[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 69 (Friday, April 10, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19358-19370]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-08311]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-302; NRC-2015-0042]
Duke Energy Florida, Inc.; Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear
Generating Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting
exemptions in response to a request from Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF
or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP)
requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to
maintain an offsite radiological emergency plan and reduce the scope of
onsite emergency planning activities at the Crystal River Unit 3
Nuclear Generating Station (CR-3) based on the reduced risks of
accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0042 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0042. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section
of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this document
(if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time
that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Orenak, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3229; email: [email protected].
I. Background
The CR-3 facility is a decommissioning power reactor located in
Citrus County, Florida. The licensee, DEF, is the holder of CR-3
Facility Operating License No. DPR-72. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations,
and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13056A005), DEF submitted to the NRC a certification in accordance
with section 50.82(a)(1)(i) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) indicating it would permanently cease power
operations, and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently defueled
the reactor vessel at CR-3. On May 28, 2011, DEF completed the final
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at CR-3. As a permanently
shutdown and defueled facility, and in accordance with section
50.82(a)(2), DEF is no longer authorized to operate the reactor or
emplace nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. CR-3 is still authorized
to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. The spent
fuel is currently being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP).
During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the
reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures,
transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-
radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating
power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems,
[[Page 19359]]
which could affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most
severe postulated accidents, would involve the release of large
quantities of fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor
operations at CR-3 and the permanent removal of the fuel from the
reactor vessel, such accidents are no longer possible. The reactor,
RCS, and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no
function related to the storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, EP
provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of
the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
Based on the time that CR-3 has been permanently shutdown
(approximately 64 months), there is no longer any possibility of an
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident that could
exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective
Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is
permanently shutdown and defueled from a reactor that is authorized to
operate. In order for DEF to modify the CR-3 emergency plan to reflect
the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of CR-3, certain exemptions from the EP regulations must be
obtained before the CR-3 emergency plan can be amended.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated September 26, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13274A584), ``Crystal River Unit 3--License Amendment Request #315,
Revision 0, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action
Level Scheme, and Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological
Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50,'' DEF
requested exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for
CR-3. More specifically, DEF requested exemptions from certain planning
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological
emergency plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power reactors;
and from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50, appendix E, section IV,
which establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency
plans. In a letter dated March 28, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14098A072), DEF provided responses to the NRC staff's request for
additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In a
letter dated May 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14139A006), DEF
provided an additional supplemental response to a separate set of RAIs,
which contained information applicable to the SFP inventory makeup
strategies for mitigating the potential loss of water inventory due to
a beyond-design-basis accident. In a letter dated August 28, 2014
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14251A237), CR-3 provided a supplement, which
amended its request to align with the exemptions recommended by the NRC
staff and approved by the Commission in staff requirements memorandum
(SRM) to SECY-14-0066, ``Request by Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements,'' dated August
7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). The information provided by
DEF included justifications for each exemption requested. The
exemptions requested by DEF will eliminate the requirements to maintain
formal offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR
part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning activities.
DEF stated that application of all of the standards and requirements in
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E is not
needed for adequate emergency response capability based on the reduced
risks at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility. If offsite
protective actions were needed for a very unlikely accident that could
challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at CR-3, provisions exist for
offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive
emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System
to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context,
also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local
emergency planning in the United States. It promotes a common
understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and
decision making and helps planners at all levels of government in their
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats
emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies.
It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is
responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the
personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources
available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP is
often referred to as a synonym for ``all hazards planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However,
current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release
from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly reduced.
The reduced risk for any significant offsite radiological release is
based on two factors. One factor is the elimination of accidents
applicable only to an operating power reactor, resulting in fewer
credible accident scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-
lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to
radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the
reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the
radionuclides in the
[[Page 19360]]
current spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The
irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay,
increasing the available time to mitigate the SFP inventory loss. The
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactors bounded by the assumptions and conditions in
the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly
less than for an operating power reactor.
EP exemptions similar to those requested by DEF were granted to
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor licensees, such as for
Zion Nuclear Power Station in 1999 (ADAMS Legacy Accession No.
9909070079) and Kewaunee Power Station in 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14261A223). However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of
all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to
modify their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-
specific risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and
defueled status. Specifically, approval of the prior exemptions was
based on demonstrating that: (1) The radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond-
design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer
from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities
to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to
protect the health and safety of the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at CR-3, the licensee
provided analyses demonstrating that none would warrant an offsite
radiological emergency plan meeting the requirements of 10 CFR part 50.
With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at CR-3, the licensee
analyzed two bounding beyond-design-basis accidents that have a
potential for a significant offsite release. One of these beyond-
design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP water inventory,
where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily accomplished by
natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent fuel assemblies.
The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that as of September 26,
2013, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep
the fuel within a safe temperature range indefinitely without fuel
damage or offsite radiological release. The second beyond-design-basis
accident analysis performed by the licensee could not completely rule
out the possibility of a radiological release from an SFP. This more
limiting analysis assumes an incomplete drain down of the SFP water, or
some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of the SFP
with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of
rubble to the SFP) that would effectively impede any decay heat removal
through all possible modes of cooling. This analysis is commonly
referred to as an adiabatic heat-up. The licensee's analysis
demonstrates that, as of September 26, 2013, there would be at least
19.7 hours under adiabatic heat-up conditions before the spent fuel
cladding would reach a temperature where the potential for a
significant offsite radiological release could occur. This analysis
conservatively does not consider the period of time from the initiating
event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are
lost.
The NRC staff has verified DEF's analyses and its calculations. The
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested
exemptions to DEF, there is no design-basis accident that will result
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis
accident affecting the SFP that results in adiabatic heat-up conditions
(i.e., a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer),
the NRC staff has reviewed and verified that there will be at least
19.7 hours available before an offsite release might occur and,
therefore, at least 19.7 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating
actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a
radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and the
bases for prior EP exemption request approvals, as discussed above. The
staff determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR
50.12(a) are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. Assessment
of the DEF EP exemptions is described in SECY-14-0118, ``Request by
Duke Energy Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements,'' dated October 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14219A444). The Commission approved the NRC staff's intention to
grant the exemptions in the SRM to SECY-14-0118, dated December 30,
2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14364A111). Descriptions of the specific
exemptions requested by DEF and the NRC staff's basis for granting each
exemption are provided in SECY-14-0118 and summarized in a table at the
end of this document. The staff's detailed review and technical basis
for the approval of the specific EP exemptions are provided in the NRC
staff's safety evaluation enclosed in an NRC letter dated March 30,
2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15058A906).
A. Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, appendix E,
section IV, that would allow DEF to revise the CR-3 Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station.
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may,
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative,
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by
law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, DEF provided analyses that show the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore,
formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part
50 are no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the
exclusion area boundary.
Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis
accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses concludes that the event sequences
important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors
are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP
assessments, this is an important difference relative
[[Page 19361]]
to operating power reactors where typically a large number of different
sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738,
relaxation of offsite EP requirements under 10 CFR part 50 a few months
after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk.
NUREG-1738 further concludes that the change in risk due to
relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk
is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating
power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk.
Specifically, for ground motion levels that correspond to SFP failure
in the central and eastern United States, it is expected that
electrical power would be lost and more than half of the bridges and
buildings (including those housing communication systems and emergency
response equipment) would be unsafe even for temporary use within at
least 10 miles of the plant. This approach is also consistent with
previous Commission rulings on San Onofre and Diablo Canyon in which
the Commission found that for those risk-dominant earthquakes that
cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area,
emergency response would have marginal benefit because of offsite
damage. All other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite
radiological emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too
low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions that eliminate the requirements of
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and
reducing the scope of onsite emergency planning activities will not
present an undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by DEF only involve EP requirements under
10 CFR part 50 and will allow DEF to revise the CR-3 Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at CR-3 are not affected by the
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite
emergency planning activities at CR-3 will not adversely affect DEF's
ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear
material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with common
defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite
radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously, because CR-3 is permanently shutdown and
defueled, there is no longer a risk of offsite radiological release
from a design-basis accident and the risk of a significant offsite
radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly
reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has
confirmed the reduced risks at CR-3 by comparing the generic risk
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site specific conditions
at CR-3 and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the
risks presented by CR-3. Furthermore, the staff has recently concluded
in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365),
that, consistent with earlier research studies, SFPs are robust
structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes without
leaking cooling water and potentially uncovering the spent fuel. The
NUREG-2161 study shows the likelihood of a radiological release from
spent fuel after the analyzed severe earthquake at the reference plant
to be about one time in 10 million years or lower.
The licensee has analyzed site-specific spent fuel air-cooling and
adiabatic heat-up beyond-design-basis accident scenarios to determine
the risk of cladding damage, and the time to rapid cladding oxidation.
The air-cooling analysis shows that as of September 26, 2013, in the
event of a complete SFP drain down due to a loss of water inventory,
assuming that natural circulation of air through the spent fuel racks
was available, the peak fuel clad temperature would remain below
1049[emsp14][deg]F (565[ordm]C), the temperature at which incipient
cladding failure may occur. Therefore, in this postulated accident,
fuel cladding remains intact.
The beyond-design-basis adiabatic heat-up accident analysis of the
spent fuel evaluates a postulated condition involving a very unlikely
scenario where the SFP is drained in such a way that all modes of
cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable. DEF analysis of
this beyond-design-basis accident shows that as of September 26, 2013,
19.7 hours would be available between the time the fuel is uncovered
(at which time adiabatic heat-up begins), until the fuel cladding
reaches a temperature of 1652[emsp14][deg]F (900[ordm]C), the
temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential
for a significant radiological release.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff
concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the DEF
requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to
initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if
needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a
CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency plans,
required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, DEF committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in
its letter to the NRC dated May 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14139A006). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP
include: Using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying
water through hoses to connections to the existing SFP piping using the
diesel-driven fire service pump; and using a diesel-driven portable
pump to take suction from CR-3 intake and discharge canals. These
strategies will continue to be required as license condition 2.C.(14),
``Mitigation Strategy License Condition.'' Considering the very low
probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these
diverse strategies provide
[[Page 19362]]
multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before
the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions to meet the underlying purpose of all
of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, acceptably satisfy the
special circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly
reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the
permanently shutdown and defueled state of the CR-3 facility.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness
at CR-3 and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the unlikely event
of a radiological emergency at the CR-3 facility. Since the underlying
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and reduction in
the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at CR-3, the
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental
Assessment published March 2, 2015 (80 FR 11233).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), that DEF's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEF exemptions from certain EP
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the
staff's safety evaluation dated March 30, 2015. The exemptions are
effective as of March 30, 2015.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of March, 2015.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
Table of Exemptions Granted to DEF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47(b).............. In the Statement of Considerations (SOC)
The NRC is granting for the final rule for emergency
exemptions from portions of planning (EP) requirements for
the rule language that would independent spent fuel storage
otherwise require offsite installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor
emergency response plans. retrievable storage installations (MRS)
(60 Federal Register (FR) 32430; June
22, 1995), the Commission responded to
comments concerning offsite EP for
ISFSIs or a MRS and concluded that,
``the offsite consequences of potential
accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not
warrant establishing Emergency Planning
Zones [EPZ].''
In a nuclear power reactor's permanently
defueled state, the accident risks are
more similar to an ISFSI or a MRS than
an operating nuclear power plant. The EP
program would be similar to that
required for an ISFSI under section
72.32(a) of 10 CFR when fuel stored in
the spent fuel pool (SFP) has more than
5 years of decay time and would not
change substantially when all the fuel
is transferred from the SFP to an onsite
ISFSI. Exemptions from offsite EP
requirements have previously been
approved when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available
until the hottest fuel assembly reaches
900[deg]C from a partial drain-down
event without any spent fuel cooling.
The technical basis that underlied the
approval of the exemption request is
based partly on the analysis of a time
period that spent fuel stored in the SFP
is unlikely to reach the zirconium
ignition temperature in less than 10
hours. This time period is based on a
heat-up calculation, which uses several
simplifying assumptions. Some of these
assumptions are conservative (adiabatic
conditions), while others are non-
conservative (no oxidation below
900[deg]C). Weighing the conservatisms
and non-conservatisms, the NRC staff
judges that this calculation reasonably
represents conditions, which may occur
in the event of an SFP accident. The
staff concluded that if 10 hours were
available to initiate mitigative
actions, or if needed, offsite
protective actions using a comprehensive
emergency management plan (CEMP), formal
offsite radiological emergency plans are
not necessary for these permanently
defueled nuclear power reactor
licensees.
As supported by the licensee's SFP
analysis, the NRC staff believes an
exemption to the requirements for formal
offsite radiological emergency plans is
justified for a zirconium fire scenario
considering the low likelihood of this
event together with time available to
take mitigative or protective actions
between the initiating event and before
the onset of a postulated fire.
The Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF)
analysis has demonstrated that due to
the considerable time since shutdown,
approximately 4 years as of the date of
the analysis, the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents
will not exceed the limits of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at
the exclusion area boundary. These
analyses also show that for beyond-
design-basis events where the SFP is
drained, air cooling will prevent the
fuel from reaching the lowest
temperature where incipient cladding
failure may occur (565[deg]C). In the
event that air cooling is not possible,
19.7 hours is available to take
mitigative or, if needed, offsite
protective actions using a CEMP from the
time the fuel is uncovered until it
reaches the auto-ignition temperature of
900[deg]C.
[[Page 19363]]
DEF has also furnished information on its
SFP inventory makeup strategies for
mitigating the loss of water inventory.
Several sources of makeup to the pools
are available, such as the fire service
system, using the diesel-driven fire
service pump for loss of electrical
power. If available fresh water sources
are depleted, salt water sources with
inexhaustible inventory from the Crystal
River Unit 3 (CR-3) intake and discharge
canal, using portable diesel powered
pumps are available.
Pool inventory addition can be
implemented without accessing the
elevation of the pool deck. In a letter
dated May 7, 2014, ``Crystal River Unit
3--Response to Requests for Additional
Information and Supplement 1 to License
Amendment Request #316, Revision 0''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14139A006), DEF
withdrew its request to remove License
Condition 2.C.(14), ``Mitigation
Strategy License Condition,'' from its
Facility Operating License. This license
condition requires CR-3 to maintain its
SFP inventory makeup strategies as
discussed above.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1)........... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require the need
for Emergency Planning Zones
(EPZs).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)........... Considering the time available to take
The NRC is granting mitigative or, if needed, offsite
exemptions from portions of protective actions using a CEMP between
the rule language that would the initiating event and before the
otherwise require the need onset of a postulated fire,
for an Emergency Operations decommissioning power reactors present a
Facility (EOF). low likelihood of any credible accident
resulting in a radiological release. As
such, an emergency operations facility
would not be required. The ``nuclear
island,'' control room, or other onsite
location can provide for the
communication and coordination with
offsite organizations for the level of
support required.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)........... Considering the time available to take
The NRC is granting mitigative or if needed, offsite
exemptions from portions of protective actions using a CEMP between
the rule language that would the initiating event and before the
otherwise require reference onset of a postulated fire,
to formal offsite decommissioning power reactors present a
radiological emergency low likelihood of any credible accident
response plans. resulting in a radiological release. As
such, formal offsite radiological
emergency response plans are not
required.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
document NEI 99-01, ``Development of
Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive
Reactors'' (Revision 6), was found to be
an acceptable method for development of
emergency action levels (EALs) and was
endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) in a letter dated March
28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 provides EALs
for non-passive operating nuclear power
reactors, permanently defueled reactors,
and ISFSIs.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)........... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require early
notification of the public
and a means to provide
instructions to the public
within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)........... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require prompt
communications with the
public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7)........... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require
information to be made
available to the public on a
periodic basis about how
they will be notified and
what their initial
protective actions should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)........... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require the
capability for monitoring
offsite consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).......... In the unlikely event of an SFP accident,
The NRC is granting the iodine isotopes, which contribute to
exemptions from portions of an offsite dose from an operating
the rule language that would reactor accident, are not present, so
reduce the range of potassium iodide distribution would no
protective actions developed longer serve as an effective or
for radiological necessary supplemental protective
emergencies. Consideration action.
of evacuation, sheltering,
or the use of potassium
iodide will no longer be
necessary. Evacuation time
estimates (ETEs) will no
longer need to developed or
updated. Protective actions
for the ingestion exposure
pathway EPZ will not need to
be developed.
[[Page 19364]]
The CR-3 SFP is considered an ISFSI and
is licensed under 10 CFR part 72,
subpart K, ``General License for Storage
of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites.''
The Commission responded to comments in
its SOC for the final rule for EP
requirements for ISFSIs and MRS
facilities (60 FR 32435), and concluded
that, ``the offsite consequences of
potential accidents at an ISFSI or an
MRS would not warrant establishing
EPZs.'' Additionally, in the SOC for the
final rule for EP requirements for
ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR
32430), the Commission responded to
comments concerning site-specific EP
that includes evacuation of surrounding
population for an ISFSI not at a reactor
site, and concluded that, ``The
Commission does not agree that as a
general matter emergency plans for an
ISFSI must include evacuation
planning.''
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)
and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)........... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require the
establishment of a 10 mile
radius plume exposure
pathway EPZ and a 50 mile
radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, The EP Rule published in the Federal
section IV.1. Register (76 FR 72560; November 23,
The NRC is granting 2011), amended certain requirements in
exemptions from portions of 10 CFR part 50. Among the changes, the
the rule language that would definition of ``hostile action'' was
otherwise require onsite added as an act directed toward a
protective actions during nuclear power plant or its personnel.
hostile action. This definition is based on the
definition of ``hostile action''
provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02,
``Emergency Preparedness and Response
Actions for Security-Based Events.'' NRC
Bulletin 2005-02 was not applicable to
nuclear power reactors that have
permanently ceased operations and have
certified that fuel has been removed
from the reactor vessel.
The NRC excluded non-power reactors from
the scope of ``hostile action'' at the
time of the rulemaking because, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-power
reactor is not considered a nuclear
power reactor and a regulatory basis had
not been developed to support the
inclusion of non-power reactors within
the scope of ``hostile action.''
Similarly, a decommissioning power
reactor or an ISFSI is not a ``nuclear
reactor'' as defined in 10 CFR part 50.
A decommissioning power reactor also has
a low likelihood of a credible accident
resulting in radiological releases
requiring offsite protective measures.
For all of these reasons, the NRC staff
concludes that a decommissioning power
reactor is not a facility that falls
within the scope of ``hostile action.''
Similarly, for security, risk insights
can be used to determine which targets
are important to protect against
sabotage. A level of security
commensurate with the consequences of a
sabotage event is required and is
evaluated on a site-specific basis. The
severity of the consequences declines as
fuel ages and, thereby, removes over
time the underlying concern that a
sabotage attack could cause offsite
radiological consequences.
Although, this analysis provides a
justification for exempting CR-3 from
``hostile action'' related requirements,
some EP requirements for security-based
events are maintained. The
classification of security-based events,
notification of offsite authorities and
coordination with offsite agencies under
a CEMP concept are still required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
section IV.2.
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language concerning
the evacuation time analyses
within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ for the
licensee's initial
application.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.3. appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting 50.47(b).
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require use of NRC-
approved ETEs and updates to
State and local governments
when developing protective
action strategies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.4. appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting 50.47(b).
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require licensees
to update evacuation time
estimates based on the most
recent census data and
submit the ETE analysis to
the NRC prior to providing
it to State and local
government for developing
protective action strategies.
[[Page 19365]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.5. appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting an 50.47(b).
exemption from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require licensees
to estimate the EPZ
permanent resident
population changes once a
year between decennial
censuses.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.6. appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting an 50.47(b).
exemption from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require the
licensee to submit an
updated ETE analysis to the
NRC based on changes in the
resident population that
result in exceeding specific
evacuation time increase
criteria.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Based on the permanently shutdown and
section IV.A.1. defueled status of the reactor, a
The NRC is granting an decommissioning reactor is not
exemption from the word authorized to operate under 10 CFR
``operating'' in the 50.82(a). Because the licensee cannot
requirement to describe the operate the reactors, the licensee does
normal plant organization. not have a ``plant operating
organization.''
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, The number of staff at decommissioning
section IV.A.3. sites is generally small but is
The NRC is granting an commensurate with the need to safely
exemption from the store spent fuel at the facility in a
requirement to describe the manner that is protective of public
licensee's headquarters health and safety. Decommissioning sites
personnel sent to the site typically have a level of emergency
to augment the onsite response that does not require response
emergency response by the licensee's headquarters
organization. personnel.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Although, the likelihood of events that
section IV.A.4. would result in doses in excess of the
The NRC is granting EPA PAGs to the public beyond the
exemptions from portions of exclusion area boundary based on the
the rule language that would permanently shutdown and defueled status
otherwise require the of the reactor is extremely low, the
licensee to identify a licensee still must be able to determine
position and function within if a radiological release is occurring.
its organization, which will If a release is occurring, then the
carry the responsibility for licensee staff should promptly
making offsite dose communicate that information to offsite
projections. authorities for their consideration. The
offsite organizations are responsible
for deciding what, if any, protective
actions should be taken based on
comprehensive EP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.57(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, The minimal systems and equipment needed
section IV.A.5. to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in
The NRC is granting an the SFP in a safe condition requires
exemption from the minimal personnel and is governed by the
requirement for the licensee technical specifications. As such,
to identify individuals with additional employees or other persons
special qualifications, both with special qualifications are not
licensee employees and non- anticipated
employees, for coping with Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
emergencies. appendix E, section IV.A.3
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Offsite emergency measures are limited to
section IV.A.7. support provided by local police, fire
The NRC is granting departments, and ambulance and hospital
exemptions from portions of services, as appropriate. Due to the low
the rule language that would probability of design-basis accidents or
otherwise require a other credible events to exceed the EPA
description of the PAGs, protective actions such as
assistance expected from evacuation should not be required, but
State, local, and Federal could be implemented at the discretion
agencies for coping with a of offsite authorities using a CEMP.
hostile action.
Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV.1 and 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Offsite emergency measures are limited to
section IV.A.8. support provided by local police, fire
The NRC is granting an departments, and ambulance and hospital
exemption from the services, as appropriate. Due to the low
requirement to identify the probability of design-basis accidents or
State and local officials other credible events to exceed the EPA
for ordering protective PAGs, protective actions such as
actions and evacuations. evacuation should not be required, but
could be implemented at the discretion
of offsite authorities using a CEMP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Responsibilities should be well defined
section IV.A.9. in the emergency plan and procedures,
The NRC is granting an regularly tested through drills and
exemption from the exercises audited and inspected by the
requirement for the licensee licensee and the NRC. The duties of the
to provide an analysis on-shift personnel at a decommissioning
demonstrating that on-shift reactor facility are not as complicated
personnel are not assigned and diverse as those for an operating
responsibilities that would power reactor.
prevent performance of their
assigned emergency plan
functions.
The NRC staff considered the similarity
between the staffing levels at a
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactor and staffing levels at an
operating power reactor site. The
minimal systems and equipment needed to
maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the
SFP or in an ISFSI in a safe condition
requires minimal personnel and is
governed by Technical Specifications. In
the EP final rule published in the
Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November
23, 2011), the NRC concluded that the
staffing analysis requirement was not
necessary for non-power reactor
licensees due to the small staffing
levels required to operate the facility.
[[Page 19366]]
The NRC staff also examined the actions
required to mitigate the very low
probability design-basis events for the
SFP. Several sources of makeup to the
pools are available, such as the fire
service system, using the diesel-driven
fire service pump for loss of electrical
power. If available fresh water sources
are depleted, salt water sources with
inexhaustible inventory from the CR-3
intake and discharge canal, using
portable diesel powered pumps are
available. Pool inventory addition can
be implemented without accessing the
elevation of the pool deck. DEF believes
these diverse strategies provide defense-
in-depth and ample time to provide
makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the
onset of zirconium cladding ignition
when considering very low probability
beyond-design-basis events affecting the
SFP. In a letter dated May 7, 2014, DEF
withdrew its request to remove License
Condition 2.C.(14), ``Mitigation
Strategy License Condition,'' from its
Facility Operating License. This license
condition requires CR-3 to maintain its
SFP inventory makeup strategies as
discussed above.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was found to be an
section IV.B.1. acceptable method for development of
The NRC is granting EALs. No offsite protective actions are
exemptions from portions of anticipated to be necessary, so
the rule language that would classification above the alert level is
otherwise require offsite no longer required, which is consistent
emergency actions levels and with ISFSI facilities.
offsite protective measures
and associate offsite
monitoring for the emergency
conditions.
In addition, the NRC is
granting exemption from
portions of the rule
language that would
otherwise require emergency
action levels based on
hostile action.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV.1 and 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Containment parameters do not provide an
section IV.C.1. indication of the conditions at a
The NRC is granting defueled facility and emergency core
exemptions from portions of cooling systems are no longer required.
the rule language that would SFP level, SFP temperature, and area
otherwise require emergency radiation monitors indicate the
actions levels based on conditions at CR-3.
operating reactor concerns,
such as offsite radiation
monitoring, pressure in
containment, and the
response of the emergency
core cooling system.
In addition, the NRC is
striking language that would
otherwise require offsite
emergency action levels of a
site area emergency and a
general emergency.
In the SOC for the final rule for EP
requirements for ISFSIs and MRS
facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission
responded to comments concerning a
general emergency at an ISFSI and a MRS,
and concluded that, ``an essential
element of a General Emergency is that a
release can be reasonably expected to
exceed EPA PAGs exposure levels off site
for more than the immediate site area.''
The probability of a condition reaching
the level above an emergency
classification of alert is very low. In
the event of an accident at a defueled
facility that meets the conditions for
relaxation of EP requirements, there
will be available time for event
mitigation and, if necessary,
implementation of offsite protective
actions using a CEMP.
NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was found to be an
acceptable method for development of
EALs. No offsite protective actions are
anticipated to be necessary, so
classification above the alert level is
no longer required.
Also, refer to the basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, In the EP rule published in the Federal
section IV.C.2. Register (76 FR 72560), non-power
The NRC is granting reactor licensees were not required to
exemptions from portions of assess, classify and declare an
the rule language that would emergency condition within 15 minutes.
otherwise require the An SFP and an ISFSI are also not nuclear
licensee to assess, power reactors as defined in the NRC's
classify, and declare an regulations. A decommissioning power
emergency condition within reactor has a low likelihood of a
15 minutes. credible accident resulting in
radiological releases requiring offsite
protective measures. For these reasons,
the NRC staff concludes that a
decommissioning power reactor should not
be required to assess, classify and
declare an emergency condition within 15
minutes.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
section IV.D.1. CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require the
licensee to reach agreement
with local, State, and
Federal officials and
agencies for prompt
notification of protective
measures or evacuations.
In addition, the NRC is
granting an exemption from
identifying the associated
titles of officials to be
notified for each agency
within the EPZs.
[[Page 19367]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) ,10
section IV.D.2. CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5).
The NRC is granting an
exemption from the
requirement for the licensee
to annually disseminate
general information on
emergency planning and
evacuations within the plume
exposure pathway EPZ.
In addition, the NRC is
granting an exemption for
the need for signage or
other measures to address
transient populations in the
event of an accident.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, While the capability needs to exist for
section IV.D.3. the notification of offsite government
The NRC is granting agencies within a specified time period,
exemptions from portions of previous exemptions have allowed for
the rule language that would extending the State and local government
otherwise require the agencies' notification time up to 60
licensee to have the minutes based on the site-specific
capability to make justification provided.
notifications to State and
local government agencies
within 15 minutes of
declaring an emergency.
DEF's exemption request provides that CR-
3 will make notifications to the State
of Florida and the NRC within 60 minutes
of declaration of an event. The State
Watch Office will perform the
notification to the County (Citrus), as
well as the Florida Department of
Emergency Management. In the permanently
defueled condition of the reactor, the
rapidly developing scenarios associated
with events initiated during reactor
power operation are no longer credible.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)
and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.D.4. The NRC is appendix E, section IV.D.3 regarding the
granting an exemption from alert and notification system
the requirement for the requirements.
licensee to obtain FEMA
approval of its backup alert
and notification capability.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Due to the low probability of design-
section IV.E.8.a.(i). basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting to exceed the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
exemptions from portions of area boundary, the available time for
the rule language that would event mitigation at a decommissioning
otherwise require the reactor and, if needed, to implement
licensee to have an onsite offsite protective actions using a CEMP,
technical support center and an EOF and a technical support center
emergency operations (TSC) would not be required to support
facility. offsite agency response. Onsite actions
may be directed from the control room or
other location, without the requirements
imposed on a TSC.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for
section IV.E.8.a.(ii). Emergency Response Facilities'' (ADAMS
The NRC is granting Accession No. ML051390358) provides that
exemptions from portions of the operational support center (OSC) is
the rule language that would an onsite area separate from the control
otherwise require the room and the TSC where licensee
licensee to have an onsite operations support personnel will
operational support center. assemble in an emergency. For a
decommissioning power reactor, an OSC is
no longer required to meet its original
purpose of an assembly area for plant
logistical support during an emergency.
The OSC function can be incorporated
into another facility.
Also refer to the basis for 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV.E.8.a.(i).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and
section IV.E.8.b. and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
subpart sections 8.a.(i).
IV.E.8.b.(1)--E.8.b.(5).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from the
requirements related to an
offsite emergency operations
facility's location, space
and size, communications
capability, access to plant
data and radiological
information, and access to
copying and office supplies.
10 CFR part 50, App. E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and
section IV E.8.c. and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
sections IV E.8.c.(1)-- 8.a.(i).
E.8.c.(3).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from the
requirements to have an
emergency operations
facility with the
capabilities to obtain and
display plant data and
radiological information;
the capability to analyze
technical information and
provide briefings; and the
capability to support events
occurring at more than one
site (if the emergency
operations center supports
more than one site).
10 CFR part 50, App. E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV E.8.d. appendix E, section IV.1; 10 CFR part
The NRC is granting 50, appendix E, section IV.E 8.a.(i);
exemptions from the and 10 CFR 50, appendix E, section
requirements to have an IV.E.8.a.(ii).
alternate facility that
would be accessible even if
the site is under threat of
or experiencing hostile
action, to function as a
staging area for
augmentation of emergency
response staff.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Because of the low probability of design-
section IV.E.8.e. basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting an that would be expected to exceed the EPA
exemption from the need for PAGs and the available time for event
the licensee to comply with mitigation and, if needed,
paragraph 8.b of this implementation of offsite protective
section that details EOFs actions using a CEMP, there is no need
requirements. for the EOF.
Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
8.a.(i).
[[Page 19368]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, The Plume exposure pathway EPZ is no
section IV.E.9.a. longer required by the exemption granted
The NRC is granting to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The State and
exemptions from portions of the local governments in which the
the rule language that would nuclear facility is located will still
otherwise require the need to be informed of events and
licensee to have emergencies, so lines of communication
communications with must be maintained.
contiguous State and local
governments that are within
the plume exposure pathway
EPZ.
Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Because of the low probability of design-
section IV.E.9.c. basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting exemption that would be expected to exceed the EPA
from the requirements for PAGs and the available time for event
communication and testing mitigation and, if needed,
provisions between the implementation of offsite protective
control room, the onsite actions using a CEMP, there is no need
TSC, State/local emergency for the TSC, EOF, offsite field
operations centers, and assessment teams, and the communication
field assessment teams. and testing provisions that refer to
them.
Refer to justification for 10 CFR
50.47(b)(3) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix
E, section IV.E 8.a.(i). Communication
with State and local emergency operation
centers is maintained to coordinate
assistance on site if required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, The functions of the control room, EOF,
section IV.E.9.d. TSC, and OSC may be combined into one or
The NRC is granting more locations due to the smaller
exemptions from portions of facility staff and the greatly reduced
the rule language that would required interaction with State and
otherwise require provisions local emergency response facilities. The
for communications from the licensee is still required to maintain
control room, onsite TSC, monthly communication tests with NRC
and EOF with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate
Headquarters and the Regional Operations Center.
appropriate Regional
Operations Center.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b);
10 CFR 50, appendix E, section
IV.E.8.a.(i); and 10 CFR 50, appendix E,
section IV.E.8.a.(ii).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Decommissioning power reactor sites
section IV.F.1. and section typically have a level of emergency
IV F.1.viii. response that does not require
The NRC is granting additional response by the licensee's
exemptions from portions of headquarters personnel. Therefore, the
the rule language that would NRC staff considers exempting licensee's
otherwise require the headquarters personnel from training
licensee to provide training requirements to be reasonable.
and drills for the
licensee's headquarters
personnel, Civil Defense
personnel, or local news
media.
Due to the low probability of design-
basis accidents or other credible events
to exceed the EPA PAGs, offsite
emergency measures are limited to
support provided by local police, fire
departments, and ambulance and hospital
services, as appropriate. Local news
media personnel no longer need
radiological orientation training since
they will not be called upon to support
the formal Joint Information Center. The
term ``Civil Defense'' is no longer
commonly used; references to this term
in the examples provided in the
regulation are, therefore, not needed.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Because of the low probability of design-
section IV.F.2. basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting that would be expected to exceed the
exemptions from portions of limits of EPA PAGs and the available
the rule language that would time for event mitigation and offsite
otherwise require testing of protective actions from a CEMP, the
a public alert and public alert and notification system are
notification system. not needed and, therefore, require no
testing.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Due to the low probability of design-
section IV.F.2.a. and basis accidents or other credible events
sections IV.F.2.a.(i) that would be expected to exceed the
through IV.F.2.a.(iii). limits of EPA PAGs, the available time
The NRC is granting for event mitigation and, if necessary,
exemptions from the implementation of offsite protective
requirements for full actions using a CEMP, no formal offsite
participation exercises and radiological emergency plans are
the submittal of the required and full participation
associated exercise emergency plan exercises that test the
scenarios to the NRC. State and local emergency plans are not
necessary.
The intent of submitting exercise
scenarios at an operating power reactor
site is to ensure that licensees utilize
different scenarios in order to prevent
the preconditioning of responders at
power reactors. For decommissioning
power reactor sites, there are limited
events that could occur, and as such,
the submittal of exercise scenarios is
not necessary.
The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR
part 50, appendix E, section
IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) because the licensee
would be exempt from the umbrella
provision of 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV.F.2.a.
Also, refer to the basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV.C.1.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, The intent of submitting onsite exercise
section IV.F.2.b. scenarios at an operating power reactor
The NRC is granting site is to ensure that licensees utilize
exemptions from portions of different scenarios in order to prevent
the rule language that would the preconditioning of responders at
otherwise require the power reactors. For decommissioning
licensee to submit scenarios power reactor sites, there are limited
for its biennial exercises events that could occur, and as such,
of its onsite emergency the submittal of exercise scenarios is
plan. In addition, the NRC not necessary. Biennial exercises are
is granting exemption from not required per the exemption from 10
portions of the rule CFR part 50, appendix E, section
language that requires IV.F.2.c.
assessment of offsite
releases, protective action
decision making, and
references to the TSC, OSC,
and EOF.
[[Page 19369]]
The low probability of design basis
accidents or other credible events that
would exceed the EPA PAGs, the available
time for event mitigation and, if
necessary, implementation of offsite
protective actions using a CEMP, render
a TSC, OSC and EOF unnecessary. The
principal functions required by
regulation can be performed at an onsite
location that does not meet the
requirements of the TSC, OSC, or EOF.
Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV.F.2.a; 10 CFR
part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
8.a.(i); 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV.E 8.a.(ii); and 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.F.2.c. and appendix E, section IV.F.2.a and 10 CFR
sections IV F.2.c.(1) 50.47(b).
through F.2.c.(5).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from the
requirements regarding the
need for the licensee to
exercise offsite plans
biennially with full
participation by each
offsite authority having a
role under the radiological
response plan. The NRC is
also granting exemptions
from the conditions for
conducting these exercises
(including hostile action
exercises) if two different
licensees have facilities on
the same site or on
adjacent, contiguous sites,
or share most of the
elements defining co-located
licensees.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50, appendix E,
section IV.F.2.d. section IV.F.2.a.
The NRC is granting
exemptions from the
requirements to obtain State
participation in an
ingestion pathway exercise
and a hostile action
exercise, with each State
that has responsibilities,
at least once per exercise
cycle.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and
section IV.F.2.e. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting
exemptions from portions of
the rule language that would
otherwise require the
licensee to allow
participation exercise in
licensee drills by any State
and local Government in the
plume exposure pathway EPZ
when requested.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, FEMA is responsible for evaluating the
section IV.F.2.f. adequacy of offsite response during an
The NRC is granting exercise. No action is expected from
exemptions from portions of State or local government organizations
the rule language that would in response to an event at a
otherwise require FEMA to decommissioning power reactor site other
consult with the NRC on than onsite firefighting, law
remedial exercises. The NRC enforcement and ambulance/medical
is granting exemption from services support. A memorandum of
portions of the rule understanding is in place for those
language that discuss the services. Offsite response organizations
extent of State and local will continue to take actions on a
participation in remedial comprehensive emergency planning basis
exercises. to protect the health and safety of the
public as they would at any other
industrial site.
Also, refer to the basis for 10 CFR 50,
appendix E, section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Due to the low probability of design-
section IV.F.2.i. basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available
exemptions from portions of time for event mitigation and, if
the rule language that would needed, implementation of offsite
otherwise require the protective actions using a CEMP, the
licensee to engage in drills previously routine progression to
and exercises for scenarios general emergency in power reactor site
that include a wide spectrum scenarios is not applicable to a
of radiological release decommissioning site. Therefore, the
events and hostile action. licensee is not expected to demonstrate
response to a wide spectrum of events.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV.1 regarding
hostile action.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, With the permanently shutdown defueled
section IV.F.2.j. and conditions of the site, where only
The NRC is granting the SFP and its related support systems,
exemptions from the structures, and components remain, there
requirements regarding the are no other facilities in which
need for the licensee's emergency response organization
emergency response personnel could demonstrate proficiency.
organization to demonstrate
proficiency in key skills in
the principal functional
areas of emergency response.
In addition, the NRC is
granting an exemption during
an eight calendar year
exercise cycle, from
demonstrating proficiency in
the key skills necessary to
respond to such scenarios as
hostile actions, unplanned
minimal radiological
release, Sec. 50.54(hh)(2)
implementation strategies,
and scenarios involving
rapid escalation to a site
area emergency or general
emergency.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV.F.2.i.
[[Page 19370]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
section IV.I. appendix E, section IV.1.
The NRC is granting
exemptions from the
requirements regarding the
need for the licensee to
develop a range of
protective action for onsite
personnel during hostile
actions.
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[FR Doc. 2015-08311 Filed 4-9-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P