[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 134 (Monday, July 14, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40801-40805]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-16368]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-72560; File No. SR-NYSEARCA-2014-72]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing 
and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Amending the Fees 
for NYSE ArcaBook

July 8, 2014.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby 
given that, on June 24, 2014, NYSE Arca, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or 
``NYSE Arca'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, 
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory 
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE ArcaBook, which 
will be operative on July 1, 2014. The text of the proposed rule change 
is available on the Exchange's Web site at www.nyse.com, at the 
principal office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public 
Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization 
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the 
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the 
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at 
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared 
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most 
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE ArcaBook, which 
will be operative on July 1, 2014.
    NYSE ArcaBook is a real-time market data product that is a 
compilation of all limit orders resident in the NYSE Arca limit order 
book. The Exchange charges the following monthly display fees for NYSE 
ArcaBook: \4\
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    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 71483 (February 5, 
2014), 79 FR 8217 (February 11, 2014) (SR-NYSEArca-2014-12).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
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Access Fee................................  $2,000.
Redistribution Fee........................  $1,500.
Subscriber Fees...........................  Professional: $40.
                                            Non-professional: $10.
                                            Non-professional Fee Cap:
                                             $20,000.
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    The cap applies to any broker-dealer for non-professional 
subscribers that maintain brokerage accounts with the broker-dealer.\5\ 
The Exchange proposes to establish tiered non-professional user fees, 
which would remain at the current rate of $10 per user for up to 1,500 
non-professional users, and then decrease to $6 per user for the next 
1,500 non-professional users and then decrease to $3 per user for all 
non-professional users above that level, with the non-professional fee 
cap for broker-dealers set at $40,000. Most vendors with non-
professional users will pay the same fees as they do today, while a 
small number of vendors with larger numbers of non-professional users 
will pay more than they do today.
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    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54597 (October 12, 
2006), 71 FR 62029 (October 20, 2006) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21).
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    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent 
with the market-based approach of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``Commission''). The decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 
615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010), upheld reliance by the Commission upon 
the existence of competitive market mechanisms to set reasonable and 
equitably allocated fees for proprietary market data:

    In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress 
intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay of 
competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are 
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those 
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the 
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'

    Id. at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229 at 92 (1975), as reprinted 
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323). The court agreed with the Commission's 
conclusion that ``Congress intended that `competitive forces should 
dictate the services and practices that constitute the U.S. national 
market system for trading equity securities.' '' \6\
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    \6\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 535.
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    As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden on 
Competition, the Exchange believes that there is substantial evidence 
of competition in the marketplace for proprietary market data and that 
the Commission can rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees 
proposed in this filing are the product of competition and therefore 
satisfy the relevant statutory standards.\7\ In addition, the existence 
of alternatives to NYSE ArcaBook, including real-time consolidated 
data, free delayed consolidated data, and proprietary data from other 
sources, as described below, further ensures that the Exchange cannot 
set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, 
when vendors and subscribers can elect such alternatives.
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    \7\ Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the ``Dodd-Frank Act'') amended 
paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3), 
to make clear that all exchange fees for market data may be filed by 
exchanges on an immediately effective basis.
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    As the NetCoalition decision noted, the Commission is not required 
to undertake a cost-of-service or ratemaking approach.\8\ The Exchange 
believes that, even if it were possible as a matter of economic theory, 
cost-based pricing for non-core market data would be so complicated 
that it could not be done practically.\9\
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    \8\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 536.
    \9\ The Exchange believes that cost-based pricing would be 
impractical because it would create enormous administrative burdens 
for all parties, including the Commission, to cost-regulate a large 
number of participants and standardize and analyze extraordinary 
amounts of information, accounts, and reports. In addition, and as 
described below, it is impossible to regulate market data prices in 
isolation from prices charged by markets for other services that are 
joint products. Cost-based rate regulation would also lead to 
litigation and may distort incentives, including those to minimize 
costs and to innovate, leading to further waste. Under cost-based 
pricing, the Commission would be burdened with determining a fair 
rate of return, and the industry could experience frequent rate 
increases based on escalating expense levels. Even in industries 
historically subject to utility regulation, cost-based ratemaking 
has been discredited. As such, the Exchange believes that cost-based 
ratemaking would be inappropriate for proprietary market data and 
inconsistent with Congress's direction that the Commission use its 
authority to foster the development of the national market system, 
and that market forces will continue to provide appropriate pricing 
discipline. See Appendix C to NYSE's comments to the Commission's 
2000 Concept Release on the Regulation of Market Information Fees 
and Revenues, which can be found on the Commission's Web site at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/buck1.htm.

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[[Page 40802]]

2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent 
with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\10\ in general, and 
Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\11\ in particular, in that it 
provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among its members, 
issuers, and other persons using its facilities and is not designed to 
permit unfair discrimination among customers, issuers, brokers, or 
dealers. The Exchange also believes that the proposed rule change is 
consistent with Section 11(A) of the Act \12\ in that it is consistent 
with (i) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange 
markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange 
markets; and (ii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors 
of information with respect to quotations for and transactions in 
securities. Furthermore, the proposed rule change is consistent with 
Rule 603 of Regulation NMS,\13\ which provides that any national 
securities exchange that distributes information with respect to 
quotations for or transactions in an NMS stock do so on terms that are 
not unreasonably discriminatory.
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    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4), (5).
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78k-1.
    \13\ See 17 CFR 242.603.
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    The Exchange believes that the increase in the non-professional fee 
cap is reasonable because until this year, the Exchange had not raised 
NYSE ArcaBook fees since they were proposed more than seven years ago 
in 2006, and the total non-professional user fee for all issues has 
remained the same since that time.\14\ The Exchange has enhanced NYSE 
ArcaBook through delivery upgrades, and the message traffic has 
increased threefold. The Exchange believes that the new fees are fair 
and reasonable in light of increased quote message traffic and the 
Exchange's ongoing effort to improve the delivery technology for market 
data.
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    \14\ See supra notes 4 and 5.
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    In addition, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees and cap 
are reasonable because they are less than the fees applicable to 
similar products offered by The NASDAQ Stock Market (``NASDAQ''). Under 
NASDAQ Rule 7023, NASDAQ offers (i) Level 2, which is the best-priced 
displayed orders or quotes from each NASDAQ member for NASDAQ-listed 
issues, for $9 per month per non-professional user; (ii) TotalView, 
which covers all displayed orders and quotes from all NASDAQ members 
for NASDAQ-listed issues for $14 per month per non-professional user 
(which includes Level 2); and (iii) OpenView, which covers all 
displayed orders and quotes from all NASDAQ members for issues listed 
on other exchanges for $1 per month per non-professional user. Together 
these fees total $15 per month per non-professional subscriber to cover 
all issues. NASDAQ's monthly fee cap for broker-dealers to provide 
NASDAQ products to their non-professional customers is $25,000, but it 
does not apply to Level 2 fees. In comparison, NYSE ArcaBook covers 
securities listed on NYSE Arca as well as other exchanges in a single 
product for $10 or less per month per non-professional subscriber and 
no fees are excluded from the proposed cap; as such, the Exchange's 
proposed fees will be less than NASDAQ's fees for its three products.
    The Exchange further believes that the proposed subscriber fees are 
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because the fee structure of 
differentiated professional and non-professional fees has long been 
used by the Exchange for other products, by other exchanges for their 
products, and by the CTA and CQ Plans in order to make data more 
broadly available to retail customers.\15\ Continuing to offer NYSE 
ArcaBook to non-professional users with the same data available to 
professional users results in greater equity among data recipients.
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    \15\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20002, File 
No. S7-433 (July 22, 1983) (establishing non-professional fees for 
CTA data); NASDAQ Rules 7023(b), 7047.
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    The tiered structure with decreasing fees as the number of non-
professional subscribers increases is equitable and not unfairly 
discriminatory because it is similar to the four-tier structure used 
for professional subscribers by the CTA and CQ for Network A data.\16\ 
Most of the broker-dealers that purchase NYSE ArcaBook have fewer than 
1,500 non-professional users and would be unaffected by the change in 
fees, and only a small number of broker-dealers that have a large 
number of non-professional users will pay more as a result of the 
proposed cap.
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    \16\ Those monthly fees are $50 for 1-2 devices, $30 for 3-999 
devices, $25 for 1,000-9,999 devices, and $20 for 10,000 or more 
devices. See CTA Network A Rate Schedule, available at http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/default.aspx?tabid=518.
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    The Exchange notes that it recently increased its access and 
professional fees for NYSE ArcaBook, which also had been unchanged 
since 2006,\17\ and that it is equitable to apply an increase to the 
cap for non-professional users as well because they also benefit from 
the Exchange's ongoing effort to improve the delivery technology for 
market data. The Exchange believes that maintaining the cap at the 
increased level is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because 
broker-dealers will continue to get the benefit of an enterprise cap 
and can continue to receive a substantial discount to what the cost 
would be without a cap. The Exchange believes that it has structured 
the proposed change in a manner that minimizes its impact on most 
broker-dealers; those that would pay more would have the largest number 
of customers over which to spread the cost. The Exchange believes that 
its proposal will continue to encourage the availability of the data to 
a broad spectrum of non-professional users.
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    \17\ See supra note 5.
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    The Exchange also notes that the use of NYSE ArcaBook is entirely 
optional. Firms have alternative market data products from which to 
choose. Moreover, the Exchange is not required to make these 
proprietary data products available or to offer any specific pricing 
alternatives to any customers.
    For these reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are 
reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act,\18\ the Exchange 
does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden 
on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of 
the purposes of the Act. An exchange's ability to price its proprietary 
data feed products is constrained by (1) the inherent contestability of 
the market for proprietary data and actual competition for the sale of 
such data, (2) the joint product nature of exchange platforms, and (3) 
the existence of alternatives to proprietary data.
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    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
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    The Existence of Actual Competition. The market for proprietary 
data products is currently competitive and inherently contestable 
because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the 
creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the 
proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with

[[Page 40803]]

each other for listings and order flow and sales of market data itself, 
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish 
to compete in any or all of those areas, including producing and 
distributing their own market data. Proprietary data products are 
produced and distributed by each individual exchange, as well as other 
entities, in a vigorously competitive market.
    Competitive markets for listings, order flow, executions, and 
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of 
proprietary data products and therefore constrain markets from 
overpricing proprietary market data. The U.S. Department of Justice 
also has acknowledged the aggressive competition among exchanges, 
including for the sale of proprietary market data itself. In 2011, 
Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney stated that exchanges 
``compete head to head to offer real-time equity data products. These 
data products include the best bid and offer of every exchange and 
information on each equity trade, including the last sale.'' \19\
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    \19\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant 
Attorney General Christine Varney Holds Conference Call Regarding 
NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. Abandoning 
Their Bid for NYSE Euronext (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/atr/speeches/2011/at-speech-110516.html.
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    It is common for broker-dealers to further exploit this recognized 
competitive constraint by sending their order flow and transaction 
reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single 
market. As a 2010 Commission Concept Release noted, the ``current 
market structure can be described as dispersed and complex'' with 
``trading volume . . . dispersed among many highly automated trading 
centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks'' and ``trading 
centers offer[ing] a wide range of services that are designed to 
attract different types of market participants with varying trading 
needs.'' \20\ More recently, SEC Chair White has noted that competition 
for order flow in exchange-listed equities is ``intense'' and divided 
among many trading venues, including exchanges, more than 40 
alternative trading systems, and more than 250 broker-dealers.\21\
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    \20\ Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (Jan. 14, 2010), 75 FR 3594 (Jan. 21, 
2010) (File No. S7-02-10).
    \21\ Mary Jo White, Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure, 
Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage 
Conference, (June 5, 2014) (available on the Commission Web site), 
citing Tuttle, Laura, 2014, ``OTC Trading: Description of Non-ATS 
OTC Trading in National Market System Stocks,'' at 7-8.
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    In addition, in the case of products that are distributed through 
market data vendors, the market data vendors themselves provide 
additional price discipline for proprietary data products because they 
control the primary means of access to certain end users. These vendors 
impose price discipline based upon their business models. The Exchange 
believes that broker-dealers will not elect to make NYSE ArcaBook 
available to their non-professional customers unless the broker-dealers 
believe that such an offering will help them attract or retain 
customers. All of these operate as constraints on pricing proprietary 
data products.
    Joint Product Nature of Exchange Platform. Transaction execution 
and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is 
both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market 
data and trade executions are a paradigmatic example of joint products 
with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an 
order will depend on the attributes of the platforms where the order 
can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality, and price 
and distribution of their data products. Without a platform for posting 
quotations and executing transactions, market data would not exist.
    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution 
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a 
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both 
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's broker-
dealer customers view the costs of transaction executions and market 
data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange.
    Other market participants have noted that the liquidity provided by 
the order book, trade execution, core market data, and non-core market 
data are joint products of a joint platform and have common costs.\22\ 
The Exchange also notes that the economics literature confirms that 
there is no way to allocate common costs between joint products that 
would shed any light on competitive or efficient pricing.\23\
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    \22\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62887 (Sept. 10, 
2010), 75 FR 57092, 57095 (Sept. 17, 2010) (SR-Phlx-2010-121); 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62907 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR 
57314, 57317 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-110); and Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR 57321, 57324 
(Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-111) (``all of the exchange's costs 
are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, 
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data 
about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns 
reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the 
total costs of the joint products.''); see also Securities Exchange 
Act Release Nos. 71217 (Dec. 31, 2013), 79 FR 875, 877 (Jan. 7, 
2014) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-162) and 70945 (Nov. 26, 2013), 78 FR 72740, 
72741 (Dec. 3, 2013) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-142) (``Transaction execution 
and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data 
is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, 
market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint 
products with joint costs.'').
    \23\ See generally Mark Hirschey, Fundamentals of Managerial 
Economics, at 600 (2009) (``It is important to note, however, that 
although it is possible to determine the separate marginal costs of 
goods produced in variable proportions, it is impossible to 
determine their individual average costs. This is because common 
costs are expenses necessary for manufacture of a joint product. 
Common costs of production--raw material and equipment costs, 
management expenses, and other overhead--cannot be allocated to each 
individual by-product on any economically sound basis. . . . Any 
allocation of common costs is wrong and arbitrary.''). This is not 
new economic theory. See, e.g., F.W. Taussig, ``A Contribution to 
the Theory of Railway Rates,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics V(4) 
438, 465 (July 1891) (``Yet, surely, the division is purely 
arbitrary. These items of cost, in fact, are jointly incurred for 
both sorts of traffic; and I cannot share the hope entertained by 
the statistician of the Commission, Professor Henry C. Adams, that 
we shall ever reach a mode of apportionment that will lead to 
trustworthy results.'').
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    Analyzing the cost of market data product production and 
distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting 
the creation of market data and market data products will inevitably 
underestimate the cost of the data and data products. Thus, because it 
is impossible to obtain the data inputs to create market data products 
without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution 
system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of both 
obtaining the market data itself and creating and distributing market 
data products. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute 
all of an exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's 
joint products. Rather, all of an exchange's costs are incurred for the 
unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing 
orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The 
total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives 
from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.
    The level of competition and contestability in the market is 
evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow, 
including 12 equities self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') markets, 
as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various forms of 
alternative trading

[[Page 40804]]

systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools and electronic communication 
networks (``ECNs''). Competition among trading platforms can be 
expected to constrain the aggregate return that each platform earns 
from the sale of its joint products, but different platforms may choose 
from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as 
the means of recovering total costs. For example, some platforms may 
choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices 
for market data products (or provide market data products free of 
charge), and charge relatively high prices for accessing posted 
liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of paying lower 
rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting relatively high 
prices for market data products, or setting relatively low prices for 
accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there is no economic 
basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an 
industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to 
the joint offering.
    Existence of Alternatives. The large number of SROs, BDs, and ATSs 
that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of 
producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data 
products. Each SRO, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce 
proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced 
plans to do so, including but not limited to the Exchange, NYSE, NYSE 
MKT, NASDAQ OMX, BATS, and Direct Edge.
    The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can 
bypass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete 
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data 
products. Second, because a single order or transaction report can 
appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or 
both, the amount of data available via proprietary products is greater 
in size than the actual number of orders and transaction reports that 
exist in the marketplace. Because market data users can thus find 
suitable substitutes for most proprietary market data products, such as 
the NASDAQ products described herein, a market that overprices its 
market data products stands a high risk that users may substitute 
another source of market data information for its own.
    Those competitive pressures imposed by available alternatives are 
evident in the Exchange's proposed pricing. As noted above, the 
proposed fees for NYSE ArcaBook are less than the fees charged by 
NASDAQ for non-professional use of its depth-of-book products.
    In addition to the competition and price discipline described 
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly 
contestable because market entry is rapid and inexpensive. The history 
of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly 
grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and 
proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, 
RediBook, Attain, TrackECN, BATS, and Direct Edge. Today, BATS and 
Direct Edge provide certain market data at no charge on their Web sites 
in order to attract more order flow, and use revenue rebates from 
resulting additional executions to maintain low execution charges for 
their users.\24\
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    \24\ This is simply a securities market-specific example of the 
well-established principle that in certain circumstances more sales 
at lower margins can be more profitable than fewer sales at higher 
margins; this example is additional evidence that market data is an 
inherent part of a market's joint platform.
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    Further, data products are valuable to certain end users only 
insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist 
them or their customers. The Exchange believes that only broker-dealers 
that expect to derive a reasonable benefit from offering NYSE ArcaBook 
to their non-professional customers will choose to pay the attendant 
monthly fees.
    In establishing the proposed fees, the Exchange considered the 
competitiveness of the market for proprietary data and all of the 
implications of that competition. The Exchange believes that it has 
considered all relevant factors and has not considered irrelevant 
factors in order to establish fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably 
discriminatory fees and an equitable allocation of fees among all 
users. The existence of alternatives to the Exchange's products, 
including proprietary data from other sources, ensures that the 
Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably 
discriminatory, when vendors and subscribers can elect these 
alternatives or choose not to purchase a specific proprietary data 
product if its cost to purchase is not justified by the returns any 
particular vendor or subscriber would achieve through the purchase.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the 
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to 
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \25\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 
19b-4 \26\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other 
charge imposed by the Exchange.
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    \25\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \26\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission 
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under 
Section 19(b)(2)(B) \27\ of the Act to determine whether the proposed 
rule change should be approved or disapproved.
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    \27\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-NYSEARCA-2014-72 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEARCA-2014-72. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's

[[Page 40805]]

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 
submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with 
respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, 
and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change 
between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be 
withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing will also be available for inspection 
and copying at the NYSE's principal office and on its Internet Web site 
at www.nyse.com. All comments received will be posted without change; 
the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from 
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make 
available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-
NYSEARCA-2014-72 and should be submitted on or before August 4, 2014.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\28\
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    \28\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-16368 Filed 7-11-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P