[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 26, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70555-70566]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27985]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


United States V. Flakeboard America Limited, Celulosa Arauco Y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., Inversiones Angelini Y 
Compa[ntilde][iacute]a, Limitada, and Sierrapine; Proposed Final 
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, 
Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in United 
States of America v. Flakeboard America Limited, Celulosa Arauco y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., Inversiones Angelini y 
Compa[ntilde][iacute]a, Limitada and SierraPine, Civil Action No. 3:14-
cv-04949. On November 7, 2014, the United States filed a Complaint 
alleging that Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine coordinated to close 
SierraPine's Springfield, Oregon particleboard mill and move the mill's 
customers to Flakeboard before receiving federal antitrust approval 
under Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, also commonly known 
as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (``Section 
7A'' or ``HSR Act''). The Complaint alleges that this coordination 
constituted a per se unlawful agreement between competitors to reduce 
output and allocate customers in violation of

[[Page 70556]]

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and a premature transfer of 
beneficial ownership to Flakeboard in violation of the HSR Act.
    The United States and the defendants have reached a proposed 
settlement that eliminates the need for a trial in this case. The 
proposed Final Judgment, filed the same time as the Complaint, remedies 
the Sherman Act violation by enjoining the defendants from reaching 
similar anticompetitive agreements with competitors and requiring 
Flakeboard to disgorge $1.15 million, the approximate amount of profits 
that Flakeboard illegally obtained from the closure of the Springfield 
mill. To resolve the HSR Act violation, the proposed Final Judgment 
requires the companies to pay a combined $3.8 million in civil 
penalties.
    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive 
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of 
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth 
Street NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481), 
on the Department of Justice's Web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr, 
and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California. Copies of these materials may be 
obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the 
copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this 
notice. Such comments, including the name of the submitter, and 
responses thereto, will be posted on the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division's internet Web site, filed with the Court and, under 
certain circumstances, published in the Federal Register. Comments 
should be directed to Peter Mucchetti, Chief, Litigation I Section, 
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 
4100, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-0001).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.
Amy R. Fitzpatrick (D.C. Bar #458680)
David Altschuler (D.C. Bar #983023)
Bindi Bhagat (PA Bar #308788)
Barry Creech (D.C. Bar #421070)
Claudia H. Dulmage (OH Bar #0026543)
Scott I. Fitzgerald (WA Bar #39716)
Kara Kuritz (D.C. Bar #991349)
John Lohrer (D.C. Bar #438989)
Jeffrey Vernon (D.C. Bar #1009690)

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street 
NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Phone: (202) 532-4558, 
Facsimile: (202) 307-5802, Email: [email protected]

[Additional counsel listed on signature page]

Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America

United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
San Francisco Division

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Flakeboard America 
Limited, Celulosa Arauco y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., Inversiones 
Angelini y Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada, and Sierrapine, 
Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-cv-4949

Complaint

    The United States of America brings this civil antitrust action to 
challenge unlawful conduct by Flakeboard America Limited; its parent 
companies, Celulosa Arauco y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., and Inversiones 
Angelini y Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada; and SierraPine that 
occurred while the U.S. Department of Justice was reviewing 
Flakeboard's proposed acquisition of certain assets from SierraPine.

I. Nature of the Action

    1. On January 13, 2014, Flakeboard and SierraPine executed an asset 
purchase agreement in which Flakeboard agreed to acquire SierraPine's 
particleboard mills in Springfield, Oregon, and Martell, California, 
and a medium-density fiberboard (MDF) mill in Medford, Oregon. The 
total value of the proposed transaction was approximately $107 million, 
plus a variable amount for inventory.
    2. SierraPine's Springfield and Martell particleboard mills 
competed directly with Flakeboard's particleboard mill in Albany, 
Oregon. Particleboard is an unfinished wood product that is widely used 
in countertops, shelving, low-end furniture, and other finished 
products. Both companies also compete in the sale of MDF, a higher-end 
wood product that is widely used in furniture, kitchen cabinets, and 
decorative mouldings.
    3. The transaction exceeded thresholds established by Section 7A of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, also commonly known as the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (``Section 7A'' 
or ``HSR Act''). Consequently, the HSR Act required that the defendants 
make premerger notification filings with the Federal Trade Commission 
and Department of Justice and observe a waiting period before 
Flakeboard obtained beneficial ownership of SierraPine's business. The 
waiting period seeks to ensure that the parties to a proposed 
transaction are preserved as independent entities while the reviewing 
agency--here, the Department of Justice--investigates the transaction 
and determines whether to challenge it.
    4. Instead of preserving SierraPine as an independent business, 
however, Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine coordinated during the HSR 
waiting period to close SierraPine's Springfield mill and move the 
mill's customers to Flakeboard. The mill was permanently shut down on 
March 13, 2014, months before the HSR waiting period expired. On 
September 30, 2014, Flakeboard and SierraPine abandoned their proposed 
transaction in response to concerns expressed by the Department of 
Justice about the transaction's likely anticompetitive effects in the 
sale of MDF.
    5. The defendants' coordination to close Springfield and move the 
mill's customers to Flakeboard constituted a per se unlawful agreement 
between competitors to reduce output and allocate customers in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and prematurely 
transferred operational control of SierraPine's business to Flakeboard 
during the HSR waiting period in violation of Section 7A of the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a.

II. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Interstate Commerce

    6. The United States brings this action under Section 4 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, seeking relief for the violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and under Section 7A of the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, to recover civil penalties for the violation of the 
HSR Act. This Court has jurisdiction over this action and the 
defendants under Section 7A(g) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g), 28 
U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), 1345, and 1355.
    7. The defendants are engaged in, and their activities 
substantially affect, interstate commerce.
    8. The defendants have stipulated to venue and personal 
jurisdiction in this District.

III. The Defendants

    9. Flakeboard America Limited is a Delaware corporation with its 
U.S. headquarters in Fort Mill, South Carolina. Flakeboard and its 
related entities own numerous mills in North America that produce 
particleboard and MDF, including a particleboard mill in Albany, 
Oregon.
    10. Flakeboard's parent company is Celulosa Arauco y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., a Chilean company headquartered in Santiago, 
Chile, that also produces particleboard and other products. Arauco 
oversees Flakeboard's operations in North America.

[[Page 70557]]

    11. Inversiones Angelini y Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada is a 
Chilean corporation headquartered in Santiago, Chile. Inversiones 
Angelini is a holding company and Flakeboard's ultimate parent entity, 
as defined by the Premerger Notification Rules, 16 CFR 800 et seq. 
Inversiones Angelini is also the ultimate parent entity of Arauco.
    12. SierraPine is a California limited partnership with its 
headquarters in Roseville, California. SierraPine owns an operating 
particleboard mill in Martell, California; the closed particleboard 
mill in Springfield, Oregon; a closed particleboard mill in Adel, 
Georgia; and an operating MDF mill in Medford, Oregon.

IV. The HSR Act and the Asset Purchase Agreement

    13. The HSR Act imposes notification and waiting-period 
requirements on certain transactions that result in an acquiring person 
holding assets or voting securities valued above certain thresholds. 
Section 801(c)(1) of the Premerger Notification Rules, 16 CFR 800 et 
seq., defines ``hold'' to mean to have ``beneficial ownership.'' One 
way that an acquiring person may prematurely obtain beneficial 
ownership of assets or voting securities it plans to acquire is by 
obtaining operational control of the acquired person's business before 
the end of the HSR waiting period. This conduct, sometimes referred to 
as ``gun jumping,'' violates Section 7A.
    14. Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g)(1), 
states that any person, or any officer, director, or partner thereof, 
who fails to comply with any provision of the HSR Act is liable to the 
United States for a civil penalty for each day during which the person 
is in violation. For the period relevant to the Complaint, the maximum 
civil penalty was $16,000 per defendant, per day, according to the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, Sec.  31001(s) 
(amending the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 
28 U.S.C. 2461 note), and Federal Trade Commission Rule 1.98, 16 CFR 
1.98, 61 FR 54548 (Oct. 21, 1996).
    15. Flakeboard's proposed acquisition of SierraPine's mills was 
subject to the HSR Act. On January 22, 2014, Flakeboard's ultimate 
parent entity, Inversiones Angelini, and SierraPine submitted premerger 
notification filings to the antitrust agencies as required by Section 
7A. The HSR waiting period expired on August 27, 2014, 30 days after 
Flakeboard and SierraPine certified compliance with the Antitrust 
Division's requests for additional information.
    16. Before negotiating the proposed acquisition, SierraPine had no 
plans to shut down the Springfield mill. But during negotiations, 
Flakeboard made clear that it did not intend to operate Springfield 
after the transaction closed. Flakeboard insisted that SierraPine close 
the mill because Flakeboard did not want to manage the shutdown, and 
its parent company, Arauco, was concerned that its reputation might be 
harmed if it announced the closure.
    17. Accordingly, SierraPine agreed in the asset purchase agreement 
(APA) to ``take such actions as are reasonably necessary to shut down 
and close all business operations at its Springfield, Oregon facility 
five (5) days prior to the Closing.'' The APA further provided that 
``in no event shall [SierraPine] be required to shut down or close its 
business operations at its Springfield, Oregon facility'' until ``[a]ny 
required waiting periods and approvals . . . under applicable Antitrust 
Law shall have expired or been terminated.'' Consistent with these 
provisions, when Flakeboard and SierraPine executed the APA, they 
anticipated that SierraPine would announce and implement the 
Springfield closure immediately after the HSR waiting period expired, 
but before the transaction was consummated.

V. The Defendants' Unlawful Conduct

    18. Despite the defendants' intentions under the APA, they 
subsequently entered into a series of agreements and took other actions 
during the HSR waiting period to close SierraPine's Springfield mill 
and move the mill's customers to Flakeboard--conduct that together 
constituted an unlawful agreement between competitors and prematurely 
transferred operational control of SierraPine's business to Flakeboard.
    19. On January 14, 2014, the day after executing the APA, the 
defendants announced Flakeboard's proposed acquisition of SierraPine's 
mills. SierraPine did not announce the Springfield closure at that time 
because it intended to continue operating Springfield if the 
acquisition was not consummated and knew that employees and customers 
would start leaving the mill as soon as news of the planned closure 
became public.
    20. Within two days of the transaction's announcement, however, a 
labor issue arose that SierraPine believed would likely require it to 
publicly disclose the Springfield closure earlier than planned, while 
the transaction was still being reviewed by the Department of Justice. 
SierraPine immediately informed Flakeboard that the labor issue would 
require them to ``share the pending news on Springfield . . . before we 
have early determination on [the] HSR.'' The following week, SierraPine 
and Flakeboard discussed the Springfield closure announcement, its 
timing, and its ramifications. During these discussions, the companies 
considered the possibility that Flakeboard might waive the provision 
requiring SierraPine to close the mill, which they expected would avert 
the need to announce the Springfield closure during the HSR waiting 
period.
    21. After consulting with Arauco, however, Flakeboard informed 
SierraPine that it would not waive the Springfield closure provision. 
As a result, the companies understood that SierraPine would announce 
the Springfield closure during the HSR waiting period and that the mill 
would close within weeks of that announcement, without regard to 
whether the HSR waiting period had expired and regardless of whether 
the underlying transaction was ultimately consummated. Consistent with 
this understanding, at the end of January, Flakeboard and SierraPine 
agreed on the content and timing of a press release announcing that 
Springfield would ``cease operations in an orderly manner over the next 
few weeks'' and that the mill would be ``permanent[ly] clos[ed].'' 
SierraPine issued the press release on February 4, 2014, and ceased 
production at Springfield on March 13, 2014, months before the HSR 
waiting period expired.
    22. Flakeboard and SierraPine also agreed to transition 
Springfield's customers to Flakeboard's competing mill in Albany, 
Oregon. In the period leading up to the Springfield closure 
announcement, SierraPine gave Flakeboard competitively sensitive 
information about Springfield's customers--including the name, contact 
information, and types and volume of products purchased by each 
Springfield customer--and Flakeboard distributed this information to 
its sales employees. SierraPine also agreed to Flakeboard's request to 
delay the issuance of the press release from February 3 to February 4 
so that Flakeboard could better position its sales personnel to contact 
Springfield's customers.
    23. In addition, at Flakeboard's request, SierraPine instructed its 
own sales employees to inform Springfield customers following the 
Springfield closure announcement that Flakeboard wanted to serve their 
business and would match SierraPine's prices. Also at Flakeboard's 
request, SierraPine relayed

[[Page 70558]]

assurances of future employment with Flakeboard to key SierraPine sales 
employees so that they would direct SierraPine's Springfield customers 
to Flakeboard. A top Flakeboard sales manager underscored the purpose 
of these employment assurances: ``Once that [Springfield closure] 
announcement is made the 74 [million square feet of particleboard] from 
Springfield becomes fair game. I . . . want to make sure that the 
SierraPine sales group will be trying to direct the business to their 
new employer and to [Flakeboard's Albany mill].''
    24. After the Springfield closure announcement, SierraPine did not 
compete for most of Springfield's customers from its remaining 
particleboard mill in Martell, California, but instead directed these 
customers to Flakeboard, telling them that Flakeboard could meet their 
needs and would honor SierraPine's prices. As SierraPine informed one 
Springfield customer, ``We will try and transition all business to 
[Flakeboard's] Albany [mill].''
    25. With SierraPine's assistance, Flakeboard successfully secured a 
substantial amount of Springfield's business, including a significant 
number of new customers that Flakeboard had not previously served and 
additional business from customers that Springfield and Flakeboard's 
Albany mill both previously served. The increased sales volumes from 
SierraPine's Springfield customers significantly increased Flakeboard's 
profits.
    26. Although Flakeboard and SierraPine subsequently abandoned their 
transaction on September 30, 2014, SierraPine's Springfield mill 
remains closed. Virtually all of its employees have voluntarily left or 
been terminated. Reopening the Springfield mill would be costly and 
time-consuming, and SierraPine has no plans to do so.

VI. Violations Alleged

First Cause of Action (Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act)

    27. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations in 
paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint.
    28. Flakeboard and SierraPine are horizontal competitors in the 
sale of particleboard.
    29. Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine's coordination to close 
SierraPine's particleboard mill in Springfield, Oregon, and to move the 
mill's customers to Flakeboard constituted a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade that was unlawful under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Their unlawful agreement was not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the procompetitive benefits of any 
legitimate business collaboration.
    30. Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine's actions to close the 
Springfield mill and move its customers to Flakeboard were undertaken 
without any assurance that their transaction would be consummated and 
constituted an agreement between competitors to reduce output and 
allocate customers that is per se unlawful under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.

Second Cause of Action (Violation of Section 7A of the Clayton Act)

    31. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations in 
paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint.
    32. Flakeboard's acquisition of SierraPine's mills was subject to 
Section 7A's premerger notification and waiting-period requirements.
    33. Flakeboard, after contracting to acquire SierraPine's assets 
under the APA, exercised operational control, and therefore obtained 
beneficial ownership, over SierraPine's business in violation of the 
HSR Act by:
    (a) Coordinating with SierraPine to close the Springfield mill 
without regard to the HSR waiting period;
    (b) Coordinating with SierraPine to move Springfield's customers to 
Flakeboard during the HSR waiting period, by, among other things:
    (i) obtaining competitively sensitive information from SierraPine, 
including a customer list with the name, contact information, and types 
and volume of products purchased by each Springfield customer, and 
distributing this confidential information to Flakeboard sales 
employees;
    (ii) delaying the Springfield closure announcement so that 
Flakeboard could better position its sales team to contact 
Springfield's customers;
    (iii) directing SierraPine sales employees to inform Springfield 
customers that Flakeboard sought their business and would match 
SierraPine's prices; and
    (iv) coordinating with SierraPine to offer assurances of future 
employment with Flakeboard to key SierraPine sales employees so that 
they would direct Springfield's customers to Flakeboard.
    34. Through these actions, Flakeboard exercised operational 
control, and therefore obtained beneficial ownership, of SierraPine's 
business before the HSR waiting period expired.
    35. The defendants were continuously in violation of Section 7A 
from on or about January 17, 2014, until the HSR waiting period expired 
on August 27, 2014. Thus, Inversiones Angelini, as Flakeboard's 
ultimate parent entity (together with Arauco and Flakeboard) and 
SierraPine are each liable to the United States for a maximum civil 
penalty of $16,000 per day.

VII. Request for Relief

    36. The United States requests that this Court:
    (a) adjudge and decree that Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine 
engaged in an agreement, combination, or conspiracy that was unlawful 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act;
    (b) award the United States such other relief, including equitable 
monetary relief, as the nature of this case may require and as is just 
and proper to prevent the recurrence of the alleged violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and to dissipate the anticompetitive 
effects of the violation;
    (c) adjudge and decree that the defendants violated the HSR Act and 
were in violation of the HSR Act during the period beginning on or 
about January 17, 2014, and ending on August 27, 2014;
    (d) order that Inversiones Angelini (together with Arauco and 
Flakeboard) and SierraPine each pay to the United States an appropriate 
civil penalty as provided under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. 18(a)(g)(1), and 16 CFR 1.98(a); and
    (e) award the United States the costs of this action.


Dated: November 7, 2014

    Respectfully Submitted,

    For Plaintiff United States of America.

/s/William J. Baer
William J. Baer
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust

Leslie C. Overton
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

David I. Gelfand
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Patricia A. Brink
Director of Civil Enforcement

Mark W. Ryan
Director of Litigation

Peter J. Mucchetti
Chief, Litigation I

Ryan M. Kantor
Assistant Chief, Litigation I

/s/Amy R. Fitzpatrick
Amy R. Fitzpatrick*
David Altschuler
Bindi Bhagat
Barry Creech
Claudia H. Dulmage
Scott I. Fitzgerald
Kara Kuritz
John Lohrer
Jeffrey Vernon

Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street 
NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Phone: (202) 532-4558, 
Facsimile: (202) 307-5802, Email: [email protected]


[[Page 70559]]


Attorneys for the United States
* Attorney of Record

Certificate of Service

    I certify that on November 7, 2014, I electronically filed this 
Complaint with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. A copy has 
also been sent via email to:

Counsel for Flakeboard America Limited, Celulosa Arauco y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., and Inversiones Angelini y 
Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada: Andrew M. Lacy, Simpson, Thacher & 
Bartlett LLP, 1155 F Street NW., Washington, DC 20004, Phone: (202) 
636-5505, Email: [email protected]
Counsel for SierraPine: Amanda P. Reeves, Latham & Watkins LLP, 555 
Eleventh Street NW., Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20004, Phone: (202) 
637-2183, Email: [email protected]

/s/ Amy R. Fitzpatrick
Amy R. Fitzpatrick
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street 
NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Phone: (202) 532-4558, 
Facsimile: (202) 307-5802, Email: [email protected]

Amy R. Fitzpatrick (D.C. Bar #458680)
David Altschuler (D.C. Bar #983023)
Bindi Bhagat (PA Bar #308788)
Scott I. Fitzgerald (WA Bar #39716)

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street 
NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Phone: (202) 532-4558, 
Facsimile: (202) 307-5802, Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America

United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
San Francisco Division

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Flakeboard America 
Limited, Celulosa Arauco y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., Inversiones 
Angelini y Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada, and Sierrapine, 
Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-cv-4949

Competitive Impact Statement

    The United States of America files this Competitive Impact 
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry 
in this antitrust proceeding, as required by Section 2(b) of the 
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 
U.S.C. 16(b)-(h).

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

    On November 7, 2014, the United States filed a two-count Complaint 
against Flakeboard America Limited; its parent companies, Celulosa 
Arauco y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., and Inversiones Angelini y 
Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada; and SierraPine for engaging in 
unlawful conduct while Flakeboard's proposed transaction with 
SierraPine was under antitrust review.
    Flakeboard and SierraPine compete in the sale of particleboard, an 
unfinished wood product that is widely used in countertops, shelving, 
and other finished products. In January 2014, Flakeboard agreed to 
acquire three competing mills from SierraPine--two particleboard mills 
in Springfield, Oregon, and Martell, California, and a medium-density 
fiberboard (MDF) mill in Medford, Oregon. This transaction exceeded the 
thresholds established by Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Sec.  18a, also commonly known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (``Section 7A'' or ``HSR Act''), 
and therefore required the defendants to notify the federal antitrust 
agencies of their proposed acquisition and observe a waiting period 
before Flakeboard could take control of SierraPine's business. This 
waiting period seeks to ensure that the parties to a proposed 
transaction are preserved as independent entities while the reviewing 
agency--here, the Department of Justice--investigates the transaction 
and determines whether to challenge it.
    Instead of preserving SierraPine as an independent business, 
however, the Complaint alleges that Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine 
coordinated during the HSR waiting period to close SierraPine's 
Springfield mill and move the mill's customers to Flakeboard. The mill 
was permanently shut down on March 13, 2014, months before the HSR 
waiting period expired. On September 30, 2014, Flakeboard and 
SierraPine abandoned their proposed transaction in response to concerns 
expressed by the Department of Justice about the transaction's likely 
anticompetitive effects in the sale of MDF. The Complaint alleges that 
the defendants' conduct constituted a per se unlawful agreement between 
competitors to reduce output and allocate customers in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1, and a premature 
transfer of beneficial ownership to Flakeboard in violation of Section 
7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  18a.
    The United States and the defendants have reached a proposed 
settlement that eliminates the need for a trial in this case. The 
proposed Final Judgment remedies the Sherman Act violation by enjoining 
Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine from reaching similar 
anticompetitive agreements with competitors and requiring Flakeboard to 
disgorge $1.15 million of ill-gotten gains, the approximate amount of 
profits that Flakeboard illegally obtained by coordinating with 
SierraPine to close the Springfield mill and move the mill's customers 
to Flakeboard. To resolve the HSR Act violation, the proposed Final 
Judgment requires Inversiones Angelini (together with Flakeboard and 
Arauco) and SierraPine to each pay a civil penalty of $1.9 million, for 
a total of $3.8 million.
    The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the 
proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. 
Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, 
except that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or 
enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish any 
violations.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation

A. The Defendants and the Proposed Acquisition

    Flakeboard America Limited is a Delaware corporation with its U.S. 
headquarters in Fort Mill, South Carolina. Flakeboard and its related 
entities own numerous mills in North America that produce particleboard 
and MDF, including a particleboard mill in Albany, Oregon, that 
competes against SierraPine.
    Flakeboard's parent company is Celulosa Arauco y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., a Chilean company headquartered in Santiago, 
Chile, that also produces particleboard and other products. Arauco 
oversees Flakeboard's operations in North America.
    Inversiones Angelini y Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada is a Chilean 
corporation headquartered in Santiago, Chile. Inversiones Angelini is a 
holding company and Flakeboard's ultimate parent entity, as defined by 
the Premerger Notification Rules, 16 CFR Sec.  800 et seq. Inversiones 
Angelini is also the ultimate parent entity of Arauco.
    SierraPine is a California limited partnership with its 
headquarters in Roseville, California. SierraPine owns an operating 
particleboard mill in Martell, California; the closed particleboard 
mill in Springfield, Oregon; a closed particleboard mill in Adel, 
Georgia; and an operating MDF mill in Medford, Oregon.
    On January 13, 2014, Flakeboard and SierraPine entered into an 
asset purchase agreement (APA) in which Flakeboard agreed to acquire 
SierraPine's Medford, Martell, and Springfield mills for approximately 
$107 million, plus a variable amount for inventory. Before negotiating 
the APA, SierraPine had no plans to shut down the Springfield mill. 
During

[[Page 70560]]

negotiations, however, Flakeboard made clear that it did not intend to 
operate Springfield after the transaction closed and insisted that 
SierraPine close the mill before the transaction was consummated. Thus, 
as part of the APA, SierraPine agreed to ``take such actions as are 
reasonably necessary to shut down and close all business operations at 
its Springfield, Oregon facility'' before the transaction closed. When 
the defendants executed the APA, they anticipated that SierraPine would 
announce and implement the Springfield mill closure immediately after 
the HSR waiting period expired, but before the transaction was 
consummated.

B. The Defendants' Unlawful Conduct

    Despite the defendants' intentions under the APA, they subsequently 
entered into a series of agreements and took other actions during the 
HSR waiting period to close SierraPine's Springfield mill and move the 
mill's customers to Flakeboard.
    The Complaint alleges that on January 14, 2014, the day after 
executing the APA, the defendants announced the proposed transaction. 
At that time, SierraPine did not announce the Springfield closure 
because it intended to continue operating Springfield if the 
acquisition were not consummated and knew that employees and customers 
would start leaving the mill as soon as news of the planned closure 
became public.
    Within two days of the transaction's announcement, however, a labor 
issue arose that SierraPine believed would likely require it to 
publicly announce the Springfield closure earlier than planned, while 
the transaction was still being reviewed by the Department of Justice. 
SierraPine immediately informed Flakeboard, notifying Flakeboard's 
president and an executive at Arauco on January 17, 2014, that ``we 
need to have a discussion about [the] Springfield announcement'' 
because the labor issue would force the companies to ``share the 
pending news on Springfield'' in early February ``before we have early 
determination on [the] HSR.'' The following week, SierraPine and 
Flakeboard discussed the Springfield closure announcement, its timing, 
and its ramifications. During these discussions, the companies 
considered the possibility that Flakeboard might waive the provision 
requiring SierraPine to close the mill, which they expected would avert 
the need to announce the Springfield closure during the HSR waiting 
period.
    After consulting with Arauco, however, Flakeboard informed 
SierraPine that it would not waive the Springfield closure provision. 
The Complaint alleges that as a result, the companies understood that 
SierraPine would announce the Springfield closure during the HSR 
waiting period and that the mill would close within weeks of that 
announcement, without regard to whether the HSR waiting period had 
expired and regardless of whether the underlying transaction was 
ultimately consummated. Consistent with this understanding, at the end 
of January, Flakeboard and SierraPine agreed on the content and timing 
of a press release announcing that Springfield would be permanently 
closed. SierraPine issued the press release on February 4, 2014, and 
ceased production at Springfield on March 13, 2014, months before the 
HSR waiting period expired.
    The Complaint further alleges that Flakeboard and SierraPine agreed 
to transition Springfield's customers to Flakeboard's competing mill in 
Albany, Oregon, in several ways. First, in the period leading up to the 
Springfield closure announcement, SierraPine gave Flakeboard 
competitively sensitive information about Springfield's customers--
including the name, contact information, and types and volume of 
products purchased by each Springfield customer--and Flakeboard 
distributed this information to its sales employees.
    Second, SierraPine agreed to Flakeboard's request to delay the 
issuance of the press release from February 3 to February 4 so that 
Flakeboard could better position its sales personnel to contact 
Springfield's customers.
    Third, at Flakeboard's request, SierraPine instructed its own sales 
employees to inform Springfield customers following the Springfield 
closure announcement that Flakeboard wanted to serve their business and 
would match SierraPine's prices.
    Fourth, also at Flakeboard's request, SierraPine relayed assurances 
of future employment with Flakeboard to key SierraPine sales employees 
so that they would direct SierraPine's Springfield customers to 
Flakeboard.
    As a result of these actions, the Complaint alleges that Flakeboard 
successfully secured a substantial amount of Springfield's business, 
including a significant number of new customers that Flakeboard had not 
previously served. The increased sales volumes from SierraPine's 
Springfield customers significantly increased Flakeboard's profits.
    Today, although Flakeboard and SierraPine abandoned their proposed 
transaction, the Springfield mill remains closed and virtually all of 
its employees have voluntarily left or been terminated. Furthermore, as 
the Complaint alleges, reopening the Springfield mill would be costly 
and time-consuming, and SierraPine has no plans to do so.

C. The Defendants' Antitrust Violations

1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
    Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any ``contract, combination 
. . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade.'' This prohibition 
remains in force during the premerger period: The pendency of a 
proposed transaction does not excuse transacting parties of their 
obligations to compete independently. Thus, until a transaction is 
consummated, a party that coordinates with its rival on price, output, 
or other competitively significant matters may violate Section 1.
    Here, Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine's coordination to close 
the Springfield mill and move the mill's customers to Flakeboard 
constituted an agreement between competitors that is per se unlawful. 
See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 
85, 100 (1984) (holding that the per se rule ordinarily applies to 
agreements to reduce output); Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 
46, 49 (1990) (affirming the per se rule for horizontal market 
allocations). The defendants' agreement eliminated the Springfield 
mill's output and allocated the mill's customers. This type of 
agreement, because of its ``pernicious effect on competition and lack 
of any redeeming virtue,'' is presumed to be unreasonable without an 
elaborate inquiry into its precise harm or potential business 
justification. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958).
    Furthermore, no special circumstances justified the unlawful 
agreement or exempted it from per se treatment. This agreement was not 
reasonably necessary to achieve any procompetitive benefits of the 
transaction, and therefore does not qualify as an ancillary restraint. 
The agreement also was undertaken without any assurance that the 
transaction would be consummated.
2. The HSR Act (Section 7A of the Clayton Act)
    The Complaint also alleges that Flakeboard exercised operational 
control over SierraPine's business during the HSR waiting period in 
violation of the HSR Act. Because the payment of civil penalties under 
the HSR Act is not subject to the Tunney

[[Page 70561]]

Act,\1\ the civil-penalties component of the proposed Final Judgment is 
not open to public comment. Nevertheless, this Competitive Impact 
Statement explains the Antitrust Division's views regarding the 
defendants' violations of the HSR Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See, e.g., United States v. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2014-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 78,870 (D.D.C.) (entering a consent judgment for 
civil penalties under the HSR Act without employing Tunney Act 
procedures); United States v. Barry Diller, 2013-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
] 78,446 (D.D.C.) (same); United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 2013-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 78,443 (D.D.C.) (same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Before the HSR Act was enacted, the DOJ and the FTC were often 
forced to investigate anticompetitive mergers that had already been 
consummated without public notice. In those situations, the agencies' 
only recourse was to sue to unwind the parties' merger, and the merged 
firm often delayed the litigation so that years elapsed before 
adjudication and attempted relief. During this extended time, the loss 
of competition continued to harm consumers, and if the court ultimately 
found that the merger was illegal, effective relief was often 
impossible to achieve.
    The HSR Act addressed these problems and strengthened antitrust 
enforcement by providing the antitrust agencies the ability to 
investigate certain large acquisitions before they are consummated. In 
particular, the HSR Act prohibits certain acquiring parties from 
undertaking their acquisition before a prescribed waiting period 
expires or is terminated. Throughout the waiting period, the parties 
must remain separate and preserve their status as independent economic 
actors. Indeed, the legislative history of the HSR Act underscores 
Congress's desire that competition existing before the merger should be 
maintained to the extent possible pending review by the antitrust 
agencies and the court.
    Instead of preserving SierraPine as an independent entity, however, 
the Complaint alleges that Flakeboard exercised operational control 
over SierraPine's business during the HSR waiting period in several 
ways. First, Flakeboard coordinated with SierraPine to close the 
Springfield mill without regard to the HSR waiting period. Flakeboard 
then coordinated with SierraPine to move Springfield's customers to 
Flakeboard during the HSR waiting period. For example, as the Complaint 
alleges:
     Flakeboard obtained competitively sensitive information 
from SierraPine, including a customer list with the name, contact 
information, and types and volume of products purchased by each 
Springfield customer, and distributed that information to Flakeboard 
sales employees.
     Flakeboard had SierraPine delay the Springfield closure 
announcement so that Flakeboard could better position its sales team to 
contact Springfield's customers.
     Flakeboard directed SierraPine sales employees to inform 
Springfield customers that Flakeboard sought their business and would 
match SierraPine's prices.
     Flakeboard coordinated with SierraPine to offer assurances 
of future employment with Flakeboard to key SierraPine sales employees 
so that they would direct Springfield's customers to Flakeboard.
    These actions undermined the purpose of the HSR Act, which is 
designed to allow the antitrust agencies to conduct an investigation 
before the parties have combined their operations or transferred 
significant assets.

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The proposed Final Judgment remedies the Sherman Act violation by 
requiring disgorgement and injunctive relief and addresses the HSR Act 
violation by requiring monetary civil penalties. Section XII of the 
proposed Final Judgment states that these provisions will expire ten 
years after entry of the Final Judgment.

A. Disgorgement

1. Disgorgement Is an Appropriate Remedy
    The proposed Final Judgment requires Flakeboard to disgorge the 
profits that it earned as a result of its unlawful agreement with 
SierraPine. Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that seeks to ``deprive 
a wrongdoer of unjust enrichment.'' SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intern. 
Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
Disgorgement also protects the public by deterring illegal conduct. 
See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 
1998). The amount of disgorgement ``should include all gains flowing 
from the illegal activities,'' and ``need be only a reasonable 
approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.'' 
Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1096 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).
    In United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638-41 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), the court held that the government may seek 
disgorgement in antitrust suits brought (like this one) under the 
Sherman Act. The court in Keyspan concluded that disgorgement under the 
Sherman Act was within a district court's inherent equitable powers and 
fully consistent with ``established principles of antitrust law.'' Id. 
at 639-40. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that ``there 
appear[ed] to be little disagreement among commentators about the 
propriety of disgorgement as an antitrust remedy,'' citing to the 
leading antitrust law treatise's conclusion that ``equity relief may 
include, where appropriate, the disgorgement of improperly obtained 
gains.'' Id. at 640 (quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ] 325a 
(3d ed. 2007)).
    Furthermore, both the Ninth Circuit and this Court have affirmed 
the district court's authority to award disgorgement to governmental 
entities enforcing federal statutory provisions. See, e.g., First Pac. 
Bancorp, 142 F.3d at 1191-92 (authorizing disgorgement for violations 
of the securities laws); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1159-60 
(9th Cir. 2010) (authorizing disgorgement under the FTC Act); FTC v. 
Silueta Distribs., 1995 WL 215313, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1995) 
(same). And the Ninth Circuit has emphasized the need for ``broad 
equity powers to enforce the antitrust laws.'' United States v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 575 F.2d 222, 229 (9th Cir. 1978).
2. Disgorgement Is Appropriate in This Case
    Here, disgorgement is necessary to ensure that Flakeboard is not 
unjustly enriched by the profits that it earned by coordinating with 
SierraPine to close the Springfield mill and move the mill's customers 
to Flakeboard. As the Complaint alleges, Flakeboard secured a 
substantial amount of Springfield's business for its Albany mill, 
including new customers that Albany had not previously served and 
additional sales from customers that were previously purchasing from 
both mills. From this business, Flakeboard earned approximately $1.15 
million in illegally obtained profits during the six-month period 
leading up to this settlement, which is equal to the disgorgement 
amount required by the proposed Final Judgment.
    Disgorgement is also appropriate here because the injunctive relief 
that would most likely restore competition--requiring the mill to be 
reopened--is impractical. As alleged in the Complaint, the Springfield 
mill has been closed for several months and virtually all of its 
employees have either left the mill or been terminated. Furthermore, in 
this case, no other remedy would be as effective to fulfill the goal of 
the Sherman Act to ``prevent

[[Page 70562]]

and restrain'' antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. 4. Disgorgement will 
deter Flakeboard and others from participating in anticompetitive 
conduct in the context of a pending transaction, regardless of whether 
the transaction is subject to the HSR Act.

B. Injunctive Provisions

1. Prohibited Conduct
    Section VII.A of the proposed Final Judgment is designed to prevent 
future Sherman Act violations during a pending transaction, regardless 
of whether the transaction is subject to the HSR Act. Under this 
provision, Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine may not reach agreements 
while a transaction is pending that affect price or output for 
competing products in the United States or that allocate markets or 
customers. The prohibited agreements also include those involving 
disclosure of competitively sensitive information, except as allowed in 
Section VIII, or the closure of a production facility that produces a 
competing product without giving prior written notice to and obtaining 
written approval from the United States. Although an agreement to close 
a production facility before a transaction is consummated may be 
permissible under certain circumstances, this notice-and-approval 
provision ensures that, in light of the defendants' conduct, they will 
not take additional actions that reduce competition or interfere with a 
potential antitrust review.

2. Permitted Conduct

    Section VIII of the proposed Final Judgment identifies conduct that 
is permitted by the Final Judgment. Sections VIII.A and VIII.B ensure 
that the decree will not be interpreted to forbid certain ``conduct of 
business'' covenants that are common in merger agreements. For example, 
Section VIII.A allows agreements requiring a seller to operate its 
business in the ordinary course of business. And Section VIII.B allows 
for ``material adverse change'' provisions, which give the acquiring 
firm certain rights to prevent a to-be-acquired firm from materially 
changing how it conducts its business. These common provisions are 
intended to protect a transaction's value and prevent a to-be-acquired 
firm from wasting assets.
    Section VIII.C recognizes a narrow exception to Section VII.A.3's 
prohibition on exchanging competitively sensitive information. As a 
general rule, competitors should not obtain prospective, customer-
specific price information before consummating a transaction because it 
could be used to harm competition if the transaction is abandoned. 
Nevertheless, a prospective acquirer may need information about pending 
contracts to properly value a business during the due-diligence 
process.
    Section VIII.E clarifies that the proposed Final Judgment does not 
prohibit the defendants from entering into buyer-seller agreements that 
would have been lawful independent of the proposed transaction.
3. Compliance and Inspection
    Sections IX and X of the proposed Final Judgment establish 
procedures to ensure that the defendants comply with the antitrust laws 
and the terms of the Final Judgment. Section IX requires Flakeboard and 
SierraPine to maintain an antitrust compliance program, which includes 
naming an antitrust compliance officer responsible for supervising 
compliance with the Final Judgment. The compliance officer must 
distribute a copy of the Final Judgment to the company's officers, 
directors, and any other employees responsible for mergers and 
acquisitions, and must provide a copy of the Final Judgment to any 
potential partners to a merger or acquisition. In addition, Arauco must 
distribute a copy of the Final Judgment to each of its officers, 
directors, and any other employees responsible for any business in the 
United States.
    To further ensure that the defendants are complying with the Final 
Judgment, Section X grants the DOJ access, upon reasonable notice, to 
the defendants' records and documents relating to matters contained in 
the Final Judgment. The defendants must also make their personnel 
available for interviews or depositions regarding such matters. In 
addition, upon request, the defendants must prepare written reports 
relating to matters contained in the Final Judgment.

C. Civil Penalties Under the HSR Act

    Under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g)(1), any 
person who fails to comply with the HSR Act is liable to the United 
States for a civil penalty of not more than $16,000 for each day that 
the person is in violation of the Act.\2\ The Complaint alleges that 
the defendants were in violation of the HSR Act from on or about 
January 17, 2014, when Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine began 
coordinating on the closure of the Springfield mill, until the 
expiration of the statutory waiting period on August 27, 2014--a period 
of 223 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Id.; see also Pub. L. 104-134 Sec.  31001(s) (Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996); 16 C.F.R. 1.98(a) (increasing 
maximum penalty to $16,000 per day).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the United States was prepared to seek the maximum civil 
penalty of $3.568 million for both Inversiones Angelini (together with 
Arauco and Flakeboard) and SierraPine at trial, other factors led to 
acceptance of $1.9 million each as an appropriate penalty for 
settlement purposes. In particular, a lower penalty is appropriate 
because Flakeboard and SierraPine cooperated with the United States 
during its investigation by voluntarily producing evidence of their 
unlawful premerger conduct and, despite the daily accruing fine, 
entering into a timing agreement that resulted in an orderly production 
of documents relating to their proposed acquisition.

IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any 
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times 
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither 
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. 
Under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed 
Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any subsequent private 
lawsuit that may be brought against the defendants.

V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the 
proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance 
with the provisions of the APPA unless the United States has withdrawn 
its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination 
that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest.
    The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days preceding the 
effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person 
may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed 
Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within 60 
days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in 
the Federal Register, or the last date of publication in a newspaper of 
the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. 
All comments received during this period will be considered by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw

[[Page 70563]]

its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time before the 
Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United 
States will be filed with the Court. In addition, comments will be 
posted on the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division's internet 
Web site and, under certain circumstances, published in the Federal 
Register.
    Written comments should be submitted to: Peter J. Mucchetti, Chief, 
Litigation I Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of 
Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530.
    The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains 
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court 
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed 
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against the defendants. The 
United States is satisfied, however, that the proposed relief, 
including the disgorgement of profits and payment of civil penalties, 
is an appropriate remedy in this matter. The proposed relief should 
deter the defendants and others from engaging in similar conduct. 
Furthermore, given the facts of this case, the proposed Final Judgment 
would achieve all or substantially all of the relief the United States 
would have obtained through litigation, but avoids the time, expense, 
and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits of the Complaint.

VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed 
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be 
subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the court shall 
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the 
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination, 
the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is 
required to consider:
    (A) The competitive impact of such judgment, including termination 
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, 
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies 
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other 
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment 
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the 
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals 
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint 
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived 
from a determination of the issues at trial.
    15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory 
factors, the court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the 
government is entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the 
defendant within the reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also United 
States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 13-cv-1236 (CKK), 2014-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ] 78, 748, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *16-17 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 25, 2014) (same); see generally United States v. SBC Commc'ns, 
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (describing the public-interest 
standard under the Tunney Act); United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 
08-1965 (JR), 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the court's review of 
a consent judgment is limited and only inquires ``into whether the 
government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the 
antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and 
whether the mechanisms to enforce the final judgment are clear and 
manageable.'').\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in 
directing relevant factors for courts to consider and amended the 
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to 
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. 
16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Commc'ns, 
489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments 
``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the D.C. Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, 
among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the 
specific allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether 
the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are 
sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. 
See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the 
relief secured by the decree, a court may not ``engage in an 
unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.'' 
United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see 
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 
F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, 
at *3. Courts have held that:

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected 
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first 
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's 
role in protecting the public interest is one of [e]nsuring that the 
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to 
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a 
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but 
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public 
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the 
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

    Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\4\ 
In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, 
a district court ``must accord deference to the government's 
predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require 
that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC 
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also U.S. Airways, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57801, at *16 (noting that a court should not reject the proposed 
remedies because it believes others are preferable); Microsoft, 56 F.3d 
at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be ``deferential to the 
government's predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies''); 
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court should grant due respect to the 
United States' prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its 
perception of the market structure, and its views of the nature of the 
case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's 
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or 
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co., 
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the 
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not 
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's 
reducing glass''). See generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 
(discussing whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so 
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 
`reaches of the public interest''').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent 
decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of 
liability in a litigated matter. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved 
even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, 
as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the 
reaches of public interest.' '' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted); see also U.S. 
Airways, 2014

[[Page 70564]]

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *18 (noting that room must be made for the 
government to grant concessions in the negotiation process for 
settlements (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461)); United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving 
the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater 
remedy). To meet this standard, the United States ``need only provide a 
factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably 
adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 
2d at 17.
    Moreover, the court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing 
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has 
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to 
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree 
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *18 (noting that the court must simply 
determine whether there is a factual foundation for the government's 
decisions such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements 
are reasonable); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the 
`public interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations 
alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have, 
or even should have, been alleged''). Because the ``court's authority 
to review the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising 
its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' 
it follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree 
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire 
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1459-60. As the court recently confirmed in SBC Communications, 
courts ``cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest 
determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a 
mockery of judicial power.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
    In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve 
the practical benefits of using consent decrees in antitrust 
enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in 
this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to 
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also U.S. Airways, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57801, at *20 (noting that a court is not required to hold an 
evidentiary hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review 
under the Tunney Act). The language captured Congress's intent when it 
enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney explained: ``The 
court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended 
proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of 
prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process.'' 
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the 
procedure for the public-interest determination is left to the 
discretion of the court, with the recognition that the court's ``scope 
of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of 
Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.\5\ A 
court can make its public-interest determination based on the 
competitive impact statement and response to public comments alone. 
U.S. Airways, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the 
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the 
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone''); 
United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., No. 73-CV-681-W-1, 1977-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 61,508, at 71,980, *22 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (``Absent 
a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its 
duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should. . 
.carefully consider the explanations of the government in the 
competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order 
to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the 
circumstances.''); S. Rep. No. 93-298, at 6 (1973) (``Where the 
public interest can be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of 
briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be 
utilized.'').
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VIII. Determinative Documents

    There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in 
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.
    Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Amy R. Fitzpatrick

Amy R. Fitzpatrick

David Altschuler
Bindi Bhagat
Scott I. Fitzgerald

Attorneys for the United States, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department 
of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530.

Dated: November 7, 2014.

Certificate of Service

    I certify that on November 7, 2014, I electronically filed this 
Competitive Impact Statement with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF 
system. A copy has also been sent via email to:

Counsel for Flakeboard America Limited, Celulosa Arauco y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., and Inversiones Angelini y 
Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada: Andrew M. Lacy, Simpson, Thacher & 
Bartlett LLP, 1155 F Street NW., Washington, DC 20004, Phone: (202) 
636-5505, Email: [email protected]
Counsel for SierraPine: Amanda P. Reeves, Latham & Watkins LLP, 555 
Eleventh Street NW., Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20004, Phone: (202) 
637-2183, Email: [email protected]

/s/ Amy R. Fitzpatrick

Amy R. Fitzpatrick
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street 
NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Phone: (202) 532-4558, 
Facsimile: (202) 307-5802, Email: [email protected].

EXHIBIT A

United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
San Francisco Division

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Flakeboard America 
Limited, Celulosa Arauco y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., Inversiones 
Angelini y Compa[Ntilde][Iacute]a Limitada, and Sierrapine, 
Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-cv-4949

[Proposed] Final Judgment

    WHEREAS, Plaintiff, United States of America, filed its Complaint 
on November 7, 2014, alleging that Defendants violated Section 7A of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, and that Flakeboard America Limited, 
Celulosa Arauco y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., and SierraPine violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1, and without this Final 
Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by any party 
regarding any issue of fact or law;
    AND WHEREAS, Defendants, without admitting any wrongdoing, agree to 
be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment pending its approval 
by the Court;
    AND WHEREAS, Defendants have represented to the United States that 
the actions and conduct restrictions required below can and will be 
made and that Defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or 
difficulty as grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the 
provisions contained below;
    NOW THEREFORE, before any testimony is taken, and without trial or 
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon the consent of the 
parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

I. Jurisdiction

    This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of 
the parties to this action. The Complaint states claims upon which 
relief may be granted against Flakeboard, Arauco, and

[[Page 70565]]

SierraPine under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1, and 
against all Defendants under Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Sec.  18a.

II. Definitions

    A. ``Arauco'' means Defendant Celulosa Arauco y 
Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., a Chilean company; its successors and 
assigns; and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, 
partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, officers, 
managers, agents, and employees.
    B. ``Agreement'' means any contract, agreement, or understanding, 
formal or informal, written or unwritten.
    C. ``Competing Product'' means any product that any Defendant 
offers for sale in the United States that is primarily used for the 
same purpose as any product that any other party to a proposed 
Transaction with any Defendant offers for sale in the United States.
    D. ``Defendants'' mean Flakeboard America Limited, Celulosa Arauco 
y Constituci[oacute]n, S.A., the Ultimate Parent Entity, and 
SierraPine.
    E. ``Flakeboard'' means Defendant Flakeboard America Limited, a 
Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Fort Mill, South 
Carolina; its successors and assigns; and its subsidiaries, divisions, 
groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their 
directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    F. ``SierraPine'' means Defendant SierraPine, a California limited 
partnership with its headquarters in Roseville, California; its 
successors and assigns; and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, 
affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, 
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    G. ``Negotiation and Interim Period'' means the period between the 
commencement of negotiations with respect to an offer to enter into a 
Transaction, and the date when negotiations are abandoned or when any 
resulting Transaction is consummated or abandoned.
    H. ``Person'' means any individual, partnership, firm, corporation, 
association, or other legal or business entity.
    I. ``Production Facility'' means any mill, plant, or other asset 
that manufactures products.
    J. ``Transaction'' means any Agreement to acquire any voting 
securities, assets, or non-corporate interests, form a joint venture, 
settle litigation, or license intellectual property with any person 
offering a Competing Product.
    K. ``Ultimate Parent Entity'' means Defendant Inversiones Angelini 
y Compa[ntilde][iacute]a Limitada, a holding company with its 
headquarters in Santiago, Chile, and its successors and assigns.

III. Applicability

    This Final Judgment applies to Flakeboard, Arauco, the Ultimate 
Parent Entity, and SierraPine as defined above, and all other persons 
in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual 
notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise. This 
Court orders the relief in Section IV of this Final Judgment under 
Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a. All other relief in this 
Final Judgment is to remedy the violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1.

IV. Civil Penalty Under Section 7A of the Clayton Act

    Within 30 days of the entry of this Final Judgment, Flakeboard, 
Arauco, and the Ultimate Parent Entity must pay $1.9 million to the 
United States, and within 60 days of the entry of this Final Judgment, 
SierraPine must pay $1.9 million to the United States, for a total of 
$3.8 million.

V. Disgorgement To Remedy the Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act

    Within 30 days of the entry of this Final Judgment, Flakeboard must 
pay $1.15 million in disgorgement to the United States.

VI. Payment of Civil Penalty and Disgorgement

    A. The payments specified in this Final Judgment must be made by 
wire transfer. Before making any transfers a Defendant must contact 
Janie Ingalls of the Antitrust Division's Antitrust Documents Group, at 
(202) 514-2481, for wire-transfer instructions.
    B. In the event of a default in payment, interest at the rate of 18 
percent per annum will accrue thereon from the date of default to the 
date of payment.

VII. Prohibited Conduct

    A. Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine may not enter into, maintain, 
or enforce any Agreement with an acquiring or to-be-acquired Person 
that, during the Negotiation and Interim Period of a Transaction:
    1. fixes, raises, sets, stabilizes, or otherwise establishes price 
or output for any Competing Product;
    2. moves, migrates, or otherwise allocates customers for any 
Competing Product;
    3. discloses or seeks the disclosure of information about 
customers, prices, or output for any Competing Product, except as such 
disclosures may be permitted in subsection VIII.C or to the extent that 
such information is publicly available at the time disclosure occurs; 
or
    4. closes a Production Facility that produces a Competing Product 
without prior written notice to and written approval from the United 
States.

VIII. Permitted Conduct

    Nothing in this Final Judgment prohibits Defendants from:
    A. entering into an Agreement that a party to a Transaction must 
continue operating in the ordinary course of business;
    B. entering into an Agreement that a party to a Transaction forego 
conduct that would cause a material adverse change in the value of to-
be-acquired assets;
    C. before closing or abandoning a Transaction, conducting or 
participating in reasonable and customary due diligence, though no 
disclosure covered by this section is permitted unless (1) the 
information is reasonably related to a party's understanding of future 
earnings and prospects; and (2) the disclosure occurs under a non-
disclosure agreement that (a) limits use of the information to 
conducting due diligence and (b) prohibits disclosure of the 
information to any employee of the Person receiving the information who 
is directly responsible for the marketing, pricing, or sales of the 
Competing Products;
    D. disclosing confidential business information related to 
Competing Products, subject to a protective order, in the context of 
litigation or settlement discussions; or
    E. entering into an Agreement where either one of the Defendants 
and the other party to the Transaction are or would be in a buyer/
seller relationship and the Agreement would be lawful in the absence of 
the planned acquisition.

IX. Antitrust Compliance Program

    A. Flakeboard and SierraPine must each maintain an antitrust 
compliance program that designates, within 30 days of entry of this 
order, an Antitrust Compliance Officer with responsibility for 
achieving compliance with this Final Judgment. The Antitrust Compliance 
Officer must, on a continuing basis, supervise the review of current 
and proposed activities to ensure compliance with this Final Judgment. 
The Antitrust Compliance Officer must also do the following:
    1. Distribute within 45 days of entry of this Final Judgment, a 
copy of this Final Judgment to each current officer

[[Page 70566]]

and director, all sales managers and supervisors, and each employee, 
agent, or other person who, in each case, has responsibility for or 
authority over mergers and acquisitions; and for Flakeboard's Antitrust 
Compliance Officer, a copy of this Final Judgment to each current 
officer and director of Arauco;
    2. distribute in a timely manner a copy of this Final Judgment to 
any officer, director, employee, or agent who succeeds to a position 
described in Section IX.A.1;
    3. obtain within 60 days from the entry of this Final Judgment, and 
annually thereafter, and retain for the duration of this Final 
Judgment, a written certification from each person designated in 
Sections IX.A.1 & 2 that he or she (a) has received, read, understands, 
and agrees to abide by the terms of this Final Judgment; (b) 
understands that failure to comply with this Final Judgment may result 
in conviction for criminal contempt of court; and (c) is not aware of 
any violation of the Final Judgment; and
    4. provide a copy of this Final Judgment to each potential partner 
to a merger or acquisition before the initial exchange of a letter of 
intent, definitive agreement, or other agreement of merger.
    B. Within 60 days of entry Flakeboard and SierraPine must each 
certify to Plaintiff that it has (1) designated an Antitrust Compliance 
Officer, specifying his or her name, business address, and telephone 
number; and (2) distributed the Final Judgment in accordance with 
Section IX.A.1.
    C. For the term of this Final Judgment, on or before its 
anniversary date, Flakeboard and SierraPine must each file with 
Plaintiff an annual statement as to the fact and manner of its 
compliance with the provisions of Sections VII and IX.
    D. Within 45 days of entry of this Final Judgment, Arauco must 
distribute a copy of this Final Judgment to each current officer and 
director, sales manager and supervisor, and employee, agent, or other 
person who, in each case, has responsibility for any business in the 
United States.
    E. If any director, officer, or Antitrust Compliance Officer of any 
of the Defendants learns of a violation of this Final Judgment, that 
Defendant must within three business days take appropriate action to 
terminate or modify the activity so as to assure compliance with this 
Final Judgment, and must notify the Plaintiff of the violation within 
10 business days.

X. Right to Inspection

    A. For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this 
Final Judgment, any related orders, or determining whether the Final 
Judgment should be modified or vacated, and subject to any legally 
recognized privilege, authorized representatives of the United States 
Department of Justice, including consultants and other persons retained 
by the United States, shall, upon written request of an authorized 
representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to the Defendants, be 
permitted:
    1. Access during Defendants' office hours to inspect and copy or at 
Plaintiff's option, to require Defendants to provide hard copy or 
electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records, data, and 
documents in the possession, custody, or control of Defendants, 
relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and
    2. to interview, either informally or on the record, Defendants' 
officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel 
present, regarding such matters. The interviews are subject to the 
reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or 
interference by Defendants.
    B. Upon written request of an authorized representative of the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, 
Defendants must submit written reports or responses to written 
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the 
matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
    C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in 
this section may be divulged by the Plaintiff to any person other than 
an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United 
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United 
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the 
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as 
otherwise required by law.
    D. If, at the time a Defendant furnishes information or documents 
to Plaintiff, the Defendant represents and identifies in writing the 
material in any such information or documents to which a claim of 
protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the Defendant marks each pertinent page of such 
material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United States shall 
give 10 calendar days' notice before divulging that material in any 
legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding) to which the 
Defendant is not a party.

XI. Retention of Jurisdiction

    This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final 
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and 
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe 
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce 
compliance, and to punish any violations of its provisions.

XII. Expiration of Final Judgment

    Unless extended by this Court, this Final Judgment expires ten 
years from the date of its entry.

XIII. Costs

    Each party must bear its own costs of this action.

XIV. Public-Interest Determination

    The parties have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust 
Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  16, including making 
copies available to the public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive 
Impact Statement, and any public comments thereon and Plaintiff's 
responses to those comments. Based upon the record before the Court, 
which includes the Competitive Impact Statement and any comments and 
responses to comments filed with the Court, entry of this Final 
Judgment is in the public interest.

Dated:___--

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United States District Judge

[FR Doc. 2014-27985 Filed 11-25-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P