[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 28 (Wednesday, February 11, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7636-7646]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-02836]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0011]


Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture; Application for Permanent 
Variance and Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for 
Comments

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of Impregilo 
Healy Parsons Joint Venture for a permanent variance and interim order 
from the provisions of OSHA standards that regulate work in compressed 
air environments and presents the Agency's preliminary finding to grant 
the permanent variance. OSHA also announces its grant of an interim 
order in this notice.

DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this 
notice, and request for a hearing on or before March 13, 2015. The 
interim order specified by this notice becomes effective on February 
11, 2015, and shall remain in effect until the completion of the 
Anacostia River tunnel project or the interim order is modified or 
revoked.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods:
    1. Electronically: Submit comments and attachments electronically 
at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal. 
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
    2. Facsimile: If submissions, including attachments, are not longer 
than 10 pages, commenters may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at 
(202) 693-1648.
    3. Regular or express mail, hand delivery, or messenger (courier) 
service: Submit comments, requests, and any attachments to the OSHA 
Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-2014-0011, Technical Data Center, U.S. 
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-2625, 
Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-2350 (TTY number: (877) 889-
5627). Note that security procedures may result in significant delays 
in receiving comments and other written materials by regular mail. 
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about security 
procedures concerning delivery of materials by express mail, hand 
delivery, or messenger service. The hours of operation for the OSHA 
Docket Office are 8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
    4. Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and 
the OSHA docket number (OSHA-2014-0011). OSHA places comments and other 
materials, including any personal information, in the public docket 
without revision, and these materials will be available online at 
http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the Agency cautions commenters 
about submitting statements they do not want made available to the 
public, or submitting comments that contain personal information 
(either about themselves or others) such as Social Security numbers, 
birth dates, and medical data.
    5. Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the 
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at 
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index; however, some information (e.g., 
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download 
through the Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material, 
are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. 
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for assistance in locating docket 
submissions.
    6. Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of the 
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov. 
This Federal Register notice, as well as new releases and other 
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.
    7. Extension of comment period: Submit requests for an extension of 
the comment period on or before March 13, 2015 to the Office of 
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Directorate of 
Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution 
Avenue NW., Room N-3655,

[[Page 7637]]

Washington, DC 20210, or by fax to (202) 693-1644.
    8. Hearing requests. According to 29 CFR 1905.15, hearing requests 
must include: (1) A short and plain statement detailing how the 
variance would affect the requesting party; (2) a specification of any 
statement or representation in the variance application that the 
commenter denies, and a concise summary of the evidence adduced in 
support of each denial; and (3) any views or arguments on any issue of 
fact or law present in the variance application.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is 
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office 
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999; 
email: [email protected].
    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, 
Acting Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination 
Activities, Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of 
Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; 
phone: (202) 693-2110 or email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Notice of Application

    On April 3, 2014, Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture, (``IHP 
JV'' or ``the applicant''), 2600 Independence Avenue SE, Washington, DC 
20003, submitted an application for a permanent variance and interim 
order under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and 
other relief under section 6(d)'') from several provisions of the OSHA 
standard that regulates work in compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. IHP 
JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the 
application for a variance (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0002, Request for 
Variance). Specifically, the applicant seeks a variance from the 
provisions of the standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker 
exposure to pressures exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) 
except in an emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \1\ (2) require the use 
of the decompression values specified in decompression tables in 
Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 
1926.803(f)(1)); and (3) require the use of automated operational 
controls and a special decompression chamber (29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), respectively).
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    \1\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express 
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge 
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g. 
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i. 
value specified by Sec.  1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent 
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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    According to its application, IHP JV is currently the general 
contractor for the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's 
(``DC Water'') project to construct the Anacostia River tunnel. The 
Anacostia River tunnel project design requires the ability to safely 
perform hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher 
than allowed in the existing OSHA standard 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) which 
states: ``No employee shall be subjected to pressure exceeding 50 
(p.s.i.g.) except in emergency'' (see footnote 1).
    The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects 
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground 
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of 
subaqueous tunnels below the water table through soft soils consisting 
of clay, silt, and sand using advanced shielded mechanical excavation 
techniques in conjunction with an Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring 
Machine (EPBTBM).
    IHP JV employs specially trained personnel for the construction of 
the tunnel, and states that this construction project will use shielded 
mechanical-excavation techniques. IHP JV asserts that its workers 
perform hyperbaric interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. 
in the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM. The hyperbaric interventions 
consist of conducting inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-
head structure and cutting tools of the EPBTBM.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    IHP JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation, specifically 
with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to pressurize 
the entire tunnel. This technology negates the requirement that all 
members of a tunnel-excavation crew work in compressed air while 
excavating the tunnel. These advances in technology modified 
substantially the methods used by the construction industry to excavate 
subaqueous tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the 
current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR 
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the 
total duration of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel 
construction.
    Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction 
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide 
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized 
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the 
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in 
the working chamber take place only after halting tunnel excavation and 
preparing the machine and crew for an intervention. Interventions occur 
to inspect or maintain the mechanical-excavation components located in 
the working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the working chamber 
includes changing replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, 
and, in rare cases, repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
    In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research 
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for 
construction in 1971 resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In 
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression 
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer 
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29 
CFR part 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According 
to the applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees 
performing interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to 
hyperbaric pressures up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than 
maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR 
1926.803(e)(5)). The applicant asserts that these hyperbaric exposures 
are possible because of advances in hyperbaric technology, a better 
understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a project-
specific HOM (Hyperbaric Operations Manual) that requires specialized 
medical support and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a 
team of specially trained man-lock attendants and hyperbaric workers.
    The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures 
included in its application provide its workers with a place of 
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain 
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for 
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee 
representatives of affected workers with

[[Page 7638]]

a copy of the variance application.\2\ The applicant also certifies 
that it notified its workers of the variance application by posting, at 
prominent locations where it normally posts workplace notices, a 
summary of the application and information specifying where the workers 
can examine a copy of the application. In addition, the applicant 
informed its workers and their representatives of their rights to 
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and 
Health for a hearing on the variance application.
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    \2\ See the definition of ``Affected employee or worker'' in 
section V. D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of 
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (see Footnote 1)

    The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions 
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the 
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g. 
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The 
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments. 
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for 
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man 
locks if required in an emergency.
    EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and 
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use 
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads 
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that 
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier, 
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this 
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the 
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: the staging 
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the 
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry 
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is 
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
    The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level 
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging 
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum 
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant 
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be at or near 
atmospheric pressure. However, the applicant maintains that they may 
have to perform interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
    During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one 
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the 
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a 
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working 
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber 
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression 
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew 
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or 
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working 
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
    The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Anacostia 
River tunnel project (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0003, IHP JV Project-
Specific HOM) that describes in detail the hyperbaric procedures and 
required medical examinations used during the tunnel-construction 
project. The HOM is project-specific, and discusses standard operating 
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures 
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who 
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat 
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants are under the 
direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and attending 
physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening and review 
of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of this 
screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical conditions 
(e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and muscle 
cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g., 
a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated pressures 
and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber 
(shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working 
chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle 
attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large recompression 
chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM 
provide safe work conditions when interventions are necessary, 
including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.

C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To 
Use OSHA Decompression Tables

    OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires 
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A 
of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an 
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to 
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used 
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these 
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the 
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 1926, 
subpart S. Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric 
conditions in the working chamber.
    Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times, the 
1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air decompression with or 
without oxygen. IHP JV asserts that oxygen decompression has many 
benefits, including reducing decompression time by about 33 percent, 
and significantly lowering the rate of decompression illness (DCI), 
compared to the air-decompression tables in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 
1926, subpart S. In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in 
hyperbaric medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during 
hyperbaric exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-
lock attendant also will be present during hyperbaric exposures and 
decompression. This man-lock attendant will operate the hyperbaric 
system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression table. A 
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric 
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly oversee all 
hyperbaric interventions, and ensure that staff follow the procedures 
delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
    The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures, 
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols 
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection 
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols 
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for 
the Anacostia River tunnel project. The applicant is committed to 
follow the decompression procedures described in the project-specific 
HOM during these interventions.

[[Page 7639]]

D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, 
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression

    According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric 
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's 
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions, 
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the 
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure 
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen 
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the 
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure 
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles 
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly 
referred to as ``the bends.'' This description of the etiology of DCI 
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue 
(see footnote 11 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
    The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the 
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged 
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into 
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in 
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the 
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the 
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes 
8 through 15 in this notice for references to these studies).\3\ In 
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least 
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression 
process because:
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    \3\ In the study cited in footnote 9 of this notice, starting at 
page 338, Dr. Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically 
regulated continuous decompression in the Washington State safety 
standards for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its 
decompression tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the 
union, and against the advice of the expert who calculated the 
decompression table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr. 
Kindwall then states, ``Continuous decompression is inefficient and 
wasteful. For example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the 
surface took 1 h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less 
than 2 psig . . . , which provides less and less meaningful bubble 
suppression . . . '' In addition, the report referenced in footnote 
5 under the section titled, ``Background on the Need for Interim 
Decompression Tables'' addresses the continuous-decompression 
protocol in the OSHA compressed-air standard for construction, 
noting that ``[a]side from the tables for saturation diving to deep 
depths, no other widely used or officially approved diving 
decompression tables use straight line, continuous decompressions at 
varying rates. Stage decompression is usually the rule, since it is 
simpler to control.''
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    1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and 
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly 
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock 
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of 
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression 
tables, including stops; and
    2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged 
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control 
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results 
in lower occurrences of DCI.
    Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance 
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires 
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the 
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to 
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the 
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric 
supervisor.

E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement 
of Special Decompression Chamber

    The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires 
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total 
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Another provision of OSHA's compressed-air 
standard calls for locating the special decompression chamber adjacent 
to the man lock on the atmospheric pressure side of the tunnel bulkhead 
(see 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(2)(vii)). However, since only the working 
chamber of the EPBTBM is under pressure, and only a few workers out of 
the entire crew are exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks 
(which, as noted earlier, connect directly to the working chamber) are 
of sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition, 
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special 
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of 
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose 
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds 
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in 
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move 
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This 
alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent 
neuromuscular problems during decompression.

F. Multi-State Variance

    As stated earlier in this notice, IHP JV applied for a permanent 
variance and interim order for its Anacostia River tunnel project only. 
The Anacostia River tunnel project is located entirely in the District 
of Columbia and thus under Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction. 
Therefore, any variance OSHA grants IHP JV will have effect only in the 
District of Columbia.
    Twenty-seven state safety and health plans have been approved by 
OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\4\ As part of the permanent 
variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs 
will notify the State Plans of IHP JV's variance application and grant 
of the Anacostia River tunnel project interim order.
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    \4\ Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York, and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety and 
health authority to state and local employers only. State Plans that 
exercise their occupational safety and health authority over both 
public- and private-sector employers are: Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wyoming.
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    Additionally, OSHA notes that four State Plans have previously 
granted sub-aqueous tunnel construction variances and imposed different 
or additional requirements and conditions (California, Nevada, Oregon, 
and Washington). California also promulgated new standards \5\ for 
similar sub-aqueous tunnel construction work.
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    \5\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Application for a 
Permanent Variance

    This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29 
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides 
additional detail regarding the proposed conditions that form the basis 
of IHP JV's application for a permanent variance.

Proposed Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work 
situations specified under this proposed condition. Clearly defining 
the scope of the permanent variance provides IHP JV, IHP JV's 
employees, and OSHA with necessary information regarding the

[[Page 7640]]

work situations in which the proposed permanent variance would apply.
    According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of 
employers \6\) may request a permanent variance for a specific 
workplace or workplaces (multiple sites). If granted, the variance 
applies to the specific employer(s) that submitted the application. In 
this instance, if OSHA were to grant a permanent variance, it would 
apply to the IHP JV's Anacostia River tunnel project only. As a result, 
it is important to understand that the variance would not apply to any 
other employers such as other joint ventures the applicant may 
undertake in the future. However, the variance rules of practice do 
contain provisions for future modification of permanent variances. 
Under the provisions of 29 CFR 1905.13, an applicant may submit an 
application to modify or amend a permanent variance to add or include 
additional employers for the project.
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    \6\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade 
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided 
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application 
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Proposed Condition B: Application

    This proposed condition specifies the circumstances under which the 
permanent variance would be in effect, notably only for hyperbaric work 
performed during interventions. The proposed condition places clear 
limits on the circumstances under which the applicant can expose its 
employees to hyperbaric pressure.

Proposed Condition C: List of Abbreviations

    Proposed condition C defines a number of abbreviations used in the 
proposed permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these 
abbreviations serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby 
enhancing the applicant's and its employees' understanding of the 
conditions specified by the proposed permanent variance.

Proposed Condition D: Definitions

    The proposed condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical 
terms, used in the proposed permanent variance to standardize and 
clarify their meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the 
applicant's and its employees' understanding of the conditions 
specified by the interim order and proposed permanent variance.

Proposed Condition E: Safety and Health Practices

    This proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and 
submit to OSHA an HOM specific to the Anacostia River tunnel project at 
least six months before using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations. 
Additionally, the proposed condition includes a series of related 
hazard prevention and control requirements and methods (e.g., 
decompression tables, job hazard analyses (JHA), operations and 
inspections checklists, incident investigation, recording and 
notification to OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries and illnesses, 
etc.) designed to ensure the continued effective functioning of the 
hyperbaric equipment and operating system.
    Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety 
and health instructions and measures it specifies would be appropriate 
and would adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs; and (2) 
request the applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the 
hyperbaric safety and health procedures are not suitable for the 
specific project and would not adequately protect the safety and health 
of the CAWs. Once approved, the project specific HOM becomes part of 
the variance, thus enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health 
procedures and measures.\7\
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    \7\ Publication of this Federal Register notice announcing IHP 
JV's application for a permanent variance and grant of a project-
specific interim order constitutes acknowledgement by OSHA of the 
acceptability of the HOM provided by IHP JV for the Anacostia River 
tunnel project.
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Proposed Condition F: Communication

    Proposed condition F would require the applicant to develop and 
implement an effective system of information sharing and communication. 
Effective information sharing and communication ensures that affected 
workers receive updated information regarding any safety-related 
hazards and incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start 
of each shift. The condition also requires the applicant to ensure that 
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained 
for affected workers and support personnel during hyperbaric 
operations. Availability of such reliable means of communications would 
enable affected workers and support personnel to respond quickly and 
effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop 
during EPBTBM operations.

Proposed Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training

    This proposed condition would require the applicant to develop and 
implement an effective qualification and training program for affected 
workers. The condition specifies the factors that an affected worker 
must know to perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how 
to enter, work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both 
normal and emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified 
workers performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they 
recognize, and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health 
hazards. These qualification and training requirements enable affected 
workers to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort 
and physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing 
injury, illness, and fatalities among workers.
    Paragraph (2)(e) of this proposed condition also would require the 
applicant to provide affected workers with information they can use to 
contact the appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe that 
they are developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement 
provides for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health 
effects resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the 
potential severity of these effects.

Proposed Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    Proposed condition H would require the applicant to develop, 
implement, and operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of 
the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated 
work areas. This condition would help to ensure the safe operation and 
physical integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct 
hyperbaric operations. The condition would also enhance worker safety 
by reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
    Paragraph (3) of this proposed condition would require the 
applicant to document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and 
repairs involving the EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job 
site for the duration of the job. This requirement would provide the 
applicant with information needed to schedule tests and inspections to 
ensure the continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and 
to determine that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric 
equipment and systems were

[[Page 7641]]

appropriate, prior to returning them to service.

Proposed Condition I: Compression and Decompression

    This proposed condition would require the applicant to consult with 
its designated medical advisor regarding special compression or 
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW. This 
proposed provision would ensure that the applicant consults with the 
medical advisor, and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, 
development, and implementation of compression or decompression 
protocols appropriate for any CAW requiring acclimation to the 
hyperbaric conditions encountered during EPBTBM operations. 
Accordingly, CAWs requiring acclimation would have an opportunity to 
acclimate prior to exposure to these hyperbaric conditions. OSHA 
believes this condition would prevent or reduce adverse reactions among 
CAWs to the effects of compression or decompression associated with the 
intervention work they perform in the EPBTBM.

Proposed Condition J: Recordkeeping

    Proposed condition J would require the applicant to maintain 
records of specific factors associated with each hyperbaric 
intervention. The information gathered and recorded under this 
provision, in concert with the information provided under proposed 
condition K (using OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate and 
record hyperbaric recordable injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 
1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), would enable the applicant and OSHA to 
determine the effectiveness of the permanent variance in preventing DCI 
and other hyperbaric-related effects.\8\
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    \8\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping 
forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook 
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html); and updates 
to OSHA's recordkeeping rule Web page ((79 FR 56130); http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed Condition K: Notifications

    Under this proposed condition, the applicant would be required, 
within specified periods, to notify OSHA of: (1) Any recordable 
injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of 
an eye, or fatality that occur as a result of hyperbaric exposures 
during EPBTBM operations; (2) provide OSHA with a copy of the incident 
investigation report (using OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3) include 
on the 301 form information on the hyperbaric conditions associated 
with the recordable injury or illness, the root-cause determination, 
and preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented by the 
applicant; and (4) its certification that it informed affected workers 
of the incident and the results of the incident investigation.
    This proposed condition also would require the applicant to: notify 
the Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) 
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days 
should the applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in 
its compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with 
the conditions of the proposed permanent variance; and would provide 
OSHA's OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of 
the project, with a report evaluating the effectiveness of the 
decompression tables.
    These notification requirements would enable the applicant, its 
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's 
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke 
the conditions of the proposed permanent variance. Timely notification 
would permit OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and 
appropriate to prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing 
notification to employees would inform them of the precautions taken by 
the applicant to prevent similar incidents in the future.
    This proposed condition would also require the applicant to notify 
OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its 
main office, or transfers the operations covered by the proposed 
permanent variance to a successor company. In addition, the condition 
specifies that OSHA must approve the transfer of the permanent variance 
to a successor company. These requirements would allow OSHA to 
communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the 
proposed permanent variance, and expedite the Agency's administration 
and enforcement of the permanent variance. Stipulating that an 
applicant would be required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a 
variance to a successor company would provide assurance that the 
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the 
conditions specified by proposed permanent variance, thereby ensuring 
the safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by 
the proposed permanent variance.

IV. Grant of Interim Order

    As noted earlier, the applicant requested an interim order that 
would remain in effect until completion of the Anacostia River tunnel 
project, or until the Agency makes a decision on its application for a 
permanent variance. During this period, the applicant will fully comply 
with the conditions of the interim order as an alternative to complying 
with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803 (hereafter, ``the standard'') 
that:
    1. Prohibit employers using compressed air under hyperbaric 
conditions from subjecting workers to pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g., 
except in emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5));
    2. Require the use of decompression values specified by the 
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29 
CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
    3. Require the use of automated operational controls and a special 
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), 
respectively).
    After reviewing the application, OSHA preliminarily determined 
that:
    1. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective 
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under 
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The proposed alternative 
measures include use of engineering and administrative controls of the 
hazards associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions 
exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous 
tunnel using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in 
conjunction with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the 
EPBTBM's pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel 
excavation and prepares the machine and crew to conduct the 
interventions. Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair 
of the mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
    2. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric 
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical 
examinations for the project's CAWs. The applicant compiled these 
standard operating procedures into a project-specific HOM. The HOM 
discusses the procedures and personnel qualifications for performing 
work safely during the compression and decompression phases of 
interventions. The HOM also specifies the

[[Page 7642]]

decompression tables the applicant proposes to use. Depending on the 
maximum working pressure and exposure times during the interventions, 
the tables provide for decompression using air, pure oxygen, or a 
combination of air and oxygen. The decompression tables also include 
delays or stops for various time intervals at different pressure levels 
during the transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged 
decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in hyperbaric 
medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during 
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock 
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or 
illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of key importance, a 
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric 
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all 
hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures 
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
    3. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training program 
to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with conducting 
hyperbaric operations.
    4. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective 
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously 
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the 
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the 
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to 
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent 
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit 
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor, and 
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all 
hyperbaric operations.
    5. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective 
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by 
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be 
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the 
working chamber) at elevated pressure. The applicant limits 
interventions conducted in the working chamber to performing required 
inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting tools on the face of 
the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber provide 
sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to stand up and 
move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up to 360 
minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the EPBTBM's man 
lock and working chamber function as effectively as the special 
decompression chamber required by the standard.
    OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding 
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method 
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) the applicant proposed 
would provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the 
standard. Based on this review, OSHA preliminarily determined that 
decompressions conducted in tunneling operations performed with these 
tables \9\ result in a lower occurrence of DCI than the decompression 
tables specified by the standard.10 11 12
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    \9\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974 
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A 
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear) 
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and 
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times 
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
    \10\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed air tunneling and caisson 
work decompression procedures: development, problems, and solutions. 
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article 
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19 
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence 
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA 
standard.
    \11\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric 
environment: medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations. 
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article 
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures 
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence 
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington 
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to 
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51 
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g., 
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
    \12\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled ``Criteria for Interim 
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers''; this report 
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries 
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on 
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies 
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
result in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified 
by the standard. For example, H.L. Anderson studied the occurrence of 
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43 
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \13\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to 
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson 
observed 6 DCS cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported 
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI 
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H.L. Andersen is 
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the 
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in 
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA 
decompression tables, nor did OSHA find any studies indicating that the 
1992 French Decompression Tables were more hazardous to employees than 
the OSHA decompression tables.\14\ Therefore, OSHA preliminarily 
concludes that the proposed use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
would protect workers at least as effectively as the OSHA decompression 
tables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during 
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and 
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
    \14\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F. 
(September 1996). Compressed air work--French tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical 
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp. 
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2014-0011-0004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State 
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) 
\15\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \16\ for hyperbaric 
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work, 
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application, 
OSHA is issuing an interim order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs. 
OSHA-2014-0011-0005 (Nevada), OSHA-2014-0011-0006 (Oregon), and 
OSHA-2014-0011-0007 (Washington).
    \16\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the interim order and variance application, instead of 
complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), 
(g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), IHP JV will: (1) Comply with the 
conditions listed below under ``Specific Conditions of the Interim 
Order and the Application for a Permanent Variance'' for the period 
between the date of this notice and completion of the Anacostia River 
tunnel project or the date OSHA publishes its final decision on IHP 
JV's application in the Federal Register; (2) comply fully with all 
other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3) provide a copy 
of this Federal Register

[[Page 7643]]

notice to all employees affected by the conditions, including the 
affected employees of other employers, using the same means it used to 
inform these employees of its application for a permanent variance. 
Additionally, this interim order will remain in effect until one of the 
following conditions occurs: (1) Completion of the IHP JV tunnel 
project; (2) OSHA publishes its final decision on the variance 
application in the Federal Register; or (3) OSHA modifies or revokes 
the interim order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.

V. Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Application for a 
Permanent Variance

    The following conditions apply to the interim order OSHA is 
granting to IHP JV. These conditions specify the alternative means of 
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), 
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii). In addition, the proposed 
conditions included in this notice specify the alternative means of 
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), 
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) that IHP JV is proposing for its 
permanent variance. The proposed conditions would apply to all 
employees of IHP JV exposed to hyperbaric conditions. These proposed 
conditions would be: \17\
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    \17\ In these conditions, the future conditional form of the 
verb (e.g., ``would'') pertains to the application for a permanent 
variance (designated as ``permanent variance''). Under the interim 
order, the applicant is required to comply with these conditions in 
lieu of complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), 
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Scope

    The permanent variance would apply only to work:
    1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Anacostia 
River tunnel project, a subaqueous tunnel constructed using advanced 
shielded mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an 
EPBTBM;
    2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to 
52 p.s.i.g. at the Anacostia River tunnel project;
    3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and 
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress 
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), 
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), IHP JV would be required to 
comply fully with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; 
and
    5. The interim order granted for the Anacostia River tunnel project 
will remain in effect until one of the following conditions occurs (1) 
completion of the Anacostia River tunnel project; or (2) OSHA modifies 
or revokes this interim order or grants IHP JV's request for a 
permanent variance in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.

B. Application

    The permanent variance would apply only when IHP JV stops the 
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs 
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e., 
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or 
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.

C. List of Abbreviations

    Abbreviations used throughout this proposed permanent variance 
would include the following:

1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities

D. Definitions

    The following definitions would apply to this proposed permanent 
variance. These definitions would supplement the definitions in IHP 
JV's project-specific HOM.
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is 
affected by the conditions of this proposed permanent variance, or any 
one of his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has 
the meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
    2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea level, 
generally 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
    3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained 
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment 
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
    4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying 
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working 
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, 
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to 
eliminate them.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Decompression illness--an illness (also called decompression 
sickness (DCS) or the bends) caused by gas bubbles appearing in body 
compartments due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of 
symptoms of decompression illness include (but are not limited to): 
Joint pain (also known as the ``bends'' for agonizing pain or the 
``niggles'' for sight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric 
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a 
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as 
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction); 
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial 
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See Appendix 10 of ``A Guide to the Work in Compressed Air 
Regulations 1996,'' published by the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf.

    Note:  Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention 
but not considered symptoms of DCI can include: barotrauma (direct 
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses 
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in 
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and is 
caused by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure); 
and oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting 
from the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(O2) at elevated partial pressures).

    6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery 
used to excavate the tunnel.
    7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that 
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable 
atmosphere.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
    9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of 
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric 
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting, 
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
    10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific 
health and safety plan developed and implemented by IHP JV for working 
in compressed air during the construction of the Anacostia River 
tunnel.
    11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to 
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.

[[Page 7644]]

    12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used 
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either 
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
    13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as 
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
    14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of 
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
    15. p.s.i.a--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute pressure, 
is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At sea-
level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 14.7 to 
a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute 
pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
    16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of 
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure 
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is 
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in 
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
    17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a 
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully 
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the 
subject matter, the work, or the project.\21\
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    \21\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs 
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.

E. Safety and Health Practices

    1. IHP JV would have to develop and implement a project-specific 
HOM, and submit the HOM to OSHA for approval at least six months before 
using the EPBTBM. IHP JV would have to receive a written 
acknowledgement from OSHA regarding the acceptability of the HOM.\22\ 
The HOM would provide the governing safety and health requirements 
regarding hyperbaric exposures during the tunnel-construction project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ This notice constitutes such acknowledgement by OSHA of the 
acceptability of the HOM provided by IHP JV for the Anacostia River 
tunnel project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. IHP JV would have to implement the safety and health 
instructions included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the 
EPBTBM, and the safety and health instructions provided by the 
manufacturer for the operation of decompression equipment.
    3. IHP JV would have to use air as the only breathing gas in the 
working chamber.
    4. IHP JV would have to use the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
for air, air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM, 
specifically, the tables titled ``French Regulation Air Standard 
Tables.''
    5. IHP JV would have to equip man locks used by its employees with 
an oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. IHP JV would be 
required to not store oxygen or other compressed gases used in 
conjunction with hyperbaric work in the tunnel.
    6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions would 
have to use flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
    7. In hyperbaric work areas, IHP JV would have to maintain an 
adequate fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
    8. IHP JV would have to develop and implement one or more JHAs for 
work in the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as 
necessary (e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that 
affects its operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected 
employees. The JHAs would have to include all the job functions that 
the risk assessment \23\ indicates are essential to prevent injury or 
illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. IHP JV would have to develop a set of checklists to guide 
compressed-air work and ensure that employees follow the procedures 
required by this proposed permanent variance (including all procedures 
required by the HOM, which this proposed variance would incorporate by 
reference). The checklists would have to include all steps and 
equipment functions that the risk assessment indicates are essential to 
prevent injury or illness during compressed-air work.
    10. IHP JV would have to ensure that the safety and health 
provisions of the HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors 
and subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for 
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program 
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Communication

    1. Prior to beginning a shift, IHP JV would have to implement a 
system that informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any 
hazardous occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety, 
including hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth 
or rock slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
    2. IHP JV would have to provide a power-assisted means of 
communication among affected workers and support personnel in 
hyperbaric conditions where unassisted voice communication is 
inadequate.
    (a) IHP JV would have to use an independent power supply for 
powered communication systems, and these systems would have to operate 
such that use or disruption of any one phone or signal location will 
not disrupt the operation of the system from any other location.
    (b) IHP JV would have to test communication systems at the start of 
each shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

G. Worker Qualifications and Training

    IHP JV would have to:
    1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on 
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency 
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this 
training.
    2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric 
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure 
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The 
instruction would have to include topics such as:
    (a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
    (b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
    (c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric 
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen 
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity);
    (d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression; 
and
    (e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate 
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may 
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (b) of this 
proposed condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making 
changes to its hyperbaric operations).
    4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers make this 
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's 
national office and OSHA's nearest affected Area Office before the 
training takes place.

[[Page 7645]]

H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    1. IHP JV would have to initiate and maintain a program of frequent 
and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and 
support systems (such as temperature control, illumination, 
ventilation, and fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and 
hyperbaric work areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
    (a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person 
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work 
areas; and
    (b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks 
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
    2. If the competent person determines that the equipment 
constitutes a safety hazard, IHP JV would have to remove the equipment 
from service until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the 
correction approved by a qualified person.
    3. IHP JV would have to maintain records of all tests and 
inspections of the EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and 
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the job.

I. Compression and Decompression

    IHP JV would have to consult with its attending physician 
concerning the need for special compression or decompression exposures 
appropriate for CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.

J. Recordkeeping

    IHP JV would have to maintain a record of any recordable injuries, 
illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or 
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure of an 
employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301 Incident 
Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses.

    Note:  Examples of important information to include on the OSHA 
301 Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on 
the form) would have to address the following: The task performed 
(Question (Q) 14); an estimate of the CAW's workload (Q 14); the 
composition of the gas mixture; the pressure worked at (Q 14); 
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14); did 
something unusual occur during the task or decompression (Q 14); 
time of symptom onset (Q 15); duration of time between decompression 
and onset of symptoms (Q 15); nature and duration of symptoms (Q 
16); a medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of 
the hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); any possible contributing 
factors (Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by 
injured or ill CAW (Q 17); the number of prior interventions 
completed by injured or ill CAW at that pressure (Q 17); the contact 
information for the treating healthcare provider (Q 17); and the 
date and time of last hyperbaric exposure for this CAW.

    In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and 
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, IHP JV would have 
to maintain records of:
    1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent 
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing), 
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
    2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric 
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
    3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric 
work time at each pressure.
    4. The post-intervention physical assessment of each individual CAW 
for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, nitrogen 
narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated with work 
in compressed air or mixed gasses for each hyperbaric intervention.

K. Notifications

    1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein, 
IHP JV would have to:
    (a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of 
any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, 
amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed 
OSHA 301 Incident Report form \25\) resulting from exposure of an 
employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require 
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, 
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria 
(of 29 CFR 1904). The notification would have to be made within 8 hours 
of the incident, or after becoming aware of a recordable injury or 
illness, and a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA 301) would have 
to be provided within 24 hours of the incident, or after becoming aware 
of a recordable injury or illness. In addition to the information 
required by the OSHA 301, the incident-investigation report would have 
to include a root-cause determination, and the preventive and 
corrective actions identified and implemented.
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    \25\ See footnote 8.
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    (b) Provide certification within 15 days of the incident that it 
informed affected workers of the incident and the results of the 
incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and 
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    (c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office 
within 15 working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-
air operations that affects IHP JV's ability to comply with the 
proposed conditions specified herein.
    (d) Upon completion of the Anacostia River tunnel project, evaluate 
the effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the 
project, and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA 
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.

    Note:  The evaluation report would have to contain summaries of: 
(1) The number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric 
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented 
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the 
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the 
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or 
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded 
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and 
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root-causes, and preventive 
and corrective actions identified and implemented.

    (e) To assist OSHA in administering the proposed conditions 
specified herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area 
Office as soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
    (i) Cease to do business;
    (ii) Change the location and address of the main office for 
managing the tunneling operations specified by the project-specific 
HOM; or
    (iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor 
company.
    (f) Notify all affected employees of this proposed permanent 
variance by the same means required to inform them of its application 
for a variance.
    2. OSHA would have to approve the transfer of the proposed 
permanent variance to a successor company.

VI. Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice. 
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
655(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No.

[[Page 7646]]

1-2012 (77 FR 3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-02836 Filed 2-10-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P