[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 190 (Wednesday, October 1, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 59298-59301]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-23299]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Mine Safety and Health Administration


Petitions for Modification of Application of Existing Mandatory 
Safety Standards

AGENCY: Mine Safety and Health Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 
1977 and 30 CFR Part 44 govern the application, processing, and 
disposition of petitions for modification. This notice is a summary of 
petitions for modification submitted to the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) by the parties listed below to modify the 
application of existing mandatory safety standards codified in Title 30 
of the Code of Federal Regulations.

DATES: All comments on the petitions must be received by the Office of 
Standards, Regulations and Variances on or before October 31, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments, identified by ``docket 
number'' on the subject line, by any of the following methods:
    1. Electronic Mail: [email protected]. Include the docket 
number of the petition in the subject line of the message.
    2. Facsimile: 202-693-9441.
    3. Regular Mail or Hand Delivery: MSHA, Office of Standards, 
Regulations and Variances, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Room 2350, Arlington, 
Virginia 22209-3939, Attention: Sheila McConnell, Acting Director, 
Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances. Persons delivering 
documents are required to check in at the receptionist's desk on the 
21st floor. Individuals may inspect copies of the petitions and 
comments during normal business hours at the address listed above.
    MSHA will consider only comments postmarked by the U.S. Postal 
Service or proof of delivery from another delivery service such as UPS 
or Federal Express on or before the deadline for comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barbara Barron, Office of Standards, 
Regulations and Variances at 202-693-9447 (Voice), 
[email protected] (Email), or 202-693-9441 (Facsimile). [These are 
not toll-free numbers.]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 
(Mine Act) allows the mine operator or representative of miners to file 
a petition to modify the application of any

[[Page 59299]]

mandatory safety standard to a coal or other mine if the Secretary of 
Labor determines that:
    1. An alternative method of achieving the result of such standard 
exists which will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure 
of protection afforded the miners of such mine by such standard; or
    2. That the application of such standard to such mine will result 
in a diminution of safety to the miners in such mine.
    In addition, the regulations at 30 CFR 44.10 and 44.11 establish 
the requirements and procedures for filing petitions for modification.

II. Petitions for Modification

    Docket Numbers: M-2014-007-M; M-2014-008-M; M-2014-009-M; M-2014-
010-M; M-2014-011-M; M-2014-012-M; M-2014-013-M; M-2014-014-M; M-2014-
015-M; M-2014-016-M; M-2014-017-M; and M-2014-018-M.
    Petitioner: Wilson County Holdings, LLC, 950 17th Street, Suite 
2600, Denver, Colorado 80202.
    Mine: Fredonia Project, MSHA I.D. No. 14-01756, located in Wilson 
County, Kansas.
    Regulations Affected: 30 CFR 57.22301(a), 30 CFR 57.22301(b)(2)(i) 
and 30 CFR 57.22301(c) (Atmospheric monitoring systems (I-A, II-A, and 
V-A mines)); 30 CFR 57.22302 (Approved equipment (I-A and V-A mines)); 
30 CFR 57.22312 (Distribution boxes (II-A and V-A mines)); 30 CFR 22501 
(Personal electric lamps (I-A, I-B, I-C, II-A, II-B, III, IV, V-A, and 
V-B mines)); 30 CFR 57.22207 and 30 CFR 22207(b)(1) (Booster fans (I-A, 
II-A, III, and V-A mines)); 30 CFR 57.22227(a) and 30 CFR 
57.22227(c)(1) (Approved testing devices (I-A, I-B, I-C, II-A, II-B, 
III, IV, V-A, and V-B mines)); 30 CFR 57.22234 and 57.22234(b) (Actions 
at 1.0 percent methane (I-A, I-B, III, V-A, and V-B mines)).
    Modification Request: The petitioner requests a modification of the 
existing standards stating that the operator is not required to comply 
with the standards at its Fredonia, Kansas Oil Extraction Project (the 
Fredonia Project) but instead may substitute equipment classified as 
explosion proof by the National Electric Code (NEC). By filing this 
petition, the petitioner does not concede that the cited standards 
applies or will apply in the future. However, should the standards be 
applied, it will result in a diminution of safety to the miners.
    The petitioner states that:
    (1) The filing of this petition should not be construed in any way, 
or in any subsequent forum, as a waiver of Wilson County Holding's 
right to contest any citation issued pursuant to the regulation listed 
above at any time in the future.
    (2) The Fredonia Project is among the latest of a handful of 
underground oil recovery projects. In general, conventional oil 
recovery only recovers a relatively small percentage of the oil in 
place. In addition, modern developments intended to increase that 
recovery, such as horizontal and directional drilling, are subject to a 
variety of technological limitations which make them unsuitable for 
conventional recovery methods in certain circumstances, such as fields 
at depths less than 2400 feet. Therefore, the majority of the 
recoverable resource in many older, shallower fields is stranded in 
place because recovery is either uneconomical or not technically 
feasible.
    (3) The Fredonia Project addresses the recoverability issue by 
sinking a shaft through the oil bearing formation and mining out a room 
approximately 10-20 feet below the bottom of the formation. All 
underground areas will be completely lined with concrete or shotcrete 
and there will be no exposed ground at the time that equipment 
installation and operations begin. Special ports are preinstalled in 
the wall of the production area through which the wells are to be 
drilled. These ports are designed to be integrated into the drilling 
process and there will be no additional penetration of the shotcrete 
lining.
    (4) When the underground area is completed, three drill rigs will 
be installed in the round portion of the underground area (the 
production room) to drill upward into the formation allowing oil to 
drain out naturally. The oil will be collected into pipes and closed 
vessels and pumped out to the surface for transport to a refinery.
    (5) The drilling process to be used at the Fredonia Project is 
quite similar to that used at conventional oil and gas drilling sites. 
The bit used is slightly bigger than the drill pipe on which it is 
mounted. During drilling, specially formulated ``drilling mud'' is 
pumped into the hole at a pressure intended to remove cuttings and to 
hold back any surges in formation pressure that may lead to 
uncontrolled flow of gases of fluids uphole. The mud is then circulated 
back uphole through the annulus around the drill pipe, carrying with it 
the cuttings from the drill as well as any water or hydrocarbons that 
are released. The entire mixture is collected in a sealed system in 
which the mud, cuttings, water, and hydrocarbons are pumped to the 
surface where they are separated and treated appropriately. Although a 
small amount of the used mud mixture might be exposed to the mine 
atmosphere during routing drilling operations, the only circumstances 
in which any material amount of the used mud mixture or any of its 
components could escape into the mine atmosphere would be either where 
a spike in formation pressures overwhelmed the controls in the 
collection system, where a leak developed in the system, or in the 
event of a component malfunction. As with other conventional drilling 
operations, great care is taken during the drilling process to ensure 
that no gases or fluids escape back up the drill hole as it is advanced 
toward the target. Those precautions become increasingly intensive as 
the drill approaches the hydrocarbon bearing formation. In the case of 
the Fredonia Project, all systems intended for collection of drilling 
fluids are designed to withstand pressures of up to 740 Pounds Per 
Square Inch Gauge (psig) even though tests show that formation 
pressures are not anticipated to exceed 100 psig.
    (6) Because it is vitally important for both the safety of the 
miners and the commercial success of the project, quite a bit of care 
has been taken in developing a monitoring system intended to detect any 
condition that might lead to an escape of hydrocarbons or other toxic 
material from the system. In general, the detection and monitoring 
systems are digitally based, automated and remotely monitored. A 
variety of sensors (e.g., lower explosive limit (LEL), methane, smoke, 
system pressures, temperature), digitally measure and transmit the data 
measured to different locations. The data can be monitored remotely 
from the surface and is made accessible to those authorized to see it. 
Each monitoring system is also programmed to either: (1) Alert 
personnel and/or (2) automatically trigger corrective action (e.g., 
increase ventilation or open or close valves) and/or (3) shut down 
critical operations in the event a pre-set alarm, corrective action, or 
shut-down level is exceeded. This is known as a ``fail-to-safe'' 
system. In other words, critical component failure, or excursion of a 
measured value above or below a set point is programmed to 
automatically trigger a condition-appropriate response, up to and 
including critical system shut down.
    (7) In addition to the monitoring and control systems, the 
petitioner recognizes the importance of the ventilation system as 
integral to its overall safe operation. Ventilation for normal 
operations begins at the surface

[[Page 59300]]

near the entrance to the Supply Air Emergency Escape Shaft. There are 
2-100 horse power fans whose speed is controlled by variable frequency 
drives (VFD's) with a butterfly-type valve shutoff damper at the 
downstream exit of each fan duct located just upstream of the plenum. 
The fans will operate in a ``Lead-Lag'' configuration where one fan 
operates continuously (lead) and is supported by the back-up (lag) in 
the event the lead fan is inoperable or is cycled for wear issues. Each 
fan has a 56,000 cfm capacity at 1.75 in-wg for fan blade 2-position at 
1800 revolutions per minute. The VFD's are part of the fan control 
system providing control of flow rates. Air flow progresses as follows:
    (a) Air is drawn into the fan inlet then flows through the Supply 
Air Shaft into the underground Alcove. From the Alcove a portion of the 
supply air is forced through cooling coils and then into the Motor 
Control Center (MCC) Room. This air removes heat from the area then 
exits via a duct to the main hoist opening in the Drilling Room. The 
MCC ductwork (28 inches in diameter) and the discharge duct (54 inches 
by 18 inches) to the main shaft is galvanized steel.
    (b) The balance of the air remaining in the Alcove then exits via a 
flow regulator (roll-up door) where it then ventilates the Pump Room 
and Drilling Room areas.
    (c) Air is circulated around the Drilling Room by three axial flow 
fans located on the Rib or Back to ensure thorough mixing and movement 
of air.
    (d) All air flows then converge to exit upwards via the Main Shaft 
to the surface and atmosphere.
    Ventilation flow is to help ensure that workers and staff have 
adequate ventilation and that the MCC Room maintains a positive 
relative pressure to the Pump and Drilling Rooms, and this air is 
exhausted directly to the main shaft.
    The supply air fans provide more than 100 percent back up as a 
standby, or to provide higher velocity and flow through the mine as 
needed. Approximate total air quantity is expected to be 25,000 cfm 
allowing for up to 14 people underground, operation of diesel skid 
steer loader underground, heat removal from equipment and personnel, 
and dilution of potential contaminants including strata gas. 
Adjustments will be made to meet requirements for cooling and 
contaminant dilution as necessary.
    Notwithstanding the fact that the system is deliberately ``over-
designed'' in terms of anticipated pressures and is virtually 100 
percent monitored in a fail-to-safe configuration, the petitioner 
recognizes that there is a possibility that some componentry or 
instrumentation may be exposed to a potentially flammable or explosive 
level of hydrocarbon(s). For that reason, all of the components and 
systems that are being used in areas that could possibly be hydrocarbon 
contaminated have some measure of explosion protection. Because the 
facility is regulated by MSHA, a great deal of effort was expended to 
secure electrical components that have been certified as 
``permissible'' or ``explosion proof'' by MSHA. However, after 
extensive effort, with respect to a number of critical components, the 
petitioner has been unable to locate any of those critical components 
that have been certified as permissible. Where permissible componentry 
is unavailable or unsuitable, the design has called for equipment that 
is rated for use in either Class I Division 1 or Class I Division 2 
pursuant to Article 500.5 of the NEC depending on the potential 
exposure of the particular componentry to ignitable or explosive 
atmospheres.
    The petitioner recognizes that there may be some componentry which 
may be suitable for classification for use in Class I Division 1 or 
Class I Division 2 locations, but which do not meet the precise 
requirements to be certified as permissible and vice versa. However, 
the petitioner also recognizes that the ``permissible'' designation 
takes into account the dynamic and largely non-engineered environment 
encountered in typical mining operations while the NEC Class I Division 
1 and 2 designations refer to primarily static, engineered 
environments.
    Although regulated by MSHA, the underground environment at the 
Fredonia Project is more akin to the environments envisioned by the NEC 
classification than those envisioned by the MSHA permissibility 
certification requirements. If granted, the petition would allow the 
petitioner to use permissible equipment, where available, and equipment 
classified for use in either NEC Class I Division 1 or 2 environments, 
as appropriate.
    I. Complying with the permissibility standards would subject miners 
to greater hazards than they are subjected to under current Wilson 
County conditions. Although the cited standard may not apply in this 
instance, but in the event that it did, requiring the petitioner to 
comply would subject miners to greater hazards than they would be 
subject to using the systems proposed by Wilson County. To the extent 
that permissible equipment is available, the electrical equipment 
specified by the petitioner for the Project is explosion proof, rated 
at either Class I Division 1 or Class I Division 2, as appropriate to 
its location. This design provides a greater level of protection from 
explosion than would permissible equipment, and also enables a far 
safer work environment based on all of the equipment's inherent 
advantages over similar equipment that has been certified permissible 
by MSHA. The petitioner states that the use of explosion proof, but not 
permissible equipment creates a much safer environment all around 
through the number of mechanisms.
    The primary advantage presented by the equipment sought to be used 
is that it will allow for more precise measurement of potentially 
hazardous conditions through remote monitoring and greater automation 
of the operation. Use of the specified equipment (for which a 
permissible equivalent is generally unavailable) will allow remote 
operation and monitoring of the operation, along with facilitating the 
``fail-to-safe'' design of the operating circuitry. The primary reason 
for this is that the transmission components of the monitoring systems 
available in Class I Division 1 and Class I Division 2 compliant 
versions are not available in a permissible version in some instances. 
What this means is that, while the permissible equipment may be able to 
provide the necessary data, it cannot necessarily transmit the data 
either to a remote (in this case surface) location or locations nor can 
it communicate with a programmable logical control system which runs 
the ``fail-to-safe'' logic. On the other hand, the equipment currently 
specified for use at the Project can do all of that.
    This enhanced transmission capability creates two significant 
safety advantages for the Project. First, it drastically lowers the 
number of miners who are needed underground at any given time. Absent 
the ability to transmit the monitored data to a remote location, miners 
would need to be physically underground to check readings and make 
determinations as to potential problems. With the pumping systems, for 
example, this could be as basic as periodically checking sight glasses 
to ensure that the pumps are functioning properly. With other systems 
it could involve physically reading digital or analog meters to make 
similar determinations. Little, if any, of this type of effort is 
necessary if the specified explosion proof, but not permissible, 
equipment is used.
    Lowering the number of miners underground reduces the potential for 
exposure to flammable vapors and, in turn, increases safety overall by

[[Page 59301]]

removing the miners from proximity to the potential hazard. In doing 
so, the proposed equipment actually increases the number of people able 
to monitor data and respond to potential upset conditions. As currently 
configured, the system would allow remote monitoring of data not only 
at a central location at the surface, but also to other authorized 
users. Any alarms or warnings that might be sent by the system are 
heard and seen by every person necessary to respond almost regardless 
of when it occurs or where they might be. Thus, decisions that might 
end up saving lives could be made in essentially real time, rather than 
being delayed by having to be relayed by telephone. Second, the ``fail-
to-safe'' system would operate without the need for human intervention 
or judgment. When any metric being monitored detected above or below a 
pre-set level, the system automatically initiates an orderly shut-down 
or power-down of specified equipment or, depending on the condition 
detected, a set of actions intended to reduce the hazard. For example, 
the permissibility rules dictate that certain changes must be made to 
ventilation when methane levels rise to 0.25 percent. Were the 
monitoring equipment used in the Project set to 0.10 percent, the 
system could automatically trigger an increase in ventilation which 
might prevent methane from reaching levels at which the regulations 
would require a change, thus reducing the level of potential methane 
exposure to a level well below the level which the regulations would 
require. The end result is that fewer miners are exposed to potential 
hazards. This also allows personnel to focus on other areas of concern 
such as evacuation procedures and other areas of importance.
    II. The proposed action by the petitioner would provide no lesser 
degree of safety than application of the permissibility standards. 
Another basis for permitting modification of the cited standard's 
application is that the petitioner's proposed alternative equipment 
provides at least the same measure of safety contemplated by the 
permissibility standards.
    The explosion proof but not permissible equipment to be utilized in 
the Fredonia Project is much more scalable than their permissible 
counterparts. For instance, available permissible LEL monitors are 
triggered at 0.25 percent methane, the level at which regulatory action 
is required, and are not sensitive to levels below that. The explosion 
proof, but not permissible monitors specified for the project, however, 
can be set to levels much lower than 0.25 percent methane which will 
allow them to automatically trigger corrective measures before methane 
reaches a level at which such measures are required.
    The petitioner has done extensive research and has taken great 
strides in ensuring that miners' safety is at the forefront of all 
decisions. For instance, not only does the selected equipment allow for 
early detection and warning of potentially hazardous conditions, but in 
the event of an emergency, the equipment can be automatically shut down 
through the use of remote monitoring. This is not possible with 
available MSHA permissible equipment. In fact, use of the explosion 
proof equipment would provide even greater protection than that 
required by the permissibility standard.
    The measures and electrical equipment proposed by the petitioner, 
coupled with the ability to work in what is essentially a much safer 
environment, alleviates any potential hazards by providing a workplace 
with safeguards additional to those required by MSHA while avoiding the 
creation of hazards associated with non-explosion proof equipment.
    The petitioner asserts that strict application of the existing 
standards would result in a diminution of safety to the miners involved 
with the Fredonia Project, while use of the proposed equipment would 
afford no less protection (in fact, greater protection) from explosion 
hazards than would the available permissible equipment.

    Dated: September 25, 2014.
Sheila McConnell,
Acting Director, Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances.
[FR Doc. 2014-23299 Filed 9-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-43-P