[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 217 (Tuesday, November 10, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69702-69705]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-28593]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2012-0068]
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Draft interim staff guidance; request for comment.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is soliciting
public comment on its draft Japan Lessons-Learned Division Interim
Staff Guidance (JLD-ISG), JLD-ISG-2012-01, Draft Revision 1,
``Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard
to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events.'' This draft JLD-ISG revision provides guidance and
clarification to assist nuclear power reactors applicants and licensees
with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements
to mitigate challenges to key safety functions.
DATES: Submit comments by December 10, 2015. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received
before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting
comments on a specific subject):
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0068. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration,
Mail Stop: OWFN-12-H08, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
[[Page 69703]]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Bowman, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2963; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0068 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain
publicly-available information related to this action by any of the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0068.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected].
The documents identified in the following table are
available to interested persons through one or more of the following
methods, as indicated.
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Document title Abbreviated title ADAMS Accession No.
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JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance JLD-ISG-2012-01, ML15294A078
with Order EA-12-049, Order Draft Revision 1.
Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events,'' Draft Revision 1.
See Previous Entry............ JLD-ISG-2012-01, ML12229A174
for JLD-ISG-2012-01........... Revision 0.
Order EA-12-049, ``Order Order EA-12-049.. ML12054A736
Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events''.
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, n/a.............. ML14100A092
Unit 2 License, License No.
NPF-93.
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, n/a.............. ML14100A101
Unit 3 License, License No.
NPF-94.
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, n/a.............. ML15084A170
Unit 3 License, License No.
NPF--95.
SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term SECY-11-0093..... ML11186A950
Report and Recommendations
for Agency Actions Following
the Events in Japan''.
SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended SECY-11-0124..... ML11245A158
Actions to be Taken without
Delay from the Near-Term Task
Force Report''.
SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization SECY-11-0137..... ML11272A111
of Recommended Actions to be
Taken in Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned''.
Commission's staff SRM-SECY-11-0093. ML112310021
requirements memorandum (SRM)
for SECY[dash]11[dash]0093.
SRM for SECY-11-0124 (see SRM-SECY-110124.. ML112911571
entry to SECY-11-0124 for
full title).
SRM for SECY-11-0137 (see SRM-SECY-11-0137. ML113490055
entry to SECY-11-0124 for
full title).
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) n/a.............. ML11353A008
Letter Titled, ``An
Integrated, Safety-Focused
Approach to Expediting
Implementation of Fukushima
Daiichi Lessons Learned''.
SECY-12-0025, ``Proposed SECY-12-0025..... ML12039A103
Orders and Requests for
Information in Response to
Lessons Learned from Japan's
March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami''.
SRM for SECY-12-0025 (see SRM-SECY-12-0025. ML120690347
entry for SECY-12-0025 for
full title).
Request for Information 50.54(f) Letter.. ML12053A340
Pursuant to Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR) 50.54(f) Regarding
Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and
9.3, of the Near-Term Task
Force Review of Insights from
the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Accident.
NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and NEI 12-06, ML12144A419
Flexible Coping Strategies Revision B.
(FLEX) Implementation
Guide,'' Revision B.
NEI 12-06, Revision B1 (See NEI 12-06, ML12143A232
Previous Entry for NEI 12-06). Revision B1.
``NRC Response to Public n/a.............. ML12229A253
Comments, JLD-ISG-2012-01
(Docket ID NRC-2012-0068)''.
NEI 12-06, Revision C (See NEI 12-06, ML121910390
Previous Entry for NEI 12-06). Revision C.
NEI 12-06, Draft Revision 0 NEI 12-06, Draft ML12221A204
(See Previous Entry for NEI Revision 0.
12-06).
See Previous Entry for JLD-ISG- JLD-ISG-2012-01, ML12146A014
2012-01. Draft Revision 0.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power n/a.............. ML13064A300
Station's Overall Integrate
Plan.
COMSECY-14-0037, ``Integration COMSECY-14-0037.. ML14238A616
of Mitigating Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events and the Reevaluation
(sic) of Flooding Hazards''.
SRM-COMSECY-14-0037........... SRM-COMSECY-14-00 ML15089A236
37.
NEI 12-06, Revision 1 (See NEI 12-06, ML15244B006
Previous Entry for NEI 12-06). Revision 1.
NEI 12-06, Revision 1A (See NEI 12-06, ML15279A425
Previous Entry for NEI 12-06). Revision 1A.
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence NUREG-2161....... ML14255A365
Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting
the Spent Fuel Pool for a
U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor''.
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The NRC may post materials related to this document,
including public comments, on the Federal rulemaking Web site at http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-0068. The Federal
rulemaking Web site allows you to receive alerts when changes or
additions occur in a docket folder. To subscribe: 1) Navigate to the
docket folder (NRC-2012-0068 ); 2) click the ``Sign up for Email
Alerts'' link; and 3) enter your email address and select how
frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or
monthly).
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0068 in your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as entering
[[Page 69704]]
the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit
comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.
II. Background
The NRC staff issued JLD-ISG-2012-01 Revision 0 on August 29, 2012.
The NRC staff developed JLD-ISG-2012-01 Draft Revision 1 to provide
further guidance and clarification to assist nuclear power reactor
applicants and licensees with the identification of measures needed to
comply with requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety
functions. These requirements are contained in Order EA-12-049. In
addition, these requirements are included in the following license
conditions: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 2 License (V.C.
Summer), License No. NPF-93, Condition 2.D.(13), V.C. Summer Nuclear
Station, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF-94, Condition 2.D.(13), and
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF-95,
Condition 2.D.(12)(g). The draft ISG is not a substitute for the
requirements in Order EA-12-049, and compliance with the ISG is not
required. This ISG revision is being issued in draft form for public
comment to involve the public in development of the implementation
guidance.
Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant
on March 11, 2011, the NRC established a senior-level agency task force
referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked
with conducting a systematic and methodical review of the NRC
regulations and processes, and determining if the agency should make
additional improvements to these programs in light of the events at
Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this review, the NTTF developed a
comprehensive set of recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, dated
July 12, 2011. These recommendations were enhanced by the NRC staff
following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the staff's
efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, dated September 9, 2011, and
SECY-11-0137, dated October 3, 2011.
As directed by the Commission's SRM for SECY-11-0093, the NRC staff
reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the context of the NRC's
existing regulatory framework and considered the various regulatory
vehicles available to the NRC to implement the recommendations. SECY-
11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the staff's prioritization of the
recommendations.
After receiving the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-0124 and
SRM-SECY-11-0137, the NRC staff conducted public meetings to discuss
enhanced mitigation strategies intended to maintain or restore core
cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities
following beyond-design-basis external events. At these meetings, the
industry described its proposal for a Diverse and Flexible Mitigation
Capability (FLEX), as documented in NEI's letter, dated December 16,
2011. FLEX is proposed as a strategy to fulfill the key safety
functions of core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel
cooling. Stakeholder input influenced the staff to pursue a more
performance-based approach to improve the safety of operating power
reactors than was originally envisioned in NTTF Recommendation 4.2,
SECY-11-0124, and SECY-11-0137.
On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff provided SECY-12-0025 to the
Commission, including the proposed order to implement the enhanced
mitigation strategies. As directed by SRM-SECY-12-0025, the NRC staff
issued Order EA-12-049 and, in parallel, issued as a Request for
Information under 10 CFR 50.54(f) for a reevaluation of licensees'
flooding and seismic hazards.
Guidance and strategies required by the order would be available if
the loss of power, motive force and normal access to the ultimate heat
sink to prevent fuel damage in the reactor, and SFP affected all units
at a site simultaneously. The order requires a three-phase approach for
mitigating beyond-design-basis external events. The initial phase
requires the use of installed equipment and resources to maintain or
restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling. The transition
phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment and
consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be
accomplished with resources brought from off site. The final phase
requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain those
functions indefinitely.
On May 4, 2012, NEI submitted document 12-06, Revision B, and on
May 13, 2012, Revision B1, to provide specifications for an industry-
developed methodology for the development, implementation, and
maintenance of guidance and strategies in response to the mitigating
strategies order. The strategies and guidance described in NEI 12-06
expand on the strategies the industry developed and implemented to
address the limited set of beyond-design-basis external events that
involve the loss of a large area of the plant due to explosions and
fire required pursuant to paragraph (hh)(2) of 10 CFR 50.54(f),
``Conditions of licenses.''
On May 31, 2012, the NRC staff issued a draft version of JLD-ISG-
2012-01, Revision 0, and published a notice of its availability for
public comment in the Federal Register (FR) (77 FR 33779; June 7,
2012), with the comment period running through July 7, 2012, 30 days
from its publication. The staff received seven comments during this
time, addressing the comments, as documented in ``NRC Response to
Public Comments, JLD-ISG-2012-01 (Docket ID NRC-2012-0068).''
On July 3, 2012, NEI submitted Revision C to NEI 12-06,
incorporating many of the exceptions and clarifications included in the
draft version of this ISG. On August 3, 2012, NEI submitted Draft
Revision 0 to NEI 12-06, incorporating many of the remaining exceptions
and clarifications. On August 21, 2012, NEI submitted Revision 0 to NEI
12-06, making various editorial corrections. The NRC reviewed the
August 21, 2012, submittal of Revision 0 of NEI 12-06 and endorsed it
as a process the NRC considers acceptable for meeting the regulatory
requirements with noted clarifications in revision 0 of JLD-ISG-2012-
01.
By February 2013, licensees of operating power reactors submitted
their overall integrated plans (OIPs) under the Mitigating Strategies
order describing the guidance and strategies to be developed and
implemented. Because this development and implementation was to be
accomplished in parallel with the reevaluation of the seismic and
flooding hazards under the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter issued subsequent to
SECY-12-0025, these included in their key assumptions a statement that
typically read, ``[f]lood and seismic re-evaluations pursuant to the 10
CFR 50.54(f) letter of March 12, 2012, are not completed and therefore
not assumed in this submittal. As the reevaluations are completed,
appropriate issues will be entered into the corrective action system
and addressed on a schedule commensurate with other licensing
[[Page 69705]]
bases changes.'' (See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's
OIP)
In order to clarify the relationship between the Mitigating
Strategies order and the hazard reevaluation, the NRC staff provided
COMSECY-14-0037 to the Commission on November 21, 2014, requesting that
the Commission affirm that ``[l]icensees for operating nuclear power
plants need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their
mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events (Order
EA-12-049 and related [Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events] MBDBE
rulemaking).'' COMSECY-14-0037 further requested affirmation that
``[l]icensees for operating nuclear power plants may need to address
some specific flooding scenarios that could significantly damage the
power plant site by developing targeted or scenario-specific mitigating
strategies, possibly including unconventional measures, to prevent fuel
damage in reactor cores or spent fuel pools.'' In SRM-COMSECY-14-0037,
the Commission affirmed these two items and noted that ``it is within
the staff's authority, and is the staff's responsibility, to determine,
on a plant-specific basis, whether targeted or scenario-specific
mitigating strategies, possibly including unconventional measures, are
acceptable.''
On August 25, 2015, NEI submitted Revision 1 to NEI 12-06,
incorporating lessons learned in the implementation of Order EA-12-049
and alternative approaches taken by licensees for compliance to that
order. Following a public webinar discussion of potential exceptions
and clarifications that took place on September 21, 2015, NEI submitted
Revision 1A to NEI 12-06 on October 5, 2015.
III. Specific Request for Comment
The NRC is seeking advice and recommendations from the public on
the revision to this interim staff guidance document. We are
particularly interested in comments and supporting rationale from the
public on the following:
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Spray strategy: Order EA-12-049 was issued in
parallel with the March 12, 2012, request for information under 10 CFR
50.54(f) for reevaluation of seismic and flooding hazards. The order
and the guidance developed to support the development and
implementation of the mitigating strategies were intended to address
the uncertainties associated with beyond-design-basis external events.
Since March 12, 2012, the NRC has completed NUREG-2161, ``Consequence
Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool
for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,'' which predicted an SFP liner
failure likelihood of about two times in a million years and a
possibility of release of radioactive materials only if that liner
failure occurs during 8 percent of the operating cycle of the reference
plant considered in the study. The results of the study showed that the
risk of individual latent cancer fatality within 10 miles of the
reference plant due to the effects of a beyond-design-basis earthquake
on the SFP is several orders of magnitude below the quantitative health
objectives established in the Commission's safety goal policy, ``Safety
Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants,'' 51 FR 28044, August
4, 1986, as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028, August 21, 1986.
These results did not quantitatively credit the existing SFP spray
strategy under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), which would be necessary for
conformance with the guidance contained in this revision to JLD-ISG-
2012-01 through its endorsement of NEI 12-06, Revision 1A, at Tables C-
3 and D-3 for boiling-water reactors and pressurized-water reactors,
respectively. The NRC seeks comment on whether continuing to require
the SFP spray strategy under Order EA-12-049 is warranted in light of
the analyses performed for NUREG-2161, or whether the need for this
strategy should be limited or removed.
Proposed Action
By this action, the NRC is requesting public comments on JLD-ISG-
2012-01 Draft Revision 1. This draft JLD-ISG proposes guidance related
to requirements contained in Order EA-12-049, Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. The NRC staff will make a final
determination regarding issuance of the JLD-ISG after it considers any
public comments received in response to this request.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of November, 2015.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Stewart N. Bailey,
Acting Director, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2015-28593 Filed 11-9-15; 8:45 am]
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