[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 227 (Tuesday, November 25, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70268-70270]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27955]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Safety Advisory 2014-02]


Roadway Worker Authority Limits--Importance of Clear 
Communication, Compliance With Applicable Rules and Procedures, and 
Ensuring That Appropriate Safety Redundancies Are in Place in the Event 
of Miscommunication or Error

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2014-02 to reemphasize the 
importance of clear communication and compliance with applicable rules 
and procedures regarding roadway worker authority limits on controlled 
track. FRA believes it is necessary to issue this advisory in light of 
the miscommunication or error involved in recent roadway worker 
incidents that occurred at locations that were either outside of 
authority limits or within authority limits that were no longer 
protected due to dispatcher error. This safety advisory recommends that 
railroads monitor their employees for compliance with existing 
applicable rules and procedures and that they also examine their train 
dispatching systems, rules, and procedures to ensure that appropriate 
safety redundancies are in place in the event of miscommunication or 
error. In addition, this safety advisory recommends that if a railroad 
determines that appropriate safety redundancies are not in place, the 
railroad should adopt electronic technology that would provide 
appropriate safety redundancies, and adopt certain interim safety 
measures and procedures at least until such technology is in place.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth Rusk, Staff Director, Track 
Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6236; or Anna Nassif Winkle, 
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6166.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    FRA is concerned about the infrequent, but repetitive incidents 
involving roadway workers being struck or nearly struck by trains that 
appear to be due to miscommunication or error regarding the roadway 
workers' authority limits or location in relation to the authority 
limits. This safety advisory discusses six such incidents, three of 
which resulted in four employee fatalities. However, there have been 
other close-call incidents involving similar circumstances that did not 
result in fatalities but further highlight the need for this safety 
advisory. Information regarding some of the incidents discussed below 
is based on FRA's preliminary findings and the respective railroad's 
reporting to date. The probable causes and contributing factors, if 
any, have not yet been established for all of these incidents and 
nothing in this safety advisory is intended to attribute a cause to 
these incidents, or place responsibility for these incidents on the 
acts or omissions of any person or entity.
    The following is a summary of the circumstances involved in each of 
the incidents:
    In November 2013, a BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) lead welder was killed 
when his welding truck collided with an eastbound freight train on a 
single main track at a location that was outside of his roadway work 
group's limits of authority. It appears from FRA's preliminary 
investigation that the two-man work group set on the track at a 
location outside of their authority limits after the workers disagreed 
regarding the extent of the authority limits and after not being able 
to quickly resolve the discrepancy because the screen displaying their 
authority was not visible at the time they set on the track. The 
foreman was apparently attempting to ``wake up'' the computer screen as 
the operator was setting their vehicle on and operating over the track, 
rather than remaining clear of the track until the discrepancy could be 
resolved, as required by the railroad's good faith challenge 
procedures.
    In May 2013, a Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. (Metro-North) 
track foreman was struck and killed by a passenger train in Danbury, 
Connecticut, after a student dispatcher prematurely removed the control 
signal blocking devices that had been established for the track 
foreman's work group, and cleared the signal for the passenger train. 
Investigation by FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) determined that the student dispatcher assumed that the foreman 
no longer needed the main track after the dispatcher had lined the 
foreman-piloted locomotive crane into an out-of-service track. Several 
weeks prior to this incident, a very similar incident occurred on the 
same railroad. However, in that situation, the roadway worker detected 
the advancing train movement in sufficient time to move away from the 
track and avoid being struck by the train.
    In May 2013, a CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) hi-rail vehicle 
collided with a CSX train while traveling southward on the CSX Florence 
Division, Charlotte Subdivision. The hi-rail was operating under an EC-
1 authority (a form of exclusive track occupancy), but was struck when 
it encountered the northbound CSX train at milepost (MP) 340.52. This 
location was approximately one and one-quarter miles outside of the 
authority limits the track inspector operating the vehicle had 
requested and was granted (i.e., from MP 339.1 to MP 339.3). FRA's 
investigation also determined that in requesting authority from the 
dispatcher, the track inspector stated his location as MP 339.5, which

[[Page 70269]]

was approximately two-tenths of a mile outside of the authority limits 
he requested; however, neither the dispatcher nor the operator caught 
that the initial point of entry was outside of the authority limits 
being requested during the radio transmission of the authority. In 
addition, when the track inspector completed his work, he had planned 
on exiting at the same point that he had entered the track, but decided 
that the highway traffic at the crossing at that location was too heavy 
to safely take off the hi-rail, so he continued south, thinking that he 
could exit the track at the crossing located at MP 340.88, but was 
struck in a curve before reaching that crossing. The track inspector 
received minor injuries from the head-on collision, and no train crew 
injuries were reported.
    In April 2013, a Metro-North roadway work group in a hi-rail truck 
mistakenly reported to the dispatcher that they were in the clear, 
south of an interlocking. However, FRA's investigation determined that 
the truck was in fact still inside the limits of the interlocking. 
Minutes later, a commuter train struck and destroyed the vehicle. The 
occupants vacated the vehicle seconds before it was struck, and there 
were no injuries to the employees or the passengers.
    In March 2013, a Kansas City Southern Railway Co. (KCS) hi-rail 
vehicle operating northward on KCS' Shreveport Subdivision collided 
with the side of a BNSF freight train that was operating on Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. track through a KCS interlocking at Texarkana, 
Texas. FRA's investigation determined that the KCS section foreman that 
was operating the hi-rail vehicle had been looking for potential 
washouts after heavy rains, and indicated to FRA that he attempted to 
stop his hi-rail vehicle short of the interlocking after realizing his 
close proximity, but failed to do so due to wet rail conditions. The 
KCS hi-rail truck entered the limits of the interlocking (outside of 
his limits of authority) and collided with the 74th and 75th cars in 
the BNSF train that was operating on signal indication through the 
interlocking. The collision resulted in significant damage to the hi-
rail vehicle, and minimal damage to the rolling stock. The section 
foreman was not injured.
    In January 2007, a Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Co., LLC 
dispatcher prematurely lifted an exclusive track occupancy that was 
providing on-track safety for a roadway work group in Woburn, 
Massachusetts, and a commuter train struck and killed two roadway 
workers in the group and seriously injured two others. The track gang 
had a valid Form D, Line 4 (a form of exclusive track occupancy) with a 
main track out of service. Just prior to the incident, a hi-rail 
vehicle asked for and received permission from the roadway worker in 
charge (RWIC) of the authority limits to enter the out-of-service area. 
When the hi-rail vehicle cleared the authority limits, the operator of 
the hi-rail broadcast this information via a radio communication. 
Investigation by FRA and the NTSB determined that the dispatcher lifted 
the blocking devices after having accepted that communication as the 
track gang foreman having cleared the limits, rather than the operator 
of the hi-rail vehicle having cleared the limits. FRA notes this 
incident in particular, since it gave rise to NTSB safety 
recommendations, as discussed in footnote 1.
    The above incidents represent the various types of errors that can 
occur by various employees in establishing, removing, or adhering to 
roadway worker authority limits, and highlight the importance of clear 
communication and the need for railroads to monitor their employees for 
compliance with existing applicable rules and procedures. In addition, 
the range of possible errors also highlights the need for railroads to 
examine their train dispatching systems, rules, and procedures to 
ensure that appropriate safety redundancies \1\ are in place in the 
event that an employee fails to comply with such rules and procedures.
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    \1\ The incident that occurred in January 2007 in Woburn, 
Massachusetts, resulted in three NTSB Safety Recommendations to FRA, 
two of which are addressed, or partially addressed, in this safety 
advisory. Safety Recommendation R-08-05 recommended that FRA 
``[a]dvise railroads of the need to examine their train dispatching 
systems and procedures to ensure that appropriate safety 
redundancies are in place for establishing protection and preventing 
undesired removal of protection for roadway workers receiving track 
occupancy authority,'' and Safety Recommendation R-08-06 recommended 
that FRA ``[r]equire redundant signal protection, such as shunting, 
for maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train dispatcher 
to provide signal protection.'' Although this safety advisory adopts 
Safety Recommendation R-08-05 and recommends safety redundancies in 
general that would also seemingly address the recommendation in R-
08-05, it does not recommend a position on shunting, as FRA has 
specifically invited comment on this issue from the railroad 
industry and other interested parties in a notice of proposed 
rulemaking on Railroad Workplace Safety; Roadway Worker Protection 
Miscellaneous Revisions (see 77 FR 50324, Aug. 20, 2012), and that 
issue will be addressed in the final rule.
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    FRA believes that the probability of the incidents described above 
occurring could be significantly reduced by installation of Positive 
Train Control (PTC). Until such time that PTC is implemented, and for 
locations where PTC is not required, FRA recommends that railroads 
adopt one or more electronic technologies that may serve to fill the 
technology gap. Examples of such technology already in use include the 
following systems:
     Enhanced Employee Protection System--With this system, 
when an RWIC secures a track authority, he or she is provided a code 
via a beeper-like device that is not provided to the dispatcher issuing 
the authority. The system is designed so that the dispatcher cannot 
remove the blocking devices that are preventing the clearing of the 
absolute signal until the RWIC provides him or her with the issued 
code. Thus, the dispatcher cannot remove the associated on-track safety 
provided by the authority without the knowledge and agreement of the 
RWIC. This system is currently in use on a northeastern commuter 
railroad.
     Hi-Rail Limits Compliance System--This system relies upon 
a global positioning system location transponder that is mounted in a 
hi-rail or roadway maintenance machine and linked to the dispatching 
office. When the vehicle or machine is operated within a mile of the 
authority limits, the operator will be alerted via a yellow warning 
light on the transponder. When the vehicle or machine is operated 
within one-half mile of the authority limits, the operator will be 
alerted via a yellow flashing light on the transponder. If the operator 
operates the vehicle or machine outside of his or her authority limits 
or sets on a main track for which he or she does not have authority, 
the operator will be alerted via a red warning light and the dispatcher 
is immediately notified as well, so that appropriate action can be 
taken. This system is currently in use on a number of subdivisions of a 
Class 1 railroad.
     Train Approach Warning System (TAWS)--For this system, an 
electronic alerter device is utilized at interlockings to detect an 
approaching train on any track and provide both visual and audible 
indicators to roadway workers via a personal beeper device on their 
person and at their bungalow, once the system is activated. This on-
track safety system has been utilized under FRA waiver by a major Class 
1 railroad at selected interlockings since 2001.

Recommended Action

    In light of the miscommunication or error involved in roadway 
worker incidents that have occurred at locations that were either 
outside of the respective roadway workers' authority limits or within 
authority limits that

[[Page 70270]]

were no longer protected due to dispatcher error, FRA recommends that 
railroads take the following actions to promote the safety of roadway 
workers:
    1. Increase monitoring of their employees for compliance with 
existing applicable rules and procedures, particularly those involving 
the establishment, removal, or verification of track authority, and 
good faith challenges.
    2. Examine their train dispatching systems, rules, and procedures 
to ensure that appropriate safety redundancies are in place.
    3. If a railroad determines that appropriate safety redundancies 
are not in place, adopt electronic technology that would provide 
appropriate safety redundancies. At least until such technology is in 
place, and as an immediate first step to the adoption of such 
technology, railroads should--
    a. Stress the importance of dispatchers being advised of the work 
plans by the RWIC when securing track occupancy authority;
    b. Forbid student dispatchers by general order or bulletin from 
removing blocking devices until confirmation is received by the 
dispatcher providing supervision; and
    c. Require student dispatchers to secure confirmation from the 
supervising dispatcher prior to the removal of blocking devices.
    d. With regard to inadvertent and unauthorized hi-rail movement 
outside the limits of authority, instruct roadway workers that prior to 
passing any absolute signal, a roadway worker should verify the limits 
of his or her authority as follows:
    i. For roadway workers traveling with other occupants in a vehicle, 
verify the limits with another occupant within the vehicle by verbally 
reviewing the authority;
    ii. For roadway workers acting in the capacity of a lone worker (or 
otherwise traveling alone in a vehicle that is the first vehicle in the 
roadway work group to pass the absolute signal), announce over the 
radio the location and intent to pass the absolute signal; and
    iii. In either case, if the roadway worker or roadway work group is 
relying upon an electronic authority, and the electronic device 
displaying that authority malfunctions, the roadway worker must either 
secure a hard copy of the authority or vacate the track until he or she 
can verify the authority.
    FRA encourages railroads to take actions that are consistent with 
the preceding recommendations and to take other actions to help ensure 
the safety of the Nation's railroad employees and the general public. 
FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2014-02, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate actions it deems necessary to 
ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads, including 
pursuing other corrective measures under its rail safety authority.

Robert C. Lauby,
Associate Administrator for Safety and Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2014-27955 Filed 11-21-14; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P