[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 75 (Monday, April 20, 2015)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21989-22004]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-08833]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employee Benefits Security Administration

29 CFR Part 2550

[Application Number D-11713]
ZRIN 1210-ZA25


Proposed Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain 
Debt Securities between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee 
Benefit Plans and IRAs

AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), U.S. 
Department of Labor.

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Class Exemption.

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SUMMARY: This document contains a notice of pendency before the U.S. 
Department of Labor of a proposed exemption from certain prohibited 
transactions provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). The 
provisions at issue generally prohibit fiduciaries with respect to 
employee benefit plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) from 
purchasing and selling securities when the fiduciaries are acting on 
behalf of their own accounts (principal transactions). The exemption 
proposed in this notice would permit principal transactions in certain 
debt securities between a plan, plan participant or beneficiary 
account, or an IRA, and a fiduciary that provides investment advice to 
the plan or IRA, under conditions to safeguard the interests of these 
investors. The proposed exemption would affect participants and 
beneficiaries of plans, IRA owners, and fiduciaries with respect to 
such plans and IRAs.

DATES: Comments: Written comments concerning the proposed class 
exemption must be received by the Department on or before July 6, 2015.
    Applicability: The Department proposes to make this exemption 
available eight months after publication of the final exemption in the 
Federal Register.

ADDRESSES: All written comments concerning the proposed class exemption 
should be sent to the Office of Exemption Determinations by any of the 
following methods, identified by ZRIN: 1210-ZA25:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov at Docket ID 
number: EBSA-EBSA-2014-0016. Follow the instructions for submitting 
comments.
    Email to: [email protected].
    Fax to: (202) 693-8474.
    Mail: Office of Exemption Determinations, Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, (Attention: D-11713), U.S. Department of 
Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Suite 400, Washington, DC 20210.
    Hand Delivery/Courier: Office of Exemption Determinations, Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, (Attention: D-11713), U.S. Department 
of Labor, 122 C St. NW., Suite 400, Washington, DC 20001.
     Instructions. All comments must be received by the end of the 
comment period. The comments received will be available for public 
inspection in the Public Disclosure Room of the Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-1513, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210. Comments will also be 
available online at www.regulations.gov, at Docket ID number: EBSA-
2014-0016 and www.dol.gov/ebsa, at no charge.

[[Page 21990]]

    Warning: All comments will be made available to the public. Do not 
include any personally identifiable information (such as Social 
Security number, name, address, or other contact information) or 
confidential business information that you do not want publicly 
disclosed. All comments may be posted on the Internet and can be 
retrieved by most Internet search engines.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Shiker, Office of Exemption 
Determinations, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. 
Department of Labor (202) 693-8824 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department is proposing this class 
exemption on its own motion, pursuant to ERISA section 408(a) and Code 
section 4975(c)(2), and in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
29 CFR part 2570, subpart B (76 FR 66637 (October 27, 2011)).
    Public Hearing: The Department plans to hold an administrative 
hearing within 30 days of the close of the comment period. The 
Department will ensure ample opportunity for public comment by 
reopening the record following the hearing and publication of the 
hearing transcript. Specific information regarding the date, location 
and submission of requests to testify will be published in a notice in 
the Federal Register.

Executive Summary

Purpose of Regulatory Action

    The Department is proposing this exemption in connection with its 
proposed regulation under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 
4975(e)(3)(B) (Proposed Regulation), published elsewhere in this issue 
of the Federal Register. The Proposed Regulation specifies when an 
entity is a fiduciary by reason of the provision of investment advice 
for a fee or other compensation regarding assets of a plan or IRA. If 
adopted, the Proposed Regulation would replace an existing regulation 
that was adopted in 1975. The Proposed Regulation is intended to take 
into account the advent of 401(k) plans and IRAs, the dramatic increase 
in rollovers, and other developments that have transformed the 
retirement plan landscape and the associated investment market over the 
four decades since the existing regulation was issued. In light of the 
extensive changes in retirement investment practices and relationships, 
the Proposed Regulation would update existing rules to distinguish more 
appropriately between the sorts of advice relationships that should be 
treated as fiduciary in nature and those that should not.
    The exemption proposed in this notice would allow investment advice 
fiduciaries to engage in purchases and sales of certain debt securities 
out of their inventory (i.e., engage in principal transactions) with 
plans, participant or beneficiary accounts, and IRAs, under conditions 
designed to safeguard the interests of these investors. In the absence 
of an exemption, these transactions would be prohibited under ERISA and 
the Code. In this regard, ERISA and the Code generally prohibit 
fiduciaries with respect to plans and IRAs from purchasing or selling 
any property to plans, participant or beneficiary accounts, or IRAs. 
Fiduciaries also may not engage in self-dealing or, under ERISA, act in 
any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party whose interests 
are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its 
participants and beneficiaries. When a fiduciary sells a security out 
of its own inventory in a principal transaction, it violates these 
prohibitions.
    ERISA section 408(a) specifically authorizes the Secretary of Labor 
to grant administrative exemptions from ERISA's prohibited transaction 
provisions.\1\ Regulations at 29 CFR 2570.30 to 2570.52 describe the 
procedures for applying for an administrative exemption. Before 
granting an exemption, the Department must find that it is 
administratively feasible, in the interests of plans and their 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective of the 
rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plans and IRA owners. 
Interested parties are permitted to submit comments to the Department 
through July 6, 2015. The Department plans to hold an administrative 
hearing within 30 days of the close of the comment period.
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    \1\ Code section 4975(c)(2) authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to grant exemptions from the parallel prohibited 
transaction provisions of the Code. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 
1978 (5 U.S.C. app. at 214 (2000)) generally transferred the 
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to grant administrative 
exemptions under Code section 4975 to the Secretary of Labor. This 
proposed exemption would provide relief from the indicated 
prohibited transaction provisions of both ERISA and the Code.
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Summary of the Major Provisions

    The proposed exemption would allow an individual investment advice 
fiduciary (an adviser) \2\ and the firm that employs or otherwise 
contracts with the adviser (a financial institution) to engage in 
principal transactions involving certain debt securities, with plans, 
participant and beneficiary accounts, and IRAs. The proposed exemption 
limits the type of debt securities that may be purchased or sold and 
contains conditions which the adviser and financial institution must 
satisfy in order to rely on the exemption. To safeguard the interests 
of plans, participants and beneficiaries, and IRA owners, the exemption 
would require the adviser and financial institution to contractually 
acknowledge fiduciary status and commit to adhere to certain 
``Impartial Conduct Standards'' when providing investment advice 
regarding the principal transaction to the plan fiduciary with 
authority to make investment decisions for the plan, the participant or 
beneficiary of a plan, or the IRA owner (referred to herein as 
retirement investors), including providing advice that is in their best 
interest. The financial institution would further be required to 
warrant that it has adopted policies and procedures designed to 
mitigate the impact of material conflicts of interest and ensure that 
the individual advisers adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards. The 
retirement investor would be required to consent to the principal 
transactions following disclosure of the material conflicts of interest 
associated with such transactions and of the debt security's pricing 
information. Financial institutions would be subject to recordkeeping 
requirements.
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    \2\ By using the term ``adviser,'' the Department does not 
intend to limit the exemption to investment advisers registered 
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or under state law. As 
explained herein, an adviser must be an investment advice fiduciary 
of a plan or IRA who is an employee, independent contractor, agent, 
or registered representative of a registered investment adviser, 
bank, or registered broker-dealer.
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Executive Order 12866 and 13563 Statement

    Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, the Department must 
determine whether a regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore 
subject to the requirements of the Executive Order and subject to 
review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Executive Orders 
13563 and 12866 direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to 
select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including 
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, 
distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the 
importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, 
of harmonizing and streamlining rules, and of promoting flexibility. It 
also requires federal

[[Page 21991]]

agencies to develop a plan under which the agencies will periodically 
review their existing significant regulations to make the agencies' 
regulatory programs more effective or less burdensome in achieving 
their regulatory objectives.
    Under Executive Order 12866, ``significant'' regulatory actions are 
subject to the requirements of the Executive Order and review by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Section 3(f) of Executive Order 
12866, defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as an action that is 
likely to result in a rule (1) having an annual effect on the economy 
of $100 million or more, or adversely and materially affecting a sector 
of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, 
public health or safety, or State, local or tribal governments or 
communities (also referred to as ``economically significant'' 
regulatory actions); (2) creating serious inconsistency or otherwise 
interfering with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) 
materially altering the budgetary impacts of entitlement grants, user 
fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or (4) raising novel legal or policy issues arising out of 
legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth 
in the Executive Order. Pursuant to the terms of the Executive Order, 
OMB has determined that this action is ``significant'' within the 
meaning of Section 3(f)(4) of the Executive Order. Accordingly, the 
Department has undertaken an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
the proposed amendment, and OMB has reviewed this regulatory action.

Background

Proposed Regulation Defining a Fiduciary

    As explained more fully in the preamble to Department's Proposed 
Regulation under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 
4975(e)(3)(B), also published in this issue of the Federal Register, 
ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to protect the interests of 
plan participants and beneficiaries, the integrity of employee benefit 
plans, and the security of retirement, health, and other critical 
benefits. The broad public interest in ERISA-covered plans is reflected 
in its imposition of stringent fiduciary responsibilities on parties 
engaging in important plan activities, as well as in the tax-favored 
status of plan assets and investments. One of the chief ways in which 
ERISA protects employee benefit plans is by requiring that plan 
fiduciaries comply with fundamental obligations rooted in the law of 
trusts. In particular, plan fiduciaries must manage plan assets 
prudently and with undivided loyalty to the plans and their 
participants and beneficiaries.\3\ In addition, they must refrain from 
engaging in ``prohibited transactions,'' which ERISA forbids because of 
the dangers posed by the fiduciaries' conflicts of interest with 
respect to the transactions.\4\ When fiduciaries violate ERISA's 
fiduciary duties or the prohibited transaction rules, they may be held 
personally liable for the breach.\5\ In addition, violations of the 
prohibited transaction rules are subject to excise taxes under the 
Code.
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    \3\ ERISA section 404(a).
    \4\ ERISA section 406. ERISA also prohibits certain transactions 
between a plan and a ``party in interest.''
    \5\ ERISA section 409; see also ERISA section 405.
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    The Code also has rules regarding fiduciary conduct with respect to 
tax-favored accounts that are not generally covered by ERISA, such as 
IRAs. Although ERISA's general fiduciary obligations of prudence and 
loyalty do not govern the fiduciaries of IRAs, these fiduciaries are 
subject to the prohibited transaction rules. In this context 
fiduciaries engaging in the prohibited transactions are subject to an 
excise tax enforced by the Internal Revenue Service. Unlike 
participants in plans covered by Title I of ERISA, under the Code, IRA 
owners cannot bring suit against fiduciaries under ERISA for violation 
of the prohibited transaction rules and fiduciaries are not personally 
liable to IRA owners for the losses caused by their misconduct, nor can 
the Secretary of Labor bring suit to enforce the prohibited transaction 
rules. The exemption proposed herein, as well as another exemption for 
the receipt of compensation by investment advice fiduciaries published 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register, would create 
contractual obligations for the adviser to adhere to certain standards 
(the Impartial Conduct Standards). IRA owners would have a right to 
enforce these new contractual rights.
    Under this statutory framework, the determination of who is a 
``fiduciary'' is of central importance. Many of ERISA's protections, 
duties, and liabilities hinge on fiduciary status. In relevant part, 
section 3(21)(A) of ERISA and section 4975(e)(3) of the Code provide 
that a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan or IRA to the 
extent he or she (1) exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control with respect to management of such plan or IRA, 
or exercises any authority or control with respect to management or 
disposition of its assets; (2) renders investment advice for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or 
other property of such plan or IRA, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so; or, (3) has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan or IRA.
    The statutory definition deliberately casts a wide net in assigning 
fiduciary responsibility with respect to plan and IRA assets. Thus, 
``any authority or control'' over plan or IRA assets is sufficient to 
confer fiduciary status, and any persons who render ``investment advice 
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect'' are fiduciaries, 
regardless of whether they have direct control over the plan's or IRA's 
assets and regardless of their status as an investment adviser or 
broker under the federal securities laws. The statutory definition and 
associated fiduciary responsibilities were enacted to ensure that plans 
and IRAs can depend on persons who provide investment advice for a fee 
to provide recommendations that are untainted by conflicts of interest. 
In the absence of fiduciary status, the providers of investment advice 
would neither be subject to ERISA's fundamental fiduciary standards, 
nor accountable for imprudent, disloyal, or tainted advice under ERISA 
or the Code, no matter how egregious the misconduct or how substantial 
the losses. Plans, individual participants and beneficiaries, and IRA 
owners often are not financial experts and consequently must rely on 
professional advice to make critical investment decisions. In the years 
since then, the significance of financial advice has become still 
greater with increased reliance on participant-directed plans and IRAs 
for the provision of retirement benefits.
    In 1975, the Department issued a regulation, at 29 CFR 2510.3-
21(c)(1975) defining the circumstances under which a person is treated 
as providing ``investment advice'' to an employee benefit plan within 
the meaning of section 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA (the ``1975 
regulation'').\6\ The regulation narrowed the scope of the statutory 
definition of fiduciary investment advice by creating a five-part test 
that must be satisfied before a person can be treated as rendering 
investment advice for a fee. Under the regulation, for advice to 
constitute ``investment advice,'' an adviser who does not have 
discretionary authority or control with

[[Page 21992]]

respect to the purchase or sale of securities or other property of the 
plan must--(1) render advice as to the value of securities or other 
property, or make recommendations as to the advisability of investing 
in, purchasing or selling securities or other property (2) on a regular 
basis (3) pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding, 
with the plan or a plan fiduciary that (4) the advice will serve as a 
primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and 
that (5) the advice will be individualized based on the particular 
needs of the plan. The regulation provides that an adviser is a 
fiduciary with respect to any particular instance of advice only if he 
or she meets each and every element of the five-part test with respect 
to the particular advice recipient or plan at issue. A 1976 Department 
of Labor Advisory Opinion further limited the application of the 
statutory definition of ``investment advice'' by stating that 
valuations of employer securities in connection with employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP) purchases would not be considered fiduciary 
advice.\7\
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    \6\ The Department of Treasury issued a virtually identical 
regulation, at 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c), which interprets Code section 
4975(e)(3).
    \7\ Advisory Opinion 76-65A (June 7, 1976).
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    As the marketplace for financial services has developed in the 
years since 1975, the five-part test may now undermine, rather than 
promote, the statutes' text and purposes. The narrowness of the 1975 
regulation allows professional advisers, consultants and valuation 
firms to play a central role in shaping plan investments, without 
ensuring the accountability that Congress intended for persons having 
such influence and responsibility when it enacted ERISA and the related 
Code provisions. Even when plan sponsors, participants, beneficiaries 
and IRA owners clearly rely on paid consultants for impartial guidance, 
the regulation allows consultants to avoid fiduciary status and 
disregard the accompanying obligations of care and prohibitions on 
disloyal and conflicted transactions. As a consequence, these advisers 
can steer customers to investments based on their own self-interest, 
give imprudent advice, and engage in transactions that would otherwise 
be categorically prohibited by ERISA and the Code without liability 
under ERISA or the Code.
    In the Proposed Regulation, the Department seeks to replace the 
existing regulation with one that more appropriately distinguishes 
between the sorts of advice relationships that should be treated as 
fiduciary in nature and those that should not, in light of the legal 
framework and financial marketplace in which plans and IRAs currently 
operate.\8\ The Proposed Regulation describes the types of advice that 
constitutes ``investment advice'' with respect to plan or IRA assets 
for purposes of the definition of a fiduciary at ERISA section 
3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 4975(e)(3)(B). The proposal provides, 
subject to certain carve-outs, that a person renders investment advice 
with respect to a plan or IRA if, among other things, the person 
provides, directly to a plan, a plan fiduciary, a plan participant or 
beneficiary, IRA or IRA owner one of the following types of advice:
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    \8\ The Department initially proposed an amendment to its 
regulation under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 
4975(e)(3)(B) on October 22, 2010, at 75 FR 65263. It subsequently 
announced its intention to withdraw the proposal and propose a new 
rule, consistent with the President's Executive Orders 12866 and 
13563, in order to give the public a full opportunity to evaluate 
and comment on the new proposal and updated economic analysis.
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    (1) A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, holding, 
disposing or exchanging securities or other property, including a 
recommendation to take a distribution of benefits or a recommendation 
as to the investment of securities or other property to be rolled over 
or otherwise distributed from a plan or IRA;
    (2) A recommendation as to the management of securities or other 
property, including recommendations as to the management of securities 
or other property to be rolled over or otherwise distributed from the 
plan or IRA;
    (3) An appraisal, fairness opinion or similar statement, whether 
verbal or written, concerning the value of securities or other 
property, if provided in connection with a specific transaction or 
transactions involving the acquisition, disposition or exchange of such 
securities or other property by the plan or IRA; and
    (4) A recommendation of a person who is also going to receive a fee 
or other compensation for providing any of the types of advice 
described in paragraphs (1) through (3), above.
    In addition, to be a fiduciary, such person must either (1) 
represent or acknowledge that it is acting as a fiduciary within the 
meaning of ERISA (or the Code) with respect to the advice, or (2) 
render the advice pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, 
arrangement or understanding that the advice is individualized to, or 
that such advice is specifically directed to, the advice recipient for 
consideration in making investment or management decisions with respect 
to securities or other property of the plan or IRA.
    In the Proposed Regulation, the Department refers to FINRA guidance 
on whether particular communications should be viewed as 
``recommendations'' \9\ within the meaning of the fiduciary definition, 
and requests comment on whether the Proposed Regulation should adhere 
to or adopt some or all of the standards developed by FINRA in defining 
communications which rise to the level of a recommendation. For more 
detailed information regarding the Proposed Regulation, see the Notice 
of the Proposed Regulation published in this issue of the Federal 
Register.
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    \9\ See NASD Notice to Members 01-23 and FINRA Regulatory 
Notices 11-02, 12-25 and 12-55.
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    For advisers who do not represent that they are acting as ERISA (or 
Code) fiduciaries, the Proposed Regulation provides that advice 
rendered in conformance with certain carve-outs will not cause the 
adviser to be treated as a fiduciary under ERISA or the Code. For 
example, under the seller's carve-out, counterparties in arm's-length 
transactions with plans may make investment recommendations without 
acting as fiduciaries if certain conditions are met.\10\ Similarly, the 
proposal contains a carve-out from fiduciary status for providers of 
appraisals, fairness opinions, or statements of value in specified 
contexts (e.g., with respect to ESOP transactions). The proposal 
additionally carves out from fiduciary status the marketing of 
investment alternative platforms to plans, certain assistance in 
selecting investment alternatives, and other activities. Finally, the 
Proposed Regulation contains a carve-out from fiduciary status for the 
provision of investment education.
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    \10\ Although the preamble adopts the phrase ``seller's carve-
out'' as a shorthand way of referring to the carve-out and its 
terms, the regulatory carve-out is not limited to sellers but rather 
applies more broadly to counterparties in arm's length transactions 
with plan investors with financial expertise.
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Prohibited Transactions

    The Department anticipates that the Proposed Regulation will cover 
many investment professionals who do not currently consider themselves 
to be fiduciaries under ERISA or the Code. If the Proposed Regulation 
is adopted, these entities will become subject to the prohibited 
transaction restrictions in ERISA and the Code that apply specifically 
to fiduciaries. ERISA section 406(b)(1) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(E) 
prohibit a fiduciary from dealing with the income or assets of a plan 
or IRA in his own interest or his own account. ERISA section 406(b)(2)

[[Page 21993]]

provides that a fiduciary shall not ``in his individual or in any other 
capacity act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party 
(or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of 
the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries.'' \11\ 
ERISA section 406(b)(3) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(F) prohibit a 
fiduciary from receiving any consideration for his own personal account 
from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction 
involving assets of the plan or IRA. Parallel regulations issued by the 
Departments of Labor and the Treasury explain that these provisions 
impose on fiduciaries of plans and IRAs a duty not to act on conflicts 
of interest that may affect the fiduciary's best judgment on behalf of 
the plan or IRA. Given these prohibitions, conferring fiduciary status 
on particular investment advice activities will have important 
implications for many investment professionals.
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    \11\ The Code does not contain this prohibition.
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    The purchase or sale of a security in a principal transaction 
between a plan or IRA and a fiduciary, resulting from the fiduciary's 
provision of investment advice, raises issues under ERISA section 
406(b) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(E).\12\ Nevertheless, the Department 
recognizes that certain investment advice fiduciaries view the ability 
to execute principal transactions as integral to the economically 
efficient distribution of fixed income securities. The Department has 
carefully considered requests for exemptive relief for principal 
transactions in connection with the development of the Proposed 
Regulation, in light of the existing legal framework. In this regard, 
as further discussed below, fiduciaries who engage in principal 
transactions under certain circumstances can avoid the ERISA and Code 
restrictions. Moreover, there are existing statutory and administrative 
exemptions, also discussed below, that already provide prohibited 
transaction relief for fiduciaries engaging in principal transactions 
with plans and IRAs. This notice proposes a new class exemption which 
would provide additional prohibited transaction relief for investment 
advice fiduciaries to engage in principal transactions with plans and 
IRAs.
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    \12\ The purchase or sale of a security in a principal 
transaction between a plan or IRA and a fiduciary also is prohibited 
by ERISA section 406(a)(1)(A) and (D) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(A) 
and (D).
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1. Blind Transactions
    Certain principal transactions between a plan or IRA and an 
investment advice fiduciary may not need exemptive relief because they 
are blind transactions executed on an exchange. The ERISA Conference 
Report states that a transaction will, generally, not be a prohibited 
transaction if the transaction is an ordinary ``blind'' purchase or 
sale of securities through an exchange where neither the buyer nor the 
seller (nor the agent of either) knows the identity of the other party 
involved.\13\
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    \13\ See H.R. Rep. 93-1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1974); see 
also ERISA Advisory Opinion 2004-05A (May 24, 2004).
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2. Principal Transactions Permitted Under an Exemption
    ERISA and the Code counterbalance the broad proscriptive effect of 
the prohibited transaction provisions with numerous statutory 
exemptions. ERISA and the Code also provide for administrative 
exemptions that the Secretary of Labor may grant on an individual or 
class basis if the Secretary finds that the exemption is (1) 
administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of plans and their 
participants and beneficiaries, and (3) protective of the rights of the 
participants and beneficiaries of such plans.
A. Statutory Exemptions
    ERISA section 408(b)(14) provides a statutory exemption for 
transactions entered into in connection with the provision of fiduciary 
investment advice to a participant or beneficiary of an individual 
account plan or an IRA owner. The exemption provides relief for, among 
other things, the acquisition, holding, or sale of a security or other 
property as an investment under the plan pursuant to the investment 
advice. As set forth in ERISA section 408(g), the exemption is 
available if the advice is provided under an ``eligible investment 
advice arrangement'' which either (1) ``provides that any fees 
(including any commission or other compensation) received by the 
fiduciary adviser for investment advice or with respect to the sale, 
holding or acquisition of any security or other property for purposes 
of investment of plan assets do not vary depending on the basis of any 
investment option selected'' or (2) ``uses a computer model under an 
investment advice program meeting the requirements of [ERISA section 
408(g)(3)].'' Additional conditions apply. Code section 4975(d)(17) 
provides the same relief from the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) 
and (b).
    ERISA section 408(b)(16) provides relief for transactions involving 
the purchase or sale of securities between a plan and a party in 
interest, including an investment advice fiduciary, if the transactions 
are executed through an electronic communication network, alternative 
trading system, or similar execution system or trading venue. Among 
other conditions, subparagraph (B) of the statutory exemption requires 
that either: (i) ``the transaction is effected pursuant to rules 
designed to match purchases and sales at the best price available 
through the execution system in accordance with applicable rules of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission or other relevant governmental 
authority,'' or (ii) ``neither the execution system nor the parties to 
the transaction take into account the identity of the parties in the 
execution of trades[.]'' The transactions covered by ERISA section 
408(b)(16) include principal transactions between a plan and an 
investment advice fiduciary. Code section 4975(d)(19) provides the same 
relief from the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b).
B. Administrative Exemptions
    An administrative exemption for certain principal transactions will 
continue to be available through PTE 75-1.\14\ Specifically, PTE 75-1, 
Part IV, provides an exemption that is available to investment advice 
fiduciaries who are ``market-makers.'' Relief is available from ERISA 
section 406 for the purchase or sale of securities by a plan or IRA, 
from or to a market-maker with respect to such securities who is also 
an investment advice fiduciary with respect to the plan or IRA, or an 
affiliate of such fiduciary.
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    \14\ 40 FR 50845 (Oct. 31, 1975), as amended, 71 FR 5883 (Feb. 
3, 2006).
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    Further, Part II(1) of PTE 75-1 currently provides relief from 
ERISA section 406(a) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(A) through (D) for the 
purchase or sale of a security in a principal transaction between a 
plan or IRA and a broker-dealer registered under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. However, the exemption permits plans and IRAs to 
engage in principal transactions with broker-dealers only if they do 
not have or exercise any discretionary authority or control (except as 
a directed trustee) with respect to the investment of plan or IRA 
assets involved in the transaction, and do not render investment advice 
(within the meaning of 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c)) with respect to the 
investment of those assets. PTE 75-1, Part II(1) will continue to be 
available to parties in interest that are not fiduciaries and that 
satisfy its conditions.

[[Page 21994]]

C. New Exemption Proposed in This Notice
    In response to public concerns, the Department is proposing in this 
notice additional relief for principal transactions in certain debt 
securities between a plan, participant or beneficiary account, or an 
IRA, and an investment advice fiduciary. While relief was informally 
requested with respect to a broad range of principal transactions 
(e.g., those involving equities, debt securities, futures, derivatives, 
currencies, etc.), the Department has elected to propose relief solely 
with respect to certain widely-held debt securities. This limitation is 
based on the Department's view that principal transactions involve a 
potentially severe conflict of interest when engaged in by a fiduciary 
with respect to a plan, participant or beneficiary account, or an IRA. 
The Department is concerned that, when acting as a principal in a 
transaction involving a plan, participant or beneficiary account, or an 
IRA, a fiduciary may have difficulty reconciling its duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest with its concern for its own financial interests. 
Of primary concern are issues involving liquidity, pricing, 
transparency, and the fiduciary's possible incentive to ``dump'' 
unwanted assets. Accordingly, when crafting the exemption, the 
Department focused on debt securities as common investments of plans, 
participant or beneficiary accounts, and IRAs that may need to be sold 
on a principal basis because particular bond issues may be sold by only 
one or a limited number of financial institutions. Without an 
exemption, plans, participant or beneficiary accounts, and IRAs may 
face reduced choice in the market for these debt securities.
    Under this rationale, however, the Department is not persuaded at 
this point that additional exemptive relief for principal transactions 
involving other types of assets would be in the interests of, and 
protective of, plans, their participants and beneficiaries and IRA 
owners. Equity securities, for example, are widely available through 
agency transactions that do not involve the particular conflicts of 
interest associated with principal transactions. Other assets such as 
futures, derivatives and currencies, may possess a level of complexity 
and risk that would require a retirement investor to rely heavily on a 
fiduciary's advice. In such cases, the Department is concerned that the 
class exemption proposed here would be insufficiently protective of 
plans, participants and beneficiaries, and IRA owners.
    The Department requests comment on the limitation of the proposed 
exemption to debt securities. Public input is requested on whether 
there are additional assets that are commonly held by plans, 
participant or beneficiary accounts, and IRAs that are sold primarily 
in principal transactions. Commenters should provide specifics about 
the characteristics of such assets and the proposed safeguards that 
would apply to an exemption permitting their sale in a principal 
transaction. To the extent interested parties believe it is possible or 
appropriate to provide relief for additional transactions, the 
Department would also invite applications for additional exemptions 
tailored to the unique characteristics of those transactions and 
protective of the interests of plan participants and IRA owners.

Proposed Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Debt 
Securities

    Section I of the proposed exemption would provide relief for 
``Advisers'' and ``Financial Institutions'' to enter into ``principal 
transactions'' in ``debt securities'' with plans and IRAs. The proposed 
exemption uses the term ``Retirement Investor'' to describe the types 
of persons who can be investment advice recipients under the exemption, 
and the term ``Affiliate'' to describe people and entities with a 
connection to the Adviser or Financial Institution. These terms are 
defined in Section VI of this proposed exemption. The following 
sections discuss key definitional terms of the exemption as well as the 
scope and conditions of the proposed exemption.

Defined Terms

1. Adviser
    The proposed exemption contemplates that an individual person, an 
Adviser, will provide advice to the Retirement Investor. An Adviser 
must be an investment advice fiduciary of a plan or IRA who is an 
employee, independent contractor, agent, or registered representative 
of a ``Financial Institution'' (discussed in the next section), and the 
Adviser must satisfy the applicable banking and securities laws with 
respect to the covered transaction.\15\ Advisers may be, for example, 
registered representatives of broker-dealers registered under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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    \15\ See Section VI(a) of the proposed exemption.
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2. Financial Institutions
    For purposes of the proposed exemption, a Financial Institution is 
the entity that employs an Adviser or otherwise retains the Adviser as 
an independent contractor, agent or registered representative.\16\ 
Financial Institutions must be registered investment advisers, banks, 
or registered broker-dealers. This limitation is based on the 
Department's understanding that these entities may commonly sell debt 
securities out of inventory. The Department requests comment on whether 
there are other types of financial institutions that should be included 
in the definition.
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    \16\ See Section VI(f) of the proposed exemption.
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3. Affiliates
    The proposed exemption uses the term Affiliate to describe persons 
or entities with certain relationships to the Adviser and Financial 
Institution. An ``Affiliate'' means: (1) any person directly or 
indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controlling, controlled 
by, or under common control with the Adviser or Financial Institution; 
(2) any officer, director, employee, relative (as defined in ERISA 
section 3(15)) or member of family (as defined in Code section 
4975(e)(6)), agent or registered representative of, or partner in such 
Adviser or Financial Institution; and (3) any corporation or 
partnership of which the Adviser or Financial Institution is an 
officer, director, or employee, or in which the Adviser or Financial 
Institution is a partner. For purposes of this definition, the term 
``control'' means the power to exercise a controlling influence over 
the management or policies of a person other than an individual.
4. Retirement Investor
    The proposed exemption uses the term ``Retirement Investor,'' to 
mean a plan fiduciary of a non-participant directed ERISA plan with 
authority to make investment decisions for the plan, a plan participant 
or beneficiary with authority to direct the investment of assets in his 
or her plan account or to take a distribution, or, in the case of an 
IRA, the beneficial owner of the IRA (i.e., the IRA owner).
5. Principal Transaction
    For purposes of the proposed exemption, a principal transaction is 
a purchase or sale of a debt security where an Adviser or Financial 
Institution is purchasing from or selling to the plan, participant or 
beneficiary account, or IRA on behalf of the account of the Financial 
Institution or the

[[Page 21995]]

account of any person directly or indirectly, through one or more 
intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with the Financial Institution. The Department requests comment as to 
whether, and on what grounds, relief is also necessary for the purchase 
or sale of a debt security from the Adviser's own account in addition 
to the Financial Institution's own account.
6. Debt Securities
    The proposed exemption is limited to principal transactions in 
certain debt securities. For purposes of the exemption, the term ``debt 
security,'' is defined by reference to Rule 10b-10(d)(4) under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The categories of covered debt 
securities include securities that are (1) dollar denominated, issued 
by a U.S. corporation and offered pursuant to a registration statement 
under the Securities Act of 1933; (2) U.S. agency debt securities (as 
defined in FINRA Rule 6710(l)); and (3) U.S. Treasury securities (as 
defined in FINRA Rule 6710(p)).
    The debt security may not have been issued by the Financial 
Institution or any Affiliate. Additionally, the debt security may not 
be purchased by the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA, 
in an underwriting or underwriting syndicate in which the Financial 
Institution or any Affiliate is the underwriter or a member. Purchases 
by plans, participant or beneficiary accounts, or IRAs may occur, 
however, if a debt security originally underwritten by the Financial 
Institution or an Affiliate was later obtained for sale in the 
secondary market.
    The debt security must also possess no greater than moderate credit 
risk and be sufficiently liquid that the debt security could be sold at 
or near its fair market value within a reasonably short period of time. 
Debt securities subject to a moderate credit risk should possess at 
least average credit-worthiness relative to other similar debt issues. 
Moderate credit risk would denote current low expectations of default 
risk, with an adequate capacity for payment of principal and interest. 
These securities have a level of creditworthiness similar to investment 
grade securities.\17\
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    \17\ The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has similarly 
referred to securities that are `subject to no greater than moderate 
credit risk' and sufficiently liquid that [the security] can be sold 
at or near its carrying value within a reasonably short period of 
time'' in setting standards of creditworthiness in its regulations. 
See, e.g., Rule 6a-5 issued under Investment Company Act,17 CFR 
270.6a-5 (77 FR 70117, November 23, 2012).
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Scope of Relief in the Proposed Exemption

    The proposed exemption provides relief for principal transactions 
in debt securities between a plan, participant or beneficiary account, 
or IRA and a Financial Institution or an entity in a control 
relationship with the Financial Institution, when the principal 
transaction is a result of the Adviser's and Financial Institution's 
provision of investment advice. Relief is proposed from ERISA sections 
406(a)(1)(A) and (D), and 406(b)(1) and (2), and the taxes imposed by 
Code section 4975(a) and (b), by reason of Code section 4975(c)(1)(A), 
(D) and (E). Relief has not been proposed in this exemption from ERISA 
section 406(b)(3) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(F), which prohibit a plan 
fiduciary from receiving any consideration for its own personal account 
from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction 
involving the assets of the plan. As a result, the proposed exemption 
does not include relief for the receipt by a fiduciary of consideration 
from a trading venue in connection with the execution of purchases and 
sales thereon (e.g., payment for order flow).
    Several limitations apply to the scope of the proposed exemption. 
First, relief is limited to Advisers whose fiduciary authority with 
respect to the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA assets 
involved in the transaction is as a provider of investment advice.\18\ 
Advisers who have full investment discretion with respect to the assets 
of a plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA or who have 
discretionary authority over the administration of the plan, 
participant or beneficiary account, or IRA, for example, may not take 
advantage of relief under the exemption.
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    \18\ See Section I(c)(1) of the proposed exemption.
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    Second, the exemption is not available to a transaction involving a 
plan covered by Title I of ERISA if the Adviser or Financial 
Institution, or any Affiliate is the employer of employees covered by 
the plan which is the recipient of the advice.\19\ This restriction on 
employers does not apply in the case of an IRA or other similar plan 
that is not covered by Title I of ERISA. Accordingly, an Adviser or 
Financial Institution may provide advice to the beneficial owner of an 
IRA who is employed by the Adviser, its Financial Institution or an 
Affiliate, and receive compensation as a result, provided the IRA is 
not covered by Title I of ERISA.
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    \19\ See Section I(c)(2) of the proposed exemption.
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    Finally, the exemption does not apply if the Adviser or Financial 
Institution is a named fiduciary or plan administrator, as defined in 
ERISA section 3(16)(A) with respect to an ERISA plan, or an affiliate 
thereof, that was selected to provide advice to the plan by a fiduciary 
who is not independent of them.\20\ This provision is intended to 
disallow selection of Advisers and Financial Institutions by named 
fiduciaries or plan administrators that have an interest in them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See Section VI(f), defining the term ``Independent.''
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Conditions of the Proposed Exemption

    Sections II-V of the proposal set forth the conditions of the 
exemption. All applicable conditions must be satisfied in order to 
avoid application of the specified prohibited transaction provisions of 
ERISA and the Code. The Department believes that these conditions are 
necessary for the Secretary to find that the exemption is 
administratively feasible, in the interests of plans, their 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective of the 
rights of the participants and beneficiaries of such plans and IRA 
owners. Under ERISA section 408(a)(2), and Code section 4975(c)(2), the 
Secretary may not grant an exemption without making such findings. The 
proposed conditions are described below.

Contractual Obligations (Section II)

    Section II(a) of the proposal requires that an Adviser and the 
Financial Institution enter into a written contract with the Retirement 
Investor prior to engaging in a principal transaction with a plan, 
participant or beneficiary account, or IRA. The contract must be 
executed by the Adviser and Financial Institution as well as the 
Retirement Investor, acting on behalf of the plan, participant or 
beneficiary account, or IRA. In the case of advice provided to a 
participant or beneficiary in a plan, the participant or beneficiary 
should be the Retirement Investor that is the party to the contract, on 
behalf of his or her individual account.
    The contract may be part of a master agreement with the Retirement 
Investor and does not require execution prior to each additional 
principal transaction. The exemption does not, by its terms, mandate an 
ongoing or long-term advisory relationship, but rather leaves that to 
the parties. The terms of the contract, along with other 
representations, agreements, or understandings between the Adviser, 
Financial Institution and Retirement

[[Page 21996]]

Investor, will govern the ongoing or transactional nature of the 
relationship between the parties.
    The contract is the cornerstone of the proposed exemption, and the 
Department believes that by requiring a contract as a condition of the 
proposed exemption, it creates a mechanism by which a Retirement 
Investor can be alerted to the Adviser's and Financial Institution's 
obligations and be provided with a basis upon which its rights can be 
enforced. In order to comply with the exemption, the contract must 
contain every required element set forth in Section II(b)-(e) and also 
must not include any of the prohibited provisions described in Section 
II(f). It is intended that the contract creates actionable obligations 
with respect to both the Impartial Conduct Standards and the 
warranties, described below. In addition, failure to satisfy the 
Independent Conduct Standards will result in loss of the exemption.
1. Fiduciary Status
    The proposal sets forth multiple contractual requirements. The 
first and most fundamental contractual requirement, which is set out in 
Section II(b) of proposal, is that both the Adviser and Financial 
Institution must acknowledge fiduciary status under ERISA or the Code, 
or both, with respect to the investment recommendations to the 
Retirement Investor regarding principal transactions. If this 
acknowledgment of fiduciary status does not appear in a contract with a 
Retirement Investor, the exemption is not satisfied with respect to 
principal transactions involving that Retirement Investor. This 
fiduciary acknowledgment is critical to ensuring that there is no 
uncertainty--before or after investment advice is given with regard to 
the principal transaction--that both the Adviser and Financial 
Institution are acting as fiduciaries under ERISA and the Code. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the contractual language is 
only required to apply to communications that are investment 
recommendations to the Retirement Investor regarding principal 
transactions. Compliance with all the exemption's conditions is 
necessary only with respect to transactions that otherwise would 
constitute prohibited transactions under ERISA and the Code.
2. Standards of Impartial Conduct
    Building upon the required acknowledgment of fiduciary status, the 
proposal additionally requires that both the Adviser and the Financial 
Institution contractually commit to adhering to specifically delineated 
Impartial Conduct Standards when providing investment advice to the 
Retirement Investor regarding principal transactions, and that they in 
fact do adhere to such standards. Therefore, if an Adviser and/or 
Financial Institution fail to comply with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards, relief under the exemption is no longer available and the 
contract is violated.
    Specifically, Section II(c)(1) of the proposal requires that under 
the contract the Adviser and Financial Institution provide advice 
regarding principal transactions that is in the ``best interest'' of 
the Retirement Investor. Best interest is defined to mean that the 
Adviser and Financial Institution act with the care, skill, prudence, 
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
person would exercise based on the investment objectives, risk 
tolerance, financial circumstances, and the needs of the Retirement 
Investor when providing investment advice to the Retirement Investor. 
Further, under the best interest standard, the Adviser and Financial 
Institution must act without regard to the financial or other interests 
of the Adviser, Financial Institution, their Affiliates or any other 
party. Under this standard, the Adviser and Financial Institution must 
put the interests of the Retirement Investor ahead of the financial 
interests of the Adviser, Financial Institution, their Affiliates or 
any other party.
    The best interest standard set forth in this exemption is based on 
longstanding concepts derived from ERISA and the law of trusts. For 
example, ERISA section 404 requires a fiduciary to act ``solely in the 
interest of the participants . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in 
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.'' 
Similarly, both ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) and the trust-law duty of 
loyalty require fiduciaries to put the interests of trust beneficiaries 
first, without regard to the fiduciaries' own self-interest. 
Accordingly, the Department would expect the standard to be interpreted 
in light of forty years of judicial experience with ERISA's fiduciary 
standards and hundreds more with the duties imposed on trustees under 
the common law of trusts. In general, courts focus on the process the 
fiduciary used to reach its determination or recommendation--whether 
the fiduciaries, ``at the time they engaged in the challenged 
transactions, employed the proper procedures to investigate the merits 
of the investment and to structure the investment.'' Donovan v. 
Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, a fiduciary's 
investment recommendation is measured based on the circumstances 
prevailing at the time of the transaction, not on how the investment 
turned out with the benefit of hindsight.
    In this regard, the Department notes that while fiduciaries of 
plans covered by ERISA are subject to the ERISA section 404 standards 
of prudence and loyalty, the Code contains no provisions that hold IRA 
fiduciaries to these standards. However, as a condition of relief under 
the proposed exemption, both IRA and plan fiduciaries would have to 
agree to, and uphold, the best interest requirement that is set forth 
in Section II(c). The best interest standard is defined to effectively 
mirror the ERISA section 404 duties of prudence and loyalty, as applied 
in the context of fiduciary investment advice.
    The Impartial Conduct Standards continue in Section II(c) of the 
proposal. Section II(c)(2) requires that the Adviser and Financial 
Institution agree that they will not enter into a principal transaction 
with the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA if the 
purchase or sales price of the debt security (including the mark-up or 
mark-down) is unreasonable under the circumstances. Finally, Section 
II(c)(3) requires that the Adviser's and Financial Institution's 
statements about the debt security, fees, material conflicts of 
interest, and any other matters relevant to a Retirement Investor's 
investment decisions, are not misleading.
    Under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c), the Department 
cannot grant an exemption unless it first finds that the exemption is 
administratively feasible, in the interests of plans and their 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective of the 
rights of participants and beneficiaries of plans and IRA owners. An 
exemption permitting transactions that violate the requirements of 
Section II(c) would be unlikely to meet these standards.
3. Warranty--Compliance With Applicable Law
    Section II(d) of the proposal requires that contract include 
certain warranties intended to be protective of the rights of 
Retirement Investors. In particular, to satisfy the exemption, the 
Adviser, and Financial Institution must warrant that they and their 
Affiliates will comply with all applicable federal and state laws 
regarding the rendering of the investment advice and the purchase and

[[Page 21997]]

sale of debt securities. This warranty must be in the contract but the 
exemption is not conditioned on compliance with the warranty. 
Accordingly, the failure to comply with applicable federal or state law 
could result in contractual liability for breach of warranty, but it 
would not result in loss of the exemption, as long as the breach did 
not involve a violation of one of the exemption's other conditions 
(e.g., the best interest standard). Thus, for example, de minimis 
violations of state or federal law would not result in the loss of the 
exemption.
4. Warranty--Policies and Procedures
    The Financial Institution must also contractually warrant that it 
has adopted written policies and procedures that are reasonably 
designed to mitigate the impact of material conflicts of interest that 
exist with respect to the provision of investment advice to Retirement 
Investors regarding principal transactions and ensure that individual 
Advisers adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards described above. For 
purposes of the exemption, a material conflict of interest is deemed to 
exist when an Adviser or Financial Institution has a financial interest 
that could affect the exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary in 
rendering advice to a Retirement Investor.\21\ Like the warranty on 
compliance with applicable law, discussed above, this warranty must be 
in the contract but the exemption is not conditioned on compliance with 
the warranty. Failure to comply with the warranty, however, could 
result in contractual liability for breach of warranty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See Section VI(h) of the proposed exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As part of the contractual warranty on policies and procedures, the 
Financial Institution must state that in formulating its policies and 
procedures, it specifically identified material conflict of interests 
and adopted measures to prevent those material conflicts of interest 
from causing violations of the Impartial Conduct Standards. Further, 
the Financial Institution must state that neither it nor (to the best 
of its knowledge) its Affiliates will use quotas, appraisals, 
performance or personnel actions, bonuses, contests, special awards, 
differentiated compensation or other actions or incentives to the 
extent they would tend to encourage individual Advisers to make 
recommendations regarding principal transactions that are not in the 
best interest of Retirement Investors.
    While these warranties must be part of the contract between the 
Adviser and Financial Institution and the Retirement Investor, the 
proposal does not mandate the specific content of the policies and 
procedures. This flexibility is intended to allow Financial 
Institutions to develop policies and procedures that are effective for 
their particular business models, within the constraints of their 
fiduciary obligations and the Impartial Conduct Standards. A more 
detailed description of the policies and procedures requirement is 
included in the discussion of the similar requirement in the Proposed 
Exemption for the Receipt of Compensation by Investment Advice 
Fiduciaries, published in this same issue of the Federal Register.
5. Contractual Disclosures
    Finally, Section II(e) of the proposal requires certain disclosures 
in the written contract. If the disclosures do not appear in a contract 
with a Retirement Investor, the exemption is not satisfied with respect 
to transactions involving that Retirement Investor. The written 
contract must (i) set forth the circumstances under which the Adviser 
and Financial Institution may engage in principal transactions with the 
plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA and (ii) identify and 
disclose the material conflicts of interest associated with principal 
transactions. The contract must also document the Retirement Investor's 
affirmative written consent, on a prospective basis, to principal 
transactions with the Adviser or Financial Institution. Finally, the 
contract must inform the Retirement Investor (i) that the consent to 
principal transactions is terminable at will by the Retirement Investor 
at any time, without penalty to the plan, participant or beneficiary 
account, or IRA, and (ii) of the right to obtain complete information 
about all the fees and other payments currently associated with its 
investments.

Enforcement of the Contractual Obligations

    The contractual conditions set forth in Section II of the proposal 
are enforceable. Plans, plan participants and beneficiaries, IRA 
owners, and the Department may use the contract as a tool to ensure 
compliance with the exemption. The Department notes, however, that this 
contractual tool creates different rights with respect to plans, 
participant and beneficiaries, IRA owners and the Department.
1. IRA Owners
    The contract between the IRA owner and the Adviser and Financial 
Institution forms the basis of the IRA owner's enforcement rights. As 
outlined above, the contract embodies obligations on the part of the 
Adviser and Financial Institution. The Department intends that all the 
contractual obligations (the Impartial Conduct Standards and the 
warranties) will be actionable by IRA owners. The most important of 
these contractual obligations for enforcement purposes is the 
obligation imposed on both the Adviser and the Financial Institution to 
comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards. Because these standards 
are contractually imposed, the IRA owner has a claim if, for example, 
the Adviser recommends an investment product that is not in fact in the 
best interest of the IRA owner.
2. Plans, Plan Participants and Beneficiaries
    The protections of the exemption and contractual terms will also be 
enforceable by plans, plan participants and beneficiaries. 
Specifically, if an Adviser or Financial Institution receives 
compensation in a prohibited transaction but fails to satisfy any of 
the Impartial Conduct Standards or any other condition of the 
exemption, the Adviser and Financial Institution would be unable to 
qualify for relief under the exemption, and, as a result, could be 
liable under ERISA section 502(a)(2) and (3). An Adviser's failure to 
comply with the exemption or the Impartial Conduct Standards would 
result in a non-exempt prohibited transaction and would likely 
constitute a fiduciary breach. As a result, a plan, plan participant or 
beneficiary would be able to sue under ERISA section 502(a)(2) or (3) 
to recover any loss in value to the plan (including the loss in value 
to an individual account), or to obtain disgorgement of any wrongful 
profits or unjust enrichment. Additionally, plans, participants and 
beneficiaries could enforce their obligations in an action based on 
breach of the agreement.
3. The Department
    In addition, the Department will be able to enforce ERISA's 
prohibited transaction provisions with respect to employee benefit 
plans, but not IRAs, in the event that the Adviser or Financial 
Institution receives compensation in a prohibited transaction but fails 
to comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards or any other conditions 
of the exemption. If any of the specific conditions of the exemption 
are not met, the Adviser and Financial Institution will have engaged in 
a non-exempt prohibited transaction, and the Department will be 
entitled to seek relief under ERISA section 502(a)(2) and (5).

[[Page 21998]]

4. Excise Taxes Under the Code
    In addition to the claims described above that may be brought by 
IRA owners, plans, plan participants and beneficiaries, and the 
Department, to enforce the contract and ERISA, Advisers and Financial 
Institutions that engage in prohibited transactions under the Code are 
subject to an excise tax. The excise tax is generally equal to 15% of 
the amount involved. Parties who have participated in a prohibited 
transaction for which an exemption is not available must pay the excise 
tax and file Form 5330 with the Internal Revenue Service.

Prohibited Provisions

    Finally, in order to preserve these various enforcement rights, 
Section II(f) of the proposal provides that certain provisions may not 
be in the contract. If these provisions appear in a contract with a 
Retirement Investor, the exemption is not satisfied with respect to 
transactions involving that Retirement Investor. First, the proposal 
provides that the contract may not contain exculpatory provisions that 
disclaim or otherwise limit liability for an Adviser's or Financial 
Institution's violations of the contract's terms. Second, the contract 
may not require the plan, IRA or Retirement Investor to agree to waive 
its right to bring or participate in a class action or other 
representative action in court in a contract dispute with the Adviser 
or Financial Institution. The right of a Retirement Investor to bring a 
class-action claim in court (and the corresponding limitation on 
fiduciaries' ability to mandate class-action arbitration) is consistent 
with FINRA's position that its arbitral forum is not the correct venue 
for class-action claims. As proposed, this section would not impact the 
ability of a Financial Institution or Adviser, and a Retirement 
Investor, to enter into pre-dispute binding arbitration agreement with 
respect to individual contract claims. The Department expects that most 
such individual arbitration claims under this exemption will be subject 
to FINRA's arbitration procedures and consumer protections. The 
Department seeks comments on whether there are certain procedures and/
or consumer protections that it should adopt or mandate for those 
contract disputes not covered by FINRA.

General Conditions Applicable to Each Transaction (Section III)

    Section III of the proposal sets forth conditions that apply to the 
terms of each principal transaction entered into under the exemption. 
As noted above, Section III(a) of the proposal provides that the debt 
security being bought or sold must not have been issued or, at the time 
of the transaction, underwritten by the Financial Institution or any 
Affiliate. The debt security also must possess no greater than a 
moderate credit risk and be sufficiently liquid that the debt security 
could be sold at or near its fair market value within a reasonably 
short period of time.
    Section III(b) provides that the principal transaction may not be 
part of an agreement, arrangement, or understanding designed to evade 
compliance with ERISA or the Code, or to otherwise impact the value of 
the debt security. Such a condition protects against the Adviser or 
Financial Institution manipulating the terms of the principal 
transaction, either as an isolated transaction or as a part of a series 
of transactions, to benefit themselves or their Affiliates. Further, 
this condition would also prohibit an Adviser or Financial Institution 
from engaging in principal transactions with Retirement Investors for 
the purpose of ridding inventory of unwanted or poorly performing debt 
securities.
    Section III(c) of the proposal provides that the purchase or sale 
of the debt security must be for no consideration other than cash. By 
limiting a purchase or sale of debt securities to cash consideration, 
the Department intends that relief will not be provided for a principal 
transaction that is executed on an in-kind basis.
    Finally, Section III(d) of the proposal addresses the pricing of 
the principal transaction. Section III(d)(1) provides that the purchase 
or sale of the debt security must be executed at a price that the 
Adviser and Financial Institution reasonably believe is at least as 
favorable to the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA than 
the price available to the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or 
IRA in a transaction that is not a principal transaction. Section 
III(d)(2) provides that the purchase or sale of the debt security must 
be at least as favorable to the plan, participant or beneficiary 
account, or IRA as the contemporaneous price for the debt security, or 
a similar security if a price is not available with respect to the same 
debt security, offered by two ready and willing counterparties that are 
not Affiliates in agency transactions. When evaluating the price 
offered by the counterparties, the Adviser and Financial Institution 
may take into account the resulting price to the plan, participant or 
beneficiary account, or IRA, including commissions. The Department 
intends that the proposal should allow a comparison between the actual 
cost to the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA of the 
principal transaction (including the mark-up or mark-down) and the 
actual cost to the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA of 
a non-principal transaction (e.g., an agency transaction) in the same 
or a similar debt security, including a commission.
    For purposes of Section III(d)(2), the similarity of a debt 
security should be construed in accordance with FINRA Rule 2121, or its 
successor, and the guidance promulgated thereunder. Generally, such 
guidance has stated that a similar debt security is one which is 
sufficiently similar to the subject debt security that it would serve 
as a reasonable alternative investment for the applicable investor.

Disclosure Requirements (Section IV)

    Prior to engaging in a principal transaction, Section IV(a) of the 
proposal provides that the Adviser or Financial Institution must 
provide a pre-transaction disclosure to the Retirement Investor, either 
orally or in writing. The disclosure must notify the Retirement 
Investor that the purchase or sale of the debt security will be 
executed as a principal transaction between the Adviser or Financial 
Institution and the plan, participant or beneficiary account, or the 
IRA. Further, the disclosure must also provide the Retirement Investor 
with any available pricing information regarding the debt security, 
including two quotes obtained from unaffiliated parties required by 
Section III(d)(2).
    As proposed, the pre-transaction disclosure set forth in Section 
IV(a) would also include the mark-up or mark-down to be charged in 
connection with the principal transaction. The purpose of this 
requirement would be to permit the Retirement Investor to evaluate the 
compensation and other transaction costs associated with the principal 
transaction. The Department believes it is important that the Financial 
Institution and Adviser disclose the compensation they will receive 
before the Retirement Investor consents to engage in the principal 
transaction.
    For purpose of Section IV, the Department is considering defining a 
mark-up as the amount in excess of the ``prevailing market price'' that 
a customer pays for the debt security. Mark-down would be defined as 
the amount by which the price of a debt security is reduced from the 
``prevailing market price'' that a customer receives for the debt 
security. The Department is

[[Page 21999]]

further considering whether to define the ``prevailing market price'' 
by reference to FINRA Rule 2121 and Supplementary Material .02 
thereunder, which sets forth a methodology for determining the 
prevailing market price.
    We request comment on our proposed approach to the definition of 
mark-up and mark-down, and in particular, our potential reliance on the 
FINRA guidance in Rule 2121 for purposes of the disclosure requirement 
in this exemption. Would a disclosure of the mark-up/down as defined in 
this manner provide information that will be useful to Retirement 
Investors in evaluating the principal transaction? Are there practical 
difficulties with our approach? Are there other formulations of the 
mark-up mark-down definition that have advantages in these respects?
    Section IV(b) of the proposal provides that the Financial 
Institution must provide a written confirmation of the principal 
transaction in accordance with Rule 10b-10 under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 \22\ that also includes disclosure of the mark-up, 
mark-down, or other payment to the Adviser, Financial Institution or 
Affiliate in connection with the Principal Transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ 17 CFR 240.10b-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section IV(c) of the proposal provides that the Adviser or the 
Financial Institution must provide the Retirement Investor with an 
annual statement that lists the principal transactions engaged in 
during the year, provides the prevailing market price at which the debt 
security was purchased or sold, and provides the applicable mark-up or 
mark-down or other payment for each debt security. The annual statement 
must also remind the Retirement Investor that it may withdraw its 
consent to principal transactions at any time, without penalty to the 
plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA. The annual statement 
may be provided in combination with other statements provided to the 
Retirement Investor by the Adviser or Financial Institution.
    Finally, Section IV(d) of the proposal provides that, upon 
reasonable request, the Adviser or Financial Institution must provide 
the Retirement Investor with additional information regarding the debt 
security and the transaction for any principal transaction that has 
occurred within the past 6 years preceding the date of the request.

Recordkeeping (Section V) and Definitions (Section VI)

    Section V of the proposal establishes a recordkeeping requirement, 
and Section VI sets forth definitions that are used in the proposed 
exemption.

Applicability Date

    The Department is proposing that compliance with the final 
regulation defining a fiduciary under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and 
Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) will begin eight months after publication of 
the final regulation in the Federal Register (Applicability Date). The 
Department proposes to make this exemption, if granted, available on 
the Applicability Date.

No Relief Proposed From ERISA Section 406(a)(1)(C) or Code section 
4975(c)(1)(C) for the Provision of Services

    If granted, this proposed exemption will not provide relief from a 
transaction prohibited by ERISA section 406(a)(1)(C), or from the taxes 
imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b) by reason of Code section 
4975(c)(1)(C), regarding the furnishing of goods, services or 
facilities between a plan and a party in interest. The provision of 
investment advice to a plan under a contract with a fiduciary is a 
service to the plan and compliance with this exemption will not relieve 
an Adviser or Financial Institution of the need to comply with ERISA 
section 408(b)(2), Code section 4975(d)(2), and applicable regulations 
thereunder.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent 
burden, the Department conducts a preclearance consultation program to 
provide the general public and Federal agencies with an opportunity to 
comment on proposed and continuing collections of information in 
accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(2)(A)). This helps to ensure that the public understands the 
Department's collection instructions, respondents can provide the 
requested data in the desired format, reporting burden (time and 
financial resources) is minimized, collection instruments are clearly 
understood, and the Department can properly assess the impact of 
collection requirements on respondents.
    Currently, the Department is soliciting comments concerning the 
proposed information collection request (ICR) included in the Proposed 
Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Debt Securities 
between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and 
IRAs as part of its proposal to amend its 1975 rule that defines when a 
person who provides investment advice to an employee benefit plan, 
participant or beneficiary, or IRA owner, becomes a fiduciary. A copy 
of the ICR may be obtained by contacting the PRA addressee shown below 
or at http://www.RegInfo.gov.
    The Department has submitted a copy of the Proposed Class Exemption 
for Principal Transactions in Certain Debt Securities between 
Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 
3507(d) for review of its information collections. The Department and 
OMB are particularly interested in comments that:
     Evaluate whether the collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
     Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the 
burden of the collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used;
     Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected; and
     Minimize the burden of the collection of information on 
those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate 
automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting 
electronic submission of responses.
    Comments should be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Room 10235, New Executive 
Office Building, Washington, DC 20503; Attention: Desk Officer for the 
Employee Benefits Security Administration. OMB requests that comments 
be received within 30 days of publication of the Proposed Investment 
Advice Initiative to ensure their consideration.
    PRA Addressee: Address requests for copies of the ICR to G. 
Christopher Cosby, Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 200 Constitution 
Avenue NW, Room N-5718, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone (202) 693-8410; 
Fax: (202) 219-5333. These are not toll-free numbers. ICRs submitted to 
OMB also are available at http://www.RegInfo.gov.
    As discussed in detail below, the proposed class exemption would 
permit principal transactions in certain debt securities between a 
plan, participant or beneficiary account, or an IRA, and a financial 
institution or certain of its affiliates. The proposed class exemption

[[Page 22000]]

would require financial institutions and their advisers to enter into a 
contractual arrangement with the retirement investor (i.e., the plan 
fiduciary, participant or beneficiary, or the IRA owner), make certain 
disclosures to the retirement investors and maintain records necessary 
to prove that the conditions of the exemption have been met for a 
period of six (6) years from the date of each principal transaction. 
These requirements are ICRs subject to the PRA.
    The Department has made the following assumptions in order to 
establish a reasonable estimate of the paperwork burden associated with 
these ICRs:
     Approximately 2,800 financial institutions \23\ will 
utilize the proposed exemption to engage in principal transactions and 
eight percent will be new each year;
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    \23\ As described in the regulatory impact analysis for the 
accompanying rule, the Department estimates that approximately 2,619 
broker-dealers service the retirement market. The Department 
anticipates that the exemption will be used primarily, but not 
exclusively, by broker-dealers. Further, the Department assumes that 
all broker-dealers servicing the retirement market will use the 
exemption. Beyond the 2,619 broker-dealers, the Department estimates 
that almost 200 other financial institutions will use the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Financial Institutions and advisers will use existing in-
house resources to obtain the required quotes and maintain the 
recordkeeping systems necessary to meet the requirements of the 
exemption; and
     A combination of personnel will perform the tasks 
associated with the ICRs at an hourly wage rate of $125.95 for a 
financial manager, $30.42 for clerical personnel, $79.67 for an IT 
professional, and $129.94 for a legal professional.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The Department's estimated 2015 hourly labor rates include 
wages, other benefits, and overhead, and are calculated as follows: 
Mean wage from the 2013 National Occupational Employment Survey 
(April 2014, Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf); wages as a percent of total 
compensation from the Employer Cost for Employee Compensation (June 
2014, Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t02.htm); overhead as a multiple of compensation is assumed to 
be 25 percent of total compensation for paraprofessionals, 20 
percent of compensation for clerical, and 35 percent of compensation 
for professional; annual inflation assumed to be 2.3 percent annual 
growth of total labor cost since 2013 (Employment Costs Index data 
for private industry, September 2014 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/eci.nr0.htm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Obtaining Quotes
    In order to engage in principal transactions, Section III(d) of the 
proposed class exemption requires financial institutions to obtain two 
price quotes from unaffiliated parties in agency transactions. The 
Department estimates that ten percent of defined benefit (DB) plans 
that obtain investment advice from fiduciaries will engage in principal 
transactions. These plans are assumed to engage in one transaction per 
year requiring a total of approximately 2,000 quotes annually. 
Similarly, the Department estimates that ten percent of defined 
contribution (DC) plans that do not allow participants to direct 
investments that obtain investment advice from fiduciaries will engage 
in principal transactions. These plans are assumed to engage in one 
transaction per year requiring a total of approximately 6,000 quotes 
annually. The Department estimates that one percent of DC plan 
participants, who direct their own investments and obtain investment 
advice from fiduciaries, will engage in 12 principal transactions 
annually (one per month) requiring approximately 261,000 quotes. 
Finally, the Department estimates that ten percent of IRA owners who 
obtain investment advice from fiduciaries will engage in principal 
transactions. They are assumed to engage in one transaction per year 
requiring a total of approximately 4 million quotes annually.
    Overall, the terms of this exemption will result in financial 
institutions and advisers obtaining approximately 4.3 million quotes 
per year. The Department assumes that a financial manager will spend 
five minutes to obtain the quotes. Therefore, obtaining quotes will 
produce approximately 359,000 hours of burden annually at an equivalent 
cost of $45.2 million.
Contract
    In order to engage in principal transactions under this proposed 
class exemption, Section II requires financial institutions and 
advisers to enter into a written contract with retirement investors 
affirmatively stating that the financial institution and adviser are 
fiduciaries under ERISA or the Code with respect to recommendations 
regarding principal transactions, and that the financial institution 
and adviser will act in the best interest of the retirement investor.
    The Department assumes that financial institutions already maintain 
contracts with their clients. Drafting the contractual provisions 
required by Section II and inserting them into the existing contracts 
will require 24 hours of legal time during the first year that the 
financial institution uses the class exemption. This legal work results 
in approximately 67,000 hours of burden during the first year and 
approximately 5,000 hours of burden during subsequent years at an 
equivalent cost of $8.7 million and $699,000 respectively.
    Because the Department assumes that financial institutions already 
maintain contracts with their clients, the required contractual 
provisions will not require any additional costs for production or 
distribution.
Disclosures and Statement
    The conditions of this PTE require the financial institution and 
adviser to make certain disclosures to the retirement investor. These 
disclosures include the two price quotes obtained from unaffiliated 
parties in agency transactions, other available pre-transaction pricing 
information, as well as the mark-up/mark-down to be charged, and an 
annual statement describing all transactions made during the year. The 
quotes and pre-transaction pricing and mark-up disclosures may be made 
orally or in writing. The Department assumes that all financial 
institutions and advisers will use the oral option at no additional 
burden.
    The Department estimates that 2 million plans and IRAs will receive 
a one-page annual statement. DB and DC plans that do not allow 
participants to direct investments will receive the statement 
electronically at de minimis cost. The statement will be distributed 
electronically to 38 percent of the 11,000 DC plan participants and 50 
percent of 2 million IRA holders at de minimis cost. Paper statements 
will be mailed to 62 percent of DC plan participants and 50 percent of 
IRA owners. The Department estimates that electronic distribution will 
result in de minimis cost, while paper distribution will cost 
approximately $548,000. Paper distribution will also require two 
minutes of clerical time to print and mail the statement, resulting in 
34,000 hours at an equivalent cost of $1 million annually.
Confirmation
    The conditions of this PTE require the financial institution to 
provide a confirmation notice upon completion of each transaction. The 
Department believes that providing confirmation notices is a regular 
and customary business practice, and therefore no additional burden is 
imposed by this requirement.
Recordkeeping Requirement
    Section V of the class exemption requires the financial institution 
to maintain or cause to be maintained for six years and disclosed upon 
request the records necessary for the Department, Internal Revenue 
Service, plan fiduciary, contributing employer or

[[Page 22001]]

employee organization whose members are covered by the plan, 
participants, beneficiaries and IRA owners to determine whether the 
conditions of this exemption have been met in a manner that is 
accessible for audit and examination.
    The Department assumes that each financial institution will 
maintain these records in the normal course of business. Therefore, the 
Department has estimated that the additional time needed to maintain 
records consistent with the exemption will only require about one-half 
hour, on average, annually for a financial manager to organize and 
collate the documents or else draft a notice explaining that the 
information is exempt from disclosure, and an additional 15 minutes of 
clerical time to make the documents available for inspection during 
normal business hours or prepare the paper notice explaining that the 
information is exempt from disclosure. Thus, the Department estimates 
that a total of 45 minutes of professional time per firm would be 
required for a total hour burden of 2,100 hours at an equivalent cost 
of $198,000.
    In connection with this recordkeeping and disclosure requirements 
discussed above, Section V(b)(2) and (3) provides that financial 
institutions relying on the exemption do not have to disclose trade 
secrets or other confidential information to members of the public 
(i.e., plan fiduciaries, contributing employers or employee 
organizations whose members are covered by the plan, participants and 
beneficiaries and IRA owners), but that in the event they refuse to 
disclose information on this basis, they must provide a written notice 
to the requester advising of the reasons for the refusal and advising 
that the Department may request such information. The Department's 
experience indicates that this provision is not commonly invoked, and 
therefore, the written notice is rarely, if ever, generated. Therefore, 
the Department believes the cost burden associated with this clause is 
de minimis. No other cost burden exists with respect to recordkeeping.
IT Costs
    The Department estimates that updating computer systems to insert 
the contract provisions into existing contracts, maintain the required 
records, and insert the required markup information into existing 
confirmation notices will require eight hours of IT staff time during 
the first year that the financial institution uses the PTE. This IT 
work results in approximately 22,000 hours of burden during the first 
year and approximately 1,800 hours of burden during subsequent years at 
an equivalent cost of $1.8 million and $142,000 respectively.
Overall Summary
    Overall, the Department estimates that in order to meet the 
conditions of this class exemption, financial institutions and advisers 
will obtain approximately 4.3 million price quotes and distribute an 
additional 2 million statements annually. Obtaining these quotes, 
distributing statements, adjusting contracts, and maintaining records 
that the conditions of the exemption have been fulfilled will result in 
a total of 484,000 hours of burden during the first year and 402,000 
hours of burden in subsequent years. The equivalent cost of this burden 
is $51.1million during the first year and $47.2 million in subsequent 
years. This exemption will result in a materials and postage cost 
burden of $548,000 annually.
    These paperwork burden estimates are summarized as follows:
    Type of Review: New collection (Request for new OMB Control 
Number).
    Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of 
Labor.
    Titles: (1) Proposed Exemption for Principal Transactions in 
Certain Debt Securities between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and 
Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs and (2) Proposed Investment Advice 
Regulation.
    OMB Control Number: 1210-NEW.
    Affected Public: Business or other for-profit.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 2,800.
    Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 6,333,921.
    Frequency of Response: When engaging in exempted transaction; 
Annually.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 484,072 hours during the first 
year, 401,643 in subsequent years.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $548,079.

General Information

    The attention of interested persons is directed to the following:
    (1) The fact that a transaction is the subject of an exemption 
under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2) does not relieve 
a fiduciary or other party in interest or disqualified person with 
respect to a plan or IRA from certain other provisions of ERISA and the 
Code, including any prohibited transaction provisions to which the 
exemption does not apply and the general fiduciary responsibility 
provisions of ERISA section 404 which require, where applicable, among 
other things, that a fiduciary discharge his or her duties respecting 
the plan solely in the interests of the plan's participants and 
beneficiaries and in a prudent fashion in accordance with ERISA section 
404(a)(1)(B);
    (2) If granted, this class exemption does not extend to 
transactions prohibited under ERISA section 406(a)(1)(B) and (C), ERISA 
section 406(b)(3) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(B), (C), and (F);
    (3) Before a class exemption may be granted under ERISA section 
408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2), the Department must find that the 
class exemption is administratively feasible, in the interests of plans 
and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective 
of the rights of the plan's participants and beneficiaries and IRA 
owners;
    (4) If granted, this class exemption will be applicable to a 
particular transaction only if the transaction satisfies the conditions 
specified in the class exemption; and
    (5) If granted, this class exemption will be supplemental to, and 
not in derogation of, any other provisions of ERISA and the Code, 
including statutory or administrative exemptions and transitional 
rules. Furthermore, the fact that a transaction is subject to an 
administrative or statutory exemption is not dispositive of whether the 
transaction is in fact a prohibited transaction.

Proposed Exemption

    The Department is proposing the following exemption under the 
authority of ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2), and in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in 29 CFR part 2570, subpart B 
(76 FR 66637, October 27, 2011).\25\
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    \25\ For purposes of this proposed exemption, references to 
ERISA should be read to refer as well to the corresponding 
provisions of the Code.
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Section I--Exemption

    (a) In general. ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code prohibit 
fiduciary advisers to employee benefit plans (Plans) and individual 
retirement plans (IRAs) from self-dealing, including receiving 
compensation that varies based on their investment recommendations. 
ERISA and the Code also prohibit fiduciaries from engaging in 
securities purchases and sales with Plans or IRAs on behalf of their 
own accounts (Principal Transactions). This exemption permits certain 
persons who provide investment advice to Retirement Investors (i.e., 
fiduciaries of Plans, Plan participants or beneficiaries,

[[Page 22002]]

or IRA owners) to engage in certain Principal Transactions as described 
below.
    (b) Exemption for Certain Principal Transactions. This exemption 
permits an Adviser or Financial Institution to engage in the purchase 
or sale of a Debt Security in a Principal Transaction with a Plan, 
participant or beneficiary account, or IRA, and receive a mark-up, 
mark-down or other payment for themselves or any Affiliate, as a result 
of the Adviser's and Financial Institution's advice. As detailed below, 
parties seeking to rely on the exemption must contractually acknowledge 
fiduciary status, agree to adhere to Impartial Conduct Standards in 
rendering advice, disclose Material Conflicts of Interest associated 
with Principal Transactions and obtain the prospective written consent 
of the Plan or IRA; warrant that they have adopted policies and 
procedures designed to mitigate the dangers posed by Material Conflicts 
of Interest; disclose important information about the cost of the 
security in the Principal Transaction and retain certain records. This 
exemption provides relief from ERISA section 406(a)(1)(A) and (D) and 
section 406(b)(1) and (2), and the taxes imposed by Code section 
4975(a) and (b), by reason of Code section 4975(c)(1)(A), (D), and (E). 
The Adviser and Financial Institution must comply with the conditions 
of Sections II-V.
    (c) Scope of this exemption: This exemption does not apply if:
    (1) The Adviser: (i) Exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of the assets of the Plan 
or IRA involved in the transaction or exercises any discretionary 
authority or control respecting management or the disposition of the 
assets; or (ii) has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of the Plan or IRA; or
    (2) The Plan is covered by Title I of ERISA and (i) the Adviser, 
Financial Institution or any Affiliate is the employer of employees 
covered by the Plan, or (ii) the Adviser or Financial Institution is a 
named fiduciary or plan administrator (as defined in ERISA section 
3(16)(A)) with respect to the Plan, or an affiliate thereof, that was 
selected to provide investment advice to the plan by a fiduciary who is 
not Independent.

Section II--Contract, Impartial Conduct, and Other Requirements

    (a) Contract. Prior to engaging in the Principal Transaction, the 
Adviser and Financial Institution enter into a written contract with 
the Retirement Investor, acting on behalf of the Plan, participant or 
beneficiary account, or IRA, that incorporates the terms required by 
Section II(b)-(e).
    (b) Fiduciary. The written contract affirmatively states that the 
Adviser and Financial Institution are fiduciaries under ERISA or the 
Code, or both, with respect to any investment recommendation to the 
Retirement Investor regarding Principal Transactions.
    (c) Impartial Conduct Standards. The Adviser and Financial 
Institution affirmatively agree to, and comply with, the following:
    (1) When providing investment advice to a Retirement Investor 
regarding the Principal Transaction, the Adviser and Financial 
Institution will provide investment advice that is in the Best Interest 
of the Retirement Investor (i.e., advice that reflects the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a 
prudent person would exercise based on the investment objectives, risk 
tolerance, financial circumstances, and needs of the Retirement 
Investor, without regard to the financial or other interests of the 
Adviser, Financial Institution, or any Affiliate or other party);
    (2) The Adviser and Financial Institution will not enter into a 
Principal Transaction with the Plan, participant or beneficiary 
account, or IRA if the purchase or sales price of the Debt Security 
(including the mark-up or mark-down) is unreasonable under the 
circumstances; and
    (3) The Adviser's and Financial Institution's statements about the 
Debt Security, fees, Material Conflicts of Interest, the Principal 
Transaction, and any other matters relevant to a Retirement Investor's 
investment decision in the Debt Security, are not misleading.
    (d) Warranty. The Adviser and Financial Institution affirmatively 
warrant the following:
    (1) The Adviser, Financial Institution and Affiliates will comply 
with all applicable federal and state laws regarding the rendering of 
the investment advice and the purchase and sale of the Debt Security;
    (2) The Financial Institution has adopted written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to mitigate the impact of Material 
Conflicts of Interest and to ensure that its individual Advisers adhere 
to the Impartial Conduct Standards set forth in Section II(c);
    (3) In formulating its policies and procedures, the Financial 
Institution has specifically identified Material Conflicts of Interest 
and adopted measures to prevent the Material Conflicts of Interest from 
causing violations of the Impartial Conduct Standards set forth in 
Section II(c); and
    (4) Neither the Financial Institution nor (to the best of its 
knowledge) any Affiliate uses quotas, appraisals, performance or 
personnel actions, bonuses, contests, special awards, differentiated 
compensation or other actions or incentives to the extent they would 
tend to encourage individual Advisers to make recommendations regarding 
Principal Transactions that are not in the Best Interest of the 
Retirement Investor.
    (e) Principal Transaction Disclosures. The written contract must 
specifically:
    (1) Set forth in writing (i) the circumstances under which the 
Adviser and Financial Institution may engage in Principal Transactions 
with the Plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA and (ii) 
identify and disclose the Material Conflicts of Interest associated 
with Principal Transactions;
    (2) Document the Retirement Investor's affirmative written consent, 
on a prospective basis, to Principal Transactions between the Adviser 
or Financial Institution and the Plan, participant or beneficiary 
account, or IRA; and
    (3) Inform the Retirement Investor (i) that the consent set forth 
in Section II(e)(2) is terminable at will by the Retirement Investor at 
any time, without penalty to the Plan or IRA, and (ii) of the right to 
obtain complete information about all the fees and other payments 
currently associated with its investments.
    (f) Prohibited Contractual Provisions. The written contract shall 
not contain the following:
    (1) Exculpatory provisions disclaiming or otherwise limiting 
liability of the Adviser or Financial Institution for a violation of 
the contract's terms; and
    (2) A provision under which the Plan, IRA or the Retirement 
Investor waives or qualifies its right to bring or participate in a 
class action or other representative action in court in a dispute with 
the Adviser or Financial Institution.

Section III--General Conditions

    (a) Debt Security. The Debt Security being purchased or sold:
    (1) Was not issued by the Financial Institution or any Affiliate;
    (2) Is not purchased by the Plan, participant or beneficiary 
account, or IRA in an underwriting or underwriting syndicate in which 
the Financial

[[Page 22003]]

Institution or any Affiliate is the underwriter or a member;
    (3) Possesses no greater than a moderate credit risk; and
    (4) Is sufficiently liquid that the Debt Security could be sold at 
or near its fair market value within a reasonably short period of time.
    (b) Arrangement. The Principal Transaction is not part of an 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding designed to evade compliance 
with ERISA or the Code, or to otherwise impact the value of the Debt 
Security.
    (c) Cash. The purchase or sale of the Debt Security is for cash.
    (d) Pricing. The purchase or sale of the Debt Security is executed 
at a price that:
    (1) The Adviser and Financial Institution reasonably believe is at 
least as favorable to the Plan, participant or beneficiary account, or 
IRA than the price available to the Plan, participant or beneficiary 
account, or IRA in a transaction that is not a Principal Transaction; 
and
    (2) Is at least as favorable to the Plan, participant or 
beneficiary account, or IRA as the contemporaneous price for the Debt 
Security, or a similar security if a price is not available with 
respect to the same Debt Security, offered by two ready and willing 
counterparties that are not Affiliates.
    When comparing the price offered by the counterparties referred to 
in (2), the Adviser and Financial Institution may take into account a 
commission as part of the resulting price to the Plan, participant or 
beneficiary account, or IRA, as compared to the price of the Debt 
Security, including any mark-up or mark-down.

Section IV--Disclosure Requirements

    (a) Pre-Transaction Disclosure. Prior to engaging in the Principal 
Transaction, the Adviser or Financial Institution provides the 
following, orally or in writing, to the Retirement Investor:
    (1) A statement that the purchase or sale of the Debt Security will 
be executed as a Principal Transaction between the Adviser or Financial 
Institution and the Plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA; 
and
    (2) Any available pricing information regarding the Debt Security, 
including the two quotes obtained pursuant to Section III(d). The mark-
up or mark-down or other payment that will be charged also must be 
disclosed.
    (b) Confirmation. The Financial Institution provides a written 
confirmation of the Principal Transaction in accordance with Rule 10b-
10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that also includes 
disclosure of the mark-up, mark-down, or other payment to the Adviser, 
Financial Institution or Affiliate in connection with the Principal 
Transaction.
    (c) Annual Disclosure. The Adviser or Financial Institution 
provides the following written information to the Retirement Investor, 
annually, within 45 days of the end of the applicable year, in a single 
disclosure:
    (1) A list identifying each Principal Transaction engaged in during 
the applicable period, the prevailing market price at which the Debt 
Security was purchased or sold, and the applicable mark-up or mark-down 
or other payment for each Debt Security; and
    (2) A statement that the consent required pursuant to Section 
II(e)(2) is terminable at will, without penalty to the Plan or IRA.
    (d) Upon Request. Upon the Retirement Investor's reasonable 
request, prior to or following the completion of a Principal 
Transaction, the Adviser or Financial Institution must provide the 
Retirement Investor with additional information regarding the Debt 
Security and its purchase or sale; provided that such request may not 
relate to a Principal Transaction that was executed more than six (6) 
years from the date of the request.

Section V--Recordkeeping

    (a) The Financial Institution maintains for a period of six (6) 
years from the date of each Principal Transaction the records necessary 
to enable the persons described in Section V(b) to determine whether 
the conditions of this exemption have been met, except that:
    (1) If such records are lost or destroyed, due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the Financial Institution, then no prohibited 
transaction will be considered to have occurred solely on the basis of 
the unavailability of those records; and
    (2) No party other than the Financial Institution that is engaging 
in the Principal Transaction shall be subject to the civil penalty that 
may be assessed under ERISA section 502(i) or to the taxes imposed by 
Code sections 4975(a) and (b) if the records are not maintained or are 
not available for examination as required by Section V(b).
    (b)
    (1) Except as provided in Section V(b)(2) and notwithstanding any 
provisions of ERISA sections 504(a)(2) and 504(b), the records referred 
to in Section V(a) are unconditionally available at their customary 
location for examination during normal business hours by:
    (i) Any duly authorized employee or representative of the 
Department or the Internal Revenue Service;
    (ii) any fiduciary of the Plan or IRA that was a party to a 
Principal Transaction described in this exemption, or any duly 
authorized employee or representative of such fiduciary;
    (iii) any employer of participants and beneficiaries and any 
employee organization whose members are covered by the Plan, or any 
authorized employee or representative of these entities; and
    (iv) any participant or beneficiary of the Plan, or the beneficial 
owner of an IRA.
    (2) None of the persons described in subparagraph (1)(ii) through 
(iv) are authorized to examine trade secrets of the Financial 
Institution, or commercial or financial information which is privileged 
or confidential; and
    (3) Should the Financial Institution refuse to disclose information 
on the basis that such information is exempt from disclosure, the 
Financial Institution must by the close of the thirtieth (30th) day 
following the request, provide a written notice advising the requestor 
of the reasons for the refusal and that the Department may request such 
information.

Section VI--Definitions

    (a) ``Adviser'' means an individual who:
    (1) Is a fiduciary of a Plan or IRA solely by reason of the 
provision of investment advice described in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) 
or Code section 4975(e)(3)(B), or both, and the applicable regulations, 
with respect to the Assets involved in the transaction;
    (2) Is an employee, independent contractor, agent, or registered 
representative of a Financial Institution; and
    (3) Satisfies the applicable banking, and securities laws with 
respect to the covered transaction.
    (b) ``Affiliate'' of an Adviser or Financial Institution mean:
    (1) Any person directly or indirectly, through one or more 
intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with the Adviser or Financial Institution. For this purpose, the term 
``control'' means the power to exercise a controlling influence over 
the management or policies of a person other than an individual;
    (2) Any officer, director, employee, relative (as defined in ERISA 
section 3(15)) or member of family (as defined in Code section 
4975(e)(6)), agent or registered representative of, or partner

[[Page 22004]]

in the Adviser or Financial Institution; and
    (3) Any corporation or partnership of which the Adviser or 
Financial Institution is an officer, director, or employee, or in which 
the Adviser or Financial Institution is a partner.
    (c) Investment advice is in the ``Best Interest'' of the Retirement 
Investor when the Adviser and Financial Institution providing the 
advice act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person would exercise 
based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial 
circumstances, and needs of the Retirement Investor, without regard to 
the financial or other interests of the Adviser, Financial Institution, 
any Affiliate or other party.
    (d) ``Debt Security'' means a ``debt security'' as defined in Rule 
10b-10(d)(4) of the Exchange Act that is:
    (1) U.S. dollar denominated, issued by a U.S. corporation and 
offered pursuant to a registration statement under the Securities Act 
of 1933;
    (2) An ``Agency Debt Security'' as defined in FINRA Rule 6710(l) or 
its successor; or
    (3) A ``U.S. Treasury Security'' as defined in FINRA Rule 6710(p) 
or its successor.
    (e) ``Financial Institution'' means the entity that (i) employs the 
Adviser or otherwise retains such individual as an independent 
contractor, agent or registered representative, and (ii) customarily 
purchases or sells Debt Securities for its own account in the ordinary 
course of its business, and that is:
    (1) Registered as an investment adviser under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.) or under the laws of the 
state in which the adviser maintains its principal office and place of 
business;
    (2) A bank or similar financial institution supervised by the 
United States or state, or a savings association (as defined in section 
3(b)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(b)(1))), 
but only if the advice resulting in the compensation is provided 
through a trust department of the bank or similar financial institution 
or savings association which is subject to periodic examination and 
review by federal or state banking authorities; and
    (3) A broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    (f) ``Independent'' means a person that:
    (1) Is not the Adviser or Financial Institution or an Affiliate;
    (2) Does not receive compensation or other consideration for his or 
her own account from the Adviser, Financial Institution or an 
Affiliate; and
    (3) Does not have a relationship to or an interest in the Adviser, 
Financial Institution or an Affiliate that might affect the exercise of 
the person's best judgment in connection with transactions described in 
this exemption.
    (g) ``Individual Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' means any trust, 
account or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), 
including, for example, an individual retirement account described in 
Code section 408(a) and a health savings account described in Code 
section 223(d).
    (h) A ``Material Conflict of Interest'' exists when an Adviser or 
Financial Institution has a financial interest that could affect the 
exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary in rendering advice to a 
Retirement Investor regarding Principal Transactions.
    (i) ``Plan'' means an employee benefit plan described in ERISA 
section 3(3) and any plan described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(A).
    (j) ``Principal Transaction'' means a purchase or sale of a Debt 
Security where an Adviser or Financial Institution is purchasing from 
or selling to a Plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA on 
behalf of the Financial Institution's own account or the account of a 
person directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, 
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the Financial 
Institution.
    (k) ``Retirement Investor'' means:
    (1) A fiduciary of a non-participant directed Plan subject to Title 
I of ERISA with authority to make investment decisions for the Plan;
    (2) A participant or beneficiary of a Plan subject to Title I of 
ERISA with authority to direct the investment of assets in his or her 
Plan account or to take a distribution; or
    (3) The beneficial owner of an IRA acting on behalf of the IRA.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 14th day of April, 2015.
Phyllis C. Borzi,
Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2015-08833 Filed 4-15-15; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-29-P