Authority for This Rulemaking

The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.

This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General Requirements.” Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It prescribes new safety standards for the design of transport category airplanes.

The FAA is amending Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.307(a), 25.621, 25.683, 25.721, 25.787(a), 25.963(d), and 25.994 as described below. This action harmonizes part 25 requirements with the corresponding requirements in Book 1 of the EASA Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Large Aeroplanes (CS-25).

1. Section 25.307(a), “Proof of structure,” currently requires structural strength testing, unless the applicant has demonstrated that analysis alone is reliable. Paragraph (a) is revised to clarify the load levels to which testing is required, when such testing is required.

2. Section 25.621, “Casting factors,” is revised to clarify the quality control, inspection, and testing requirements for critical and non-critical castings.

3. Section 25.683, “Operation tests,” is revised to add a requirement that—

• The control system must remain free from jamming, friction, disconnection, and permanent damage in the presence of structural deflection and

• Under vibration loads, no hazard may result from interference or contact of the control system with adjacent elements.

4. Section 25.721, “Landing Gear—General,” is revised to—

• Expand the landing gear failure conditions to include side loads, in addition to up and aft loads, and expand this requirement to include nose landing gear in addition to the main landing gear,

• Specify that the wheels-up landing conditions are assumed to occur at a descent rate of 5 feet per second,

• Add a sliding-on-ground condition, and

• Require the engine mount be designed so that, when it fails due to overload, this failure does not cause the spillage of enough fuel to constitute a fire hazard.

5. Section 25.787, “Stowage compartments,” is revised to expand the inertia forces requirements for cargo compartments by removing the exclusion of compartments located below or forward of all occupants in the airplane.

6. Section 25.963, “Fuel tanks: general,” is revised to—

• Require that fuel tanks be designed so that no fuel is released in or near the fuselage, or near the engines, in quantities that would constitute a fire hazard in otherwise survivable emergency landing conditions,

• Define fuel tank pressure loads for fuel tanks located within and outside the fuselage pressure boundary and near the fuselage or near the engines, and

• Specify the wheels-up landing conditions and landing gear and engine mount failure conditions that must be considered when evaluating fuel tank structural integrity.

7. Section 25.994, “Fuel system components,” is revised to specify the wheels-up landing conditions to be considered when evaluating fuel system components.

Part 25 of 14 CFR prescribes airworthiness standards for type certification of transport category airplanes, for products certified in the United States. EASA CS-25 Book 1 prescribes the corresponding airworthiness standards for products certified in Europe. While part 25 and CS-25 Book 1 are similar, they differ in several respects. To resolve those differences, the FAA tasked ARAC through the Loads and Dynamics Harmonization Working Group (LDHWG) and the General Structures Harmonization Working Group (GSHWG) to review existing structures regulations and recommend changes that would eliminate differences between the U.S. and European airworthiness standards. The LDHWG and GSHWG developed recommendations, which EASA has incorporated into CS-25 with some changes. The FAA agrees with the ARAC recommendations as adopted by EASA, and this final rule amends part 25 accordingly.

On February 14, 2013, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Notice No. 25-137, Docket No. FAA-2013-0109, to amend §§ 25.307(a), 25.621, 25.683, 25.721, 25.787(a), 25.963(d), and 25.994. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on March 1, 2013 (78 FR 13835). (The NPRM Notice No. was corrected to “13-03” in the Federal Register on April 16, 2014 (79 FR 21413)). In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to (1) revise the structural test requirements necessary when analysis has not been found reliable; (2) clarify the quality control, inspection, and testing requirements for critical and non-critical castings; (3) add control system requirements that consider structural deflection and vibration loads; (4) expand the fuel tank structural and system requirements regarding emergency landing conditions and landing gear failure conditions; (5) add a requirement that engine mount failure due to overload must not cause hazardous fuel spillage; and (6) revise the inertial forces requirements for cargo compartments by removing the exclusion of compartments located below or forward of all occupants in the airplane. The FAA proposed these changes to eliminate regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the FAA and EASA. The NPRM comment period closed on May 30, 2013.

The FAA received 16 comments from 5 commenters. All commenters generally support the proposal, but they suggested changes discussed more fully below. The FAA received comments on each of the sections being changed, as follows:

• Section 25.307(a)—four comments

• Section 25.621—four comments

• Section 25.683—one comment

• Section 25.721—one comment

• Section 25.787(a)—two comments

• Section 25.963(d)—three comments

• Section 25.994—one comment

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed revising paragraph (a) of § 25.307 to require that, when structural analysis has not been shown to be reliable, substantiating tests must be made to load levels that are sufficient to verify structural behavior up to limit and ultimate loads of § 25.305.

One commenter stated that § 25.305 includes both limit and ultimate loads, so it is unclear which “loads” were intended by this change. More importantly, “up to” could mean any load level below limit or below ultimate and as such is indefinite. For example, an applicant could choose a load level of 10 percent of limit load and be in compliance with the proposed rule. The commenter proposed changing “up to loads specified in § 25.305” to “at least limit load as specified in § 25.305.”

The FAA believes the wording proposed in the NPRM is correct, and no change is necessary. The phrase “up to” does not apply to the test load level; it applies to the design load level—the loads specified in § 25.305, including ultimate loads—which must be verified. The intent of the rule is that, when analysis has not been shown to be reliable, tests must be conducted to “sufficient” load levels. Normally, testing to ultimate load levels is required, but when previous relevant test evidence can be used to support the analysis, a lower level of testing may be accepted. The rule allows this intermediate level of testing. Advisory Circular (AC) 25.307-1, “Proof of Structure,” which the FAA is issuing concurrently with the final rule, provides detailed guidance on means of compliance with the rule.

Another commenter recommended changing the word “reliable” in the proposed rule to “dependable and conservative.” The term “reliable” has been in place since this rule was originally published in 1965. As stated in the NPRM, while the rule has changed, the rule intent remains the same. We believe “reliable” is appropriate and clear, and no change is necessary.

The same commenter also recommended noting that, where justified, test load levels may be less than ultimate. We do not believe this change is necessary because it is already expressed in the rule that substantiating tests must be made to load levels that are sufficient to verify structural behavior up to loads specified in § 25.305.

The same commenter also recommended the FAA add further explanation about the absolute need to validate models and when lack of validation might be acceptable. We do not believe it is necessary to revise the rule to address validation, since that subject relates to the acceptability of an applicant's showing of compliance rather than to the airworthiness standard itself. This subject is thoroughly addressed in the accompanying AC 25.307-1. We have not revised the final rule in this regard.

With this rulemaking, the FAA clarifies “critical castings” as each casting whose failure could preclude continued safe flight and landing of the airplane or could result in serious injury to occupants. One commenter agreed that improved foundry methods have resulted in higher quality castings but not to the point where a casting factor less than 1.25 is justified. The commenter recommended to either (1) eliminate the option for casting factors of 1.0 for critical castings, or (2) ensure that the characterization of material properties that are equivalent to those of wrought alloy products of similar composition includes the effect of defects in the static strength, fatigue, and damage tolerance requirements. The commenter provided the following examples of defects that could affect material properties: shell defects, hard-alpha contamination, shrink, porosity, weld defects, grain size, hot tears, incomplete densifications, and prior particle boundaries, among others.

The FAA does not agree with the commenter's first recommendation to eliminate the option for using a casting factor of 1.0 for critical castings. The criteria specified in the final rule will ensure product quality that is sufficient to justify using a casting factor of 1.0. According to the rule, to qualify for a casting factor of 1.0, the applicant must demonstrate, through process qualification, proof of product, and process monitoring, that the casting has coefficients of variation of the material properties that are equivalent to those of wrought alloy products of similar composition. The rule requires process monitoring that includes testing of coupons and, on a sampling basis, coupons cut from critical areas of production castings. In addition, the applicant must inspect 100 percent of the casting surface of each casting, as well as structurally significant internal areas and areas where defects are likely to occur. The applicant must also test one casting to limit and ultimate loads. The purpose of the minimum casting factor of 1.25 in the current rule is to increase the strength of the casting to account for variability in the casting process. In the final rule, the additional process, inspection, and test requirements required to use a casting factor less than 1.25 ensure a more consistent product and maintain the same level of safety as the existing standards. AC 25.621-1, “Casting Factors,” provides detailed guidance on the premium casting process necessary to allow a casting factor of 1.0, and the FAA is issuing that AC concurrently with this final rule.

The FAA partially agrees with the commenter's second recommendation, which is to ensure that the characterization of material properties that are equivalent to those of wrought alloy products of similar composition includes the effect of defects in the static strength, fatigue, and damage tolerance requirements. The rule requires that the characterization of material properties includes the effect of defects with regard to static strength. If any type of defect is discovered during process qualification, proof of product, or process monitoring, or by any inspection or static strength test, such that the coefficients of variation of the material properties are not equivalent to those of wrought alloy products of similar composition, then that casting would not qualify for a casting factor of 1.0. These defects include each of the examples identified by the commenter, as well as any other type of defect that could affect material properties. In addition, as noted previously, AC 25.621-1, which the FAA is issuing concurrently with the final rule, provides detailed guidance on the premium casting process necessary to allow a casting factor of 1.0. The AC includes reference to and addresses defects as proposed by the commenter.

We do not, however, agree that the characterization of material properties to determine the appropriate casting factor should include the effect of defects on fatigue and damage tolerance properties. Since casting factors apply only to strength requirements, rather than fatigue and damage tolerance requirements, the comparison of cast material to wrought material should only be based on material strength properties, rather than fatigue and damage tolerance characteristics.

Section 25.621(c)(2)(ii)(B) specifies a factor of 1.15 be applied to limit load test values to allow an applicant to use a casting factor of 1.25. Section 25.621(c)(3)(ii)(B) also specifies a factor of 1.15 be applied to limit load test values to allow a casting factor of 1.5. One commenter recommended that the 1.15 test factor in § 25.621(c)(3)(ii)(B) be scaled up by a factor of 1.2 (1.5/1.25), so as to align with the corresponding ultimate requirement. The 1.15 limit load test factor in § 25.621(c)(3)(ii)(B) would then be 1.38 (i.e., 1.5/1.25 × 1.15; 1.15 being required already in conjunction with the 1.25 casting factor for ultimate).

The FAA does not agree that for critical castings with a casting factor of 1.25 or 1.5, the limit load test factor should be linked to the ultimate load test factor. The ultimate and limit load tests have different purposes. The ultimate load test confirms ultimate load capability, while the limit load test confirms that no deformation will occur up to a much lower load level. Therefore, we see no reason to link the two test factors, and we believe the 1.15 factor specified in § 25.621(c)(3)(ii)(B) is appropriate, as recommended by ARAC and as currently specified in EASA CS 25.621.

The same commenter recommended modifying § 25.621(c) by adding a reference to § 25.305 for clarity—that each critical casting must have a factor associated with it for showing compliance with the strength and deformation requirement “of § 25.305.” We agree and have revised the final rule as recommended.

The same commenter noted that § 25.621 only refers to static testing and does not include any requirements for fatigue testing. The commenter stated that critical castings should also comply with § 25.571 concerning fatigue and damage tolerance. The commenter recommended including information to remind manufacturers of this requirement. The FAA agrees with the commenter that § 25.571 applies to critical castings. We believe the current wording in § 25.571 and the new wording in § 25.621 is sufficiently clear on this point, and no changes to these requirements are necessary.

No other public comments were received on § 25.621. However, after further FAA review, we revised the rule in several places to specify “visual inspection and liquid penetrant or equivalent inspection methods.” This change is to clarify “equivalent inspection methods” refers to the liquid penetrant inspection, and not the visual inspection. Although there is some textual difference between this and CS 25.621, there is no substantive difference between the two harmonized rules.

A commenter noted that the control systems to which § 25.683(b) applies are those control systems that obtain the pitch, roll, and yaw limit maneuver loads of the airplane structure. For example, an applicant must take into account the elevator, rudder, and aileron because these control surfaces obtain the referenced maneuver loads, while high lift systems do not need to be considered under § 25.683(b). The commenter suggested that we clarify this in the preamble to the final rule. The FAA agrees and hereby clarifies that § 25.683 only applies to those control systems that are loaded to obtain the specified maneuver loads. No change to the final rule text is necessary.

No other public comments were received on § 25.683. We would like to explain what is meant by “where necessary” as used in § 25.683(b). The rule states: “It must be shown by analysis and, where necessary, by tests, that in the presence of deflections of the airplane structure,” the control system operates without jamming, excessive friction, or permanent damage. The FAA may accept analysis alone to comply with this requirement. However, the FAA or the applicant may determine that, in certain cases, some testing is necessary to verify the analysis. For example, some testing may be necessary if the structure or control system is significantly more complex than a previous design, or if the analysis shows areas where the control system could be susceptible to jamming, friction, disconnection or damage. Testing may include component testing or full-scale tests.

A commenter proposed to add a paragraph (d) to § 25.721 to state that the conditions in paragraphs (a) through (c) must be considered regardless of the corresponding probabilities. The FAA does not believe this addition is necessary. The various failure conditions in the rule are stated directly, and the FAA intended no implication that the probability of these failure conditions may be taken into account. However, because the FAA proposed that a failure mode not be likely to cause the spillage of enough fuel to constitute a fire hazard, the proposal may have implied that an applicant should take probability into account to determine whether the failure conditions would lead to fuel spillage. The FAA did not intend this. Probability should not be taken into account to determine whether the failure mode will lead to fuel spillage.

No other public comments were received on § 25.721. However, after further FAA review, we revised § 25.721(b) to clarify its intent. We removed the phrase “as separate conditions,” which was proposed in § 25.721(b)(1)(i) and (b)(2)(i), because we believe that phrase is confusing. In § 25.721(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)(ii), we also changed the proposed phrase “any other combination of landing gear legs not extended” to “any one or more landing gear legs not extended” which is the same phrase used in § 25.721(b) at Amendment 25-32. We made this change to ensure that applicants are required to address every possible combination of landing gear legs not extended, including single landing gear legs not extended. This is consistent with the way EASA has applied its rule.

Both §§ 25.721(b) and 25.994 final rules use the phrase “wheels-up landing.” This phrase has been used in § 25.994 since that rule was adopted at Amendment 25-23. A “wheels-up landing” includes every possible combination of landing gear legs not extended, including single landing gear legs not extended, and all gears fully retracted.

To date, § 25.787(a) has required that cargo compartments be designed to the emergency landing conditions of § 25.561(b), but excluded compartments located below or forward of all occupants in the airplane. The FAA now revises § 25.787(a) to include compartments located below or forward of all occupants in the airplane. This change would ensure that, in these compartments, inertia forces in the up and aft direction will not injure passengers, and inertia forces in any direction will not cause penetration of fuel tanks or lines, or cause other hazards.

A commenter recommended revising the text to clarify that only those specific emergency landing conditions that would result in one of the three listed effects need to be considered. The FAA agrees, and we have revised the text to clarify this intent.

The same commenter suggested that fires only need to be protected against if they can result in injury to occupants, and the rule text should be revised to clarify that intent. The FAA does not agree that fires only need to be protected against if they can result in injury to occupants. The FAA believes that the wording proposed in the NPRM is correct, and no change is necessary. The requirement intends protection against any fire or explosion on the airplane. Although the FAA agrees the objective of the rule is to prevent injuries to occupants, the FAA considers any fuel tank fire or explosion in an otherwise survivable landing as potentially injury-causing.

One commenter suggested that exactly the same wording be used in § 25.963(d) and CS 25.963(d). EASA CS 25.963(d) requires that no fuel be released in quantities “sufficient to start a serious fire” in otherwise survivable emergency landing conditions. Proposed § 25.963(d) would have required that no fuel be released in quantities “that would constitute a fire hazard.” The FAA stated in the NPRM that the two phrases have the same meaning, and that proposed § 25.963(d) was more consistent with the wording of the other related sections.

The FAA is adopting the wording proposed in the NPRM as more appropriate. As noted in the NPRM, the two phrases have the same meaning, and the latter phrase is consistent with the wording in CS 25.721/§ 25.721, CS 25.963(d)(4)/§ 25.963(d)(4), and CS 25.994/§ 25.994. In addition, EASA agrees with and supports the NPRM. In recent special conditions, the FAA has defined a hazardous fuel leak as “a running leak, a dripping leak, or a leak that, 15 minutes after wiping dry, results in a wetted airplane surface exceeding 6 inches in length or diameter.” We regard this as an appropriate definition of the amount of fuel that would “constitute a fire hazard” as specified in §§ 25.721, 25.963, and 25.994.

Another commenter suggested modifying § 25.963(d)(5) to reference landing gear before engine mounts in the rule text, since these are referred to respectively in § 25.721(a) and (c). The FAA agrees and the recommended change has been made.

EASA CS 25.963(e)(2) provides the fire protection criteria for fuel tank access covers. A commenter recommended that § 25.963(e)(2) be revised to match CS 25.963(e)(2), which the commenter believes is clearer. The FAA notes that this paragraph was not addressed in the NPRM and so will not be addressed in this final rule. The FAA might consider harmonizing this paragraph in the future.

No other public comments were received on § 25.963. However, after further FAA review, we determined that further explanation of the various requirements in § 25.963(d) would be beneficial. Section 25.963(d), as revised by Amendment 25-**, requires that “Fuel tanks must, so far as it is practicable, be designed, located, and installed so that no fuel is released in or near the fuselage, or near the engines, in quantities that would constitute a fire hazard in otherwise survivable emergency landing conditions. . . .” In addition to this primary requirement, § 25.963(d)(1) through (d)(5) provide minimum quantitative criteria. Survivable landing conditions may occur that exceed, or are not captured by, the conditions specified in § 25.963(d)(1) through (d)(5). Therefore, to meet the introductory requirement in § 25.963(d), every practicable consideration should be made to ensure protection of fuel tanks in more severe crash conditions, especially tanks located in the fuselage below the main cabin floor.

The fuel tank pressure loads specified in § 25.963(d) vary depending on whether the fuel tank is within or outside the pressure boundary. For certification of unpressurized airplanes, all fuel tanks should be considered to be “within” the fuselage pressure boundary, unless a fire resistant barrier exists between the fuel tank and the occupied compartments of the airplane.

Finally, the FAA notes that, for future rulemaking, we plan to consider specific crashworthiness requirements that would exceed the quantitative criteria specified in §§ 25.561, 25.721, and 25.963. Also, the FAA has recently applied special conditions on certain airplanes that require a crashworthiness evaluation at descent rates up to 30 feet per second.

To date, § 25.994 has required that fuel system components in an engine nacelle or in the fuselage be protected from damage that could result in spillage of enough fuel to constitute a fire hazard as a result of a wheels-up landing on a paved runway. We proposed to revise § 25.994 to specify that the wheels-up landing conditions that must be considered are those prescribed in § 25.721(b).

A commenter proposed two changes to what the FAA proposed: (1) Add a reference to § 25.721(c), and (2) change the order in which the nacelles and the fuselage are referenced, based on the order the fuselage and nacelle are addressed in § 25.721. We do not agree with the proposed changes. Adding a reference to § 25.721(c) would not be correct because wheels-up landing conditions are only listed in § 25.721(b). Since § 25.721(c) is not referenced in § 25.994, and since § 25.721(b) does not refer to the fuselage or nacelles, there is no reason to change the order in which the fuselage and nacelles are specified in § 25.994.

On March 13, 2013, the FAA published and solicited public comments on three proposed ACs that describe acceptable means for showing compliance with the proposed regulations in the NPRM. The comment period for the proposed ACs closed on June 14, 2013. Concurrently with this final rule, the FAA is issuing the following new ACs to provide guidance material for the regulations adopted by this amendment:

• AC 25-30, “Fuel Tank Strength in Emergency Landing Conditions.” (AC 25-30 would provide guidance for the fuel tank structural integrity requirements of §§ 25.561, 25.721, and 25.963.)

• AC 25.307-1, “Proof of Structure.”

• AC 25.621-1, “Casting Factors.”

Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.

Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement to that effect and the basis for it be included in the preamble if a full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared. Such a determination has been made for this final rule. The reasoning for this determination follows.

The FAA is amending certain airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. Adopting this final rule would eliminate regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the FAA and the EASA. This final rule does not add new requirements as U.S. manufacturers currently meet EASA requirements. Meeting two sets of certification requirements imposes greater costs for developing new transport category airplanes with little to no increase in safety. In the interest of fostering international trade, lowering the cost of manufacturing new transport category airplanes, and making the certification process more efficient, the FAA, EASA, and several industry working groups came together to create, to the maximum extent possible, a single set of certification requirements that would be accepted in both the United States and Europe. Therefore, as a result of these harmonization efforts, the FAA is amending the airworthiness regulations described in section I of this final rule, “Overview of the Final Rule.” This action harmonizes part 25 requirements with the corresponding requirements in EASA CS-25 Book 1.

In order to sell their aircraft in Europe, all manufacturers of transport category airplanes, certificated under part 25 must be in compliance with the EASA certification requirements in CS-25 Book 1. Since future certificated transport airplanes are expected to meet CS-25 Book 1, and this rule simply adopts the same EASA requirements, manufacturers will incur minimal or no additional cost resulting from this final rule. Therefore, the FAA estimates that there are no additional costs associated with this final rule.

In fact, manufacturers could receive cost savings because they will not have to build and certificate transport category airplanes to two different authorities' certification specifications and rules. Further, harmonization of these airworthiness standards, specifically § 25.621 may benefit manufacturers by providing another option in developing aircraft structures. The final rule permits use of a lower casting factor for critical castings, provided that tight controls are established for the casting process, inspection, and testing, which lead to cost savings in terms of aircraft weight. These additional controls are expected to at least maintain an equivalent level of safety as provided by existing regulations for casting factors.

The FAA has not attempted to quantify the cost savings that may accrue from this final rule, beyond noting that, while they may be minimal, they contribute overall to a potential harmonization savings. The agency concludes that because the compliance cost for this final rule is minimal and there may be harmonization cost savings, further analysis is not required.

During the public comment period, the Agency received 16 comments from 5 commenters. There were no comments regarding costs to this final rule; however, one commenter raised concern for safety in § 25.621. Details of this comment and the FAA's response can be found in the “General Overview of Comments” section. These harmonization efforts ensure that the current level of safety in transport category airplanes is maintained while encouraging the use of modern casting process technology.

The agency concludes that the changes would eliminate regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the FAA and EASA resulting in potential cost savings and maintaining current levels of safety. The FAA has, therefore, determined that this final rule is not a “significant regulatory action” as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, and is not “significant” as defined in DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) establishes “as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given serious consideration.” The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions.

Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.

However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the agency may so certify, and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.

The FAA believes that this final rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities for the following reasons. The net effect of this final rule is minimum regulatory cost relief, as the rule would adopt EASA requirements that the industry already meets. Further, all United States transport category aircraft manufacturers exceed the Small Business Administration small-entity criteria of 1,500 employees. The Agency received no comments regarding the Regulatory Flexibility Act during the public comment period.

If an agency determines that a rulemaking will not result in a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, the head of the agency may so certify under section 605(b) of the RFA. Therefore, as provided in section 605(b), the head of the FAA certifies that this rulemaking will not result in a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic objective, such the protection of safety, and does not operate in a manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined that it is in accord with the Trade Agreements Act as the final rule uses European standards as the basis for United States regulation.

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a “significant regulatory action.” The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value of $151 million in lieu of $100 million. This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that there would be no new requirement for information collection associated with this final rule.

(1) In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and has identified no differences with these regulations.

(2) Executive Order (EO) 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, (77 FR 26413, May 4, 2012) promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues and reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has analyzed this action under the policy and agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation. The agency has determined that this action would eliminate differences between U.S. aviation standards and those of other civil aviation authorities by creating a single set of certification requirements for transport category airplanes that would be acceptable in both the United States and Europe.

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f of Order 1050.1E and involves no extraordinary circumstances.

The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency determined that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have Federalism implications.

The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it is not a “significant energy action” under the executive order and it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained by using the Internet—

1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal ( http://www.regulations.gov ),

2. Visit the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/, or

3. Access the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.

Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; or by calling (202) 267-9680.

Comments received may be viewed by going to http://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document, may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. To find out more about SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

The California Department of Transportation has requested a temporary change to the operation of the Rio Vista Drawbridge, mile 12.8, over Sacramento River, at Rio Vista, CA. The drawbridge navigation span provides 18 feet vertical clearance above Mean High Water in the closed-to-navigation position. In accordance with 33 CFR 117.5, the draw opens on signal. Navigation on the waterway is commercial, search and rescue, law enforcement, and recreational.

A four-hour advance notice for openings is required from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. daily, from September 22, 2014 to October 17, 2014, to allow the bridge owner to repair the concrete vertical lift span deck. This temporary deviation has been coordinated with the waterway users. No objections to the temporary deviation were raised.

Vessels able to pass through the bridge in the closed position may do so at any time. The bridge will be able to open for emergencies with four hour advance notice. No alternative route is available for navigation. The Coast Guard will inform waterway users of this temporary deviation via our Local and Broadcast Notices to Mariners, to minimize resulting navigational impacts.

In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the effective period of this temporary deviation. This deviation from the operating regulations is authorized under 33 CFR 117.35.

The Illinois Department of Transportation requested a temporary deviation for the Jefferson Street Drawbridge, across the Illinois River, mile 287.9, at Joliet, Illinois to remain in the closed-to-navigation position for 1 hour from 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. on October 5, 2014 in order to allow the Fall Color 5K run to cross the bridge.

The Jefferson Street Drawbridge currently operates in accordance with 33 CFR 117.393(c), which states the general requirement that the drawbridge shall open on signal except it need not open from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. and from 4:15 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. Monday through Saturday.

There are no alternate routes for vessels transiting this section of the Illinois River.

The Jefferson Street Drawbridge, in the closed-to-navigation position, provides a vertical clearance of 16.6 feet above normal pool. Navigation on the waterway consists primarily of commercial tows and recreational watercraft and will not be significantly impacted. This temporary deviation has been coordinated with waterway users. No objections were received.

In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the effective period of this temporary deviation. This deviation from the operating regulations is authorized under 33 CFR 117.35.

The Illinois Department of Transportation requested a temporary deviation for the Cass Street Drawbridge, across the Illinois River, mile 288.1, at Joliet, Illinois to remain in the closed-to-navigation position for 1 hour from 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. on October 5, 2014 in order to allow the Fall Color 5K run to cross the bridge.

The Cass Street Drawbridge currently operates in accordance with 33 CFR 117.393(c), which states the general requirement that the drawbridge shall open on signal except it need not open from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. and from 4:15 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. Monday through Saturday.

There are no alternate routes for vessels transiting this section of the Illinois River.

The Cass Street Drawbridge, in the closed-to-navigation position, provides a vertical clearance of 16.6 feet above normal pool. Navigation on the waterway consists primarily of commercial tows and recreational watercraft and will not be significantly impacted. This temporary deviation has been coordinated with waterway users. No objections were received.

In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the effective period of this temporary deviation. This deviation from the operating regulations is authorized under 33 CFR 117.35.

Throughout this document, “we,” “us,” and “our” refer to EPA.

Table 1 lists the rules we are approving with the dates that they were adopted by the local air agencies and submitted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB).

On April 9, 2014 and May 5, 2014 respectively, EPA determined that the submittal for ICAPCD Rule 101 and SJVUAPCD Rule 1020 met the completeness criteria in 40 CFR part 51, Appendix V, which must be met before formal EPA review.

There are previous versions of ICAPCD Rule 101 and SJVUAPCD Rule 1020 in the SIP. Most recently, on March 7, 2011 (76 FR 12280), we approved a version of ICAPCD Rule 101 that was adopted locally on February 23, 2010; and on August 28, 2009 (74 FR 44291), we approved a version of SJVUAPCD Rule 1020 that was adopted locally on January 15, 2009.

Section 110(a) of the CAA requires States to submit regulations that control volatile organic compounds, oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter, and other air pollutants which harm human health and the environment. These rules were developed as part of the local agency's program to control these pollutants.

Imperial County Rule 101 is being amended by adding new definitions, revising definitions for clarity, making various administrative changes, updating the exempt volatile organic compounds list to correspond with EPA's, and deleting two obsolete definitions. EPA's technical support document (TSD) has more detailed information about this rule.

SJVUAPCD amended Rule 1020 to add dimethyl carbonate (DMC) and propylene carbonate (PC) to the District's list of exempt compounds within the definition of VOC as a response to EPA findings that DMC and PC have a low potential to form ozone in the atmosphere. EPA's TSD has more detailed information about this rule.

These rules describe administrative provisions and definitions that support emission controls found in other local agency requirements. In combination with the other requirements, these rules must be enforceable (see section 110(a) of the Act) and must not relax existing requirements (see sections 110(l) and 193). EPA policy that we used to evaluate enforceability requirements consistently includes the Bluebook (“Issues Relating to VOC Regulation Cutpoints, Deficiencies, and Deviations,” EPA, May 25, 1988), the Little Bluebook (“Guidance Document for Correcting Common VOC & Other Rule Deficiencies,” EPA Region 9, August 21, 2001), and “State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,” 57 FR 13498 (April 16, 1992); 57 FR 18070 (April 28, 1992).

We believe these rules are consistent with the relevant policy and guidance regarding enforceability and SIP relaxations. The TSDs have more information on our evaluations.

The TSD describes additional rule revisions that we recommend for the next time the local agency modifies the rules.

As authorized in section 110(k)(3) of the Act, EPA is fully approving the submitted rules because we believe they fulfill all relevant requirements. We do not think anyone will object to this approval, so we are finalizing it without proposing it in advance. However, in the Proposed Rules section of this Federal Register , we are simultaneously proposing approval of the same submitted rules. If we receive adverse comments by November 3, 2014, we will publish a timely withdrawal in the Federal Register to notify the public that the direct final approval will not take effect and we will address the comments in a subsequent final action based on the proposal. If we do not receive timely adverse comments, the direct final approval will be effective without further notice on December 1, 2014. This will incorporate these rules into the federally enforceable SIP.

Please note that if EPA receives adverse comment on an amendment, paragraph, or section of this rule and if that provision may be severed from the remainder of the rule, EPA may adopt as final those provisions of the rule that are not the subject of an adverse comment.

Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP submission that complies with the provisions of the Act and applicable Federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in reviewing SIP submissions, EPA's role is to approve State choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, this action merely approves State law as meeting Federal requirements and does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by State law. For that reason, this action:

• Is not a “significant regulatory action” subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993);

• Does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. );

• Is certified as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. );

• Does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);

• Does not have Federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);

• Is not an economically significant regulatory action based on health or safety risks subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997);

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001);

• Is not subject to requirements of Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent with the Clean Air Act; and

• Does not provide EPA with the discretionary authority to address disproportionate human health or environmental effects with practical, appropriate, and legally permissible methods under Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).

In addition, this rule does not have tribal implications as specified by Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000), because the SIP is not approved to apply in Indian country located in the State, and EPA notes that it will not impose substantial direct costs on tribal governments or preempt tribal law.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. EPA will submit a report containing this action and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . A major rule cannot take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register . This action is not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit by December 1, 2014. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action. Parties with objections to this direct final rule are encouraged to file a comment in response to the parallel notice of proposed rulemaking for this action published in the Proposed Rules section of this Federal Register , rather than file an immediate petition for judicial review of this direct final rule, so that EPA can withdraw this direct final rule and address the comment in the proposed rulemaking. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to enforce its requirements (see section 307(b)(2)).

Environmental protection, Air pollution control, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nitrogen dioxide, Ozone, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Volatile organic compounds.

Part 52, Chapter I, Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

Throughout this document, wherever “we,” “us,” or “our” is used, it is intended to refer to the EPA.

Northern Ada County was identified as an area of concern for PM 10 with the promulgation of the PM 10 NAAQS in 1987, and was formally designated as a moderate PM 10 nonattainment area upon passage of the 1990 CAA amendments. Idaho developed a state implementation plan (SIP) and submitted it to the EPA in November 1991, later submitting revisions in December 1994 and July 1995. The EPA approved the Northern Ada County PM 10 SIP on May 30, 1996 (61 FR 27019). Idaho submitted a maintenance plan and a request to redesignate the area to attainment on September 27, 2002, and provided supplemental information on July 10 and 21, 2003. On October 27, 2003, the EPA approved the Northern Ada County PM 10 Maintenance Plan and redesignated the area to attainment status for PM 10 (68 FR 61106).

In actions dated August 25, 1994 (59 FR 43475) and May 26, 1995 (60 FR 27891), the EPA conditionally approved the SIP for the Pinehurst, Idaho PM 10 nonattainment area. The conditional approval concluded that IDEQ had not satisfied the requirement for contingency measures for both the City of Pinehurst and the Pinehurst Expansion area. The EPA set a deadline of July 20, 1995 for IDEQ to submit the required contingency measures. IDEQ met the established deadline with its submission “Contingency Measures for the Pinehurst PM 10 Air Quality Improvement Plan,” dated July 13, 1995.

On September 23, 2013, IDEQ submitted documentation in accordance with the Exceptional Events Rule (40 CFR 50.14) to demonstrate that the monitored PM 10 values on February 15-16, 2011 at the Boise monitor were due to a high wind event and resulting dust storm that originated in Nevada. The EPA proposed approval of this maintenance plan and the Pinehurst Contingency Measures on February 20, 2014 (79 FR 9697).

On March 24, 2014, the EPA received one set of comments opposing the EPA's proposed approval of Northern Ada County PM 10 Second Ten-Year Maintenance Plan (Ada County PM 10 plan). The comments were focused on the potential impact that possible coal export terminals, proposed to be built in the Pacific Northwest, could have on PM 10 concentrations in the maintenance area. These comments are similar to comments previously submitted on February 22, 2013, related to emissions impacts of locomotive coal transport in the emissions inventory for the Tacoma fine particulate (PM 2.5 ) nonattainment area (78 FR 32131, May 29, 2013) and comments submitted on March 10, 2014, related to the Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma Second 10-Year PM 10 Limited Maintenance Plan (79 FR 49239, August 20, 2014). The EPA responded to these comments in the May 29, 2013 and August 20, 2014 final rulemakings. Due to the specific focus of today's action, the EPA is only addressing those comments directly relevant to the Ada County PM 10 plan.

Comment: The commenter requested that the EPA disapprove the Ada County PM 10 plan because the plan relied on general growth factors in estimating future railroad traffic without consideration of future growth associated with proposed coal export terminals that may be built in Oregon and Washington.

Response: The EPA guidance regarding development of emissions inventories requires states to consider reasonably anticipated growth in emission sources such as increased vehicle miles traveled, population growth, and possible emissions growth at permitted stationary sources. 1 None of the projects in question are far enough along in their development that the scope or impact of their emissions can be estimated with any degree of certainty. In this case, the Washington State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) and/or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) processes for coal export proposals cited in the March 24, 2014 letter are ongoing. It is not known whether the facilities will be constructed, and if they are constructed, the size and scope of operations that would be authorized. In addition, as the commenter notes, there are several possible rail routes that could be used in the future and it is not known whether locomotive traffic associated with coal shipments would traverse or bypass the Ada County maintenance area or, as may be the case, whether routes would constantly vary based on decisions by the rail operator. Given the range of uncertainty surrounding the proposed terminals, including whether the terminals will be constructed, the location (s) of such terminals and decisions of terminal and railway operators that would affect rail routes, the EPA believes it would be unreasonable to disapprove the Ada County PM 10 plan on the basis that the emissions inventory did not estimate potential future events that may or may not impact the maintenance area. Should any of these coal export facilities be built in the future, both the EPA and the State have the authority under the EPA's longstanding guidance regarding contingency measures to reexamine emissions inventories and establish additional control measures if a noticeable impact on PM 10 levels in Ada County were to occur. 2

Comment: The commenter noted Washington State's Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma Second 10-Year PM 10 Limited Maintenance Plan submittal which included a calculation of estimated fugitive coal dust emissions as part of the 2011 baseline emissions inventory for that area (Docket No. EPA-R10-OAR-2013-0713)(Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma PM 10 plan). The commenter requested that the EPA disapprove the Ada County PM 10 plan because it did not contain a comparable estimate of fugitive coal dust emissions.

Response: A key difference between the Washington and Idaho plans is that there is already coal-related locomotive activity through the Washington maintenance areas on the way to export through Canada, captured as part of the 2011 baseline emissions inventory. The commenter provides no compelling evidence to suggest that Ada County experiences similar Canadian export traffic like Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma. Instead the commenter's focus is on proposed export terminals that may or may not be built in Oregon and Washington. As noted above, consideration of potential, future impacts of projects that may or may not be built is not a reasonable basis for disapproving the Ada County PM 10 plan. The EPA also notes that the commenter raised several issues specific to the Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma PM 10 plan fugitive dust estimation methodology which are not germane to the Ada County PM 10 plan and therefore not addressed here.

Comment: The Commenter noted that modeling conducted by the Sierra Club of the potential impacts of the proposed Ambre Energy Coyote Island Terminal in Morrow predicts elevated PM 2.5 emissions. The commenter indicates that results for PM 2.5 could be assumed to be PM 10 and that this information is enough to conclude that there would be high levels of PM 10 emissions that could result in exceedances in Ada County.

Response: The Tran Modeling analysis evaluated potential emissions from the proposed Ambre Energy Coyote Island Terminal in Morrow, Oregon and calculated emissions near the facility at values above the NAAQS. Given the uncertainty surrounding the proposed Morrow Terminal, including whether the facility will be constructed, the EPA believes it would be unreasonable to disapprove the Ada County PM 10 Maintenance Plan on the basis of this modeling analysis. In addition, because the modeling predicts emission levels near the facility in Oregon, the EPA believes it is unreasonable to draw conclusions about how these emissions could affect Ada County, Idaho. Should this facility be built in the future, both the EPA and the state have the authority under the EPA's longstanding guidance regarding contingency measures to establish additional control measures if a noticeable impact on PM 10 levels in Ada County were to occur.

The EPA is taking final action to approve the Northern Ada County PM 10 Second Ten-Year Maintenance Plan and Pinehurst PM 10 Contingency Measures. This action approves and incorporates into the SIP the PM 10 control measures submitted by IDEQ on March 11, 2013 and July 13, 1995, respectively. The EPA is also approving the February 15-16, 2011 high wind exceptional event at the Boise Fire Station monitor. Provisions describing state or local enforcement authority are not incorporated into the SIP to avoid potential conflict with the EPA's independent authorities.

Under the CAA, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP submission that complies with the provisions of the Act and applicable Federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in reviewing SIP submissions, the EPA's role is to approve state choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the CAA. Accordingly, this action merely approves state law as meeting Federal requirements and does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by state law. For that reason, this action:

• Is not a “significant regulatory action” subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993);

• does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. );

• is certified as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601, et seq. );

• does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);

• does not have Federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);

• is not an economically significant regulatory action based on health or safety risks subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997);

• is not a significant regulatory action subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001);

• is not subject to requirements of Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent with the CAA; and

• does not provide the EPA with the discretionary authority to address, as appropriate, disproportionate human health or environmental effects, using practicable and legally permissible methods, under Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).

The SIP is not approved to apply on any Indian reservation land or in any other area where EPA or an Indian tribe has demonstrated that a tribe has jurisdiction. In those areas of Indian country, the rule does not have tribal implications as specified by Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000), nor will it impose substantial direct costs on tribal governments or preempt tribal law.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. The EPA will submit a report containing this action and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . A major rule cannot take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register . This action is not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit by December 1, 2014. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to enforce its requirements. (See section 307(b)(2)).

40 CFR part 52 is amended as follows:

States which have received Final authorization from the EPA under RCRA section 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. 6926(b), must maintain a hazardous waste program that is equivalent to, consistent with, and no less stringent than the Federal hazardous waste program. As the Federal program changes, the States must change their programs and ask the EPA to authorize the changes. Changes to State hazardous waste programs may be necessary when Federal or State statutory or regulatory authority is modified or when certain other changes occur. Most commonly, States must change their programs because of changes to the EPA's regulations in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 124, 260 through 268, 270, 273 and 279. States can also initiate their own changes to their hazardous waste program and these changes must then be authorized.

We conclude that Arkansas' revisions to its authorized program meet all of the statutory and regulatory requirements established by RCRA. We found that the State-initiated changes make Arkansas' rules more clear or conform more closely to the Federal equivalents and are of such nature that a formal application is unnecessary. Therefore, we grant Arkansas final authorization to operate its hazardous waste program with the changes described in the table at Section G below. Arkansas has responsibility for permitting Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs) within its borders (except in Indian Country) and for carrying out all authorized aspects of the RCRA program, subject to the limitations of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA). New Federal requirements and prohibitions imposed by Federal regulations that EPA promulgates under the authority of HSWA take effect in authorized States before they are authorized for the requirements. Thus, the EPA will implement those requirements and prohibitions in Arkansas, including issuing permits, until the State is granted authorization to do so.

The effect of this decision is that a facility in Arkansas subject to RCRA will now have to comply with the authorized State requirements instead of the equivalent Federal requirements in order to comply with RCRA. Arkansas has enforcement responsibilities under its State hazardous waste program for violations of such program, but the EPA retains its authority under RCRA sections 3007, 3008, 3013, and 7003, which include, among others, authority to:

• Do inspections, and require monitoring, tests, analyses, or reports;

• Enforce RCRA requirements and suspend or revoke permits; and

• Take enforcement actions regardless of whether the State has taken its own actions.

This action does not impose additional requirements on the regulated community because the statutes and regulations for which Arkansas is being authorized by this direct action are already effective and are not changed by this action.

The EPA did not publish a proposal before this rule because we view this as a routine program change and do not expect comments that oppose this approval. We are providing an opportunity for public comment now. In addition to this rule, in the Proposed Rules section of this Federal Register , we are publishing a separate document that proposes to authorize the State program changes.

If the EPA receives comments that oppose this authorization or the incorporation-by-reference of the State program, we will withdraw this rule by publishing a timely document in the Federal Register before the rule becomes effective. The EPA will base any further decision on the authorization of the State program changes, or the incorporation-by-reference, on the proposal mentioned in the previous paragraph. We will then address all public comments in a later final rule. If you want to comment on this authorization and incorporation-by-reference, you must do so at this time. If we receive comments that oppose only the authorization of a particular change to the State hazardous waste program or the incorporation-by-reference of the State program, we may withdraw only that part of this rule, but the authorization of the program changes or the incorporation-by-reference of the State program that the comments do not oppose will become effective on the date specified above. The Federal Register withdrawal document will specify which part of the authorization or incorporation-by-reference of the State program will become effective and which part is being withdrawn.

Arkansas initially received final authorization on January 25, 1985 (50 FR 1513), to implement its Base Hazardous Waste Management program. Arkansas received authorization for revisions to its program on January 11, 1985 (50 FR 1513), effective January 25, 1985; March 27, 1990 (55 FR 11192), effective May 29, 1990; September 18, 1991 (56 FR 47153), effective November 18, 1991; October 5, 1992 (57 FR 45721), effective December 4, 1992; October 7, 1994 (59 FR 51115), effective December 21, 1994, April 24, 2002 (67 FR 20038), effective June 24, 2002; August 15, 2007 (72 FR 45663), effective October 15, 2007, as amended June 28, 2010 (75 FR 36538); June 28, 2010 (75 FR 36538), effective August 27, 2010; and August 10, 2012 (77 FR 47779), effective October 9, 2012.

The State has made amendments to the provisions listed in the table which follows. These amendments clarify the State's regulations and make the State's regulations more internally consistent. The State's laws and regulations, as amended by these provisions, provide authority which remains equivalent to, no less stringent than, and not broader in scope than the Federal laws and regulations. These State-initiated changes satisfy the requirements of 40 CFR 271.21(a). We are granting Arkansas final authorization to carry out the following provisions of the State's program in lieu of the Federal program. These provisions are analogous to the indicated RCRA regulations found at 40 CFR as of July 1, 2008. Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission Regulation No. 23, Hazardous Waste Management, as amended April 23, 2010, effective June 13, 2010.

This authorization does not affect the status of State permits and those permits issued by the EPA because no new substantive requirements are a part of these revisions.

Arkansas is not authorized to carry out its Hazardous Waste Program in Indian Country within the State. This authority remains with EPA. Therefore, this action has no effect in Indian Country.

Codification is the process of placing a State's statutes and regulations that comprise the State's authorized hazardous waste management program into the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Section 3006(b) of RCRA, as amended, allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to authorize State hazardous waste management programs to operate in lieu of the Federal hazardous waste management regulatory program. The EPA codifies its authorization of State programs in 40 CFR part 272 and incorporates by reference State statutes and regulations that the EPA will enforce under sections 3007 and 3008 of RCRA and any other applicable statutory provisions.

The EPA incorporated by reference Arkansas' then authorized hazardous waste program effective December 13, 1993 (58 FR 52674), August 21, 1995 (60 FR 32112), and August 27, 2010 (75 FR 36538). In this action, EPA is revising Subpart E of 40 CFR part 272 to include the recent authorization revision actions effective August 27, 2010 (75 FR 36538) and October 9, 2012 (77 FR 47779).

The purpose of this Federal Register document is to codify Arkansas' base hazardous waste management program and its revisions to that program. The EPA provided notices and opportunity for comments on the Agency's decisions to authorize the Arkansas program, and the EPA is not reopening the decisions, nor requesting comments, on the Arkansas authorizations as published in the Federal Register notices specified in Section I.F. of this document.

This document incorporates by reference Arkansas' hazardous waste statutes and regulations and clarifies which of these provisions are included in the authorized and Federally enforceable program. By codifying Arkansas' authorized program and by amending the Code of Federal Regulations, the public will be more easily able to discern the status of Federally approved requirements of the Arkansas hazardous waste management program.

The EPA is incorporating by reference the Arkansas authorized hazardous waste program in subpart E of 40 CFR part 272. Section 272.201 incorporates by reference Arkansas' authorized hazardous waste statutes and regulations. Section 272.201 also references the statutory provisions (including procedural and enforcement provisions) which provide the legal basis for the State's implementation of the hazardous waste management program, the Memorandum of Agreement, the Attorney General's Statements and the Program Description, which are approved as part of the hazardous waste management program under Subtitle C of RCRA.

The EPA retains its authority under statutory provisions, including but not limited to, RCRA sections 3007, 3008, 3013, and 7003, and other applicable statutory and regulatory provisions to undertake inspections and enforcement actions and to issue orders in authorized States. With respect to these actions, the EPA will rely on Federal sanctions, Federal inspection authorities, and Federal procedures rather than any authorized State analogues to these provisions. Therefore, the EPA is not incorporating by reference such particular, approved Arkansas procedural and enforcement authorities. Section 272.201(c)(2) of 40 CFR lists the statutory and regulatory provisions which provide the legal basis for the State's implementation of the hazardous waste management program, as well as those procedural and enforcement authorities that are part of the State's approved program, but these are not incorporated by reference.

The public needs to be aware that some provisions of Arkansas' hazardous waste management program are not part of the Federally authorized State program. These non-authorized provisions include:

(1) Provisions that are not part of the RCRA subtitle C program because they are “broader in scope” than RCRA subtitle C (see 40 CFR 271.1(i));

(2) Federal rules for which Arkansas is not authorized, but which the State has adopted in its regulations;

(3) Unauthorized amendments to authorized State provisions; and

(4) New unauthorized State requirements.

State provisions that are “broader in scope” than the Federal program are not part of the RCRA authorized program and the EPA will not enforce them. Therefore, they are not incorporated by reference in 40 CFR part 272. For reference and clarity, 40 CFR 272.201(c)(3) lists the Arkansas regulatory provisions which are “broader in scope” than the Federal program and which are not part of the authorized program being incorporated by reference. “Broader in scope” provisions cannot be enforced by the EPA; the State, however, may enforce such provisions under State law.

Arkansas has adopted but is not authorized for the following Federal rules published in the Federal Register on July 15, 1985 (50 FR 28702; amendments to 40 CFR 260.22 only); April 12, 1996 (61 FR 16290); August 5, 2005 (70 FR 45508); October 4, 2005 (70 FR 57769); October 12, 2005 (70 FR 59402); April 4, 2006 (71 FR 16862); July 14, 2006 (71 FR 40254); July 28, 2006 (71 FR 42928); January 2, 2008 (73 FR 57). Therefore, these Federal amendments included in Arkansas' regulations, are not part of the State's authorized program and are not part of the incorporation by reference addressed by this Federal Register document.

Additionally, Arkansas' hazardous waste regulations include amendments which have not been authorized by the EPA. Since the EPA cannot enforce a State's requirements which have not been reviewed and authorized in accordance with RCRA section 3006 and 40 CFR part 271, it is important to be precise in delineating the scope of a State's authorized hazardous waste program. Regulatory provisions that have not been authorized by the EPA include amendments to previously authorized State regulations as well as new State requirements. State regulations that are not incorporated by reference in this rule at 40 CFR 272.201(c)(1), or that are not listed in 40 CFR 272.201(c)(3) (“broader in scope”), are considered new unauthorized State requirements. These requirements are not Federally enforceable.

With respect to any requirement pursuant to the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA) for which the State has not yet been authorized, the EPA will continue to enforce the Federal HSWA standards until the State is authorized for these provisions.

The EPA is not amending 40 CFR part 272 to include HSWA requirements and prohibitions that are implemented by EPA. Section 3006(g) of RCRA provides that any HSWA requirement or prohibition (including implementing regulations) takes effect in authorized and not authorized States at the same time. A HSWA requirement or prohibition supersedes any less stringent or inconsistent State provision which may have been previously authorized by the EPA (50 FR 28702, July 15, 1985). The EPA has the authority to implement HSWA requirements in all States, including authorized States, until the States become authorized for such requirement or prohibition. Authorized States are required to revise their programs to adopt the HSWA requirements and prohibitions, and then to seek authorization for those revisions pursuant to 40 CFR part 271.

Instead of amending the 40 CFR part 272 every time a new HSWA provision takes effect under the authority of RCRA section 3006(g), the EPA will wait until the State receives authorization for its analog to the new HSWA provision before amending the State's 40 CFR part 272 incorporation by reference. Until then, persons wanting to know whether a HSWA requirement or prohibition is in effect should refer to 40 CFR 271.1(j), as amended, which lists each such provision.

Some existing State requirements may be similar to the HSWA requirement implemented by the EPA. However, until the EPA authorizes those State requirements, the EPA can only enforce the HSWA requirements and not the State analogs. The EPA will not codify those State requirements until the State receives authorization for those requirements.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has exempted this action from the requirements of Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993), and therefore, this action is not subject to review by OMB. This rule incorporated by reference Arkansas' authorized hazardous waste management regulations, and imposes no additional requirements beyond those imposed by State law. This final rule does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Incorporation by reference will not impose any new burdens on small entities. Accordingly, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). Because this rule merely incorporates by reference certain existing State hazardous waste management program requirements which the EPA already approves under 40 CFR part 271, and does not impose any additional enforceable duty beyond that required by State law, it does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4).

This action will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government, as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999), because it merely incorporates by reference existing State hazardous waste management program requirements without altering the relationship or the distribution of power and responsibilities established by RCRA. This action also does not have Tribal implications within the meaning of Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 6, 2000).

This action also is not subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997), because it is not economically significant and it does not make decisions based on environmental health or safety risks. This action is not subject to Executive Order 13211, “Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply Distribution or Use” (66 FR 28344, May 22, 2001) because it is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.

Under RCRA 3006(b), the EPA grants a State's application for incorporation by reference as long as the State meets the criteria required by RCRA. It would thus be inconsistent with applicable law for the EPA, when it reviews a State incorporation by reference application, to require the use of any particular voluntary consensus standard in place of another standard that otherwise satisfies the requirements of RCRA. Thus, the requirements of section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272) do not apply. The final rule does not include environmental justice issues that require consideration under Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994). The EPA has complied with Executive Order 12630 (53 FR 8859, March 15, 1988) by examining the takings implications of the rule in accordance with the “Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings” issued under the executive order. As required by section 3 of Executive Order 12988 (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996), in issuing this rule, the EPA has taken the necessary steps to eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity, minimize potential litigation, and provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication in the Federal Register . A major rule cannot take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register . This action is not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). This action will be effective December 1, 2014.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, under the authority at 42 U.S.C. 6912(a), 6926, and 6974(b), the EPA is granting final authorization under part 271 to the State of Arkansas for revisions to its hazardous waste program under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and is amending 40 CFR part 272 as follows:

This is a summary of the Commission's Order on Remand CC Docket No. 01-92, FCC 14-134, adopted September 15, 2014 and released September 17, 2014. This document does not contain information collection(s) subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. In addition, therefore, it does not contain any new or modified “information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees,” pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002. As we are adopting no rules in this Order on Remand, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required. The full-text of this document may be downloaded at the following Internet address: http://www.fcc.gov/document/commission-finds-2005-t-mobile-order-not-odds-rural-exemption. The complete text may be purchased from Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th Street SW., Room Cy-B402, Washington, DC 20554. To request alternative formats for persons with disabilities (e.g., accessible format documents, sign language, interpreters, CARTS, etc.), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Commissions Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

1. In response to claims by Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers that incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) were filing state tariffs charging excessive rates for terminating wireless-originated local traffic on their wireline networks, the Commission in its 2005 T-Mobile Order adopted a rule banning such wireless termination tariffs on a prospective basis. Two incumbent LECs sought judicial review, arguing that the rule conflicted with the “rural exemption” in section 251(f)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934 (the Act), which exempts rural incumbent LECs from certain market-opening requirements imposed on incumbent LECs by section 251(c) unless a state commission terminates that exemption according to specified criteria. Finding that the T-Mobile Order did not adequately analyze and explain the effects of its rule on the rural exemption in section 251(f)(1), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit last year “remand[ed]” the T-Mobile Order to the FCC “for further consideration.”

2. This Order on Remand responds to the court's directive. Specifically, the Commission examines the interplay between the T-Mobile Order and the rural exemption set forth in section 251(f)(1)(A). As explained below, the T-Mobile Order was based on the Commission's plenary authority under sections 201 and 332 of the Act, and the rural exemption contained in section 251(f)(1)(A) only relieves rural LECs from complying with obligations arising under an entirely separate statutory provision, i.e., section 251(c) of the Act. Accordingly, we conclude that the T-Mobile Order rule prohibiting the filing of wireless termination tariffs for non-access traffic is not at odds with the section 251(f)(1) rural exemption.

3. LEC/CMRS Interconnection Regime. The Commission established rules governing interconnection between LECs and CMRS providers in 1994. Pursuant to its authority under sections 201(a) and 332 of the Act, the Commission adopted rules requiring LECs and CMRS carriers to negotiate in good faith the terms and conditions of interconnection, and pay mutual compensation for the exchange of traffic. As originally adopted, § 20.11 of the Commission's rules required LECs to provide the type of interconnection reasonably requested and also required the originating carrier, whether LEC or CMRS provider, to pay reasonable compensation to the terminating carrier in connection with traffic that terminates on the latter's network facilities. As a general matter, early decisions addressing CMRS interconnection issues indicate that the Commission intended for these arrangements to be negotiated agreements between the parties and also reflect an expectation that tariffs would be filed only after carriers had negotiated agreements.

4. Section 251 Duties. Adopted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), section 251 of the Act provides a graduated set of interconnection requirements and other obligations designed to foster competition in telecommunications markets. The nature and scope of these obligations vary depending on the type of service provider. Section 251(a) sets forth general duties applicable to all telecommunications carriers, including the duty “to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers.” Section 251(b) sets forth additional duties for LECs pertaining to resale of services, number portability, dialing parity, access to rights-of-way, and reciprocal compensation—the duty of LECs to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications (i.e., arrangements for exchange of traffic terminating on another carrier's network). Section 251(c) sets forth the most detailed obligations, which apply only to incumbent LECs. These section 251(c) obligations include, among other things, the duty to “negotiate in good faith in accordance with section 252 the particular terms and conditions of agreements” to fulfill the section 251(b) and (c) requirements.

5. The Rural Exemption. Section 251(f)(1)(A), generally known as “the rural exemption,” specifies that section 251(c) “shall not apply to a rural telephone company” until the rural telephone company, or rural LEC, has received a bona fide “request for interconnection, services, or network elements,” and the relevant state commission determines “that the request is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with section 254 . . . . ” The Commission has stated that Congress intended exemption from the section 251(c) requirements to be the exception rather than the rule, and to apply only to the extent, and for the period of time, that policy considerations justify such exemption.

6. Section 252. Section 252 of the Act provides that incumbent LECs, upon receiving a request for interconnection under section 251, may seek to negotiate a voluntary interconnection agreement with the requesting carrier. Any party negotiating such an agreement may ask a state commission to mediate any differences. Additionally, section 252(b) sets forth a mandatory arbitration scheme for the resolution of disputes. Further, the final agreement, whether arrived at by negotiation or arbitration, must be submitted for approval to the state commission. The Commission has declined to adopt rules advising the state commissions on how to conduct mediations and arbitrations, and has asserted that the states are in a better position to develop mediation and arbitration rules that support the objectives of the 1996 Act.

7. The T-Mobile Order dealt with certain issues that had arisen in the context of LEC-CMRS interconnection and traffic exchange. CMRS providers typically interconnect indirectly with incumbent LECs via tandems owned by third parties. In this scenario, a CMRS provider delivers the call to a tandem, which in turn delivers the call to the terminating incumbent LEC. The indirect nature of the interconnection enables the CMRS provider and incumbent LEC to exchange traffic even if there is no interconnection agreement or other compensation arrangement between the parties. This structure led to disputes about whether terminating compensation was due in the absence of a compensation arrangement, as well as the type of intercarrier compensation due. In response, incumbent LECs began filing state tariffs that included wireless termination charges, which some CMRS providers claimed were excessive. In 2002, T-Mobile USA, Inc., Western Wireless Corporation, Nextel Communications and Nextel Partners jointly filed a petition for declaratory ruling asking the Commission to reaffirm “that wireless termination tariffs are not a proper mechanism for establishing reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of traffic.”

8. In the T-Mobile Order, the Commission determined that nothing in the 1996 Act or pre-1996 Act requirements specifically prohibited incumbent LECs from filing such state wireless termination tariffs. Given the clear preference for negotiated interconnection agreements reflected in both the 1996 Act and the Commission's past actions and policies under sections 201(a) and 332, however, the Commission found it in the public interest to preclude the filing of wireless termination tariffs in this context going forward. Accordingly, the Commission amended § 20.11 of its rules to prohibit LECs from imposing non-access compensation obligations on CMRS providers pursuant to tariff. The Commission revised this section of the rules pursuant to its “plenary authority under sections 201 and 332 of the Act.”

9. Recognizing that CMRS providers may lack incentives to enter into agreements for compensation arrangements, the Commission also amended § 20.11 to provide that an incumbent LEC may request interconnection from a CMRS provider and invoke the same negotiation and arbitration procedures that apply under section 252 of the Act to interconnection requests made by a CMRS provider to an incumbent LEC. This revision also was adopted pursuant to the Commission's authority under sections 201 and 332 of the Act. The Commission did not exempt rural incumbent LECs from the rules adopted in the T-Mobile Order nor did it expressly address how the new tariff prohibition and procedures related to rural incumbent LECs' exemption from section 251(c) under section 251(f)(1) of the Act. Shortly after the T-Mobile Order was released, Ronan Telephone Co. and Hot Springs Telephone Co. (Petitioners) filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit ordered the case held in abeyance until the Commission addressed pending reconsideration requests.

10. In the 2011 USF/ICC Transformation Order, the Commission declined to reconsider, in the context of broader intercarrier compensation reform, certain aspects of the T-Mobile Order. Among the issues considered was whether the Commission had improperly extended the obligations contained in section 252 to providers that are not subject to that provision. The Commission clarified that it did not extend negotiation and arbitration requirements to non-incumbent LECs under section 252, but rather, acting pursuant to sections 201 and 332 and authority ancillary to those provisions and sections 251(a)(1) and 251(b)(5), applied duties “analogous to the [section 252] negotiation and arbitration requirements.” Thus, the Commission agreed with parties arguing that references to the negotiation and arbitration procedures in section 252 were intended merely to describe, in an abbreviated manner, duties similar to those applied under section 252.

11. As part of its broader reforms, the Commission also adopted bill-and-keep as the immediately applicable default compensation methodology for non-access traffic between LECs and CMRS providers under § 20.11 and the reciprocal compensation requirements in part 51 of our rules. The Commission reasoned that a federal bill-and-keep methodology for such compensation would address growing confusion and litigation over the appropriate compensation rates for this traffic and eliminate the incentives for traffic stimulation and regulatory arbitrage. Significantly, the Commission did not abrogate existing agreements or otherwise adopt a “fresh look” in light of its reforms. Thus, carriers bound by an existing compensation agreement would continue to receive compensation pursuant to such agreements until the conclusion of the contract term. On reconsideration, however, the Commission acknowledged that these agreements often contain change of law provisions that would, as a practical matter, result in carriers moving to a bill-and-keep methodology upon the effective date of the rule rather than when the agreement expires. Accordingly, the Commission extended the effective date of the new default-bill-and-keep methodology from December 29, 2011 to July 1, 2012 for situations where carriers were exchanging non-access traffic pursuant to an agreement.

12. Subsequent to the USF/ICC Transformation Order, the Ninth Circuit returned the appeal to the active calendar. In their opening brief to the court, Petitioners maintained that, under section 251(f)(1), rural telephone companies are exempt from the negotiation and arbitration obligations set forth in section 251(c) unless the exemption is terminated by a state public utility commission. They argued that, under the T-Mobile Order, LECs are eligible for compensation for terminating CMRS provider traffic only if they enter into negotiated agreements with CMRS providers or submit to the arbitration process. Thus, they contended that the Commission unlawfully usurped the authority of state commissions by essentially terminating the rural exemption.

13. On August 21, 2013, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the T-Mobile Order. Specifically, the court observed that Congress had exempted rural telephone companies from certain section 251 obligations generally applicable to incumbent LECs but that, in the T-Mobile Order, the Commission had not included any exemption for rural carriers from the rule prohibiting wireless termination tariffs. Responding to arguments from the petitioners that the rule, effectively eliminated the rural exemption, the court remanded to the Commission to consider and explain this aspect of the issue. We now address that issue.

14. We confirm that the Commission's T-Mobile Order did not terminate or otherwise affect operation of the rural exemption or rural carriers' rights under that provision. Nor did it affect the states' role in ruling on petitions to terminate the rural exemption in specific circumstances. Although the rural exemption adopted in 1996 excused rural LECs from specific new obligations under section 251, it did not excuse them from obligations established pursuant to other sections of the Act. As discussed above, LECs have long been required to negotiate interconnection agreements in good faith governing both the physical linking of networks and any associated charges. These obligations were adopted pursuant to sections 201 and 332 of the Act, and predate the obligations contained in section 251 adopted as part of the 1996 Act. Like the pre-1996 Act orders adopting the LEC-CMRS interconnection regime, the Commission's actions with respect to that regime in the T-Mobile Order were based on the Commission's plenary authority under sections 201 and 332 of the Act.

15. The adoption of the 1996 Act in general, and section 251 in particular, did not alter the relevant Commission authority under sections 201 and 332 of the Act with respect to the LEC-CMRS interconnection regime. Section 601(c) of the 1996 Act states that “[t]his Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.” The 1996 Act was adopted against the backdrop of Commission regulation of LEC-CMRS interconnection, and nothing in section 251 expressly modified, impaired, or superseded the Commission's efforts. To the contrary, as to section 201, section 251(i) provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the Commission's authority under section 201.” Courts likewise have upheld the Commission's continued exercise of sections 201 and 332 authority notwithstanding the adoption of section 251 in the 1996 Act. Thus, sections 201 and 332 provide the basis for the LEC-CMRS interconnection and compensation rules adopted prior to the 1996 Act and an independent and sufficient basis for the modifications of those rules adopted in the T-Mobile Order.

16. Moreover, the Section 251 rural exemption is limited to exempting rural incumbent LECs from obligations arising under a different statutory provision, i.e., section 251(c) of the Act. Because the amendments to the LEC-CMRS interconnection regime adopted in the T-Mobile Order were supported by the Commission's authority under 201 and 332, the Commission's T-Mobile Order did not terminate or otherwise affect operation or applicability of the rural exemption as to rural LECs. We also emphasize that the T-Mobile Order did not preempt the authority of a state commission under section 251(f)(1) to evaluate and, if appropriate, terminate a carrier's rural exemption.

17. Some parties have contended that, by precluding, as a practical matter, a LEC from receiving compensation from a CMRS provider for providing call termination services unless it enters into an agreement with the CMRS provider, the Commission “eviscerates the rural LEC's exemption from negotiating.” This characterization of the rural exemption is incorrect in that it fails to acknowledge the limited scope of the rural exemption, given the specific reference in section 251(f)(1) to section 251(c).

18. Thus, even to the extent that the T-Mobile Order relied, as an alternate basis for authority, on section 251(b), it is not at odds with the section 251(f)(1) rural exemption. In particular, we disagree with Petitioners' claim that the rural exemption extends to obligations in section 251(b) by virtue of a reference to such section in section 251(c). In the CRC/Time Warner Declaratory Ruling, the Commission clarified that rural incumbent LEC obligations under sections 251(a) and (b) can be implemented through the state commission arbitration and mediation provisions in section 252 of the Act independently of the 251(c)(1) negotiation obligation.

19. Finally, the LEC obligations under the LEC-CMRS regime are different from the obligations under the 251 regime. Specifically, the relevant “duty” in section 251(c)(1) is a legal obligation enforceable against the incumbent LEC to negotiate in good faith. To the extent that the T-Mobile Order framework gives a rural incumbent LEC some incentive to negotiate with CMRS providers, that incentive falls well short of a legal duty of the sort at issue in section 251(c)(1). This is particularly true where the rural LEC has other possible options to seek revenues (e.g., from its end users if it can modify its local retail rates), and thus seeking compensation from the CMRS provider is but one alternative.

20. For the reasons discussed above, we reject claims that the T-Mobile Order “eviscerates the rural LEC's exemption from negotiating.” For those same reasons, we likewise reject arguments that the Commission's actions in the T-Mobile Order usurped the authority of state utility commissions to terminate the rural exemption. Thus, in response to the Ronan Remand, we conclude that the T-Mobile Order rule prohibiting the filing of wireless termination tariffs for non-access traffic is not at odds with the section 251(f)(1) rural exemption.

21. As we are adopting no rules in this Order on Remand, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required.

22. This Order does not contain proposed information collection(s) subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. In addition, therefore, it does not contain any new or modified “information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees,” pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002.

23. The Commission will not send a copy of this Order on Remand in a report to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act because no rules are being adopted.

24. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to the authority contained in sections 1-5, 7, 10, 201-05, 207-09, 214, 218-20, 225-27, 251-54, 256, 271, 303, 332, 403, 405, 502 and 503 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151-55, 157, 160, 201-05, 207-09, 214, 218-20, 225-27, 251-54, 256, 271, 303, 332, 403, 405, 502, 503, and § 1.1, 1.2 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.1, 1.2, this Order on Remand in CC Docket No. 01-92 is adopted.

25. It is further ordered that this Order on Remand shall become effective November 3, 2014.

This is a synopsis of the Report and Order, DA 14-1361, adopted September 18, 2014, and released September 19, 2014. The full text of this Commission decision is available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC's Reference Information Center at Portals II, CY-A257, 445 Twelfth Street SW., Washington, DC 20554. This document may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractors, Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th Street SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 1-800-378-3160 or via email www.BCPIWEB.com.

Our staff engineering analysis confirms that there is no line of sight and substantial terrain obstructions for Channel 246C at Toquerville, Utah at the proposed reference coordinates; and the restricted site substantially reduces the number of existing communications facilities for a Class C facility. We determine that alternative Channel 281C at Toquerville accommodates the Application for Channel 280A at Peach Springs, Arizona, and grant the Application, File No. BNPH-20120529ALI. This document does not contain information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 73 as follows:

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that agencies tell the public when they maintain information about a person in a file which may be retrieved by reference to that person's name or some other identifying particular. A group of these files is a “system of records,” and the existence of each system must be published in a “system of records notice” (SORN). An agency wishing to exempt portions of some systems of records from certain provisions of the Privacy Act must notify the public of that exemption in both the SORN and in an exemption rule. This rule clarifies that portions of the General Investigations Records System and Personnel Security Records System are not subject to some access and notification provisions of the Privacy Act. Exempting the systems from these requirements is necessary to protect the public's interest in fair and accurate investigations.

The DOT identifies a system of records that is exempt from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act (pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k)) both in the SORN published in the Federal Register for public comment and in an Appendix to DOT's regulations implementing the Privacy Act (49 CFR part 10, Appendix). This rule amends the Appendix by exempting those portions of the General Investigations Records System (DOT/OST 016) compiled in the context of an investigation from all portions of the Privacy Act, except the following subsections: (b) (Conditions of disclosure); (c)(1) and (2) (Accounting of certain disclosures); (e)(4)(A) through (F) (Publication of existence and character of system); (e)(6) (Ensure records are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete before disclosure to person other than an agency and other than pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request); (e)(6) (Ensure records are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete before disclosure to person other than an agency and other than pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request); (e)(7) (Restrict record keeping on First Amendment Rights); (e)(9) (Rules of conduct); (e)(10) (Safeguards); (e)(11) (Routine use publication); and (i) (Criminal penalties).

This rule also exempts records in the General Investigations Records System from subsections (c)(3) (Accounting of Certain Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records) to the extent that records consist of investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than material within the scope of subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act, or are properly classified in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(1). Properly classified material in the System is additionally exempt under this rule from subsections (e)(4)(G) through (I) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules) of the Privacy Act.

Additionally, this rule exempts those portions of records in the Personnel Security Records System (DOT/OST 035) that would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express or, prior to September 27, 1975, an implied promise of confidentiality, from the following subsections of the Privacy Act: (c)(3) (Accounting of Certain Disclosures), (d) (Access to Records), (e)(4)(G) through (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules). We also correct an error by replacing an incorrect reference to the identification number of this System, DOT/OST 016, with the correct identification number of DOT/OST 035.

These exemptions were initially adopted as part of the establishment of 49 CFR part 10, published at 40 FR 45729, effective September 29, 1975, and amended by 40 FR 57361 on November 26, 1975. Since that time, DOT has claimed these exemptions in its published SORNs for both of these Systems. On January 30, 1980, DOT republished the Appendix at 45 FR 8993, and summarized the changes as making minor amendments reflecting organizational changes within DOT, adding three limited exemptions for investigatory files, and changing procedures relating to disclosure of medical records. Notwithstanding this explanation, the republished Appendix omitted the exemptions. Despite the absence of the exemptions in the Appendix, DOT has nevertheless continued to refer to them. Since the 1980 error, we have heard no complaints from the public on this matter. This rule conforms the Appendix to Part 10 to, both to the applicable SORNs and current DOT practice and thus will have no substantive impact on the public. Therefore, DOT finds that there is good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to make this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

The DOT also finds that notice and comment are unnecessary and that the rule is exempt from prior notice and comment requirements under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Notice and comment would be contrary to the public interest because in the absence of these exemptions, DOT may be required to provide an accounting of disclosures to the subject of an investigation, thereby permitting the subject of the investigation to take measures to impede the investigation, as by destroying evidence or intimidating witnesses. Additionally, DOT would be required to disclose the identity of informants who promised information under an express promise of confidentiality. This would hamper DOT's ability to obtain complete and accurate statements from witnesses and chill individuals from providing DOT with information necessary for investigations. These disclosures would not serve the public interest of ensuring that investigations are as accurate as possible. Interested persons are still welcome to comment, and DOT will respond to any comments received on or before the closing of the comment period (see DATES ).

The DOT has considered the impact of this rulemaking action under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 (January 18, 2011, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review”), and the DOT's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). The DOT has determined that this action does not constitute a significant regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 and within the meaning of DOT regulatory policies and procedures. This rule has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. There are no costs associated with this rule.

Because no notice of proposed rulemaking is required for this rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96-354, 5 U.S.C. 601-612) do not apply. Even so, DOT has evaluated the effects of these changes on small entities and does not believe that this rule would impose any costs on small entities because the reporting requirements themselves are not changed and because the rule applies only to information on individuals that is maintained by the Federal Government. Therefore, I hereby certify that this proposal will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The agency has analyzed the environmental impacts of this proposed action pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ) and has determined that it is categorically excluded pursuant to DOT Order 5610.1C, Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts (44 FR 56420, Oct. 1, 1979). Categorical exclusions are actions identified in an agency's NEPA implementing procedures that do not normally have a significant impact on the environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 1508.4. In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. Id. Paragraph 3.c.5 of DOT Order 5610.1C incorporates by reference the categorical exclusions for all DOT Operating Administrations. This action is covered by the categorical exclusion listed in the Federal Highway Administration's implementing procedures, “[p]romulgation of rules, regulations, and directives.” 23 CFR 771.117(c)(20). The purpose of this rulemaking is to make a correction to the Appendix to DOT's Privacy Act regulations. The agency does not anticipate any environmental impacts and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 dated August 4, 1999, and it has been determined that it does not have a substantial direct effect on, or sufficient federalism implications for, the States, nor would it limit the policymaking discretion of the States. Therefore, the preparation of a Federalism Assessment is not necessary.

This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13084 (“Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments”). Because it has no effect on Indian Tribal Governments, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 13084 do not apply.

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. ), Federal agencies must obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget for each collection of information they conduct, sponsor, or require through regulations. The DOT has determined that this action does not contain a collection of information requirement for the purposes of the PRA.

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, March 22, 1995) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of certain regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. The UMRA requires a written statement of economic and regulatory alternatives for proposed and final rules that contain Federal mandates. A “Federal mandate” is a new or additional enforceable duty, imposed on any State, local, or tribal Government, or the private sector. If any Federal mandate causes those entities to spend, in aggregate, $143.1 million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation), an UMRA analysis is required. This rule would not impose Federal mandates on any State, local, or tribal governments or the private sector.

In consideration of the foregoing, DOT amends part 10 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

Congress delegated certain powers to regulate interstate commerce to the United States Department of Transportation (DOT or Department) in numerous pieces of legislation, most notably in section 6 of the Department of Transportation Act (DOT Act) (Pub. L. 85-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966)). Section 55 of the DOT Act transferred to the Department the authority of the former Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate the qualifications and maximum hours-of-service of employees, the safety of operations, and the equipment of motor carriers in interstate commerce. See 49 U.S.C. 104. This authority, first granted to the ICC in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (Pub. L. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543, Aug. 9, 1935), now appears in chapter 315 of title 49 of the U.S. Code. The regulations issued under this authority became known as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, appearing generally at 49 CFR parts 350-399. The administrative powers to enforce chapter 315 were also transferred from the ICC to the DOT in 1966 and appear in chapter 5 of title 49 of the U.S. Code. The Secretary of the U.S. DOT (Secretary) delegated oversight of these provisions to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), a predecessor agency of the FMCSA. The FMCSA Administrator has been delegated authority under 49 CFR 1.87 to carry out the motor carrier functions vested in the Secretary.

Between 1984 and 1999, a number of statutes added to FHWA's authority. Various statutes authorize the enforcement of the FMCSRs, the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs), and the Commercial Regulations, and provide both civil and criminal penalties for violations of these requirements. These statutes include the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832, Oct. 30, 1984), codified at 49 U.S.C. chapter 311, subchapter III; the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-170, Oct. 27, 1986), codified at 49 U.S.C. chapter 313; the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990, as amended (Pub. L. 101-615, 104 Stat. 3244, Nov. 16, 1990), codified at 49 U.S.C. chapter 51; and the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803, Dec. 29, 1995), codified at 49 U.S.C. chapters 131-149.

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA) (Pub. L. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748, Dec. 9, 1999) established FMCSA as a new operating administration within the DOT, effective January 1, 2000. The motor carrier safety responsibilities previously assigned to both the ICC and the FHWA are now assigned to FMCSA. Congress expanded, modified, and amended FMCSA's authority in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, Oct. 26, 2001), the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, Aug. 10, 2005), the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-244, 122 Stat. 1572, June 6, 2008), and the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) (Pub. L. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405, July 6, 2012).

The provisions of the FMCSRs amended by this rule are based on the statutes detailed above. The legal authority for each of those provisions was explained when the requirement was originally adopted and is noted at the beginning of each part in title 49 of the CFR. Title 49 CFR subtitle B, chapter III, contains all of the FMCSRs.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551-706) specifically provides exceptions to its notice and public comment rulemaking procedures where the Agency finds there is good cause (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) to dispense with them. Generally, good cause exists where the Agency determines that notice and public procedures are impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). The amendments made in this final rule merely correct inadvertent errors and omissions, remove or update obsolete references, and make minor changes to improve clarity and consistency. The technical amendments do not impose any new requirements, nor do they make any substantive changes to the CFR. For these reasons, the FMCSA finds good cause that notice and public comment on this final rule is unnecessary; thus this rule will be effective on the date of publication in the Federal Register .

This document makes editorial changes to correct inaccurate references and citations, improve clarity, and fix errors. The reasons for each of these minor revisions are set out below, in a section-by-section description of the changes. These amendments do not impose any new requirements, nor do they make substantive changes to the CFR.

This section-by-section analysis describes the technical amendment provisions in numerical order.

Appendix A to Part 355. Under the section for “Regulatory Review,” the paragraph titled “Hours of Service of Drivers” is revised to account for the final rules of December 27, 2011 (76 FR 81134) and October 28, 2013 (78 FR 64179). In addition, new text summarizing requirements for passenger carriers is added.

Section 365.405. In paragraph (a)(1), the name of the office that receives filings of Form OP-FC-1 is changed from the former name “IT Operations Division (MC-RIO)” to “Office of Registration and Safety Information (MC-RS).”

Section 365.411. In paragraph (b), the name of the office that receives filings of protests and petitions for reconsideration is changed from the former “IT Operations Division (MC-RIO)” to “Office of Registration and Safety Information (MC-RS).”

Section 365.413. In paragraph (b), the name of the office that receives filings of protests and petitions for reconsideration is changed from the former “IT Operations Division (MC-RIO)” to “Office of Registration and Safety Information (MC-RS).”

Section 369.6. The phrase “Office of Information Technology” (MC-RI) is removed and replaced with the phrase “Office of Registration and Safety Information (MC-RS)” to reflect the proper name of the office with such responsibilities.

Section 383.3. The Interpretative rule referenced in Question 18 and responsive Guidance to § 383.3 is removed. Question 18 was published April 4, 1997 (65 FR 16394). FMCSA rescinds that interpretation and motor carriers should no longer rely on that guidance since it was made obsolete by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 § 4, (Pub. L. 101-615, Nov. 16, 1990), which granted the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration jurisdiction over intrastate hazardous materials. The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) apply to the transport of hazardous materials requiring placarding, regardless of the type of vehicle utilized. Also note that this deletion ensures internal consistency with related guidance. Specifically, guidance to § 383.97, Question 7, clarifies that all drivers of vehicles required to be placarded need to have a Commercial Driver's License (CDL) with an HM endorsement.

Section 383.5. First, under the definition for “Conviction,” the word “probated” is removed and replaced with the word “prorated” to correct an error. Second, the definition of commercial motor vehicle is amended to add the names of the three vehicle groups listed in 49 CFR 383.91(a): Combination Vehicle (Group A), Heavy Straight Vehicle (Group B), and those vehicles that meet neither the Group A nor Group B requirements (Group C). This amendment does not change the applicability of the commercial driver's license (CDL) requirements in any way, but provides a practical means for the reader to understand how the four individual components of the definition in § 383.5 align with the three vehicle groups listed in § 383.91. As such, the amended definition provides a valuable reference tool for CDL applicants and holders, employers, and motor carrier enforcement personnel by eliminating the need to reference multiple sections within part 383.

Section 383.73. The March 25, 2013 CDL Testing and CLP Standards final rule (78 FR 17875) made revisions to several provisions of parts 383 and 384 to include a prohibition on the transfer of Commercial Learner's Permits (CLPs) as provided in the Commercial Driver's License Information System (CDLIS) State Procedures Manual incorporated by reference in 49 CFR 384.107. The March 2013 final rule inadvertently omitted from paragraph (n)(1) conforming changes to reflect the CLP transfer prohibition. To correct this omission, first, in paragraph (n)(1), the phrase “or upgraded CLP, or an initial, renewed” is added after the word “renewed.” Also, after the first instance of the word “upgraded” the phrase “or transferred CLP or” is removed. The other change in paragraph (n)(1) concerns knowledge and skills test scores verification before a transferred CDL is issued. Verification of test scores is not needed when a CDL is transferred to another State because the scores were previously verified when the CDL was initially issued in the former State of record. This change is consistent with the requirements in §§ 383.135(c) and 384.225 that exclude the test scores from being part of the CDLIS driver record (as defined by 49 CFR 383.5) that is required to be sent to the new State of record upon transfer of a CDL. Therefore, States cannot and need not enforce the knowledge and skills test scores verification requirements for a CDL transferred to a new State of record under § 383.73(n)(1). This amendment addresses this issue by removing the requirement to verify knowledge and skills test scores when a CDL is transferred to a new State of record.

In paragraph (o)(4), after the third instance of the word “medical” the following phrase is added: “examiner's certificate is voided or rescinded or a medical.” This clarifies statutory authority granted to FMCSA under 49 U.S.C. section 31149(c)(2) for FMCSA to void a medical examiner's certificate for a CLP or CDL under certain circumstances.

Section 384.107. The entire section was revised according to the incorporation by reference drafting requirements of the Office of the Federal Register. In paragraph (b), the incorporation by reference of the AAMVA “Commercial Driver's License Information System (CDLIS) State Procedures Manual,” Release 5.2.0, February 2011, is replaced by the updated version, Commercial Driver's License Information System (CDLIS) State Procedures Manual,” Release 5.3.2.1, August 2013. This change reflects a routine update of the referenced manual to include clarifications of procedures related to the medical examiner's certification as part of the CDL, modification of procedures to reflect the Federal requirements in the CDL Testing and CLP Standards final rule and the renumbering of sections and cross-references. Paragraph (c) is deleted to address the incorporation by reference drafting requirements of the Office of the Federal Register. The scope of the incorporation by reference is otherwise unchanged.

Section 384.206. Paragraph (a)(1) is amended by clarifying that CLPs cannot be transferred from one State to another State. The March 25, 2013 CDL Testing and CLP standards final rule made revisions to several sections of 49 CFR parts 383 and 384 to include a prohibition on the transfer of CLPs, but conforming changes to this section were mistakenly omitted. This amendment addresses this omission.

Section 384.209. Paragraph (b)(2) is amended by adding the phrase “from a foreign country” after the phrase “a person” to implement MAP-21 section 32203(b) requiring reporting of convictions of a foreign commercial driver to the Federal Convictions and Withdrawal Database. The current language could be seen as applying to all commercial drivers from the United States, but that contradicts the plain language of the statute limiting application to a foreign commercial driver.

Section 384.212. In paragraph (b), the phrase “CLP or,” inadvertently appears twice. The March 25, 2013 CDL Testing and CLP Standards final rule made revisions to several sections of 49 CFR parts 383 and 384 to include a prohibition on the transfer of CLPs, but mistakenly omitted conforming changes to this section. This amendment addresses that omission.

Section 384.225. Paragraph (e) is amended to ensure the language properly correlates with the section's lead in language “the state must,” and, thus, is grammatically correct. The word “allow” is inserted and the word “may” is replaced by the word “to” for clarity.

Paragraph (f) is amended by changing “The” to “Ensure the” at the beginning of the paragraph for grammatical precision. Also, the phrase regarding the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) is removed, since NLETS is not maintaining the CDLIS system, but only has the ability to access CDLIS data.

Section 384.228. Paragraph (j)(2) is moved to paragraph (h)(3). Movement of this text reflects new requirements placed in paragraph (h)(1) as part of the March 25, 2013 CDL Testing and CLP Standards final rule (78 FR 17875), which changed background checks from an annual requirement to a one-time event. This is a conforming amendment to retain existing requirements for such background checks and to place such requirements in the appropriate place within § 384.228.

Section 384.229. Paragraph (b) is amended by deleting the sentence beginning after “examiners,” which reads: “For third party testers and examiners who were granted the training and skills testing exception under § 383.75(a)(7), the covert and overt monitoring must be performed at least once every year;.” The March 25, 2013 CDL Testing and CLP Standards final rule (78 FR 17875) removed the exception under § 383.75(a)(7) referenced in § 384.229. This is a conforming amendment to clarify that the exception was deleted.

Section 384.305. In the final untitled paragraph, the phrase “Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 2125-0542” is deleted for clarity. The reference to a specific OMB information collection is outdated and confusing in the context of the State certification requirements.

Section 385.308. Paragraph (a)(1) is corrected by adding the word “motor” after “commercial” and before “vehicle” to provide the proper term “commercial motor vehicle,” as utilized in part 385 and defined in § 385.3.

Section VII of Part 385, Appendix B. In the “List of Acute and Critical Regulations” the following paragraph regarding § 397.101(d) is deleted: “Requiring or permitting the operation of a motor vehicle containing highway route-controlled quantity, as defined in § 173.403, of radioactive materials that is not accompanied by a written route plan.” This provision was mistakenly added to part 385, Appendix B and will therefore be deleted.

Section 387.15. The references to OMB numbers 2125-0074 and 2125-0075 are deleted for clarity in Illustrations I and II respectively. Such references to specific OMB information collection approvals are outdated, confusing, and superfluous in the context of the rules' sample illustrations of insurance and surety bond forms.

Section 387.39. The reference to OMB approval under control number 2125-0518 is deleted for clarity. This reference to a specific OMB information collection approval is outdated, confusing, and superfluous in the context of the rules' sample illustration of a motor carrier public liability surety bond.

Section 390.5. First, under the definition of “Conviction,” the word “probated” is removed and replaced with the word “prorated” to correct an error. Second, a definition of “Crash” that cross-references the existing definition of “Accident” in 49 CFR 390.5 is added to clarify that these terms are synonymous.

Section 390.19. In paragraph (d), the name of the office to file forms MCS-150, MCS-150B and MCS-150C is changed in the first sentence from “Office of Information Management” to “Office of Registration and Safety Information.” Also, in the first sentence after the word “with” the word “the” is inserted to correct the grammar. In the second sentence, the office to file forms with is changed from “Office of Information Management, MC-RIO” to “Office of Registration and Safety Information (MC-RS).”

Section 390.40. The cross-reference to § 386.72(b)(1) in paragraph (j) is an error and is replaced with the correct cross-reference to section 386.72(b)(3).

Section 391.63. The reference to approval under OMB control number 2125-0081 is deleted for clarity. This reference to a specific OMB information collection approval is outdated, confusing, and superfluous in the context of the rules' description of the obligations for motor carriers employing multiple-employer drivers.

Section 392.5. In paragraph (a)(3), the word “and” is changed to “or” to correct an error.

Section 395.8. The reference to OMB approval under control number 2125-0016 is deleted for clarity. This reference to a specific OMB information collection approval is outdated, confusing, and superfluous in the context of the rule's sample illustration of regulations, which generally outline drivers' record of duty status obligations and provide a sample duty status graph grid.

Section 397.69. Paragraph (b) is amended to reflect statutory changes under section 33013(b) of MAP-21, which amended 49 U.S.C. 5125(c)(1) to require publication of highway route designations in the Department's hazardous materials route registry under 49 U.S.C. 5112(c). The citation to section 105(b)(4) of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act is deleted since it is now obsolete. Language regarding an effective date of November 14, 1996, is also deleted since it is also obsolete.

In paragraph (c), the phrase “of this subpart” is amended to read “of this part” to correct an inaccurate reference.

Section 397.73. In paragraph (a), footnote 2 is deleted and replaced by an internet link for convenience. Also, the reference to FMCSA is replaced by the “Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),” since that latter agency is the correct publisher of the “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.”

In paragraph (b), additional text is added since section 33013(a) of MAP-21 amended 49 U.S.C. section 5112(c) to add State reporting requirements, which include the name of the responsible agency for hazmat materials highway route designations. In addition, the phrase “regarding designations existing on November 14, 1994” is deleted as obsolete. Also, based on a new requirement from section 33013(b) of MAP- 21, a State or Tribally-designated route is effective only after it is published in FMCSA's Hazardous Materials Route Registry. This requirement is added as new paragraph (c).

The reference to OMB approval under control number 2125-0554 at the end of the section is deleted for clarity. Such a reference to a specific OMB information collection approval is outdated, confusing, and superfluous in the context of the rule's public information and reporting requirements.

Section 397.103. Based on a new publication requirement from section 33013(b) of MAP-21, the following sentence will be added as a new paragraph (c)(3) to clarify when a new routing designation is effective for radioactive materials: “The route is published in FMCSA's Hazardous Materials Route Registry.”

FMCSA has determined that this action is not a significant regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866, as supplemented by Executive Order 13563 (76 FR 3821, January 18, 2011), or within the meaning of the DOT regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 1103, February 26, 1979). Thus, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) did not review this document. We expect the final rule will have minimal costs; therefore, a full regulatory evaluation is unnecessary.

In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), FMCSA has evaluated the effects of this rule on small entities. Because the rule makes only minor editorial corrections and places no new requirements on the regulated industry, FMCSA certifies that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The final rule will not impose an unfunded Federal mandate, as defined by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1532, et seq. ), that will result in the expenditure by State, local and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $141.9 million (which is the value of $100 million in 2010 after adjusting for inflation) or more in any 1 year.

A rule has implications for Federalism under section 1(a) of Executive Order 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among various levels of government.” FMCSA has determined that this rule will not have substantial direct effects on States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts or modifies any provision of State law or regulation, imposes substantial direct unreimbursed compliance costs on any State, or diminishes the power of any State to enforce its own laws. Accordingly, this rulemaking does not have Federalism implications warranting the application of E.O. 13132.

The regulations implementing E.O. 12372 regarding intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and activities do not apply to this rule.

This rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175 titled, “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,” because it would not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ), Federal agencies must obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for each collection of information they conduct, sponsor, or require through regulations. FMCSA determined that no new information collection requirements are associated with this final rule.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule for the purpose of ascertaining the applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ) and determined under our Environmental Procedures Order 5610.1, issued March 1, 2004 (69 FR 9680), that this action would not have any effect on the quality of the environment. In addition, this final rule is categorically excluded from further analysis and documentation under the Categorical Exclusion (CE) in paragraph 6(b) of Appendix 2 of FMCSA Order 5610.1. This CE addresses minor editorial corrections such as found in this rulemaking; therefore preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement is not necessary.

The FMCSA also analyzed this rule under the Clean Air Act, as amended (CAA), section 176(c) (42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)), and implementing regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency. Approval of this action is exempt from the CAA's general conformity requirement since it does not affect direct or indirect emissions of criteria pollutants.

This technical amendment final rule is not subject to Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994). Executive Order 12898 establishes Federal executive policy on environmental justice. Its main provision directs Federal agencies, to make environmental justice part of their mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of their programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United States. FMCSA determined that this rule will not have disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority or low-income populations because it does not change the substance of any of the FMCSRs.

FMCSA has analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211 titled, “Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use.” The Agency has determined that it is not a “significant energy action” under that Executive Order because it is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866 and is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. Therefore, no Statement of Energy Effects is required.

Executive Order 13045 titled, “Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks” (62 FR 19885, Apr. 23, 1997), requires agencies issuing “economically significant” rules, if the regulation also concerns an environmental health or safety risk that an agency has reason to believe may disproportionately affect children, to include an evaluation of the regulation's environmental health and safety effects on children. As discussed previously, this rule is not economically significant. Therefore, no analysis of the impacts on children is required.

This action meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988 titled, “Civil Justice Reform,” to minimize litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

This rule will not effect a taking of private property or otherwise have taking implications under E.O. 12630 titled, “Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.”

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (15 U.S.C. 272 note) requires Federal agencies proposing to adopt technical standards to consider whether voluntary consensus standards are available. If the Agency chooses to adopt its own standards in place of existing voluntary consensus standards, it must explain its decision in a separate statement to OMB. Because FMCSA does not intend to adopt technical standards, there is no need to submit a separate statement to OMB on this matter.

Section 522(a)(5) of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. 108- 447, Division H, Title I, 118 Stat. 2809 at 3268, Dec. 8, 2004) requires DOT and certain other Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment of each rule that will affect the privacy of individuals. Because this final rule will not affect the privacy of individuals, FMCSA did not conduct a separate privacy impact assessment.

In consideration of the foregoing, FMCSA is amending 49 CFR chapter III, parts 355, 365, 369, 383, 384, 385, 387, 390, 391, 392, 395, and 397, as set forth below: