[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 18 (Wednesday, January 28, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4489-4497]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-01575]



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  Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 18 / Wednesday, January 28, 2015 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 4489]]



MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

5 CFR Part 1201


Practices and Procedures

AGENCY: Merit Systems Protection Board.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or the Board) hereby 
amends its regulations governing how jurisdiction is established over 
Board appeals.

DATES: Effective March 30, 2015, and applicable in any appeal filed on 
or after March 30, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William D. Spencer, Clerk of the 
Board, Merit Systems Protection Board, 1615 M Street NW., Washington, 
DC 20419; phone: (202) 653-7200; fax: (202) 653-7130; or email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Board has been considering for several 
years changes to its regulations governing how jurisdiction is 
established over MSPB appeals. On June 7, 2012, the Board proposed 
amendments to 5 CFR 1201.56. 77 FR 33663. In that proposed rule, the 
Board noted that 5 CFR 1201.56 is in conflict with a significant body 
of Board case law holding that certain jurisdictional elements may be 
established by making nonfrivolous allegations. The Board therefore 
proposed to amend this regulation to allow the use of nonfrivolous 
allegations to establish certain jurisdictional elements.
    On October 12, 2012, after receiving numerous thoughtful comments 
concerning the proposed rule, the Board withdrew its proposed 
amendments to 5 CFR 1201.56 in order to reconsider the matter. 77 FR 
62350. The Board thereafter directed the MSPB regulations working group 
to thoroughly reevaluate the Board's regulations relating to the 
establishment of jurisdiction. The MSPB regulations working group 
developed four options (A-D) and on November 8, 2013, the Board 
published a request for public comments in the Federal Register. 78 FR 
67076.
    On April 3, 2014, after considering each of the four options 
developed by the MSPB regulations working group and comments from the 
public, the Board published a proposed rule. 79 FR 18658. This proposed 
rule included a section-by-section analysis of the proposed amendments 
to the Board's regulations.

Comments, Responses, and Changes to the Proposed Amendments

    In response to publication of the proposed rule, the MSPB received 
104 pages of comments from 19 commenters. These comments are available 
for review by the public at: www.mspb.gov/regulatoryreview/index.htm. 
As explained below, the Board carefully considered all public comments 
and has decided to adopt the proposed rule as final with several 
relatively minor changes.
    A commenter criticized the MSPB for failing to explain in the 
proposed rule why it had rejected the other options (A, C, and D). This 
commenter further suggested that the proposed rule therefore would not 
be entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (setting 
forth the legal test for determining if a court should grant deference 
to a Federal agency's interpretation of a statute which it 
administers).
    The Board appreciates the commenter's observation. The Board did 
indeed consider all options, A-D. The Board used the MSPB regulations 
working group (a committee of seasoned MSPB employees formed for the 
accomplishment of this important task) to carefully review and present 
options for the Board's consideration. The options initially developed 
by the regulations working group were presented to the Board and 
published for public comment in the Federal Register on November 8, 
2013. Following several months of additional review by the regulations 
working group, the options and public comments were presented to the 
Board Members for a decision regarding how to proceed. Following 
extensive review, the Board Members unanimously selected a revised 
option B as the best choice and published it as a proposed rule on 
April 3, 2014.
    The Board Members selected revised option B because it was largely 
consistent with current precedent and would clarify certain matters 
without requiring potentially disruptive changes that, in the end, 
would contribute little to the transparency and efficiency of MSPB 
adjudications. For these reasons, the Board Members also believed that 
option B was much less likely than options C and D to be successfully 
challenged on appeal. Finally, the Board determined that option B was 
unlikely to cause possible unintended consequences or process 
disruption that would adversely affect the parties who appear before 
the Board. Thus, in selecting option B, the Board decided that it was 
the best option for all parties concerned, including pro se and 
represented appellants, agencies, unions, attorneys, and the MSPB 
itself.
    Option A set forth a general framework for jurisdictional 
determinations and informed the parties of only the general rules the 
Board follows in allocating burdens of proof. This option also stressed 
the important role that administrative judges play in explaining 
applicable burdens of proof and requirements for establishing MSPB 
jurisdiction. As to the latter point, option B likewise envisions an 
important role for administrative judges. The Board declined to adopt 
option A because this option, while consistent with current law and 
practice, included minimal additional information but not the helpful 
information contained in option B. Therefore, option A did not satisfy 
the Board's intention to make the Board's regulations more 
comprehensive and user-friendly.
    The Board Members also carefully considered options C and D but 
decided against adopting them for several reasons. First, as noted 
above, the Board determined that the numerous major changes suggested 
in options C and D would change the current scheme in a manner 
inconsistent with long-standing precedent and procedures without 
offering any real advantage to the Board or MSPB litigants. The Board 
also was concerned that adoption of the more radical changes in these 
two options might not be accorded Chevron deference and that the lack 
of any real

[[Page 4490]]

advantage to options C and D made running such a risk unappealing.
    The Board Members thus chose the option that they believed would 
most efficiently serve the Board's critical mission of adjudicating 
appeals. In addition, the Board, as the promulgator of these 
regulations, has considerable discretion regarding, and is particularly 
well-suited to speak to, its intent in adopting these regulations and 
thus is entitled to Chevron deference as to its interpretation of these 
regulations. See, e.g., Reizenstein v. Shinseki, 583 F.3d 1331, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Gose v. U.S. Postal Service, 451 F.3d 831, 837 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006).
    Finally, the MSPB would further note that other commenters, such as 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), lauded the careful 
consideration exhibited by the Board and had no significant objection 
to the Board's selection of option B.
    A commenter expressed the concern that new section 1201.57 would 
improperly bar appellants from raising the ``principles'' embodied in 
affirmative defenses in individual right of action (IRA), Veterans 
Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), and Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) appeals as 
required under 5 U.S.C. 7701(c)(2).
    This commenter chiefly relies upon a nonprecedential Board decision 
(Robinson v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket 
No. CH-3330-11-0845-I-1, 119 M.S.P.R. 21 (Table), Nonprecedential Final 
Order (Dec. 26, 2012)), that appears to state that an affirmative 
defense under 5 U.S.C. 7701(c)(2) may be raised in a VEOA appeal. Such 
a holding is, however, inconsistent with longstanding Board precedent. 
Ruffin v. Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 396, ] 12 (2001) (in 
a VEOA appeal the Board cannot consider a claim of prohibited 
discrimination under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(1) because VEOA does not grant 
the Board the authority to consider claims for violations of laws other 
than veterans' preference rules). Thus, the Board will not amend the 
proposed rule as suggested by this commenter.
    A commenter expressed concern regarding the clarity of MSPB 
regulations, especially for pro se litigants and inexperienced counsel. 
The commenter requested that the Board explain in the regulations how a 
nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction under oath or penalty of 
perjury is done. This commenter also suggested that the MSPB redraft 
the proposed definitions related to jurisdiction in section 1201.4 and 
include examples illustrating how an appellant can establish MSPB 
jurisdiction by making nonfrivolous allegations. The commenter also 
suggested that such examples should address how to establish MSPB 
jurisdiction over constructive adverse actions and IRA appeals.
    While we are cognizant that the regulations contain legal concepts 
that may be complex and difficult to understand, especially for pro se 
litigants, the complexity of the regulations is a product of the 
complexity of the law itself. The Board has found that attempting to 
clarify some concepts by restating them in plain English, or by 
providing illustrative examples of them, may create a misleading or 
incomplete definition of the concept. In particular, providing examples 
of some of the circumstances that could support jurisdiction over 
constructive action appeals raises a danger that they may limit the 
circumstances that will be described by pro se appellants to establish 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the statement in the regulation is not 
intended to be a detailed substantive description of an appellant's 
burden in a particular type of appeal. Rather, the regulations 
generally inform the reader that the appellant is expected to provide 
specific factual allegations that describe a matter within the Board's 
jurisdiction. Under court and Board precedent, the Board already 
expects that MSPB administrative judges will fully inform an appellant 
with specificity of his or her burden of proving the claim, the burden 
of going forward with the evidence, and the types of evidence necessary 
to make a nonfrivolous allegation. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection 
Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In addition, the 
statement that the allegations ``generally'' should be under oath or 
penalty of perjury is not an absolute evidentiary requirement. Where 
appropriate, the Board may still find a nonfrivolous allegation of 
jurisdiction based solely upon the documentation in the appeal file 
without relying on a verified factual statement from the appellant. 
Furthermore, making a statement under penalty of perjury is not a 
significant hurdle. For example, in cases filed using the Board's e-
Appeal Online system (https://e-appeal.mspb.gov), the appellant can 
easily meet it by merely checking a box in the initial appeal to verify 
under penalty of perjury that the information being asserted on the 
form is true and correct, based on the appellant's information and 
belief.
    In response to sections 1201.56(d) and 1201.57(e), which require 
the MSPB administrative judge to provide the parties with information 
relating to the requirements for establishing jurisdiction and other 
relevant information, a commenter expressed a concern that show cause 
orders issued by administrative judges are generally not tailored to 
the facts of the particular appeal or written in plain and easily 
understood language.
    Administrative judges frequently must issue jurisdictional orders 
that provide complex legal information early in the processing of a 
case, when they still have only a partial understanding of the factual 
basis of the appeal. As a result, the orders by necessity often must be 
general and cannot be tailored to the specific appeal. In addition, as 
with these regulations, it often is not possible to define the 
applicable jurisdictional standards with precision, while still using 
plain English. The administrative judges, however, are expected to 
provide further explanation of the Board's jurisdictional standard in 
appropriate cases. See Parker v. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 106 M.S.P.R. 329, ] 7 (2007) (while the general statement 
on jurisdiction in the acknowledgment order was appropriate when it was 
issued, the appellant's reply necessitated an additional show cause 
order setting forth a more explicit explanation about the evidence and 
arguments he would need to present to nonfrivolously allege that his 
appeal fell within the Board's jurisdiction).
    A commenter suggested that the Board include a provision in its 
regulations setting forth an agency's responsibility to disclose 
relevant information to an appellant when an issue of jurisdiction or 
timeliness is raised in a show cause order.
    The Board agrees with the commenter that an agency is obligated to 
disclose information relevant to the issue of jurisdiction. This 
obligation has already been recognized in MSPB precedent, and 
appellants are entitled to discovery of matters relevant to 
jurisdiction. See Parker, 106 M.S.P.R. 392, ] 8. The Board, however, 
does not feel it is necessary to codify this precedent in these 
regulations. With regard to issues of timeliness, the agency generally 
completes its duty to disclose relevant information once it establishes 
that it provided the appellant with the appropriate notice of appeal 
rights.
    A commenter stated that it was unrealistic to require an appellant 
to establish jurisdiction without first engaging in discovery and that 
the proposed amendments would make it

[[Page 4491]]

more difficult to rely upon circumstantial evidence to establish MSPB 
jurisdiction.
    We believe that the proposed amendments will not result in making 
it more difficult for an appellant to show that the Board has 
jurisdiction over his appeal. As noted in our response to an earlier 
comment, administrative judges issue acknowledgement orders and 
additional orders if needed to inform the parties of their burdens. The 
Board requires its administrative judges to provide a fair and just 
adjudication and to rule on relevant evidence. 5 CFR 1201.41; see also, 
e.g., Hall v. Department of Defense, 119 M.S.P.R. 180, ]] 4, 5 (2013). 
Administrative judges also have wide discretion in matters pertaining 
to discovery, and an administrative judge's discovery rulings will not 
stand if they are too restrictive. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 118 M.S.P.R. 161, ] 27 (2012).
    A commenter questioned why the Board did not include USERRA 
reemployment claims under proposed section 1201.57 and suggested that 
this section be amended to cover such claims.
    From 1979 until 1994, a claim that an agency violated an 
individual's right under USERRA's predecessor statute to return to 
civilian employment following military duty was within the Board's 
appellate jurisdiction under regulations issued by OPM. See 1979 
through 1993 versions of 5 CFR part 353, subparts C & D. Such 
reemployment appeals were governed by section 7701 procedures. See 
Britton v. Department of Agriculture, 23 M.S.P.R. 170, 173 (1984). 
USERRA, enacted in 1994, made, among other things, the basis for Board 
jurisdiction over reemployment appeals statutory. See 38 U.S.C. 4324.
    The Board has no basis for concluding that in enacting USERRA 
Congress meant to bring reemployment appeals outside the coverage of 5 
U.S.C. 7701; the effect of such a change would have been to place the 
burden of proof on the merits on the appellant, when under section 
7701(c)(2)(B) it is on the agency, Britton, 23 M.S.P.R. at 173, and to 
eliminate an appellant's right to raise an affirmative defense under 
section 7701(c)(2). Such changes would have been to the detriment of 
individuals seeking to vindicate their reemployment rights following 
military duty, and there is no indication that in enacting USERRA 
Congress intended such changes to Board procedures. Accordingly, the 
Board will not include USERRA reemployment appeals in section 1201.57, 
as that section covers appeals in which the appellant bears the burden 
of proof on the merits and may not raise affirmative defenses.
    Nevertheless, the commenter is correct in stating that the Board 
has taken jurisdiction in USERRA reemployment appeals based on 
nonfrivolous allegations. See Silva v. Department of Homeland Security, 
112 M.S.P.R. 362, ] 19 (2009); Groom v. Department of the Army, 82 
M.S.P.R. 221, ] 9 (1999); accord DePascale v. Department of the Air 
Force, 59 M.S.P.R. 186, 187 n.1 (1993) (arising under USERRA's 
predecessor statute). The current regulatory revisions generally aim to 
codify the case law-based methods for establishing jurisdiction in 
different types of appeals, however, and there is no reason to use this 
occasion to place a higher jurisdictional burden than currently exists 
on appellants in USERRA reemployment appeals. Thus, it is appropriate 
to except USERRA reemployment appeals from the requirement at section 
1201.56(b)(2)(A) that jurisdiction be established by preponderant 
evidence. The final rule provides an exception to section 
1201.56(b)(2)(A) for cases in which the appellant asserts a violation 
of his right to reemployment following military duty under 38 U.S.C. 
4312-4314.
    Several commenters expressed a concern that the MSPB was raising 
jurisdictional standards in constructive adverse action cases without 
any stated rationale for such action.
    The Board understands the commenters' concerns regarding the 
proposed rule Sec.  1201.4(s), but the rule neither raises 
jurisdictional standards in cases before the Board, nor alters Board 
precedent concerning the type of documentation that can be used to 
satisfy the burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation. It is merely to 
remind the parties of obligations imposed by 18 U.S.C. 1001(a). The 
definition of ``nonfrivolous allegation'' in the first sentence of 
proposed rule Sec.  1201.4(s) is based on longstanding Board precedent. 
The second sentence in the proposed rule further explains that, when an 
allegation is made under oath or penalty of perjury, it will generally 
be considered nonfrivolous if it is more than conclusory, plausible on 
its face and material to the legal issues in the appeal. The Board 
furthers note that, in this context, an allegation is made under oath 
or penalty of perjury if it is accompanied by the following: ``I 
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Executed on 
(date). (Signature).'' See 28 U.S.C. 1746; Cobel v. Norton, 391 F.3d 
251, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
    Several commenters stated that the MSPB was inappropriately 
limiting the type of evidence that could be used for satisfying the 
burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation. A commenter was concerned 
that the Board was improperly limiting such evidence to a statement 
under penalty of perjury while disallowing the use of evidence, such as 
an email.
    We disagree with the commenter's statement that the Board is 
inappropriately limiting the type of evidence that could be used for 
satisfying the burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation.
    Several commenters questioned whether the MSPB could modify the 
definition of ``nonfrivolous allegation'' in a regulation because that 
term has already been defined in controlling U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit precedent interpreting jurisdiction-conferring 
statutes and OPM regulations.
    As previously stated, the definition of ``nonfrivolous allegation'' 
in proposed rule 1201.4(s) is based on longstanding Board precedent. 
Further, while we are cognizant of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit's precedent analyzing the Board's case law applying 
nonfrivolous allegation standards, we disagree with the commenters' 
conclusion that this precedent is binding. The court has routinely held 
that the Board has properly applied the nonfrivolous allegation 
standard. We believe this court review is instructive, rather than 
directive. In addition, we believe it is not appropriate to determine 
here whether the court owes deference to the Board's interpretation of 
its own jurisdiction under this particular regulation and instead 
believe such matters should properly be handled in due course on a 
case-by-case basis. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
    Several commenters asked the Board to amend 5 CFR 1201.56 to add a 
new subparagraph (e) addressing when an appellant is entitled to a 
jurisdictional hearing. A commenter also suggested that the MSPB 
include in the final rule a procedure under which the Board would not 
be required to hold an evidentiary hearing on matters on which an 
appellant bears the burden of proof when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact to be resolved.
    The Board believes that this proposed amendment is not necessary 
because the general definition of a nonfrivolous allegation in the 
proposed regulations and the show cause orders that administrative 
judges routinely issue in appeals tailored to a specific case are 
sufficient to inform an appellant of what

[[Page 4492]]

he or she will be required to do to obtain a jurisdictional hearing.
    A commenter suggested that the MSPB reconsider drafting section 
1201.5 from option C because in the commenter's opinion option C more 
clearly identified matters that must be proven by preponderance of the 
evidence.
    The Board carefully considered the four options (A-D) and decided 
against incorporating the referenced language contained in option C 
because (a) such information is already communicated to appellants in 
show cause orders, and (b) the inclusion of the level of detail set 
forth in the referenced section of option C would require frequent 
updates to the Board's regulations to reflect changes in the law and 
bind the Board to the contents of its regulations when the flexibility 
to reconsider past decisions is sometimes needed.
    A commenter identified the jurisdiction matrix produced by the MSPB 
regulations working group as a useful tool and proposed that the MSPB 
include this document in its regulations or on its Web site.
    The Board appreciates that the commenter found this table so useful 
and will undertake to maintain a similar document summarizing MSPB 
jurisdiction on the MSPB Web site.
    A commenter suggested that the Board should replace the term 
``nonfrivolous allegation'' with a term that, according to the 
commenter, could be more easily understood and which has the same 
meaning.
    While the Board understands the commenter's concern, it believes 
that it would simply be impractical to change this well-established 
legal term at this stage. The term has been adopted in case law by both 
the Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
Moreover, revised 5 CFR 1201.4(s) provides a definition for this term 
that the Board expects will be easily understood by practitioners and 
appellants, including pro se appellants.
    A commenter suggested section 1201.4(s) would be improved if the 
MSPB added examples of a ``conclusory statement'' and a statement that 
the MSPB would consider to be ``more than conclusory.''
    The Board appreciates that examples are often an effective means of 
communicating legal concepts and so has included examples elsewhere in 
its regulations. However, at the present time, the Board believes it 
most appropriate to develop the meaning of these terms through case law 
and perhaps add examples to its regulations at a later date.
    A commenter criticized the proposed rule for failing to recognize 
that all MSPB appeals include ``what'' and ``who'' jurisdictional 
elements that always require proof by preponderant evidence.
    This comment appears to recommend that the Board adopt a major 
structural element of option C, a potential approach to making 
jurisdictional determinations that was previously published on the 
Board's Web site but that the Board Members chose not to propose in 
this rulemaking. The main structural element of option B, the approach 
that the Board has proposed (with minor modification), is to 
distinguish between categories of appeals that are covered by 5 U.S.C. 
7701 procedures and those that are not. Options B and C were formulated 
as comprehensive methods for making jurisdictional determinations, and 
the Board sees no compelling reason to import a major element of option 
C into option B.
    A commenter questioned whether the MSPB erred by failing to justify 
requiring nonfrivolous allegations of jurisdictional elements that are 
also merits issues in IRA, VEOA, USERRA, and other types of appeals. 
This commenter explained that requiring nonfrivolous allegations in 
such appeals was inappropriate where the relevant statutes provide that 
an individual who ``alleges,'' ``claims,'' ``believes,'' or 
``considers'' that an agency acted in a particular way is entitled to 
appeal to the MSPB. Therefore, the commenter concluded that the Board's 
requirement of raising nonfrivolous allegations to establish 
jurisdiction in these appeals would be found ``not in accordance with 
law'' under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
706(2)(A).
    The proposed revision in the regulations is primarily intended to 
accurately reflect current, controlling Board and court precedent for 
establishing MSPB's jurisdiction in various types of appeals. We doubt 
that this precedent would be subject to collateral attack in an APA 
proceeding because it already has been subjected to years of court 
review. In addition, the Board carefully considered a comprehensive 
reform of our jurisdictional standards (options C and D) but concluded 
that introducing such changes in our standards would not be the best 
option to follow.
    A commenter expressed his preference for option C and noted his 
concern that the proposed rule improperly treated purely merits issues 
as jurisdictional issues and left undisturbed case law in which the 
MSPB and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit improperly 
classified merits issues as jurisdictional requirements.
    The Board does not agree with the comment that the requirement of 
raising nonfrivolous allegations to establish jurisdiction in certain 
appeals would be found not in accordance with law. The Board has 
proposed revisions to its jurisdictional regulations to clarify the 
burdens on parties and to insure that the Board's regulations are 
consistent with both statutes and case law. The Board is not revising 
its jurisdictional regulations for the purpose of reversing controlling 
precedent. Therefore, we agree that the regulations codify and endorse 
Board and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit precedent. The 
Board believes that such consistency and clarification are helpful to 
the parties it serves. Also, as noted earlier, the Board expects an 
administrative judge to provide notice to an appellant of the specific 
jurisdictional burdens raised in an appeal.
    A commenter stated that the proposed rule improperly treated the 
exhaustion requirement in IRA and VEOA appeals as a jurisdictional 
requirement.
    According to the commenter, U.S. Supreme Court precedent treats 
administrative exhaustion requirements that are ``analogous to those in 
IRA and VEOA appeals'' as ``claim processing rules'' and not 
jurisdictional requirements. The Supreme Court has never directly 
opined on the nature of administrative exhaustion requirements in the 
IRA or VEOA context. Furthermore, Yunus v. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001), an appellate court 
decision that is binding on the Board, squarely holds that exhaustion 
of the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) complaint process is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to an IRA appeal. The Yunus decision is 
consistent with other appellate court decisions holding that filing of 
an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suing the 
government in tort, GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 904 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), in contract, Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 
609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and for discrimination in 
employment, Hays v. Postmaster General, 868 F.2d 328, 330-31 (9th Cir. 
1989). The Board is not persuaded that it is ``improper'' to treat the 
exhaustion requirement in IRA and VEOA appeals as jurisdictional 
prerequisites to filing such appeals.
    A commenter observed that the Board may not affirm any agency 
action or decision, including in IRA, VEOA, and USERRA appeals, where 
the agency

[[Page 4493]]

violated the appellant's constitutional rights.
    The commenter does not cite any decision in which the Board has 
either considered or declined to consider a constitutional claim in an 
IRA, VEOA, or USERRA appeal. Moreover, the commenter does not point to 
any portion of the laws conferring jurisdiction over these three types 
of appeals that gives the Board the authority to consider 
constitutional claims. While it is true that in appeals governed by 5 
U.S.C. 7701--i.e., appeals other than IRA, VEOA, and USERRA appeals--
the Board will consider constitutional claims, in doing so the Board 
will identify the constitutional interest at stake as part of its 
analysis. For example, the Board will consider a claim that an agency 
removed an individual without affording him minimum due process in 
accordance with the Fifth Amendment, so long as the individual was the 
type of employee with a constitutionally-protected property interest in 
continued Federal employment. E.g., Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 85 
M.S.P.R. 162, ] 1 (2000). At least with respect to VEOA and USERRA 
appeals, it is not clear what constitutionally-protected interests 
might be implicated in the most frequently-arising fact patterns, where 
individuals seek to vindicate statutory interests such as the right to 
veterans' preference in initial employment, the right to compete for 
employment, the right to reemployment following military duty, and the 
right to be free of discrimination in employment based on prior 
military service or a present obligation to perform such service. For 
these reasons, the Board believes that the basis and scope of its 
authority to adjudicate constitutional claims in IRA, VEOA, and USERRA 
appeals is best left to development in the case law.
    A commenter suggested that 1201.57 should be amended to state with 
greater specificity the standards of proof for each of the appeals 
covered by that regulation.
    The Board has proposed the revisions to its jurisdictional 
regulations to insure that they are consistent with statutes, other 
regulations, and case law. The Board considered stating the specific 
standards or elements for establishing jurisdiction for each type of 
appeal in the revised regulations but ultimately concluded that the 
inclusion of this information may have the unintended effect of 
confusing the reader, especially a pro se appellant. In addition, the 
Board's jurisdiction is a continually evolving concept. As a result, 
the Board also was concerned that the regulations would quickly become 
obsolete or inaccurate if specific standards for establishing 
jurisdiction in each type of appeal were provided in the regulations. 
Finally, as noted several times earlier, the Board expects 
administrative judges to provide notice to the appellant of the 
specific jurisdictional burdens raised in the appeal.
    A commenter recommended that section 1201.57(e) should be amended 
to require the jurisdictional notice to be issued as soon as 
practicable and to allow the parties additional time, if needed, to 
complete discovery before the jurisdictional question is resolved.
    The Board appreciates the commenter's valid concern. As the 
commenter correctly notes, administrative judges typically do issue 
jurisdictional show cause orders as soon as practicable, often within 
weeks after an appeal is filed. However, in certain cases, new 
questions of jurisdiction materialize only after the parties file 
pleadings that highlight emerging issues. As a result, the Board 
believes that its practice is working well for most cases and that, as 
a rule, administrative judges usually issue jurisdictional notices at 
the appropriate time. As for the comment about allowing the parties 
additional time to complete discovery before the jurisdictional 
question is resolved, the Board believes, as stated earlier, that such 
matters are best left to the administrative judges' discretion on a 
case-by-case basis.
    A commenter suggested that the Board should undertake additional 
study to determine whether its regulations should address any 
additional jurisdictional pleading requirements that may arise when 
matters are made appealable to the Board by OPM regulation, rather than 
by statute.
    The commenter notes that options C and D, previously posted on the 
Board's Web site as potential approaches to jurisdictional 
determinations, contained detailed pleading requirements for some types 
of appeals authorized by OPM regulations. The Board is aware that case 
law sets forth specific substantive requirements for establishing 
jurisdiction over certain kinds of regulatory appeals, such as those 
brought by probationers or that challenge employment practices, that 
may not be applicable in other kinds of cases. All appeals authorized 
by OPM regulations are covered by 5 U.S.C. 7701, however, and the 
purpose of the current rulemaking is to distinguish broadly between how 
jurisdiction is established in appeals that are covered by, and those 
that are not covered by, section 7701. Laying out substantive 
jurisdictional tests for different kinds of appeals within one of those 
categories is best left to developing case law.
    A commenter suggested that the Board reorder paragraphs (b) and (c) 
of 1201.57 to reinforce the rule that the Board cannot bypass a 
jurisdictional question to reach the merits of a case.
    The Board agrees with this suggestion and will make the minor edit 
necessary by switching the order of the paragraphs.
    A commenter found the language in 1201.57(c) was ambiguous where it 
states that the paragraph applies ``[e]xcept for matters described in 
subsections (b)(1) and (3) of this section above.''
    We agree and have amended this provision to make it clearer.
    A commenter proposed a revision of 1201.57(c) on the grounds that 
an appellant should be required to make more than a nonfrivolous 
allegation that the appeal was timely filed and that the preponderance 
of the evidence standard should apply to timeliness issues.
    The Board believes that the current language in the regulations is 
appropriate and protects the rights of appellants to show by 
preponderant evidence that their appeals were timely filed or to 
establish good cause for an untimely filing, consistent with long-
established precedent. The current language also accurately reflects 
that, for an appellant to be entitled to a hearing on the timeliness 
issue, he or she must raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the appeal 
was timely filed. That said, the commenter correctly notes that 
timeliness and jurisdictional questions are not always inextricably 
intertwined and so administrative judges need to carefully review the 
record in such cases to provide the parties with the proper notice and 
determine if a hearing is warranted under the circumstances.
    A commenter asserted that the amendments to the Board's regulations 
would increase the number of constructively discharged employees who 
are unsuccessful before the Board both on the merits and in 
establishing the MSPB's jurisdiction.
    The Board does not agree. The regulatory revisions under discussion 
are certainly not intended to make it more difficult to establish 
jurisdiction or to prevail in a constructive adverse action appeal. 
Instead, the Board is attempting to codify principles in case law that 
are not fully reflected in the Board's regulations. The commenter's 
true concern appears to be that the Board's ``current practice'' 
results in appellants not ``winning when . . . they ought to'' in 
constructive adverse action appeals. However, this rulemaking is not 
intended to work a fundamental

[[Page 4494]]

change in the way the Board approaches such appeals.
    A commenter objected to Board's use of the term ``conclusory'' as 
well as the Board's definition of that term.
    The Board believes that the use of the term is clear to convey the 
idea that something is conclusory if it is an inference that has no 
proof but is stated nonetheless. In other words, something is 
conclusory if it consists of or relates to a conclusion or assertion 
for which no supporting evidence is offered. The definition of 
``conclusory'' is easily obtained with an online search although the 
word may not be found in older or abridged dictionaries. Yet as the 
commenter correctly notes, recent editions of Blacks' Law Dictionary 
define conclusory as ``expressing a factual inference without stating 
the underlying facts on which the inference is based.'' BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999); id. (8th ed. 2004); id. (9th ed. 2009).
    A commenter suggested that the Board should abandon trying to 
define what a nonfrivolous allegation is, and should instead decide 
jurisdiction the way Federal courts do.
    The commenter does not specify how he believes the Board is 
determining questions of jurisdiction differently than do Federal 
courts. Nonetheless, the commenter correctly observes that the Board is 
a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and so the Board believes that it is 
properly adjudicating jurisdictional issues that come before it, 
including determining if a nonfrivolous allegation has been raised.
    A commenter suggested that the Board should revise its definition 
of ``preponderance of the evidence'' by adopting ``the standard law 
dictionary definition.''
    The Board currently defines ``preponderance of the evidence'' as 
``[t]he degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, 
considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find 
that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue.'' The 
proposed rule would move this definition from section 1201.56 to 
section 1201.4 but would leave the substance of the definition 
unchanged. Citing a law dictionary, the commenter suggests that the 
Board change the definition to ``evidence which is more convincing than 
the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is [the] degree of proof 
which is more probable than not.'' The commenter believes that the 
current definition creates confusion because it is framed in terms of 
what a ``reasonable person'' would find rather than what an 
administrative judge should find.
    The Board declines to adopt this suggestion. Over a period of 
decades, the Board's primary reviewing court has cited and applied the 
Board's definition of ``preponderance of the evidence'' without 
questioning its validity or clarity. E.g., Haebe v. Department of 
Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Veterans 
Administration, 768 F.2d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Changing the 
definition would allow parties to argue before the court that the new 
definition has a different meaning than the old one, and the Board 
would then need to convince the court that no change in meaning was 
intended. If the Board agreed with the commenter that the current 
definition creates confusion, then it might be worth the risk of having 
the court find that a revised definition has a new meaning, but the 
Board is not aware of widespread confusion over the wording of the 
current definition.
    In fact, the current definition of ``preponderance of the 
evidence'' stands in clear contrast to the definition of ``substantial 
evidence.'' The former definition focuses on what a reasonable person 
``would accept'' as sufficient to prove a contested fact, whereas the 
latter focuses on what a reasonable person ``might accept'' as 
sufficient to prove a contested fact ``even though other reasonable 
persons might disagree.'' This clear contrast would be lost if the 
reference to a ``reasonable person'' were removed from the definition 
of ``preponderance of the evidence'' as the commenter suggests.
    A commenter stated that the Board lacks authority to issue 5 CFR 
1208.23(b) limiting the right to an evidentiary hearing to cases that 
are timely filed and within the Board's jurisdiction.
    The commenter appears to object to the Board's reference to 5 CFR 
1208 if an individual would like additional information regarding VEOA 
or USERRA appeals. However, 5 CFR 1208 is not a proposed rule and 
therefore is not subject to the notice and comment of the regulations 
at issue. Furthermore, the Board's proposed regulations do not provide 
for summary judgment. It is well settled that a VEOA complainant does 
not have an unconditional right to a hearing before the Board, and a 
USERRA claimant is entitled to a hearing on the merits only upon 
establishing Board jurisdiction over his appeal. Downs v. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 139, ]] 17-18 (2008). The Board may 
decide a VEOA appeal on the merits without an evidentiary hearing only 
where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party must 
prevail as a matter of law. Jarrard v. Department of Justice, 113 
M.S.P.R. 502, 506 (2010).
    A commenter, citing Kirkendall v. Department of the Navy, 479 F.3d 
830, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2009), asserted that 5 U.S.C. 7701 applies to VEOA 
appeals and questioned the Board's citation to Goldberg v. Department 
of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 660 (2005), for the proposition that 
the Board lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate an affirmative defense under 
5 U.S.C. 7701(c)(2) in these appeals.
    After reviewing Kirkendall, Goldberg and related precedent, the 
Board remains convinced that it lacks jurisdiction over affirmative 
defenses in a VEOA or USERRA appeal. In particular, we note that the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found in Kirkendall that 
the failure of Congress to specifically reference section 7701 in a 
statute, such as USERRA, demonstrates that it did not necessarily want 
all provisions of section 7701 to apply to the Board's review of the 
claim. Furthermore, we note that the court has affirmed the Board's 
interpretation of the VEOA statute. For instance, in a veterans' 
preference case, which was decided on the merits, the court affirmed 
the Board's finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the 
appellant's affirmative defenses of discrimination and harmful 
procedural error. Graves v. Department of the Navy, 451 F. App'x 931 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the Board declines to change its 
position that it lacks jurisdiction over affirmative defenses in a VEOA 
or USERRA appeal.
    A commenter asserted that the Board may not ``overrule'' section 
1201.56 in VEOA appeals by adjudication because the Board lacks the 
delegated authority to do so.
    At the outset, the Board notes that it has the authority to review 
or modify its regulations. 5 U.S.C. 1204(h) and 7701(k).
    The commenter, though, suggests that the Board tried to 
``overrule'' 5 CFR 1201.56 by adjudication in the cases of Donaldson v. 
Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 489 (2013) (Table); 
Donaldson v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 244 (2013) 
(Table); Donaldson v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 219 
(2012) (Table); Donaldson v. Department of Homeland Security, 117 
M.S.P.R. 609 (2012) (Table); Donaldson v. Department of Homeland 
Security, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-12-0356-B-1 (Initial Decision, Jan. 
9, 2013); Donaldson v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. 
DC-300A-12-0619-I-1 (Initial Decision, Sep. 17, 2012); Donaldson v.

[[Page 4495]]

Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-12-0356-W-1 
(Initial Decision, June 28, 2012); Donaldson v. Department of Homeland 
Security, MSPB Docket No. DC-3330-11-0636-I-1 (Aug. 10, 2011); and 
Donaldson v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DC-3330-
11-0637-I-1 (July 29, 2011).
    According to the commenter, the Board's decisions in Donaldson 
contravened the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's holding 
in Tunik v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 407 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). The Board disagrees with the commenter's characterization of 
what the Board did in the Donaldson cases. In any event, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit repeatedly concluded that the Board 
correctly decided the Donaldson cases, including the jurisdictional 
determinations therein. See Donaldson v. Department of Homeland 
Security, 528 F. App'x 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Table) (the court affirmed 
the Board's decision that the appellant was not entitled to relief 
under VEOA); Donaldson v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 527 F. App'x 
945 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Table) (the court held that the Board correctly 
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the appellant's whistleblower 
claim); Donaldson v. Department of Homeland Security, 495 F. App'x 53 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Table) (the court affirmed the Board's decision that 
the agency did not violate USERRA and VEOA when it failed to select him 
for positions). Notwithstanding the Board's holdings in the Donaldson 
appeals, the court in Tunik pointed out that there are ``numerous 
exceptions'' to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of 5 
U.S.C. 553. Tunik, 407 F.3d at 1341-45. In particular, the court in 
Tunik indicated that the Board is authorized to repeal a regulation 
through notice and comment procedures, which is exactly what the Board 
is doing here. Tunik, 407 F.3d at 1345. The commenter appears to 
concede this point, when he notes that the Board is not precluded from 
repealing the regulation in accordance with section 553(b).
    A commenter questioned the validity of 5 CFR part 1208 and 1201.57 
because these regulations allegedly inadequately protect veterans' 
preference rights.
    The commenter asserts that Congress intended greater protection for 
preference-eligible veterans than the aforementioned regulations 
provide, but the commenter does not provide any examples. Again, the 
main purpose of this rulemaking is to make the Board's regulations 
consistent with how the Board actually makes jurisdictional 
determinations, as explained in the case law.
    A commenter questioned why the Board had abandoned beneficial 
amendments proposed in 2012, such as allowing litigating parties to 
file reply briefs and steps to facilitate settlement.
    The amendments proposed by the Board in 2012 (77 FR 33663) were not 
abandoned. These proposed amendments were adopted in a final rule 
published later that year (77 FR 62350). The final rule authorized the 
filing of reply briefs (5 CFR 1201.114(a)) and included steps to 
facilitate settlement (5 CFR 1201.28).
    A commenter objected to the Board's proposal to limit the issues 
that may be raised in an IRA appeal. The commenter specifically 
objected to the fact that agencies no longer need to establish the 
justification for a personnel action in an IRA appeal.
    The Board does not agree with the commenter that the Board's 
regulations ease an agency's requirement to prove misconduct if an 
employee has first chosen to file with the OSC. The Board reminds the 
commenter that 5 U.S.C. 1221 indicates that corrective action will not 
be ordered even if an individual establishes that he/she has disclosed 
that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel 
action, if an agency demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that 
it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the 
disclosure. The agency is thus still required to justify its personnel 
action.
    A commenter suggested that the Board move proposed paragraph 
1201.56(d) and 1201.57(e) to a newly created section ``1201.41(d) 
Proof.''
    The Board considered merging into a single provision this 
requirement for administrative judges to provide the parties notice of 
the proof required as to the issues in each type of appeal. However, we 
ultimately determined that the parties, particularly pro se appellants, 
would be less likely to be confused if it were set forth separately in 
1201.56 and 1201.57.
    A commenter argued that the term ``standing'' in 1201.57(b)(3) was 
an inappropriate way to describe a jurisdictional element that must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence. The commenter suggested 
that the term ``coverage'' would be more appropriate.
    As the commenter points out, under 1201.57(b)(3), a party must 
prove, by preponderant evidence, that he or she ``[h]as standing to 
appeal'' an action, but only ``when disputed by the agency or 
questioned by the Board.'' The regulation defines ``standing'' to mean 
that the individual ``falls within the class of persons who may file an 
appeal under the law applicable to the appeal.'' The Board believes 
that the term ``standing'' under 1201.57(b)(3) is appropriate and 
consistent with court and Board precedent. Standing is a threshold 
requirement that implicates jurisdiction and is ```perhaps the most 
important' condition for a justiciable claim.'' Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Therefore, the question of standing is a 
preliminary issue that may be raised by the agency or the Board, to be 
explored as part of the Board's inquiry into whether it has 
jurisdiction over a case. Silva, 112 M.S.P.R. 362, ] 6 & n.2
    A commenter expressed a concern that the Board's regulations and 
case law will impair the ability of appellants in IRA appeals to 
establish jurisdiction by requiring the production of documents, such 
as an OSC decision to terminate its investigation, to satisfy the OSC 
exhaustion requirement. This commenter noted that 5 U.S.C. 1221(f)(2) 
states that OSC's decision to terminate its investigation may not be 
considered in an IRA appeal.
    The commenter does not actually seem to take issue with any portion 
of the proposed regulations. Instead, the commenter's true concern is 
that the Board has changed the test for OSC exhaustion in recent Board 
precedent. The Board believes that such matters are best addressed in 
developing case law.
    A commenter suggested that information concerning the degree and 
burden of proof borne by the appellant should come exclusively from the 
administrative judge and the Board should overturn case law that allows 
such advice to be exclusively communicated to an appellant in an 
agency's motion to dismiss.
    It is well-settled that an administrative judge's failure to 
provide proper notice, as required by Burgess, 758 F.2d at 643-44, can 
be cured if the agency's pleadings contain the notice that was lacking 
in the acknowledgement order or if the initial decision itself puts the 
appellant on notice of what to do to establish jurisdiction, thus 
affording the appellant with the opportunity to meet the jurisdictional 
burden in a petition for review. The Board believes that restricting 
notice to that which is provided in the acknowledgement order would 
unfairly limit the opportunity to later clarify matters that are 
complicated or unclear when first filed during the processing of an 
appeal.

[[Page 4496]]

List of Subjects in 5 CFR Part 1201

    Administrative practice and procedure.

    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Board 
amends 5 CFR part 1201 as follows:

PART 1201--PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

0
1. The authority citation for 5 CFR part 1201 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 1204, 1305, and 7701, and 38 U.S.C. 4331, 
unless otherwise noted.

0
2. In Sec.  1201.4, add paragraphs (p), (q), (r), and (s) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  1201.4  General definitions.

* * * * *
    (p) Substantial evidence. The degree of relevant evidence that a 
reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons 
might disagree. This is a lower standard of proof than preponderance of 
the evidence.
    (q) Preponderance of the evidence. The degree of relevant evidence 
that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would 
accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be 
true than untrue.
    (r) Harmful error. Error by the agency in the application of its 
procedures that is likely to have caused the agency to reach a 
conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence 
or cure of the error. The burden is upon the appellant to show that the 
error was harmful, i.e., that it caused substantial harm or prejudice 
to his or her rights.
    (s) Nonfrivolous allegation. A nonfrivolous allegation is an 
assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. An 
allegation generally will be considered nonfrivolous when, under oath 
or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that:
    (1) Is more than conclusory;
    (2) Is plausible on its face; and
    (3) Is material to the legal issues in the appeal.

0
3. Revise Sec.  1201.56 to read as follows:


Sec.  1201.56  Burden and degree of proof.

    (a) Applicability. This section does not apply to the following 
types of appeals which are covered by Sec.  1201.57:
    (1) An individual right of action appeal under the Whistleblower 
Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221;
    (2) An appeal under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act, 5 
U.S.C. 3330a(d);
    (3) An appeal under the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4324, in which the appellant alleges 
discrimination or retaliation in violation of 38 U.S.C. 4311; and
    (4) An appeal under 5 CFR 353.304, in which the appellant alleges a 
failure to restore, improper restoration of, or failure to return 
following a leave of absence.
    (b) Burden and degree of proof--(1) Agency. Under 5 U.S.C. 
7701(c)(1), and subject to the exceptions stated in paragraph (c) of 
this section, the agency bears the burden of proof and its action must 
be sustained only if:
    (i) It is brought under 5 U.S.C. 4303 or 5 U.S.C. 5335 and is 
supported by substantial evidence (as defined in Sec.  1201.4(p)); or
    (ii) It is brought under any other provision of law or regulation 
and is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (as defined in 
Sec.  1201.4(q)).
    (2) Appellant. (i) The appellant has the burden of proof, by a 
preponderance of the evidence (as defined in Sec.  1201.4(q)), with 
respect to:
    (A) Issues of jurisdiction, except for cases in which the appellant 
asserts a violation of his right to reemployment following military 
duty under 38 U.S.C. 4312-4314;
    (B) The timeliness of the appeal; and
    (C) Affirmative defenses.
    (ii) In appeals from reconsideration decisions of the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) involving retirement benefits, if the 
appellant filed the application, the appellant has the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence (as defined in Sec.  
1201.4(q)), entitlement to the benefits. Where OPM proves by 
preponderant evidence an overpayment of benefits, an appellant may 
prove, by substantial evidence (as defined in Sec.  1201.4(p)), 
eligibility for waiver or adjustment.
    (c) Affirmative defenses of the appellant. Under 5 U.S.C. 
7701(c)(2), the Board is required to reverse the action of the agency, 
even where the agency has met the evidentiary standard stated in 
paragraph (b) of this section, if the appellant:
    (1) Shows harmful error in the application of the agency's 
procedures in arriving at its decision (as defined in Sec.  1201.4(r));
    (2) Shows that the decision was based on any prohibited personnel 
practice described in 5 U.S.C. 2302(b); or
    (3) Shows that the decision was not in accordance with law.
    (d) Administrative judge. The administrative judge will inform the 
parties of the proof required as to the issues of jurisdiction, the 
timeliness of the appeal, and affirmative defenses.


Sec. Sec.  1201.57 and 1201.58  [Redesignated as Sec. Sec.  1201.58 and 
1201.59]

0
4. Redesignate Sec. Sec.  1201.57 and 1201.58 as Sec. Sec.  1201.58 and 
1201.59, respectively.

0
5. Add new Sec.  1201.57 to read as follows:


Sec.  1201.57  Establishing jurisdiction in appeals not covered by 
Sec.  1201.56; burden and degree of proof; scope of review.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to the following types of 
appeals:
    (1) An individual right of action (IRA) appeal under the 
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221;
    (2) A request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment 
Opportunities Act (VEOA), 5 U.S.C. 3330a(d);
    (3) A request for corrective action under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4324, in 
which the appellant alleges discrimination or retaliation in violation 
of 38 U.S.C. 4311; and
    (4) An appeal under 5 CFR 353.304, in which an appellant alleges a 
failure to restore, improper restoration of, or failure to return 
following a leave of absence (denial of restoration appeal).
    (b) Matters that must be supported by nonfrivolous allegations. 
Except for proving exhaustion of a required statutory complaint process 
and standing to appeal (paragraphs (c)(1) and (3) of this section), in 
order to establish jurisdiction, an appellant who initiates an appeal 
covered by this section must make nonfrivolous allegations (as defined 
in Sec.  1201.4(s)) with regard to the substantive jurisdictional 
elements applicable to the particular type of appeal he or she has 
initiated.
    (c) Matters that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
An appellant who initiates an appeal covered by this section has the 
burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence (as defined in 
Sec.  1201.4(q)), on the following matters:
    (1) When applicable, exhaustion of a statutory complaint process 
that is preliminary to an appeal to the Board;
    (2) Timeliness of an appeal under 5 CFR 1201.22;
    (3) Standing to appeal, when disputed by the agency or questioned 
by the Board. (An appellant has ``standing'' when he or she falls 
within the class of persons who may file an appeal under the law 
applicable to the appeal.); and
    (4) The merits of an appeal, if the appeal is within the Board's 
jurisdiction and was timely filed.
    (d) Scope of the appeal. Appeals covered by this section are 
limited in scope. With the exception of denial of

[[Page 4497]]

restoration appeals, the Board will not consider matters described at 5 
U.S.C. 7701(c)(2) in an appeal covered by this section.
    (e) Notice of jurisdictional, timeliness, and merits elements. The 
administrative judge will provide notice to the parties of the specific 
jurisdictional, timeliness, and merits elements that apply in a 
particular appeal.
    (f) Additional information. For additional information on IRA 
appeals, the reader should consult 5 CFR part 1209. For additional 
information on VEOA appeals, the reader should consult 5 CFR part 1208, 
subparts A & C. For additional information on USERRA appeals, the 
reader should consult 5 CFR part 1208, subparts A and B.
    (g) For additional information on denial of restoration appeals, 
the reader should consult 5 CFR part 353, subparts A and C.

William D. Spencer,
Clerk of the Board.

[FR Doc. 2015-01575 Filed 1-27-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7400-01-P