[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 227 (Tuesday, November 25, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70268-70270]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27955]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2014-02]
Roadway Worker Authority Limits--Importance of Clear
Communication, Compliance With Applicable Rules and Procedures, and
Ensuring That Appropriate Safety Redundancies Are in Place in the Event
of Miscommunication or Error
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2014-02 to reemphasize the
importance of clear communication and compliance with applicable rules
and procedures regarding roadway worker authority limits on controlled
track. FRA believes it is necessary to issue this advisory in light of
the miscommunication or error involved in recent roadway worker
incidents that occurred at locations that were either outside of
authority limits or within authority limits that were no longer
protected due to dispatcher error. This safety advisory recommends that
railroads monitor their employees for compliance with existing
applicable rules and procedures and that they also examine their train
dispatching systems, rules, and procedures to ensure that appropriate
safety redundancies are in place in the event of miscommunication or
error. In addition, this safety advisory recommends that if a railroad
determines that appropriate safety redundancies are not in place, the
railroad should adopt electronic technology that would provide
appropriate safety redundancies, and adopt certain interim safety
measures and procedures at least until such technology is in place.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth Rusk, Staff Director, Track
Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6236; or Anna Nassif Winkle,
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6166.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
FRA is concerned about the infrequent, but repetitive incidents
involving roadway workers being struck or nearly struck by trains that
appear to be due to miscommunication or error regarding the roadway
workers' authority limits or location in relation to the authority
limits. This safety advisory discusses six such incidents, three of
which resulted in four employee fatalities. However, there have been
other close-call incidents involving similar circumstances that did not
result in fatalities but further highlight the need for this safety
advisory. Information regarding some of the incidents discussed below
is based on FRA's preliminary findings and the respective railroad's
reporting to date. The probable causes and contributing factors, if
any, have not yet been established for all of these incidents and
nothing in this safety advisory is intended to attribute a cause to
these incidents, or place responsibility for these incidents on the
acts or omissions of any person or entity.
The following is a summary of the circumstances involved in each of
the incidents:
In November 2013, a BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) lead welder was killed
when his welding truck collided with an eastbound freight train on a
single main track at a location that was outside of his roadway work
group's limits of authority. It appears from FRA's preliminary
investigation that the two-man work group set on the track at a
location outside of their authority limits after the workers disagreed
regarding the extent of the authority limits and after not being able
to quickly resolve the discrepancy because the screen displaying their
authority was not visible at the time they set on the track. The
foreman was apparently attempting to ``wake up'' the computer screen as
the operator was setting their vehicle on and operating over the track,
rather than remaining clear of the track until the discrepancy could be
resolved, as required by the railroad's good faith challenge
procedures.
In May 2013, a Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. (Metro-North)
track foreman was struck and killed by a passenger train in Danbury,
Connecticut, after a student dispatcher prematurely removed the control
signal blocking devices that had been established for the track
foreman's work group, and cleared the signal for the passenger train.
Investigation by FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) determined that the student dispatcher assumed that the foreman
no longer needed the main track after the dispatcher had lined the
foreman-piloted locomotive crane into an out-of-service track. Several
weeks prior to this incident, a very similar incident occurred on the
same railroad. However, in that situation, the roadway worker detected
the advancing train movement in sufficient time to move away from the
track and avoid being struck by the train.
In May 2013, a CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) hi-rail vehicle
collided with a CSX train while traveling southward on the CSX Florence
Division, Charlotte Subdivision. The hi-rail was operating under an EC-
1 authority (a form of exclusive track occupancy), but was struck when
it encountered the northbound CSX train at milepost (MP) 340.52. This
location was approximately one and one-quarter miles outside of the
authority limits the track inspector operating the vehicle had
requested and was granted (i.e., from MP 339.1 to MP 339.3). FRA's
investigation also determined that in requesting authority from the
dispatcher, the track inspector stated his location as MP 339.5, which
[[Page 70269]]
was approximately two-tenths of a mile outside of the authority limits
he requested; however, neither the dispatcher nor the operator caught
that the initial point of entry was outside of the authority limits
being requested during the radio transmission of the authority. In
addition, when the track inspector completed his work, he had planned
on exiting at the same point that he had entered the track, but decided
that the highway traffic at the crossing at that location was too heavy
to safely take off the hi-rail, so he continued south, thinking that he
could exit the track at the crossing located at MP 340.88, but was
struck in a curve before reaching that crossing. The track inspector
received minor injuries from the head-on collision, and no train crew
injuries were reported.
In April 2013, a Metro-North roadway work group in a hi-rail truck
mistakenly reported to the dispatcher that they were in the clear,
south of an interlocking. However, FRA's investigation determined that
the truck was in fact still inside the limits of the interlocking.
Minutes later, a commuter train struck and destroyed the vehicle. The
occupants vacated the vehicle seconds before it was struck, and there
were no injuries to the employees or the passengers.
In March 2013, a Kansas City Southern Railway Co. (KCS) hi-rail
vehicle operating northward on KCS' Shreveport Subdivision collided
with the side of a BNSF freight train that was operating on Union
Pacific Railroad Co. track through a KCS interlocking at Texarkana,
Texas. FRA's investigation determined that the KCS section foreman that
was operating the hi-rail vehicle had been looking for potential
washouts after heavy rains, and indicated to FRA that he attempted to
stop his hi-rail vehicle short of the interlocking after realizing his
close proximity, but failed to do so due to wet rail conditions. The
KCS hi-rail truck entered the limits of the interlocking (outside of
his limits of authority) and collided with the 74th and 75th cars in
the BNSF train that was operating on signal indication through the
interlocking. The collision resulted in significant damage to the hi-
rail vehicle, and minimal damage to the rolling stock. The section
foreman was not injured.
In January 2007, a Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Co., LLC
dispatcher prematurely lifted an exclusive track occupancy that was
providing on-track safety for a roadway work group in Woburn,
Massachusetts, and a commuter train struck and killed two roadway
workers in the group and seriously injured two others. The track gang
had a valid Form D, Line 4 (a form of exclusive track occupancy) with a
main track out of service. Just prior to the incident, a hi-rail
vehicle asked for and received permission from the roadway worker in
charge (RWIC) of the authority limits to enter the out-of-service area.
When the hi-rail vehicle cleared the authority limits, the operator of
the hi-rail broadcast this information via a radio communication.
Investigation by FRA and the NTSB determined that the dispatcher lifted
the blocking devices after having accepted that communication as the
track gang foreman having cleared the limits, rather than the operator
of the hi-rail vehicle having cleared the limits. FRA notes this
incident in particular, since it gave rise to NTSB safety
recommendations, as discussed in footnote 1.
The above incidents represent the various types of errors that can
occur by various employees in establishing, removing, or adhering to
roadway worker authority limits, and highlight the importance of clear
communication and the need for railroads to monitor their employees for
compliance with existing applicable rules and procedures. In addition,
the range of possible errors also highlights the need for railroads to
examine their train dispatching systems, rules, and procedures to
ensure that appropriate safety redundancies \1\ are in place in the
event that an employee fails to comply with such rules and procedures.
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\1\ The incident that occurred in January 2007 in Woburn,
Massachusetts, resulted in three NTSB Safety Recommendations to FRA,
two of which are addressed, or partially addressed, in this safety
advisory. Safety Recommendation R-08-05 recommended that FRA
``[a]dvise railroads of the need to examine their train dispatching
systems and procedures to ensure that appropriate safety
redundancies are in place for establishing protection and preventing
undesired removal of protection for roadway workers receiving track
occupancy authority,'' and Safety Recommendation R-08-06 recommended
that FRA ``[r]equire redundant signal protection, such as shunting,
for maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train dispatcher
to provide signal protection.'' Although this safety advisory adopts
Safety Recommendation R-08-05 and recommends safety redundancies in
general that would also seemingly address the recommendation in R-
08-05, it does not recommend a position on shunting, as FRA has
specifically invited comment on this issue from the railroad
industry and other interested parties in a notice of proposed
rulemaking on Railroad Workplace Safety; Roadway Worker Protection
Miscellaneous Revisions (see 77 FR 50324, Aug. 20, 2012), and that
issue will be addressed in the final rule.
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FRA believes that the probability of the incidents described above
occurring could be significantly reduced by installation of Positive
Train Control (PTC). Until such time that PTC is implemented, and for
locations where PTC is not required, FRA recommends that railroads
adopt one or more electronic technologies that may serve to fill the
technology gap. Examples of such technology already in use include the
following systems:
Enhanced Employee Protection System--With this system,
when an RWIC secures a track authority, he or she is provided a code
via a beeper-like device that is not provided to the dispatcher issuing
the authority. The system is designed so that the dispatcher cannot
remove the blocking devices that are preventing the clearing of the
absolute signal until the RWIC provides him or her with the issued
code. Thus, the dispatcher cannot remove the associated on-track safety
provided by the authority without the knowledge and agreement of the
RWIC. This system is currently in use on a northeastern commuter
railroad.
Hi-Rail Limits Compliance System--This system relies upon
a global positioning system location transponder that is mounted in a
hi-rail or roadway maintenance machine and linked to the dispatching
office. When the vehicle or machine is operated within a mile of the
authority limits, the operator will be alerted via a yellow warning
light on the transponder. When the vehicle or machine is operated
within one-half mile of the authority limits, the operator will be
alerted via a yellow flashing light on the transponder. If the operator
operates the vehicle or machine outside of his or her authority limits
or sets on a main track for which he or she does not have authority,
the operator will be alerted via a red warning light and the dispatcher
is immediately notified as well, so that appropriate action can be
taken. This system is currently in use on a number of subdivisions of a
Class 1 railroad.
Train Approach Warning System (TAWS)--For this system, an
electronic alerter device is utilized at interlockings to detect an
approaching train on any track and provide both visual and audible
indicators to roadway workers via a personal beeper device on their
person and at their bungalow, once the system is activated. This on-
track safety system has been utilized under FRA waiver by a major Class
1 railroad at selected interlockings since 2001.
Recommended Action
In light of the miscommunication or error involved in roadway
worker incidents that have occurred at locations that were either
outside of the respective roadway workers' authority limits or within
authority limits that
[[Page 70270]]
were no longer protected due to dispatcher error, FRA recommends that
railroads take the following actions to promote the safety of roadway
workers:
1. Increase monitoring of their employees for compliance with
existing applicable rules and procedures, particularly those involving
the establishment, removal, or verification of track authority, and
good faith challenges.
2. Examine their train dispatching systems, rules, and procedures
to ensure that appropriate safety redundancies are in place.
3. If a railroad determines that appropriate safety redundancies
are not in place, adopt electronic technology that would provide
appropriate safety redundancies. At least until such technology is in
place, and as an immediate first step to the adoption of such
technology, railroads should--
a. Stress the importance of dispatchers being advised of the work
plans by the RWIC when securing track occupancy authority;
b. Forbid student dispatchers by general order or bulletin from
removing blocking devices until confirmation is received by the
dispatcher providing supervision; and
c. Require student dispatchers to secure confirmation from the
supervising dispatcher prior to the removal of blocking devices.
d. With regard to inadvertent and unauthorized hi-rail movement
outside the limits of authority, instruct roadway workers that prior to
passing any absolute signal, a roadway worker should verify the limits
of his or her authority as follows:
i. For roadway workers traveling with other occupants in a vehicle,
verify the limits with another occupant within the vehicle by verbally
reviewing the authority;
ii. For roadway workers acting in the capacity of a lone worker (or
otherwise traveling alone in a vehicle that is the first vehicle in the
roadway work group to pass the absolute signal), announce over the
radio the location and intent to pass the absolute signal; and
iii. In either case, if the roadway worker or roadway work group is
relying upon an electronic authority, and the electronic device
displaying that authority malfunctions, the roadway worker must either
secure a hard copy of the authority or vacate the track until he or she
can verify the authority.
FRA encourages railroads to take actions that are consistent with
the preceding recommendations and to take other actions to help ensure
the safety of the Nation's railroad employees and the general public.
FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2014-02, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate actions it deems necessary to
ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads, including
pursuing other corrective measures under its rail safety authority.
Robert C. Lauby,
Associate Administrator for Safety and Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2014-27955 Filed 11-21-14; 11:15 am]
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