual hydraulic system installed, certificated in any 
category.

    Note 1 to paragraph (a) of this AD:  The dual hydraulic system 
for Model AS350B3 helicopters is referred to as Airbus modification 
OP 3082 or OP 3346.

(b) Unsafe Condition

    This AD defines the unsafe condition as lack of hydraulic 
pressure in a tail rotor (T/R) hydraulic system. This condition 
could result in loss of T/R flight control and subsequent loss of 
control of the helicopter.

(c) Affected ADs

    This AD supersedes Emergency AD 2015-22-52, Directorate 
Identifier 2015-SW-074-AD, dated October 28, 2015.

(d) Effective Date

    This AD becomes effective December 16, 2015 to all persons 
except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by 
Emergency AD 2015-22-53, issued on October 30, 2015, which contains 
the requirements of this AD.

(e) Compliance

    You are responsible for performing each action required by this 
AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been 
accomplished prior to that time.

(f) Required Actions

    Before further flight, insert a copy of this AD into the 
rotorcraft flight manual, Section 4 Normal Operating Procedures, or 
make pen and ink changes to the preflight and post-flight procedures 
as follows:
    (1) Stop performing the yaw load compensator check (ACCU TST 
switch) during preflight procedures, and instead perform the yaw 
load compensator check during post-flight procedures after rotor 
shut-down.
    (2) The yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) must be 
in the ``ON'' (forward) position before takeoff.

    Note 2 to paragraph (f)(2) of this AD:  The yaw servo hydraulic 
switch is also called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut 
off switch in various Airbus Helicopters rotorcraft flight manuals.

(g) Special Flight Permits

    Special flight permits are prohibited.

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs 
for this AD. Send your proposal to: Stephen Barbini, Flight Test 
Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 
10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; 
email [email protected].
    (2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating 
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you 
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, 
the manager of the local flight standards district office or 
certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft 
complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(i) Additional Information

    (1) Airbus Helicopters Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, 
Revision 1, dated October 22, 2015, and Airbus Helicopters Safety 
Information Notice No. 2944-S-29, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015, 
which are not incorporated by reference, contain additional 
information about the subject of this AD. For service information 
identified in this AD, contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum 
Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641-0000 or (800) 
232-0323; fax (972) 641-3775; or at http://www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub. You may review a copy of the 
service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 
Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 
76177.
    (2) The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) AD No. 2015-0178, dated August 26, 2015. You 
may view the EASA AD on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov 
by searching for and locating it in Docket No. FAA-2015-5806.

(j) Subject

    Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 2910, Main 
Hydraulic System.


    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 13, 2015.
Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-30274 Filed 11-30-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P