[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 11 (Friday, January 16, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2570-2590]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00665]



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Vol. 80

Friday,

No. 11

January 16, 2015

Part III





United States Sentencing Commission





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Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 80 , No. 11 / Friday, January 16, 2015 / 
Notices  

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UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION


Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts

AGENCY: United States Sentencing Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed amendments to sentencing guidelines, policy 
statements, and commentary. Request for public comment, including 
public comment regarding retroactive application of any of the proposed 
amendments. Notice of public hearing.

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SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 994(a), (o), and (p) of title 28, United 
States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission is considering 
promulgating certain amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy 
statements, and commentary. This notice sets forth the proposed 
amendments and, for each proposed amendment, a synopsis of the issues 
addressed by that amendment. This notice also sets forth a number of 
issues for comment, some of which are set forth together with the 
proposed amendments; one of which is set forth independent of any 
proposed amendment; and one of which (regarding retroactive application 
of proposed amendments) is set forth in the Supplementary Information 
portion of this notice.
    The proposed amendments and issues for comment in this notice are 
as follows:
    (1) a proposed amendment to make certain technical changes to the 
Guidelines Manual, including (A) technical changes to reflect the 
editorial reclassification of certain sections of the United States 
Code, (B) stylistic and technical changes to the Commentary following 
Sec.  3D1.5 (Determining the Total Punishment) captioned 
``Illustrations of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'' to 
better reflect its purpose as a concluding commentary to Part D of 
Chapter Three, and (C) clerical changes to Sec.  2D1.11 (Unlawful 
Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed Chemical; 
Attempt or Conspiracy) and to the commentary of other guidelines;
    (2) a proposed amendment to Sec.  4A1.2 (Definitions and 
Instructions for Computing Criminal History) to respond to a circuit 
conflict regarding the meaning of the ``single sentence'' rule and its 
implications for the career offender guideline and other guidelines 
that use predicate offenses, and related issues for comment;
    (3) a proposed amendment to Sec.  1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct (Factors 
that Determine the Guideline Range)) to provide more guidance on the 
use of ``jointly undertaken criminal activity'' in determining relevant 
conduct under the guidelines, and a related issue for comment on 
whether the Commission should make changes for policy reasons to the 
operation of ``jointly undertaken criminal activity'';
    (4) a proposed amendment to revise the monetary tables throughout 
the Guidelines Manual, including options for amending the monetary 
tables in the guidelines to adjust for inflation, conforming changes to 
other guidelines that refer to monetary tables, and related issues for 
comment;
    (5) a proposed amendment to Sec.  3B1.2 (Mitigating Role) to 
respond to a circuit conflict regarding what determining the ``average 
participant'' requires, to revise the Commentary to state that certain 
individuals who perform limited functions in criminal activity may 
receive a mitigating role adjustment, and to provide a non-exhaustive 
list of factors for the court to consider in determining whether to 
apply a mitigating role adjustment and the amount of the adjustment, 
and a related issue for comment on the application of the mitigating 
role adjustment;
    (6) a detailed request for comment on offenses in which controlled 
substances are colored, packaged, or flavored in ways to appear to be 
designed to attract use by children;
    (7) a proposed amendment to Sec.  2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, 
Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent 
to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy) to address the new 
statutory penalty structure for offenses involving hydrocodone and 
hydrocodone combination products in light of recent administrative 
actions by the Food and Drug Administration and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and a related issue for comment; and
    (8) a proposed amendment to Sec.  2B1.1 (Theft, Property, 
Destruction, and Fraud), including (A) options to revise the definition 
of ``intended loss'' at Sec.  2B1.1, comment. (n.3(A)(ii)), (B) options 
to address the impact of the victims table in Sec.  2B1.1(b)(2), (C) a 
proposed amendment to revise the specific offense characteristic for 
sophisticated means in subsection (b)(10)(C), and (D) a proposed 
amendment to address offenses involving fraud on the market and related 
offenses, and related issues for comment.

DATES: (1) Written Public Comment.--Written public comment regarding 
the proposed amendments and issues for comment set forth in this 
notice, including public comment regarding retroactive application of 
any of the proposed amendments, should be received by the Commission 
not later than March 18, 2015.
    (2) Public Hearing.--The Commission plans to hold a public hearing 
regarding the proposed amendments and issues for comment set forth in 
this notice on March 12, 2015. Further information regarding the public 
hearing, including requirements for testifying and providing written 
testimony, as well as the location, time, and scope of the hearing, 
will be provided by the Commission on its Web site at www.ussc.gov.

ADDRESSES: Public comment should be sent to the Commission by 
electronic mail or regular mail. The email address for public comment 
is [email protected]. The regular mail address for public comment 
is United States Sentencing Commission, One Columbus Circle NE., Suite 
2-500, Washington, DC 20002-8002, Attention: Public Affairs.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeanne Doherty, Public Affairs 
Officer, (202) 502-4502, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Sentencing Commission is 
an independent agency in the judicial branch of the United States 
Government. The Commission promulgates sentencing guidelines and policy 
statements for federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). The 
Commission also periodically reviews and revises previously promulgated 
guidelines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) and submits guideline 
amendments to the Congress not later than the first day of May each 
year pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(p).
    The proposed amendments in this notice are presented in one of two 
formats. First, some of the amendments are proposed as specific 
revisions to a guideline or commentary. Bracketed text within a 
proposed amendment indicates a heightened interest on the Commission's 
part in comment and suggestions regarding alternative policy choices; 
for example, a proposed enhancement of [2][4][6] levels indicates that 
the Commission is considering, and invites comment on, alternative 
policy choices regarding the appropriate level of enhancement. 
Similarly, bracketed text within a specific offense characteristic or 
application note means that the Commission specifically invites comment 
on whether the proposed provision is appropriate. Second, the 
Commission has highlighted certain issues for comment and invites

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suggestions on how the Commission should respond to those issues.
    The Commission requests public comment regarding whether, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. 994(u), any proposed amendment 
published in this notice should be included in subsection (c) of Sec.  
1B1.10 (Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended 
Guideline Range (Policy Statement)) as an amendment that may be applied 
retroactively to previously sentenced defendants. The Commission lists 
in Sec.  1B1.10(c) the specific guideline amendments that the court may 
apply retroactively under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The background 
commentary to Sec.  1B1.10 lists the purpose of the amendment, the 
magnitude of the change in the guideline range made by the amendment, 
and the difficulty of applying the amendment retroactively to determine 
an amended guideline range under Sec.  1B1.10(b) as among the factors 
the Commission considers in selecting the amendments included in Sec.  
1B1.10(c). To the extent practicable, public comment should address 
each of these factors.
    Publication of a proposed amendment requires the affirmative vote 
of at least three voting members and is deemed to be a request for 
public comment on the proposed amendment. See Rules 2.2 and 4.4 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. In contrast, the 
affirmative vote of at least four voting members is required to 
promulgate an amendment and submit it to Congress. See Rule 2.2; 28 
U.S.C. 994(p).
    Additional information pertaining to the proposed amendments 
described in this notice may be accessed through the Commission's Web 
site at www.ussc.gov.

    Authority: 28 U.S.C. 994(a), (o), (p), (x); USSC Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, Rule 4.4.

Patti B. Saris,
Chair.

1. Technical Amendment

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment makes 
certain technical changes to the Guidelines Manual.
    The proposed amendment contains three parts, as follows.
    Part A sets forth technical changes to reflect the editorial 
reclassification of certain sections in the United States Code. 
Effective February 2014, the Office of the Law Revision Counsel 
transferred provisions relating to voting and elections from titles 2 
and 42 to a new title 52. It also transferred provisions of the 
National Security Act of 1947 from one place to another in title 50. To 
reflect the new section numbers of the reclassified provisions, changes 
are made to--
    (1) the Commentary to Sec.  2C1.8 (Making, Receiving, or Failing to 
Report a Contribution, Donation, or Expenditure in Violation of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act; Fraudulently Misrepresenting Campaign 
Authority; Soliciting or Receiving a Donation in Connection with an 
Election While on Certain Federal Property);
    (2) the Commentary to Sec.  2H2.1 (Obstructing an Election or 
Registration);
    (3) the Commentary to Sec.  2M3.9 (Disclosure of Information 
Identifying a Covert Agent);
    (4) Application Note 5 to Sec.  5E1.2 (Fines for Individual 
Defendants); and
    (5) Appendix A (Statutory Index).
    Part B makes stylistic and technical changes to the Commentary 
following Sec.  3D1.5 (Determining the Total Punishment) captioned 
``Illustrations of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'' to 
better reflect its purpose as a concluding commentary to Part D of 
Chapter Three.
    Part C makes clerical changes to--
    (1) the Background Commentary to Sec.  1B1.11 (Use of Guidelines 
Manual in Effect on Date of Sentencing (Policy Statement)), to correct 
a typographical error in a U.S. Reports citation;
    (2) the Commentary to Sec.  2B4.1 (Bribery in Procurement of Bank 
Loan and Other Commercial Bribery), to correct certain United States 
Code citations to correspond with their respective references in 
Appendix A that were revised by Amendment 769 (effective November 1, 
2012);
    (3) subsection (e)(7) to Sec.  2D1.11 (Unlawfully Distributing, 
Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed Chemical; Attempt or 
Conspiracy), to add a missing measurement unit to the line referencing 
Norpseudoephedrine; and
    (4) Application Note 2 to Sec.  2H4.2 (Willful Violations of the 
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act), to correct a 
typographical error in an abbreviation.

(A) Reclassification of Sections of United States Code

Proposed Amendment
    The Commentary to Sec.  2C1.8 captioned ``Statutory Provisions'' is 
amended by striking ``2 U.S.C.'' and all that follows through ``441k;'' 
and after ``18 U.S.C. 607'' inserting ``; 52 U.S.C. 30109(d), 30114, 
30116, 30117, 30118, 30119, 30120, 30121, 30122, 30123, 30124(a), 
30125, 30126''; and by striking ``Statutory Index (Appendix A)'' and 
inserting ``Appendix A (Statutory Index)''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2C1.8 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 1 by striking ``2 U.S.C. 441e(b)'' and inserting ``52 
U.S.C. 30121(b)''; by striking ``2 U.S.C. 431 et seq'' and inserting 
``52 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.''; and by striking ``(2 U.S.C. 431(8) and 
(9))'' and inserting ``(52 U.S.C. 30101(8) and (9))''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2H2.1 captioned ``Statutory Provisions'' is 
amended by striking ``42 U.S.C. 1973i, 1973j(a), (b)'' and inserting 
``52 U.S.C. 10307, 10308(a), (b)''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2M3.9 is amended by striking ``Sec.  421'' 
each place such term appears and inserting ``Sec.  3121''; and by 
striking ``Sec.  421(d)'' and inserting ``Sec.  3121(d)''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  5E1.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 5 by striking ``2 U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)(D)'' and inserting 
``52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(D)''; and by striking ``2 U.S.C. 441f'' and 
inserting ``52 U.S.C. 30122''.
    Appendix A (Statutory Index) is amended by striking the following 
line references:

 
 
 
``2 U.S.C. 437g(d)                   2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 439a                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441a                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441a-1                      2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441b                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441c                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441d                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441e                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441f                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441g                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441h(a)                     2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441i                        2C1.8
2 U.S.C. 441k                        2C1.8'',
 

and inserting at the end the following new line references:

 
 
 
``52 U.S.C. 30109                    2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30114                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30116                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30117                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30118                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30119                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30120                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30121                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30122                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30123                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30124(a)                   2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30125                      2C1.8
52 U.S.C. 30126                      2C1.8'';
 

by striking the following line references:

 
 
 
``42 U.S.C. 1973i(c)                 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973i(d)                   2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973i(e)                   2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973j(a)                   2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973j(b)                   2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973j(c)                   2X1.1
42 U.S.C. 1973aa                     2H2.1

[[Page 2572]]

 
42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1                   2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a                  2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973aa-3                   2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973bb                     2H2.1
42 U.S.C. 1973gg-10                  2H2.1'',
 

    and inserting after the line referenced to 50 U.S.C. App. 2410 the 
following new line references:

 
 
 
``52 U.S.C. 10307(c)                 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10307(d)                   2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10307(e)                   2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10308(a)                   2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10308(b)                   2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10308(c)                   2X1.1
52 U.S.C. 10501                      2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10502                      2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10503                      2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10505                      2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 10701                      2H2.1
52 U.S.C. 20511                      2H2.1'';
 

    and by striking the line referenced to 50 U.S.C. 421 and inserting 
after the line referenced to 50 U.S.C. 1705 the following new line 
reference:

 
 
 
``50 U.S.C. 3121                     2M3.9''.
 

(B) Stylistic Changes to the Illustrations of the Operation of the 
Multiple-Count Rules

Proposed Amendment
    The Commentary following Sec.  3D1.5 captioned ``Illustrations of 
the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'' is amended by striking the 
heading as follows:
    `` Illustrations of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'',
    and inserting the following new heading:
    `` Concluding Commentary to Part D of Chapter Three Illustrations 
of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'';
    in Examples 1 and 2 by striking ``convicted on'' both places such 
term appears and inserting ``convicted of'';
    in Example 2 by striking ``Defendant C'' and inserting ``Defendant 
B'';
    and in Example 3 by striking ``Defendant D'' and inserting 
``Defendant C''; by striking ``$27,000'', ``$12,000'', ``$15,000'', and 
``$20,000'' and inserting ``$1,000'' in each place such terms appear; 
by striking ``$74,000'' and inserting ``$4,000''; and by striking 
``16'' both places such term appears and inserting ``9''.

(C) Clerical Changes

Proposed Amendment
    The Commentary to Sec.  1B1.11 captioned ``Background'' is amended 
by striking ``144 S. Ct.'' and inserting ``133 S. Ct.''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B4.1 captioned ``Statutory Provisions'' is 
amended by striking ``41 U.S.C. 53, 54'' and inserting ``41 U.S.C. 
8702, 8707''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B4.1 captioned ``Background'' is amended 
by striking ``41 U.S.C. 51, 53-54'' and inserting ``41 U.S.C. 8702, 
8707''.
    Section 2D1.11(e)(7) is amended in the line referenced to 
Norpseudoephedrine by striking ``400'' and inserting ``400 G''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2H4.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 2 by striking ``et. seq.'' and inserting ``et seq.''.

2. ``Single Sentence'' Rule

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment responds to 
a circuit conflict regarding the meaning of the ``single sentence'' 
rule and its implications for the career offender guideline and other 
guidelines that use predicate offenses.
    When the defendant's criminal history includes two or more prior 
sentences that meet certain criteria specified in Sec.  4A1.2(a)(2), 
those prior sentences are counted as a ``single sentence'' rather than 
separately. This operates to reduce the cumulative impact of the prior 
sentences on the criminal history score. Courts are now divided over 
whether this ``single sentence'' rule also causes certain prior 
sentences that ordinarily would qualify as predicates under the career 
offender guideline to be disqualified from serving as predicates. See 
Sec.  4B1.2, comment. (n.3).
    The ``single sentence'' rule in subsection (a)(2) to Sec.  4A1.2 
(Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) provides:

    If the defendant has multiple prior sentences, determine whether 
those sentences are counted separately or as a single sentence. 
Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were 
imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest 
(i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to 
committing the second offense). If there is no intervening arrest, 
prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences 
resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or 
(B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. Count any prior 
sentence covered by (A) or (B) as a single sentence. See also Sec.  
4A1.1(e).
    For purposes of applying Sec.  4A1.1(a), (b), and (c), if prior 
sentences are counted as a single sentence, use the longest sentence 
of imprisonment if concurrent sentences were imposed. If consecutive 
sentences were imposed, use the aggregate sentence of imprisonment.

    See Sec.  4A1.2(a)(2).
    In 2010, in King v. United States, the Eighth Circuit held that 
when two or more prior sentences are counted as a single sentence, all 
the criminal history points attributable to the single sentence are 
assigned to only one of the prior sentences--specifically, the one that 
was the longest. King, 595 F.3d 844, 852 (8th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, 
only that prior sentence may be considered a predicate for purposes of 
the career offender guideline. Id. at 849, 852.
    In King, there were two different sets of prior sentences that each 
qualified as a single sentence. Each set of prior sentences included a 
sentence that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender predicate 
and several other sentences that were not career offender predicates, 
imposed to run concurrently. The panel indicated that, within a 
``single sentence,'' only one sentence receives the criminal history 
points. For the first set of sentences, one of the non-predicate 
sentences ``should receive the criminal history point for this group 
because it was the longest.'' Id. at 849. Accordingly, the sentence 
that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender predicate did not 
receive criminal history points and therefore did not qualify as a 
career offender predicate. Id. For the second set of sentences, the 
sentence that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender predicate 
was the same length as the one of the non-predicate sentences, and 
longer than any of the other sentences; it was unclear which of the two 
should be treated as the ``longest.'' Given the uncertainty, the panel 
applied the rule of lenity and attributed the criminal history points 
to the sentence that was not a career offender predicate. Id. As a 
result, the sentence that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender 
predicate did not receive criminal history points and did not qualify 
as a career offender predicate.
    In June 2014, in United States v. Williams, a panel of the Sixth 
Circuit considered and rejected King as ``nonsensical,'' because it 
permitted the defendant to ``evade career offender status because he 
committed more crimes.'' Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 639 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis in original). The facts in Williams were similar to the 
second set of sentences in King: The single sentence included one 
sentence that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender predicate 
and one sentence that was not a career offender predicate. The two 
sentences were equally long. Because each of the sentences ordinarily 
would receive criminal history points, the panel held, the sentence 
that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender predicate was not 
disqualified by the single sentence rule; it remained eligible to serve 
as a career offender predicate. Id.
    On August 26, 2014, a different panel of the Eighth Circuit agreed 
with the

[[Page 2573]]

Sixth Circuit's analysis in Williams but was not in a position to 
overrule the earlier panel's decision in King. See Donnell v. United 
States, 765 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2014) (``we are bound by this 
court's prior decision in King even though a majority of the panel 
believe it should now be overruled to eliminate a conflict with the 
Sixth Circuit''). Before then, other panels of the Eighth Circuit had 
followed King, applying it to a case involving the firearms guideline 
rather than the career offender guideline and to a case in which the 
prior sentences were consecutive rather than concurrent. See, e.g., 
Pierce v. United States, 686 F.3d 529, 533 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(indicating that the reasoning of King would also apply to predicate 
offenses under the firearms guideline); United States v. Parker, 762 
F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir. 2014) (``King's logic is equally applicable to 
consecutive sentences'').
    The Eleventh Circuit anticipated this issue in dicta in United 
States v. Cornog, a 1991 decision not cited by either King or Williams. 
See 945 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). The defendant in Cornog had two 
prior sentences, one that ordinarily would qualify as a career offender 
predicate and another that was not a career offender predicate but was 
the longer of the two. He argued under the ``related cases'' rule 
(predecessor to the ``single sentence'' rule) that only the longer 
sentence should receive criminal history points and therefore the 
shorter sentence should be disqualified from serving as a career 
offender predicate. The Eleventh Circuit found this unpersuasive: ``It 
would be illogical . . . to ignore a conviction for a violent felony 
just because it happened to be coupled with a nonviolent felony 
conviction having a longer sentence.'' See 945 F.2d at 1506 n.3.
    Of the other cases discussing this issue, some have been consistent 
with the Sixth Circuit's approach in Williams. See, e.g., United States 
v. Carr, 2013 WL 4855341 (N.D. Ga. 2013); United States v. Augurs, 2014 
WL 3735584 (W.D. Pa., July 28, 2014). Others have been consistent with 
the Eighth Circuit's approach in King. See, e.g., United States v. 
Santiago, 387 F. App'x 223 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. McQueen, 
2014 WL 3749215 (E.D. Wash., July 29, 2014).
    The proposed amendment generally follows the Sixth Circuit's 
approach in Williams. It amends the commentary to Sec.  4A1.2 to 
provide that, when multiple prior sentences are counted as a single 
sentence, the court should treat each of the multiple prior sentences 
as if it received criminal history points for purposes of determining 
predicate offenses. As a result, it also states that a prior sentence 
included in a single sentence may serve as a predicate under the career 
offender guideline (or other guidelines that involve predicates) if it 
independently would have received criminal history points.
    In addition, the proposed amendment provides two issues for 
comment. The first issue for comment is on whether the Commission 
should use a different approach to respond to the King/Williams 
conflict over the ``single sentence'' rule. The second issue for 
comment is on whether the application issues presented by the ``single 
sentence'' rule are also presented by other provisions involved in 
calculating the criminal history score, such as the provision in Sec.  
4A1.1(c) (adding 1 point for certain prior offenses up to a total of 4 
points).

Proposed Amendment

    The Commentary to Sec.  4A1.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 3 by redesignating Note 3 as Note 3(B), and by 
inserting at the beginning the following:
    ``Counting Multiple Prior Sentences Separately or as a Single 
Sentence (Subsection (a)(2)).--
    (A) In General.--In some cases, multiple prior sentences are 
counted as a single sentence for purposes of calculating the criminal 
history score under Sec.  4A1.1(a), (b), and (c). However, for purposes 
of determining predicate offenses, each of the multiple prior sentences 
included in the single sentence should be treated as if it received 
criminal history points, if it independently would have received 
criminal history points. Therefore, an individual prior sentence may 
serve as a predicate under the career offender guideline (see Sec.  
4B1.2(c)) or other guidelines with predicate offenses, such as Sec.  
2K1.3(a) and Sec.  2K2.1(a), if it independently would have received 
criminal history points.
    For example, a defendant's criminal history includes one robbery 
conviction and one theft conviction. The sentences for these offenses 
were imposed on the same day and are counted as a single sentence under 
Sec.  4A1.2(a)(2). If the defendant received a one-year sentence of 
imprisonment for the robbery and a two-year sentence of imprisonment 
for the theft, to be served concurrently, a total of 3 points is added 
under Sec.  4A1.1(a). Because this particular robbery met the 
definition of a felony crime of violence and independently would have 
received 2 criminal history points under Sec.  4A1.1(b), it may serve 
as a predicate under the career offender guideline.''.

Issues for Comment

    1. The proposed amendment follows the Sixth Circuit's approach in 
Williams regarding the meaning of the ``single sentence'' rule and its 
implications for guidelines that use predicate offenses. The Commission 
seeks comment on whether a different approach should be used to respond 
to the King/Williams conflict over the ``single sentence'' rule. For 
example, should the Commission follow the Eighth Circuit's approach in 
King, and amend the commentary to Sec.  4A1.2 to provide that, if prior 
sentences are counted as a single sentence, only one of the sentences 
included in the single sentence is counted (the sentence with the 
longest term of imprisonment) and any other sentences included in the 
single sentence cannot serve as a predicate under the career offender 
guideline (or other guidelines that involve predicates)?
    2. The Commission seeks comment on whether the application issues 
presented by the King/Williams conflict over the ``single sentence'' 
rule are also presented by other provisions involved in calculating the 
criminal history score and, if so, whether and how they should be 
addressed.
    In particular, there may be cases in which the defendant has more 
than four sentences that each could qualify for a criminal history 
point under Sec.  4A1.1(c), which instructs the court to add 1 point 
for each such sentence, ``up to a total of 4 points.'' In a case in 
which the defendant has more than four such sentences, and one of the 
sentences would ordinarily qualify as a career offender predicate, 
should that sentence (A) always qualify as a career offender predicate, 
following the reasoning of Williams; (B) never qualify as a career 
offender predicate, following the reasoning of King; or (C) qualify as 
a career offender predicate in some circumstances but not in others? 
For example, some helpline callers have asked whether the sentences 
under Sec.  4A1.1(c) should be placed in chronological sequence, with 
the first four sentences each receiving a point (and being eligible to 
serve as a career offender predicate) and any remaining sentences not 
receiving a point (and being ineligible to serve as a career offender 
predicate). A similar issue may also be presented by the 3-point 
limitation in Sec.  4A1.1(e), which instructs courts to add 1 point for 
certain prior sentences ``up to a total of 3 points.''
    Are there application issues presented by these provisions, or 
other provisions in the guidelines, that are similar to the issues 
presented by the King/Williams

[[Page 2574]]

conflict over the ``single sentence'' rule? If so, how, if at all, 
should the Commission address them?
    Finally, if the Commission were to address this circuit conflict 
and/or any similar application issues, what conforming or clarifying 
changes, if any, should be made to other provisions of the guidelines? 
In particular, are there places in the guidelines that refer to the 
``single sentence'' rule (or, conversely, refer to whether prior 
sentences are ``counted separately'') that should be revised to clarify 
how they operate? If so, which ones, and how should the Commission 
address them?

3. Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment is a result 
of the Commission's effort to simplify the operation of the guidelines, 
including, among other matters, the use of relevant conduct in offenses 
involving multiple participants. See United States Sentencing 
Commission, ``Notice of Final Priorities,'' 79 FR 49378 (Aug. 20, 
2014).
    This proposed amendment is being published to inform the 
Commission's consideration of these issues. The Commission seeks 
comment on revisions that would provide further guidance on the 
operation of the ``jointly undertaken criminal activity'' provision as 
well as on possible revisions that would change the operation of the 
provision.

Proposed Additional Guidance

    The proposed amendment would revise Sec.  1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct 
(Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)) to provide more guidance 
on the use of ``jointly undertaken criminal activity'' in determining 
relevant conduct under the guidelines. See Sec.  1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 
Specifically, it restructures the guideline and its commentary to set 
out more clearly the three-step analysis the court applies to hold the 
defendant accountable for acts of others in the jointly undertaken 
criminal activity. The three-step test requires that the court (1) 
identify the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to 
jointly undertake; (2) determine whether the conduct of others in the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity was in furtherance of that 
criminal activity; and (3) determine whether the conduct of others was 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.

Possible Policy Changes

    An issue for comment is provided on whether the Commission should 
make changes for policy reasons to the operation of ``jointly 
undertaken criminal activity.'' Several options are presented for 
comment.

Proposed Amendment

    Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) is amended by striking ``all reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity,'' and inserting the following:
    ``all acts and omissions of others that were--
    (i) within the scope of the criminal activity that the defendant 
agreed to jointly undertake,
    (ii) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
and
    (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity;''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  1B1.3 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended by striking Note 2 as follows:
    ``2. A `jointly undertaken criminal activity' is a criminal plan, 
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert 
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy.
    In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection 
(a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct 
(acts and omissions) of others that was both:
    (A) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and
    (B) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity.
    Because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of 
many participants over a period of time, the scope of the criminal 
activity jointly undertaken by the defendant (the `jointly undertaken 
criminal activity') is not necessarily the same as the scope of the 
entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the 
same for every participant. In order to determine the defendant's 
accountability for the conduct of others under subsection (a)(1)(B), 
the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the 
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of 
the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's 
agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity 
jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this 
provision. The conduct of others that was not in furtherance of the 
criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant, or was not 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity, is 
not relevant conduct under this provision.
    In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the 
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of 
the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's 
agreement), the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit 
agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.
    Note that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to 
jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in 
furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily identical. 
For example, two defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the 
course of that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a 
victim. The second defendant is accountable for the assault and injury 
to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed to the 
assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt 
anyone) because the assaultive conduct was in furtherance of the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably 
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature 
of the offense).
    With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled 
substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of 
contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a 
jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable 
quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal 
activity that he jointly undertook.
    The requirement of reasonable foreseeability applies only in 
respect to the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of others under 
subsection (a)(1)(B). It does not apply to conduct that the defendant 
personally undertakes, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, 
procures, or willfully causes; such conduct is addressed under 
subsection (a)(1)(A).
    A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of 
members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy, 
even if the defendant knows of that conduct (e.g., in the case of a 
defendant who joins an ongoing drug distribution conspiracy knowing 
that it had been selling two kilograms of cocaine per week, the cocaine 
sold prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy is not included as 
relevant conduct in determining the defendant's offense level). The 
Commission does not foreclose the possibility that there may be some 
unusual set of circumstances in which the exclusion of such conduct may 
not adequately reflect the defendant's culpability; in such a case, an 
upward departure may be warranted.

[[Page 2575]]

Illustrations of Conduct for Which the Defendant Is Accountable

    (a) Acts and omissions aided or abetted by the defendant
    (1) Defendant A is one of ten persons hired by Defendant B to off-
load a ship containing marihuana. The off-loading of the ship is 
interrupted by law enforcement officers and one ton of marihuana is 
seized (the amount on the ship as well as the amount off-loaded). 
Defendant A and the other off-loaders are arrested and convicted of 
importation of marihuana. Regardless of the number of bales he 
personally unloaded, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-ton 
quantity of marihuana. Defendant A aided and abetted the off-loading of 
the entire shipment of marihuana by directly participating in the off-
loading of that shipment (i.e., the specific objective of the criminal 
activity he joined was the off-loading of the entire shipment). 
Therefore, he is accountable for the entire shipment under subsection 
(a)(1)(A) without regard to the issue of reasonable foreseeability. 
This is conceptually similar to the case of a defendant who transports 
a suitcase knowing that it contains a controlled substance and, 
therefore, is accountable for the controlled substance in the suitcase 
regardless of his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the actual type or 
amount of that controlled substance.
    In certain cases, a defendant may be accountable for particular 
conduct under more than one subsection of this guideline. As noted in 
the preceding paragraph, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-
ton shipment of marihuana under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant A also 
is accountable for the entire one-ton shipment of marihuana on the 
basis of subsection (a)(1)(B)(applying to a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity). Defendant A engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (the scope of which was the importation of the shipment of 
marihuana). A finding that the one-ton quantity of marihuana was 
reasonably foreseeable is warranted from the nature of the undertaking 
itself (the importation of marihuana by ship typically involves very 
large quantities of marihuana). The specific circumstances of the case 
(the defendant was one of ten persons off-loading the marihuana in 
bales) also support this finding. In an actual case, of course, if a 
defendant's accountability for particular conduct is established under 
one provision of this guideline, it is not necessary to review 
alternative provisions under which such accountability might be 
established.
    (b) Acts and omissions aided or abetted by the defendant; 
requirement that the conduct of others be in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable
    (1) Defendant C is the getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in 
which $15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted and injured. Defendant 
C is accountable for the money taken under subsection (a)(1)(A) because 
he aided and abetted the act of taking the money (the taking of money 
was the specific objective of the offense he joined). Defendant C is 
accountable for the injury to the teller under subsection (a)(1)(B) 
because the assault on the teller was in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably 
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature 
of the offense).
    As noted earlier, a defendant may be accountable for particular 
conduct under more than one subsection. In this example, Defendant C 
also is accountable for the money taken on the basis of subsection 
(a)(1)(B) because the taking of money was in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably 
foreseeable (as noted, the taking of money was the specific objective 
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity).
    (c) Requirement that the conduct of others be in furtherance of the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable; scope 
of the criminal activity
    (1) Defendant D pays Defendant E a small amount to forge an 
endorsement on an $800 stolen government check. Unknown to Defendant E, 
Defendant D then uses that check as a down payment in a scheme to 
fraudulently obtain $15,000 worth of merchandise. Defendant E is 
convicted of forging the $800 check and is accountable for the forgery 
of this check under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant E is not 
accountable for the $15,000 because the fraudulent scheme to obtain 
$15,000 was not in furtherance of the criminal activity he jointly 
undertook with Defendant D (i.e., the forgery of the $800 check).
    (2) Defendants F and G, working together, design and execute a 
scheme to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone. Defendant F fraudulently 
obtains $20,000. Defendant G fraudulently obtains $35,000. Each is 
convicted of mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are accountable for 
the entire amount ($55,000). Each defendant is accountable for the 
amount he personally obtained under subsection (a)(1)(A). Each 
defendant is accountable for the amount obtained by his accomplice 
under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the conduct of each was in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and was 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
    (3) Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marihuana importation 
conspiracy in which Defendant J was hired only to help off-load a 
single shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are included in a single count 
charging conspiracy to import marihuana. Defendant J is accountable for 
the entire single shipment of marihuana he helped import under 
subsection (a)(1)(A) and any acts and omissions in furtherance of the 
importation of that shipment that were reasonably foreseeable (see the 
discussion in example (a)(1) above). He is not accountable for prior or 
subsequent shipments of marihuana imported by Defendants H or I because 
those acts were not in furtherance of his jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (the importation of the single shipment of marihuana).
    (4) Defendant K is a wholesale distributor of child pornography. 
Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who purchases child pornography 
from Defendant K and resells it, but otherwise operates independently 
of Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is a retail-level dealer who 
purchases child pornography from Defendant K and resells it, but 
otherwise operates independently of Defendant K. Defendants L and M are 
aware of each other's criminal activity but operate independently. 
Defendant N is Defendant K's assistant who recruits customers for 
Defendant K and frequently supervises the deliveries to Defendant K's 
customers. Each defendant is convicted of a count charging conspiracy 
to distribute child pornography. Defendant K is accountable under 
subsection (a)(1)(A) for the entire quantity of child pornography sold 
to Defendants L and M. Defendant N also is accountable for the entire 
quantity sold to those defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B) because 
the entire quantity was within the scope of his jointly undertaken 
criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable. Defendant L is 
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child 
pornography that he purchased from Defendant K because the scope of his 
jointly undertaken criminal activity is limited to that amount. For the 
same reason, Defendant M is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only 
for the quantity of child pornography that he purchased from Defendant 
K.

[[Page 2576]]

    (5) Defendant O knows about her boyfriend's ongoing drug-
trafficking activity, but agrees to participate on only one occasion by 
making a delivery for him at his request when he was ill. Defendant O 
is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for the drug quantity 
involved on that one occasion. Defendant O is not accountable for the 
other drug sales made by her boyfriend because those sales were not in 
furtherance of her jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the one 
delivery).
    (6) Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who knows of other 
street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell the same 
type of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other dealers share a 
common source of supply, but otherwise operate independently. Defendant 
P is not accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other 
street-level drug dealers because he is not engaged in a jointly 
undertaken criminal activity with them. In contrast, Defendant Q, 
another street-level drug dealer, pools his resources and profits with 
four other street-level drug dealers. Defendant Q is engaged in a 
jointly undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he is accountable 
under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of drugs sold by the four 
other dealers during the course of his joint undertaking with them 
because those sales were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken 
criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that 
criminal activity.
    (7) Defendant R recruits Defendant S to distribute 500 grams of 
cocaine. Defendant S knows that Defendant R is the prime figure in a 
conspiracy involved in importing much larger quantities of cocaine. As 
long as Defendant S's agreement and conduct is limited to the 
distribution of the 500 grams, Defendant S is accountable only for that 
500 gram amount (under subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the much 
larger quantity imported by Defendant R.
    (8) Defendants T, U, V, and W are hired by a supplier to backpack a 
quantity of marihuana across the border from Mexico into the United 
States. Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their individual shipments 
from the supplier at the same time and coordinate their importation 
efforts by walking across the border together for mutual assistance and 
protection. Each defendant is accountable for the aggregate quantity of 
marihuana transported by the four defendants. The four defendants 
engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, the object of which 
was the importation of the four backpacks containing marihuana 
(subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and abetted each other's actions 
(subsection (a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity. In contrast, if Defendants T, U, V, and W were hired 
individually, transported their individual shipments at different 
times, and otherwise operated independently, each defendant would be 
accountable only for the quantity of marihuana he personally 
transported (subsection (a)(1)(A)). As this example illustrates, in 
cases involving contraband (including controlled substances), the scope 
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (and thus the 
accountability of the defendant for the contraband that was the object 
of that jointly undertaken activity) may depend upon whether, in the 
particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is more 
appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity or as 
a number of separate criminal activities.'';
    by redesignating Notes 3 through 10 as Notes 5 through 12, 
respectively, and inserting the following new Notes 2, 3 and 4:
    ``2. Accountability Under More Than One Provision.--In certain 
cases, a defendant may be accountable for particular conduct under more 
than one subsection of this guideline. If a defendant's accountability 
for particular conduct is established under one provision of this 
guideline, it is not necessary to review alternative provisions under 
which such accountability might be established.
    3. Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity (Subsection (a)(1)(B)).--
    (A) In General.--A `jointly undertaken criminal activity' is a 
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the 
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy.
    In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection 
(a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct 
(acts and omissions) of others that was:
    (i) within the scope of the criminal activity that the defendant 
agreed to jointly undertake;
    (ii) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; 
and
    (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity.
    The conduct of others that was within the scope of, in furtherance 
of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal 
activity jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under 
this provision. The conduct of others that was not within the scope of 
the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, 
was not in furtherance of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by 
the defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in connection with 
that criminal activity, is not relevant conduct under this provision.
    (B) Scope.--Because a count may be worded broadly and include the 
conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the 
criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant (the `jointly 
undertaken criminal activity') is not necessarily the same as the scope 
of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily 
the same for every participant. In order to determine the defendant's 
accountability for the conduct of others under subsection (a)(1)(B), 
the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the 
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of 
the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's 
agreement). In doing so, the court may consider any explicit agreement 
or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant 
and others. Accordingly, the accountability of the defendant for the 
acts of others is limited by the scope of his or her agreement to 
jointly undertake the particular criminal activity. Acts of others that 
were not within the scope of the defendant's agreement, even if those 
acts were known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, are not 
relevant conduct under subsection (a)(1)(B).
    In cases involving contraband (including controlled substances), 
the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (and thus the 
accountability of the defendant for the contraband that was the object 
of that jointly undertaken activity) may depend upon whether, in the 
particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is more 
appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity or as 
a number of separate criminal activities.
    A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of 
members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy, 
even if the defendant knows of that conduct (e.g., in the case of a 
defendant who joins an ongoing drug distribution conspiracy knowing 
that it had been selling two kilograms of cocaine per week, the cocaine 
sold prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy is not included as 
relevant conduct in determining the defendant's offense level). The 
Commission does not foreclose the possibility that there may be some 
unusual set of circumstances in which the exclusion of such conduct may 
not adequately reflect the defendant's

[[Page 2577]]

culpability; in such a case, an upward departure may be warranted.
    (C) In Furtherance.--The court must determine if the conduct (acts 
and omissions) of others was in furtherance of the criminal activity 
that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake.
    (D) Reasonably Foreseeable.--The court must then determine if the 
conduct (acts and omissions) of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity was reasonably foreseeable in connection 
with the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to jointly 
undertake.
    Note that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to 
jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in 
furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily identical. 
For example, two defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the 
course of that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a 
victim. The second defendant is accountable for the assault and injury 
to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed to the 
assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt 
anyone) because the assaultive conduct was within the scope of the 
criminal activity that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake (the 
robbery), was in furtherance of that criminal activity (the robbery), 
and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity (given the nature of the offense).
    With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled 
substances), the defendant is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) 
for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved 
and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity under 
subsection (a)(1)(B), all reasonably foreseeable quantities of 
contraband that were within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the 
criminal activity that he jointly undertook.
    The requirement of reasonable foreseeability applies only in 
respect to the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of others under 
subsection (a)(1)(B). It does not apply to conduct that the defendant 
personally undertakes, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, 
procures, or willfully causes; such conduct is addressed under 
subsection (a)(1)(A).
    4. Illustrations of Conduct for Which the Defendant is Accountable 
under Subsections (a)(1)(A) and (B).--
    (A) Acts and omissions aided or abetted by the defendant.--
    (i) Defendant A is one of ten persons hired by Defendant B to off-
load a ship containing marihuana. The off-loading of the ship is 
interrupted by law enforcement officers and one ton of marihuana is 
seized (the amount on the ship as well as the amount off-loaded). 
Defendant A and the other off-loaders are arrested and convicted of 
importation of marihuana. Regardless of the number of bales he 
personally unloaded, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-ton 
quantity of marihuana. Defendant A aided and abetted the off-loading of 
the entire shipment of marihuana by directly participating in the off-
loading of that shipment (i.e., the specific objective of the criminal 
activity he joined was the off-loading of the entire shipment). 
Therefore, he is accountable for the entire shipment under subsection 
(a)(1)(A) without regard to the issue of reasonable foreseeability. 
This is conceptually similar to the case of a defendant who transports 
a suitcase knowing that it contains a controlled substance and, 
therefore, is accountable for the controlled substance in the suitcase 
regardless of his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the actual type or 
amount of that controlled substance.
    In certain cases, a defendant may be accountable for particular 
conduct under more than one subsection of this guideline. As noted in 
the preceding paragraph, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-
ton shipment of marihuana under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant A also 
is accountable for the entire one-ton shipment of marihuana on the 
basis of subsection (a)(1)(B) (applying to a jointly undertaken 
criminal activity). Defendant A engaged in a jointly undertaken 
criminal activity that meets all three criteria of subsection 
(a)(1)(B). First, the criminal activity was within the scope of what 
the defendant agreed to jointly undertake (the importation of the 
shipment of marihuana). Second, the off-loading of the shipment of 
marihuana was in furtherance of the criminal activity, as described 
above. And third, a finding that the one-ton quantity of marihuana was 
reasonably foreseeable is warranted from the nature of the undertaking 
itself (the importation of marihuana by ship typically involves very 
large quantities of marihuana). The specific circumstances of the case 
(the defendant was one of ten persons off-loading the marihuana in 
bales) also support this finding. In an actual case, of course, if a 
defendant's accountability for particular conduct is established under 
one provision of this guideline, it is not necessary to review 
alternative provisions under which such accountability might be 
established. See Application Note 2.
    (B) Acts and omissions aided or abetted by the defendant; acts and 
omissions in a jointly undertaken criminal activity.--
    (i) Defendant C is the getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in 
which $15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted and injured. Defendant 
C is accountable for the money taken under subsection (a)(1)(A) because 
he aided and abetted the act of taking the money (the taking of money 
was the specific objective of the offense he joined). Defendant C is 
accountable for the injury to the teller under subsection (a)(1)(B) 
because the assault on the teller was within the scope and in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery), 
and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity (given the nature of the offense).
    As noted earlier, a defendant may be accountable for particular 
conduct under more than one subsection. In this example, Defendant C 
also is accountable for the money taken on the basis of subsection 
(a)(1)(B) because the taking of money was within the scope and in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery), 
and was reasonably foreseeable (as noted, the taking of money was the 
specific objective of the jointly undertaken criminal activity).
    (C) Requirements that the conduct of others be within the scope of 
the jointly undertaken criminal activity, in furtherance of that 
criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable.--
    (i) Defendant D pays Defendant E a small amount to forge an 
endorsement on an $800 stolen government check. Unknown to Defendant E, 
Defendant D then uses that check as a down payment in a scheme to 
fraudulently obtain $15,000 worth of merchandise. Defendant E is 
convicted of forging the $800 check and is accountable for the forgery 
of this check under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant E is not 
accountable for the $15,000 because the fraudulent scheme to obtain 
$15,000 was not within the scope of the criminal activity he agreed to 
jointly undertake with Defendant D (i.e., the forgery of the $800 
check).
    (ii) Defendants F and G, working together, design and execute a 
scheme to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone. Defendant F fraudulently 
obtains $20,000. Defendant G fraudulently obtains $35,000. Each is 
convicted of mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are accountable for 
the entire amount ($55,000). Each defendant is accountable for the 
amount he personally obtained under subsection (a)(1)(A). Each 
defendant is accountable for the amount obtained by his accomplice 
under subsection (a)(1)(B)

[[Page 2578]]

because the conduct of each was within the scope of the criminal 
activity they agreed to jointly undertake (the scheme to sell 
fraudulent stocks), was in furtherance of that criminal activity, and 
was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
    (iii) Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marihuana 
importation conspiracy in which Defendant J was hired only to help off-
load a single shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are included in a single 
count charging conspiracy to import marihuana. Defendant J is 
accountable for the entire single shipment of marihuana he helped 
import under subsection (a)(1)(A) and any acts and omissions of others 
related to the importation of that shipment on the basis of subsection 
(a)(1)(B) (see the discussion in example (A)(i) above). He is not 
accountable for prior or subsequent shipments of marihuana imported by 
Defendants H or I because those acts were not within the scope of his 
jointly undertaken criminal activity (the importation of the single 
shipment of marihuana).
    (iv) Defendant K is a wholesale distributor of child pornography. 
Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who purchases child pornography 
from Defendant K and resells it, but otherwise operates independently 
of Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is a retail-level dealer who 
purchases child pornography from Defendant K and resells it, but 
otherwise operates independently of Defendant K. Defendants L and M are 
aware of each other's criminal activity but operate independently. 
Defendant N is Defendant K's assistant who recruits customers for 
Defendant K and frequently supervises the deliveries to Defendant K's 
customers. Each defendant is convicted of a count charging conspiracy 
to distribute child pornography. Defendant K is accountable under 
subsection (a)(1)(A) for the entire quantity of child pornography sold 
to Defendants L and M. Defendant N also is accountable for the entire 
quantity sold to those defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B) because 
the entire quantity was within the scope of his jointly undertaken 
criminal activity (to distribute child pornography with Defendant K), 
in furtherance of that criminal activity, and reasonably foreseeable. 
Defendant L is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the 
quantity of child pornography that he purchased from Defendant K 
because he is not engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity 
with the other defendants. For the same reason, Defendant M is 
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child 
pornography that he purchased from Defendant K.
    (v) Defendant O knows about her boyfriend's ongoing drug-
trafficking activity, but agrees to participate on only one occasion by 
making a delivery for him at his request when he was ill. Defendant O 
is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for the drug quantity 
involved on that one occasion. Defendant O is not accountable for the 
other drug sales made by her boyfriend because those sales were not 
within the scope of her jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the 
one delivery).
    (vi) Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who knows of other 
street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell the same 
type of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other dealers share a 
common source of supply, but otherwise operate independently. Defendant 
P is not accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other 
street-level drug dealers because he is not engaged in a jointly 
undertaken criminal activity with them. In contrast, Defendant Q, 
another street-level drug dealer, pools his resources and profits with 
four other street-level drug dealers. Defendant Q is engaged in a 
jointly undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he is accountable 
under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of drugs sold by the four 
other dealers during the course of his joint undertaking with them 
because those sales were within the scope of the jointly undertaken 
criminal activity, in furtherance of that criminal activity, and 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
    (vii) Defendant R recruits Defendant S to distribute 500 grams of 
cocaine. Defendant S knows that Defendant R is the prime figure in a 
conspiracy involved in importing much larger quantities of cocaine. As 
long as Defendant S's agreement and conduct is limited to the 
distribution of the 500 grams, Defendant S is accountable only for that 
500 gram amount (under subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the much 
larger quantity imported by Defendant R. Defendant S is not accountable 
under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the other quantities imported by 
Defendant R because those quantities were not within the scope of his 
jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the 500 grams).
    (viii) Defendants T, U, V, and W are hired by a supplier to 
backpack a quantity of marihuana across the border from Mexico into the 
United States. Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their individual 
shipments from the supplier at the same time and coordinate their 
importation efforts by walking across the border together for mutual 
assistance and protection. Each defendant is accountable for the 
aggregate quantity of marihuana transported by the four defendants. The 
four defendants engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, the 
object of which was the importation of the four backpacks containing 
marihuana (subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and abetted each other's 
actions (subsection (a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly undertaken 
criminal activity (which under subsection (a)(1)(B) were also in 
furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the 
criminal activity). In contrast, if Defendants T, U, V, and W were 
hired individually, transported their individual shipments at different 
times, and otherwise operated independently, each defendant would be 
accountable only for the quantity of marihuana he personally 
transported (subsection (a)(1)(A)). As this example illustrates, the 
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity may depend upon 
whether, in the particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is 
more appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity 
or as a number of separate criminal activities. See Application Note 
3(A).''.

Issues for Comment

    1. Additional Guidance. The Commission seeks comment on whether 
additional or different guidance should be provided on the ``jointly 
undertaken criminal activity'' provision in subsection (a)(1)(B). In 
particular, should the Commission provide further guidance on how to 
determine (A) the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
(B) whether the conduct of others was in furtherance of the criminal 
activity, and (C) whether the conduct of others was reasonably 
foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity? Does the proposed 
amendment provide adequate guidance on the operation of ``jointly 
undertaken criminal activity''?
    Should the Commission provide additional or different examples to 
better explain the operation of ``jointly undertaken criminal 
activity''? If so, what examples should be provided? Are there examples 
that are no longer good illustrations of present-day criminal cases? If 
so, should those examples be deleted or revised, or should they be 
replaced with more appropriate illustrations of present-day criminal 
cases?
    2. Possible Policy Changes. The Commission seeks comment on whether 
changes should be made for policy reasons to the operation of ``jointly

[[Page 2579]]

undertaken criminal activity,'' such as to provide greater limitations 
on the extent to which a defendant is held accountable at sentencing 
for the conduct of co-participants that the defendant did not aid, 
abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, or willfully cause. (Such 
conduct is covered by Sec.  1B1.3(a)(1)(A).) In particular, but without 
limitation, the Commission seeks comment on two options for possible 
changes that could be made to the operation of ``jointly undertaken 
criminal activity'', as follows.
(A) Option A: Requiring a Higher State of Mind Than ``Reasonable 
Foreseeability''
    This option would revise ``jointly undertaken criminal activity'' 
by changing the ``reasonable foreseeability'' part of the analysis. The 
requirement that the other participant's conduct be reasonably 
foreseeable has been described as a ``negligence'' standard, that is, 
the defendant should have known or should have foreseen the conduct.
    The Commission seeks specific comment on whether ``jointly 
undertaken criminal activity'' should require a higher state of mind, 
such as recklessness or deliberate indifference; knowledge; or intent. 
For example, if a co-participant possessed a weapon, should the 
defendant be held accountable for the weapon only if he was 
deliberately indifferent to whether a weapon would be possessed; or 
only if he knew the weapon would be possessed; or only if he intended 
that the weapon be possessed?
(B) Option B: Requiring a Conviction for Conspiracy or At Least a 
``Pinkerton Conviction''
    This option would hold a defendant accountable for a ``jointly 
undertaken criminal activity'' only when the defendant (1) was 
convicted of a conspiracy charge related to a co-conspirator's conduct 
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; or (2) was 
convicted by a jury that was specifically instructed on Pinkerton 
liability regarding a substantive offense; or (3) admitted facts 
sufficient to constitute Pinkerton liability.
    The Commission seeks specific comment on what the practical impact 
of such a change would be on charging and sentencing practices.
    Does the current provision on ``jointly undertaken criminal 
activity'' appropriately further the purposes of sentencing? If not, 
what changes, if any, should the Commission make to ``jointly 
undertaken criminal activity'' to more appropriately further the 
purposes of sentencing? Do any of the options described above more 
appropriately further the purposes of sentencing? Are there other 
possible changes, whether or not identified in the options described 
above, that should be made to ``jointly undertaken criminal activity'' 
to more appropriately further the purposes of sentencing?

4. Inflationary Adjustments

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment is a result 
of the Commission's work in examining the overall structure of the 
guidelines post-Booker. See United States Sentencing Commission, 
``Notice of Final Priorities,'' 79 FR 49378 (Aug. 20, 2014). As part of 
that work, the Commission is considering whether to adjust monetary 
tables in the guidelines for inflation. Congress has generally mandated 
that agencies in the executive branch must, every four years, adjust 
the civil monetary penalties they impose to account for inflation. See 
Section 4 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflationary Adjustment Act of 
1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note). The work of the Commission does not involve 
civil monetary penalties. It involves establishing appropriate criminal 
sentences for categories of offenses and offenders, including 
appropriate amounts for criminal fines. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 994(b)(1), 
(a)(1)(B). While some of the monetary values in the Chapter Two offense 
guidelines have been revised since they were originally established in 
1987 (e.g., the loss table in Sec.  2B1.1 was substantially amended in 
2001), they have never been revised specifically to account for 
inflation. Other monetary values in the Chapter Two offense guidelines, 
as well as the monetary values in the fine tables for individual 
defendants and for organizational defendants, have never been revised.
    The proposed amendment, including the issues for comment set forth 
below, are intended to inform the Commission's work across all the 
relevant guidelines and its examination of rulemaking practices 
generally. The proposed amendment illustrates one possible approach for 
implementing an inflationary adjustment during this amendment cycle. 
Specifically, it sets forth options for amending the monetary tables in 
the guidelines to adjust for inflation, i.e., the tables in Sec. Sec.  
2B1.1 (Theft, Property, Destruction, and Fraud), 2B2.1 (Burglary), 
2B3.1 (Robbery), 2R1.1 (Bid-Rigging, Price-Fixing or Market-Allocation 
Agreements Among Competitors), 2T4.1 (Tax Table), 5E1.2 (Fines for 
Individual Defendants), and 8C2.4 (Base Fine). The options are based on 
changes to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index and on 
different time frames (taking into consideration the year each monetary 
table was last amended). For each of the seven tables, two options are 
presented. They are as follows.
    Option 1 adjusts the amounts in the monetary tables using a 
specific multiplier derived from the Consumer Price Index, and then 
rounds the amounts using the rounding methodology applied when 
adjusting civil monetary penalties for inflation under section 5(a) of 
the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 
2461 note). In effect, this rounds--
    amounts greater than $200,000 to the nearest multiple of $25,000;
    amounts greater than $100,000 to the nearest multiple of $10,000;
    amounts greater than $10,000 to the nearest multiple of $5,000;
    amounts greater than $1,000 to the nearest multiple of $1,000;
    amounts greater than $100 to the nearest multiple of $100; and
    amounts less than or equal to $100 to the nearest multiple of $10.
    Option 2 adjusts the amounts in the monetary tables using a 
specific multiplier derived from the Consumer Price Index, but then 
rounds the amounts using a different set of rounding rules extrapolated 
from the methodology used in Option 1. This ``extrapolated'' 
methodology provides rules that address a wider range of values than 
Option 1, such as by providing rounder numbers for amounts 
significantly greater than $200,000. Specifically, this methodology 
rounds--
    amounts greater than $100,000,000 to the nearest multiple of 
$50,000,000;
    amounts greater than $10,000,000 to the nearest multiple of 
$5,000,000;
    amounts greater than $1,000,000 to the nearest multiple of 
$500,000;
    amounts greater than $100,000 to the nearest multiple of $50,000;
    amounts greater than $10,000 to the nearest multiple of $5,000;
    amounts greater than $1,000 to the nearest multiple of $500; and
    amounts of $1,000 or less to the nearest multiple of $50.
    For the loss table in Sec.  2B1.1(b)(1) and the tax table in Sec.  
2B4.1, the options would adjust for inflation since 2001, the year both 
tables were last amended. According to the Consumer Price Index, $1.00 
in 2001 has the same buying power as $1.34 in 2014. For the loss tables 
in Sec. Sec.  2B2.1 (Burglary) and 2B3.1 (Robbery), and the fine table 
for individual defendants at Sec.  5E1.2(c)(3), the options would 
adjust for inflation since 1989, the year these tables were last 
amended. The adjustments would

[[Page 2580]]

take into account that $1.00 in 1989 has the same buying power as $1.91 
in 2014, according to the Consumer Price Index. The options for the 
antitrust table in Sec.  2R1.1(b)(2) would adjust for inflation since 
2005, the year the table was last amended. According to the Consumer 
Price Index, $1.00 in 2005 has the same buying power as $1.22 in 2014. 
And, finally, for the fine table for organizational defendants at Sec.  
8C2.4(d), the options would adjust for inflation since 1991, as the 
table has not been substantially amended since it was promulgated. The 
adjustments would take into account that, according to the Consumer 
Price Index, $1.00 in 1991 has the same buying power as $1.74 in 2014.
    Each of the tables shows the initial multiplier used to make the 
adjustments for inflation taken from the Consumer Price Index. In 
addition, the proposed amendment includes conforming changes to other 
Chapter Two guidelines that refer to the monetary tables.
    Finally, the proposed amendment sets forth a series of issues for 
comment related to additional changes to the monetary tables that could 
be considered instead of, or in conjunction with, the proposed 
amendment.

Proposed Amendment

    Section 2B1.1(b)(1) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $5,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$7,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $70,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $120,000 and inserting $160,000;
    by striking $200,000 and inserting $275,000;
    by striking $400,000 and inserting $525,000;
    by striking $1,000,000 and inserting $1,350,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $3,350,000;
    by striking $7,000,000 and inserting $9,375,000;
    by striking $20,000,000 and inserting $26,800,000;
    by striking $50,000,000 and inserting $67,000,000;
    by striking $100,000,000 and inserting $134,000,000;
    by striking $200,000,000 and inserting $268,000,000; and
    by striking $400,000,000 and inserting $536,000,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $5,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$6,500;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $70,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $120,000 and inserting $150,000;
    by striking $200,000 and inserting $250,000;
    by striking $400,000 and inserting $550,000;
    by striking $1,000,000 and inserting $1,500,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $3,500,000;
    by striking $7,000,000 and inserting $9,500,000;
    by striking $20,000,000 and inserting $30,000,000;
    by striking $50,000,000 and inserting $70,000,000;
    by striking $100,000,000 and inserting $150,000,000;
    by striking $200,000,000 and inserting $300,000,000; and
    by striking $400,000,000 and inserting $550,000,000.]
    Section 2B1.4(b)(1) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $5,000 and inserting $7,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $5,000 and inserting $6,500.]
    Section 2B1.5(b)(1) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $3,000; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$7,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $2,500; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$6,500.]
    Section 2B2.1(b)(2) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $2,500 each place such term appears and inserting 
$5,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $20,000;
    by striking $50,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $475,000;
    by striking $800,000 and inserting $1,525,000;
    by striking $1,500,000 and inserting $2,875,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $4,775,000;
    by striking $5,000,000 and inserting $9,550,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $2,500 each place such term appears and inserting 
$5,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $20,000;
    by striking $50,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $500,000;
    by striking $800,000 and inserting $1,500,000;
    by striking $1,500,000 and inserting $3,000,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $5,000,000;
    by striking $5,000,000 and inserting $9,500,000.]
    Section 2B2.3(b)(3) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $3,000; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$7,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $2,500; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$6,500.]
    Section 2B3.1(b)(7) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $10,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$20,000;
    by striking $50,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $475,000;
    by striking $800,000 and inserting $1,525,000;
    by striking $1,500,000 and inserting $2,875,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $4,775,000;
    by striking $5,000,000 and inserting $9,550,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $10,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$20,000;
    by striking $50,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $500,000;
    by striking $800,000 and inserting $1,500,000;
    by striking $1,500,000 and inserting $3,000,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $5,000,000;
    by striking $5,000,000 and inserting $9,500,000.]
    Section 2B3.2(b)(2) is amended by striking $10,000 and inserting 
$20,000.
    Sections 2B3.3(b)(1), 2B4.1(b)(1), 2B5.1(b)(1), 2B5.3(b)(1), and 
2B6.1(b)(1) are each amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $3,000; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$7,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $2,500; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$6,500.]

[[Page 2581]]

    Sections 2C1.1(b)(2), 2C1.2(b)(2), and 2C1.8(b)(1) are each 
amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $5,000 and inserting $7,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $5,000 and inserting $6,500.]
    Sections 2E5.1(b)(2) and 2Q2.1(b)(3) are each amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $3,000; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$7,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $2,000 and inserting $2,500; and
    by striking $5,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$6,500.]
    Section 2R1.1(b)(2) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $1,000,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$1,225,000;
    by striking $10,000,000 and inserting $12,200,000;
    by striking $40,000,000 and inserting $48,800,000;
    by striking $100,000,000 and inserting $122,000,000;
    by striking $250,000,000 and inserting $305,000,000;
    by striking $500,000,000 and inserting $610,000,000;
    by striking $1,000,000,000 and inserting $1,220,000,000;
    by striking $1,500,000,000 and inserting $1,830,000,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $1,000,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$1,000,000;
    by striking $10,000,000 and inserting $10,000,000;
    by striking $40,000,000 and inserting $50,000,000;
    by striking $100,000,000 and inserting $100,000,000;
    by striking $250,000,000 and inserting $300,000,000;
    by striking $500,000,000 and inserting $600,000,000;
    by striking $1,000,000,000 and inserting $1,200,000,000;
    by striking $1,500,000,000 and inserting $1,850,000,000.]
    Section 2T3.1(a) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $1,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$2,000;
    by striking $100 both places such term appears and inserting $200.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $1,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$1,500;
    by striking $100 both places such term appears and inserting $200.]
    Section 2T4.1 is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $2,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$3,000;
    by striking $5,000 and inserting $7,000;
    by striking $12,500 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $80,000 and inserting $110,000;
    by striking $200,000 and inserting $275,000;
    by striking $400,000 and inserting $525,000;
    by striking $1,000,000 and inserting $1,350,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $3,350,000;
    by striking $7,000,000 and inserting $9,375,000;
    by striking $20,000,000 and inserting $26,800,000;
    by striking $50,000,000 and inserting $67,000,000;
    by striking $100,000,000 and inserting $134,000,000;
    by striking $200,000,000 and inserting $268,000,000; and
    by striking $400,000,000 and inserting $536,000,000.]
    [Option 2:
    By striking $2,000 both places such term appears and inserting 
$2,500;
    by striking $5,000 and inserting $6,500;
    by striking $12,500 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $80,000 and inserting $100,000;
    by striking $200,000 and inserting $250,000;
    by striking $400,000 and inserting $550,000;
    by striking $1,000,000 and inserting $1,500,000;
    by striking $2,500,000 and inserting $3,500,000;
    by striking $7,000,000 and inserting $9,500,000;
    by striking $20,000,000 and inserting $25,000,000;
    by striking $50,000,000 and inserting $65,000,000;
    by striking $100,000,000 and inserting $150,000,000;
    by striking $200,000,000 and inserting $250,000,000; and
    by striking $400,000,000 and inserting $550,000,000.]
    Section 5E1.2(c)(3) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    In Column A--
    by striking $100 and inserting $200;
    by striking $250 and inserting $500;
    by striking $500 and inserting $1,000;
    by striking $1,000 and inserting $2,000;
    by striking $2,000 and inserting $4,000;
    by striking $3,000 and inserting $6,000;
    by striking $4,000 and inserting $8,000;
    by striking $5,000 and inserting $10,000;
    by striking $6,000 and inserting $10,000;
    by striking $7,500 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $20,000;
    by striking $12,500 and inserting $25,000;
    by striking $15,000 and inserting $30,000;
    by striking $17,500 and inserting $35,000;
    by striking $20,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $25,000 and inserting $50,000;
    and in Column B--
    by striking $5,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$10,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $20,000;
    by striking $20,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $55,000;
    by striking $40,000 and inserting $75,000;
    by striking $50,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $60,000 and inserting $110,000;
    by striking $75,000 and inserting $140,000;
    by striking $100,000 and inserting $190,000;
    by striking $125,000 and inserting $250,000;
    by striking $150,000 and inserting $275,000;
    by striking $175,000 and inserting $325,000;
    by striking $200,000 and inserting $375,000; and
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $475,000.]
    [Option 2:
    In Column A--
    by striking $100 and inserting $200;
    by striking $250 and inserting $500;
    by striking $500 and inserting $1,000;
    by striking $1,000 and inserting $2,000;
    by striking $2,000 and inserting $4,000;
    by striking $3,000 and inserting $5,500;
    by striking $4,000 and inserting $7,500;
    by striking $5,000 and inserting $10,000;
    by striking $6,000 and inserting $10,000;

[[Page 2582]]

    by striking $7,500 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $20,000;
    by striking $12,500 and inserting $25,000;
    by striking $15,000 and inserting $30,000;
    by striking $17,500 and inserting $35,000;
    by striking $20,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $25,000 and inserting $50,000;
    and in Column B--
    by striking $5,000 each place such term appears and inserting 
$9,500;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $20,000;
    by striking $20,000 and inserting $40,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $55,000;
    by striking $40,000 and inserting $75,000;
    by striking $50,000 and inserting $95,000;
    by striking $60,000 and inserting $100,000;
    by striking $75,000 and inserting $150,000;
    by striking $100,000 and inserting $200,000;
    by striking $125,000 and inserting $250,000;
    by striking $150,000 and inserting $300,000;
    by striking $175,000 and inserting $350,000;
    by striking $200,000 and inserting $400,000; and
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $500,000.]
    Section 8C2.4(d) is amended--
    [Option 1:
    By striking $5,000 and inserting $9,000;
    by striking $7,500 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $15,000 and inserting $25,000;
    by striking $20,000 and inserting $35,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $50,000;
    by striking $40,000 and inserting $70,000;
    by striking $60,000 and inserting $100,000;
    by striking $85,000 and inserting $150,000;
    by striking $125,000 and inserting $225,000;
    by striking $175,000 and inserting $300,000;
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $425,000;
    by striking $350,000 and inserting $600,000;
    by striking $500,000 and inserting $875,000;
    by striking $650,000 and inserting $1,125,000;
    by striking $910,000 and inserting $1,575,000;
    by striking $1,200,000 and inserting $2,100,000;
    by striking $1,600,000 and inserting $2,775,000;
    by striking $2,100,000 and inserting $3,650,000;
    by striking $2,800,000 and inserting $4,875,000;
    by striking $3,700,000 and inserting $6,450,000;
    by striking $4,800,000 and inserting $8,350,000;
    by striking $6,300,000 and inserting $10,950,000;
    by striking $8,100,000 and inserting $14,100,000;
    by striking $10,500,000 and inserting $18,275,000;
    by striking $13,500,000 and inserting $23,500,000;
    by striking $17,500,000 and inserting $30,450,000;
    by striking $22,000,000 and inserting $38,275,000;
    by striking $28,500,000 and inserting $49,600,000;
    by striking $36,000,000 and inserting $62,650,000;
    by striking $45,500,000 and inserting $79,175,000;
    by striking $57,500,000 and inserting $100,050,000;
    by striking $72,500,000 and inserting $126,150,000.]
    [Option 2:
    by striking $5,000 and inserting $8,500;
    by striking $7,500 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $10,000 and inserting $15,000;
    by striking $15,000 and inserting $25,000;
    by striking $20,000 and inserting $35,000;
    by striking $30,000 and inserting $50,000;
    by striking $40,000 and inserting $70,000;
    by striking $60,000 and inserting $100,000;
    by striking $85,000 and inserting $150,000;
    by striking $125,000 and inserting $200,000;
    by striking $175,000 and inserting $300,000;
    by striking $250,000 and inserting $450,000;
    by striking $350,000 and inserting $600,000;
    by striking $500,000 and inserting $850,000;
    by striking $650,000 and inserting $1,000,000;
    by striking $910,000 and inserting $1,500,000;
    by striking $1,200,000 and inserting $2,000,000;
    by striking $1,600,000 and inserting $3,000,000;
    by striking $2,100,000 and inserting $3,500,000;
    by striking $2,800,000 and inserting $5,000,000;
    by striking $3,700,000 and inserting $6,500,000;
    by striking $4,800,000 and inserting $8,500,000;
    by striking $6,300,000 and inserting $10,000,000;
    by striking $8,100,000 and inserting $15,000,000;
    by striking $10,500,000 and inserting $20,000,000;
    by striking $13,500,000 and inserting $25,000,000;
    by striking $17,500,000 and inserting $30,000,000;
    by striking $22,000,000 and inserting $40,000,000;
    by striking $28,500,000 and inserting $50,000,000;
    by striking $36,000,000 and inserting $65,000,000;
    by striking $45,500,000 and inserting $80,000,000;
    by striking $57,500,000 and inserting $100,000,000;
    by striking $72,500,000 and inserting $150,000,000.]

Issues for Comment

    1. The Commission seeks comment on whether the monetary tables in 
the guidelines should be adjusted for inflation. The monetary tables 
set forth in the proposed amendment relate to a variety of different 
offenses and apply to a number of different criminal statutes. Given 
the difference between the types of offenses, should all monetary 
tables be adjusted for inflation in the same way? Does the type of 
offenses or statutory provisions related to any of the monetary tables 
suggest that it should not be adjusted for inflation?
    2. As set forth in the proposed amendment, should an adjustment for 
inflation be made during the 2014-2015 amendment cycle? Should the 
Commission make it a practice to make, or consider making, an 
inflationary adjustment at periodic intervals, such as every four or 
ten years, or at particular inflationary measures, such as when $1.00 
in the year the table was last adjusted has the same buying power as 
$1.25 or $1.33 or $1.50 in the current year? Should the Commission

[[Page 2583]]

incorporate directly into the guidelines a mechanism for automatically 
adjusting for inflation?
    3. In each of the options presented above, the amounts associated 
with the offense level increases in the monetary tables would be 
adjusted for inflation. The Commission seeks comment on whether the 
changes, if any, to account for inflation should be made using a 
different methodology than the options presented above. Should the 
changes be based on a different indicator than the changes to the 
Consumer Price Index? Should the changes be based on different time 
frames than the ones provided? Should the changes be rounded using a 
different method than presented in the options above?
    4. The Commission seeks comment on whether, in addition to or 
instead of any of the options above, the Commission should consider any 
other changes to the monetary tables, such as to promote 
proportionality or to reduce complexity.
    5. There are 18 other Chapter Two guidelines that refer to the loss 
table at Sec.  2B1.1(b)(1) (see Sec. Sec.  2B1.4, 2B1.5, 2B2.3, 2B3.3, 
2B4.1, 2B5.1, 2B5.3, 2B6.1, 2C1.1, 2C1.2, 2C1.8, 2E5.1, 2G2.2, 2G3.1, 
2G3.2, 2Q2.1, 2S1.1, 2S1.3); 1 other Chapter Two guideline that refers 
to the loss table at Sec.  2B3.1(b)(7) (see Sec.  2B3.2); and 8 other 
Chapter Two guidelines that refer to the tax table at Sec.  2T4.1 (see 
Sec. Sec.  2E4.1, 2T1.1, 2T1.4, 2T1.6, 2T1.7, 2T1.9, 2T2.1, 2T3.1). If 
the Commission were to adjust the monetary tables in the guidelines, 
should the revised tables apply to these other guidelines as well? In 
the alternative, should the Commission provide separate, alternative 
monetary tables specifically for these other guidelines? If so, which 
ones?
    6. Are there other places in the guidelines that refer to monetary 
values that should be adjusted, if the Commission were to adjust the 
tables in the guidelines?

5. Mitigating Role

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment is a result 
of the Commission's study of the operation of Sec.  3B1.2 (Mitigating 
Role) and related provisions in the Guidelines Manual. See United 
States Sentencing Commission, ``Notice of Final Priorities,'' 79 FR 
49378 (Aug. 20, 2014).
    First, there are differences among the circuits about what 
determining the ``average participant'' requires. The Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits have concluded that the ``average participant'' means only 
those persons who actually participated in the criminal activity at 
issue in the defendant's case, so that the defendant's relative 
culpability is determined only by reference to his or her co-
participants. See, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1498 
(9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that ``the relevant comparison . . . is to 
the conduct of co-participants in the case at hand.''); United States 
v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006) (``While a comparison 
to the conduct of a hypothetical average participant may be appropriate 
in determining whether a downward adjustment is warranted at all, the 
relevant comparison in determining which of the Sec.  3B1.2 adjustments 
to grant a given defendant is to the conduct of co-participants in the 
case at hand.'') (internal quotations omitted); United States v. 
DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993) (``The controlling standard 
for an offense level reduction under [Sec.  3B1.2] is whether the 
defendant was substantially less culpable than the conspiracy's other 
participants.''). The First and Second Circuits have concluded that the 
``average participant'' also includes typical offenders who commit 
similar crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 357 F.3d 136, 142 
(1st Cir. 2004) (``[A] defendant must prove that he is both less 
culpable than his cohorts in the particular criminal endeavor and less 
culpable than the majority of those within the universe of persons 
participating in similar crimes.''); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 
88, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (``A reduction will not be available simply 
because the defendant played a lesser role than his co-conspirators; to 
be eligible for a reduction, the defendant's conduct must be `minor' or 
`minimal' as compared to the average participant in such a crime.''). 
Under this latter approach, courts will ordinarily consider the 
defendant's culpability relative both to his co-participants and to the 
typical offender. The proposed amendment would generally adopt the 
approach of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
    Second, the Commentary to Sec.  3B1.2 provides that certain 
individuals who perform limited functions in criminal activity are not 
precluded from consideration for a mitigating role adjustment. The 
proposed amendment would revise this language to state that such an 
individual may receive a mitigating role adjustment.
    Third, the proposed amendment provides a non-exhaustive list of 
factors for the court to consider in determining whether to apply a 
mitigating role adjustment and, if so, the amount of the adjustment.
    An issue for comment is also included.

Proposed Amendment

    The Commentary to Sec.  3B1.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 3(A) by inserting after ``that makes him substantially 
less culpable than the average participant'' the following: ``in the 
criminal activity'', by striking ``concerted'' and inserting ``the'', 
by striking ``is not precluded from consideration for'' each place such 
term appears and inserting ``may receive'', by striking ``role'' both 
places such term appears and inserting ``participation'', and by 
striking ``personal gain from a fraud offense and who had limited 
knowledge'' and inserting ``personal gain from a fraud offense or who 
had limited knowledge'';
    in Note 3(C) by inserting at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``In determining whether to apply subsection (a) or (b), or an 
intermediate adjustment, the court should consider the following non-
exhaustive list of factors:
    (i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and 
structure of the criminal activity;
    (ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or 
organizing the criminal activity; and
    (iii) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the 
criminal activity.'';
    in Note 4 by striking ``concerted'' and inserting ``the criminal'';
    and in Note 5 by inserting after ``than most participants'' the 
following: ``in the criminal activity''.

Issue for Comment

    1. The Commission seeks comment on the application of the 
mitigating role adjustment. Are there application issues relating to 
this adjustment that the Commission should address and, if so, how 
should the Commission address them?
    The proposed amendment would provide additional guidance on 
applying the mitigating role adjustment. Is the additional guidance in 
the proposed amendment appropriate? What additional or different 
guidance should the Commission provide on applying mitigating role 
adjustments?

6. Flavored Drugs

Issue for Comment

    1. The Commission seeks comment on offenses in which controlled 
substances are colored, packaged, or flavored in ways that appear to be 
designed to attract use by children. How prevalent are these offenses, 
and do the guidelines adequately address these offenses?
    The Commission has received comment, for example, that drugs are

[[Page 2584]]

being flavored with additives to make them taste like candy, with 
flavors such as strawberry, lemon, coconut, cinnamon and chocolate, and 
are being marketed in smaller amounts, making them cheaper and more 
accessible to children. The Commission has also received comment about 
incidents in which candy and soft drinks were laced with marijuana and 
packaged to look like well-known, brand-name products.
    Under the Controlled Substances Act, a person who distributes a 
controlled substance to a person under 21 years of age is generally 
subject to twice the statutory maximum term of imprisonment that would 
otherwise apply, and a statutory minimum term of imprisonment of one 
year, unless a higher statutory minimum applies. See 21 U.S.C. 859(a). 
If such a person already has a prior conviction under section 859, he 
or she is generally subject to three times the statutory maximum term 
of imprisonment that would otherwise apply. See 21 U.S.C. 859(b). 
Notably, these provisions apply only to the distribution of the 
controlled substance, not to the manufacture of the controlled 
substance.
    The Commission seeks comment on whether the guidelines provide 
appropriate penalties for offenders who manufacture or create drugs 
that are packaged or modified by coloring or flavoring with the intent 
of appealing to children, or who combine drugs with candy or soft 
drinks with the intent of appealing to children. If not, how should the 
Commission revise the guidelines to provide appropriate penalties in 
such cases? Should the Commission provide new departure provisions, 
enhancements, adjustments, or minimum offense levels to account for 
such offenses? If so, what provision or provisions should the 
Commission provide, and what penalty increase should be provided?
    If the Commission were to provide such a provision, what specific 
offense conduct, harm, or other factor should be the basis for applying 
the provision? For example, should the provision apply to any type of 
manufacturing conduct as long as the defendant had the specific intent 
to appeal to children? Or should the provision apply without regard to 
specific intent, as long as a specific type of offense conduct was 
involved, such as (1) combining with soft drinks or candy, (2) 
marketing or packaging to look like soft drinks or candy, or (3) 
flavoring or coloring?
    Should the provision take the form of a specific instruction to 
apply a vulnerable victim adjustment under subsection (b) of Sec.  
3A1.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim)? For example, should 
the Commission provide a specific instruction at Sec.  2D1.1(d)(2) 
stating that, if a specific objective of the offense was to manufacture 
a controlled substance product for marketing to, or use by, minors, an 
adjustment under Sec.  3A1.1(b) would apply?

7. Hydrocodone

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment addresses 
the new statutory penalty structure for offenses involving hydrocodone 
and hydrocodone combination products in light of two recent 
administrative actions. As a result of those actions, all hydrocodone 
products are now schedule II controlled substances rather than schedule 
III controlled substances.

A. Until Recently, the Scheduling of Hydrocodone Has Depended on 
Whether It Is a Single-Entity Product (Schedule II) or a Combination 
Product (Schedule III)

    Products featuring hydrocodone in combination with one or more 
unscheduled active pharmaceutical ingredients have been schedule III 
controlled substances, until recently. Such ``hydrodocone combination'' 
products are the most frequently prescribed opioids in the United 
States, with nearly 137 million prescriptions for such products 
dispensed in 2013, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
See Drug Enforcement Administration, ``Schedules of Controlled 
Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products From 
Schedule III to Schedule II,'' 79 FR 49661 (August 22, 2014). There are 
several hundred hydrocodone combination products on the market. The 
hydrocodone combination products that were most frequently prescribed 
in 2013 were combinations of hydrocodone and acetaminophen, with brand 
names such as Vicodin and Lortab as well as generics. Id.
    In contrast, single-entity, or ``standalone,'' hydrocodone products 
have been, and continue to be, schedule II controlled substances. 
However, there have been no single-entity hydrocodone products on the 
United States market, until recently.

B. All Hydrocodone Products Are Now Schedule II Controlled Substances

    Two recent administrative actions have had the effect of moving all 
offenses involving hydrocodone (whether in combination or standing 
alone) to schedule II.
    First, in October 2013 the Food and Drug Administration approved a 
single-entity hydrocodone product (brand name Zohydro), the first such 
product to be approved for the United States market. According to the 
Food and Drug Administration, Zohydro is ``an opioid analgesic 
medication for the management of moderate to severe chronic pain when a 
continuous, around-the-clock opioid analgesic is needed for an extended 
period of time.'' It is marketed in extended-release capsules and 
formulated in dose strengths up to 50 milligrams. See Food and Drug 
Administration, ``Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug Products Advisory 
Committee: Notice of Meeting,'' 77 FR 67380 (November 9, 2012). As 
mentioned above, such a product is a schedule II controlled substance. 
Other single-entity hydrocodone products are also being considered for 
the U.S. market.
    Second, the Drug Enforcement Administration published a final rule 
that moved all hydrocodone combination products from schedule III to 
schedule II. See Drug Enforcement Administration, ``Schedules of 
Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products 
From Schedule III to Schedule II,'' 79 FR 49661 (August 22, 2014). This 
action imposes stronger regulatory controls and administrative and 
civil sanctions on persons who handle hydrocodone combination products. 
As discussed in more detail below, it also changes the statutory and 
guideline penalty structure for offenses involving hydrocodone 
combination products.

C. The Statutory and Guideline Penalty Structures

    By statute, an offense involving a schedule III controlled 
substance has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years, 
unless certain aggravating factors are present (such as a prior 
conviction for a felony drug offense or the use of the substance 
resulting in death or bodily injury). See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(E). An 
offense involving a schedule II controlled substance, in contrast, has 
a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, unless such an 
aggravating factor is present. See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C).
    Under the guidelines, an offense involving ``schedule III 
hydrocodone'' generally has a base offense level determined by the 
number of pills, tablets, or capsules, without regard to the weight of 
the pills, tablets, or capsules or the quantity of hydrocodone in them. 
The base offense levels for schedule III hydrocodone range from a 
minimum of level 6 to a maximum of level 30, and quantity is determined 
by a marijuana equivalency under which 1

[[Page 2585]]

``unit'' (i.e., 1 pill, tablet, or capsule) equals 1 gram of marijuana.
    An offense involving schedule II hydrocodone generally has a base 
offense level determined by the weight of the entire pill, tablet, or 
capsule involved. The base offense levels for schedule II hydrocodone 
range from a minimum of level 12 to a maximum of level 38, and quantity 
is determined by a marijuana equivalency under which 1 gram of the 
pills, tablets, or capsules equals 500 grams of marijuana.

D. The Proposed Amendment Deletes the Reference to ``Schedule III 
Hydrocodone'' and Proposes a Marijuana Equivalency Using ``Hydrocodone 
(Actual)''

    The proposed amendment responds to the administrative actions in 
two ways. First, the proposed amendment deletes references in the 
guidelines to ``Schedule III Hydrocodone.'' In light of the 
rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products from schedule III to 
schedule II, the references to schedule III hydrocodone are obsolete.
    Second, the proposed amendment provides a single marijuana 
equivalency for hydrocodone offenses, whether single-entity or in 
combination, that is based on the actual weight of the hydrocodone 
involved rather than the number of pills involved or the weight of an 
entire pill. Specifically, a marijuana equivalency under which 1 gram 
of ``hydrocodone (actual)'' equates to [4,467]/[6,700] grams of 
marijuana is proposed.
    The use of an ``actual'' approach for hydrocodone in the proposed 
amendment is informed by the Commission's decision in 2003 to use an 
``actual'' approach for oxycodone. See USSG App. C, amend. 657 
(effective November 1, 2003). Oxycodone is an opium alkaloid found in 
certain prescription pain relievers such as Percocet and OxyContin, 
generally sold in pill form. The Commission determined that a penalty 
structure based on the weight of the entire pill resulted in 
proportionality issues because (1) products come in different pill 
sizes and formulations and (2) products of the same size and 
formulation come in different dosages, containing different amounts of 
oxycodone. The Commission remedied these proportionality issues by 
adopting a penalty structure for oxycodone offenses using the weight of 
the actual oxycodone instead of the weight of the entire pill. See USSG 
App. C, amend. 657 (Reason for Amendment).
    Such proportionality issues may also arise with offenses involving 
hydrocodone products, to the extent those products come in different 
pill sizes, formulations, or dosages. The proposed use of an ``actual'' 
approach for hydrocodone would address these proportionality issues by 
providing sentences for hydrocodone offenses using the weight of the 
actual hydrocodone instead of the number of pills or the weight of an 
entire pill.
    The rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products also raises 
severity issues, and the proposed amendment addresses the severity 
issues by bracketing two possible severity levels, one that assigns 
hydrocodone (actual) the same marijuana equivalency as oxycodone 
(actual), and one that assigns a lower marijuana equivalency. The 
higher severity level (6,700 gm) is based on a 1:1 ratio of hydrocodone 
to oxycodone in marijuana equivalency, which would reflect a view that 
equivalent amounts of hydrocodone and oxycodone cause the same 
pharmacological effects on the body. The lower severity level (4,467 
gm) is based on a 3:2 ratio of hydrocodone to oxycodone in marijuana 
equivalency, which would reflect a view that it takes more hydrocodone 
than oxycodone to achieve the same pharmacological effects on the body. 
Compare ``Dosing Data for Clinically Employed Opioid Analgesics'' in 
Goodman and Gilman's The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, 12th 
edition (2011), p. 496 (recommending equivalent amounts of hydrocodone 
and oxycodone) with University of Chicago Department of Palliative 
Care, Opioid Analgesic Chart, available at http://champ.bsd.uchicago.edu/documents/Pallpaincard2009update.pdf 
(recommending 15 milligrams of hydrocodone as equivalent to 10 
milligrams of oxycodone).
    A multi-part issue for comment is also provided, seeking comment on 
hydrocodone offenses and offenders and how the proportionality and 
severity issues raised by the administrative actions should be 
addressed, either by the approach taken in the proposed amendment or 
some other manner.
Proposed Amendment
    Sections 2D1.1(c) is amended in subdivisions (5), (6), (7), (8) and 
(9) by striking the lines referenced to Schedule III Hydrocodone;
    and in subdivisions (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16) and 
(17) by striking the lines referenced to Schedule III Hydrocodone, and 
in the lines referenced to Schedule III substances (except Ketamine or 
Hydrocodone) by striking ``or Hydrocodone''.
    The annotation to Sec.  2D1.1(c) captioned ``Notes to Drug Quantity 
Table'' is amended in Note (B) in the last paragraph by striking ``The 
term `Oxycodone (actual)' refers'' and inserting ``The terms 
`Hydrocodone (actual)' and `Oxycodone (actual)' refer''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2D1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 8(D), under the heading relating to Schedule I or II 
Opiates, by striking the line referenced to Hydrocodone/
Dihydrocodeinone and inserting the following:
    ``1 gm of Hydrocodone (actual) = [4467]/[6700] gm of marihuana'';
    in the heading relating to Schedule III Substances (except ketamine 
and hydrocodone) by striking ``and hydrocodone'' both places such term 
appears;
    and in the heading relating to Schedule III Hydrocodone by striking 
the heading and subsequent paragraphs as follows:
    ``Schedule III Hydrocodone * * *
1 unit of Schedule III hydrocodone = 1 gm of marihuana

    * * * Provided, that the combined equivalent weight of all Schedule 
III substances (except ketamine), Schedule IV substances (except 
flunitrazepam), and Schedule V substances shall not exceed 2,999.99 
kilograms of marihuana.'';
    and in Note 27(C) by inserting after ``methamphetamine,'' the 
following ``hydrocodone,''.
Issue for Comment
    1. The Commission seeks comment on how, if at all, the guidelines 
for hydrocodone trafficking should be changed, such as to address the 
administrative actions described in the synopsis above, and the 
severity and proportionality issues that may result from those actions.
A. Proportionality
    The proposed amendment would provide a marijuana equivalency for 
hydrocodone based on the actual weight of the controlled substance 
rather than on the number of pills or the weight of an entire pill. As 
discussed in the synopsis above, the Commission has used such an 
``actual'' approach for offenses involving oxycodone. Is the use of an 
``actual'' approach for hydrocodone offenses appropriate to address the 
proportionality issues that arise from differing pill sizes, 
formulations, and dosages?
    In the alternative, should the Commission continue to provide a 
marijuana equivalency for hydrocodone based on the entire weight of the 
pill?

[[Page 2586]]

If so, how, if at all, should the Commission address the 
proportionality issues that arise to the extent there are differing 
pill sizes, formulations, or dosages? For example, should the 
guidelines continue to distinguish between single-entity hydrocodone 
products and hydrocodone combination products? What distinctions, if 
any, should be made?
B. Severity
    Whether the Commission continues to provide a marijuana equivalency 
for hydrocodone based on the entire weight of the pill or provides a 
marijuana equivalency using an ``actual'' approach (as proposed by the 
proposed amendment), the Commission seeks comment on what marijuana 
equivalency or equivalencies should be provided for hydrocodone 
trafficking, in light of the first-ever approval of a hydrocodone 
single-entity product and the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination 
products from schedule III to schedule II.
    Under the current guidelines, a schedule III hydrocodone product 
has a marijuana equivalency based on the number of pills, at 1 unit = 1 
gram marijuana, and a schedule II hydrocodone product has a marijuana 
equivalency based on the weight of the entire pill, at 1 gram = 500 
grams marijuana. In light of the rescheduling, the entry for schedule 
III hydrocodone products is obsolete, and all hydrocodone combination 
products are schedule II controlled substances, with a marijuana 
equivalency based on the weight of the entire pill, at 1 gram = 500 
grams marijuana.
    If the Commission were to continue to use the entire weight of the 
pill for all hydrocodone offenses, is this severity level (1 gram = 500 
grams marijuana) appropriate? Should the Commission establish a 
different equivalency for all hydrocodone offenses, or several 
equivalencies, such as one equivalency for single-entity products and 
another for combination products? If so, what equivalency or 
equivalencies should the Commission provide?
    In the alternative, if the Commission were to use the ``actual'' 
approach in the proposed amendment, what marijuana equivalency should 
be used? Should 1 gram of hydrocodone (actual) equate to [4,467] grams 
of marijuana, or to [6,700] grams of marijuana? Or should the 
Commission establish a different equivalency than either of these? If 
so, what equivalency should the Commission provide?
C. General Comment on Hydrocodone Offenses and Offenders
    In determining the marijuana equivalencies for controlled 
substances, the Commission has considered, among other things, the 
chemical structure, the pharmacological effects, the potential for 
addiction and abuse, the patterns of abuse and harms associated with 
abuse, and the patterns of trafficking and harms associated with 
trafficking.
    The Commission invites general comment on hydrocodone offenses and 
hydrocodone offenders and how these offenses and offenders compare with 
other drug offenses and drug offenders. For example, how is hydrocodone 
manufactured, distributed, and marketed? How is it diverted? Once 
diverted, how is it distributed, possessed, and used? What are the 
characteristics of the offenders involved in these various activities? 
What harms are posed by these activities?
    Is the chemical structure of hydrocodone substantially similar to 
the chemical structure of a any other controlled substance referenced 
in Sec.  2D1.1? If so, to what substance?
    Is the effect on the central nervous system of hydrocodone 
substantially similar to the effect of any other controlled substance 
referenced in Sec.  2D1.1? If so, to what substance? Is the quantity of 
hydrocodone needed to produce that effect lesser or greater than the 
quantity needed of the other such substance? If so, what is the 
difference in relative potency?
    The Commission specifically invites comment on whether hydrocodone 
is similar to oxycodone. If so, should the Commission provide a 
marijuana equivalency for hydrocodone on this basis, e.g., by 
specifying a marijuana equivalency for hydrocodone (actual) equal to 
the marijuana equivalency for oxycodone (actual), which is 1 gram 
oxycodone (actual) = 6700 grams of marijuana?

8. Economic Crime

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment is a result 
of the Commission's multi-year study of Sec.  2B1.1 (Theft, Property, 
Destruction, and Fraud), and related guidelines, including examination 
of the loss table, the definition of loss, role in the offense, and 
offenses involving fraud on the market. See United States Sentencing 
Commission, ``Notice of Final Priorities,'' 79 FR 49378 (Aug. 20, 
2014).
    The proposed amendment contains four parts. The Commission is 
considering whether to promulgate any one or more of these parts, as 
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They are as follows:
    Part A revises the definition of ``intended loss'' at Sec.  2B1.1, 
comment. (n.3(A)(ii)). Two options are presented, one of which would 
reflect certain principles discussed in the Tenth Circuit's decision in 
United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011). Issues for 
comment on intended loss are also provided.
    Part B addresses the impact of the victims table in Sec.  
2B1.1(b)(2). It proposes to establish a new enhancement for cases where 
one or more victims suffered substantial [financial] hardship and to 
reduce the levels of enhancement that apply based solely on the number 
of victims. Two options are provided. It includes issues for comment on 
the victims table and other provisions relating to victims.
    Part C revises the specific offense characteristic for 
sophisticated means in subsection (b)(10)(C) in several ways. An issue 
for comment is also included.
    Part D addresses offenses involving fraud on the market and related 
offenses. Issues for comment are also included.

(A) Intended Loss

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This part of the proposed amendment 
revises the definition of ``intended loss'' at Sec.  2B1.1, comment. 
(n.3(A)(ii)). While the current definition for intended loss was added 
as part of the Economic Crime Package in 2001, see USSG App. C, amend. 
617 (eff. Nov. 1, 2001), the concept of intended loss has been included 
in the fraud and theft guidelines since the inception of the 
guidelines, see USSG Sec.  2F1.1, comment. (n.7) (1987). Note 3(A)(ii) 
states that ``intended loss''--
    (I) means the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the 
offense; and (II) includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been 
impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting 
operation, or an insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded the 
insured value).
    The Commission has received comment expressing concern regarding 
the operation of intended loss, including suggestions that the 
Commission consider certain revisions to better reflect a defendant's 
culpability. In addition to these comments, the Commission has observed 
some disagreement in the case law regarding whether intended loss 
requires a subjective or objective inquiry. In United States v. 
Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit held that a 
subjective inquiry is required, which is similar to holdings in the 
Second, Third and Fifth Circuits. See United States v. Confredo,

[[Page 2587]]

528 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2008) (remanding for consideration of 
whether defendant had ``proven a subjective intent to cause a loss of 
less than the aggregate amount'' of fraudulent loans); United States v. 
Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that intended loss is the 
loss the defendant subjectively intended to inflict on the victim); 
United States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (``To make 
this determination, we look to the defendant's subjective expectation, 
not to the risk of loss to which he may have exposed his victims.''); 
United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 527 (5th Cir. 2003) (``our case 
law requires the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant had the subjective intent to cause the loss that is 
used to calculate his offense level''). On the other hand, the First 
and the Seventh Circuits have issued decisions that support a more 
objective inquiry. See United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 291 
(1st Cir. 2008) (``we focus our loss inquiry for purposes of 
determining a defendant's offense level on the objectively reasonable 
expectation of a person in his position at the time he perpetrated the 
fraud, not on his subjective intentions or hopes''); United States v. 
Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 590 (7th Cir. 2003) (``The determination of 
intended loss under the Sentencing Guidelines therefore focuses on the 
conduct of the defendant and the objective financial risk to victims 
caused by that conduct'').
    The Commission is publishing this proposed amendment and issues for 
comment to inform the Commission's consideration of these issues. Two 
options are bracketed for comment. They are as follows:
    Option 1 would state that intended loss means the pecuniary harm 
``that the defendant purposely sought to inflict'' and that the 
defendant's purpose may be inferred from all available facts. This 
would reflect certain principles discussed in the Tenth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011). 
In Manatau, the defendant was convicted of bank fraud and aggravated 
identity theft. The district court determined that the intended loss 
should be determined by adding up the credit limits of the stolen 
convenience checks, because a loss up to those credit limits was ``both 
possible and potentially contemplated by the defendant's scheme.'' 647 
F.3d at 1049-1050. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that 
``intended loss'' contemplates ``a loss the defendant purposely sought 
to inflict,'' and that the appropriate standard was one of ``subjective 
intent to cause the loss.'' 647 F.3d at 1055. Such an intent, the court 
held, may be based on making ``reasonable inferences about the 
defendant's mental state from the available facts.'' 647 F.3d at 1056.
    Option 2 is similar to Option 1, but would also encompass the 
pecuniary harm that any other participant purposely sought to inflict, 
if the defendant was accountable under Sec.  1B1.3(a)(1)(A) for the 
other participant.
    Issues for comment on intended loss are also provided.
Proposed Amendment
    [Option 1:
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 3(A)(ii) by striking ``(I) means the pecuniary harm 
that was intended to result from the offense; and'' and inserting ``(I) 
means the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to 
inflict; and''; and by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``The defendant's purpose may be inferred from all available facts, 
including the defendant's actions, the actions and intentions of other 
participants, and the natural and probable consequences of those 
actions.''.]
    [Option 2:
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 3(A)(ii) by striking ``(I) means the pecuniary harm 
that was intended to result from the offense; and'' and inserting ``(I) 
means (a) the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to 
inflict and (b) the pecuniary harm that any other participant purposely 
sought to inflict, if the defendant was accountable under Sec.  
1B1.3(a)(1)(A) for the other participant; and''; and by adding at the 
end the following new paragraph:
    ``An individual's purpose may be inferred from all available facts, 
including the individual's actions, the actions and intentions of other 
participants, and the natural and probable consequences of those 
actions.''.]
Issues for Comment
    1. The Commission seeks comment on whether the definition of 
``intended loss'' should be revised or refined, in the manner 
contemplated by the proposed amendment or in some other manner, to 
clarify or simplify guideline operation or for other reasons consistent 
with the purposes of sentencing. What changes, if any, should the 
Commission make to the definition of ``intended loss''?
    How should the definition of ``intended loss'' interact with other 
parts of the guidelines? For example:
    (A) Should intended loss be limited to the amount the defendant 
personally intended, or should it also include amounts intended by 
other participants, such as participants (i) that the defendant aided 
and abetted, and/or (ii) that were in a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity with the defendant?
    (B) How should intended loss interact with the commentary relating 
to partially completed offenses in Sec.  2B1.1, Application Note 18 
(providing that, in the case of a partially completed offense, the 
offense level is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of 
Sec.  2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy))?
    2. Section 2B1.1 provides that for the determination of loss under 
subsection (b)(1), the court shall use the greater of ``actual loss'' 
or ``intended loss.'' Should intended loss be limited in some manner?

(B) Victims Table

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This part of the proposed amendment 
addresses issues relating to the impact of the victims table in Sec.  
2B1.1(b)(2) as well as other provisions relating to victims in Sec.  
2B1.1.
    The victims table provides a tiered enhancement based on the number 
of victims. It provides an enhancement of 2 levels if the offense 
involved 10 or more victims or was committed through mass-marketing; 4 
levels if the offense involved 50 or more victims; and 6 levels if the 
offense involved 250 or more victims.
    First, the proposed amendment provides a new enhancement at 
subsection (b)(3)(A) that applies if the offense resulted in 
substantial [financial] hardship to one or more victims. Two options 
are presented. Under Option 1, the enhancement applies if there are one 
or more such victims and the amount of the enhancement is bracketed at 
[2][3][4] levels. Option 2 provides a tiered enhancement based on the 
number of such victims. Specifically, if there is at least [one] such 
victim, the enhancement is [1][2] levels; if there are at least [five] 
such victims, the enhancement is [2][4] levels; and if there are at 
least [25] such victims, the enhancement is [3][6] levels. The proposed 
amendment also provides factors for the court to consider in 
determining whether substantial [financial] hardship resulted. Several 
of those factors, bracketed in the proposed amendment, are non-monetary 
and are derived from the upward departure

[[Page 2588]]

provision at Application Note 20(A)(vi). The proposed amendment also 
brackets the possibility of deleting Application Note 20(A)(vi).
    Both options also bracket the possibility of a ``cap'' that limits 
the cumulative impact of subsection (b)(2) and the new (b)(3)(A) to [6] 
levels.
    Second, the proposed amendment revises the impact of the victims 
table by reducing the enhancements in the table from 2, 4, and 6 levels 
to 1, 2, and 3 levels, respectively.
    Third, the proposed amendment deletes prong (iii) of subsection 
(b)(16)(B), relating to an offense that substantially endangered the 
solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims.
    Finally, the proposed amendment includes issues for comment on 
other possible changes to the operation and impact of the victims table 
and other provisions relating to victims in Sec.  2B1.1.
Proposed Amendment
    Section 2B1.1 is amended in subsection (b)(2) by striking ``2 
levels'', ``4 levels'', and ``6 levels'' and inserting ``1 level'', ``2 
levels'', and ``3 levels'', respectively;
    by redesignating subsections (b)(3) through (b)(16) as (b)(4) 
through (b)(17), respectively (and conforming references to those 
subsections accordingly);
    by inserting after subsection (b)(2) the following new subsection 
(b)(3):
    [Option 1:
    ``(3)(A) If the offense resulted in substantial [financial] 
hardship to one or more victims, increase by [2][3][4] levels.
    [(B) The cumulative adjustments from application of both 
subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3)(A) shall not exceed [6] levels.'']];
    [Option 2:
    ``(3)(A) (Apply the greatest) If the offense resulted in 
substantial [financial] hardship to--
    (i) [one] or more victims, increase by [1][2] levels;
    (ii) [five] or more victims, increase by [2][4] levels; or
    (iii) [25] or more victims, increase by [3][6] levels.
    [(B) The cumulative adjustments from application of both 
subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3)(A) shall not exceed [6] levels.'']]; and
    in subsection (b)(17) (as so redesignated) by inserting ``or'' at 
the end of subdivision (B)(i); by striking ``; or (iii) substantially 
endangered the solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims''; 
and by striking ``(b)(16)(B)'' and inserting ``(b)(17)(B)''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended by redesignating Notes 5 through 20 as Notes 6 through 21, 
respectively; by inserting after Note 4 the following new Note 5:
    ``5. Enhancement for Substantial [Financial] Hardship (Subsection 
(b)(3)).--In determining whether the offense resulted in substantial 
[financial] hardship to a victim, the court shall consider, among other 
factors, whether the offense resulted in the victim--
    (A) becoming insolvent;
    (B) filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code (title 11, 
United States Code);
    (C) suffering substantial loss of a retirement, education, or other 
savings or investment fund;
    (D) making substantial changes to his or her employment, such as 
postponing his or her retirement plans;
    (E) making substantial changes to his or her living arrangements, 
such as relocating to a less expensive home;
    [(F) suffering substantial harm to his or her reputation or credit 
record, or a substantial inconvenience related to repairing his or her 
reputation or a damaged credit record;]
    [(G) being erroneously arrested or denied a job because an arrest 
record has been made in his or her name;]
    [(H) having his or her identity assumed by someone else.]''; and
    in Note 21 (as so redesignated) [by striking subdivision (A)(vi)].
Issues for Comment
    1. The Commission seeks comment on whether the victims table and 
other parts of Sec.  2B1.1 adequately address the harms to victims. If 
not, what if any additional enhancements or other provisions should the 
Commission provide to address those harms?
    Alternatively, should the Commission amend Sec.  2B1.1 to limit the 
impact of the victims table if no victims were substantially harmed by 
the offense? For example, should the Commission provide that the 4-
level and 6-level prongs of the victim table apply only if the offense 
substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of at least 
one victim?
    2. The proposed amendment would establish a new enhancement if the 
offense resulted in substantial [financial] hardship to one or more 
victims, and provides factors for the court to consider in determining 
whether the enhancement applies.
    The Commission seeks comment on the scope of the enhancement and 
the factors provided. Should the new enhancement encompass non-monetary 
harms? If so, what non-monetary harms should it encompass? Should any 
factors be deleted or changed? Should any additional factors be added? 
If so, what factors?
    How should this new enhancement interact with other provisions in 
Sec.  2B1.1 that account for harm to victims? For example, how should 
this new enhancement interact with the victims table in subsection 
(b)(2), the enhancement for theft from the person of another in 
subsection (b)(3), the enhancement for means of identification in 
subsection (b)(11), and the enhancement for unauthorized public 
dissemination of personal information in subsection (b)(17)(B)? Should 
this new enhancement be fully cumulative with the victims table and the 
other enhancements, or should the Commission reduce the cumulative 
impact of these various provisions?
    3. Section 2B1.1(b)(16)(B)(iii) provides a 4-level enhancement if 
the offense ``substantially endangered the solvency or financial 
security of 100 or more victims.'' The Commission seeks comment on 
whether subsection (b)(16)(B)(iii) should be eliminated (as reflected 
in the proposed amendment) or, in the alternative, whether the number 
of victims required by subsection (b)(16)(B)(iii) should be reduced. If 
the number of victims should be reduced, what number of victims should 
be required?

(C) Sophisticated Means

    Synopsis of the Proposed Amendment: As part of its overall 
examination of Sec.  2B1.1, the Commission is considering issues 
relating to the application of the sophisticated means enhancement set 
forth in subsection (b)(10)(C). In doing so, the Commission identified 
two issues that are the subject of this part of the proposed amendment.
    First, the existing enhancement applies if ``the offense otherwise 
involved sophisticated means.'' Applying this language, courts have 
applied this enhancement without a determination of whether the 
defendant's own conduct was ``sophisticated.'' See, e.g., United States 
v. Bishop-Oyedepo, 480 Fed. App'x 431, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming enhancement for mortgage loan officer who submitted three 
fraudulent applications because the other schemer's actions were 
``reasonably foreseeable''; stating that ``because [the defendant] knew 
of the scheme and the scheme as a whole was sophisticated, the 
adjustment was appropriate regardless of the sophistication of her 
individual actions''). Relatedly, courts have varied in their analysis 
as to whether a scheme must be ``sophisticated'' in comparison to any

[[Page 2589]]

fraud that could be sentenced under Sec.  2B1.1 or if, instead, the 
scheme must be sophisticated in comparison to a scheme of the type at 
issue. Compare United States v. Jones, 530 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 
2008) (affirming application of enhancement because scheme at issue was 
``readily distinguishable from less sophisticated means by which the 
myriad crimes within the ambit of Sec.  2B1.1 may be committed''), with 
United States v. Wayland, 549 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
application of enhancement because the ``scheme required a greater 
level of planning or concealment than the typical health care fraud 
case'') and United States v. Hance, 501 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that the sophisticated means enhancement is appropriate when 
the ``mail fraud, viewed as a whole, was notably more intricate than 
that of the garden-variety mail fraud scheme'').
    The Commission is publishing this part of the proposed amendment to 
inform its consideration of whether the enhancement should be revised 
such that it applies based only on the defendant's conduct rather than 
offense as a whole, and whether the conduct should be compared only to 
similar frauds or to all frauds that could fall within the scope of 
Sec.  2B1.1.
    The proposed amendment revises the specific offense characteristic 
for sophisticated means in subsection (b)(10)(C) in several ways.
    Specifically, it specifies that sophisticated means is determined 
relative to offenses of the same kind, and it narrows the scope of the 
specific offense characteristic to cases in which the defendant used 
(rather than the offense involved) sophisticated means.
    An issue for comment is also included.
Proposed Amendment
    Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) is amended by inserting after ``otherwise 
involved sophisticated means'' the following: ``and the defendant 
engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 9 by striking ``Sophisticated Means Enhancement under'' 
in the heading and inserting ``Application of''; and by striking 
subdivision (B) as follows:
    ``(B) Sophisticated Means Enhancement under Subsection 
(b)(10)(C).--For purposes of subsection (b)(10)(C), `sophisticated 
means' means especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct 
pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense. For example, 
in a telemarketing scheme, locating the main office of the scheme in 
one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in another 
jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated means. Conduct such as 
hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious 
entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts also 
ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.''; and inserting the 
following new subdivision (B):
    ``(B) Sophisticated Means Enhancement under Subsection 
(b)(10)(C).--For purposes of subsection (b)(10)(C), `sophisticated 
means' means especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct 
that displays a significantly greater level of planning or employs 
significantly more advanced methods in executing or concealing the 
offense than a typical offense of the same kind. Conduct that is common 
to offenses of the same kind ordinarily does not constitute 
sophisticated means.
    In addition, application of subsection (b)(10)(C) requires not only 
that the offense involve conduct constituting sophisticated means but 
also that the defendant engaged in or caused such conduct, i.e., the 
defendant committed such conduct or the defendant aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused such 
conduct. See Sec.  1B1.3(a)(1)(A).''.
Issue for Comment
    1. The proposed amendment would specify that ``sophisticated 
means'' is determined relative to other offenses of the same kind. What 
guidance, if any, should the Commission provide for determining what 
offenses are of the same kind, for purposes of determining 
sophisticated means? For example, are all telemarketing fraud offenses 
of the same kind, or should distinctions be made among different kinds 
of telemarketing fraud offenses, or--conversely--are all telemarketing 
fraud offenses in fact a subset of a broader category? Similarly, are 
all theft offenses of the same kind, or are there broader or narrower 
distinctions that should be made?

(D) Fraud on the Market and Related Offenses

    Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This part of the proposed amendment 
addresses offenses involving the fraudulent inflation or deflation in 
the value of a publicly traded security or commodity. The proposed new 
guideline is a result of the Commission's continued work on fraud 
offenses and, in particular, in the area of securities fraud and 
``fraud on the market'' offenses. See 79 FR 49379 (August 20, 2014) 
(identifying as a Commission priority for the current amendment cycle 
the continuation of its work on economic crimes, including among other 
things a study of offenses involving fraud on the market).
    The proposed amendment also involves the Commission's past work in 
implementing the directive in section 1079A(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203.
    Specifically, section 1079A(a)(1)(A) directed the Commission to 
``review and, if appropriate, amend'' the guidelines and policy 
statements applicable to ``persons convicted of offenses relating to 
securities fraud or any other similar provision of law, in order to 
reflect the intent of Congress that penalties for the offenses under 
the guidelines and policy statements appropriately account for the 
potential and actual harm to the public and the financial markets from 
the offenses.''
    In addition, section 1079A(a)(1)(B) provided that, in promulgating 
any such amendment, the Commission shall--
    (i) ensure that the guidelines and policy statements, particularly 
section 2B1.1(b)(14) and section 2B1.1(b)(17) (and any successors 
thereto), reflect--
    (I) the serious nature of the offenses described in subparagraph 
(A);
    (II) the need for an effective deterrent and appropriate punishment 
to prevent the offenses; and
    (III) the effectiveness of incarceration in furthering the 
objectives described in subclauses (I) and (II);
    (ii) consider the extent to which the guidelines appropriately 
account for the potential and actual harm to the public and the 
financial markets resulting from the offenses;
    (iii) ensure reasonable consistency with other relevant directives 
and guidelines and Federal statutes;
    (iv) make any necessary conforming changes to guidelines; and
    (v) ensure that the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of 
sentencing, as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United 
States Code.
    Securities fraud is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1348 (Securities and 
commodities fraud), which makes it unlawful to knowingly execute, or 
attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any person in 
connection with a security or (2) to obtain, by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or 
property in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The 
statutory maximum term of imprisonment for an offense under section 
1348 is 25 years. Offenses under section 1348 are referenced in 
Appendix

[[Page 2590]]

A (Statutory Index) to Sec.  2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and 
Fraud).
    Securities fraud is also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Failure 
of corporate officers to certify financial reports), violations of the 
provisions of law referred to in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47), and violations 
of the rules, regulations, and orders issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission pursuant to those provisions of law. See Sec.  
2B1.1, comment. (n.14(A)). In addition, there are cases in which the 
defendant committed a securities law violation but is prosecuted under 
a general fraud statute. In general, these offenses are likewise 
referenced to Sec.  2B1.1.
    Under the proposed amendment, the court is directed to use gain, 
rather than loss, for purposes of subsection (b)(1) if the offense 
involved (i) the fraudulent inflation or deflation in the value of a 
publicly traded security or commodity and (ii) the submission of false 
information in a public filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or similar regulator. However, the enhancement under 
subsection (b)(1) shall be not less than [14]-[22] levels. While cases 
involving this conduct occur infrequently (the Commission identified 
seven such cases in fiscal years 2012 and 2013), the Commission has 
received comment that these cases are complex, resulting in courts 
applying a variety of methods to determine the appropriate enhancement 
under subsection (b)(1). In such cases in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, 
the median enhancement under subsection (b)(1) was 14 levels and the 
average sentence was 48 months.
    As a conforming change, the special rule at Application Note 
3(F)(ix), relating to the calculation of loss in cases involving the 
fraudulent inflation in the value of a publicly traded security or 
commodity, is deleted.
    Issues for comment are also included.
Proposed Amendment
    Section 2B1.1 is amended in subsection (b)(1) by adding after 
subparagraph (P) the following proviso to subsection (b)(1):
    ``Provided, that if the offense involved (i) the fraudulent 
inflation or deflation in the value of a publicly traded security or 
commodity and (ii) the submission of false information in a public 
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission or similar 
regulator, the enhancement determined above shall be based on the gain 
that resulted from the offense rather than the loss. However, the 
enhancement under subsection (b)(1) shall be not less than [14]-[22] 
levels.''.
    The Commentary to Sec.  2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is 
amended in Note 3(F) by deleting subdivision (ix).
Issues for Comment
    1. In 2012, the Commission responded to directives in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-
203, by providing, among other things, a special rule for determining 
actual loss in cases involving the fraudulent inflation or deflation in 
the value of a publicly traded security or commodity, see Sec.  2B1.1, 
comment. (n.3(F)(ix)), and departure provisions for cases in which 
there was risk of a significant disruption of a national financial 
market, see Sec.  2B1.1, comment. (n.20(A)(iv)), and cases in which 
there was a securities fraud involving a fraudulent statement made 
publicly to the market, see Sec.  2B1.1, comment. (n.20(C)).
    The Commission seeks comment on the operation of these provisions 
and whether they adequately address ``fraud on the market'' cases and 
similar types of cases involving the financial markets. Should the 
Commission revise these provisions to better address these types of 
cases? If so, how? Should the Commission make any other changes to the 
guidelines to address these types of cases? If so, what changes should 
the Commission make? For example, should the Commission provide a 
separate guideline for these cases? In the alternative, should these 
cases be sentenced under Sec.  2B1.4 (Insider Trading) instead of Sec.  
2B1.1, and if so, what if any changes should be made to Sec.  2B1.4 to 
address these cases?
    2. The Commission seeks comment on whether gain, rather than loss, 
is a more appropriate method for determining the harm accountable to 
the defendant in ``fraud on the market'' cases. What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of using gain to measure harm in such cases? Are 
there application issues that would arise in determining gain in such 
cases? If so, what are the issues and how, if at all, should the 
Commission address them?
    3. The Commission has heard concerns that gain and loss are 
difficult to measure in ``fraud on the market'' cases and may not 
effectively address the role of market forces and other factors. 
Accordingly, it has been argued, the use of gain or loss may over-
punish some defendants and under-punish others. How, if at all, should 
the Commission address this issue?
    In particular, the Commission seeks comment on whether ``fraud on 
the market'' offenses should be structured to include a minimum level 
of enhancement of [14]-[22] levels (as bracketed in the proposed 
amendment) under subsection (b)(1). Would such an approach be 
consistent with the purposes of sentencing and the directives to the 
Commission in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act? Should the Commission consider such an approach? If so, what 
minimum level of enhancement should be provided?
    If the Commission were to provide such a minimum enhancement for 
such cases, should the Commission also specify that certain other 
specific offense characteristics in the guideline should not apply in 
such cases?

[FR Doc. 2015-00665 Filed 1-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 2210-40-P