[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 52 (Wednesday, March 18, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 14027-14029]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-06213]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Chapter II

[Railworthiness Directive, Notice No. 1]


Railworthiness Directive for Railroad Tank Cars Equipped With 
Certain McKenzie Valve & Machining LLC Valves

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of railworthiness directive.

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SUMMARY: Recent FRA investigations identified several railroad tank 
cars transporting hazardous materials and leaking small quantities of 
product from the cars' liquid lines. FRA's investigation revealed that 
the liquid lines of the leaking tank cars were equipped with a certain 
type of 3 ball valve marketed and sold by McKenzie Valve and 
Machining (McKenzie) (formerly McKenzie Valve & Machining Company), an 
affiliate company of Union Tank Car Company (UTLX). FRA further found 
certain closure plugs installed on the 3 valves cause 
mechanical damage to the valves, which leads to the destruction of the 
valves' seal integrity and that the 3 valves, as well as 
similarly-designed 1 and 2 valves provided by 
this manufacturer are not approved for use on tank cars. FRA is issuing 
this Railworthiness Directive (Directive) to all owners of tank cars 
used to transport hazardous materials within the United States to 
ensure they identify and appropriately remove and replace these valves 
with approved valves consistent with Federal regulations.

DATES: This Directive is effective March 18, 2015. This Directive is 
applicable March 13, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Alexy, Staff Director, Hazardous 
Materials Division, Office of Technical Oversight, FRA, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6245; 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Recent FRA investigations identified several 
DOT Specification 111 railroad tank cars transporting hazardous 
materials and leaking small quantities of product.\1\ One instance 
occurred during the week of January 11, 2015, and involved a train of 
100 tank cars loaded with crude oil being transported by BNSF Railway 
(BNSF) from Tioga, ND, to a refinery in Anacortes, WA. BNSF discovered 
14 tank cars leaking crude oil en route and in accordance with the 
applicable regulations, notified FRA of the releases. Upon discovery of 
the defective condition of these cars, BNSF removed the cars from the 
train (at Hauser, ID; Vancouver and Auburn, WA, respectively). When the 
train arrived at its final destination in Anacortes, the consignee, 
Tesoro Refining, discovered two additional cars leaking product. In 
all, BNSF and Tesoro identified 16 leaking tank cars from the original 
train consist.
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    \1\ DOT Specification 111 tank cars are general purpose, 
nonpressure railroad tank cars commonly used to transport a variety 
of regulated hazardous materials, as well as nonregulated 
commodities. In 2011, through issuance of Casualty Prevention 
Circular 1232, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) adopted 
an industry standard intended to improve the crashworthiness of DOT 
Specification 111 tank cars used in crude oil and ethanol service. 
These cars, known as CPC 1232 cars, include a thicker shell, head 
protection, top fittings protection, and relief valves with a 
greater flow capacity as compared to baseline DOT Specification 111 
cars. The leaking tank cars identified in this Directive include 
both a baseline DOT 111 Specification car and CPC-1232 cars.
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    On January 15, 2015, FRA inspected seven of the identified leaking 
tank cars that BNSF removed from the train in Vancouver. The FRA 
inspector observed crude oil on the sides of each of these cars, and 
upon inspection of each tank car's top fittings, found product leaking 
from the liquid line ball valves and around each valve's closure plug. 
FRA also found the standalone closure plugs in each of these valves 
loose. Further inspection revealed that the valve balls had visual 
signs of mechanical damage. The mechanical damage FRA observed 
indicated that the bottom face of the closure plug came in contact with 
the valve ball, consequentially preventing complete engagement of the 
closure plug.
    A second instance involved a single tank car loaded with mineral 
spirits (a Class 3 flammable liquid) found leaking on January 15, 2015, 
in a BNSF yard in Denver, CO. FRA's preliminary investigation shows 
that the leak occurred through the liquid line valve

[[Page 14028]]

while the car was en route to its destination.
    UTLX owns all 17 of the cars found leaking as described above. Each 
of the leaking cars was configured with liquid line ball valves sold by 
UTLX's affiliate, McKenzie, and each valve was configured with a 
3 standalone plug as a closure. FRA identified the leaking 
valves as 3 McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valves (McKenzie 
valves).
    McKenzie provided FRA several valve configuration drawings 
indicating that the valve was a full port valve. This configuration 
requires a 3 x 2 reducer bushing with a 
2 plug to prevent contact between the closure plug and the 
valve ball. McKenzie also informed FRA that it markets and sells the 
same design of valve in 1 and 2 models. For the 
2 valve, McKenzie specified the use of a 1 plug 
and an appropriately sized reducer.
    At FRA's request, UTLX provided FRA drawings of the top fittings 
arrangements for these cars. However, unlike the drawings provided by 
McKenzie, the UTLX drawings provided by UTLX did not include a full 
port valve with a reducer bushing. Instead, consistent with the 
physical configuration of the tank cars FRA inspected, the drawings 
showed a full port threaded valve along with a 3 plug and 
chain.
    On January 27, 2015, FRA conducted field testing of the McKenzie 
valves at UTLX's Altoona, PA, tank car repair facility. FRA tested new 
1, 2, and 3 McKenzie valves at the 
facility's valve shop. The field testing included two cycles of 
application and removal of each valve's plug. FRA found that the 
1 and 2 McKenzie valves showed no signs of 
contact between the valve ball when a 1 or 2 
closure plug was installed and tightened. However, when a 3 
closure plug was applied and tightened in the 3 McKenzie 
valve, the plug contacted and damaged the ball. The damage observed 
during this testing was consistent with the type of damage observed on 
the leaking UTLX tank cars described above.
    FRA's field testing further found that the application of downward 
force on the valve ball applied by the 3 plug resulted in 
the over-compression, damage, and misalignment of the inboard seal, 
causing the valve to leak. FRA also observed that once a valve's ball 
is damaged, when the valve is subsequently opened, the damaged surface 
of the ball also damaged the valve's top seals by tearing the seals. 
This further compromises the valve's seal. Additionally, FRA 
understands that with repeated opening and closing (exemplifying in-
service use), the valve's threads will degrade, necessitating further 
engagement of the threads during subsequent applications of the plug. 
This continual degradation of the threads will require increasingly 
more tightening of the plug, exacerbating the damage to the ball and 
seals. In summary, FRA found that normal application and tightening of 
the 3 plug in a 3 McKenzie valve destroys the 
valve seal integrity.
    FRA conducted a followup investigation at the UTLX facility in 
Altoona to perform a leak test of the 3 McKenzie valve that 
was field tested and damaged on January 27, 2015. Although the designed 
leak-free working pressure of this valve is up to 500 pounds per square 
inch (psi), the leak test procedure requires that the valve hold a 
minimum pressure of 30 psi. The subject McKenzie valve failed to retain 
the minimum 30 psi of compressed air test pressure. The valve showed 
signs of a significant leak.
    As required by Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 179.100-
13 and 179.200-16 of the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 
CFR parts 171-180; (HMR)), all valves applied to tanks cars must be of 
an approved design. The term ``approved is defined in 49 CFR 
179.2 as ``approved by the [AAR] Tank Car Committee.'' \2\
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    \2\ As background, the Tank Car Committee is composed of various 
railroad industry representatives, including railroads, tank car 
shipper and owner organizations, tank car builders, and chemical and 
industry associations. FRA and the DOT's Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration also participate in the Tank Car 
Committee's processes. The Tank Car Committee has traditionally been 
the body with the expertise to develop tank car design, 
construction, and maintenance standards in this country. DOT sets 
minimum tank car specifications at 49 CFR part 179, and AAR approves 
designs meeting the requirements of part 179.
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    McKenzie provided FRA with the Association of American Railroads 
(AAR) approval letters for the McKenzie valves. While McKenzie may have 
believed these approvals were sufficient, the provided AAR approvals 
demonstrate clear inconsistencies between the type of valve design that 
AAR approved versus the design of the valve actually being used and the 
design depicted on the valve configuration drawings both McKenzie and 
UTLX provided to FRA. AAR Approval E-077035 (October 26, 2007) is a 
renewal of previous AAR approvals,\3\ and describes a 3 
standard port threaded ball valve. The original approvals that AAR 
renewed described and referred to UTLX Drawing 72916, which depicts a 
3 standard port threaded ball valve. In contrast, the 
3 McKenzie valve at issue is a full port ball valve. A full 
port valve is different from a standard port valve.\4\ The dimensions 
of the valve body that AAR approved is significantly longer than the 
bodies of the valves depicted on the McKenzie drawings and the bodies 
of the valves actually installed on the leaking tank cars. McKenzie 
also provided a copy of a September 29, 2008, application for approval 
of a 3 threaded full port valve (AAR application number E-
087016), but neither McKenzie nor AAR have provided evidence of that 
valve's subsequent approval.
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    \3\ AAR Approval E-977030 (April 9, 1997). AAR Approval E-977030 
was a renewal of AAR Approval E-897047 (June 21, 1989), which also 
referred to UTLX Drawing 72916.
    \4\ The difference between a full port and standard port ball 
valve is the size of the ball's bore diameter as related to nominal 
pipe sizes, with the ball size being in proportion to the bore size 
diameter. The bore size in a full port valve is that of its nominal 
pipe size, where the bore size in a standard port valve is that of 
the next smallest nominal pipe size. For example, the bore diameter 
for a 3 standard port ball valve is approximately 
2.25, or one pipe size smaller, and for a full port ball 
valve, the bore diameter is approximately 3 in diameter 
(the actual size of the pipe).
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    McKenzie provided information to FRA indicating that from 2009 
through the present, it sold approximately 11,200 of the 3 
valves to a variety of tank car owners and tank car facilities. 
McKenzie indicates that since 2012, its sales of these valves were 
predominantly to replace in-kind valves previously installed on 
existing tank cars. Further, McKenzie informed FRA that as of January 
26, 2015, the company has stopped selling the 3 valves as a 
result of the noted safety concerns. Overall, McKenzie and UTLX 
provided information leading FRA to conclude that approximately 6,000 
DOT Specification railroad tank cars are equipped with the unapproved 
3 McKenzie UNNR valves. In addition, McKenzie indicates that 
it has sold over 37,000 1 and 2 valves to a 
variety of tank car owners and tank car facilities.
    To date, FRA has identified only a small number of relatively minor 
hazardous materials leaks directly attributable to the identified 
McKenzie valves. FRA believes that the number of leaks potentially 
attributable to the identified McKenzie valves used in tank car liquid 
lines could be much higher. Based on FRA's field testing, the 
3 McKenzie valve appears to present an immediate safety 
issue in certain circumstances. While the 1 and 2 
McKenzie valves do not appear to present similar concerns, based on the 
information that AAR, McKenzie, and UTLX have provided to date, it does 
not appear that any size of the McKenzie valves (i.e., the 
1, 2, or 3 UNNR valves) are currently 
approved for use

[[Page 14029]]

on railroad tank cars. Accordingly, use of such valves on tank cars is 
in violation of the HMR. At this time, FRA is not aware of any non-
accident releases or other releases from railroad tank cars involving 
the 1 or 2 McKenzie valves, but since the valves 
have not been approved by AAR they have not been shown to be safe for 
use on railroad tank cars.
    McKenzie and UTLX have taken independent actions to address some of 
the safety concerns with the 3 valves. However, FRA believes 
those actions fail to adequately address the safety issue the valves 
present.
    Railworthiness Directive: Based on the above discussion, and acting 
under the authority granted in 49 CFR 180.509(b)(4), FRA finds that the 
continued use of railroad tank cars equipped with the unapproved 
McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valves (including the 1, 
2, and 3 UNNR valves) to transport hazardous 
materials by rail in the United States presents an unsafe operating 
condition. The use of such tank cars equipped with these valves could 
result in the release of hazardous materials. Further, the use of tank 
cars equipped with these McKenzie valves used to transport hazardous 
materials in the United States violates the requirements of the HMR. 
FRA is issuing this directive to ensure public safety, ensure 
compliance with the applicable Federal regulations governing the safe 
movement of hazardous materials by rail, and restore the railworthiness 
of all tank cars equipped with the above-described McKenzie valves.
    Upon the applicability date of this Directive, any railroad tank 
car equipped with an unapproved McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valve 
(McKenzie valve) is prohibited from being loaded with any hazardous 
material described in 49 CFR 172.101 and offered into transportation 
until the requirements listed below are met. Tank car owners \5\ of 
tank cars equipped with McKenzie valves must:
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    \5\ The term ``tank car owners'' is as defined in 49 CFR 
180.503.
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    (1) Identify the railroad tank cars in their fleet equipped with 
any McKenzie valve.
    (2) Provide to FRA: (a) The reporting mark and number of each car 
equipped with any McKenzie valve; and (b) the type of valve each car is 
equipped with.
    (3) Create and maintain for a minimum of 6 months from the 
applicability date of this directive a record of the inspection of each 
McKenzie valve. The record must include, at a minimum, the inspection 
date and location, as well as the results of the inspection (i.e., 
whether the valve was removed or not). The record must be made 
available to FRA for inspection upon request.
    (4) Immediately inspect the 3 McKenzie valves on each 
affected car. If any valve is configured with a 3 standalone 
plug, ensure that the car is not loaded and offered into transportation 
until that valve is replaced with an approved valve consistent with 49 
CFR part 179. In addition, any tank car equipped with an unapproved 
3 McKenzie valve is prohibited from being offered into 
transportation (whether loaded or residue) after May 12, 2015.
    (5) Immediately inspect the 1 and 2 McKenzie 
valves on each affected car. If any valve shows evidence of mechanical 
damage, ensure that the car is not loaded and offered into 
transportation until that valve is replaced with an approved valve 
consistent with 49 CFR part 179. Even if a valve is not damaged, a tank 
car equipped with an unapproved 1 or 2 McKenzie 
valve is prohibited from being offered into transportation (whether 
loaded or residue) after June 11, 2015.
    (6) Ensure that each unapproved McKenzie valve is removed and 
replaced by an entity permitted to perform such work in accordance with 
49 CFR part 179.
    (7) Ensure the valve application is properly qualified as required 
by subpart F of 49 CFR part 180.
    After tank car owners have inspected and/or replaced the unapproved 
valves on each affected tank car as required above, and have provided 
the necessary information regarding that car to FRA, tank car owners 
may load the cars with hazardous materials and offer those cars for 
transportation. Alternatively, if upon an adequate showing 
demonstrating the safety of the 1 and 2 valves, 
McKenzie obtains AAR's approval for the use of those valves on DOT 
Specification 111 tank cars, cars equipped with these 1 or 
2 McKenzie valves may be returned to hazardous materials 
service.
    Tank car owners must send the information required to be submitted 
to FRA under this Directive to:
    Mr. Randy M. Keltz, Jr., Tank Car Quality Assurance Specialist, 
Office of Railroad Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, Telephone: (202) 236-7460, 
Email: [email protected].
    Regardless of any entity's compliance with this directive, FRA 
reserves the right to seek civil penalties or to take any other 
appropriate enforcement action for violations of the HMR that have 
occurred. FRA will be conducting an investigation to ensure that all 
tank cars equipped with the valves in question are identified and 
repaired consistent with the requirements of this Directive.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 13, 2015.
Robert C. Lauby,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2015-06213 Filed 3-17-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-06-P