[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55521-55527]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23121]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-1071; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-204-AD; 
Amendment 39-18264; AD 2015-19-01]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 
The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports 
of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection 
program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this 
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the

[[Page 55522]]

fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability 
to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an 
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2013-
1071; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket 
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company 
Model 777 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on 
January 10, 2014 (79 FR 1772). The NPRM was prompted by reports of 
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or 
inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are 
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel 
shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to 
shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an 
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

Record of Ex Parte Communication

    In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted 
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information 
and information on operational and economic impacts from design 
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments 
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for 
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the 
comments discussed during this teleconference that are relevant to this 
final rule are addressed in this final rule in response to comments 
submitted by other commenters. A discussion of this contact can be 
found in the rulemaking docket at http://www.regulations.gov by 
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2013-1071.

Clarification of Certain Terminology

    Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have 
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve'' 
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to 
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel 
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance 
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79 
FR 1772, January 10, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014)

    American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found 
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) is 
not a safety concern, and that Boeing has not recommended any interim 
action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing 
the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated 
valve (MOV) actuator. We infer AA is requesting that the NPRM be 
withdrawn.
    We disagree with the commenter's request to withdraw the NPRM (79 
FR 1772, January 10, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition 
exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes 
developing a modification that will address the identified unsafe 
condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it considers this 
issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the 
required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel 
shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve 
position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel 
shutoff valve, if certain engine fire conditions were to occur, or if 
extreme engine damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event 
were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event 
would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle. The 
continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a 
fuel exhaustion event.
    The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe 
with respect to engine fire events, and the risk due to severe engine 
damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight, 
sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be 
detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle can be 
shut off in the event of an engine fire or severe damage.
    The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled 
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the 
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and 
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known 
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the 
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the 
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel 
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the 
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a 
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff 
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being 
aware of the failure. An airworthiness limitation containing required 
inspections is intended to limit the number of flights following latent 
failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the appropriate 
method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed this AD in 
this regard.

Request To Provide Further Clarification of the Purpose of the NPRM (79 
FR 1772, January 10, 2014)

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Union, requested that we 
revise the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) to add more details on 
the frequency of valve failure findings, and the associated root cause 
driving the proposed weekly inspection interval versus the existing 
maintenance planning data (MPD) document check interval of 18,000 
flight hours.
    We agree with EASA's request to provide further clarification. As 
we mentioned in a previous comment response, the reason for this final 
rule is not simply a high fuel shutoff valve failure rate, but is 
rather a design error that allows a single failure within a fuel 
shutoff valve to affect both the control

[[Page 55523]]

of the valve and the indication of the valve's position.
    The 18,000-hour check in the MPD document was recommended based on 
the assumption that the indication of the fuel shutoff valve position 
would not be affected by failures that affect the control of the valve. 
With the intended design, there was not a potential for a significant 
number of flights to occur with a fuel shutoff valve failed open (even 
if the valve was never checked), because the indication system was to 
provide real-time indication of the valve's response to commands.
    With the design error that exists in the affected fuel shutoff 
valve actuators, indication and control of the valve are not 
independent, and if no action is taken, we anticipate a significant 
number of flights to occur with a fuel shutoff valve failed open. 
Without the issuance of this final rule, our risk assessment and the 
manufacturer's risk assessment predict that thousands of flights of 
Model 777 airplanes would be conducted with latent fuel shutoff valve 
failures.
    In addition to the design error described previously, the affected 
fuel shutoff valves have a higher-than-typical rate of failure in 
several failure modes. We have received several reports of valves 
failed open (discovered only when fuel filters were changed), of valves 
failed closed (preventing engine start), and of valves that 
spontaneously closed in flight (causing an engine shutdown). Boeing's 
long-term solution to provide a redesigned MOV actuator is intended to 
address these issues in addition to restoring the independence of the 
actuator control and indication features. We have not changed this 
final rule in this regard.

Request To Postpone the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014)

    Singapore Airlines (SIA) requested that the FAA consider delaying 
the release of the final rule until after the Boeing service 
information is issued and sufficient model kits are made available. SIA 
also requested that Boeing provide warranty coverage for the post-
modified part replacement and warranty coverage for the man-hours 
incurred.
    We disagree with the commenter's request to postpone releasing the 
final rule. Because this unsafe condition could exist or develop on 
Model 777 airplanes, an airworthiness limitation containing repetitive 
inspections as an interim action is necessary to ensure the safety of 
the fleet. Issuance of an AD is the appropriate method to correct the 
unsafe condition.
    In addition, the manufacturer does not expect a large number of 
latently failed valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores 
are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to 
support the initial inspections. A functioning fuel shutoff valve is 
required at dispatch. This position is consistent with the original 
determination in developing the master minimum equipment list (MMEL) 
that dispatch relief is not allowed for fire-safety-related flammable 
fluid shutoff valves (other than in a locked, closed position for non-
required equipment). However, under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) 
of this AD, we might consider requests for an adjustment to the 
compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an 
adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety. In regard to 
providing warranty coverage, we cannot comment on Boeing's behalf on 
this issue. We have not changed the final rule in this regard.

Request for Clarification of Other Affected Airplane Models

    EASA requested clarification on whether similar designs on other 
airplanes could exist. EASA stated that this would be the basis for a 
design review of parts of similar design.
    We agree to provide clarification for the commenter. This AD is 
applicable to certain Model 777 series airplanes only. Similar AD 
action is planned for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 787 series airplanes. 
At this time, our understanding is that no other manufacturer's 
airplanes are affected by this specific design problem. We have not 
changed the final rule in this regard.

Request To Add Estimated Costs for the Proposed Repetitive Inspections

    AA requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) 
to include the estimated costs for the repetitive inspections of the 
MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA stated that the cost 
included in the NPRM does not account for the cost of the ongoing 
inspections. AA stated that the NPRM reflects only the first 
inspection. AA also stated that the annual cost of compliance will be 
52 times greater, or $839,800, if the inspection is accomplished 
weekly. AA stated that these costs should be included for operator 
planning purposes.
    We acknowledge the commenter's concern. In this AD, the required 
action is to revise the maintenance or inspection program, as 
applicable, to include a new airworthiness limitation. The added 
airworthiness limitation requires an inspection of the position of the 
MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff valve every 10 days. However, these 
repetitive inspections, which are expected to take less than an hour to 
complete, are required by section 91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) once incorporated into the maintenance 
or inspection program.
    The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions typically includes only 
the costs associated with complying with an AD. In this AD, the 
required action is the maintenance or inspection program revision, as 
applicable, to include the new airworthiness limitation, and 
accomplishing repetitive actions that are specified in the 
airworthiness limitation are not directly required by this AD. The FAA, 
as a matter of practice, does not include a cost estimate for these 
repetitive actions in an AD because these actions are required as part 
of the operating rules. Therefore, we have made no change to this final 
rule in this regard.

Requests To Limit the Applicability

    Air France, AA, Boeing, and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) 
requested that the proposed applicability be changed to include only 
Model 777 airplanes having line numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive.
    Air France and KLM stated that Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777-FTD-28-
12002, dated January 10, 2014, indicated that airplanes delivered 
December 2013 or later incorporate AIMS-2 BlockPoint (BP) v 17, which 
has a new function that avoids latently failed fuel shutoff valves.
    Boeing stated that, beginning with line number 1165, all new 
production airplanes will be delivered with AIMS-2 BP v 17 or later 
software. Boeing also stated that starting with AIMS-2 BP v 17, all 
AIMS-2 software versions will include changes to ensure that the 
correct fuel shutoff valve position is displayed in the flight deck, 
and that the software will monitor both the valve transition and the 
end state to ensure the correct position indication.
    Boeing also requested that the proposed applicability be limited to 
Model 777 airplanes with part number (P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or 
P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) actuators installed at the ``engine fuel 
spar valve locations.'' Boeing stated that the failure mode exists only 
in actuators having these part numbers. Boeing stated that actuators 
having P/N MA20A1001-1 (S343T003-39) might be installed in the ``fuel 
spar valve location,'' and that actuators having P/N MA20A1001-1 
(S343T003-39) are not susceptible to the latent failure addressed by 
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014),

[[Page 55524]]

and would not benefit from an interval inspection.
    We agree that the applicability of this AD should be limited. We 
have changed paragraph (c) of this AD to include only Model 777 
airplanes having line numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive. In addition, in 
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have changed the Applicability 
column for Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) 28-AWL-MOV to clarify that 
the limitation applies to airplanes with the AIMS-1 system having an 
actuator with P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-
66) installed at the engine fuel spar valve position; and airplanes 
with AIMS-2 BP v 16 and earlier software having an actuator with P/N 
MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) installed at the 
engine fuel spar valve position.

Request for Clarification of the Proposed Terminating Action

    AA requested clarification of the proposed terminating action. AA 
stated the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) is an interim action, 
and no information is provided regarding the terminating action. AA 
stated that, if issued, the final rule should contain sufficient 
documentation to clearly establish the effectivity of Model 777 
airplanes subject to the rule, and to terminate the inspection program 
on the subject airplanes. AA stated that Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777-
FTD-28-12002, dated January 10, 2014, among others, addresses the 
corrective action plan that is in progress.
    We agree to provide clarification regarding the modification 
referenced in the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014). Since the 
issuance of the NPRM, the manufacturer has developed a modification 
that addresses the unsafe condition identified in this final rule. 
However, the service information is not available at this time. Since 
we have limited the applicability of this AD to exclude all new 
production airplanes that are delivered with AIMS-2 BP v 17 or later 
software, as explained previously, we find that no further change to 
this AD is necessary in this regard.
    For the affected airplanes, there will likely be two possible 
terminating options--one to replace the fuel shutoff valve actuator, 
and another to upgrade airplanes with AIMS-2 systems to BP v 17 to 
address the unsafe condition. Because service information for these 
modifications is still being developed, we have not changed this final 
rule in this regard.

Request To Replace the AWL Revision Requirement With MOV Actuator 
Inspections Requirement

    Boeing requested that the proposed requirement to incorporate the 
MOV actuator inspection into the AWL Section of the Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness of the operator's maintenance or inspection 
program be replaced with an AD requirement to ``perform the MOV 
inspection every 10 days.'' Boeing stated that the MOV inspection is an 
interim mitigation and is required only until a redesigned MOV can be 
installed in the spar valve locations. Boeing stated that including the 
10-day test requirement as the required AD action would allow 
installation of the redesigned MOV to be approved as an alternative 
method of compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and as a terminating action for 
the repetitive inspections, while avoiding the need for regulatory 
approval to remove the AWL from each operator's maintenance or 
inspection program. In addition, Boeing stated the AWLs are permanent 
actions that affect operators' planning and scheduling, and that 
incorporating a temporary AWL into the operators' maintenance documents 
or a Boeing MPD document will cause confusion among operators.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. During the development of 
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014), we discussed the impact of an 
AWL revision versus a repetitive inspection requirement with Boeing, 
who, in turn, discussed it with a sample of operators. At that time, 
both Boeing and the operators indicated that the addition of an AWL 
revision was the preferred solution because it would reduce the record 
keeping required to document AD compliance. Affected operators who wish 
to use a repetitive inspection requirement in place of an AWL may apply 
for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions specified in 
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, by submitting data substantiating that the 
request would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not 
changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Extend the Proposed Compliance Time Grace Period

    AA requested that we extend the grace period for performing the 
initial inspection required by the new AWLs. AA stated that it is a 
complicated logistical matter to establish a new line maintenance task 
at stations throughout the world, and that there is a ``learning curve 
to acclimate the line maintenance organizations to the new task.'' In 
addition, AA stated that the existing inventory of actuators at 
maintenance stations may be insufficient to replace any failed valves 
discovered through the inspections, resulting in grounded airplanes, 
and that ordering new valves from the vendor generally takes at least 
30 days.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We retained the 
30-day compliance time for revising the maintenance or inspection 
program, as applicable, to include the new AWL. In addition, we have 
changed the initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions 
specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. The 
compliance time of 10 days is consistent with other regulatory actions 
on other affected airplane models.
    We have determined that the initial compliance time for the 
inspection represents an appropriate time in which the required actions 
can be performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while 
still maintaining an adequate level of safety. In developing an 
appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications, 
parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely 
accomplishment of the checks.
    The check itself involves a visual inspection of an existing 
prominent design feature that is intended to indicate the position of 
the fuel shutoff valve actuator. This check is also described in 
existing maintenance documentation. The manufacturer does not expect a 
large number of latently failed valve actuators to be discovered. 
Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and we expect that 
parts can be repositioned in time to support the initial inspections. 
However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, we might 
consider requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are 
submitted to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an 
acceptable level of safety.

Requests To Extend the Interval for the MOV Actuator Inspection

    Aerologic GmbH, Air France, All Nippon Airways (ANA), AA, Boeing, 
FedEx, Japan Airlines Company Ltd. (JAL), KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
(KLM), Lufthansa Technik AG (LTK), and Lufthansa Cargo AG (LUB) 
requested that we change the interval for the MOV actuator inspection 
of the engine fuel shutoff valve.
    Aerologic GmbH, Air France, Lufthansa LTK, Lufthansa LUB, and KLM 
stated that the interval should be 25 flight cycles based on a typical 
utilization in flight cycles that corresponds to a one-week interval. 
The operators stated that the actuator failure

[[Page 55525]]

mode is associated with the cycling of the valve, and the interval 
should, therefore, be based on flight cycles.
    AA stated that the ``weekly'' interval is not defined sufficiently, 
and that it is not clear whether this means once every seven days, one 
time each calendar week, or some other interpretation. AA stated that, 
for its airline and for many other international carriers, this 
presents a problem when the airplane continually crosses the 
International Date Line. AA also stated that the interval does not 
address occurrences where the airplane is out of service for an 
extended period of time, such as a week or longer. AA stated that it 
has strong concerns that the proposed interval may impede the airline's 
ability to function on its current published schedule. AA stated that 
many established flight routings occur on a four-day cycle, and not all 
stations can be set up to perform the inspection for logistical, 
personnel, and contractual reasons; therefore, the weekly interval 
makes it very difficult to achieve the inspection at available 
stations. AA stated that the inspection, if mandated, should be on a 
flight-cycle interval rather than a calendar schedule, and suggested a 
25-flight-cycle interval to alleviate the ``weekly'' term 
interpretation issue, and to address the adverse impact to airline 
operations.
    JAL and ANA requested that the inspection interval be ``25 flight 
cycles or more, or weekly or more, whichever occurs later.'' JAL stated 
that the FAA-proposed inspection interval of ``weekly'' is without 
detailed information such as the number of latently failed fuel shutoff 
valves, failure rates, and so forth. JAL stated that it understands 
that it is preferable to control inspection intervals in flight cycles 
for international flights. JAL and ANA also stated that an average 
flight cycle for a Model 777 airplane might be 2.5 flight cycles per 
day, but that their domestic Model 777 flight cycle average is 6 flight 
cycles per day; therefore, it is a burden to inspect the MOV actuators 
at per-flight-cycle-related intervals. ANA stated that it prefers a 
compliance time of 18,000 flight cycles, which is stated in the MPD 
document. ANA stated that they currently perform the proposed 
inspection at 2,000-flight-hour intervals, and while it has experienced 
several fuel valve actuator failures, it has not detected any latently 
failed open fuel valve actuators.
    SIA requested that the proposed inspection interval be extended to 
2,000 flight hours. SIA stated that the inspections are disruptive, 
laborious, and costly to operations, and would require SIA to inspect 
at least three to four airplanes daily. SIA also stated that frequent 
opening and closing of panels to inspect the MOV actuator may 
inadvertently disrupt other airplane systems and result in unintended 
defects. SIA stated that, if operators are unable to inspect the 
airplane within the mandated intervals, or if the inspection findings 
require extensive rectification, Boeing or the FAA should consider 
granting operators a ``no technical objection'' or an AMOC to allow the 
airplane to be released to service for a restricted period of time. SIA 
also stated that it understands Boeing is working on a modified MOV 
actuator part number that would resolve the reliability issue 
associated with it.
    Boeing requested that the interval be changed to 10 days. Boeing 
stated that it understood the term ``weekly'' to mean 10 days.
    We partially agree with the commenters' request. We agree with 
extending the inspection interval to 10 days. Some operators' route 
structures and maintenance intervals do not align with a 7-day 
interval. Also, several of the operators routinely cross the 
International Date Line, potentially creating confusion over the 
application of an interval when expressed as ``weekly.'' The 10-day 
interval will provide more operational flexibility and will not 
significantly increase the number of at-risk flights. We have changed 
paragraph (g) of this AD and figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD 
accordingly.
    We also added a note to the Interval column of figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD to specify that the inspection is not required 
on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service, and that the 
inspection must be done before further flight if it has been 10 or more 
calendar days since the last inspection.
    However, we disagree with changing the interval basis to flight 
cycles. While the failure of the fuel shutoff valve is likely 
associated with the cycling of the valve, the purpose of the 
inspections is to minimize the exposure to flights that are initiated 
with a valve actuator that is latently failed in the open position.
    To determine the appropriate actions and intervals to minimize this 
exposure, we considered the actions necessary to detect the latent 
failure on each affected airplane model, and then, based on those 
identified actions, determined a minimum practical interval for 
performing the actions.
    On other Boeing airplane models with designs that allow a check to 
be performed using available indications, we determined that a daily 
check is appropriate. That interval is similar to the check interval 
required for fire detection systems. For the affected Model 777 
airplanes identified in this final rule, the fuel shutoff valve 
position cannot be checked using available indications, and a physical 
inspection of the valve actuator itself is necessary to detect the 
latent failure. Because of the work necessary to perform this 
inspection, we determined that a daily interval would be overly 
burdensome and that the 10-day interval would be a more appropriate 
balance of the risk and the burden of performing the inspection. 
However, affected operators may apply for approval of an AMOC in 
accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD 
by submitting data substantiating that the request would provide an 
acceptable level of safety.
    We also disagree that the performance of these inspections is 
likely to cause defects in other systems. While additional defects due 
to unrelated causes might be discovered during the visual inspection, 
the opening of the access door and visual inspection of the fuel 
shutoff valve position is not expected to cause other system failures.

Request To Allow Use of Parts From Less Critical Locations

    FedEx requested that a provision be added to the proposed AD (79 FR 
1772, January 10, 2014) to allow the removal of a working MOV actuator 
from a less critical fuel system valve location and installation in the 
engine fuel shutoff valve. FedEx stated that this will reduce the 
immediate impact of any actuator failures discovered by the required 
inspection.
    We disagree with the request. This situation is not unique to the 
MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. It is not our intent in this AD 
to change operational practices used in performing maintenance and 
alterations, or to change relief provided by the minimum equipment list 
(MEL). The removal of a fully functional part from a less critical 
location and its replacement with a non-functioning part is considered 
an alteration and, as such, must meet the airworthiness regulations, 
which is not possible in this case. However, if a failure occurs at a 
less critical location, operation in the same exact configuration may 
be allowed for a limited time under the MEL. The decision to allow this 
type of maintenance action remains with the local Flight Standards 
organization. Also, it should be noted that the installation of certain 
MOV actuators is prohibited by FAA AD 2013-05-03, Amendment 39-17375 
(78 FR 17290, March 21, 2013). We have not changed this AD in this 
regard.

[[Page 55526]]

Additional Change Made to This AD

    In the ``Description'' column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this 
AD, we have removed the phrase ``refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-00'' for 
performing an inspection of the MOV actuator of the fuel spar valve 
(i.e., the fuel shutoff valve).

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial 
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     [Agr]re consistent with the intent that was proposed in 
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) for correcting the unsafe 
condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014).
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Interim Action

    We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer has developed 
a modification that addresses the unsafe condition for some of the 
airplanes identified in this AD. Once the service information for the 
modification is developed, approved, and available, we might consider 
additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 190 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Cost per      Cost on  U.S.
               Action                        Labor cost           Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness           1 work-hour x $85 per                $0              $85          $16,150
 Limitation.                           hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2015-19-01 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18264; Docket No. FAA-
2013-1071; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-204-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -
300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes, certificated in any 
category, line numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff 
valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off 
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an 
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

    Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the 
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add 
Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) 28-AWL-MOV by incorporating the 
information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into 
the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance time for 
accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 
this AD is within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or 
inspection program revision required by this paragraph.

[[Page 55527]]



  Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--AWL for Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Inspection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV..................  ALI            10 days.............  Airplanes with AIMS- Engine Fuel Shutoff
                                             INTERVAL NOTE: Not     1 system.            Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
                                              required on days     Airplanes with AIMS-  MOV Actuator
                                              when the airplane     2 BlockPoint (BP)    Inspection.
                                              is not used in        v 16 and earlier    Concern: The fuel spar
                                              revenue service..     software..           valve actuator design
                                             Must be done before   APPLICABILITY NOTE:   can result in airplanes
                                              further flight if     Only applies to      operating with a failed
                                              it has been 10 or     airplanes with a     fuel spar valve
                                              more calendar days    fuel spar valve      actuator that is not
                                              since last            actuator having      reported. A latently
                                              inspection..          part number          failed fuel spar valve
                                                                    MA20A2027            actuator would prevent
                                                                    (S343T003-56) or     fuel shutoff to an
                                                                    MA30A1001            engine. In the event of
                                                                    (S343T003-66)        certain engine fires,
                                                                    installed at the     the potential exists
                                                                    engine fuel spar     for an engine fire to
                                                                    valve position..     be uncontrollable.
                                                                                        Perform an inspection of
                                                                                         the fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        NOTE: The fuel spar
                                                                                         valve actuator is
                                                                                         located behind latch
                                                                                         panel 551 DB (left
                                                                                         engine) and latch panel
                                                                                         651 DB (right engine).
                                                                                        1. Make sure both Engine
                                                                                         Control Switches are in
                                                                                         the CUTOFF position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        2. Inspect the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         left rear spar.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         left engine fuel spar
                                                                                         valve actuator is in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing
                                                                                         Airplane Maintenance
                                                                                         Manual, 28-22-02, for
                                                                                         guidance).
                                                                                        3. Inspect the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         right rear spar.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         right engine fuel spar
                                                                                         valve actuator is in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing
                                                                                         Airplane Maintenance
                                                                                         Manual, 28-22-02, for
                                                                                         guidance).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals

    After accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program 
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the 
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in 
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local 
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. 
Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, 
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle 
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: 
[email protected].

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23121 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P