[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 185 (Thursday, September 24, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57572-57576]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-24248]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Order Relating to Aiman Ammar, Rashid Albuni, Engineering
Construction & Contracting Co., Advanced Tech Solutions, and iT Wave
FZCO
Washington, DC 20230
In the Matter of: Aiman Ammar, a/k/a Ayman Ammar, with last
known addresses of: Princess Tower, Apartment 3803, Al Sufouh
Street, Dubai Marina, Dubai, UAE and 1265 Camden Way, Yuba City, CA
95991; Rashid Albuni, with last known addresses of: Dubai Silicon
Oasis, Office # AG 05-2, Dubai, UAE and The Gardens Building 65,
Apartment 12, Dubai, UAE; Engineering Construction & Contracting
Co., with last known addresses of: P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria
and Abu Romana Area, Shahin Building, Ground Floor, Damascus, Syria;
Advanced Tech Solutions, a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions, with
last known addresses of: P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria and Moasa
Square, Takriti Building, Fourth Floor, Damascus, Syria; iT Wave
FZCO, a/k/a iT-Wave, a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, with last known addresses
of: Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office # AG 05-2, Dubai, UAE and The
Gardens Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, UAE, Respondents
14-BIS-0006
The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
(``BIS''), has notified Aiman Ammar a/k/a Ayman Ammar (``Ammar''), of
Dubai, United Arab Emirates (``U.A.E.''), Rashid Albuni (``Albuni''),
of Dubai, U.A.E., Engineering Construction & Contracting Co. (``ECC''),
of Damascus, Syria, Advanced Technology Solutions a/k/a Advanced Tech
Solutions (``ATS''), of Damascus, Syria, and iT
[[Page 57573]]
Wave FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO (``iT-Wave''), of Dubai,
U.A.E. (collectively, ``Respondents''), that it has initiated an
administrative proceeding against the Respondents pursuant to Section
766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (the
``Regulations''),\1\ and Section 13(c) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979, as amended (the ``Act''),\2\ through the issuance of a
Charging Letter to Respondents that alleges that Respondents violated
the Regulations. Specifically, the charges are:
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\1\ The Regulations are currently codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (2015). The
charged violations occurred in 2010-2013. The Regulations governing
the violations at issue are found in the 2010-2013 versions of the
Code of Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730 through 774). The 2015
Regulations set forth the procedures that apply to this matter.
\2\ 50 U.S.C. app. sections 2401-2420 (2000). Since August 21,
2001, the Act has been in lapse and the President, through Executive
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which
has been extended by successive Presidential Notices, the most
recent being that of August 7, 2015 (80 FR 48233 (Aug. 11, 2015)),
has continued the Regulations in effect under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
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As to all Respondents:
Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy To Export or Reexport to Syria
Computer Equipment and Software Designed for Use in Monitoring and
Controlling Web Traffic
1. Ammar, Albuni, ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave conspired and acted in
concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about or do an act
that constitutes a violation of the Regulations. The conspiracy was
formed by and among Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS in or about October
2010. iT-Wave joined the conspiracy by no later than in or about
January 2013, and the conspiracy continued through at least in or about
March 2013. The purpose of the conspiracy was to bring about exports
and reexports without the required U.S. Government authorization to
Syria, including the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (``STE''),
of computer equipment and software designed for use in monitoring and
controlling Web traffic and of other associated equipment. All of these
items were subject to the Regulations, and nearly all of them were
classified under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 5A002
and controlled for National Security and Anti-Terrorism reasons and as
Encryption Items.\3\ The items exported or reexported to Syria pursuant
to the conspiracy were valued in total at approximately $1.8 million.
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\3\ A limited number of the items were designated as ``EAR99''
under the Regulations. EAR99 is a designation for items that are
subject to the Regulations, but not listed on the Commerce Control
List.
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2. The United States has a long-standing and widely-known trade
embargo against Syria. With the exception of certain medicines and
food, no item subject to the Regulations may be exported or reexported
to Syria without a Department of Commerce license, as set forth at all
times pertinent hereto in General Order No. 2, codified in Supplement
No. 1 to part 736 of the Regulations.\4\
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\4\ General Order No. 2 was issued pursuant to the Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. On
December 12, 2011, the controls on exports and reexports to Syria
were moved to Section 746.9 of the Regulations. The licensing
requirements continued unchanged. See 76 FR 77115 (Dec. 12, 2011).
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3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Ammar and Albuni directed
activities in and/or from the U.A.E. and Syria in a scheme to export or
reexport U.S.-origin or U.S.-controlled equipment and software for use
in Syria and in several instances to fulfill contracts with the state-
run STE. As set forth in further detail below, Albuni negotiated sales,
submitted purchase orders, and served as the end user contact for
shipments of controlled items while identifying himself as General
Manager of ATS, a Syrian company that has been in operations in the
U.A.E., and as Manager of iT-Wave, which identifies itself as an
internet computer technology company based in the U.A.E. with
operations in Syria. Ammar directed payments for the unlawful exports
and reexports to Syria from personal and business bank accounts,
including payments from the accounts of ECC, a company based in
Damascus, Syria. ECC and ATS share the same P.O. Box address in
Damascus, Syria, and upon information and belief are related companies.
Ammar also identified himself as the Chief Executive Officer of iT-
Wave.
4. Both directly and through regional resellers, Ammar, Albuni,
ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave arranged for the procurement of U.S.-origin or
U.S.-controlled items for use in Syria. Through various entities, these
individuals falsely represented, directly and indirectly, to U.S.
companies or their authorized distributors or resellers that the items
were intended for end users in such locations as Iraq, Afghanistan,
Turkey, Egypt and U.A.E, when they actually were intended for Syria,
primarily STE.
A. Equipment and Software Unlawfully Procured by Respondents in 2010-
2011 for Use in Monitoring and Controlling Web Traffic, including by
the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (``STE'')
5. In or about August 2010, Albuni, holding himself out as General
Manager of ATS of Damascus, Syria, requested pricing information from a
regional reseller for products produced by Blue Coat Systems, Inc., of
Sunnyvale, California (``Blue Coat''). The regional reseller provided
the order to Computerlinks FZCO, the authorized distributor in the
Middle East for Blue Coat. On or about October 29, 2010, Computerlinks
FZCO placed with Blue Coat an order for eight devices used to monitor
and control web traffic along with accompanying equipment and software.
In order to evade the Regulations, Albuni concealed the fact that the
items were destined for Syria, by falsely representing to Blue Coat,
through Computerlinks FZCO and the regional reseller, that the items
were intended for the Iraq Ministry of Telecom, and provided his
personal email address as the end user contact, which also did not
indicate a Syrian location. Upon receiving the order, Blue Coat
reexported the items from its facility in the Netherlands to
Computerlinks FZCO in the U.A.E. On or about December 15, 2010,
Computerlinks FZCO directed the items' transfer within the U.A.E. for
their subsequent shipment to ECC in Damascus, Syria, for use by the
state-run STE. A shipping request notice identified Ammar as the point
of contact at ECC for the shipment.
6. On or about December 31, 2010, using the same reseller and
distributor channel as for the October 29, 2010 order, a second order
was placed for six of the same Blue Coat devices, again with false
information being provided indicating that the items were intended for
the Iraq Ministry of Telecom and listing the end user contact as
Albuni, when the items were in fact destined for Syria. Upon receiving
the order, Blue Coat shipped the items from the United States to
Computerlinks FZCO in the U.A.E. On or about February 9, 2011,
Computerlinks FZCO directed that three of the six devices be
transferred within the U.A.E. for their subsequent shipment to ECC in
Damascus, Syria. In an air waybill dated February 10, 2011, the freight
forwarder identified Ammar as the point of contact for ECC in Damascus,
Syria.
7. To satisfy outstanding bills to Computerlinks FZCO for the items
for which they falsely stated were for use in
[[Page 57574]]
Iraq, Albuni and Ammar arranged or directed four wire transfers to
Computerlinks FZCO between February 2, 2011, and May 17, 2011, from
both Ammar and ECC. Prompted by an email dated April 6, 2011, from an
intermediary connected with these shipments, Albuni was asked to
arrange a letter for Ammar to transfer the remaining balance owed to
Computerlinks FZCO. Ammar had previously made a wire transfer as an
initial deposit payment to Computerlinks FZCO on February 2, 2011. He
directed a second payment from ECC on April 13, 2011, and made two
additional wire transfer payments from an account in his name in
Damascus, Syria, on May 12 and 17, 2011.
8. On or about May 15, 2011, using a similar reseller and
distribution channel, an order was placed for five more devices, along
with accompanying equipment and software, from Blue Coat, this time
falsely stating that the items were intended for Liwalnet, an Internet
service provider in Afghanistan, when in fact the items were again
destined for Syria. After the items arrived in the U.A.E. from the
Netherlands, on or about May 26, 2011, Computerlinks FZCO directed its
freight forwarder to consolidate the remaining three of the six devices
and software from the December 31, 2010 order, along with the five
devices and software from the May 15, 2011 order, and transfer the
ownership of all eight devices and the accompanying equipment within
the U.A.E. After the transfer of ownership, Albuni, identifying himself
as General Manager of ATS, directed the subsequent shipment of the
items to Syria.
9. Finally, on or about June 5, 2011, an order was placed for three
additional Blue Coat devices, along with accompanying equipment and
software, this time falsely stating that the items were destined
purportedly for Turkey for a company named Turkish Marine Services,
when the items were in fact destined for Syria. After the items arrived
in the U.A.E. from the Netherlands, on or about June 27, 2011,
Computerlinks FZCO directed its freight forwarders to transfer
ownership of the items within the U.A.E. Albuni in his capacity as
General Manager of ATS directed the freight forwarder to ship to him at
ATS, which has the same address as ECC in Syria.
10. ECC paid for the May and June orders by two wire transfers
dated, respectively, July 12 and 14, 2011.
B. Additional Equipment Unlawfully Procured by Respondents in 2011 for
Use by STE
11. On or about March 24, 2011, Albuni, through his ATS email
account, notified a different regional reseller that ATS had received
an STE contract and needed assistance in placing orders for the Brocade
ServerIron ADX 1000 and related items. These items distribute network
or application traffic (load balance) across a number of servers to
increase capacity and reliability of applications for networks and
large enterprise data centers. On March 27, 2011, an employee of this
regional reseller responded that he was negotiating about the order
with Mindware, Brocade's authorized reseller in the Middle East, and
that he had requested that the reseller ask Brocade to start the
manufacturing process so that the items could be delivered in six
weeks. After receiving the regional reseller's invoice, Albuni secured
payment for the items from Ammar, who, on or about May 10, 2011,
directed payment to the regional reseller for the order from ECC's bank
account.
12. When Brocade, the U.S. manufacturer, requested end user
information in conjunction with its approval of the order on or about
April 11, 2011, false information was provided indicating that the end
user was a company in Egypt, when in fact the items were destined for
STE in Syria. When the order arrived in the U.A.E. in early May 2011, a
co-conspirator traveled from Damascus to Dubai to inspect the shipment
and found the shipment to be acceptable. Emails received by Albuni
indicate that the shipment was eventually delivered to Syria on or
about May 17, 2011.
C. Hard Drives Unlawfully Procured by Respondents in 2013 for Use by
STE
13. Subsequently, in emails and other correspondence among STE and
Albuni at ATS and iT-Wave, STE identified hard drive issues relating to
three products, some of which were items exported or reexported in
2010-2011 as part of the conspiracy. On or about January 29, 2013,
Albuni, identifying himself as a representative of iT-Wave, placed
orders with a U.S. company for three hard drives, falsely stating that
the items were intended for iT-Wave in Dubai, U.A.E., when in fact the
items were destined for STE in Syria. On or about January 30, 2013, the
hard drives were shipped from the United States to the U.A.E. to a ship
to and bill to address for iT-Wave in Dubai, U.A.E., and transshipped
to Syria after their arrival in Dubai. Emails indicate that the hard
drives arrived in Damascus, Syria, in early March 2013.
14. Following the failure of additional hard drives, STE sought to
acquire more hard drives through Albuni. On or about March 6, 2013,
Albuni, holding himself out as a representative of iT-Wave, placed
another order with the same U.S. company for the same type of hard
drives, again falsely stating that the items were intended for iT-Wave
in Dubai, U.A.E., when in fact the items were destined for STE in
Syria. On or about the same day, the hard drives were shipped from the
United States to iT-Wave in Dubai and transshipped to Syria after their
arrival in the U.A.E. Financial records maintained by Ammar, who served
both as CEO of iT-Wave and Managing Director of ECC, indicate that ECC
paid for the transport of the hard drives from Dubai to Damascus,
Syria, for use by STE.
D. Knowledge
15. As set forth above, Respondents knew at all pertinent times
hereto that the items were destined for end users in Syria, as
evidenced by, inter alia, email discussions among and between
Respondents, the resellers and the forwarders that indicated the final
destination was Syria, shipping documents showing Syria as the ultimate
destination, and wire transfer payment made from Syria for the items.
16. Respondents also knew at all times pertinent hereto that
exports and reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited by the
United States' trade embargo against Syria and related export control
laws. For example, in an interview with BIS and the Department of
Homeland Security special agents on or about August 6, 2013, Ammar
admitted that he was ``one hundred percent'' aware of U.S. sanctions on
Syria and stated that ``[b]efore the sanctions started, I worked for
this American company . . . and when the sanctions started, they told
me to Syria we cannot ship.'' During this interview, he had a business
card that identified him as the managing director of ECC. Based on
emails, Albuni, in turn, was aware of U.S. sanctions on Syria, which
prevented U.S. companies from having registered partners in Syria, as
early as in or about October 2009. Moreover, in correspondence dated
November 29, 2010, Albuni indicated that he knew that there were
problems shipping to Syria and suggested placing STE orders through a
regional reseller, falsely stating that the items were for an Iraq
project.
17. As also set forth above, Ammar and Albuni managed and/or
controlled ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave, through which
[[Page 57575]]
they and their other co-conspirators, named and unnamed, acted in
concert pursuant to a scheme involving a series of transactions to
evade the Regulations.
18. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave each violated
Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations.
As to all Respondents except iT-Wave:
Charges 2-5: 15 CFR 764.2(h)--Evasion
19. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-10 and 15-17, supra, which are
realleged and incorporated herein, on four occasions from on or about
October 29, 2010, through in or about July 2011, Albuni, Ammar, ECC,
and ATS engaged in transactions or took actions with intent to evade
the Regulations in connection with the unlawful export and reexport to
Syria of items subject to the Regulations. The items included equipment
and software designed for use in monitoring and controlling Web traffic
that are classified under ECCN 5A002, controlled for National Security
and Anti-Terrorism reasons and as Encryption Items, and valued at
$1,548,959. Respondents knew at all pertinent times hereto that exports
and reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited by the Regulations.
20. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS committed four
violations of Section 764.2(h) of the Regulations and are jointly and
severally liable for those violations.
Charge 6: 15 CFR 764.2(h)--Evasion
21. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-4, 11-12, and 15-17, supra, which
are realleged and incorporated herein, on one occasion between in or
about March 2011, and in or about April 2011, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and
ATS engaged in a transaction or took actions with the intent to evade
the Regulations in connection with the unlawful export or reexport to
Syria of items subject to the Regulations for use by STE. The items
included data servers and associated parts that are classified under
ECCN 5A002, controlled as Encryption Items for National Security and
Anti-Terrorism reasons, or designated EAR99, and valued at
approximately $249,000. Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS knew at all times
pertinent hereto that exports or reexports of the items to Syria were
prohibited by the Regulations.
22. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS committed one
violation of Section 764.2(h) of the Regulations and are jointly and
severally liable for that violation.
As to all Respondents except ATS:
Charges 7-8: 15 CFR 764.2(h)--Evasion
23. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-4 and 13-17, supra, which are
realleged and incorporated herein, between in or about January 2013,
and in or about March 2013, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and iT-Wave engaged in
transactions or took actions with the intent to evade the Regulations
in connection with the unlawful export or reexport to Syria of items
subject to the Regulations for use by STE. The items were U.S.-origin
hard drives designated as EAR99 and valued in total at approximately
$884. Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and iT-Wave knew at all times pertinent
hereto that exports or reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited
by the Regulations.
24. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and iT-Wave committed two
violations of Section 764.2(h) of the Regulations and are jointly and
severally liable for those violations.
WHEREAS, BIS and Respondents have entered into a Settlement
Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby
they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth therein; and
WHEREAS, I have approved of the terms of such Settlement Agreement;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
FIRST, Respondents shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount
of $7,000,000. Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the
payment of this civil penalty. Payment of $250,000 shall be made to the
U.S. Department of Commerce in four installments as follows: $62,500
not later than March 1, 2016; $62,500 not later than September 1, 2016;
$62,500 not later than March 1, 2017; and $62,500 not later than
September 1, 2017. Payment shall be made in the manner specified in the
attached instructions. Payment of the remaining $6,750,000 shall be
suspended for a period of two years from the date of this Order, and
thereafter shall be waived, provided that during this two-year payment
probationary period under this Order, Respondent has committed no
violation of the Act, or any regulation, order, license or
authorization issued thereunder and has made full and timely payment of
$250,000 as set forth above. If any of the four installment payments is
not fully and timely made, any remaining scheduled installment payments
and any suspended penalty may become due and owing immediately.
SECOND, pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended (31
U.S.C. 3701-3720E (2000)), the civil penalty owed under this Order
accrues interest as more fully described in the attached Notice, and if
payment is not made by the due date specified herein, Respondents will
be assessed, in addition to the full amount of the civil penalty and
interest, a penalty charge and an administrative charge, as more fully
described in the attached Notice.
THIRD, for the applicable time periods, starting from the date of
this Order, that are set forth in Paragraph Sixth below, Aiman Ammar a/
k/a Ayman Ammar, with last known addresses of Princess Tower, Apartment
3803, Al Sufouh Street, Dubai Marina, Dubai, U.A.E., and 1265 Camden
Way, Yuba City, CA 95991; Rashid Albuni, with last known addresses of
The Gardens Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, U.A.E., and Dubai Silicon
Oasis, Office #AG 05-2, Dubai, U.A.E.; Engineering Construction &
Contracting Co., with last known addresses of P.O. Box 25858, Damascus,
Syria, and Abu Romana Area, Shahin Building, Ground Floor, Damascus,
Syria; Advanced Tech Solutions a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions,
with last known addresses of P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria, and Moasa
Square, Takriti Building, Fourth Floor, Damascus, Syria; and iT Wave
FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, with last known addresses of
Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office #AG 05-2, Dubai, U.A.E., and The Gardens
Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, U.A.E., and when acting for or on
their behalf, their successors, assigns, directors, officers,
employees, representatives, or agents (hereinafter each a ``Denied
Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons''), may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to
as ``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations, including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license
exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other
activity subject to the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or in
[[Page 57576]]
any other activity subject to the Regulations.
FOURTH, for the applicable time periods, starting from the date of
this Order, that are set forth in Paragraph Sixth below, no person may,
directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item
subject to the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be
exported from the United States, including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by a Denied Person if such service involves the use of any
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
FIFTH, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to a Denied Person by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of
trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of
this Order for the applicable time periods, starting from the date of
this Order, that are set forth in Paragraph Sixth, below.
SIXTH, that the provisions of Paragraphs Third, Fourth, and Fifth,
above, shall apply for the following periods of time:
A. As to Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., and when
acting for or on its behalf, its successors, assigns, directors,
officers, employees, representatives, or agents, for a period of seven
(7) years from the date of this Order;
B. As to Advanced Tech Solutions a/k/a Advanced Technology
Solutions, and when acting for or on its behalf, its successors,
assigns, directors, officers, employees, representatives, or agents,
for a period of seven (7) years from the date of this Order;
C. As to Rashid Albuni, and when acting for or on his behalf, his
successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees, for a
period of six (6) years from the date of this Order;
D. As to Aiman Ammar a/k/a Ayman Ammar, and when acting for or on
his behalf, his successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or
employees, for a period of five (5) years from the date of this Order;
and
E. As to iT Wave FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, and when
acting for or on its behalf, its successors, assigns, directors,
officers, employees, representatives, or agents, for a period of four
(4) years from the date of this Order.
SEVENTH, Respondents shall not take any action or make or permit to
be made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the
allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order. The foregoing does
not affect Respondents' testimonial obligations in any proceeding, nor
does it affect its right to take legal or factual positions in civil
litigation or other civil proceedings in which the U.S. Department of
Commerce is not a party.
EIGHTH, that the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and
this Order shall be made available to the public.
NINTH, that this Order shall be served on Respondents, and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this
matter, is effective immediately.\5\
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\5\ Review and consideration of this matter have been delegated
to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
Issued this 18th day of September, 2015.
Richard R. Majauskas,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015-24248 Filed 9-23-15; 8:45 am]
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