[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 155 (Tuesday, August 12, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47106-47130]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-19080]



[[Page 47106]]

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[AU Docket No. 14-78; DA 14-1018]


Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) Licenses Scheduled 
for November 13, 2014; Notice and Filing Requirements, Reserve Prices, 
Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for 
Auction 97

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures, reserve prices, and 
minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of AWS-3 licenses 
(Auction 97). This document is intended to familiarize prospective 
applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation 
in the auction.

DATES: Applications to participate in Auction 97 must be filed prior to 
6:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) on September 12, 2014. Bidding in Auction 
97 is scheduled to begin on November 13, 2014.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For legal and general auction 
questions: Valerie Barrish (attorney) at (202) 418-0660; Broadband 
Division: For licensing and service rule questions: Genevieve Ross 
(attorney) or Janet Young (engineer) at (202) 418-2487. To request 
materials in accessible formats (Braille, large print, electronic 
files, or audio format) for people with disabilities, send an email to 
[email protected] or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
(202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice released on July 23, 2014. The complete text 
of the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice, including all attachments 
and related Commission documents, is available for public inspection 
and copying from the FCC Reference Information Center, 445 12th Street 
SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554 during its regular business 
hours. The Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice and related Commission 
documents also may be purchased from the Commission's duplicating 
contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), 445 12th Street SW., 
Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-488-5300, fax 202-
488-5563, or Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. The Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice and related documents also are available on 
the Internet at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/97/, or by using the search function for AU Docket No. 14-78 
Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) Web page at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/.

I. General Information

A. Introduction

    1. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) established the 
procedures, reserve prices, and minimum opening bid amounts for the 
upcoming auction of 1,614 Advanced Wireless Services licenses in the 
1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and 2155-2180 MHz bands (collectively, 
the AWS-3 bands). This auction, which is designated as Auction 97, is 
scheduled to start on November 13, 2014. The Auction 97 Procedures 
Public Notice provided an overview of the procedures, terms, and 
conditions governing Auction 97 and the post-auction application and 
payment processes.
    2. The Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) is 
offering the licenses in Auction 97 pursuant to the Middle Class Tax 
Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (Spectrum Act). The Spectrum Act 
requires, among other things, that the Commission allocate for 
commercial use and license spectrum in certain specified frequency 
bands using a system of competitive bidding no later than February 
2015. In February 2013, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) identified the 1695-1710 MHz band for 
reallocation from Federal use to non-Federal use in satisfaction of its 
Spectrum Act obligation. In the AWS-3 Report and Order, 79 FR 32365, 
June 4, 2014, the Commission identified the 1755-1780 MHz band in 
satisfaction of the Spectrum Act's requirement that it identify fifteen 
megahertz of contiguous spectrum in addition to the bands specifically 
identified in the Spectrum Act.
    3. On May 19, 2014, the Bureau released the Auction 97 Comment 
Public Notice 79 FR 31327, June 2, 2014, seeking comment on competitive 
bidding procedures to be used in Auction 97. Ten comments, eight reply 
comments, ten ex parte filings, and four brief comments were submitted 
in response to the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice.
    4. Based on the record and after considering comments provided in 
response to the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice, establishes procedures for, among other 
things: (1) Using the Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round 
(SMR) auction format in a single auction event subject to uniform 
bidding procedures for the unpaired 1695-1710 MHz band and the paired 
1755-1780 MHz/2155-2180 MHz bands, except that bidding will close on a 
band after five consecutive rounds in which no bidding activity occurs 
on licenses in that band provided that the reserve for that band has 
been met; (2) filing short-form applications to participate in Auction 
97 during a ten-business day window that closes on September 12, 2014; 
(3) limited information disclosure, to enhance competition by 
safeguarding against potential anti-competitive auction strategies; (4) 
submission of a statement by each applicant for any license in the 
1755-1780 MHz band acknowledging that it has considered and accepts the 
risks of potential interference from Federal systems to its planned 
operations in certain geographic zones; (5) an aggregate reserve price 
for the 1695-1710 MHz license of approximately $580 million and a 
separate aggregate reserve price for the paired 1755-1780 MHz/2155-2180 
MHz licenses of approximately $10.07 billion; (6) minimum opening bids 
for each license using a calculation based on $0.15 per MHz-pop for 
paired licenses and $0.05 per MHz-pop for unpaired licenses with a 
revision to the Bureau's method for incorporating price information 
from past auctions; (7) minimum acceptable bid amounts based on an 
activity-based formula under which bids in subsequent rounds may be 
between 10-20% higher than the provisionally winning bid; and (8) 
filing long-form applications in accordance with the schedule specified 
in the Commission's rules, but establishing a deadline for down 
payments and final payments from winning bidders that will occur no 
earlier than January 2015.
    5. In addition, the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice concludes 
that any requests for temporary, limited relief from the former 
defaulter rule are beyond the scope of this proceeding and notes that 
such requests are being addressed separately.

B. Description of Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 97

    6. The 65 megahertz of AWS-3 spectrum available in Auction 97 will 
be licensed on a geographic area basis. Of the 1,614 licenses offered 
in Auction 97, 880 will be Economic Area (EA) licenses and 734 will be 
Cellular Market Area (CMA) licenses. The AWS-3 frequencies will be 
licensed in five and

[[Page 47107]]

ten megahertz blocks, with each license having a total bandwidth of 
five, ten, or twenty megahertz.
    7. The 1695-1710 MHz band will be licensed in an unpaired 
configuration for low-power mobile transmit (i.e., uplink) operations. 
The 1755-1780 MHz band will be licensed paired with the 2155-2180 MHz 
band, with the 1755-1780 MHz band authorized for low-power mobile 
transmit (i.e., uplink) operations and the 2155-2180 MHz band 
authorized for base station and fixed (i.e., downlink) operations. A 
complete list of the licenses offered in Auction 97 is available in 
Attachment A to the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice.

C. Rules and Disclaimers

1. Relevant Authority
    8. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly 
with the Commission's general competitive bidding rules, including 
Commission decisions in proceedings regarding competitive bidding 
procedures, application requirements, and obligations of Commission 
licensees. Prospective bidders should also familiarize themselves with 
the Commission's rules relating to the AWS-3 frequencies, including 
incumbency issues for AWS-3 licensees, Federal and non-Federal 
relocation and sharing and cost sharing obligations, protection of 
Federal and non-Federal incumbent operations, and rules relating to 
applications, environment, practice and procedure. All bidders must 
also be thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms and conditions 
contained in the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice and any future 
public notices that may be issued in this proceeding.
    9. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders, 
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or 
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time, 
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental 
information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all applicants 
to remain current with all Commission rules and with all public notices 
pertaining to this auction. Copies of most auctions-related Commission 
documents, including public notices, can be retrieved from the FCC 
Auctions Internet site at http://www.wireless.fcc.gov/auctions.
2. Prohibited Communications and Compliance With Antitrust Laws
    10. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) prohibits auction applicants for licenses in any of the same 
or overlapping geographic license areas from communicating with each 
other about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless such 
applicants have identified each other on their short-form applications 
(FCC Form 175) as parties with whom they have entered into agreements 
pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
a. Entities Subject to 47 CFR 1.2105
    11. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)'s prohibition on certain communications will 
apply to any applicants that submit short-form applications seeking to 
participate in a Commission auction for licenses in the same or 
overlapping geographic license area. Thus, unless they have identified 
each other on their short-form applications as parties with whom they 
have entered into agreements under 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), 
applicants for any of the same or overlapping geographic license areas 
must affirmatively avoid all communications with or disclosures to each 
other that affect or have the potential to affect bids or bidding 
strategy. In some instances, this prohibition extends to communications 
regarding the post-auction market structure. This prohibition applies 
to all applicants that submit short-form applications regardless of 
whether such applicants ultimately become qualified bidders or actually 
bid.
    12. Applicants are also reminded that, for purposes of this 
prohibition on certain communications, 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines 
``applicant'' as including all officers and directors of the entity 
submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all 
controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of 
partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest 
amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or 
outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form 
application. For example, where an individual served as an officer for 
two or more applicants, the Bureau has found that the bids and bidding 
strategies of one applicant are conveyed to the other applicant, and, 
absent a disclosed bidding agreement, an apparent violation of 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) occurs.
    13. Individuals and entities subject to 47 CFR 1.2105(c) should 
take special care in circumstances where their employees may receive 
information directly or indirectly relating to any competing 
applicant's bids or bidding strategies. The Bureau has not addressed a 
situation where non-principals (i.e., those who are not officers or 
directors, and thus not considered to be the applicant) receive 
information regarding a competing applicant's bids or bidding 
strategies and whether that information should be presumed to be 
communicated to the applicant.
    14. An exception to the prohibition on certain communications 
allows non-controlling interest holders to obtain interests in more 
than one competing applicant without violating 47 CFR 1.2105(c) 
provided specified conditions are met (including a certification that 
no prohibited communications have occurred or will occur), but that 
exception does not extend to controlling interest holders.
    15. Auction 97 applicants selecting licenses for any of the same or 
overlapping geographic license areas are encouraged not to use the same 
individual as an authorized bidder. A violation of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) 
could occur if an individual acts as the authorized bidder for two or 
more competing applicants, and conveys information concerning the 
substance of bids or bidding strategies between such applicants. 
Similarly, if the authorized bidders are different individuals employed 
by the same organization (e.g., law firm, engineering firm or 
consulting firm), a violation likewise could occur. In such a case, at 
a minimum, applicants should certify on their applications that 
precautionary steps have been taken to prevent communication between 
authorized bidders, and that the applicant and its bidders will comply 
with 47 CFR 1.2105(c).
b. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline
    16. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)'s prohibition on certain communications begins 
at the short-form application filing deadline and ends at the down 
payment deadline after the auction closes, which will be announced in a 
future public notice.
c. Prohibited Communications
    17. Applicants must not communicate directly or indirectly about 
bids or bidding strategy to other applicants in this auction. 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) prohibits not only communication about an applicant's own 
bids or bidding strategy, it also prohibits communication of another 
applicant's bids or bidding strategy. While 47 CFR 1.2105(c) does not 
prohibit non-auction-related business negotiations among auction 
applicants, each applicant must remain vigilant so as not to directly 
or indirectly communicate information that affects, or could affect, 
bids, bidding strategy, or the negotiation of settlement agreements.

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    18. Applicants are cautioned that the Commission remains vigilant 
about prohibited communications taking place in other situations. For 
example, the Commission has warned that prohibited communications 
concerning bids and bidding strategies may include communications 
regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds in support of 
bids or bidding strategies to the extent such communications convey 
information concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or 
indirectly. Moreover, the Commission has found a violation of 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) where an applicant used the Commission's bidding system to 
disclose its bidding strategy in a manner that explicitly invited other 
auction participants to cooperate and collaborate in specific markets, 
and has placed auction participants on notice that the use of its 
bidding system to disclose market information to competitors will not 
be tolerated and will subject bidders to sanctions. Applicants also 
should use caution in their dealings with other parties, such as 
members of the press, financial analysts, or others who might become 
conduits for the communication of prohibited bidding information. For 
example, where limited information disclosure procedures are in place, 
as is the case for Auction 97, an applicant's statement to the press 
that it has lost bidding eligibility and intends to stop bidding in the 
auction could give rise to a finding of a 47 CFR 1.2105(c) violation. 
Similarly, an applicant's public statement of intent not to participate 
in Auction 97 bidding could also violate the rule.
    19. Applicants are also hereby placed on notice that public 
disclosure of information relating to bidder interests and bidder 
identities that has not yet been made public by the Commission at the 
time of disclosure may violate the provisions of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) that 
prohibit certain communications. This is so even though similar types 
of information were revealed prior to and during other Commission 
auctions subject to different information procedures.
    20. In addition, when completing short-form applications, each 
applicant should avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate 
47 CFR 1.2105(c), particularly in light of the limited information 
procedures in effect for Auction 97. Specifically, an applicant should 
avoid including any information in its short-form applications that 
might convey information regarding its license selection, such as using 
applicant names that refer to licenses being offered, referring to 
certain licenses or markets in describing bidding agreements, or 
including any information in attachments that may otherwise disclose 
the applicant's license selections. Likewise, an Auction 97 applicant 
must not disclose to others whether it has filed the acknowledgement 
concerning interference obligations that is required of each applicant 
that seeks to bid on any license in the 1755-1780 MHz band, as that 
information would reveal information regarding its license selection. 
The Bureau intends to withhold from public disclosure all information 
concerning the existence of such applicant statements until after the 
close of the auction.
d. Disclosure of Bidding Agreements and Arrangements
    21. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering 
into otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form 
applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the 
agreement(s) in their short-form applications. Applicants must identify 
in their short-form applications all parties with whom they have 
entered into any agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any 
kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any agreements 
relating to post-auction market structure.
    22. If parties agree in principle on all material terms prior to 
the short-form application filing deadline, each party to the agreement 
must identify the other party or parties to the agreement on its short-
form application under 47 CFR 1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not 
been reduced to writing. If the parties have not agreed in principle by 
the short-form filing deadline, they should not include the names of 
parties to discussions on their applications, and they may not continue 
negotiation, discussion or communication with any other applicants 
after the short-form application filing deadline.
    23. 47 CFR 1.2105(c) does not prohibit non-auction-related business 
negotiations among auction applicants. However, certain discussions or 
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they 
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Such subject 
areas include, but are not limited to, issues such as management, 
sales, local marketing agreements, and other transactional agreements.
e. 47 CFR 1.2105(c) Certification
    24. By electronically submitting a short-form application, each 
applicant in Auction 97 certifies its compliance with 47 CFR 1.2105(c). 
In particular, an applicant must certify under penalty of perjury it 
has not entered and will not enter into any explicit or implicit 
agreements, arrangements or understandings of any kind with any 
parties, other than those identified in the application, regarding the 
amount of the applicant's bids, bidding strategies, or the particular 
licenses on which it will or will not bid. However, the Bureau cautions 
that merely filing a certifying statement as part of an application 
will not outweigh specific evidence that a prohibited communication has 
occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when 
warranted. The Commission has stated that it intends to scrutinize 
carefully any instances in which bidding patterns suggest that 
collusion may be occurring. Any applicant found to have violated 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) may be subject to sanctions.
f. Duty To Report Prohibited Communications
    25. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(6) provides that any applicant that makes or 
receives a communication that appears to violate 47 CFR 1.2105(c) must 
report such communication in writing to the Commission immediately, and 
in no case later than five business days after the communication 
occurs. The Commission has clarified that each applicant's obligation 
to report any such communication continues beyond the five-day period 
after the communication is made, even if the report is not made within 
the five-day period.
    26. In addition, 47 CFR 1.65 requires an applicant to maintain the 
accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its pending 
application and to notify the Commission of any substantial change that 
may be of decisional significance to that application. Thus, 47 CFR 
1.65 requires an auction applicant to notify the Commission of any 
substantial change to the information or certifications included in its 
pending short-form application. An applicant is therefore required by 
47 CFR 1.65 to report to the Commission any communication the applicant 
has made to or received from another applicant after the short-form 
application filing deadline that affects or has the potential to affect 
bids or bidding strategy, unless such communication is made to or 
received from a party to an agreement identified under 47 CFR 
1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
    27. 47 CFR 1.65(a) and 1.2105(c) require each applicant in 
competitive bidding proceedings to furnish additional or corrected 
information within five days of a significant occurrence, or to amend 
its short-form

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application no more than five days after the applicant becomes aware of 
the need for amendment. These rules are intended to facilitate the 
auction process by making the information available promptly to all 
participants and to enable the Bureau to act expeditiously on those 
changes when such action is necessary.
g. Procedure for Reporting Prohibited Communications
    28. A party reporting any communication pursuant to 47 CFR 1.65, 
1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(6) must take care to ensure that any report 
of a prohibited communication does not itself give rise to a violation 
of 47 CFR 1.2105(c). For example, a party's report of a prohibited 
communication could violate the rule by communicating prohibited 
information to other applicants through the use of Commission filing 
procedures that would allow such materials to be made available for 
public inspection.
    29. 47 CFR 1.2105(c) requires parties to file only a single report 
concerning a prohibited communication and to file that report with 
Commission personnel expressly charged with administering the 
Commission's auctions. This rule is designed to minimize the risk of 
inadvertent dissemination of information in such reports. Any reports 
required by 47 CFR 1.2105(c) must be filed consistent with the 
instructions set forth in the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice. For 
Auction 97, such reports must be filed with Margaret W. Wiener, the 
Chief of the Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau, by the most expeditious means available. Any 
such report should be submitted by email to Ms. Wiener at the following 
email address: [email protected]. If you choose instead to submit a 
report in hard copy, any such report must be delivered only to Margaret 
W. Wiener, Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
Street SW., Room 6423, Washington, DC 20554.
    30. A party seeking to report such a prohibited communication 
should consider submitting its report with a request that the report or 
portions of the submission be withheld from public inspection by 
following the procedures specified in 47 CFR 0.459. Such parties also 
are encouraged to coordinate with the Auctions and Spectrum Access 
Division staff about the procedures for submitting such reports. The 
Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice provides additional guidance on 
procedures for submitting application-related information.
h. Winning Bidders Must Disclose Terms of Agreements
    31. Each applicant that is a winning bidder will be required to 
disclose in its long-form applications the specific terms, conditions, 
and parties involved in any agreement it has entered into. This applies 
to any bidding consortia, joint venture, partnership, or agreement, 
understanding, or other arrangement entered into relating to the 
competitive bidding process, including any agreement relating to the 
post-auction market structure. Failure to comply with the Commission's 
rules can result in enforcement action.
i. Additional Information Concerning Rule Prohibiting Certain 
Communications
    32. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and the 
Bureau addressing the application of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) may be found in 
Attachment F to the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice. These 
documents are available on the Commission's auction Web page at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/prohibited_communications.
j. Antitrust Laws
    33. Regardless of compliance with the Commission's rules, 
applicants remain subject to the antitrust laws, which are designed to 
prevent anticompetitive behavior in the marketplace. Compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) will not insulate a 
party from enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance, a violation 
of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking place well 
before any party submitted a short-form application. The Commission has 
cited a number of examples of potentially anticompetitive actions that 
would be prohibited under antitrust laws: For example, actual or 
potential competitors may not agree to divide territories in order to 
minimize competition, regardless of whether they split a market in 
which they both do business, or whether they merely reserve one market 
for one and another market for the other. Similarly, the Bureau 
previously reminded potential applicants and others that even where the 
applicant discloses parties with whom it has reached an agreement on 
the short-form application, thereby permitting discussions with those 
parties, the applicant is nevertheless subject to existing antitrust 
laws.
    34. To the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific 
allegations that suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws 
may have occurred, the Commission may refer such allegations to the 
United States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant 
is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules 
in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding 
process, it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down 
payment, or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in 
future auctions, among other sanctions.
3. Incumbency Issues
    35. The AWS-3 bands are currently being used for a variety of 
government and non-government services. In the AWS-3 Report and Order, 
the Commission allocated the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands for 
commercial use. Licenses in 1695-1710 MHz band are being made available 
on a shared basis with incumbent Federal meteorological-satellite 
(MetSat) data users. The Commission adopted twenty-seven Protection 
Zones for the 1695-1710 MHz band in the AWS-3 Report and Order. 
Pursuant to 47 CFR 2.106, US note 88, forty-seven Federal earth 
stations located in these zones will operate on a co-equal, primary 
basis with commercial AWS-3 licensees. To facilitate coordination, 
uplink/mobile transmit devices in the 1695-1710 MHz band must be under 
the control of, or associated with, a base station as a means to 
facilitate shared use of the band and prevent interference to Federal 
operations. Licenses in the 1755-1780 MHz band are being made available 
on a shared basis with a limited number of Federal incumbents 
indefinitely, while some of the Federal systems will over time relocate 
out of the band. Pursuant to 47 CFR 2.106, US note 91, Federal systems 
located in the Protection Zones adopted by the Commission for the 1755-
1780 MHz band in the AWS-3 Report and Order will operate on a co-equal, 
primary basis with commercial AWS licensees. The Federal systems that 
will relocate from this band pursuant to an approved transition plan 
will operate on a primary basis until they are reaccommodated. To 
facilitate coordination, uplink/mobile transmit devices in the 1755-
1780 MHz band must be under the control of, or associated with, a base 
station as a means to facilitate shared use of the band and prevent 
interference to Federal operations. Licenses to operate in the 1695-
1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands are subject to the condition that the 
licensee must not cause harmful interference to an incumbent Federal

[[Page 47110]]

entity relocating from these bands under an approved Transition Plan. 
This condition remains in effect until NTIA terminates the applicable 
authorization of the incumbent Federal entity. In addition, AWS-3 
licensees in the 1755-1780 MHz band must agree to accept interference 
from incumbent Federal users while they remain authorized to operate in 
the band. The 2155-2180 MHz band is already allocated for exclusive 
non-Federal, commercial use. Although there are no Federal users 
currently licensed or operating in this band, there are non-Federal 
incumbent Fixed Microwave and Broadband Radio Service licensees in the 
band. AWS-3 licensees will have to protect or relocate and/or share in 
the cost of relocating such incumbent licensees.
    36. AWS-3 licensees in the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands 
are required to successfully coordinate with Federal incumbent users in 
these bands prior to operating in designated protection zones. The AWS-
3 Report and Order established that 1695-1710 MHz licensees operating 
at certain power levels would be required to coordinate with Federal 
incumbents in those protection zones, and higher-powered operations 
would generally require nationwide coordination. Similarly, operations 
in the 1755-1780 MHz band are subject to successful coordination with 
Federal incumbents in the protection zones adopted for that band, with 
the default coordination zone being nationwide. Prior to commencing 
operations in the 1755-1780 MHz band, an AWS-3 licensee must reach a 
coordination arrangement on an operator-to-operator basis with each 
Federal agency that has an assignment with United States and 
Possessions (USP) authority. The FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures 
Public Notice contains various refinements to the previously-defined 
protection zones for each of these bands. That Public Notice also 
provides information and guidance on the overall coordination process 
for these bands, as contemplated by the AWS-3 Report and Order, 
including informal pre-coordination discussion and the formal process 
of submitting coordination requests to, and receiving responses to 
coordination requests from, relevant Federal agencies. The Bureau 
encourages each potential applicant to carefully review these 
coordination requirements and the policies and procedures adopted by 
the Commission to implement them, and to consider the impact of those 
requirements and policies on its business plans.
4. Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act/Spectrum Act Requirements
    37. The spectrum in the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands is 
covered by a Congressional mandate that requires that auction proceeds 
fund the estimated relocation or sharing costs of incumbent Federal 
entities. In 2004, the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act (CSEA) 
established a Spectrum Relocation Fund (SRF) to reimburse eligible 
Federal agencies operating on certain frequencies that have been 
reallocated from Federal to non-Federal use for the cost of relocating 
their operations. The SRF is funded with cash proceeds attributable to 
``eligible frequencies'' in an auction of licenses involving such 
frequencies. The Spectrum Act amendments to the CSEA require Federal 
agencies authorized to use eligible frequencies to submit a transition 
plan no later than 240 days before an auction for such frequencies is 
scheduled to begin. The CSEA requires the NTIA to notify the Commission 
at least six months in advance of a scheduled auction of eligible 
frequencies of eligible Federal entities' estimated relocation or 
sharing costs and the timelines for such relocation or sharing. The 
NTIA must make the transition plans available on its Web site (with the 
exception of any classified information contained therein) no later 
than 120 days before the auction's scheduled start date.
    38. On May 13, 2014, pursuant to the CSEA, the NTIA notified the 
Commission of the estimated relocation or sharing costs and relocation 
timelines for eligible Federal entities assigned to frequencies in the 
1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands. The NTIA reported that the total 
estimated relocation or sharing costs for the 1695-1710 MHz band equal 
$527,069,000, and that the total estimated relocation or sharing costs 
for the 1755-1780 MHz band equal $4,575,603,000.
    39. In addition to requiring that specified auction proceeds be 
deposited in the SRF, the CSEA, as amended by the Spectrum Act, 
requires that the total cash proceeds from any auction of eligible 
frequencies must equal at least 110 percent of the estimated relocation 
or sharing costs provided to the Commission by NTIA, and prohibits the 
Commission from concluding any auction of eligible frequencies that 
falls short of this revenue requirement. In the CSEA/Part 1 Declaratory 
Ruling, the Commission determined, among other things, that total cash 
proceeds for purposes of meeting the CSEA's revenue requirement means 
winning bids net of any applicable bidding credit discounts at the end 
of bidding. Thus, whether CSEA's revenue requirements regarding 
eligible frequencies have been met at the end of an auction involving 
such frequencies depends upon whether winning bids that are 
attributable to such spectrum, net of any applicable bidding credit 
discounts, equal at least 110 percent of estimated relocation costs. In 
the CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, the Commission, among other things, 
modified its reserve price rule pursuant to the CSEA to ensure that the 
CSEA's revenue requirement would be met.
5. International Coordination
    40. Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas 
adjacent to the Canadian and Mexican border should be aware that the 
use of some or all of the AWS-3 frequencies they acquire in the auction 
are subject to international agreements with Canada and Mexico. As the 
Commission noted in the AWS-3 Report and Order, the Commission 
routinely works with the United States Department of State and Canadian 
and Mexican government officials to ensure the efficient use of the 
spectrum as well as interference-free operations in the border areas 
near Canada and Mexico. Until such time as any adjusted agreements, as 
needed, between the United States, Mexico and/or Canada can be agreed 
to, operations in the AWS-3 frequency bands must not cause harmful 
interference across the border, consistent with the terms of the 
agreements currently in force.
6. Quiet Zones
    41. AWS-3 licensees must individually apply for and receive a 
separate license for each transmitter if the proposed operation would 
affect the radio quiet zones set forth in the Commission's rules.
7. Spectrum Screen for Competitive Review of Secondary Market 
Transactions
    42. In its recent Mobile Spectrum Holdings Report and Order, the 
Commission concluded that, instead of administering its case-by-case 
review of auction winners' mobile spectrum holdings at the long-form 
application stage, it would determine prior to an auction whether an ex 
ante application of a band-specific mobile spectrum holding limit is 
necessary for the initial licensing of a band through competitive 
bidding. For the initial licensing of the AWS-3 band through 
competitive bidding, the Commission found that, on balance, it is not 
in the public interest to adopt a band-specific mobile spectrum 
holdings limit.

[[Page 47111]]

    43. The Commission's spectrum screen is a tool used to help achieve 
the Commission's policy of facilitating access to spectrum in a manner 
that promotes competition. In its competitive review of secondary 
market transactions, the Commission applies an initial screen to help 
identify for case-by-case review local markets where changes in 
spectrum holdings resulting from the proposed transaction may be of 
particular concern. The Commission observed in the Mobile Spectrum 
Holdings Report and Order that, notwithstanding whether a band-specific 
mobile spectrum holding limit is applied to the initial licensing of a 
band through competitive bidding, the band would be included in the 
Commission's application of its spectrum screen for competitive review 
of subsequent secondary market transactions if the band is deemed 
suitable and available for the provision of mobile telephony/mobile 
broadband services. Further, in the Mobile Spectrum Holdings Report and 
Order, the Commission updated its spectrum screen to reflect the 
current suitability and availability of spectrum for the provision of 
mobile telephony/broadband services. In particular, in its 
consideration of AWS-3 spectrum, the Commission added the 65 megahertz 
of AWS-3 spectrum being offered in Auction 97 to the spectrum screen on 
a market-by-market basis as it becomes available. Thus, the spectrum in 
these bands will be counted in the spectrum screen in a particular 
market once all relocating Federal incumbent systems in that market are 
within three years of completing relocation according to the Federal 
agency Transition Plans. Spectrum in the 2155-2180 MHz band will be 
counted in the spectrum screen for a particular market at the same time 
the Commission counts the paired 1755-1780 MHz band in that market in 
the screen. The Bureau encourages each potential Auction 97 applicant 
to carefully review the Mobile Spectrum Holdings Report and Order to 
understand how these policies might apply to its particular situation.
8. Due Diligence
    44. The Bureau reminds each potential bidder that it is solely 
responsible for investigating and evaluating all technical and 
marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the 
licenses that it is seeking in this auction. Each bidder is responsible 
for assuring that, if it wins a license, it will be able to build and 
operate facilities in accordance with the Commission's rules. The 
Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of this 
spectrum for particular services. Applicants should be aware that a 
Commission auction represents an opportunity to become a Commission 
licensee, subject to certain conditions and regulations, and that the 
Commission's statutory authority, under the Communications Act, to add, 
modify and eliminate rules governing spectrum use, as the public 
interest warrants, applies equally to all licenses, whether acquired 
through the competitive bidding process or otherwise. In addition, a 
Commission auction does not constitute an endorsement by the Commission 
of any particular service, technology, or product, nor does a 
Commission license constitute a guarantee of business success.
    45. An applicant should perform its due diligence research and 
analysis before proceeding, as it would with any new business venture. 
In particular, the Bureau strongly encourages each potential bidder to 
review all Commission orders and public notices establishing rules and 
policies for the AWS-3 bands, including incumbency issues for AWS-3 
licensees, Federal and non-Federal relocation and sharing and cost 
sharing obligations, and protection of Federal and non-Federal 
incumbent operations. Additionally, each potential bidder should 
perform technical analyses or refresh their previous analyses to assure 
itself that, should it become a winning bidder for any Auction 97 
license, it will be able to build and operate facilities that will 
fully comply with all applicable technical and regulatory requirements. 
The Bureau strongly encourages each applicant to inspect any 
prospective transmitter sites located in, or near, the service area for 
which it plans to bid, confirm the availability of such sites, and to 
familiarize itself with the Commission's rules regarding the National 
Environmental Policy Act.
    46. The Bureau strongly encourages each applicant to conduct its 
own research prior to Auction 97 in order to determine the existence of 
pending administrative or judicial proceedings, including pending 
allocation rulemaking proceedings, that might affect its decision to 
participate in the auction. The Bureau strongly encourages each 
participant in Auction 97 to continue such research throughout the 
auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice do not comprise an exhaustive list of steps 
that should be undertaken prior to participating in this auction. As 
always, the burden is on the potential bidder to determine how much 
research to undertake, depending upon specific facts and circumstances 
related to its interests.
    47. The Bureau also reminds each applicant that pending and future 
judicial proceedings, as well as pending and future proceedings before 
the Commission--including applications, applications for modification, 
rulemaking proceedings, requests for special temporary authority, 
waiver requests, petitions to deny, petitions for reconsideration, 
informal objections, and applications for review--may relate to 
particular applicants or the licenses available in Auction 97 (or the 
terms and conditions thereof, including all applicable Commission rules 
and regulations). Each prospective applicant is responsible for 
assessing the likelihood of the various possible outcomes and for 
considering the potential impact on licenses available in this auction.
    48. The Bureau calls special attention in this auction to the 
requirements presented by the temporary and indefinite sharing of 
portions of the AWS-3 bands by incumbent Federal users and AWS-3 
licensees, which may vary by geography and frequency. The FCC/NTIA 
Coordination Procedures Public Notice contains additional information 
regarding the extent of sharing in the AWS-3 bands, refinements to the 
protection zones adopted in the AWS-3 Report and Order, and information 
and guidance on the overall coordination process between commercial and 
Federal users. Additionally, the CSEA, as amended by the Spectrum Act, 
stipulates that Federal agencies will receive reimbursement for their 
costs in relocating their operations from, or sharing, the ``eligible 
frequencies'' offered in this auction based on their approved 
transition plans, which the NTIA will make available to the public. The 
Bureau expects that the information in both the FCC/NTIA Coordination 
Procedures Public Notice and the federal agency transition plans will 
be material to an applicant's potential participation in Auction 97. 
Therefore, the Bureau strongly encourages each applicant to closely 
review these materials, as well as future releases from the Commission 
and the NTIA concerning these issues, and to carefully consider the 
technical and economic implications for commercial use of the AWS-3 
bands.
    49. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated 
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such 
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make 
use of the licenses available in

[[Page 47112]]

Auction 97. Each potential bidder is responsible for undertaking 
research to ensure that any licenses won in this auction will be 
suitable for its business plans and needs. Each potential bidder must 
undertake its own assessment of the relevance and importance of 
information gathered as part of its due diligence efforts.
9. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System
    50. Bidders will be able to participate in Auction 97 over the 
Internet using the Commission's Web-based Integrated Spectrum Auction 
System (ISAS or FCC Auction System). The Commission makes no warranty 
whatsoever with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall 
the Commission, or any of its officers, employees, or agents, be liable 
for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of 
business profits, business interruption, loss of business information, 
or any other loss) arising out of or relating to the existence, 
furnishing, functioning, or use of the FCC Auction System that is 
accessible to qualified bidders in connection with this auction. 
Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of the Commission's 
technical, programming, or other advice or service provided in 
connection with the FCC Auction System.
10. Environmental Review Requirements
    51. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding 
implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and other 
federal environmental statutes. The construction of a wireless antenna 
facility is a federal action, and the licensee must comply with the 
Commission's environmental rules for each such facility. These 
environmental rules require, among other things, that the licensee 
consult with expert agencies having environmental responsibilities, 
including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the State Historic 
Preservation Office, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (through the local authority with 
jurisdiction over floodplains). In assessing the effect of facility 
construction on historic properties, the licensee must follow the 
provisions of the FCC's Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the 
Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process. The 
licensee must prepare an environmental assessment for any facility that 
may have a significant impact in or on wilderness areas, wildlife 
preserves, threatened or endangered species, designated critical 
habitats, historical or archaeological sites, Native American religious 
sites, floodplains, surface features, or migratory birds. In addition, 
the licensee must prepare an environmental assessment for any facility 
that includes high intensity white lights in residential neighborhoods 
or excessive radio frequency emission.

D. Auction Specifics

1. Bidding Methodology
    52. The bidding methodology for Auction 97 will be a simultaneous 
multiple round format. The Commission will conduct this auction over 
the Internet using the FCC Auction System. Qualified bidders are 
permitted to bid electronically via the Internet or by telephone using 
the telephonic bidding option. All telephone calls are recorded.
2. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
    53. The following dates and deadlines, as announced in the Auction 
97 Procedures Public Notice apply: (1) Auction tutorial available (via 
Internet) by August 28, 2014; (2) short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) 
Filing Window Opens on August 28, 2014; 12:00 noon ET; (3) short-Form 
Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline closes on September 
12, 2014; 6:00 p.m. ET; (4) upfront Payments (via wire transfer) due by 
October 15, 2014; 6:00 p.m. ET; (5) Mock Auction begins on November 10, 
2014; and (6) Auction 97 begins on November 13, 2014.
    54. In order to provide sufficient time for Commission staff to 
complete review of short-form applications and for Auction 97 
applicants to work with staff to address any deficiencies with their 
applications, the Bureau is unable to grant in full the joint request 
of CCA, CTIA, and NTCA to set a short-form deadline of September 24, 
2014. Those parties assert setting the deadline near the end of that 
month would facilitate the association members' ability to participate 
in business negotiations and panel discussions, including panels on the 
AWS-3 auction, at industry conferences scheduled during September 2014 
without risk of running afoul of 47 CFR 1.2105(c)'s prohibited 
communications period. The Bureau understands that two of three of 
those events will have concluded by September 12, 2014, which is the 
alternative date they request.
3. Requirements for Participation
    55. Those wishing to participate in this auction must: (1) Submit a 
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m. 
ET, on September 12, 2014, following the electronic filing procedures 
set forth in Attachment D to the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice; 
(2) submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice 
Form (FCC Form 159) by 6:00 p.m. ET, on October 15, 2014, following the 
procedures and instructions set forth in Attachment E; and (3) comply 
with all provisions outlined in the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice 
and applicable Commission rules.

II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Requirements

A. General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications

    56. An application to participate in an FCC auction, referred to as 
a short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information used to 
determine whether the applicant is legally, technically, and 
financially qualified to participate in Commission auctions for 
licenses or permits. The short-form application is the first part of 
the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In the first 
phase, parties desiring to participate in the auction must file a 
streamlined, short-form application in which they certify under penalty 
of perjury as to their qualifications. Eligibility to participate in 
bidding is based on the applicant's short-form application and 
certifications and on its upfront payment. In the second phase, each 
winning bidder must file a more comprehensive long-form application 
(FCC Form 601) and have a complete and accurate ownership disclosure 
information report (FCC Form 602) on file with the Commission.
    57. Every entity and individual seeking a license available in 
Auction 97 must file a short-form application electronically via the 
FCC Auction System prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on September 12, 2014, 
following the procedures prescribed in Attachment D to the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice. If an applicant claims eligibility for a 
bidding credit, the information provided in its FCC Form 175 will be 
used to determine whether the applicant is eligible for the claimed 
bidding credit. Applicants filing a short-form application are subject 
to the Commission's anti-collusion rules beginning at the deadline for 
filing.
    58. Applicants bear full responsibility for submitting accurate, 
complete and timely short-form applications. All applicants must 
certify on their short-form applications under penalty of perjury that 
they are legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified to

[[Page 47113]]

hold a license. Each applicant should read carefully the instructions 
set forth in Attachment D to the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice 
and should consult the Commission's rules to ensure that, in addition 
to the materials, all the information required is included within its 
short-form application.
    59. An individual or entity may not submit more than one short-form 
application for a single auction. If a party submits multiple short-
form applications for any license(s) in the same or overlapping 
geographic area(s), only one of its applications can be found to be 
complete when reviewed for completeness and compliance with the 
Commission's rules.
    60. Applicants should note that submission of a short-form 
application (and any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation 
by the person certifying the application that he or she is an 
authorized representative of the applicant with authority to bind the 
applicant, that he or she has read the form's instructions and 
certifications, and that the contents of the application, its 
certifications, and any attachments are true and correct. Applicants 
are not permitted to make major modifications to their applications; 
such impermissible changes include a change of the certifying official 
to the application. Submission of a false certification to the 
Commission may result in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, 
license forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, 
and/or criminal prosecution.

B. License Selection

    61. An applicant must select the licenses on which it wants to bid 
from the ``Eligible Licenses'' list on its short-form application. 
Applicants must review and verify their license selections before the 
deadline for submitting short-form applications. License selections 
cannot be changed after the short-form application filing deadline. The 
FCC Auction System will not accept bids on licenses that were not 
selected on the applicant's short-form application.

C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements

    62. An applicant will be required to identify in its short-form 
application all real parties in interest with whom it has entered into 
any agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to 
the licenses being auctioned, including any agreements relating to 
post-auction market structure.
    63. Each applicant will also be required to certify under penalty 
of perjury in its short-form application that it has not entered and 
will not enter into any explicit or implicit agreements, arrangements 
or understandings of any kind with any parties, other than those 
identified in the application, regarding the amount of its bids, 
bidding strategies, or the particular licenses on which it will or will 
not bid. If an applicant has had discussions, but has not reached an 
agreement by the short-form application filing deadline, it should not 
include the names of parties to the discussions on its application and 
may not continue such discussions with any applicants after the 
deadline.
    64. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's 
rules do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable 
interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or 
entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants, 
provided that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it 
has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or 
bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds 
an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a joint 
bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do not result in a 
change in control of any of the applicants. While 47 CFR 1.2105(c) does 
not prohibit non-auction-related business negotiations among auction 
applicants, the Bureau reminds applicants that certain discussions or 
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they 
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Further, 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) will 
not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    65. Each applicant must comply with the uniform Part 1 ownership 
disclosure standards and provide information required by 47 CFR 1.2105 
and 1.2112. Specifically, in completing the short-form application, an 
applicant will be required to fully disclose information on the real 
party- or parties-in-interest and the ownership structure of the 
applicant, including both direct and indirect ownership interests of 10 
percent or more, as prescribed in 47 CFR 1.2105 and 1.2112. Each 
applicant is responsible for ensuring that information submitted in its 
short-form application is complete and accurate.
    66. In certain circumstances, an applicant's most current ownership 
information on file with the Commission, if in an electronic format 
compatible with the short-form application (FCC Form 175) (such as 
information submitted in an FCC Form 602 or in an FCC Form 175 filed 
for a previous auction using ISAS) will automatically be entered into 
the applicant's short-form application. Each applicant must carefully 
review any information automatically entered to confirm that it is 
complete and accurate as of the deadline for filing the short-form 
application. Any information that needs to be corrected or updated must 
be changed directly in the short-form application.

E. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    67. Section 310 of the Communications Act requires the Commission 
to review foreign investment in radio station licenses and imposes 
specific restrictions on who may hold certain types of radio licenses. 
The provisions of section 310 apply to applications for initial radio 
licenses, applications for assignments and transfers of control of 
radio licenses, and spectrum leasing arrangements under the 
Commission's secondary market rules. In completing the short-form 
application (FCC Form 175), an applicant will be required to disclose 
information concerning any foreign ownership of the applicant. An 
applicant must certify in its short-form application that, as of the 
deadline for filing a short-form application to participate in Auction 
97, the applicant either is in compliance with the foreign ownership 
provisions of section 310 or has filed a petition for declaratory 
ruling requesting Commission approval to exceed the applicable foreign 
ownership limit or benchmark in section 310(b) that is pending before, 
or has been granted by, the Commission.

F. National Security Certification Requirement for Auction 97 
Applicants

    68. Section 6004 of the Spectrum Act prohibits a person who has 
been, for reasons of national security, barred by any agency of the 
Federal Government from bidding on a contract, participating in an 
auction, or receiving a grant from participating in any auction that is 
required or authorized to be conducted pursuant to the Spectrum Act. In 
2013, the Commission amended its rules to implement this mandate by 
adding a certification to the various other certifications that a party 
must make in any short-form application. Pursuant to this rule, any 
applicant seeking to participate in Auction 97 must certify in its 
short-form application, under penalty of perjury, that the applicant 
and all of the related individuals and entities required to be 
disclosed on its application are not person(s) who have

[[Page 47114]]

been, for reasons of national security, barred by any agency of the 
Federal Government from bidding on a contract, participating in an 
auction, or receiving a grant, and who are thus statutorily prohibited 
from participating in such a Commission auction. As with other required 
certifications, an auction applicant's failure to include the required 
certification in its short-form application by the applicable filing 
deadline would render its application unacceptable for filing, and its 
application would be dismissed with prejudice.

G. Acknowledgement Statement for Auction 97 Applicants

    69. The Bureau adopts its proposal to require each applicant 
selecting any license in the 1755-1780 MHz band to submit with its 
short-form application a signed statement acknowledging that the 
applicant's operations the 1755-1780 MHz band may be subject to 
interference from Federal systems, that the applicant must accept 
interference from incumbent Federal operations, and that the applicant 
has considered these risks before submitting any bids for applicable 
licenses in Auction 97. The specific text that must be included in the 
required acknowledgement statement is contained in Attachment G to the 
Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice. The acknowledgement statement must 
be signed by the same individual that signs the application on behalf 
of the applicant. Guidance on submitting the acknowledgement statement 
can be found in Attachment D to the Auction 97 Procedures Public 
Notice.
    70. Incumbent Federal users are currently operating in the 1695-
1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands. In the AWS-3 Report and Order, the 
Commission adopted rules to address commercial operations in these 
bands in light of the temporary and indefinite sharing of the bands by 
Federal incumbent users and commercial licensees, including a 
requirement that commercial licensees operate on a co-equal, primary 
operations with Federal systems, and a requirement that licensees in 
the 1755-1780 MHz band accept interference from Federal systems as long 
as such systems remain in the band.
    71. The Bureau disagrees with the recommendation of Spectrum 
Financial Partners that it should not require an acknowledgement on the 
grounds that this would be an unnecessary paperwork burden and 
applicant's acceptance of such interference obligations is already 
adequately covered by the due diligence instructions that apply to all 
auctions. As both T-Mobile and AT&T recognize, it may be useful for 
each bidder for these frequencies to sign a statement acknowledging 
that it has given consideration to potential interference issues for 
this band. AT&T and T-Mobile request that the required statement be 
narrowly drafted, and seek assurances that the acknowledgement does not 
give rise to any new obligations for the 1755-1780 MHz band beyond 
those set out in the Commission's rules. They also encourage the 
Commission to promote disclosure by federal agencies of as much 
information as possible about the potential interference environment. 
The Bureau notes that the text of the acknowledgement statement is 
narrowly tailored and expressly states that it does not supersede the 
licensee's rights and obligations specified by law, rule, or other 
Commission action.

H. Designated Entity Provisions

    72. Eligible applicants in Auction 97 may claim small business 
bidding credits and applicants should review carefully the Commission's 
decisions regarding the designated entity provisions.
1. Bidding Credits for Small Businesses
    73. A bidding credit represents an amount by which a bidder's 
winning bid will be discounted. For Auction 97, bidding credits will be 
available to small businesses and consortia thereof.
a. Bidding Credit Eligibility Criteria
    74. In the AWS-3 Report and Order, the Commission adopted small 
business bidding credits to promote and facilitate the participation of 
small businesses in competitive bidding for licenses in the AWS-3 
bands.
    75. The level of bidding credit is determined as follows: (1) a 
bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed 
$40 million for the preceding three years will receive a 15 percent 
discount on its winning bid; and (2) a bidder with attributed average 
annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million for the preceding 
three years will receive a 25 percent discount on its winning bid.
    76. Bidding credits are not cumulative; qualifying applicants 
receive either the 15 percent or the 25 percent bidding credit on its 
winning bid, but not both. Applicants should note that unjust 
enrichment provisions apply to a winning bidder that utilizes a bidding 
credit and subsequently seeks to assign or transfer control of its 
license to an entity not qualifying for the same level of bidding 
credit.
b. Revenue Disclosure on Short-Form Application
    77. An entity applying as a small business must provide gross 
revenues for the preceding three years of each of the following: (1) 
The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its controlling interests, (4) 
the affiliates of its controlling interests, and (5) the entities with 
which it has an attributable material relationship. Certification that 
the average annual gross revenues of such entities and individuals for 
the preceding three years do not exceed the applicable limit is not 
sufficient. Additionally, if an applicant is applying as a consortium 
of small businesses, this information must be provided for each 
consortium member.
2. Attributable Interests
a. Controlling Interests
    78. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and 
entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant. 
Typically, ownership of greater than 50 percent of an entity's voting 
stock evidences de jure control. De facto control is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The following are some common indicia of de facto 
control: (1) The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of 
the board of directors or management committee; (2) the entity has 
authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that 
control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and (3) the entity 
plays an integral role in management decisions.
    79. Applicants should refer to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2) and Attachment D 
to the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice to understand how certain 
interests are calculated in determining control. For example, pursuant 
to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F), officers and directors of an applicant 
are considered to have controlling interest in the applicant.
b. Affiliates
    80. Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an 
individual or entity that (1) directly or indirectly controls or has 
the power to control the applicant, (2) is directly or indirectly 
controlled by the applicant, (3) is directly or indirectly controlled 
by a third party that also controls or has the power to control the 
applicant, or (4) has an ``identity of interest'' with the applicant. 
The Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant 
encompasses both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates 
of controlling interests of the applicant. For more information 
regarding affiliates, applicants should refer to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5) 
and Attachment D to

[[Page 47115]]

the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice.
c. Material Relationships
    81. The Commission requires the consideration of certain leasing 
and resale (including wholesale) relationships--referred to as 
``attributable material relationships''--in determining designated 
entity eligibility for bidding credits. An applicant or licensee has an 
``attributable material relationship'' when it has one or more 
agreements with any individual entity for the lease or resale 
(including under a wholesale agreement) of, on a cumulative basis, more 
than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity of any individual license held 
by the applicant or licensee. The attributable material relationship 
will cause the gross revenues of that entity and its attributable 
interest holders to be attributed to the applicant or licensee for the 
purposes of determining the applicant's or licensee's (i) eligibility 
for designated entity benefits and (ii) liability for ``unjust 
enrichment'' on a license-by-license basis.
    82. The Commission grandfathered material relationships in 
existence before the release of the Designated Entity Second Report and 
Order, meaning that those preexisting relationships alone would not 
cause the Commission to examine a designated entity's ongoing 
eligibility for existing benefits or its liability for unjust 
enrichment. The Commission did not, however, grandfather preexisting 
material relationships for determinations of an applicant's or 
licensee's designated entity eligibility for future auctions or in the 
context of future assignments, transfers of control, spectrum leases, 
or other reportable eligibility events. Rather, in such circumstances, 
the Commission reexamines the applicant's or licensee's designated 
entity eligibility, taking into account all existing material 
relationships, including those previously grandfathered. The Commission 
has recently waived the bright-line application of 47 CFR 
1.2110(b)(3)(iv)'s attributable material relationship rule that would 
otherwise trigger the automatic attribution of the lessee's gross 
revenues to a designated entity (DE) applicant, where its leased 
licenses were not subject to DE benefits and, at the time the leases 
became effective, the DE applicant held no other licenses subject to DE 
benefits. To the extent that the requesting entity and any other 
similarly situated parties certify that they are qualified to claim DE 
benefits in any upcoming auction and become winning bidders, they will 
be required to demonstrate at the long-form application stage that the 
specific facts and circumstances of their spectrum lease agreements do 
not require attribution of the lessees' gross revenues in their 
respective cases.
d. Gross Revenue Exceptions
    83. The Commission has also made other modifications to its rules 
governing the attribution of gross revenues for purposes of determining 
designated entity eligibility. For example, the Commission has 
clarified that, in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the 
controlling interest standard, it will not attribute to the applicant 
the personal net worth, including personal income, of its officers and 
directors.
    84. The Commission has also exempted from attribution to the 
applicant the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone 
cooperative's officers and directors, if certain conditions specified 
in 47 CFR 1.2110(b)(3)(iii) are met. An applicant claiming this 
exemption must provide, in an attachment, an affirmative statement that 
the applicant, affiliate and/or controlling interest is an eligible 
rural telephone cooperative within the meaning of 47 CFR 
1.2110(b)(3)(iii), and the applicant must supply any additional 
information as may be required to demonstrate eligibility for the 
exemption from the attribution rule. Applicants seeking to claim this 
exemption must meet all of the conditions. Additional guidance on 
claiming this exemption may be found in Attachment D to the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice.
e. Bidding Consortia
    85. A consortium of small businesses is a conglomerate organization 
composed of two or more entities, each of which individually satisfies 
the definition of a small business. Thus, each member of a consortium 
of small businesses that applies to participate in Auction 97 must 
individually meet the criteria for small businesses. Each consortium 
member must disclose its gross revenues along with those of its 
affiliates, its controlling interests, the affiliates of its 
controlling interests, and any entities having an attributable material 
relationship with the member. Although the gross revenues of the 
consortium members will not be aggregated for purposes of determining 
the consortium's eligibility as a small business, this information must 
be provided to ensure that each individual consortium member qualifies 
for any bidding credit awarded to the consortium.

I. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

    86. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally 
recognized tribal lands, the Commission has implemented a tribal lands 
bidding credit. Applicants do not provide information regarding tribal 
lands bidding credits on their short-form applications. Instead, 
winning bidders may apply for the tribal lands bidding credit after the 
auction when they file their more detailed, long-form applications.

J. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

    87. Current defaulters or delinquents are not eligible to 
participate in Auction 97, but former defaulters or delinquents can 
participate so long as they are otherwise qualified and make upfront 
payments that are fifty percent more than would otherwise be necessary. 
An applicant is considered a ``current defaulter'' or a ``current 
delinquent'' when it, any of its affiliates, any of its controlling 
interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling interests, is in 
default on any payment for any Commission construction permit or 
license (including a down payment) or is delinquent on any non-tax debt 
owed to any Federal agency as of the filing deadline for short-form 
applications. An applicant is considered a ``former defaulter'' or a 
``former delinquent'' when it, any of its affiliates, any of its 
controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling 
interests, have defaulted on any Commission construction permit or 
license or been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal 
agency, but have since remedied all such defaults and cured all of the 
outstanding non-tax delinquencies.
    88. Four trade associations have jointly requested that the 
Commission grant a limited, temporary waiver of the Commission's 
``former defaulter'' rule, 47 CFR 1.2106(a), as to two categories of 
debt for Auction 97 applicants. The Bureau concludes that any requests 
for temporary, limited relief from the ``former defaulter'' rule are 
beyond the scope of the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice, which is 
limited to establishing procedures for the upcoming auction of AWS-3 
licenses. The Bureau notes, however, that such requests are being 
addressed separately.
    89. On the short-form application, an applicant must certify under 
penalty of perjury that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, 
and the affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by 47 CFR 
1.2110, are not in default on any payment for a Commission construction

[[Page 47116]]

permit or license (including down payments) and that it is not 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Each 
applicant must also state under penalty of perjury whether it, its 
affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its 
controlling interests, have ever been in default on any Commission 
construction permit or license or have ever been delinquent on any non-
tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Prospective applicants are 
reminded that submission of a false certification to the Commission is 
a serious matter that may result in severe penalties, including 
monetary forfeitures, license revocations, exclusion from participation 
in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.
    90. Applicants are encouraged to review the Bureau's previous 
guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the 
context of the short-form application process. For example, it has been 
determined that, to the extent that Commission rules permit late 
payment of regulatory or application fees accompanied by late fees, 
such debts will become delinquent for purposes of 47 CFR 1.2105(a) and 
1.2106(a) only after the expiration of a final payment deadline. 
Therefore, with respect to regulatory or application fees, the 
provisions of 47 CFR 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding default and 
delinquency in connection with competitive bidding are limited to 
circumstances in which the relevant party has not complied with a final 
Commission payment deadline. Parties are also encouraged to consult 
with the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau's Auctions and Spectrum 
Access Division staff if they have any questions about default and 
delinquency disclosure requirements.
    91. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United 
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The 
Commission adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the 
``red light rule,'' that implement its obligations under the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of 
debts owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, applications 
and other requests for benefits filed by parties that have outstanding 
debts owed to the Commission will not be processed. In the same 
rulemaking order, the Commission explicitly declared, however, that its 
competitive bidding rules ``are not affected'' by the red light rule. 
As a consequence, the Commission's adoption of the red light rule does 
not alter the applicability of any of its competitive bidding rules, 
including the provisions and certifications of 47 CFR 1.2105 and 
1.2106, with regard to current and former defaults or delinquencies.
    92. Applicants are reminded, however, that the Commission's Red 
Light Display System, which provides information regarding debts 
currently owed to the Commission, may not be determinative of an 
auction applicant's ability to comply with the default and delinquency 
disclosure requirements of 47 CFR 1.2105. Thus, while the red light 
rule ultimately may prevent the processing of long-form applications by 
auction winners, an auction applicant's lack of current ``red light'' 
status is not necessarily determinative of its eligibility to 
participate in an auction or of its upfront payment obligation.
    93. Moreover, prospective applicants in Auction 97 should note that 
any long-form applications filed after the close of bidding will be 
reviewed for compliance with the Commission's red light rule, and such 
review may result in the dismissal of a winning bidder's long-form 
application.

K. Optional Applicant Status Identification

    94. Applicants owned by members of minority groups and/or women, as 
defined in 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(3), and rural telephone companies, as 
defined in 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(4), may identify themselves regarding this 
status in filling out their short-form applications. This applicant 
status information is collected for statistical purposes only and 
assists the Commission in monitoring the participation of ``designated 
entities'' in its auctions.

L. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications

    95. After the deadline for filing initial applications, an Auction 
97 applicant is permitted to make only minor changes to its 
application. Permissible minor changes include, among other things, 
deletion and addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three) and 
revision of addresses and telephone numbers of the applicants and their 
contact persons. An applicant is not permitted to make a major 
modification to its application (e.g., change of license selection, 
change control of the applicant, change the certifying official, or 
claim eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding credit) after the 
initial application filing deadline. Thus, any change in control of an 
applicant--resulting from a merger, for example--will be considered a 
major modification, and the application will consequently be dismissed.
    96. If an applicant wishes to make permissible minor changes to its 
short-form application, such changes should be made electronically to 
its short-form application using the FCC Auction System whenever 
possible. For the change to be submitted and considered by the 
Commission, be sure to click on the SUBMIT button. After the revised 
application has been submitted, a confirmation page will be displayed 
stating the submission time, submission date, and a unique file number.
    97. An applicant cannot use the FCC Auction System outside of the 
initial and resubmission filing windows to make changes to its short-
form application for other than administrative changes (e.g., changing 
certain contact information or the name of an authorized bidder). If 
these or other permissible minor changes need to be made outside of 
these windows, the applicant must submit a letter briefly summarizing 
the changes and subsequently update its short-form application in the 
FCC Auction System once it is available. Moreover, after the filing 
window has closed, the system will not permit applicants to make 
certain changes, such as the applicant's legal classification and 
license selections.
    98. Any letter describing changes to an applicant's short-form 
application must be submitted by email to [email protected]. The email 
summarizing the changes must include a subject or caption referring to 
Auction 97 and the name of the applicant, for example, ``Re: Changes to 
Auction 97 Short-Form Application of ABC Corp.'' The Bureau requests 
that parties format any attachments to email as Adobe[supreg] 
Acrobat[supreg] (PDF) or Microsoft[supreg] Word documents. Questions 
about short-form application amendments should be directed to the 
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division at (202) 418-0660.
    99. As with the short-form application, any application amendment 
and related statements of fact must be certified by an authorized 
representative of the applicant with authority to bind the applicant. 
Applicants should note that submission of any such amendment or related 
statement of fact constitutes a representation by the person certifying 
that he or she is an authorized representative with such authority, and 
that the contents of the amendment or statement of fact are true and 
correct.
    100. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System, which was 
used for submitting comments regarding Auction 97. Further, parties 
submitting information related to their applications

[[Page 47117]]

should use caution to ensure that their submissions do not contain 
confidential information or communicate information that would violate 
47 CFR 1.2105(c) or the limited information procedures adopted for 
Auction 97. A party seeking to submit information that might reflect 
non-public information, such as an applicant's license selections, 
upfront payment amount, or bidding eligibility, should consider 
submitting any such information along with a request that the filing or 
portions of the filing be withheld from public inspection until the end 
of the prohibition of certain communications pursuant to 47 CFR 
1.2105(c).

M. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications

    101. 47 CFR 1.65 and 1.2105(b) requires an applicant to maintain 
the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its pending 
application and in competitive bidding proceedings to furnish 
additional or corrected information to the Commission within five days 
of a significant occurrence, or to amend a short form application no 
more than five days after the applicant becomes aware of the need for 
the amendment. Changes that cause a loss of or reduction in the 
percentage of bidding credit specified on the originally-submitted 
application must be reported immediately, and no later than five 
business days after the change occurs. If an amendment reporting 
changes is a ``major amendment,'' as defined by 47 CFR 1.2105, the 
major amendment will not be accepted and may result in the dismissal of 
the application. After the short-form filing deadline, applicants may 
make only minor changes to their applications. For changes to be 
submitted and considered by the Commission, be sure to click on the 
SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction System. In addition, an applicant 
cannot update its short-form application using the FCC Auction System 
after the initial and resubmission filing windows close. If information 
needs to be submitted pursuant to 47 CFR 1.65 after these windows 
close, a letter briefly summarizing the changes must be submitted by 
email to [email protected]. This email must include a subject or 
caption referring to Auction 97 and the name of the applicant. The 
Bureau requests that parties format any attachments to email as 
Adobe[supreg] Acrobat[supreg] (PDF) or Microsoft[supreg] Word 
documents. A party seeking to submit information that might reflect 
non-public information, such as an applicant's license selections, 
upfront payment amount, or bidding eligibility, should consider 
submitting any such information along with a request that the filing or 
portions of the filing be withheld from public inspection until the end 
of the prohibition of certain communications pursuant to 47 CFR 
1.2105(c).

III. Pre-Auction Procedures

A. Online Auction Tutorial--Available August 28, 2014

    102. No later than Thursday, August 28, 2014, an auction tutorial 
will be available on the Auction 97 Web page for prospective bidders to 
familiarize themselves with the auction process. This online tutorial 
will provide information about pre-auction procedures, completing 
short-form applications, auction conduct, the FCC Auction Bidding 
System, auction rules, and AWS-3 service rules. The tutorial will also 
provide an avenue to ask Commission staff questions about the auction, 
auction procedures, filing requirements, and other matters related to 
this auction.
    103. The Bureau believes parties interested in participating in 
this auction will find the interactive, online tutorial an efficient 
and effective way to further their understanding of the auction 
process. The tutorial will allow viewers to navigate the presentation 
outline, review written notes, listen to audio recordings of the notes, 
and search for topics using a text search function. Additional features 
of this web-based tool include links to auction-specific Commission 
releases, email links for contacting Commission licensing and auctions 
staff, a timeline with deadlines for auction preparation, and screen 
shots of the online application and bidding system. The tutorial will 
be accessible through a web browser with Adobe Flash Player.
    104. The auction tutorial will be accessible from the Commission's 
Auction 97 Web page at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/97/ through an 
``Auction Tutorial'' link. Once posted, this tutorial will remain 
available and accessible anytime for reference in connection with the 
procedures outlined in the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice.
    105. Spectrum Financial Partners asks that the Bureau clarify the 
online interactive auction tutorial to include a clear description of 
the various fields in the downloadable reports, which might not be 
familiar to those taking part in a Commission auction for the first 
time. Spectrum Financial Partners also urges the Bureau to do more to 
make the auction tutorial more broadly available, perhaps even by 
posting a video version of the interactive tutorial on YouTube. The 
Bureau finds the description of the various fields in the downloadable 
reports contained in its auction materials to be sufficiently clear, 
even for first-time bidders. The Bureau's ISAS Bidder's Guide''--which 
is sent by overnight delivery to all qualified bidders in advance of 
the mock auction and which is also available to the public in the FCC 
Auction System--provides additional information. The Bureau therefore 
declines to make the changes to the tutorial materials requested by 
Spectrum Financial Partners. In addition, because the Bureau's auction 
tutorial is publicly-available on the Auction 97 Web site and is 
accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, it is already widely 
accessible, and the Bureau is not persuaded that there is any need to 
create other formats of the tutorial.

B. Short-Form Applications--Due Prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on September 12, 
2014

    106. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants 
must first follow the procedures set forth in Attachments D and E to 
the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice to submit a short-form 
application (FCC Form 175) electronically via the FCC Auction System. 
This short-form application must be submitted prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on 
September 12, 2014. Late applications will not be accepted. No 
application fee is required, but an applicant must submit a timely 
upfront payment to be eligible to bid.
    107. Applications may generally be filed at any time beginning at 
noon ET on August 28, 2014, until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. 
ET on September 12, 2014. Applicants are strongly encouraged to file 
early and are responsible for allowing adequate time for filing their 
applications. There are no limits or restrictions on the number of 
times an application can be updated or amended until the filing 
deadline on September 12, 2014.
    108. An applicant must always click on the SUBMIT button on the 
``Certify & Submit'' screen to successfully submit its FCC Form 175 and 
any modifications; otherwise the application or changes to the 
application will not be received or reviewed by Commission staff. 
Additional information about accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC 
Form 175 is included in Attachment D to the Auction 97 Procedures 
Public Notice. FCC Auctions Technical Support is available at (877) 
480-3201, option nine; (202) 414-1250; or (202) 414-1255 (text 
telephone (TTY)); hours of service are Monday through Friday, from 8:00 
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. In order to provide better

[[Page 47118]]

service to the public, all calls to Technical Support are recorded.

C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections

    109. After the deadline for filing short-form applications, the 
Commission will process all timely submitted applications to determine 
which are complete, and subsequently will issue a public notice 
identifying (1) those that are complete, (2) those that are rejected, 
and (3) those that are incomplete or deficient because of minor defects 
that may be corrected. The public notice will include the deadline for 
resubmitting corrected applications.
    110. After the application filing deadline on September 12, 2014, 
applicants can make only minor corrections to their applications. They 
will not be permitted to make major modifications (e.g., change license 
selection, change control of the applicant, change the certifying 
official, or claim eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding 
credit).
    111. Commission staff will communicate only with an applicant's 
contact person or certifying official, as designated on the short-form 
application, unless the applicant's certifying official or contact 
person notifies the Commission in writing that applicant's counsel or 
other representative is authorized to speak on its behalf. 
Authorizations may be sent by email to [email protected].

D. Upfront Payments--Due October 15, 2014

    112. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, an upfront 
payment must be submitted and accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice 
Form (FCC Form 159). After completing its short-form application, an 
applicant will have access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 
that can be printed and sent by fax to U.S. Bank in St. Louis, 
Missouri. All upfront payments must be made as instructed in this 
Public Notice and must be received in the proper account at U.S. Bank 
before 6:00 p.m. ET on October 15, 2014.
1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer
    113. Wire transfer payments must be received before 6:00 p.m. ET on 
October 15, 2014. No other payment method is acceptable. To avoid 
untimely payments, applicants should discuss arrangements (including 
bank closing schedules) with their bankers several days before they 
plan to make the wire transfer, and allow sufficient time for the 
transfer to be initiated and completed before the deadline. The 
specific information needed to make upfront payments is outlined in the 
Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice.
    114. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire 
transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must fax a 
completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to U.S. Bank at (314) 418-4232. 
On the fax cover sheet, write ``Wire Transfer--Auction Payment for 
Auction 97.'' In order to meet the upfront payment deadline, an 
applicant's payment must be credited to the Commission's account for 
Auction 97 before the deadline.
    115. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring timely submission 
of its upfront payment and for timely filing of an accurate and 
complete FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159). An applicant should 
coordinate with its financial institution well ahead of the due date 
regarding its wire transfer and allow sufficient time for the transfer 
to be initiated and completed prior to the deadline. The Commission 
repeatedly has cautioned auction participants about the importance of 
planning ahead to prepare for unforeseen last-minute difficulties in 
making payments by wire transfer. Each applicant also is responsible 
for obtaining confirmation from its financial institution that its wire 
transfer to U.S. Bank was successful and from Commission staff that its 
upfront payment was timely received and that it was deposited into the 
proper account. To receive confirmation from Commission staff, contact 
Gail Glasser of the Office of Managing Director's Auctions Accounting 
Group at (202) 418-0578, or alternatively, Theresa Meeks at (202) 418-
2945.
    116. Please note the following information regarding upfront 
payments: (1) All payments must be made in U.S. dollars; (2) all 
payments must be made by wire transfer; (3) upfront payments for 
Auction 97 go to a lockbox number different from the lockboxes used in 
previous Commission auctions; and (4) failure to deliver a sufficient 
upfront payment as instructed by the October 15, 2014, deadline will 
result in dismissal of the short-form application and disqualification 
from participation in the auction.
2. FCC Form 159
    117. An accurate and complete FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 
159, Revised 2/03) must be faxed to U.S. Bank to accompany each upfront 
payment. Proper completion of this form is critical to ensuring correct 
crediting of upfront payments. Detailed instructions for completion of 
FCC Form 159 are included in Attachment E to the Auction 97 Procedures 
Public Notice. An electronic pre-filled version of the FCC Form 159 is 
available after submitting the FCC Form 175. Payers using the pre-
filled FCC Form 159 are responsible for ensuring that all of the 
information on the form, including payment amounts, is accurate. The 
FCC Form 159 can be completed electronically, but it must be filed with 
U.S. Bank by fax.
3. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    118. The Commission has delegated to the Bureau the authority and 
discretion to determine appropriate upfront payments for each auction. 
An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each bidder to 
establish its eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments help 
deter frivolous or insincere bidding, and provide the Commission with a 
source of funds in the event that the bidder incurs liability during 
the auction.
    119. Applicants that are former defaulters must make upfront 
payments that are fifty percent greater than non-former defaulters. For 
purposes of this calculation, the ``applicant'' includes the applicant 
itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and affiliates of 
its controlling interests, as defined by 47 CFR 1.2110.
    120. An applicant must make an upfront payment sufficient to obtain 
bidding eligibility for the licenses on which it will bid. The Bureau 
proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice that the amount of the 
upfront payment would determine a bidder's initial bidding eligibility, 
i.e., the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may place 
bids. Under the Bureau's proposal, in order to bid on a particular 
license, a qualified bidder must have selected the license on its FCC 
Form 175 and must have a current eligibility level that meets or 
exceeds the number of bidding units assigned to that license. At a 
minimum, therefore, an applicant's total upfront payment must be enough 
to establish eligibility to bid on at least one of the licenses 
selected on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 97, or else the applicant will 
not be eligible to participate in the auction. An applicant does not 
have to make an upfront payment to cover all licenses the applicant 
selected on its FCC Form 175, but only enough to cover the maximum 
number of bidding units that are associated with licenses on which it 
wishes to place bids and hold provisionally winning bids in any given 
round. The total upfront payment does

[[Page 47119]]

not affect the total dollar amount the bidder may bid on any given 
license.
    121. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to make the upfront payments equal to approximately one-half of the 
minimum opening bids. The Bureau further proposed that each license be 
assigned a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit 
per dollar of the upfront payment listed for the license. The number of 
bidding units for each license will remain constant throughout the 
auction. The Bureau did not receive any comments on its proposals for 
calculating upfront payments or assigning bidding units to each 
license, and thus adopts upfront payments that are approximately one-
half of the minimum opening bids. The Bureau notes that, because the 
minimum opening bids the Bureau adopts in the Auction 97 Procedures 
Public Notice differ from those proposed, the number of bidding units 
and the upfront payment amount associated with each license are 
different than those that were proposed in the Auction 97 Comment 
Public Notice. The complete list of licenses for Auction 97 and the 
specific number of bidding units and associated upfront payment for 
each license are set forth in Attachment A --to the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice.
    122. In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should 
determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to 
be active (bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any single 
round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that number of 
bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant should 
add together the bidding units for all licenses on which it seeks to be 
active in any given round. Each applicant should check its calculations 
carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a bidder's 
eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.
    123. If a bidder wishes to bid on License A (with 30,000 bidding 
units) and License B (with 28,000 bidding units) in a round, it must 
have selected both of these licenses on its FCC Form 175 and purchased 
at least 58,000 bidding units (30,000 + 28,000) of bidding eligibility. 
If a bidder only wishes to bid on one of these licenses, purchasing 
30,000 bidding units would allow the bidder to bid on either license, 
but not both at the same time. If the bidder purchased only 28,000 
bidding units, it would have enough eligibility to bid on License B but 
could not bid on License A.
    124. If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its 
upfront payment for all of its identified licenses by multiplying the 
number of bidding units on which it wishes to be active by 1.5. In 
order to calculate the number of bidding units to assign to former 
defaulters, the Commission will divide the upfront payment received by 
1.5 and round the result up to the nearest bidding unit.

E. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of 
Upfront Payments

    125. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed in an 
expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all pertinent 
information be supplied. Applicants can provide the information 
electronically during the initial short-form application filing window 
after the form has been submitted. (Applicants are reminded that 
information submitted as part of an FCC Form 175 will be available to 
the public. For that reason, wire transfer information should not be 
included in an FCC Form 175. Wire transfer instructions can also be 
faxed to the Commission using the instructions provided in the Auction 
97 Procedures Public Notice.

F. Auction Registration

    126. Approximately ten days before the auction, the Bureau will 
issue a public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction. 
Qualified bidders are those applicants with submitted short-form 
applications that are deemed timely-filed, accurate, and complete, 
provided that such applicants have timely submitted an upfront payment 
that is sufficient to qualify them to bid.
    127. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the 
auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the 
auction by overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact 
person at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will 
include the SecurID[supreg] tokens that will be required to place bids, 
the ``Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide,'' and 
the Auction Bidder Line phone number.
    128. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration 
mailing will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, if this mailing is 
not received by noon on Thursday, November 6, 2014, call the Auctions 
Hotline at (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration mailing is 
critical to participating in the auction, and each applicant is 
responsible for ensuring it has received all of the registration 
material.
    129. In the event that SecurID[supreg] tokens are lost or damaged, 
only a person who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the 
contact person, or the certifying official on the applicant's short-
form application may request replacements. To request replacement of 
these items, call Technical Support at (877) 480-3201, option nine; 
(202) 414-1250; or (202) 414-1255 (TTY).

G. Remote Electronic Bidding

    130. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, 
and telephonic bidding will be available as well. Only qualified 
bidders are permitted to bid. Each applicant should indicate its 
bidding preference--electronic or telephonic--on its FCC Form 175. In 
either case, each authorized bidder must have its own SecurID[supreg] 
token, which the Commission will provide at no charge. Each applicant 
with one authorized bidder will be issued two SecurID[supreg] tokens, 
while applicants with two or three authorized bidders will be issued 
three tokens. For security purposes, the SecurID[supreg] tokens, the 
telephonic bidding telephone number, and the ``Integrated Spectrum 
Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide'' are only mailed to the contact 
person at the contact address listed on the FCC Form 175. Each 
SecurID[supreg] token is tailored to a specific auction. 
SecurID[supreg] tokens issued for other auctions or obtained from a 
source other than the FCC will not work for Auction 97.
    131. Please note that the SecurID[supreg] tokens can be recycled, 
and the Bureau encourages bidders to return the tokens to the FCC. Pre-
addressed envelopes will be provided to return the tokens once bidding 
has closed.

H. Mock Auction--November 10, 2014

    132. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a 
mock auction on Monday, November 10, 2014. The mock auction will enable 
bidders to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to the 
auction. The Bureau strongly recommends that all bidders participate in 
the mock auction. Details will be announced by public notice.
    133. DISH requests that the Bureau conduct at least one, but 
preferably two, mock auctions at least one week before the auction 
begins, and that the mock auction(s) offer the same number of licenses 
as the auction itself to match the actual auction's scenarios as 
closely as possible. In keeping with the Bureau's practice in most 
auctions, it will hold a mock auction shortly before the start of 
Auction 97 that will offer a sampling of licenses available in the 
auction. Based on the Bureau's

[[Page 47120]]

experience, this approach provides adequate practice and avoids the 
need to lengthen the time period between the short-form application 
deadline and the start of bidding.

IV. Auction

    134. The first round of bidding for Auction 97 will begin on 
Thursday, November 13, 2014. The initial bidding schedule will be 
announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is 
released approximately 10 days before the start of the auction.

A. Auction Structure

1. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
    135. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to auction all licenses in Auction 97 in a single auction using a 
standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction format. This format 
offers every license for bid at the same time and consists of 
successive bidding rounds in which eligible bidders may place bids on 
individual licenses. A bidder may bid on, and potentially win, any 
number of licenses.
    136. With one exception, all commenters that discussed this issue 
support using a standard SMR auction format without any form of package 
bidding. AT&T notes that this format has been used successfully for two 
decades and that the wireless industry is extremely familiar with it. 
AT&T maintains that using this design for Auction 97 will promote a 
competitive and fair auction where both large and small bidders are 
familiar with the format and can make informed choices in an efficient 
manner. Verizon Wireless supports the use of package bidding in Auction 
97, and proposes allowing applicants to bid on a nationwide package of 
licenses in the H, I, and J Blocks. Verizon Wireless maintains that 
package bidding will increase participation and bidding competition 
because it allows bidders to bid on both the value of the individual EA 
licenses and the value of obtaining spectrum nationwide over a 
consistent set of frequencies. Verizon Wireless also claims that the 
risk of failing to acquire all licenses in a business plan (the 
``exposure problem'') may inhibit participation because, for some 
bidders, the potential for acquisition of all desired licenses is 
needed to support individual license bid amounts. However, US Cellular 
asserts that Verizon Wireless has previously made clear that the 
availability of larger license areas, such as the EA-based licenses 
being offered in Auction 97, would significantly mitigate the 
``exposure risks'' it would face if it could not bid on packages of 
smaller license areas.
    137. The Bureau concludes, based on the record and in light of its 
experience with previous spectrum auctions, including auctions of 
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) licenses, that a standard SMR format 
will provide bidders with a simple and efficient means of bidding on 
single or multiple licenses and will offer adequate opportunity for 
bidders in Auction 97 to aggregate licenses in order to obtain the 
level of coverage they desire consistent with their business plans. The 
Bureau therefore adopts a standard SMR auction format for Auction 97. 
Accordingly, bids will be accepted on all licenses in each round of the 
auction until bidding stops on every license unless otherwise 
announced.
2. Single Auction With a Single Set of Procedures and Requirements for 
the Unpaired and Paired Bands
    138. A number of commenters ask (to varying degrees) that the 
Bureau recognize the differences between the unpaired and paired bands 
when adopting procedures and requirements for Auction 97 by 
establishing separate bidding eligibility, activity waivers, and 
stopping rules for the bands. They submit that it is not likely that 
licenses in the bands could be used as close substitutes because they 
have different technical characteristics and likely uses, and that 
combined procedures could enable bidders to use bidding strategies 
designed to hurt smaller competitors and new entrants, which could 
deter competition. These commenters advocate establishing separate 
upfront payment requirements and bidding eligibility for the unpaired 
and paired bands to prevent a bidder from gaming eligibility and 
activity requirements by ``parking'' bidding eligibility on licenses in 
one band to lock competitors out of that spectrum or distract from its 
real interests. They argue that such strategic parking enables larger 
competitors to drive up the cost of spectrum they have no real interest 
in winning, and could cause smaller competitors or new entrants to drop 
out of the auction early, thereby potentially depressing auction 
revenues. They maintain that separate eligibility and activity 
requirements will avoid such results.
    139. AT&T and Verizon Wireless support a single auction with a 
single set of procedures. Verizon Wireless submits that separate 
auctions would significantly increase auction complexity, limit 
applicants' bidding flexibility, inhibit competition for the 1695-1710 
MHz band, and decrease auction revenues. AT&T argues that commenters' 
arguments in support of adopting separate procedures and requirements 
are premised on the false assumptions that the different technical 
characteristics of the bands warrant separate auction treatment, and 
that employing common auction procedures for both bands will encourage 
parking. Both AT&T and Verizon Wireless maintain that other bidders may 
view the bands as substitutable or complementary and, if so, public 
interest objectives are best promoted by allowing the market to reflect 
substitutability through a single set of auction procedures. They also 
contend that commenters' concerns about parking are misplaced, because 
an applicant bidding solely on the 1695-1710 MHz band to preserve 
eligibility will quickly move its bids as soon as the reserve is met, 
and thus eligibility ``parkers'' will not drive up the price any higher 
than otherwise required to meet the reserve.
    140. Auction 97 will offer paired and unpaired licenses in a single 
auction subject to one set of procedures and requirements. Particularly 
where, as here, interested parties are divided on whether licenses 
being offered may be characterized as substitutes, such information may 
best be discovered through a competitive bidding process. Offering both 
the paired and unpaired bands in the same auction will allow market 
forces to determine the degree to which market participants view the 
AWS-3 spectrum blocks as substitutable. The Bureau's approach is 
grounded in its experience with past auctions where the degree to which 
licenses may be characterized as substitutable or complementary differs 
depending upon the perspective of each auction participant. Providing 
for two different sets of bidding eligibility, activity waivers, and 
stopping rules would disadvantage bidders interested in both paired and 
unpaired blocks by forcing them to manage two separate pools of 
eligibility, which would reduce their ability to pursue backup 
strategies as prices rise. Whether in one auction or two simultaneous 
auctions, requiring bidders interested in both blocks to deal with 
separate sets of bidding actions would invite confusion and could lead 
to mistakes in bidding. Elsewhere in the Auction 97 Procedures Public 
Notice, the Bureau describes procedures that are intended to ameliorate 
the parking concerns raised by commenters. Accordingly, the Bureau will 
conduct Auction 97 under a single set of

[[Page 47121]]

procedures and requirements covering both the unpaired and paired 
bands.
3. Limited Information Disclosure Procedures: Information Available to 
Bidders Before and During the Auction
    141. Consistent with its practice in several prior wireless 
spectrum auctions, the Bureau proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public 
Notice to withhold, until after the close of bidding, public release of 
(1) bidders' license selections on their short-form applications (FCC 
Form 175), (2) the amounts of bidders' upfront payments and bidding 
eligibility, and (3) information that may reveal the identities of 
bidders placing bids and taking other bidding-related actions. The 
Bureau sought comment on the proposal to implement limited information 
disclosure procedures and on any alternatives for Auction 97.
    142. The Bureau received several comments on its proposal to employ 
limited information disclosure procedures for Auction 97, both in 
support and in opposition. The limited information disclosure 
procedures used in past auctions have helped safeguard against 
potential anticompetitive behavior such as retaliatory bidding and 
collusion, and after carefully considering the record on this issue, 
the Bureau finds nothing that persuades it to depart from its now-
established practice of implementing these procedures in wireless 
spectrum auctions. The Bureau disagrees with the assertions of 
commenters that argue that limited information disclosure procedures 
are unnecessary or harmful to smaller bidders, and concludes that the 
competitive benefits associated with limiting information disclosure 
support adoption of such procedures and outweigh the potential benefits 
of full disclosure. Accordingly, the Bureau adopts the limited 
information disclosure procedures proposed in the Auction 97 Comment 
Public Notice. Thus, after the conclusion of each round, the Bureau 
will disclose all relevant information about the bids placed and/or 
withdrawn except the identities of the bidders performing the actions 
and the net amounts of the bids placed or withdrawn. As in past 
auctions conducted with limited information procedures, the Bureau will 
indicate, for each license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for the 
next round and whether the license has a provisionally winning bid. 
After each round, the Bureau will also release, for each license, the 
number of bidders that placed a bid on the license and the amounts of 
those bids. Furthermore, the Bureau will indicate whether any proactive 
waivers were submitted in each round, and the Bureau will release the 
stage transition percentage -- the percentages of licenses (as measured 
in bidding units) on which there were new bids -- for the round. In 
addition, bidders can log in to the FCC Auction System to see, after 
each round, whether their own bids are provisionally winning. The 
Bureau will provide descriptions and/or samples of publicly-available 
and bidder-specific (non-public) results files prior to the start of 
the auction.
    143. The Bureau, however, retains the discretion not to use limited 
information procedures if it, after examining the level of potential 
competition based on the short-form applications filed for Auction 97, 
determines that the circumstances indicate that limited information 
procedures would not be an effective tool for deterring anti-
competitive behavior. For example, if only two applicants become 
qualified to participate in the bidding, limited information procedures 
would be ineffective in preventing bidders from knowing the identity of 
the competing bidder and, therefore, limited information procedures 
would not serve to deter attempts at signaling and retaliatory bidding 
behavior.
    144. Other Issues. Information disclosure procedures established 
for this auction will not interfere with the administration of, or 
compliance with, the Commission's prohibition of certain 
communications. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(1) provides that, after the short-form 
application filing deadline, all applicants for licenses in any of the 
same or overlapping geographic license areas are prohibited from 
disclosing to each other in any manner the substance of bids or bidding 
strategies until after the down payment deadline, subject to specified 
exceptions.
    145. In Auction 97, the Commission will not disclose information 
regarding license selection or the amounts of bidders' upfront payments 
and bidding eligibility. The Commission will disclose the other 
portions of applicants' short-form applications through its online 
database, and certain application-based information through public 
notices.
    146. To assist applicants in identifying other parties subject to 
47 CFR 1.2105(c), the Bureau will notify separately each applicant in 
Auction 97 whether applicants with short-form applications to 
participate in pending auctions, including but not limited to Auction 
97, have applied for licenses in any of the same or overlapping 
geographic areas as that applicant. Specifically, after the Bureau 
conducts its initial review of applications to participate in Auction 
97, it will send to each applicant in Auction 97 a letter that lists 
the other applicants that have pending short-form applications for 
licenses in any of the same or overlapping geographic areas. The list 
will identify the other applicants by name but will not list their 
license selections. As in past auctions, additional information 
regarding other applicants that is needed to comply with 47 CFR 
1.2105(c)--such as the identities of other applicants' controlling 
interests and entities with a greater than ten percent ownership 
interest--will be available through the publicly-accessible online 
short-form application database.
    147. When completing short-form applications, applicants should 
avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate the Commission's 
prohibition of certain communications, pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2105(c), 
particularly in light of the Commission's procedures regarding the 
availability of certain information in Auction 97. While applicants' 
license selections will not be disclosed until after Auction 97 closes, 
the Commission will disclose other portions of short-form applications 
through its online database and public notices. Accordingly, applicants 
should avoid including any information in their short-form applications 
that might convey information regarding license selections. For 
example, applicants should avoid using applicant names that refer to 
licenses being offered, referring to certain licenses or markets in 
describing bidding agreements, or including any information in 
attachments that may otherwise disclose applicants' license selections.
    148. If an applicant is found to have violated the Commission's 
rules or the antitrust laws in connection with its participation in the 
competitive bidding process, the applicant may be subject to various 
sanctions, including forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment, 
or full bid amount and prohibition from participating in future 
auctions.
    149. The Bureau hereby warns applicants that the direct or indirect 
communication to other applicants or the public disclosure of non-
public information (e.g., bid withdrawals, proactive waivers submitted, 
reductions in eligibility) could violate the Commission's limited 
information disclosure procedures and 47 CFR 1.2105(c). To the extent 
an applicant believes that such a disclosure is required by law or 
regulation, including regulations issued by the SEC, the Bureau 
strongly urges that the applicant

[[Page 47122]]

consult with the Commission staff in the Auctions and Spectrum Access 
Division before making such disclosure.
4. Eligibility and Activity Rules
    150. The Bureau will use upfront payments to determine initial 
(maximum) eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for Auction 97. 
The amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder determines 
initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on 
which a bidder may be active. Each license is assigned a specific 
number of bidding units as listed in Attachment A to the Auction 97 
Procedures Public Notice. Bidding units assigned to each license do not 
change as prices change during the auction. Upfront payments are not 
attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any 
of the licenses selected on its FCC Form 175 as long as the total 
number of bidding units associated with those licenses does not exceed 
its current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be increased during the 
auction; it can only remain the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating 
its upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the maximum 
number of bidding units it may wish to bid on or hold provisionally 
winning bids on in any single round, and submit an upfront payment 
amount covering that total number of bidding units. At a minimum, an 
applicant's upfront payment must cover the bidding units for at least 
one of the licenses it selected on its FCC Form 175. The total upfront 
payment does not affect the total dollar amount a bidder may bid on any 
given license.
    151. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the 
bidding units associated with licenses covered by the bidder's new bids 
in the round and its provisionally winning bids from the previous 
round. If a bidder removes bids in the current round or withdraws 
provisionally winning bids, those bids no longer count towards the 
bidder's activity.
    152. The minimum required activity is expressed as a percentage of 
the bidder's current eligibility, and increases by stage as the auction 
progresses. Because these auction stage and stage transition procedures 
have proven successful in maintaining the pace of previous auctions, 
the Bureau adopts them for Auction 97. Failure to maintain the 
requisite activity level will result in the use of an activity rule 
waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidder's eligibility, 
possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place 
additional bids in the auction.
5. Auction Stages
    153. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity rule. Under 
the Bureau's proposal, a bidder desiring to maintain its current 
bidding eligibility would be required to be active on licenses 
representing at least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility 
during each round of Stage One, and at least 95 percent of its current 
bidding eligibility in Stage Two. US Cellular supports the Bureau's 
proposal to divide the auction into two stages, and opposes adopting a 
third stage with a 98 percent activity requirement. Aloha Partners asks 
the Bureau to add a third stage with a 100 percent activity requirement 
and would require that minimum acceptable bids be 20 percent higher 
than provisionally winning bids, and recommends that this third stage 
be implemented when the number of new provisionally winning bids falls 
below ten bids.
    154. The Bureau sees no need to establish, at this time, a third 
stage with a 100 percent eligibility requirement as requested by Aloha 
Partners. Based on its past experience, the Bureau believes that two 
stages with 80 percent and 95 percent activity requirements should 
facilitate the auction progressing at a reasonable pace. In some of the 
Bureau's earlier auctions, it established three stages using 80 
percent, 90 percent, and 98 percent activity requirements. In many of 
these auctions, however, implementing Stage Two had little effect in 
terms of increasing bidding activity, and Stage Three was implemented 
shortly thereafter. Based on this experience, the Bureau has generally 
moved away from three-stage auctions in favor of two-stage auctions. 
Moreover, a 95 percent threshold allows bidders slightly more 
flexibility than a higher requirement would in fulfilling their 
activity requirements during the final stage of the auction. 
Accordingly, the Bureau declines to establish a third stage with a 100 
percent activity threshold at this time. The Bureau notes that it has 
the discretion to further alter the activity requirements (by, for 
example, establishing a 98 or 100 percent threshold) before and/or 
during the auction as circumstances warrant. The Bureau also has other 
mechanisms by which to influence the speed of the auction if it 
determines that such steps are necessary. Therefore, the Bureau will 
conduct the auction in two stages as follows:
    155. Stage One: During the first stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required 
to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its 
current bidding eligibility in each bidding round. Failure to maintain 
the required activity level will result in the use of an activity rule 
waiver or, if the bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining, a 
reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round. During 
Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum of bidding 
units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids during the 
current round) by five-fourths (5/4).
    156. Stage Two: During the second stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be 
active on 95 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to 
maintain the required activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver or, if the bidder has no activity rule waivers 
remaining, a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next 
round. During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round will be 
calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum 
of bidding units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids 
during the current round) by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).
    157. CAUTION: Since activity requirements increase in Stage Two, 
bidders must carefully check their activity during the first round 
following a stage transition to ensure that they are meeting the 
increased activity requirement. This is especially critical for bidders 
that have provisionally winning bids and do not plan to submit new 
bids. In past auctions, some bidders have inadvertently lost bidding 
eligibility or used an activity rule waiver because they did not re-
verify their activity status at stage transitions. Bidders may check 
their activity against the required activity level by logging into the 
FCC Auction System.
    158. When the Bureau moves the auction from Stage One to Stage Two, 
it will first alert bidders by announcement in the bidding system. The 
Bureau has the discretion to further alter the activity requirements 
before and/or during the auction as circumstances warrant.

[[Page 47123]]

6. Stage Transitions
    159. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that it would advance the auction to the next stage (i.e., from Stage 
One to Stage Two) after considering a variety of measures of auction 
activity, including, but not limited to, the percentages of licenses 
(as measured in bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number 
of new bids, and the increase in revenue. The Bureau further proposed 
that it would retain the discretion to change the activity requirements 
during the auction. For example, the Bureau could decide not to 
transition to Stage Two if it believes the auction is progressing 
satisfactorily under the Stage One activity requirement, or to 
transition to Stage Two with an activity requirement that is higher or 
lower than 95 percent. The Bureau proposed to alert bidders of stage 
advancements by announcement during the auction. The Bureau received no 
comments on this issue.
    160. The Bureau adopts its proposal for stage transitions. Thus, 
the auction will start in Stage One. The Bureau will regulate the pace 
of the auction by announcement. The Bureau retains the discretion to 
transition the auction to Stage Two, to add an additional stage with a 
higher activity requirement, not to transition to Stage Two, and to 
transition to Stage Two with an activity requirement that is higher or 
lower than 95 percent. This determination will be based on a variety of 
measures of auction activity, including, but not limited to, the number 
of new bids and the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding 
units) on which there are new bids.
7. Activity Rule Waivers
    161. The Bureau proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice 
that each bidder in the auction be provided with three activity rule 
waivers. The Bureau received no comments on this issue. Therefore, the 
Bureau adopts its proposal to provide bidders with three activity rule 
waivers. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any round during 
the course of the auction. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the 
bidder's eligibility despite its activity in the current round being 
below the required minimum activity level. An activity rule waiver 
applies to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. 
Waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.
    162. The FCC Auction System assumes that a bidder with insufficient 
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round in which a 
bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless (1) the 
bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining or (2) the bidder 
overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing 
eligibility. If no waivers remain and the activity requirement is not 
satisfied, the FCC Auction System will permanently reduce the bidder's 
eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the ability to place 
additional bids in the auction.
    163. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding round by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function 
in the FCC Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
permanently reduced to bring it into compliance with the activity rule. 
Reducing eligibility is an irreversible action; once eligibility has 
been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding 
eligibility, even if the round has not yet closed.
    164. Finally, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver 
proactively as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. 
If a proactive waiver is applied (using the ``apply waiver'' function 
in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no bids are 
placed or withdrawn, the auction will remain open and the bidder's 
eligibility will be preserved. However, an automatic waiver applied by 
the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are no new bids, 
withdrawals, or proactive waivers will not keep the auction open. A 
bidder cannot submit a proactive waiver after bidding in a round, and 
applying a proactive waiver will preclude it from placing any bids in 
that round. Applying a waiver is irreversible: Once a bidder submits a 
proactive waiver, the bidder cannot unsubmit the waiver even if the 
round has not yet ended.
8. Auction Stopping Rules
    165. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to employ a simultaneous stopping rule under its SMR proposal. Under 
this rule, all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding 
stops simultaneously on every license. More specifically, bidding will 
close on all licenses after the first round in which no bidder submits 
any new bids, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws any 
provisionally winning bids. Thus, under the Bureau's SMR proposal, 
unless it announce alternative stopping procedures, the simultaneous 
stopping rule will be used in this auction, and bidding will remain 
open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
    166. The Bureau also proposed that it retain discretion to exercise 
and of the following alternative versions of the simultaneous stopping 
rule for Auction 97: (1) The auction would close for all licenses after 
the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, withdraws a 
provisionally winning bid, or places any new bids on a license for 
which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any 
other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for 
which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction 
open under this modified stopping rule; (2) the auction would close for 
all licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, 
withdraws a provisionally winning bid, or places any new bids on a 
license that is not FCC-held; thus, absent any other bidding activity, 
a bidder placing a new bid on a license that does not already have a 
provisionally winning bid (an FCC-held license) would not keep the 
auction open under this modified stopping rule; (3) the auction would 
close using a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that 
combines Option (1) and Option (2); (4) the auction would end after a 
specified number of additional rounds (special stopping rule); if the 
Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the 
specified final round(s), after which the auction will close; or (5) 
the auction would remain open even if no bidder places any new bids, 
applies a waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bids; in this 
event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a waiver, 
and the activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder with 
insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a 
waiver.
    167. The Bureau proposed to exercise alternative versions of the 
simultaneous stopping rule only in certain circumstances, for example, 
where the auction is proceeding unusually slowly or quickly, there is 
minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction 
will not close within a reasonable period of time or will close 
prematurely (e.g., before bidder have had an adequate opportunity to 
satisfy any applicable reserve prices). The Bureau noted that before 
exercising these options, the Bureaus is likely to attempt to change 
the pace of the

[[Page 47124]]

auction by, for example, changing the number of bidding rounds per day 
and/or the minimum acceptable bids. The Bureau also proposed to retain 
the discretion to exercise any of these options with or without prior 
announcement during the auction.
    168. As part of their general request that the Bureau adopt 
separate procedures and requirements for the paired and unpaired bands, 
several parties ask the Bureau to apply its stopping rules separately 
to the paired and unpaired bands. T-Mobile suggests the Bureau apply 
the stopping rules based on activity within a particular band rather 
than the activity across all licenses. Under T-Mobile's proposal, if 
bidding stops on one of the bands, the auction for that band would 
close. T-Mobile submits that this will add certainty to the auction 
process and avoid delaying the close of the auction any longer than 
necessary, and claims that leaving the entire auction open even when 
interest in one band diminishes may prompt insincere bidding by 
allowing bidders interested in one band to park bids in another merely 
to preserve eligibility, thereby artificially prolonging the auction. 
DISH and New America Foundation/Public Knowledge advocate separate 
stopping rules for the unpaired and paired bands, arguing that combined 
procedures for bands that they consider to be non-substitutable could 
enable bidders to employ bidding strategies designed to hurt smaller 
competitors and new entrants, which could deter competition and 
suppress revenues. Like T-Mobile, DISH and New America Foundation/
Public Knowledge are concerned that applying the stopping rules based 
on activity across all licenses could facilitate strategic parking and 
permit bidders to pursue the very ``wait and see'' approach the 
eligibility and activity rules are designed to prevent. CCA echoes the 
sentiments of T-Mobile, DISH, and New America Foundation/Public 
Knowledge regarding parking and argues that such behavior could be 
prevented by adopting separate stopping rules for the bands.
    169. The Bureau adopts procedures to address these commenters' 
concerns that bidding activity could stop on one band well before it 
stops on the other. The Bureau generally adopts its proposed stopping 
rules but does so on a per-band basis described as follows. After no 
more than five consecutive rounds in which no bids have been placed or 
withdrawn for licenses in one of the two bands (i.e., the unpaired 
1695-1710 MHz band and the paired 1755-1780/2155-280 MHz band), no 
bidder has placed a proactive waiver, and the associated reserve price 
has been met, the Bureau will close the bidding for that band. 
Accordingly, bidders will no longer be able to place new bids for 
licenses in the band, nor will they be able to withdraw any provisional 
winning bids for licenses in the band. The Bureau's decision to end the 
auction for a given band in this manner for Auction 97 does not pre-
judge how we may approach stopping rules in any future auctions, 
including those in which the same or similar facts and circumstances 
exist. The Bureau reserves the right to close bidding for a band after 
fewer than five consecutive rounds without bidding activity. The Bureau 
will notify bidders with an announcement in the FCC Auction System 
before bidding closes for one of the bands.
    170. Aloha Partners agrees that there should be a mechanism to end 
the auction when the number of bids decreases to low levels, but 
expresses concern that the proposed special stopping rule could be 
misused by a bidder that has remaining eligibility in the last round by 
bidding on licenses that it may not have shown an interest in 
previously. As an alternative, Aloha Partners recommends the Bureau 
instead add a third stage, to be implemented when the number of new 
winning bids falls below ten bids, that would require a bidder to have 
activity covering 100 percent of its eligibility and would require 
minimum acceptable bids be 20 percent higher than provisionally winning 
bids. The Bureau declines to adopt Aloha Partners' request for a third 
stage with a 100 percent eligibility requirement in lieu of its special 
stopping rule.
    171. Aside from the per-band departure from its past procedure, the 
Bureau retains the discretion to employ the alternative versions of the 
stopping rule, with or without prior announcement during the auction. 
The Bureau will not, however, employ the first alternative (Option 1) 
for a band if the reserve price for that band has not been met. Bidders 
will continue to have the opportunity to place bids in a given band at 
least until the reserve price for that band is met.
9. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    172. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that, by public notice or by announcement during the auction, it may 
delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, 
technical obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an 
auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other 
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive 
bidding. The Bureau received no comment on this issue.
    173. Because this approach has proven effective in resolving 
exigent circumstances in previous auctions, the Bureau adopts these 
proposals regarding auction delay, suspension, or cancellation. By 
public notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may 
delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, 
technical obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an 
auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other 
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive 
bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect 
to resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current round 
or from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its entirety. 
Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the 
auction. The Bureau emphasize that it will exercise of this authority 
solely at its discretion, and not as a substitute for situations in 
which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.

B. Bidding Procedures

1. Round Structure
    174. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in 
the public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released 
approximately ten days before the start of the auction. Each bidding 
round is followed by the release of round results. Details regarding 
formats and locations of round results will also be included in the 
qualified bidders public notice. Multiple bidding rounds may be 
conducted each day.
    175. The Bureau has the discretion to change the bidding schedule 
in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with 
the bidders' needs to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may change the amount of time for the bidding 
rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of rounds per 
day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors.
2. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids
a. Reserve Price
    176. The Commission is statutorily obliged to consider and balance 
a variety of public interests and objectives when establishing service 
rules and licensing procedures with respect to the public spectrum 
resource. These objectives include promoting recovery for the public a 
portion of the value of

[[Page 47125]]

that resource. Certain of the frequencies in the AWS-3 bands are 
``eligible frequencies'' under the CSEA, and the CSEA requires that 
auction proceeds fund the estimated relocation or sharing costs of 
incumbent federal entities operating on these frequencies. In view of 
this, the Bureau establishes reserve prices for the AWS-3 licenses 
offered in Auction 97.
    177. The CSEA requires that the total cash proceeds attributable to 
``eligible frequencies'' be at least 110 percent of the total estimated 
relocation or sharing costs provided to the Commission pursuant to the 
CSEA before the Commission may conclude an auction involving such 
frequencies. If this condition is not met, the CSEA requires the 
Commission to cancel the auction. For purposes of determining whether 
the CSEA's revenue requirement has been met, the Commission has 
determined that ``total cash proceeds'' means winning bids net of any 
applicable bidding credit discounts at the end of bidding (e.g., 
exclusive of any Tribal lands bidding credit).
    178. Pursuant to the CSEA, on May 13, 2014, the NTIA notified the 
Commission that the total estimated relocation or sharing costs for the 
1695-1710 MHz band equal $527,069,000, and that the total estimated 
relocation or sharing costs for the 1755-1780 MHz band equal 
$4,575,603,000. Accordingly, in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, 
the Bureau proposed to establish one aggregate reserve price for the 
1695-1710 MHz band and a separate aggregate reserve price for the 
paired 1755-1780/2155-2180 MHz band.
    179. The Bureau proposed to establish an aggregate reserve price of 
$579,775,900 for the licenses in the 1695-1710 MHz band. This aggregate 
reserve price is 110 percent of total estimated relocation or sharing 
costs of $527,069,000 provided by the NTIA for this band and, 
therefore, the minimum reserve price required by the CSEA. Given that 
the 1695-1710 MHz band consists entirely of ``eligible frequencies,'' 
the Bureau propose that the winning bid for each license in this band, 
net of any applicable bidding credit discounts at the end of bidding 
(e.g., exclusive of any Tribal lands bidding credit), will be counted 
toward meeting the reserve price for the band. Thus, the aggregate 
reserve price will be met if the total winning bids for the licenses in 
the 1695-1710 MHz band, net of any applicable bidding credit discounts 
at the end of bidding (e.g., exclusive of any Tribal lands bidding 
credit), is at least $579,775,900.
    180. The 1755-1780 MHz band will be licensed paired with the 2155-
2180 MHz band. The lower half of the frequencies in each paired 
license, i.e., those in the 1755-1780 MHz band, are ``eligible 
frequencies'' and are thus subject to CSEA requirements. To meet CSEA's 
requirements, the Bureau proposed to establish an aggregate reserve 
price of $5,033,163,300 for the 1755-1780 MHz frequencies. This 
aggregate reserve price is 110 percent of total estimated relocation or 
sharing costs of $4,575,603,000 for the 1755-1780 MHz band provided by 
the NTIA and, therefore, the minimum reserve price required by CSEA. 
Because these frequencies are one half of the frequencies authorized 
for use by each of the 1755-1780/2155-2180 MHz paired licenses, the 
Bureau propose that one-half of each winning bid for each of the paired 
1755-1780/2155-2180 MHz licenses, net of any applicable bidding credit 
discounts at the end of bidding, will be counted toward meeting the 
reserve price. The aggregate reserve price will be met if one half of 
the total winning bids for the licenses in the 1755-1780/2155-2180 MHz 
band, net of any applicable bidding credit discounts at the end of 
bidding (e.g., exclusive of any Tribal lands bidding credit), is at 
least $5,033,163,300. Therefore, the winning ``net'' bids for the 
paired 1755-1780/2155-2180 MHz licenses must be at least twice that 
amount, or $10,066,326,600, in order for the Commission to conclude the 
auction.
    181. C Spire supports the Bureau's proposal to use an aggregate 
reserve for the AWS-3 spectrum bands. A few commenters asked the Bureau 
to treat the unpaired and paired bands differently with respect to 
meeting the reserve prices. T-Mobile argues that there is no reason 
that the entire auction should be declared invalid if the reserve price 
is not met for one band and that, consistent with CSEA, only the 
auction for the particular band that failed to meet the reserve should 
be cancelled.
    182. The Bureau adopts its proposed reserve prices for Auction 97 
and its proposals for implementing them. Consistent with the Bureau's 
past treatment of spectrum bands that are subject to separate reserve 
prices, and based on its reading of CSEA, the Bureau will treat the 
unpaired and paired bands separately with respect to meeting their 
respective reserve prices. Thus, if the reserve price is met or 
exceeded for a given band, the auction for that band will be deemed to 
be successful and licenses in that band will be assigned. If the 
reserve price for the other band is not met, the auction for that band 
will, as required by CSEA, be cancelled as to only that band.
    183. In light of the Bureau's proposal to adopt procedures for 
limited information disclosure for Auction 97, if information regarding 
net bid amounts is not provided during the auction, the Bureau proposed 
in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice to issue an announcement in the 
FCC Auction System, viewable by bidders and the general public, stating 
that a reserve price has been met immediately following the first round 
in which that occurs. The Bureau received no comment this proposal, and 
therefore adopts it for Auction 97. As the Bureau noted in the Auction 
97 Comment Public Notice, due to factors such as bid withdrawals and 
the effect of bidding credits, an announcement that the reserve price 
has been met following a round of the auction does not guarantee that 
the reserve price will continue to be met. Accordingly, the Bureau will 
make a further announcement in the FCC Auction System after any round 
in which the reserve price status changes.
    184. When determining whether a reserve price has been met, the 
Bureau will use net bid amounts that take into account bidding credits. 
The Bureau will not count any withdrawn bids toward meeting a reserve 
price. Thus, the Bureau will count only the current provisionally 
winning bid on a license when determining whether a reserve price has 
been met.
b. Minimum Opening Bids
    185. In addition to proposing aggregate reserve prices, the Bureau 
proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice to establish minimum 
opening bid amounts for each license in Auction 97. The Bureau believes 
a minimum opening bid amount, which has been used in other auctions, is 
an effective bidding tool for accelerating the competitive bidding 
process.
    186. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to calculate minimum opening bid amounts on a license-by-license basis 
using a formula based on bandwidth and license area population, similar 
to its approach in many previous spectrum auctions. The Bureau proposed 
to use a calculation based on $0.15 per megahertz of bandwidth per 
population (per MHz-pop) for paired licenses and $0.05 per MHz-pop for 
unpaired licenses. Additionally, the Bureau proposed, as it did for 
Auction 96, to adjust minimum opening bid amounts based on past auction 
results, in order to reflect historical price differences among 
different geographic areas. The Bureau further proposed a minimum of

[[Page 47126]]

$2,500 per license. For the license covering the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Bureau proposed to set the minimum opening bid at $2,000 per megahertz.
    187. Commenters presented a number of perspectives on the Bureau's 
proposal. Verizon Wireless, CCA, C Spire, and NTCA advocate using $0.05 
per MHz-pop to set the minimum opening bids. Verizon Wireless also 
objects to the Bureau's proposal to vary the calculation of minimum 
opening bid amounts across license areas. Spectrum Financial Partners 
recommends a change to the Bureau's proposed method for reflecting 
historical price differences by excluding the results of Auction 96. 
AT&T acknowledges the merits of the Bureau's proposal to vary the 
calculation of minimum opening bid amounts across license areas, but 
suggests an alternative method. AT&T recognizes the value of adjusting 
minimum opening bids to account for regional price differences, but 
contends that making these adjustments on a license-by-license basis 
perpetuates anomalous bidding patterns from past auctions (which may 
have involved eligibility parking and inefficient pricing) into Auction 
97. For these reasons, AT&T offers refinements that it believes would 
help prevent both inefficient allocation of bidding units and 
eligibility parking during the auction. AT&T proposes that the Bureau 
rank the licenses by population; group them into deciles; sum its 
proposed minimum opening bid amounts for the licenses in the decile; 
and then, based on population, redistribute that subtotal among the 
licenses in the decile. After careful consideration of the record, the 
Bureau finds AT&T's arguments compelling and adopts AT&T's proposal in 
a modified form.
    188. The Bureau will calculate minimum opening bid amounts as 
follows. The Bureau continues to use underlying prices of $0.15 per 
MHz-pop for paired licenses and $0.05 per MHz-pop for unpaired 
licenses, and the Bureau continues to adjust amounts based on relative 
price information from previous auctions. The Bureau changes its method 
of incorporating past price information, however, in several ways. The 
Bureau will no longer use the relative price information from Auction 
96 in its calculations for the EA licenses. The Bureau revises its 
method of incorporating past price information by using a variation of 
the decile-based approach suggested by AT&T. Rather than grouping by 
population decile, the Bureau will group the licenses by historical 
MHz-pop price deciles. For each decile the Bureau uses the lowest index 
price value and apply it to all of the markets in that decile. As 
proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau will round 
the results using its standard rounding procedures. Finally, the Bureau 
adopts a minimum of $1,000 per license, and adopts its proposal to set 
the minimum opening bids for licenses covering the Gulf of Mexico at 
$2,000 per megahertz.
    189. The Bureau finds that this approach accommodates several of 
the concerns raised in the record. The use of deciles smooths the 
opening bid amounts in a way that reduces the impact of price variation 
from previous auctions. Basing the deciles on a price index (rather 
than a population index), however, ensures that the Bureau does not 
exclude significant past price differences between similarly-sized 
markets in its calculations. The use of the lowest unit price for each 
decile, rather than the average price, ensures that minimum opening 
bids for licenses within a decile are not averaged up to the arithmetic 
mean price of the decile. As a result of these changes, the minimum 
opening bids the Bureau adopts are over 25 percent less than the ones 
proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau does not 
believe that it risks overpricing licenses by basing the minimum 
opening bid amounts on $0.15 and $0.05 per MHz-pop, especially given 
the substantial reserve prices adopted for this auction. These minimum 
opening bid amounts should, as intended, help to accelerate the 
competitive bidding process. The minimum opening bid amount for each 
AWS-3 license available in Auction 97, calculated pursuant to the 
procedures is set forth in Attachment A to the Auction 97 Procedures 
Public Notice.
3. Bid Amounts
    190. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that in each round, eligible bidders be able to place a bid on a given 
license using one or more pre-defined bid amounts. Under the proposal, 
the FCC Auction System interface will list the acceptable bid amounts 
for each license. The Bureau received no comment on this proposal and 
therefore adopts it for Auction 97.
a. Minimum Acceptable Bids
    191. The first of the acceptable bid amounts is called the minimum 
acceptable bid amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license 
will be equal to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a 
provisionally winning bid on the license. After there is a 
provisionally winning bid for a license, the minimum acceptable bid 
amount for that license will be equal to the amount of the 
provisionally winning bid plus a percentage of that bid amount 
calculated using the activity-based formula. In general, the percentage 
will be higher for a license receiving many bids than for a license 
receiving few bids. In the case of a license for which the 
provisionally winning bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable 
bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the license.
    192. The percentage of the provisionally winning bid used to 
establish the minimum acceptable bid amount (the additional percentage) 
is calculated based on an activity index at the end of each round. The 
activity index is a weighted average of (a) the number of distinct 
bidders placing a bid on the license, and (b) the activity index from 
the prior round. The additional percentage is determined as one plus 
the activity index times a minimum percentage amount, with the result 
not to exceed a given maximum. The additional percentage is then 
multiplied by the provisionally winning bid amount to obtain the 
minimum acceptable bid for the next round. The formula and examples are 
shown in Attachment B to the Auction 97 Procedures Public Notice. The 
Bureau proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice to initially 
set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage at 0.1 (10%), 
and the maximum percentage at 0.3 (30%). Hence, at these initial 
settings, the minimum acceptable bid for a license will be between ten 
percent and thirty percent higher than the provisionally winning bid, 
depending upon the bidding activity covering the license.
    193. All parties that commented on the Bureau's proposal to 
initially set the maximum acceptable bid percentage at 30 percent 
advocate lowering the maximum to 20 percent because they are concerned 
that the proposed maximum of up to 30 percent would accelerate prices 
too quickly, thereby discouraging bidder participation and/or causing 
bidders to drop out of the auction. The Bureau recognizes commenters' 
concerns that very rapid increases in minimum acceptable bids may 
potentially discourage bidder participation, inhibit price discovery, 
and create bid approval issues. At the same time, since the Bureau is 
under a statutory mandate to license the spectrum being offered in 
Auction 97 by February 2015, it is necessary that the auction move at a 
reasonably fast pace. Taking commenter concerns into account, the 
Bureau concludes that an initial maximum acceptable bid percentage of 
20 percent will allow the

[[Page 47127]]

auction to proceed at a reasonably fast pace while at the same time 
providing bidders the flexibility to bid up to the full value they 
assign to licenses. The Bureau therefore adopts an initial maximum 
acceptable bid percentage of 20 percent for Auction 97. The Bureau will 
begin the auction with the weighting factor set at 0.5, the minimum 
percentage at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage at 0.2 (20%). The 
Bureau reiterates that it has the discretion to modify minimum 
acceptable bid amounts--by changing the activity-based formula 
parameters or by imposing or modifying a cap on the dollar amount of 
bid increments--as the Bureau sees fit during the auction.
b. Additional Bid Amounts
    194. Consistent with the Bureau's practice in past wireless 
spectrum auctions, it proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice 
to calculate any additional bid amounts using the minimum acceptable 
bid amount and a bid increment percentage--more specifically, by 
multiplying the minimum acceptable bid by one plus successively higher 
multiples of the bid increment percentage. If, for example, the bid 
increment percentage is five percent, the calculation of the first 
additional acceptable bid amount is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 
(1 + 0.05), rounded or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; 
the second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid increment 
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10, 
rounded; etc. The Bureau will round the results using the Commission's 
standard rounding procedures for auctions. The Bureau proposed in the 
Auction 97 Comment Public Notice initially to set the bid increment 
percentage at five percent. The Bureau received no comment on this 
proposal and therefore adopts it for Auction 97.
    195. The Bureau also proposed in the Auction 97 Comment Public 
Notice to begin the auction with nine acceptable bid amounts per 
license (the minimum acceptable bid amount and eight additional bid 
amounts). The Bureau received no comment on this proposal. The Bureau 
therefore adopts nine acceptable bid amounts per license, which is 
consistent with its past practice for most spectrum auctions.
c. Bid Amount Changes
    196. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the additional bid amounts, the number of 
acceptable bid amounts, and the parameters of the formulas used to 
calculate minimum acceptable bid amounts and additional bid amounts if 
the Bureau determines that circumstances so dictate. Further, the 
Bureau retains the discretion to do so on a license-by-license basis. 
The Bureau also retains the discretion to limit (a) the amount by which 
a minimum acceptable bid for a license may increase compared with the 
corresponding provisionally winning bid, and (b) the amount by which an 
additional bid amount may increase compared with the immediately 
preceding acceptable bid amount. For example, if the Bureau set a $10 
million limit on increases in minimum acceptable bid amounts over 
provisionally winning bids, and the activity-based formula calculates a 
minimum acceptable bid amount that is $20 million higher than the 
provisionally winning bid on a license, the minimum acceptable bid 
amount would instead be capped at $10 million above the provisionally 
winning bid. The Bureau sought comment in the Auction 97 Comment Public 
Notice on the circumstances under which it should employ such a limit, 
factors it should consider when determining the dollar amount of the 
limit, and the tradeoffs in setting such a limit or changing other 
parameters--such as changing the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the 
bid increment percentage, or the number of acceptable bid amounts.
    197. The Bureau received no comment on this proposal. Therefore, 
the Bureau will start the auction without a limit on the dollar amount 
by which minimum acceptable bids and additional bid amounts may 
increase. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the bid 
increment percentage, and the number of acceptable bid amounts if the 
Bureau determine that circumstances so dictate. Further, the Bureau 
retains the discretion to do so on a license-by-license basis. If the 
Bureau exercises this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement 
in the FCC Auction System during the auction.
4. Provisionally Winning Bids
    198. At the end of each bidding round, a ``provisionally winning 
bid'' will be determined based on highest bid amount received for each 
license. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally 
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the license at the close of 
a subsequent round. Provisionally winning bids at the end of the 
auction become the winning bids. Bidders are reminded that 
provisionally winning bids count toward activity for purposes of the 
activity rule.
    199. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to use a random number generator to select a single provisionally 
winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts being submitted 
on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids). Under this approach, 
the FCC Auction System will assign a random number to each bid upon 
submission. The tied bid with the highest random number wins the 
tiebreaker, and becomes the provisionally winning bid. Bidders, 
regardless of whether they hold a provisionally winning bid, can submit 
higher bids in subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were to end 
with no other bids being placed, the winning bidder would be the one 
that placed the provisionally winning bid. The Bureau received no 
comment on its tied bids proposal and therefore adopts it for Auction 
97.
5. Bidding
    200. All bidding will take place remotely either through the FCC 
Auction System or by telephonic bidding. There will be no on-site 
bidding during Auction 97. Please note that telephonic bid assistants 
are required to use a script when entering bids placed by telephone. 
Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to 
bid by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The 
length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary; please allow a 
minimum of ten minutes.
    201. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses is determined 
by two factors: (1) the licenses selected on the bidder's FCC Form 175 
and (2) the bidder's eligibility. The bid submission screens will allow 
bidders to submit bids on only those licenses the bidder selected on 
its FCC Form 175.
    202. In order to access the bidding function of the FCC Auction 
System, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the 
passcode generated by the SecurID[supreg] token and a personal 
identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are strongly 
encouraged to print a ``round summary'' for each round after they have 
completed all of their activity for that round.
    203. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on 
a given license in any of up to nine pre-defined bid amounts. For each 
license, the FCC Auction System will list the acceptable bid amounts in 
a drop-down box. Bidders use the drop-down box to select

[[Page 47128]]

from among the acceptable bid amounts. The FCC Auction System also 
includes an ``upload'' function that allows text files containing bid 
information to be uploaded.
    204. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid amount. Once there are bids on a license, minimum 
acceptable bids for the following round will be determined.
    205. During a round, an eligible bidder may submit bids for as many 
licenses as it wishes (providing that it is eligible to bid on the 
specific license), remove bids placed in the current bidding round, 
withdraw provisionally winning bids from previous rounds, or 
permanently reduce eligibility. If a bidder submits multiple bids for 
the same license in the same round, the system takes the last bid 
entered as that bidder's bid for the round. Bidding units associated 
with licenses for which the bidder has removed or withdrawn bids do not 
count towards current activity.
    206. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts 
carefully because bidders that withdraw a provisionally winning bid 
from a previous round, even if the bid was mistakenly or erroneously 
made, are subject to bid withdrawal payments.
6. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
    207. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. The Bureau sought comment on 
permitting a bidder to remove a bid before the close of the round in 
which the bid was placed. With respect to bid withdrawals, the Bureau 
proposed limiting each bidder to withdrawing provisionally winning bids 
in no more than two rounds during the auction. The rounds in which a 
bidder withdraws provisionally winning bids--if it chooses to do so--
are at each bidder's discretion.
    208. The Bureau received no comment on its proposals. The proposed 
procedures will provide each bidder with appropriate flexibility during 
the auction; therefore, the Bureau adopts these proposals for Auction 
97.
a. Bid Removal
    209. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has the option 
of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the ``remove bids'' 
function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may effectively ``undo'' 
any bid placed within that round. A bidder removing a bid placed in the 
same round is not subject to withdrawal payments. If a bid is placed on 
a license during a round, it will count towards the activity for that 
round; but when that bid is then removed during the same round it was 
placed, the activity associated with it is also removed, i.e., a bid 
that is removed does not count toward bidding activity.
b. Bid Withdrawal
    210. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. 
However, in a later round, a bidder may withdraw provisionally winning 
bids from previous rounds using the ``withdraw bids'' function in the 
FCC Auction System. A provisionally winning bidder that withdraws its 
provisionally winning bid from a previous round during the auction is 
subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). 
Once a bid withdrawal is submitted during a round, that withdrawal 
cannot be unsubmitted even if the round has not yet ended.
    211. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid 
received for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of 
tied bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid. The Commission 
will serve as a placeholder provisionally winning bidder on the license 
until a new bid is submitted on that license.
c. Calculation of Bid Withdrawal Payment
    212. Generally, the Commission imposes payments on bidders that 
withdraw provisionally winning bids during the course of an auction. If 
a bidder withdraws its bid and there is no higher bid in the same or 
subsequent auction(s), the bidder that withdrew its bid is responsible 
for the difference between its withdrawn bid and the winning bid in the 
same or subsequent auction(s). If there are multiple bid withdrawals on 
a single license and no subsequent higher bid is placed and/or the 
license is not won in the same auction, the payment for each bid 
withdrawal will be calculated based on the sequence of bid withdrawals 
and the amounts withdrawn. No withdrawal payment will be assessed for a 
withdrawn bid if either the subsequent winning bid or any subsequent 
intervening withdrawn bid, in either the same or subsequent auction(s), 
equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a bidder that withdraws a 
bid will not be responsible for any final withdrawal payment if there 
is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s).
    213. 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1) sets forth the payment obligations of a 
bidder that withdraws a provisionally winning bid on a license during 
the course of an auction, and provides for the assessment of interim 
bid withdrawal payments. In the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the 
Bureau proposed to establish an interim withdrawal payment of ten 
percent of the withdrawn bid for Auction 97.
    214. The Bureau received no comment on this proposal and therefore 
adopts it for Auction 97. The Commission will assess an interim 
withdrawal payment equal to ten percent of the amount of the withdrawn 
bids. The ten percent interim payment will be applied toward any final 
bid withdrawal payment that will be assessed after subsequent auction 
of the license. Assessing an interim bid withdrawal payment ensures 
that the Commission receives a minimal withdrawal payment pending 
assessment of any final withdrawal payment. 47 CFR 1.2104(g) provides 
specific examples showing application of the bid withdrawal payment 
rule.
7. Round Results
    215. Limited information about the results of a round will be made 
public after the conclusion of the round. Specifically, after a round 
closes, the Bureau will make available for each license its current 
provisionally winning bid amount, the minimum acceptable bid amount for 
the following round, the amounts of all bids placed on the license 
during the round, and whether the license is FCC-held. The system will 
also provide an entire license history detailing all activity that has 
taken place on a license with the ability to sort by round number. The 
reports will be publicly accessible. Moreover, after the auction 
closes, the Bureau will make available complete reports of all bids 
placed during each round of the auction, including bidder identities.
    216. DISH proposes several refinements to the Bureau's standard 
round result information and procedures. Specifically, DISH recommends 
that the Bureau (1) publish auction system specifications at least four 
weeks before the start of Auction 97 and consider releasing sample data 
files; (2) provide an auction application programming interface (API) 
for several different types of auction statistics and bid actions; (3) 
provide, after the close of each round, the total current bidder 
eligibility by bidding unit, the number of bidders that have reduced 
eligibility, and information about the total number of waivers used in 
the prior round. Spectrum Financial Partners requests that, in addition 
to making round result

[[Page 47129]]

reports available in TXT and XML formats in the FCC Auction System, the 
Bureau also make them available on an FTP site (preferably in XLS or 
CVS format) that can be automatically polled for updates and downloaded 
and processed more mechanically.
    217. The Bureau respectfully declines to adopt any of these 
proposals. Any modifications to the FCC Auction System or related 
infrastructure must be considered in the context of priorities, 
resources, and time for testing prior to the auction. Additionally, 
some of the information requested by DISH is purposefully not provided 
as part of the Bureau's limited information procedures.
8. Auction Announcements
    218. The Commission will use auction announcements to report 
necessary information such as schedule changes and stage transitions. 
All auction announcements will be available by clicking a link in the 
FCC Auction System. DISH asks that, in addition to posting notices to 
the FCC Auction System, the Bureau communicate new auction 
announcements in several ways, to include at least emails and text 
messages. While communicating new auction announcements in this manner 
might be convenient for participants, the Bureau declines to do so. 
Using email and/or text messages would introduce risk by increasing 
reliance on systems outside of the Commission's control. As with DISH's 
suggested changes to the Bureau's round results procedures, 
modifications to the FCC Auction System, related infrastructure, or 
procedures must also be considered in the context of priorities, 
resources, and time for testing prior to the auction. The Bureau 
concludes that providing auction announcements in the FCC Auction 
System, has been an effective and efficient way to communicate 
necessary information to auction participants in past auctions, and 
that this will be the case for Auction 97 as well.

V. Post-Auction Procedures

    219. Shortly after bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a 
public notice declaring the auction closed, identifying the winning 
bidders, and establishing the deadlines for submitting down payments, 
final payments, long-form applications, and ownership disclosure 
information reports.

A. Down Payments

    220. The Commission's rules provide that, unless otherwise 
specified by public notice, within ten business days after release of 
the auction closing public notice, each winning bidder must submit 
sufficient funds (in addition to its upfront payment) to bring its 
total amount of money on deposit with the Commission for Auction 97 to 
twenty percent of the net amount of its winning bids (gross bids less 
any applicable small business bidding credit). Since it is currently 
not known when Auction 97 will end and thus whether post-auction 
payments will be due in late 2014 or early 2015, several commenters 
request that the Bureau announce in advance of the auction that down 
payments will be due in early 2015 to enable potential bidders to make 
the necessary financial arrangements to ensure their ability to 
participate in Auction 97. The Bureau recognizes that uncertainties 
regarding the year in which down payments will be due could affect 
potential applicants from a capital planning perspective, which could 
in turn affect participation in the auction. Accordingly, the Bureau 
exercises its discretion under 47 CFR 1.2107(b) to set the down payment 
deadline for Auction 97 to be the later of January 7, 2015, or ten 
business days after release of the auction closing public notice.

B. Final Payments

    221. The Commission's rules provide that each winning bidder must 
submit the balance of the net amount of its winning bids within ten 
business days after the applicable deadline for submitting down 
payments. The same parties that ask the Bureau to announce in advance 
of the auction that down payments will be due in early 2015 request 
that the Bureau make a similar announcement concerning the due date for 
final payments. Because the Bureau exercises its discretion to set the 
down payment deadline in early 2015, it sets the final payment deadline 
to be the later of January 21, 2015 or ten business days after the 
applicable deadline for submitting down payments.

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

    222. The Commission's rules provide that, within ten business days 
after release of the auction closing notice, winning bidders must 
electronically submit a properly completed long-form application (FCC 
Form 601) for the license(s) they won through Auction 97. CCA and US 
Cellular request that the Bureau clarify that long-form applications 
will be due in 2015. Given the Spectrum Act's mandate to license the 
spectrum being offered in Auction 97 by February 2015, the Bureau 
declines to modify the timing for winning bidders to submit their long-
form applications and will require these forms to be filed according to 
the schedule specified in the Commission's rules.
    223. Winning bidders claiming eligibility for a small business 
bidding credit must demonstrate their eligibility for the bidding 
credit. Further instructions on these and other filing requirements 
will be provided to winning bidders in the auction closing public 
notice.
    224. Winning bidders organized as bidding consortia must comply 
with the long-form application procedures established in the CSEA/Part 
1 Report and Order. Specifically, each member (or group of members) of 
a winning consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to file 
a separate long-form application for its respective license(s). If the 
license is to be partitioned or disaggregated, the member (or group) 
filing the long-form application must provide the relevant partitioning 
or disaggregation agreement in its long-form application. In addition, 
if two or more consortium members wish to be licensed together, they 
must first form a legal business entity, and any such entity must meet 
the applicable designated entity criteria.

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

    225. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
public notice, each winning bidder must also comply with the ownership 
reporting requirements in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 by submitting 
an ownership disclosure information report for wireless 
telecommunications services (FCC Form 602) with its long-form 
application.
    226. If an applicant already has a complete and accurate FCC Form 
602 on file in ULS, it is not necessary to file a new report, but 
applicants must verify that the information on file with the Commission 
is complete and accurate. If the applicant does not have an FCC Form 
602 on file, or if it is not complete and accurate, the applicant must 
submit one.
    227. When an applicant submits a short-form application, ULS 
automatically creates an ownership record. This record is not an FCC 
Form 602, but may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602 with the 
ownership information submitted on the applicant's short-form 
application. Applicants must review the pre-filled information and 
confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the filing date of the 
long-form application before certifying and submitting the FCC Form

[[Page 47130]]

602. Further instructions will be provided to winning bidders in the 
auction closing public notice.

E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

    228. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy 
facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal lands 
that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that have a 
wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is eligible to 
receive a tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 
1.2110(f). A tribal lands bidding credit is in addition to, and 
separate from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may 
qualify.
    229. Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to the 
auction, a winning bidder applies for the tribal lands bidding credit 
after the auction when it files its long-form application (FCC Form 
601). When initially filing the long-form application, the winning 
bidder will be required to advise the Commission whether it intends to 
seek a tribal lands bidding credit, for each license won in the 
auction, by checking the designated box(es). After stating its intent 
to seek a tribal lands bidding credit, the applicant will have 180 days 
from the close of the long-form application filing window to amend its 
application to select the specific tribal lands to be served and 
provide the required tribal government certifications. Licensees 
receiving a tribal lands bidding credit are subject to performance 
criteria as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2110(f)(3)(vii).
    230. For additional information on the tribal lands bidding credit, 
including how the amount of the credit is calculated, applicants should 
review the Commission's rulemaking proceeding regarding tribal lands 
bidding credits and related public notices. Relevant documents can be 
viewed on the Commission's Web site by going to http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ and clicking on the Tribal Lands Credits 
link.

F. Default and Disqualification

    231. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment 
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in 47 CFR 
1.2104(g)(2). This payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to 
the difference between the amount of the Auction 97 bidder's winning 
bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering 
the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment 
equal to a percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent 
winning bid, whichever is less.
    232. As noted in the Auction 97 Comment Public Notice, the 
percentage of the bid that a defaulting bidder must pay in addition to 
the deficiency will depend on the auction format ultimately chosen for 
a particular auction. The amount can range from three percent up to a 
maximum of twenty percent, established in advance of the auction and 
based on the nature of the service and the inventory of the licenses 
being offered. As the Bureau noted in the Auction 97 Comment Public 
Notice, the Commission explained in the CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order 
that defaults weaken the integrity of the auction process and may 
impede the deployment of service to the public, and that an additional 
default payment of up to twenty percent will be more effective in 
deterring defaults than the three percent used in some earlier 
auctions. However, the Bureau does not believe the detrimental effects 
of any defaults in Auction 97 are likely to be unusually great. 
Balancing these considerations, the Bureau proposed to establish an 
additional default payment for Auction 97 of fifteen percent of the 
applicable bid. The Bureau received no comment on this proposal and 
therefore adopts it for Auction 97.
    233. Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission has the 
discretion to re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest 
bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a 
default or disqualification involves gross misconduct, 
misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the Commission may 
declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in future 
auctions, and may take any other action that it deems necessary, 
including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing 
authorizations held by the applicant.

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

    234. After the auction, applicants that are not winning bidders or 
are winning bidders whose upfront payment exceeded the total net amount 
of their winning bids may be entitled to a refund of some or all of 
their upfront payment. All refunds will be returned to the payer of 
record, as identified on the FCC Form 159, unless the payer submits 
written authorization instructing otherwise. Bidders should not request 
a refund of their upfront payments before the Commission releases a 
public notice declaring the auction closed, identifying the winning 
bidders, and establishing the deadlines for submitting down payments, 
long-form applications, and final payments.
    235. Bidders are encouraged to file their refund information 
electronically using the Refund Information icon found on the Auction 
Application Manager page or through the Wire Transfer for Refund 
Purposes link available on the Auction Application Submit Confirmation 
page in the FCC Auction System. If an applicant has completed the 
refund instructions electronically, the refund will be sent 
automatically. If an applicant has not completed the refund 
instructions electronically, the applicant must send a written request.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 2014-19080 Filed 8-11-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P