[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 6, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26020-26021]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10559]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL14-37-000]


PJM Interconnection, LLC; Notice Inviting Post-Technical 
Conference Comments

    On January 7, 2015, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(Commission) staff conducted a technical conference to evaluate 
whether: (1) PJM Interconnection, LLC's (PJM) Financial Transmission 
Rights (FTR) forfeiture rules as they apply to virtual transactions, 
including Up-to Congestion (UTC) transactions and INC/DEC transactions, 
are just and reasonable; and (2) PJM's current uplift allocation rules 
associated with UTC transactions and INCs/DECs are just and reasonable.
    All interested persons are invited to file post-technical 
conference comments on any or all of the questions listed in the 
attachment to this Notice. These comments must be filed with the 
Commission no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on May 29, 2015.
    For more information about this Notice, please contact:

Carmen Gastilo Machuga (Legal Information), Office of the General 
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8657, [email protected].

Elizabeth Topping (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and 
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426 (202) 502-6731, [email protected].

Cathleen Colbert (Technical Information), Office of Enforcement, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, 
DC 20426, (202) 502-8997, [email protected].

    Dated: April 29, 2015.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

Post-Technical Conference Questions for Comment

    In addition to any further responses to the questions posed in the 
Commission Staff's December 10, 2014 Supplemental Notice of Technical 
Conference,\1\ Commission Staff seeks responses to the following 
questions. Parties submitting comments need not respond to each 
question.
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    \1\ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Supplemental Notice of 
Technical Conference, Docket No. EL14-37-000 (December 10, 2014). 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=13707421.
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(1) FTR Forfeiture Rule

    (a) When calculating the contribution a virtual transaction (INC, 
DEC, or UTC) has to power flowing across a given constraint, how should 
the injection/withdrawal points for the virtual transaction be 
identified? Should the defined ``worst case'' node be limited to the 
market participant's own transactions? Additionally, should the impact 
threshold(s) used for triggering the forfeiture rule remain at 75 
percent regardless of the injection/withdrawal points identified? Why 
or why not?
    (b) As an alternative to the current approach of assessing one 
virtual transaction at a time, should the FTR forfeiture rule 
collectively assess the net impact of a market participant's entire 
portfolio of INCs, DECs, and UTCs? Should it assess the net impact of 
all virtual transactions that clear the market? In addition to virtual 
transactions, should a market participant's portfolio of physical 
transactions be considered? Why or why not? If a portfolio approach 
were adopted, should the impact threshold(s) continue to be 75 percent, 
as used in the past, or is a different threshold(s) more appropriate? 
How could a portfolio approach be implemented?
    (c) Should counter-flow FTRs and bids that relieve congestion 
remain exempt from FTR forfeiture rule calculations? Should financial 
transactions that improve day-ahead and real-time market price 
convergence be exempt from the forfeiture rule? Why or why not? How, if 
at all, would these exemptions differ when assessing the impact of a 
market participant's portfolio as opposed to one INC, DEC, or UTC at a 
time? Are there any other currently exempt financial transactions that 
should be subject to FTR forfeiture calculations?
    (d) Should the application of the forfeiture rule to INCs, DECs and 
UTCs be revised in ways not addressed by these questions, and if so, 
describe in detail the proposed revision and justification for the 
change.
    (e) If you believe that changes to the current FTR Forfeiture Rule 
provisions of PJM's tariff are necessary, propose appropriate tariff 
language that you believe addresses your concern.

(2) Uplift

    (a) Should UTCs be assessed uplift? Explain why or why not. If so, 
how, if at all, should this allocation differ from the allocation to 
individual INCs and DECs and ``paired'' INCs and DECs? Should INCs and 
DECs continue to be required to pay uplift charges? What effect does 
imposing these charges have on the ability of virtual traders to 
arbitrage day-ahead and real-time price differences?
    (b) Do UTCs impact unit commitment decisions? If so, how? Several 
views were expressed during the conference. For example, one panelist 
cited PJM documentation stating that UTCs are not included in 
commitment decisions.\2\ Other panelists expressed the view that both 
``paired'' INCs and DECs and UTC's impact unit commitment.\3\
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    \2\ January 7, 2015 Presentation of Wesley Allen, ``Incremental 
Offers, Decrement Bids & Up To Congestion.'' at pp 4-5.
    \3\ January 7, 2015 Technical Conference on Financial 
Transactions in PJM, Transcript 240:15-241:4 (Adam Keech); Id. at 
242: 14-16 (Joseph Bowring).

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[[Page 26021]]

    (c) Should market participants be allowed to net INC and DEC 
transactions for the purpose of uplift allocations? Why or why not? If 
yes, should netting within a market participant's portfolio (intra-
market participant) be allowed or should market-wide (inter-market 
participant) netting be allowed? Should physical assets be included in 
the netting process? Please discuss the advantages and disadvantages to 
both approaches.
    (d) Are there other cost-causation approaches that should be 
considered? What advantages, disadvantages, and operational challenges 
would be associated with implementing such approaches in PJM?
    (e) If virtual transactions are assessed uplift, should the uplift 
be designed as a fixed amount known in advance to permit the traders to 
assess the costs of the trade versus the potential arbitrage 
differences between day-ahead and real-time?
    (f) If you believe that changes to the current Uplift provisions of 
PJM's tariff are necessary, propose appropriate tariff language that 
you believe addresses your concern.

[FR Doc. 2015-10559 Filed 5-5-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P