[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 96 (Tuesday, May 19, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28689-28693]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-12023]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 14-27]


Maryanne Phillips-Elias, M.D.; Decision and Order

    On October 23, 2014, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Christopher 
McNeil issued the attached Recommended Decision. Therein, the ALJ found 
that it was undisputed that Respondent's Nevada Controlled Substance 
Registration had been revoked and that she does not possess authority 
to dispense controlled substances in Nevada, the State in which she 
holds her DEA registration. R.D. at 6; see also id. at 2. The ALJ thus 
concluded that Respondent is no longer a practitioner within the 
meaning of the Controlled Substances Act and is therefore not entitled 
to be registered. He therefore recommended that I ``deny Respondent's 
application for a DEA Certificate of Registration.'' R.D. at 9.
    There is, however, no evidence that an application is currently 
pending before the Agency. Rather, the Government seeks the revocation 
of Respondent's registration, which does not expire until March 31, 
2017, and authorizes her to dispense controlled substances in schedules 
II through V, at registered premises located in Henderson, Nevada. 
Order to Show Cause, at 1.
    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), ``[a] registration . . . to . . . 
dispense a controlled substance . . . may be suspended or revoked by 
the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had 
[her] State license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by 
competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to 
engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.'' This Agency 
has further held that notwithstanding that this provision grants the 
Agency authority to suspend or revoke a registration, other provisions 
of the Controlled Substances Act ``make plain that a practitioner can 
neither obtain nor maintain a DEA registration unless the practitioner 
currently has authority under state law to handle controlled 
substances.'' James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), pet. for rev. 
denied, Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012).
    These provisions include section 102(21), which defines the term 
``practitioner'' to ``mean[ ] a physician . . . licensed, registered, 
or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which [s]he 
practices . . . to distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . . a

[[Page 28690]]

controlled substance in the course of professional practice,'' 21 
U.S.C. 802(21), as well as section 303(f), which directs that ``[t]he 
Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . to dispense . . . 
controlled substances . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense 
. . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which [s]he 
practices.'' Id. Sec.  823(f). Based on these provisions, the Agency 
has long held that revocation is warranted even where a state order has 
summarily suspended a practitioner's controlled substances authority 
and the state agency's order remains subject to challenge in either 
administrative or judicial proceedings.\1\ See Gary Alfred Shearer, 78 
FR 19009 (2013); Carmencita E. Gallora, 60 FR 47967 (1995).
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    \1\ I thus also reject Respondent's contention that because she 
``has not acted [in a manner] inconsistent with [the] public 
interest as laid out in'' section 823(f), ``DEA has discretion to 
carve out an exception in this case'' to the CSA's requirement that 
she possess state authority to hold a DEA registration. Resp. Reply, 
at 4. As explained above, this is a requirement imposed by statute 
which DEA has no authority to waive.
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    Respondent argues that she ``should be given a hearing to present 
evidence to refute the legitimacy of the revocation'' of her state 
registration by the Nevada Pharmacy Board. Respondent's Reply to the 
Govt.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, at 2. According to Respondent, the 
Nevada Board's Order is invalid ``because the Board never identified 
the specific grounds for which [her] license should be revoked in 
Nevada.'' Id. at 3.
    Respondent thus seeks to collaterally attack the Nevada Board's 
Order. However, ```DEA has repeatedly held that a registrant cannot 
collaterally attack the results of a state criminal or administrative 
proceeding in a proceeding brought under section 304 [21 U.S.C. 824] of 
the CSA.''' Calvin Ramsey, 76 FR 20034, 20036 (2011) (quoting Hicham K. 
Riba, 73 FR 75773, 75774 (2008) (other citations omitted)); see also 
Shahid Musud Siddiqui, 61 FR 14818 (1996); Robert A. Leslie, 60 FR 
14004 (1995). Respondent must therefore seek relief from the State 
Board's Order in those administrative and judicial forums provided by 
the State. Her various contentions as to the validity of the Nevada 
Pharmacy Board's order are therefore not material to this Agency's 
resolution of whether she is entitled to maintain her DEA registration.
    As for her argument that the Agency's use of summary disposition to 
revoke her DEA registration has denied her ``fundamental fairness'' 
because DEA regulations provide that she is entitled to a hearing, 
Resp. Reply at 3; ``summary judgment has been used for more than 100 
years to resolve legal `actions in which there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact' and has never been deemed to violate Due 
Process.'' Ramsey, 76 FR at 20036 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Advisory 
Committee Notes--1937 Adoption) and Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 
(1977)). Respondent was provided with the opportunity to dispute the 
material fact which is dispositive of the Government's allegation that 
she lacks authority to dispense controlled substances in the State in 
which she is registered and therefore cannot remained registered. I 
thus reject her contention that the use of summary disposition denied 
her fundamental fairness.
    Accordingly, for reasons explained above and with the caveat that 
there is no application pending before the Agency, I adopt the ALJ's 
factual finding that Respondent's Nevada controlled substance 
registration has been revoked and therefore she does not possess 
authority under Nevada law to dispense controlled substances. I further 
adopt the ALJ's legal conclusion that Respondent is no longer a 
practitioner within the meaning of the CSA and is therefore not 
entitled to be registered. However, because there is no application 
currently pending before the Agency, I do not adopt those portions of 
his opinion which discuss whether Respondent's application should be 
granted or denied, including his Recommendation that I deny her 
application. Instead, for reasons explained above, I will order that 
Respondent's registration be revoked.

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and 28 
CFR 0.100(b) I order that DEA Certificate of Registration FP2501648 
issued to Maryanne Phillips-Elias be, and it hereby is, revoked. This 
Order is effectively immediately.

    Dated: May 1, 2015
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
Brian Bayly, Esq., for the Government.
Michael Khouri, Esq., and Ashley K. Kagasoff, Esq., for the Respondent.

RECOMMENDED RULING, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECISION 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Nature of the Case and Procedural History

    Administrative Law Judge Christopher B. McNeil. Maryanne Phillips-
Elias, M.D., the respondent in this case, is registered with the DEA as 
a practitioner in Schedules II through V under Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) certificate registration number FP2501648 at 9065 
S. Peco Rd., Ste. 250, Henderson, NV 89074.\1\ The registration number 
expires by its own terms on March 31, 2017.\2\
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    \1\ Order to Show Cause dated Sept. 17, 2014 at 1.
    \2\ Id.
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    On September 17, 2014, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control, filed an Order 
to Show Cause as to why the DEA should not revoke her current 
certificate of registration, deny any applications for renewal or 
modification, and deny any application for any other DEA registration 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3).\3\ As grounds for 
revocation, the Government alleges that Respondent does not have 
authority to handle controlled substances in Nevada, the State in which 
Respondent is registered with the DEA.\4\
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    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Id.
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    On September 26, 2014, Respondent, through her Attorneys, Ashley K. 
Kagasoff, Esq., and Michael Khouri, Esq., filed a timely request for 
hearing.\5\ Respondent does not dispute that her controlled substance 
registration was revoked by the Nevada State Board of Pharmacy.\6\ 
Instead, Respondent asserts that the Nevada State Board of Pharmacy 
acted on grounds that did not warrant discipline and that the Board's 
decision was arbitrary.\7\ Respondent has a writ, Maryanne Phillips v. 
Nevada State Board of Pharmacy,\8\ pending in the First Judicial Court 
of Carson City County, Nevada to set aside the decision to revoke 
Respondent's registration.\9\ Respondent asks me to delay any hearing 
until the writ is resolved.\10\ Alternatively, if the delay is not 
granted, Respondent expresses her wish to continue with the hearing as 
planned.\11\
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    \5\ Respondent's Request for Hearing dated Sept. 23, 2014 at 1, 
received by DEA Sept. 26, 2014.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Case No. 14-OC-00064.
    \9\ Respondent's Request for Hearing at 1.
    \10\ Id.
    \11\ Id.

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[[Page 28691]]

    I received the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment on October 
8, 2014, with proof of service upon Respondent, accompanied by 
supporting documentation.\12\ In my Order of September 30, 2014, I 
directed the Government to provide evidence to support the allegation 
that Respondent lacks state authority to handle controlled 
substances.\13\ The factual premise relied upon by the Government in 
support of its motion is that Respondent does not have a controlled 
substance registration issued by the Nevada State Board of Pharmacy, 
the state in which Respondent is registered.\14\ Additionally, in the 
same Order, I provided Respondent the opportunity to respond to the 
Government's Motion for Summary Judgment.\15\ That response was due 
seven business days after service of the Government's motion on 
opposing parties.\16\ On October 17, 2014, I received Respondent's 
timely response.\17\ The Government exercised its right to reply to the 
response and submitted a reply on October 22, 2014.\18\ Drawing from 
the motion and briefs submitted, I find as follows:
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    \12\ Government's Motion for Summary Judgment dated Oct. 7, 2014 
at 1-18, received by DEA Oct. 8, 2014.
    \13\ Order for Briefing on Allegations Concerning Respondent's 
Lack of State Authority dated Sept. 30, 2014 at 1.
    \14\ Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-3.
    \15\ Order for Briefing on Allegations Concerning Respondent's 
Lack of State Authority at 2.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Respondent Maryanne Phillips-Elias, M.D. Reply to the 
Government's Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaration of Ashley 
K. Kagasoff in Support Thereof dated Oct. 16, 2014 at 1. Note that 
the fax was received at 6:00pm E.D.T. on October 16, 2014. As the 
document was received after normal business hours, the document is 
treated as if it was received on October 17, 2014. Regardless, the 
response was timely received.
    \18\ Government's Reply in Support of its Motion to Summary 
Judgment dated Oct. 22, 2014 at 1.
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Issue

    The substantial issue raised by the Government rests on an 
undisputed fact. The Government asserts that Respondent's application 
must be summarily denied because Respondent does not have a controlled 
substance registration issued by the state in which she intends to 
practice.\19\ Under DEA precedent, a practitioner's DEA Certificate of 
Registration for controlled substances must be summarily revoked if the 
applicant is not authorized to handle controlled substances in the 
state in which she maintains DEA registration.\20\ Unless from the 
pleadings now before me there is a material issue regarding 
Respondent's authority to handle controlled substances in Nevada, the 
application must be denied summarily, without a hearing.
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    \19\ Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2.
    \20\ See 21 U.S.C. 801(21), 823(f), 824(a)(3); see also House of 
Medicine, 79 FR 4959, 4961 (DEA 2014); Deanwood Pharmacy, 68 FR 
41662-01 (DEA July 14, 2003); Wayne D. Longmore, M.D., 77 FR 67669-
02 (DEA November 13, 2012); Alan H. Olefsky, M.D., 72 FR 42127-01 
(DEA August 1, 2007); Layfe Robert Anthony, M.D., 67 FR 15811 (DEA 
May 20, 2002); George Thomas, PA-C, 64 FR 15811-02 (DEA April 1, 
1999); Shahid Musud Siddiqui, M.D., 61 FR 14818-02 (DEA April 4, 
1996); Michael D. Lawton, M.D., 59 FR 17792-01 (DEA April 14, 1994); 
Abraham A. Chaplan, M.D., 57 FR 55280-03 (DEA November 24, 1992). 
See also Bio Diagnosis Int'l, 78 FR 39327-03, 39331 (DEA July 1, 
2013) (distinguishing distributor applicants from other 
``practitioners'' in the context of summary disposition analysis).
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Respondent's Contentions

    In Respondent's Reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Respondent never disputes the Government's contention that she is not 
currently licensed by the State of Nevada to dispense controlled 
substances.\21\ Instead, Respondent asserts three legal arguments. 
Respondent's first legal argument is that Respondent should be given a 
hearing to present evidence to refute the legitimacy of the 
revocation.\22\ Respondent states her belief that the matter should be 
determined following the resolution of Respondent's writ and that the 
Nevada State Board of Pharmacy relied on insufficient grounds to revoke 
her state controlled substance registration.\23\ Respondent's second 
argument is that she has been denied fundamental fairness by the 
DEA.\24\ Respondent writes that ``it does not make any sense that 
Respondent is given the right to a hearing only to get denied one, once 
the request is made.'' \25\ Finally, Respondent asserts that the DEA 
has discretion to do what is in the best interest of promoting the 
public interest.\26\ After stating the five public interest factors 
provided by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), Respondent declares that allowing her to 
retain her license is not inconsistent with the public interest.\27\
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    \21\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2.
    \22\ Id.
    \23\ Id. at 2-3.
    \24\ Id. at 3.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Id. at 4.
    \27\ Id.
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Scope of Authority

    On September 17, 2014, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control, filed an Order 
to Show Cause proposing to deny the application pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(3) and 21 U.S.C. 823(f).\28\
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    \28\ Order to Show Cause at 1.
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    Respondent believes that she should be given a hearing to present 
evidence to refute the legitimacy of the revocation following the 
resolution of Respondent's writ to demonstrate that the Nevada State 
Board of Pharmacy relied on insufficient grounds to revoke her state 
controlled substance registration.\29\ However, the case before me is 
presented under a grant of authority to recommend that the 
Administrator either continue or revoke Respondent's Certificate of 
Registration for controlled substances. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f), 
the DEA may grant such an application only to a ``practitioner.'' Under 
21 U.S.C. 802(21), a ``practitioner'' must be ``licensed, registered, 
or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in 
which he practices or does research, to distribute [or] dispense . . . 
controlled substance[s.]'' Given this statutory language, the DEA 
Administrator does not have the authority under the Controlled 
Substances Act to grant a registration to a practitioner if that 
practitioner is not authorized to dispense controlled substances.\30\
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    \29\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-
3.
    \30\ See Abraham A. Chaplan, M.D., 57 FR 55280-03, 55280 (DEA 
November 24, 1992), and cases cited therein. In Chaplan, DEA 
Administrator Robert C. Bonner adopts the ALJ's opinion that ``the 
DEA lacks statutory power to register a practitioner unless the 
practitioner holds state authority to handle controlled 
substances.'' Id.
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    The fact that Respondent is currently in the process of appealing 
what she views as an unjust decision of the Nevada State Board of 
Pharmacy does not change this outcome. As the Government notes, the 
assertion that she might prevail in overturning the Board's revocation 
order is ``highly speculative.'' \31\ Even if Respondent was very 
likely to succeed on appeal, summary disposition is still appropriate. 
As the Government notes in its Reply in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, ``[a]ll that matters is that Respondent lacks state 
authority to dispense or distribute controlled substances.'' \32\ Under 
no circumstances is the DEA authorized to provide a doctor, such as 
Respondent, the ability to dispense controlled substances when the 
doctor does not possess their state controlled substance registration. 
This limitation is not without meaning. In the first subchapter of the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801,

[[Page 28692]]

Congress acknowledged that controlled substances when utilized 
improperly ``have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health 
and general welfare of the American people.'' \33\ Mandating that a 
practitioner possess state authority before providing a practitioner 
the privilege to handle controlled substances lowers the risk of 
diversion by illegitimate or unqualified practitioners.
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    \31\ Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3.
    \32\ Government's Reply in Support of its Motion to Summary 
Judgment at 2.
    \33\ Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. 801(1). 1970.
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    Respondent also alleges that she has been denied fundamental 
fairness by the DEA.\34\ Specifically, Respondent cites that fact that 
the Government's Order to Show Cause provides her notice of the 
opportunity of a hearing to show cause why the DEA should not revoke 
her DEA certificate of registration, but later denies her a 
hearing.\35\ Although Respondent may believe it is unfair that the DEA 
denies her a hearing after issuing an Order to Show Cause, Respondent 
has failed to show that any disputed material fact is involved 
regarding her state controlled substance registration. If Respondent 
through her Reply to Government's Motion for Summary Judgment 
demonstrated that there was a dispute as to the material fact of 
whether her state controlled substance registration was revoked, I 
would not have dismissed this case without a comprehensive hearing. 
However, the inability for the DEA to grant Respondent a DEA 
certificate of registration without a valid state controlled substance 
registration prevents further consideration of this matter.
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    \34\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. 
Respondent's allegation does not directly allege a violation of her 
constitutional right to due process. Respondent's failure to make a 
conspicuous claim regarding due process has led to a waiver of this 
constitutional claim. However, if Respondent chooses to submit 
exceptions to this order referencing her constitutional right to due 
process, she may succeed in preserving the issue for appeal.
    \35\ Id. at 3; Order to Show Cause at 1.
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    Respondent's final argument is that the DEA has discretion to act 
in the public interest to not revoke Respondent's federal certificate 
of registration.\36\ In her Reply to Government's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Respondent correctly notes that to determine whether a DEA 
certificate of registration is in the public interest, a DEA ALJ must 
consider the factors enumerated under 21 U.S.C. 823(f).\37\ Respondent 
proceeds to apply the factors to her specific situation to make the 
argument that she should not lose her DEA certificate of 
registration.\38\ Quoting the Declaration of Ashley Kagasoff,\39\ 
Respondent cites statements such as that she has never been convicted 
of a federal or state crime to support the notion that not revoking her 
DEA COR is consistent with the public interest.\40\ Such statements 
made by Respondent are unpersuasive. If Respondent is successful in her 
writ and her state license to dispense controlled substances is 
restored, she is welcome to immediately apply for a new DEA certificate 
of registration. If Respondent's application for a new registration is 
opposed by the DEA and Respondent exercises her right to a hearing, it 
is at that time--not before that time--that a DEA ALJ will hear 
evidence from both Respondent and the Government as to whether the 
registration is consistent with the public interest.
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    \36\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-
5.
    \37\ Id. at 4. See also 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
    \38\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-
5.
    \39\ See Declaration of Ashley K. Kagasoff in Support Thereof.
    \40\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4.
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Facts

    Given this body of law, the material fact here, indeed the sole 
fact of consequence, is whether Respondent is authorized by the State 
of Nevada to dispense controlled substances. Where, as here, no 
material fact is in dispute, there is no need for an evidentiary 
hearing and summary disposition is appropriate.\41\ The sole question 
of fact before me can be addressed, and has been addressed, by the 
pleadings submitted to me by the parties. Our record includes no 
dispute regarding the Government's contention that the authority of Dr. 
Phillips-Elias to dispense controlled substances in Nevada was revoked 
by the Nevada State Board of Pharmacy on June 13, 2014.\42\ The reasons 
for the revocation are not material, given the statutory language set 
forth above.
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    \41\ See Michael G. Dolin, M.D., 65 FR 5661 (DEA February 4, 
2000); see also Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32887 (DEA July 19, 
1983), aff'd sub nom. Kirk v. Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984).
    \42\ Order to Show Cause at 1.
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Analysis, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

    In determining whether to grant the Government's Motion for Summary 
Disposition, I am required to apply the principle of law that holds 
such a motion may be granted in an administrative proceeding if no 
material question of fact exists:

It is settled law that when no fact question is involved or the facts 
are agreed, a plenary, adversary administrative proceeding involving 
evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, etc., is not obligatory--even 
though a pertinent statute prescribes a hearing. In such situations, 
the rationale is that Congress does not intend administrative agencies 
to perform meaningless tasks (citations omitted).\43\

    \43\ NLRB v. International Assoc. of Bridge, 549 F.2d 634, 638 
(9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Consolidated Mines & 
Smelting Co., Ltd., 455 F.2d 432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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    In this context, I am further guided by prior decisions before the 
DEA involving certificate holders who lacked licenses to distribute or 
dispense controlled substances. On the issue of whether an evidentiary 
hearing is required, ``it is well settled that when there is no 
question of material fact involved, there is no need for a plenary, 
administrative hearing.'' \44\ Under this guidance, the Government's 
motion must be sustained unless a material fact question has been 
presented.
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    \44\ See Michael G. Dolin, M.D., 65 FR 5661 (DEA February 4, 
2000); Jesus R. Juarez, M.D., 62 FR 14945 (DEA March 28, 1997); see 
also Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32887 (DEA July 19, 1983), aff'd 
sub nom. Kirk v. Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984).
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    The sole determinative fact now before me is that Respondent lacks 
a Nevada controlled substance registration. In order for a doctor to 
receive a DEA registration authorizing her to dispense controlled 
substances under 21 U.S.C. 823(f), she must meet the definition of 
``practitioner'' as found in the Controlled Substances Act.\45\ Such a 
person must be ``licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted by . . . 
the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to distribute, dispense, 
[or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of 
professional practice.'' \46\ Delegating to the Attorney General the 
authority to determine who may or may not be registered to perform 
these duties, Congress permitted such registration only to 
``practitioners'' as defined by the Controlled Substances Act.\47\
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    \45\ 21 U.S.C. 802(21).
    \46\ Id.
    \47\ 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
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    As cited by the Government in its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
there is substantial authority both through agency precedent and 
through decisions of courts in review of that precedent, holding that a 
doctor's DEA controlled substance registration is dependent upon the 
doctor having a state license to dispense controlled substances.\48\ 
Under the doctrine before me, the Government meets its burden of

[[Page 28693]]

establishing grounds to deny an application for registration upon 
sufficient proof establishing the applicant does not possess a state 
controlled substance registration. That proof is in the record before 
me, and it warrants the summary revocation of Respondent's DEA 
Certificate of Registration.
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    \48\ Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-3 and cases 
cited therein.
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    I am mindful of the arguments raised by Respondent in her Reply to 
the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, including the fact that 
Respondent is currently appealing the revocation of her state 
controlled substance registration.\49\ These difficulties do not, 
however, change the fact that without a state controlled substance 
registration, Respondent is not a ``practitioner'' and cannot be 
granted a Certificate of Registration.
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    \49\ Reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-
3.
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    Some care should be taken to assure the parties that the actions 
taken in this administrative proceeding conform to constitutional 
requirements. I have examined the parties' contentions with an eye 
towards ensuring all tenets of due process have been adhered to. There 
is, however, no authority for me to evaluate the facts that underlie 
Respondent's contentions. In the proceedings now before me, the only 
material question was answered by Respondent in her Request for 
Hearing. Further, while the Order to Show Cause sets forth a non-
exhaustive summary of facts and law relevant to a determination that 
granting this application would be inconsistent with the public 
interest under 21 U.S.C. 823(f), the conclusion, order and 
recommendation that follow are based solely on a finding that 
Respondent is not a ``practitioner'' as that term is defined by 21 
U.S.C. 802(21), and I make no finding regarding whether granting this 
application would or would not be inconsistent with the public 
interest.

Order Granting the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition and 
Recommendation

    I find there is no genuine dispute regarding whether Respondent is 
a ``practitioner'' as that term is defined by 21 U.S.C. 802(21), and 
that based on the record the Government has established that Respondent 
is not a practitioner and is not authorized to dispense controlled 
substances in the state in which she seeks to operate under a DEA 
Certificate of Registration. I find no other material facts at issue, 
for the reasons set forth in the Government's Motion for Summary 
Disposition. Accordingly, I GRANT the Government's Motion for Summary 
Disposition.
    Upon this finding, I ORDER that this case be forwarded to the 
Administrator for final disposition and I RECOMMEND the Administrator 
DENY Respondent's application for a DEA Certificate of Registration.

    Dated: October 23, 2014.

Christopher B. McNeil,

Administrative Law Judge.

[FR Doc. 2015-12023 Filed 5-18-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4410-09-P