[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 56 (Tuesday, March 24, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15638-15641]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-06730]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-305; NRC-2015-0068]
Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption from certain power reactor liability insurance requirements
in response to a request from Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or
the licensee) dated March 20, 2014. This exemption would permit the
licensee to reduce its primary offsite liability insurance and withdraw
from participation in the secondary retrospective rating pool for
deferred premium charges.
DATES: March 24, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0068 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0068. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Huffman, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2046; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) facility is a decommissioning
power reactor located on approximately 900 acres in Carlton (Kewaunee
County), Wisconsin, 27 miles southeast of Green Bay, Wisconsin. The
licensee, DEK, is the holder of the KPS Renewed Facility Operating
License No. DPR-43. The license provides, among other things, that the
facility is subject to all rules,
[[Page 15639]]
regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated February 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13058A065), DEK submitted a certification to the NRC indicating it
would permanently cease power operations at KPS on May 7, 2013. On May
7, 2013, DEK permanently shut down the KPS reactor. On May 14, 2013,
DEK certified that it had permanently defueled the KPS reactor vessel
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13135A209). As a permanently shutdown and
defueled facility, and in accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), KPS is no longer
authorized to operate the reactor or emplace nuclear fuel into the
reactor vessel. The licensee is still authorized to possess and store
irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently being stored
onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP) and in independent spent fuel storage
installation dry casks.
II. Request/Action
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' DEK has
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), by letter dated March
20, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14090A112). The exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
primary offsite liability insurance from $375 million to $100 million,
and would allow DEK to withdraw from participation in the secondary
financial protection (also known as the secondary retrospective rating
pool for deferred premium charges).
The regulation in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain financial protection. For a single unit reactor site,
which has a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or more, 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires the licensee to maintain $375 million in
primary financial protection. In addition, the licensee is required to
participate in a secondary retrospective rating pool (secondary
financial protection) that commits each licensee to additional
indemnification for damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage.
Participation in the secondary retrospective rating pool could
potentially subject DEK to deferred premium charges up to a maximum
total deferred premium of $121,255,000 with respect to any nuclear
incident at any operating nuclear power plant, and up to a maximum
annual deferred premium of $18,963,000 per incident.
The licensee states that the risk of an offsite radiological
release is significantly lower at a nuclear power reactor that has
permanently shut down and defueled, when compared to an operating power
reactor. Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages
that require insurance indemnification is commensurately lower.
Therefore, DEK is requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), to
permit a reduction in primary offsite liability insurance and to
withdraw from participation in the secondary financial protection pool.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 140, when the exemptions are authorized
by law and are otherwise in the public interest.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance to
satisfy liability claims by members of the public for personal injury,
property damage, or the legal cost associated with lawsuits, as the
result of a nuclear accident. The insurance levels established by this
regulation were derived from the risks and potential consequences of an
accident at an operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000
kilowatts electric (or greater). During normal power reactor
operations, the forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system
(RCS) removes heat generated by the reactor. The RCS, operating at high
temperatures and pressures, transfers this heat through the steam
generator tubes converting non-radioactive feedwater to steam, which
then flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many
of the accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors
involve failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel
in the reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents,
would involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With
the permanent cessation of reactor operations at KPS and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its March 20,
2014, exemption request, DEK discusses both design-basis and beyond
design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The
licensee states that there are no possible design-basis events at KPS
that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the
limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's early-
phase Protective Action Guidelines of 1 rem (roentgen equivalent man)
at the exclusion area boundary. The only accident that might lead to a
significant radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a
zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly
unlikely, beyond design-basis accident scenario that involves loss of
water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant heat-up of the
spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation
and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is
related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to
decrease as a function of the time that KPS has been permanently shut
down.
The licensee provided a detailed analysis of the events that could
result in an offsite radiological release at KPS in its January 16,
2014, submittal to the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML14029A076). One of
these beyond design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP
water inventory, where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily
accomplished by natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent
fuel assemblies. The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that by
October 30, 2014, air-cooling of the spent fuel assemblies will be
sufficient to keep the fuel within a safe temperature range
indefinitely without fuel damage or offsite radiological release. This
is important because the Commission has previously authorized a lesser
amount of liability insurance coverage, based on an analysis of the
zirconium fire risk. In SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning,'' dated
May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12257A628), the staff outlined a
policy for reducing required liability insurance coverage for
decommissioning reactors. The discussions in SECY-93-127 centered
primarily on the public health and safety risks associated with storing
fuel in spent fuel pools. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum dated
July 13, 1993, the Commission approved a policy that would permit
reductions in commercial liability insurance coverage, when a licensee
was able to demonstrate
[[Page 15640]]
that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of
water. Upon demonstration of this technical criterion, the Commission
policy allowed decommissioning licensees to withdraw from participation
in the secondary insurance protection layer, and permitted reductions
in the required amount of commercial liability insurance coverage to
$100 million. The staff has used this technical criterion to grant
similar exemptions to other decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g.,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion Nuclear Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700)).
Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor licensees that
have received exemptions to reduce their primary insurance level to
$100 million is provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial
Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17,
1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were
based on the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled,
consistent with the technical criterion discussed above.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
of air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the probability of
a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low. However, the staff has more
recently used an additional analysis that would bound an incomplete
drain down of the SFP water, or some other catastrophic event (such as
a complete drainage of the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack
geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP). The analysis
postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent fuel via conduction,
convection, or radiation would be impeded. This analysis is often
referred to as an adiabatic heat-up.
The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request
demonstrates that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has
drained and only air-cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is
available, there is reasonable assurance that after October 2014, the
KPS spent fuel will remain at temperatures far below those associated
with a significant radiological release. In addition, the licensee's
adiabatic heat-up analyses demonstrate that as of October 21, 2014,
there would be at least 10 hours after the loss of all means of cooling
(both air and/or water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a
temperature where the potential for a significant offsite radiological
release could occur. The licensee states that for this loss of all
cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient time for personnel to respond
with additional resources, equipment, and capability to restore cooling
to the SFP, even after a non-credible, catastrophic event. As provided
in DEK's letter dated January 10, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14016A078), the licensee furnished information concerning its makeup
strategies, in the event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. The
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying water through
hoses to a spool piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using
a diesel-driven portable pump to take suction from Lake Michigan and
provide makeup or spray to the SFP. These strategies will be maintained
by a license condition. The licensee states that the equipment needed
to perform these actions are located onsite, and that the external
makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable pump) is capable of
being deployed within 2 hours. The licensee also stated that,
considering the very low-probability of beyond design-basis accidents
affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth
and time to mitigate and prevent a zirconium fire, using makeup or
spray into the SFP before the onset of zirconium cladding rapid
oxidation.
In the safety evaluation of the licensee's request for exemptions
from certain emergency planning requirements dated October 27, 2014
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14261A223), the NRC staff assessed the DEK
accident analyses associated with the radiological risks from a
zirconium fire at the permanently shutdown and defueled KPS site. The
NRC staff has confirmed that under conditions where cooling air flow
can develop, suitably conservative calculations indicate that by the
end of October 2014, the fuel would remain at temperatures where the
cladding would be undamaged for an unlimited period. For the very
unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario, where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal
from the spent fuel are no longer available, there will be a minimum of
10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The staff
finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment of
mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million, and
the licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance pool for offsite financial protection, are consistent with
the policy established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance
considerations, resulting from additional zirconium fire risks, as
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. In addition, the NRC staff
noted that there is a well-established precedent of granting a similar
exemption to other permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors,
upon demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium fire risks from
the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. Authorized by Law
In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the Commission may grant
exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140, as the Commission
determines are authorized by law. The NRC staff has determined that
granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 170, or other laws,
as amended, which require licensees to maintain adequate financial
protection. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
B. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims, following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100 provide a basis for
allowing licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite
[[Page 15641]]
liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced, when compared to operating
reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee has
analyzed and the staff has confirmed that the possible accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological risk are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite liability insurance and
withdrawal from participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could be problematic for DEK because the licensee would incur
financial liability, if an extraordinary nuclear incident occurred at
another nuclear power plant. Because KPS is permanently shut down, it
does not produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover
such a liability. Therefore, such liability, if incurred, could
significantly affect the financial resources available to the facility
to conduct and complete radiological decontamination and
decommissioning activities. Furthermore, the shared financial risk
exposure to DEK is greatly disproportionate to the radiological risk
posed by KPS, when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power
plants does not warrant DEK to carry full operating reactor insurance
coverage, after the requisite spent fuel cooling period has elapsed,
following final reactor shutdown. The licensee's proposed financial
protection limits will maintain a level of liability insurance coverage
commensurate with the risk to the public. These changes are consistent
with previous NRC policy and exemptions approved for other
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in
insurance coverage.
Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that granting the exemption
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) is in the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC approval of the exemption to insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from further
analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve: surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration because
reducing a licensee's offsite liability requirements at KPS does not
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is unrelated to
the operation of KPS. Accordingly, there is no significant change in
the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that
may be released offsite, and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction, so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident), nor mitigation. Therefore, there is no significant increase
in the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In
addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic
conditions in the region. The requirement for offsite liability
insurance may be viewed as involving surety, insurance, or indemnity
matters.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEK exemption
from the requirement of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit the licensee to
reduce primary offsite liability insurance to $100 million, accompanied
by withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool for
offsite liability insurance.
The exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of March, 2015.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2015-06730 Filed 3-23-15; 8:45 am]
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