[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 158 (Friday, August 15, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48098-48105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-18959]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 25, 121, and 129
[Docket No.: FAA-2014-0500; Notice No. 14-07]
RIN 2120-AK30
Fuel Tank Vent Fire Protection
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: This action would amend certain airworthiness regulations for
transport category airplanes to require fuel tank designs that prevent
a fuel tank explosion caused by flame propagation through the fuel tank
vents from external fires. This action would add a new requirement for
fuel tank vent fire protection and would increase the time available
for passenger evacuation and emergency response. This proposed
amendment would apply to applications for new type certificates and
certain applications for amended or supplemental type certificates. It
would also require certain airplanes produced in the future and
operated by air carriers to meet the new standards.
DATES: Send comments on or before November 13, 2014.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2014-0500
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Mike Dostert, Propulsion and Mechanical Systems
Branch, ANM-112, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind Ave. SW., Renton,
WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2132; facsimile (425) 227-1149;
email [email protected].
For legal questions concerning this action, contact Sean Howe,
Office of the Regional Counsel, ANM-7, Federal Aviation Administration,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-2591; facsimile (425) 227-1007; email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for this Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
Requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of
aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air
commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It
prescribes new safety standards for the design and operation of
transport category airplanes.
I. Overview of Proposed Rule
A. General
This proposed rule would prevent fuel tank explosions caused by
ignition (from potential external ignition sources) of fuel vapor
present in or exiting through the fuel tank vent outlets. Ignition
sources may include, but are not limited to, ground handling equipment,
fuel fires that result from refueling spills, or ground fire that may
be present following a survivable crash landing in which the fuel tank
and the vent system remain intact. The FAA has determined that a means
to prevent propagation of flame \1\ from external sources into the tank
through the fuel tank vents, such as flame arrestors or a means of
inerting the fuel tanks, could be used to prevent or delay fuel tank
explosions following certain accidents. This prevention or delay would
provide time for the safe evacuation of passengers from the airplane.
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\1\ Flame propagation is defined as the spread of a flame in a
combustible environment outward from the point at which the
combustion started.
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This proposed rule would apply to applications for new type
certificates and applications for amended or supplemental type
certificates on significant product level change projects in which
Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.975, Fuel tank vents
and carburetor vapor vents, is applicable to a changed area. We are
also proposing a new operating requirement applicable to newly produced
airplanes that are issued an original airworthiness certificate after a
specified date, per 14 CFR part 121, Operating Requirements: Domestic,
Flag, and Supplemental Operations, and 14 CFR part 129, Operations:
Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-Registered Aircraft
Engaged in Common Carriage. We do not propose to require retrofit of
the existing fleet.
Currently, there is not an advisory circular (AC) that describes
compliance means for protection of fuel tank vents from external
ignition sources. We have provided compliance means information to
applicants for type certificates through project-specific issue papers.
These issue papers describe how to demonstrate that flame will not
progress through the fuel tank vents into the fuel tank.
Concurrent with the publication of this proposal, we are also
publishing for
[[Page 48099]]
comment an associated draft AC 25.975-X that will provide applicants
with one acceptable means of compliance for preventing propagation of
flames through the fuel tank vents.
B. Total Costs and Benefits of This Proposed Rule
The FAA finds the proposed rule to be cost-beneficial because the
costs of the rule are low enough that the expected benefits of
preventing just two fatalities would outweigh the expected costs ($4.9
million in present value benefits versus $4.4 million in present value
costs). If this action is not taken, a hazard would continue to exist
even though effective and low-cost means are available to minimize or
eliminate it.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
Fires outside of the airplane fuel tanks can be caused by events
such as fuel spilled during refueling, fuel and oil spillage following
survivable accidents from engines that separate from the airplane, or
leaking airplane fuel tanks. In some cases, external fires have ignited
fuel vapors that exit the fuel tank vents, resulting in flames
traveling through the vent lines into the fuel tank, causing fuel tank
explosions. These explosions have caused fatalities to passengers and
have prevented emergency personnel from assisting survivors.
During an industry review of potential post-crash survivability,
the Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduction (SAFER) Advisory
Committee \2\ determined that four fuel tank explosions resulting from
post-crash fires could have been avoided if flame arrestors or surge
tank explosion suppression systems \3\ had been installed in the
airplane fuel tank vents \4\. The SAFER committee examined methods of
preventing fuel tank explosions following impact survivable accidents.
Options included controlling the fuel tank flammability using nitrogen
inerting systems, using fire suppression systems, and installation of
flame arrestors.
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\2\ Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduction (SAFER)
Advisory Committee final report, volume 1, FAA/AFS-80-4 dated June
26, 1973, through June 26, 1980.
\3\ Surge tank explosion suppression systems were installed on
some Boeing airplanes to prevent a lightning strike from igniting
fuel vapor in the fuel tank vent system. These systems used light
sensors that activated the discharge of fire suppression agent into
the fuel tank vent surge tank to prevent the fire from traveling
through the vents into the airplane fuel tanks.
\4\ SAFER Report, page 49, Figure 3.
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The SAFER committee determined the most practical means of
preventing post-crash fuel tank explosions was the use of flame
arrestors. Flame arrestors or suppression systems delay propagation of
ground fires into the fuel tank and the subsequent explosions,
providing additional time for the safe evacuation of passengers. Flame
arrestors stop the flame from traveling through the fuel tank vents by
quenching the flame. Flame arrestors are typically made of numerous
small stainless steel passages that remove heat from the flame so it
dies out before passing through the vent. Flame arrestors for a typical
transport airplane range in weight from 2 to 4 pounds each.
The current airworthiness standards related to fuel system
explosion prevention in 14 CFR 25.981 include requirements to prevent
ignition inside the fuel tanks caused by system failures or external
heating of the fuel tank walls. The fuel tank venting standards also
include requirements to ensure fuel tank structural integrity following
failures of the refueling system that could result in overfilling of
the fuel tanks or clogging of the vents due to ice. Additionally, Sec.
25.954, Fuel system lightning protection, requires fuel tank vents be
designed and arranged to prevent the ignition of fuel vapor within the
system by lightning strikes.
B. History
In 1995, based on the SAFER Committee report noted above, the FAA
issued the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) entitled, ``Fuel System
Vent Fire Protection,'' (60 FR 6632), dated February 2, 1995. This
notice proposed a requirement for fuel tank vent fire protection in new
type design transport airplanes and retrofit of the existing fleet of
transport category airplanes through an amendment of operating rules.
Comments received in response to the notice questioned the accuracy of
the FAA's economic analysis related to the proposed retrofit
requirement. Comments also indicated that additional guidance, in the
form of an AC, should be developed to provide an acceptable means to
qualify flame arrestors to meet the proposed requirement.
To address these issues, the FAA obtained additional cost
information from component suppliers and developed an AC that included
means of compliance. In 2001, the FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee (ARAC) to review the draft final rule, including the
FAA's proposed disposition of public comments, and to review the draft
AC. Due to the ARAC tasking, on August 23, 2002 the FAA published a
notice in the Federal Register of withdrawal of the ``Fuel System Vent
Protection'' NPRM published in 1995. As a result of industry resource
issues and FAA rulemaking prioritization activities, no work was done
on these ARAC taskings. The FAA published a withdrawal of the tasks on
June 21, 2004.
As a result of limited ARAC resources, the FAA developed a strategy
for a number of rulemaking projects that had been tasked to ARAC and
issued a letter \5\ dated June 14, 2005, to the head of the Transport
Airplane and Engine Issues Group describing our intent to use the
existing 14 CFR 21.21 (finding an ``unsafe design feature'') to address
the need for flame arrestors in the fuel tank vents. Since 2005, this
has resulted in new type certificated airplanes having flame arrestors.
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\5\ Hickey, John. Letter to Craig Bolt. 14 June 2005.
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Prior to issuance of the letter in 2005, following industry
recommendations, many manufacturers voluntarily introduced flame
arrestors into their new type designs. Currently, most new type designs
and most newly produced transport category airplanes incorporate flame
arrestors in the fuel tank vents. Additionally, several applicants have
installed fuel tanks in the airplane fuselage that have vents located
in areas prone to lightning strikes (defined as zone 2), such that
flame arrestors were provided to prevent flame propagation into the
fuel tanks to comply with Sec. 25.954.
However, some models of newly manufactured airplanes produced under
older type certificates, including business jets and smaller transport
category airplanes, do not incorporate a means to prevent flame
propagation through the fuel vent lines to the fuel tanks. Airplanes in
14 CFR part 121 operation that do not have such a means include older
models like the DC-9, MD-80, as well as all past and currently produced
DHC-8 turboprops, and Canadair Regional Jets.
As a result of the review of several fuel tank explosions on older
designs, including a Philippine Airlines Boeing 737,\6\ the FAA issued
an airworthiness directive (AD) for Boeing Model 737 airplanes
mandating incorporation of flame arrestors.\7\ Early models of the 737
did not have means to prevent propagation of a flame from the fuel tank
vent outlet into the fuel tanks. The Philippine explosion occurred
while the airplane was parked at the gate. The ignition source that
caused the explosion could not be determined.
[[Page 48100]]
However, external ignition sources such as ground handling equipment or
hot surfaces on lighting located near the vent outlet were evaluated as
the possible source of the ignition.
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\6\ On May 11, 1990, a Philippine Airlines 737-300 was destroyed
by a fuel tank explosion on the apron at Manila Ninoy Aquino
International Airport.
\7\ AD 99-03-04 BOEING: Amendment 39-11018; Docket 98-NM-50-AD;
effective March 9, 1999.
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In addition to the 737 AD, we have issued other ADs to either
require flame arrestors or verify their functionality on the Lockheed
Model 1649A piston airplane,\8\ Boeing Models 707 and 720,\9\ the Beech
Model 400A,\10\ and the Lockheed Model 382.\11\
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\8\ AD 59-20-02 LOCKHEED: Effective October 15, 1959, for items
(1) and (2) and December 1, 1959, for item (3).
\9\ AD 67-23-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-462. Effective September
10, 1967.
\10\ AD 92-16-14 BEECH: Amendment 39-8323; Docket No. 92-NM-95-
AD; effective September 1, 1992.
\11\ AD 2011-15-02 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39-16749; Docket No.,
FAA-2010-1305; effective August 19, 2011.
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Since 2005, the FAA has also addressed the possibility of fuel tank
ignition resulting from post-crash fire propagation through fuel vent
lines with issue papers applied to specific certification projects.
However, the lack of a specific part 25 regulation has resulted in
some manufacturers completing initial airplane designs and applying for
a U.S. type certificate without considering the need to mitigate the
risk of flame propagation through fuel vent lines. Some newly
manufactured airplanes introduced into the U.S. fleet do not have flame
arrestors in the fuel tank vents.\12\
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\12\ Bombardier Q400 (Dash 8) and Canadair Regional Jets.
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III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. General
This proposal would establish a minimum time period for preventing
a fuel tank explosion caused by flame propagation through the fuel tank
vents of 2 minutes and 30 seconds, measured from the time a flame first
impinges on any fuel tank vent. This capability would allow time to
evacuate passengers and crew to a safe distance from the airplane and
for emergency response to begin. The minimum performance standard in
this proposal is based on a balance between the available technology,
practicality considerations, and providing a satisfactory passenger
evacuation safety standard.
The proposed regulatory text is intended to prevent, or at least
delay, fuel tank explosions or fires caused by external fires that
ignite fuel or vapor in the fuel tank. External fires may be caused by
sources such as post-crash ground fires, fires resulting from fuel
leakage during refueling, and ignition of fuel exiting the fuel vents.
The proposal requires consideration of flames in the fuel tank vent
outlets including propagation through the vent line, as well as
ignition sources created by damage to the vent system caused by the
external fire, such as burn-through of fuel tank vent system components
or heating of the vent system components.
To limit propagation of external fires through the vent system, it
is necessary to design a flame arrestor, a flame suppression device, or
other system to prevent flame penetration and propagation through the
airplane fuel tank vents. The minimum time period should be no less
than the time required to evacuate the airplane. The FAA has previously
established a performance standard that, under specified conditions,
the airplane must be capable of being evacuated within 90 seconds
(Sec. 25.803, Emergency evacuation). The conditions under which the
airplane is evacuated assume availability of a minimum number of exits
and all passengers are uninjured and physically capable of departing
the airplane. This is not always the case.
In addition to time for evacuation of passengers, we have also
established minimum standards for penetration of a fuel fire through
the airplane fuselage to allow emergency crews time to arrive at an
accident and to establish control of a fire (Sec. 25.856, Thermal/
Acoustic insulation materials). Analysis of past accidents showed the
greatest benefits when a minimum of 5 minutes is provided. This time
includes 1 minute for a fire to penetrate the fuselage skin and an
additional 4 minutes for the fire to burn through the insulation. The
time of 5 minutes for penetration of a post-crash ground fire into the
fuselage was based on research into studies of past accidents.\13\ \14\
As part of a project commissioned by the FAA, data have been gathered
on the relative proportion of accidents that involve ground pooled fuel
fires and statistical data on the following:
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\13\ DOT/FAA/AR-99/57, Fuselage Burnthrough Protection for
Increased Postcrash Occupant Survivability: Safety Benefit Analysis
Based on Past Accidents, September 1999.
\14\ DOT/FAA/AR-09/18, Determination of Evacuation and
Firefighting Times Based on an Analysis of Aircraft Accident Fire
Survivability Data, May 2009.
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Time to initiate an evacuation;
Time to complete an evacuation;
Time to arrival of fire-fighters; and
Time for fire-fighters to establish control in a ground
pool fire accident.
The data were extracted from accident reports and other information
published by investigating and airworthiness authorities using the
Cabin Safety Research Technical Group aircraft accident database.
Current technology flame arrestors installed in the transport fleet
have been designed to have a capability to prevent flame propagation
into the fuel tanks for up to 2 minutes and 30 seconds after flame
enters the fuel tank vent and contacts the face of the flame arrestor.
The FAA is proposing a minimum standard of 2 minutes and 30
seconds. This time is greater than the 90 second evacuation time noted
above and allows additional time for passengers to exit from the crash
scene. No adverse service experience has occurred on airplanes equipped
with flame arrestors that provide this amount of time. While this time
is less than the 5 minute test standard required by Sec. 25.856 for a
ground fire to penetrate into the fuselage, the FAA has determined
providing fuel tank vent protection in excess of 2 minutes and 30
seconds would not be practical. Comments received to the notice issued
in 1995 indicated flame arrestors that meet a 5 minute standard would
need to be significantly larger, weigh more, and would introduce
significant pressure loss in the fuel system vent line, resulting in
the need to increase the size of the vent line to meet airplane
refueling performance requirements.
B. Potential for Blockage of Vents
During the approval process for the existing compliance means that
use flame arrestors in the vent lines, several applicants expressed
concerns that requiring flame arrestors may reduce the level of safety
due to restrictions being introduced into the vents. The FAA
acknowledges that introducing flame arrestors in the fuel tank vents
may introduce the potential for clogging of the vent lines from ice and
debris. This could result in adverse consequences like more severe tank
pressures during fueling/over-fueling, greater differential pressures
on the tank skins during emergency descent or defueling, reduced fuel
jettison capability, and an increased risk of vent system blockage.
To address these design considerations, applicants have included
positive and negative pressure relief provisions in their vent system
designs. This has afforded an excellent safety record. Service
experience of thousands of airplanes in the current fleet equipped with
flame arrestors indicates that each of these concerns (and other such
concerns not listed above) can be safely mitigated with proper design
and certification of the fuel tank vent fire protection. Proposed
[[Page 48101]]
AC 25.975-X would provide the guidance necessary to address these
issues.
C. Revise ``Fuel Tank Vents and Carburetor Vapor Vents'' (Sec. 25.975)
Section 25.975 currently prescribes standards for fuel tank vents
but does not contain a standard for protecting the fuel tanks from
external flame propagating into the tank. We propose to add a new
paragraph, Sec. 25.975(a)(7), to establish a requirement for a means
to prevent the propagation of flames, for a limited time, from outside
the fuel tank through the fuel tank vents that could cause a fuel tank
explosion.
Means of compliance available today include incorporation of flame
arrestors in the fuel system vent lines. Other means that might be
available in the future include full time fuel tank inerting systems
that prevent fuel tank explosions due to post-crash or other external
fires.
We considered alternative technical solutions, such as mandating
nitrogen inerting systems that would prevent a fuel tank explosions
caused by external fires by eliminating fuel tank flammability. Current
fuel tank flammability limits in Sec. 25.981 have resulted in the use
of nitrogen inerting systems in some or all fuel tanks. However, the
fuel tanks become flammable during certain portions of airplane
operations such as during fuel tank refueling and times when the
inerting system cannot produce enough nitrogen to inert the fuel tanks.
During these times, the tanks continue to be vulnerable to explosion
from flame propagation through fuel system vent lines. The cost to
incorporate full-time nitrogen inerting systems in all fuel tanks would
be excessive.
Another alternative we considered was to continue using
certification project-specific issue papers to address fuel tank vent
fire protection. However, this alternative does not allow public review
and comment and does not result in broad industry awareness of the need
to incorporate vent system protection into new designs early in the
airplane design process. In addition, this method is more costly and
time consuming for both the FAA and applicants due to the need to
process an issue paper identifying specific requirements for each
project. Some applicants have objected to this approach, and it has
proven more difficult to apply in a standardized manner.
After considering these alternatives, we have concluded that the
most practical and cost effective method to address this safety issue
is the incorporation of flame arrestors in the fuel system vent lines
(as recommended in the SAFER committee report).
D. Newly Produced Airplanes
Parts 121 and 129 prescribe operating requirements for air
carriers, including requirements for the airworthiness of each
airplane. Part 121 applies to domestic operators and, for airworthiness
requirements, part 129 applies to foreign operators operating U.S.-
registered airplanes. We propose to add a new operating requirement
that would apply to newly manufactured airplanes entering service 2
years after the effective date of this proposed regulation. This
compliance time is based on the estimated time needed to design and
develop a flame arrestor installation for existing airplanes. Flame
arrestor technology is currently available, and adaptation of this
technology to currently produced airplanes, certifying the design and
incorporation of the design in production, should be achievable within
the 2-year compliance time.
While this proposal does not require manufacturers of existing type
designs to develop design features meeting the requirements, we
anticipate operators of the affected airplane models will enter into
business agreements with manufacturers to provide compliant designs
that meet the proposed operating regulations. Newly manufactured
airplanes that enter service typically have a minimum operating life of
20 years in passenger service. Therefore, the safety benefits of
incorporating flame arrestors would be greatest in newly produced
airplanes entering service.
We are not proposing a requirement to retrofit airplanes in the
current fleet. This decision was based on the determination that many
of the older airplane models that do not have flame arrestors are being
retired. The cost to retrofit these airplanes for the safety
improvement is not in the public interest.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by state,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's
analysis of the economic impacts of the proposed rule. We suggest
readers seeking greater detail read the full regulatory evaluation, a
copy of which we have placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this proposed
rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is not an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is not ``significant'' as defined in
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities;
(5) would not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States; and (6) would not impose an unfunded mandate on
state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector by
exceeding the threshold identified above.
These analyses are summarized below.
Total Costs and Benefits of This Proposed Rule
The FAA finds the proposed rule to be cost-beneficial because the
costs of the rule are low enough that the expected benefits of
preventing just two fatalities would outweigh the expected costs ($4.9
million in present value benefits versus $4.4 million in present value
costs). If this action is not taken, a hazard would continue to exist
even though effective and low-cost means are available to minimize or
eliminate it.
Who is potentially affected by this rule?
Manufacturers of newly certified part 25 airplanes and U.S.
operators of these airplanes are affected by the rule as a result of
its applicability to new certification part 25 airplanes. Manufacturers
and operators of
[[Page 48102]]
currently produced part 25 airplanes (production cut-in) are affected
by the rule as a result of its applicability to airplanes engaged in
part 121 or 129 operations produced two years or more after the
effective date of this rule.
Principal Assumptions and Sources of Information
Discount rate is 7 percent (Office of Management & Budget,
Circular A-94, ``Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs,'' October 29, 1992, p. 8).
Value of statistical life (VSL) begins at $9.1 million in
2012 and increases thereafter by an annual growth factor of 1.0107.
Memorandum: Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a
Statistical Life in Department Analyses. [February 2013]. United
States, Office of the Secretary of Transportation.
For small part 25 manufacturers: Two U.S. airplane
certifications in next 10-year period, twenty-one annual U.S.
deliveries per U.S. certification; three foreign airplane
certifications in next 10-year period, eleven annual U.S. deliveries
per foreign certification, 15-year airplane production run; 30-year
retirement age. Internal FAA study.
Current airplane models that could be affected by
production cut-in requirement (Bombardier Dash 8, CJ-700, and CJ-900):
FAA 2013 Fleet Forecast, Fleet Forecast Sheet, ``FAA U.S. Airlines
2013-2013 1-18-2103,'' ``Totals & FAA Tables.''
The period of analysis for new certifications is 45 years
to account for a complete product life cycle determined by a 15-year
production period and a 30-year service period.
Certification cost estimates for part 25 airplanes--Survey
of small U.S. part 25 airplane manufacturers.
Maintenance cost per airplane (every four years) for
Bombardier CJ-700/CJ-900 regional jets (subject to production cut-in)--
$240. This estimate is much lower than the U.S. estimate because it is
for passenger airplane models, while the U.S. estimate is for business
jet models. Since business jets are more prone to sit for extended
periods of time, their flame arrestors can more easily be clogged by
ice, mud daubers, or other debris, thus requiring more frequent and
longer maintenance.
Minimal fuel costs as flame arrestors weigh between 2 and
4 pounds each.
Costs of This Proposed Rule
The costs of the proposed rule are engineering, production, and
maintenance compliance costs for newly certificated part 25 airplanes
and for new production of currently-produced part 25 airplanes used in
part 121 operations (production cut-in). We first estimate compliances
costs for new certifications and then for the production cut-in.
Compliance Costs of New Certification Airplanes to Manufacturers and
Operators
For newly certificated airplanes, compliance costs consist of
engineering and production costs of U.S. manufactured airplanes
delivered to U.S. operators and maintenance costs of both U.S. and
foreign airplanes delivered to U.S. operators. U.S. part 25
manufacturers directly incur the engineering and production costs while
U.S. operators directly incur the maintenance costs. Engineering and
production costs incurred by foreign manufacturers are not included in
the costs of compliance, as costs directly attributable to foreign
entities are not included in the cost and benefit analysis of proposed
U.S. regulations.
To calculate the cost of new U.S. certifications, we assume that
all new certifications will be approved one year after the effective
date of the rule, with production beginning one year later. Using an
airplane life cycle model, we estimate the economic impact for two new
certificates, production of 21 airplanes/certificates/year, production
runs of 15 years, and an airplane retirement age of 30 years.
Compliance costs per year are calculated over an airplane life cycle of
45 years.
Industry cost estimates were solicited from small part 25
manufacturers because large airplane manufacturers (Boeing and Airbus)
are already compliant with the proposed rule. These cost estimates are
shown in the table below.
Industry Cost Estimates Using Flame Arrestors To Comply With Proposed
Rule
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Cost category Cost Notes
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Nonrecurring Engineering Costs..... $142,000 per model.
Production Costs (Hardware & 3,000 per airplane (two
Installation). flame arrestors
@$1,500 each).
Maintenance Costs (U.S. 415 per airplane annually.
manufacturers).
Maintenance Costs (Bombardier)..... 240 per airplane every 4
years.
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The industry cost estimates consist of nonrecurring (one-time)
engineering costs, production costs for two flame arrestors per
airplane (one per fuel tank), and maintenance costs per airplane per
year. (The Bombardier maintenance cost estimate is used for estimating
production cut-in costs of compliance.) Incorporating the industry cost
estimates into the airplane life cycle model, we find total costs for
new certification airplanes to be $16.2 million with present value of
$4.2 million. $2.2 million of these costs (present value $1.2 million)
are directly incurred by U.S. manufacturers and $14.0 million (present
value $2.1 million) are directly incurred by U.S. operators.\15\
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\15\ Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
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Compliance Costs of Production Cut-In
In addition to the requirement applying to new certifications, the
proposed rule would also require a production cut-in for currently
produced part 25 airplanes used in part 121 operations.\16\ To
calculate this cost, we first note that the only currently produced and
U.S. operated airplane models not already in compliance are the
Bombardier Dash 8 turboprops and Bombardier CJ-700/CJ-900 regional
jets. The final rule would apply to these Bombardier models produced
beginning in 2018. Since the FAA forecasts no Dash 8 deliveries to U.S.
airline operators after 2017, we expect no Dash 8 compliance cost for
these operators.
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\16\ We do not estimate costs for the analogous part 129
requirement as these costs are directly incurred by foreign
operators.
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The FAA does forecast the delivery of 338 CRJ-700 and 161 CRJ-900
model airplanes to U.S. airline operators over the period 2018-2033.
The engineering and production compliance costs for these airplanes are
not included in our cost estimates because, as noted above, costs
directly incurred by foreign entities are not included in the cost and
[[Page 48103]]
benefit analysis of proposed U.S. regulations. Accordingly, for these
airplanes we assess the impact on U.S. operators only, using
Bombardier's maintenance cost estimate of $240 every four years.
Allocating this cost as $60 annually and assuming a production period
of 16 years, we calculate the maintenance costs for these airplanes
from the first year of service to the retirement year of the last
airplanes produced, using a procedure analogous to that used for new
certification airplanes. We find these costs to operators to be
$898,200 with present value $178,439.
Production cut-in costs of $898,200 (present value $178,439) added
to new certification airplane costs of $16.2 million (present value
$4.2 million) yield total rule costs of $17.1 million (present value
$4.4 million).
Benefits of This Proposed Rule
Notwithstanding the absence of post-crash fuel tank explosions in
recent years and lacking other sufficient bases upon which to estimate
future risks, the merits of the proposed rule can be assessed by
considering the number of fatalities that would need to be prevented to
offset the costs of the rule.
We estimate the breakeven benefits of the rule by estimating the
number of averted fatalities necessary to offset the $4.4 million
present value costs of the rule. We find that just two averted
fatalities would offset these estimated costs.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation.'' To achieve this principle, agencies are
required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to
explain the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals
are given serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions. Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a rule will have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. If the agency determines that it
will, the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as
described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
All small U.S. manufacturers affected by this rule are wholly owned
subsidiaries of large companies, who have more than 1,500 employees
(the small business criterion for aircraft manufacturing) and,
therefore, are not classified as small entities by the Small Business
Administration. Part 121 operators would be directly affected by the
average $415 annual maintenance cost per airplane. These costs are
minimal, especially compared to the high cost of new part 25 airplanes.
If an agency determines that a rulemaking will not result in a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
the head of the agency may so certify under section 605(b) of the RFA.
Therefore, as provided in section 605(b), the head of the FAA certifies
that this rulemaking would not result in a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities.
The FAA solicits comments regarding this determination.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-39), as amended by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465), prohibits
Federal agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of
standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign
commerce of the United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate
domestic objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not
operate in a manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The
statute also requires consideration of international standards and,
where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
This proposed rule would not create an unnecessary obstacle to
foreign commerce as foreign and domestic manufacturers are equally
affected and its effect on part 121 operators would be domestic only.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law
104-4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $151.0 million in lieu of $100
million. This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore,
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this proposed rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed regulations.
G. Environmental
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and,
[[Page 48104]]
therefore, would not have Federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
would not be a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order
and would not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.
VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before
the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed
after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in
light of the comments it receives.
Proprietary or Confidential Business Information: Commenters should
not file proprietary or confidential business information in the
docket. Such information must be sent or delivered directly to the
person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document, and marked as proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD
ROM, and identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is aware of proprietary
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the
docket. It is held in a separate file to which the public does not have
access, and the FAA places a note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to examine or copy this information,
it treats it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act
(5 U.S.C. 552). The FAA processes such a request under Department of
Transportation procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
Internet by:
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the Internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
1 above.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Life-limited parts, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Transportation.
14 CFR Part 129
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, and 44704.
0
2. Amend Sec. 25.975 by revising paragraphs (a)(5) and (a)(6), and
adding a new paragraph (a)(7) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.975 Fuel tank vents and carburetor vapor vents.
(a) * * *
(5) There may be no point in any vent line where moisture can
accumulate with the airplane in the ground attitude or the level flight
attitude, unless drainage is provided;
(6) No vent or drainage provision may end at any point--
(i) Where the discharge of fuel from the vent outlet would
constitute a fire hazard; or
(ii) From which fumes could enter personnel compartments; and
(7) Each fuel tank system must be designed to prevent explosions
caused by propagation of flames from outside the tank through the fuel
tank vents into fuel tank vapor spaces for a minimum of 2 minutes and
30 seconds of continuous exposure to flame impingement on any fuel tank
vent.
* * * * *
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.
0
4. Add Sec. 121.1119 to subpart AA to read as follows:
Sec. 121.1119 Fuel tank vent explosion protection.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to transport category,
turbine-powered airplanes with a type certificate issued after January
1, 1958, that, as a result of original type certification or later
increase in capacity, have:
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.
(b) New production airplanes. No certificate holder may operate an
airplane for which the State of Manufacture issued the original
certificate of airworthiness or export airworthiness approval after
[insert date 2 years after effective date of rule] unless fuel tank
vent system explosion prevention means meeting the requirements of
Sec. 25.975 of this chapter, are installed and operational.
[[Page 48105]]
PART 129--OPERATIONS: FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN OPERATORS OF
U.S.-REGISTERED AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON CARRIAGE
0
5. The authority citation for part 129 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 40113, 40119, 41301, 44101, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901-44904, 44906,
44912, 46105, Public Law 107-71 sec. 104.
0
6. Add Sec. 129.119 to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 129.119 Fuel tank vent explosion protection.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to transport category,
turbine-powered airplanes with a type certificate issued after January
1, 1958, that, as a result of original type certification or later
increase in capacity, have:
(1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,
or
(2) A maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.
(b) New production airplanes. No certificate holder may operate an
airplane for which the State of Manufacture issued the original
certificate of airworthiness or export airworthiness approval after
[insert date 2 years after effective date of rule] unless fuel tank
vent system explosion prevention means meeting the requirements of
Sec. 25.975 of this chapter, are installed and operational.
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a),
and 44703 in Washington, DC, on August 1, 2014.
Frank Paskiewicz,
Acting Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2014-18959 Filed 8-14-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P