[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 121 (Tuesday, June 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35801-35816]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-14606]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2014-0146]
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant
Hazards Considerations
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Biweekly notice.
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SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the
Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to
be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined
license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that
such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from May 29, 2014 to June 11, 2014. The last
biweekly notice was published on June 6, 2014.
DATES: Comments must be filed by July 24, 2014. A request for a hearing
must be filed by August 25, 2014.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting
comments on a specific subject):
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0146. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration,
Mail Stop: 3WFN-06-A44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001.
For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kay K. Goldstein, NRR/DORL/LPLI-1,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001;
telephone: 301-415-1506 email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0146 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain
publicly-available information related to this action by any of the
following methods:
Federal rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0146.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2014-0146 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly
disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC will post all comment
submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment
submissions into ADAMS, and the NRC does not routinely edit comment
submissions to remove identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly
[[Page 35802]]
disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that
the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such
information before making the comment submissions available to the
public or entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses and Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in Sec. 50.92 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), this means that operation of the facility
in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave To Intervene
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or
combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency
Rules of Practice and Procedure'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is
available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. The
NRC's regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC Library on
the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is
filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer
designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request
and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing
or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing.
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing
held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139;
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings
[[Page 35803]]
unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the procedures
described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least
ten 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should
contact the Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected],
or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital
identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its
counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the
E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic
docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/getting-started.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer
assistance in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System,
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form,
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document
via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's public
Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email to
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC
regulation or other law requires submission of such information.
However, a request to intervene will require including information on
local residence in order to demonstrate a proximity assertion of
interest in the proceeding. With respect to copyrighted works, except
for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings
and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested
not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.
Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60
days from the date of publication of this notice. Requests for hearing,
petitions for leave to intervene, and motions for leave to file new or
amended contentions that are filed after the 60-day deadline will not
be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer that the
filing demonstrates good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(iii).
For further details with respect to these license amendment
applications, see the application for amendment which is available for
public inspection in ADAMS and at the NRC's PDR. For additional
direction on obtaining information related to this document, see the
``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this
document.
Duke Energy Progress Inc., Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam
Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina
Date of amendment request: September 10, 2013, as supplemented by
letter dated April 8, 2014. Publicly-available versions are in ADAMS
under Accession Nos. ML13262A008 and ML14106A370, respectively.
[[Page 35804]]
Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise
Surveillance Requirement 3.4.12.6, of Technical Specification (TS)
3.4.12, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System, with a
Note that does not require that the surveillance be performed until 12
hours after decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg
temperature to less than or equal to (<=) 350 degrees Fahrenheit
([deg]F), which is the temperature when LTOP operability controlled by
TS 3.4.12 is credited. In addition, the FREQUENCY requirement is
modified to 31 days after the initial testing has been proven to be
acceptable. The changes are in accordance with NUREG-1431, Revision 3,
``Standard Technical Specifications--Westinghouse Plants,'' dated June
2004.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This license amendment request proposes allowing up to a 12 hour
delay in performing the COT [channel operational test] testing used
to verify the LTOP lift setpoint following the RCS reaching the
maximum temperature at which the LTOP is required to be operable.
The pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) are utilized to
protect against exceeding safe pressure limits under low temperature
conditions. The system is in service whenever the plant is in Modes
4, 5 and 6 with the reactor head on and the RCS cold leg temperature
is at <= 350 [deg]F. The proposed change does not affect the
function of the LTOP or when that function is applicable for
protection of the plant. The change only adjusts the required
frequency of the initial surveillance testing after the LTOP has
been put into service per plant procedures. The affected
surveillance testing is not assumed to be an accident initiator and
has no adverse effect on the operation of the LTOP system.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed change does not alter the design, function, or
operation of any plant component and does not install any new or
different equipment. The malfunction of safety related equipment,
assumed to be operable in the accident analyses, would not be caused
as a result of the proposed technical specification change. No new
failure mode has been created and no new equipment performance
burdens are imposed.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV) are utilized
to protect against exceeding safe pressure limits under low
temperature conditions. The system is in service whenever the plant
is in Modes 4, 5 and 6 with the reactor head on and the RCS cold leg
temperature at <= 350 [deg]F. The proposed change does not affect
the function of the LTOP or when that function is applicable for
protection of the plant. The change only adjusts the required
frequency of the initial surveillance testing after the LTOP has
been put into service per plant procedures. In addition, these
proposed changes may enhance plant safety and reliability because
the delay in the required testing will allow the operators to focus
on other critical transition activities during entry into Mode 4
operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Deputy General Counsel,
Duke Energy Corporation, 550 South Tyron Street, Mail Code DEC45A,
Charlotte, NC 28202.
NRC Acting Branch Chief: Lisa M. Regner.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457,
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois, Docket Nos.
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Ogle
County, Illinois
Date of amendment request: March 18, 2014. A publicly-available
version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML14077A582.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise Technical Specifications (TS) 3.4.15, ``RCS Leakage Detection
Instrumentation,'' to define a new time limit for restoring inoperable
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation to
operable status and establish alternate methods of monitoring RCS
leakage when one or more required monitors are inoperable. The changes
are consistent with NRC-approved Revision 3 to Technical Specification
Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specification (STS)
Change Traveler TSTF-513, ``Revise PWR Operability Requirements and
Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation.''
The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the
Federal Register on January 3, 2011 (76 FR 189), as part of the
consolidated line item improvement process.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Increase in
the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change clarifies the operability requirements for
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation, and prescribes the time
allowed for the plant to operate when the only TS-required operable
RCS leakage detection instrumentation monitor is the containment
atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor. The monitoring of RCS
leakage is not a precursor to any accident previously evaluated. The
monitoring of RCS leakage is not used to mitigate the consequences
of any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the Proposed Change Create the Possibility of a New or
Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change clarifies the operability requirements for
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation and prescribes the time
allowed for the plant to operate when the only TS-required operable
RCS leakage detection instrumentation monitor is the containment
atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor. The proposed change does
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different
type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods
governing normal plant operation. The proposed change maintains
sufficient continuity and diversity of leak detection capability
that the probability of piping evaluated and approved for Leak-
Before-Break progressing to pipe rupture remains extremely low.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any previously evaluated.
3. Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a
Margin of Safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change reintroduces the containment atmosphere
gaseous radioactivity monitor as an option for
[[Page 35805]]
meeting the operability requirement for TS 3.4.15 LCO [Limiting
Condition for Operation], clarifies the operability requirements for
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation and prescribes the time
allowed for the plant to operate when the only TS-required operable
RCS leakage detection instrumentation monitor is the containment
atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor.
The proposed change reintroduces the containment atmosphere
gaseous radioactivity monitor as an option for meeting the
operability requirement for TS 3. 4.15 LCO, since industry
experience has shown that the containment atmosphere gaseous
radiation monitor is useful to detect an increase in RCS leak rate
and provides a diverse means to confirm an RCS leak exists when
other monitors detect an increase in RCS leak rate.
The amount of time the plant is allowed to operate with only the
containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor operable does
not result in a reduction in the margin of safety since an increase
in RCS leakage will be detected before it potentially results in a
gross failure.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based upon the above analysis, EGC [Exelon Generation Company,
LLC] concludes that the requested change does not involve a
significant hazards consideration, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c),
``Issuance of Amendment.''
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.
Northern States Power Company--Minnesota, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello
Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: October 30, 2012, as supplemented by
letters dated May 16, 2013, June 7, 2013, March 13, 2014, and May 30,
2014. Publicly-available versions are in ADAMS under Accession Nos.
ML123070544, ML13136A145, ML13158A269, ML14072A390, and ML14150A271,
respectively).
Description of amendment request: The amendment proposes to revise
the MNGP technical specification (TS) 4.3.1, ``Fuel Storage
Criticality,'' and TS 4.3.3, ``Fuel Storage Capacity,'' to reflect fuel
storage system changes; a revised criticality safety analysis that
addresses legacy fuel types, in addition to the planned use of AREVA
Atrium\TM\ 10XM fuel design; and adds a new TS 5.5.15, ``Spent Fuel
Pool Boral Monitoring Program,'' for assuring that the spent fuel pool
storage rack neutron absorber material (Boral) meets the minimum
requirements assumed in the criticality safety analysis.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which the Commission issued in the Federal Register on
June 11, 2013 (78 FR 35063). The Commission is issuing a revised no
significant hazards consideration to consider the aspects of the new
program TS 5.5.15.
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment does not change the fuel handling
processes, fuel storage racks, decay heat generation rate, or the
SFP [spent fuel pool] cooling and cleanup system. The proposed
amendment was evaluated for impact on the following previously-
evaluated events and accidents: (1) Fuel handling accident (FHA),
(2) fuel assembly misleading, (3) seismically-induced movement of
spent fuel storage racks, and (4) loss of spent fuel pool cooling.
Whereas fuel handling procedures will not be changed materially
for the new fuel type or the revised criticality methods, the
probability of a FHA is not increased because the implementation of
the proposed amendment will employ the same equipment and procedures
to handle fuel assemblies that are currently used. Therefore, the
proposed amendment does not increase the probability or occurrence
of a FHA. In that the proposed amendment does not increase the
mechanistic damage to a fuel assembly or the radiological source
term of any fuel assembly, the amendment would not increase the
radiological consequences of a FHA. With regard to the potential
criticality consequences of a dropped assembly coming to rest
adjacent to a storage rack or on top of a storage rack, the results
are bounded by the current analysis involving a potential missing
neutron poison plate in the storage rack. The fuel configuration
caused by a dropped assembly resting on top of loaded storage racks
is inherently bounded by the assembly misloaded in the storage rack
because the misloaded assembly is in closer proximity to other
assemblies along its entire fuel length.
Operation in accordance with the proposed amendment will not
change the probability of a fuel assembly misloading because fuel
movement will continue to be controlled by approved fuel selection
and fuel handling procedures. The consequences of a fuel misloading
event (fuel assembly loaded into an unapproved location) are not
changed because the reactivity analysis demonstrates that the same
subcriticality criteria and requirements continue to be met for the
worst-case fuel misloading event.
Operation in accordance with the proposed amendment will not
change the probability of occurrence of a seismic event, which is
considered an Act of God. Also, the consequences of a seismic event
are not changed because the proposed amendment involves no
significant change to the types of material stored in SFP storage
racks or their mass. In this manner, the forcing functions for
seismic excitation and the resulting forces are not changed. Also,
particular to criticality, the supporting criticality analysis takes
no credit for gaps between high-density rack modules so any
seismically-induced movement between high-density racks that puts
them in closer proximity would not result in an unanalyzed condition
with consequences worse than those analyzed. Also, the small
displacement of the high-density rack closest to the fixed location
of the low-density rack will not put those racks in a closer
proximity than that analyzed. In summary, the proposed amendment
will not increase the probability or consequence of a seismic event.
Operation in accordance with the proposed amendment will not
change the probability of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling because
the changes in fuel criticality limits and introduction of the
ATRIUM 10XM fuel design have no bearing on the systems, structures,
and components involved in initiating such an event. The proposed
amendment does not change the heat load imposed by spent fuel
assemblies nor does it change the flow paths in the spent fuel pool.
Therefore, the accident consequences are not increased for the
proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would establish a TS requirement to
provide and maintain a monitoring program for SFP storage rack
Boral. In that regard, the proposed TS does not change the fuel
handling processes, fuel storage racks, the character of the nuclear
fuel, or the SFP cooling and cleanup systems that might affect the
probability or consequences of an accident associated with the SFP.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment involves no new SFP loading
configurations for current and legacy fuel designs of the nuclear
plant. The proposed amendment does not change or modify the fuel
handling processes, fuel storage racks, decay heat generation rate,
or the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. Further, the new
fuel type does not introduce any incompatible materials to the spent
fuel pool environment.
As such, the proposed changes introduce no new material
interactions, man-machine interfaces, or processes that could create
the potential for an accident of a new or different type.
Operation with the proposed amendment will not create a new or
different kind of
[[Page 35806]]
accident because fuel movement will continue to be controlled by
approved fuel handling procedures. There are no changes in the
criteria or design requirements pertaining to fuel storage safety,
including subcriticality requirements, and analyses demonstrate that
the proposed storage arrays meet these requirements and criteria
with adequate margins. Thus, the proposed storage arrays cannot
cause a new or different kind of accident.
The proposed amendment would establish a TS requirement to
provide and maintain a monitoring program for SFP storage rack
Boral. As such, the proposed changes introduce no new material
interactions, man-machine interfaces, or processes that could create
the potential for an accident of a new or difference type.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment was evaluated for its effect on current
margins of safety for criticality. Although the amendment involves
changing the subcriticality acceptance limit for the low-density
storage rack from a value of 0.90 to 0.95, the margin of safety for
subcriticality is not significantly reduced in that the limit is
consistent with that of the other storage racks and the regulation
described by 10 CFR 50.68 (b)(4). The new criticality analysis
confirms that operation in accordance with the proposed amendment
continues to meet the required subcriticality margin.
The proposed amendment would establish a TS requirement to
provide and maintain a monitoring program for SFP storage rack
Boral. The proposed TS expressly establishes an acceptance criterion
that relates directly to the minimum neutron attenuation capability
assumed in the criticality safety analysis. Thus, it is expressly
created to maintain the safety margin established in the analysis.
As such, the proposed changes introduce no change to plant system
operation or nuclear fuel characteristics that would affect the
margin of safety for plant systems.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel,
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert D. Carlson.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Georgia Power Company,
Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia,
City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch
Nuclear Plant (HNP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia
Date of amendment request: March 24, 2014. A publicly-available
version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML14084A201.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
modify Technical Specification (TS) Reactor Core Safety Limits 2.1.1.1
and 2.1.1.2 to reduce the reactor steam dome pressure from 785 to 685
psig. The licensee states that this revision will resolve a concern
reported pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, ``Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance'' regarding the potential to violate Reactor Core Safety
Limit 2.1.1.1 during a pressure regulator failure open (PRFO)
transient.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
SNC has evaluated the proposed amendment in accordance with 10
CFR 50.91 against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined
that the operation of the HNP Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the
proposed amendment presents no significant hazards. SNC's evaluation
against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 follows.
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change to the reactor steam dome pressure in
Reactor Core Safety Limits 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2 does not alter the
use of the analytical methods used to determine the safety limits
that have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. The
proposed change is in accordance with an NRC approved critical power
correlation methodology, and as such, maintains required safety
margins. The proposed change does not adversely affect accident
initiators or precursors, nor does it alter the design assumptions,
conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which
the plant is operated and maintained.
The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their
intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating
event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does
not require any physical change to any plant SSCs nor does it
require any change in systems or plant operations. The proposed
change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and
resultant consequences.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the
method by which any plant systems perform a safety function. No new
accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures
are introduced as a result of the proposed change.
The proposed change does not introduce any new accident
precursors, nor does it involve any physical plant alterations or
changes in the methods governing normal plant operation. Also, the
change does not impose any new or different requirements or
eliminate any existing requirements. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is related to confidence in the ability of the
fission product barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and
primary containment) to perform their design functions during and
following postulated accidents. Evaluation of the 10 CFR Part 21
condition by General Electric determined that since the Minimum
Critical Power Ratio improves during the PRFO transient, there is no
decrease in the safety margin and therefore there is not a threat to
fuel cladding integrity.
The proposed change to Reactor Core Safety Limits 2.1.1.1 and
2.1.1.2 is consistent with and within the capabilities of the
applicable NRC approved critical power correlation for the fuel
designs in use at HNP Units 1 and 2. No setpoints at which
protective actions are initiated are altered by the proposed change.
The proposed change does not alter the manner in which the safety
limits are determined. This change is consistent with plant design
and does not change the TS operability requirements; thus,
previously evaluated accidents are not affected by this proposed
change.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, SNC has determined that operation of the
facility in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a
significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92(c), in
that it does not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three
[[Page 35807]]
standards of 10 CFR 50.59(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw,
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037
NRC Branch Chief: Robert Pascarelli.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request: November 22, 2013. A publicly-available
version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML13329A717.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the
current Technical Specifications (CTS) to Standard Technical
Specifications (STS) consistent with the Improved Standard Technical
Specifications (ITS) described in NUREG-1431, ``Standard Technical
Specifications--Westinghouse Plants,'' Revision 4. Licensees are
encouraged to upgrade their plant-specific technical specifications to
the ITS to achieve a high degree of standardization and consistency as
described in NUREG-1431 Rev. 4 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12100A222). A
number of changes and revisions have been made to those STS, which
includes the adoption of some recent Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF) travelers. The LAR also includes changes that are beyond the
scope of the ITS as described in NUREG-1431, Revision 4.
Enclosure 1 of the LAR contains ``Contents of the Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2, ITS Submittal,'' which describes the organization
and content of the submittal, including each of the volumes in
Enclosure 2.
Enclosure 2 of the LAR contains 16 volumes and the bases for the
proposed ITS. These bases, however, are not part of the technical
specifications and are not part of the staff's review, but are
maintained consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR). Volumes 1-14 provide a detailed description of the proposed
changes to the following ITS Chapters and Sections:
Volume 1.......................... Application of Selection Criteria.
Volume 2.......................... No Significant Hazard Consideration
and Environmental Assessment.
Volume 3.......................... ITS Chapter 1.0, Use and
Application.
Volume 4.......................... ITS Chapter 2.0, Safety Limits.
Volume 5.......................... ITS Section 3.0, Limiting Condition
for Operation (LCO) Applicability
and Surveillance Requirement (SR)
Applicability.
Volume 6.......................... ITS Section 3.1, Reactivity Control
Systems.
Volume 7.......................... ITS Section 3.2, Power Distribution
Limits.
Volume 8.......................... ITS Section 3.3, Instrumentation.
Volume 9.......................... ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant
System (RCS).
Volume 10......................... ITS Section 3.5, Emergency Core
Cooling Systems (ECCS).
Volume 11......................... ITS Section 3.6, Containment
Systems.
Volume 12......................... ITS Section 3.7, Plant Systems.
Volume 13......................... ITS Section 3.8, Electrical Power
Systems.
Volume 14......................... ITS Section 3.9, Refueling
Operations.
Volume 15......................... ITS Chapter 4.0, Design Features.
Volume 16......................... ITS Chapter 5.0, Administrative
Controls.
Enclosure 3 of the LAR provides a description of the 15 beyond
scope changes and 7 TSTF travelers that are likely to need a formal
Technical Branch review. Enclosure 4 provides evaluations that justify
adoption of changes to the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features
Actuation Systems. Enclosure 5 provides evaluations that justify
adoption of changes to the extension of containment isolation valve
completion times. Enclosure 6 provides information on the disposition
of other LARs as they related to the SQN ITS conversion. Enclosure 7
lists the NRC-approved changes to NUREG-1431, Revision 4, as of March
6, 2011, and summarizes TVA's disposition of these changes in the SQN
ITS conversion. Enclosure 8 lists the regulatory commitments made in
TVA's ITS conversion LAR. Enclosure 9 provides a summary of the UFSAR
descriptions required as part of the adoption of TSTF-500, ``DC [direct
current] Electrical Rewrite--Update to TSTF-360'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML111751792). Enclosure 10 provides documentation of TVA's
Probabilistic Risk Assessment technical adequacy required as part of
the adoption of TSTF-425, ``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to
Licensee Control--RITSTF Initiative 5b'' (ADAMS Package Accession No.
ML090850642).
This notice is based on the November 22, 2013, request, and the
information provided to the NRC through the Sequoyah ITS Conversion Web
page hosted by Excel Services Corporation at http://www.excelservices.com. To expedite the review of the application, the
NRC staff has issued and will issue its requests for additional
information (RAIs) using the ITS Conversion Web page. The licensee has
addressed and will address the NRC staff's RAIs through the ITS
Conversion Web page. Entry into the database is protected so that only
NRC reviewers can enter information into the database to add RAIs and
only the licensee can enter the database to provide responses to the
RAIs; however, the public can enter the database to read the questions
asked and the responses provided. To be in compliance with the
regulations for written communications for LARs and to have the
database on the SQN dockets before the amendments would be issued, the
licensee will provide a copy of the database in a submittal to the NRC
after the staff has no further RAIs and before the NRC staff's
decisions on the amendments are made. The RAIs and responses to RAIs
are organized by ITS Section.
The licensee has classified each proposed change to the SQN CTS
into one of the following five categories (with its letter designator
within brackets):
Administrative changes (A)--Changes to the CTS that do not
result in new requirements or change operational restrictions or
flexibility. These changes are supported in aggregate by a single
generic no significant hazards consideration (NSHC).
More restrictive changes (M)--Changes to the CTS that
result in added restrictions or reduced flexibility. These changes are
supported in aggregate by a single generic NSHC.
Relocated specifications (R)--Changes to the CTS that
relocate specifications that do not meet the selection criteria of
Sec. 50.36(c)(2)(ii) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR). These changes are
[[Page 35808]]
supported in aggregate by a single generic NSHC.
Removed detail changes (LA)--Changes to the CTS that
eliminate detail and relocate the detail to a licensee-controlled
document. Typically, this involves details of system design and
function, or procedural detail on methods of conducting a Surveillance
Requirement (SR). These changes are supported in aggregate by a single
generic NSHC.
Less restrictive changes (L)--Changes to the CTS that
result in reduced restrictions or added flexibility. These changes are
supported either in aggregate by a generic NSHC that addresses a
particular category of less restrictive change, or by a specific NSHC
if the change does not fall into one of the nine categories of less
restrictive changes. The nine categories of less restrictive changes
are designated as:
Category 1: Relaxation of LCO Requirements
Category 2: Relaxation of Applicability
Category 3: Relaxation of Completion Time
Category 4: Relaxation of Required Action
Category 5: Deletion of Surveillance Requirement
Category 6: Relaxation of Surveillance Requirement Acceptance Criteria
Category 7: Relaxation of Surveillance Frequency
Category 8: Deletion of Surveillance Requirement Shutdown Performance
Requirements
Category 9: Allowed Outage Time, Surveillance Frequency, and Bypass
Time Extensions Based on Generic Topical Reports
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination (NSHC): As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of NSHC, by classification of
change, which is presented below. The generic proposed NSHC, by
classification of change, are listed first, followed by the specific
proposed NSHC related to less restrictive changes.
For those less restrictive changes that do not fall into one of the
generic ``Less Restrictive Change'' categories, or those changes that
are in the ``More Restrictive Change'' categories, specific NSHC
evaluations have been provided:
ITS Chapter 1.0, ``Use and Applications,'' Less Restrictive
Change L01
ITS Section 3.0, ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' Less
Restrictive Change L01
ITS Section 3.0, ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' Less
Restrictive Change L02
ITS Section 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' Less Restrictive Change L11 and L12
ITS Section 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' More Restrictive Change M24
Generic Proposed NSHC
Administrative Changes
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves reformatting, renumbering, and
rewording the CTS. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording
process involves no technical changes to the CTS. As such, this
change is administrative in nature and does not affect initiators of
analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient
events.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
change will not impose any new or eliminate any old requirements.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any safety analyses assumptions. This change is
administrative in nature.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
More Restrictive Changes
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change provides more stringent Technical
Specification requirements for the facility. These more stringent
requirements do not result in operations that significantly increase
the probability of initiating an analyzed event, and do not alter
assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient
event. The more restrictive requirements continue to ensure process
variables, structures, systems, and components are maintained
consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
change does impose different Technical Specification requirements.
However, these changes are consistent with the assumptions in the
safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The imposition of more restrictive requirements either has no
effect on or increases the margin of plant safety. As provided in
the discussion of change, each change in this category is, by
definition, providing additional restrictions to enhance plant
safety. The change maintains requirements within the safety analyses
and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Relocated Specifications
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relocates requirements and Surveillances for
structures, systems, components, or variables that do not meet the
criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for inclusion in Technical
Specifications as identified in the Application of Selection
Criteria to the SQN Technical Specifications. The affected
structures, systems, components or variables are not assumed to be
initiators of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate
accident or transient events. The requirements and Surveillances for
these affected structures, systems, components, or variables will be
relocated from the CTS to the TRM [Technical Requirements Manual],
which is currently incorporated by reference into the UFSAR, thus it
will be maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The UFSAR is subject to
the change control provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 50.71(e).
In addition, the affected structures, systems, components, or
variables are addressed in existing surveillance procedures which
are also controlled by 10 CFR 50.59, and are subject to the change
control provisions imposed by plant administrative procedures, which
endorse applicable regulations and standards.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
[[Page 35809]]
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
proposed change will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and
adequate control of existing requirements will be maintained.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no significant effect on any safety analyses assumptions, as
indicated by the fact that the requirements do not meet the 10 CFR
50.36 criteria for retention. In addition, the relocated
requirements are moved without change, and any future changes to
these requirements will be evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
NRC prior review and approval of changes to these relocated
requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, will no longer be
required. This review and approval does not provide a specific
margin of safety that can be evaluated. However, the proposed change
is consistent with NUREG-1431, issued by the NRC, which allows
revising the CTS to relocate these requirements and Surveillances to
a licensee controlled document.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
Removed Detail Changes
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relocates certain details from the CTS to
other documents under regulatory control. The Technical
Specification Bases and the TRM, which is currently incorporated by
reference into the UFSAR, will be maintained in accordance with 10
CFR 50.59. In addition to 10 CFR 50.59 provisions, the Technical
Specification Bases are subject to the change control provisions in
the Administrative Controls Chapter of the ITS. The UFSAR is subject
to the change control provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR
50.71(e). Other documents are subject to controls imposed by the ITS
or other regulations. Since any changes to these documents will be
evaluated, no significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
change will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and adequate
control of the information will be maintained.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any safety analyses assumptions. In addition,
the details to be moved from the CTS to other documents are not
being changed. Since any future changes to these details will be
evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control mechanism,
no significant reduction in a margin of safety will be allowed. A
significant reduction in the margin of safety is not associated with
the elimination of the 10 CFR 50.90 requirement for NRC review and
approval of future changes to the relocated details. Not including
these details in the Technical Specifications is consistent with
NUREG-1431, issued by the NRC, which allows revising the Technical
Specifications to relocate these requirements and Surveillances to a
licensee controlled document controlled by 10 CFR 50.59, 10 CFR
50.71(e), or other Technical Specification controlled or regulation
controlled documents.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 1--Relaxation of LCO Requirements
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change provides less restrictive LCO requirements
for operation of the facility. These less restrictive LCO
requirements do not result in operation that will significantly
increase the probability of initiating an analyzed event and do not
alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient
event in that the requirements continue to ensure process variables,
structures, systems, and components are maintained consistent with
the current safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
proposed change does impose different requirements. However, the
change is consistent with the assumptions in the current safety
analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The imposition of less restrictive LCO requirements does not
involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As provided
in the discussion of change, this change has been evaluated to
ensure that the current safety analyses and licensing basis
requirements are maintained.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 2--Relaxation of Applicability
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the conditions under which the LCO
requirements for operation of the facility must be met. These less
restrictive applicability requirements for the LCOs do not result in
operation that will significantly increase the probability of
initiating an analyzed event and do not alter assumptions relative
to mitigation of an accident or transient event in that the
requirements continue to ensure that process variables, structures,
systems, and components are maintained in the MODES and other
specified conditions assumed in the safety analyses and licensing
basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
proposed change does impose different requirements. However, the
requirements are consistent with the assumptions in the safety
analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The relaxed applicability of LCO requirements does not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety. As provided in the
discussion of change, this change has been evaluated to ensure that
the LCO requirements are applied in the MODES and specified
conditions assumed in the safety analyses and licensing basis.
[[Page 35810]]
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 3--Relaxation of Completion Time
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Completion Time for a Required
Action. Required Actions and their associated Completion Times are
not initiating conditions for any accident previously evaluated, and
the accident analyses do not assume that required equipment is out
of service prior to the analyzed event. Consequently, the relaxed
Completion Time does not significantly increase the probability of
any accident previously evaluated. The consequences of an analyzed
accident during the relaxed Completion Time are the same as the
consequences during the existing Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or a change in the method governing normal plant operation. The
Required Actions and associated Completion Times in the ITS have
been evaluated to ensure that no new accident initiators are
introduced.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The relaxed Completion Time for a Required Action does not
involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As provided
in the discussion of change, the change has been evaluated to ensure
that the allowed Completion Time is consistent with safe operation
under the specified Condition, considering the OPERABILITY status of
the redundant systems of required features, the capacity and
capability of remaining features, a reasonable time for repairs or
replacement of required features, and the low probability of a DBA
[design basis accident] occurring during the repair period.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 4--Relaxation of Required Action
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes Required Actions. Required Actions
and their associated Completion Times are not initiating conditions
for any accident previously evaluated, and the accident analyses do
not assume that required equipment is out of service prior to the
analyzed event. Consequently, the relaxed Required Actions do not
significantly increase the probability of any accident previously
evaluated. The Required Actions in the ITS have been developed to
provide appropriate remedial actions to be taken in response to the
degraded condition considering the OPERABILITY status of the
redundant systems of required features, and the capacity and
capability of remaining features while minimizing the risk
associated with continued operation. As a result, the consequences
of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly
increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
Required Actions and associated Completion Times in the ITS have
been evaluated to ensure that no new accident initiators are
introduced.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The relaxed Required Actions do not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety. As provided in the discussion of
change, this change has been evaluated to minimize the risk of
continued operation under the specified Condition, considering the
OPERABILITY status of the redundant systems of required features,
the capacity and capability of remaining features, a reasonable time
for repairs or replacement of required features, and the low
probability of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) occurring during the
repair period.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 5--Deletion of Surveillance
Requirement
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change deletes Surveillance Requirements.
Surveillances are not initiators to any accident previously
evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously
evaluated is not significantly increased. The equipment being tested
is still required to be OPERABLE and capable of performing the
accident mitigation functions assumed in the accident analyses. As a
result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are
not significantly affected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
remaining Surveillance Requirements are consistent with industry
practice, and are considered sufficient to prevent the removal of
the subject Surveillances from creating a new or different type of
accident.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The deleted Surveillance Requirements do not result in a
significant reduction in the margin of safety. As provided in the
discussion of change, the change has been evaluated to ensure that
the deleted Surveillance Requirements are not necessary for
verification that the equipment used to meet the LCO can perform its
required functions. Thus, appropriate equipment continues to be
tested in a manner and at a frequency necessary to give confidence
that the equipment can perform its assumed safety function.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 6--Relaxation of Surveillance
Requirement Acceptance Criteria
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the acceptance criteria of
Surveillance Requirements. Surveillances are not initiators to any
accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an
accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The
equipment being tested is still required to be OPERABLE and capable
of performing the accident mitigation functions assumed in the
accident analyses. As a result, the consequences of any accident
previously evaluated are not significantly affected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or
[[Page 35811]]
different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the
methods governing normal plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The relaxed acceptance criteria for Surveillance Requirements do
not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As
provided in the discussion of change, the relaxed Surveillance
Requirement acceptance criteria have been evaluated to ensure that
they are sufficient to verify that the equipment used to meet the
LCO can perform its required functions. Thus, appropriate equipment
continues to be tested in a manner that gives confidence that the
equipment can perform its assumed safety function.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 7--Relaxation of Surveillance
Frequency
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes Surveillance Frequencies. The
relaxed Surveillance Frequencies have been established based on
achieving acceptable levels of equipment reliability. Consequently,
equipment that could initiate an accident previously evaluated will
continue to operate as expected, and the probability of the
initiation of any accident previously evaluated will not be
significantly increased. The equipment being tested is still
required to be OPERABLE and capable of performing any accident
mitigation functions assumed in the accident analyses. As a result,
the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly affected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed)
or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The relaxed Surveillance Frequencies do not result in a
significant reduction in the margin of safety. As provided in the
discussion of change, the relaxation in the Surveillance Frequency
has been evaluated to ensure that it provides an acceptable level of
equipment reliability. Thus, appropriate equipment continues to be
tested at a Frequency that gives confidence that the equipment can
perform its assumed safety function when required.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 8--Deletion of Surveillance
Requirement Shutdown Performance Requirements
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves the deletion of the requirement to
perform Surveillance Requirements while in a shutdown condition.
Surveillances are not initiators to any accident previously
evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously
evaluated is not significantly increased. The appropriate plant
conditions for performance of the Surveillance will continue to be
controlled in plant procedures to assure the potential consequences
are not significantly increased. This control method has been
previously determined to be acceptable as indicated in NRC Generic
Letter No. 91-04. The proposed change does not affect the
availability of equipment or systems required to mitigate the
consequences of an accident because of the availability of redundant
systems or equipment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves the deletion of the requirement to
perform Surveillance Requirements while in a shutdown condition, but
does not change the method of performance. The appropriate plant
conditions for performance of the Surveillance will continue to be
controlled in plant procedures to assure the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident is not created. The control method has
been previously determined to be acceptable as indicated in NRC
Generic Letter No. 91-04.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves the deletion of the requirement to
perform Surveillance Requirements while in a shutdown condition.
However, the appropriate plant conditions for performance of the
Surveillance will continue to be controlled in plant procedures. The
control method has been previously determined to be acceptable as
indicated in NRC Generic Letter No. 91-04.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Less Restrictive Changes--Category 9--Allowed Outage Time, Surveillance
Frequency, and Bypass Time Extensions Based on Generic Topical Reports
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to completion times, bypass times, the
Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) and the RTB [reactor trip
breaker] Completion Time (CT) reduce the potential for inadvertent
reactor trips and spurious actuations, and therefore, do not
increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes will not result in a significant increase
in the risk of plant operation as demonstrated in the NRC approved
WCAPs [Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power (Reports)]. The impact
of plant safety as measured by core damage frequency (CDF) is less
than 1.0E-06 per year and the impact of large early release
frequency (LERF) is less than 1.0E-07 per year. These changes meet
the acceptance criteria in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177.
Therefore, there will not be a significant increase in the
probability of an accident.
The proposed changes did not include any hardware changes, and
therefore, all structures, systems, and components will continue to
perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an
event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do
not affect source term, containment isolation, or the radiological
release assumptions used in evaluating radiological consequences of
previously analyzed accidents.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not increase the consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve any hardware changes, any
setpoint changes, any addition of safety related equipment, or any
changes in the manner in which the systems provide plant protection.
Additionally, all operator actions credited in accident analyses
remain the same. There are no new or different accident initiators
or new accidents scenarios created by the proposed changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The safety analyses acceptance criteria in the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are not impacted by these changes.
The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits,
limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for
operation are determined.
All signals and operator actions credited in the UFSAR accident
analyses will remain the same. Redundant RPS [reactor protection
[[Page 35812]]
system] and ESFAS [engineered safety feature actuation system]
trains are maintained and diversity with regard to the signals that
provide reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation is
also maintained. The calculated impact on risk continues to meet the
acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
Specific Proposed NSHC (Change Does Not Fall Into One of Eight
Categories of Less Restrictive Changes)
ITS Chapter 1.0, ``Use and Applications,'' Less Restrictive Change
L01 (LAR, Enclosure 2, Volume 3; Revision 0, page 116 of 117):
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change adds an allowance that an actual as well as
a simulated signal can be credited during the COT [Channel
Operational Test]. This change allows taking credit for unplanned
actuations if sufficient information is collected to satisfy the
surveillance test requirements. This change is acceptable because
the channel itself cannot discriminate between an ``actual'' or
``simulated'' signal, and the proposed requirement does not change
the technical content or validity of the test. This change will not
affect the probability of an accident. The source of the signal sent
to components during a Surveillance is not assumed to be an
initiator of any analyzed event. The consequence of an accident is
not affected by this change. The results of the testing, and,
therefore, the likelihood of discovering an inoperable component,
are unaffected. As a result, the assurance that equipment will be
available to mitigate the consequences of an accident is unaffected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change adds an allowance that an actual as well as
a simulated signal can be credited during the COT. This change will
not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of
equipment will be installed). The change does not require any new or
revised operator actions.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change adds an allowance that an actual as well as
a simulated signal can be credited during the COT. The margin of
safety is not affected by this change. This change allows taking
credit for unplanned actuations if sufficient information is
collected to satisfy the surveillance test requirements. This change
is acceptable because the channel itself cannot discriminate between
an ``actual'' or ``simulated'' signal. As a result, the proposed
requirement does not change the technical content or validity of the
test.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.0, ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' Less Restrictive
Change L01 (LAR, Enclosure 2, Volume 5, Revision 0, page 86 of 90):
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Barriers are not an initiator to any accident previously
evaluated. The probability of an accident previously evaluated is
not significantly increased. Barriers support the operation of
equipment assumed to mitigate the effects of accidents previously
evaluated. The proposed relaxation may only be applied to a single
train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem Technical
Specification system at a given time for a given category of
initiating event, or to multiple trains or subsystems of a multiple
train or subsystem Technical Specification system provided the
affected barriers protect against different categories of initiating
events. Therefore, for any given category of initiating event, the
ability to perform the assumed safety function is preserved. The
consequences of an accident occurring during the time allowed when
barriers are not capable of performing their related support
function are no different from the consequences of the same accident
while relying on the Actions of the supported Technical
Specification systems.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
No new or different accidents result from using the proposed
change. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be
installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or
different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The
changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The
proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions
and current plant operating practice.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows for a limited period of time in which
barriers may be unable to perform their related support function
without declaring the supported systems inoperable. A risk analysis
has shown that this provision will not have a significant effect on
plant risk. In addition, regulatory requirements in 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4) require risk assessment and risk management, which will
ensure that plant risk is not significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.0, ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' Less Restrictive
Change L02 (LAR, Enclosure 2, Volume 5, Revision 0, page 89 of 90):
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows the Completion Time for periodic
actions to be extended by 25 percent. This change does not
significantly affect the probability of an accident. The length of
time between performance of Required Actions is not an initiator to
any accident previously evaluated. The consequences of any accident
previously evaluated are the same during the Completion Time or
during any extension of the Completion Time. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows the Completion Time for periodic
actions to be extended by 25 percent. This change will not involve
physically altering the plant (i.e., no new or different type of
equipment will be installed). In addition, the change does not
involve any new or revised operator actions.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows the Completion Time for periodic
actions to be extended by 25 percent. The 25 percent extension
allowance is provided for scheduling convenience and is not expected
to have significant effect on the average time between Required
Actions. As a result, the Required Action will continue to provide
appropriate compensatory measures for the subject Condition.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' Less Restrictive Change L11 and L12 (LAR,
Enclosure 2, Volume 8, Revision 0, page 323 of 1148):
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
[[Page 35813]]
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low, when
an RCS Loop [Delta]T [change in temperature] or a Containment
Pressure (EAM [Environmental Allowance Modifier]) channel is
inoperable. Placing the affected Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam
Generator Water Level-Low-Low channels in trip uses installed
equipment designed specifically for placing the channels in trip.
This change will not affect the probability of an accident, because
the OPERABLE Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-
Low-Low channels will continue to perform the safety function the
instrumentation is required to perform. The Auxiliary Feedwater Main
Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low channels are not initiators of
any accident sequence analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR). Rather, Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator
Water Level-Low-Low channels are used to mitigate accidents. The
consequences of an analyzed accident will not be significantly
increased since the minimum requirements for Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low channels will be maintained
to ensure the availability of the required instrumentation to
mitigate accidents assumed in the UFSAR. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS [technical specifications] will ensure that
sufficient Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-
Low channels are OPERABLE as required to support the unit's required
features. Therefore, the mitigating functions supported by the
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
instrumentation will continue to provide the protection assumed by
the accident analysis. The integrity of fission product barriers,
plant configuration, and operating procedures as described in the
UFSAR will not be affected by the proposed changes. Thus, the
consequences of previously analyzed accidents will not be
significantly increased by implementing these changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the ESFAS
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
channels. The remaining Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator
Water Level-Low-Low channels are required to be OPERABLE to support
the associated unit's required features. This change will not
physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment
will be installed). The proposed changes will maintain the minimum
requirements for Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water
Level-Low-Low channels to ensure the availability of the equipment
required to mitigate accidents assumed in the UFSAR.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the ESFAS
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
channels. The remaining Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator
Water Level-Low-Low channels are required to be OPERABLE to support
the associated unit's required features. The margin of safety is not
affected by this change because the minimum requirements for
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
channels will be maintained to ensure the availability of the
required Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-
Low instrumentation to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a
safe shutdown condition after an abnormal operational transient or
postulated design basis accident.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' More Restrictive Change M24 (LAR, Enclosure 2,
Volume 8, Revision 0, page 327 of 1148):
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change affects the setpoint limits and the nominal
setpoint for the RCP [reactor coolant pump] underfrequency reactor
trip. Once the setpoint is exceeded, the RCP underfrequency reactor
trip performs its design function in the same manner as before the
proposed change. Maintenance and operation of the instrumentation is
unchanged, except for a change in CTS setpoint, thus there is no
increase in the likelihood of a malfunction of the instrument. The
revision of the RCP underfrequency has been evaluated and the
results are documented in approved calculations. These calculations
verify that the revised values are acceptable in accordance with
appropriate calculation methodologies and that they will continue to
support the accident analysis. Although, this proposed change
revised the settings listed in CTS, these revisions will not require
changes to the instrumentation settings currently being used or the
methods for maintaining them.
Therefore, the proposed revision of these values will not
significantly increase the probability or consequences of an
accident.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The revised setpoints and the proposed operability limits will
continue to provide acceptable initiation of safety functions for
the mitigation of postulated accidents as required by the design
basis. The primary function of the reactor protection system is to
initiate accident mitigation functions. These functions are not
considered initiators of postulated accidents. The proposed changes
do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
because the design functions are not altered and the proposed values
meet the accident analysis requirements for accident mitigation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The NTSP [nominal trip setpoint] and AV [allowable value]
revisions proposed in this request were evaluated and found to be
acceptable without impact to the safety limits required for the
associated functions. Plant systems will continue to be actuated for
those plant conditions that require the initiation of accident
mitigation functions. The margin of safety is not reduced because
the proposed conservative changes to the AV and NTSP will not change
design functions and the initiation of accident mitigation functions
for appropriate plant conditions is ensured. Operational margin is
reduced by increasing the NTSP and AV, maintaining the margin of
safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
(ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Less Restrictive Change L12 and L13 (LAR,
Enclosure 2, Volume 8, Revision 0, page 677 of 1148):
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low, when
an RCS Loop [Delta]T or a Containment Pressure (EAM) channel is
inoperable. Placing the affected Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam
Generator Water Level-Low-Low channels in trip uses installed
equipment designed specifically for placing the channels in trip.
This change will not affect the probability of an accident, because
the OPERABLE Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-
Low-Low channels will continue to perform the safety function the
instrumentation is required to perform. The Auxiliary Feedwater Main
Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low channels are not initiators of
any accident sequence analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR). Rather, Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator
Water Level-Low-Low channels are used to mitigate accidents. The
consequences of an analyzed accident will not be significantly
increased since the minimum requirements for Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low channels will be maintained
to ensure the availability of the required instrumentation to
mitigate accidents assumed in the UFSAR. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS will ensure that sufficient Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
[[Page 35814]]
channels are OPERABLE as required to support the unit's required
features. Therefore, the mitigating functions supported by the
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
instrumentation will continue to provide the protection assumed by
the accident analysis. The integrity of fission product barriers,
plant configuration, and operating procedures as described in the
UFSAR will not be affected by the proposed changes. Thus, the
consequences of previously analyzed accidents will not be
significantly increased by implementing these changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the ESFAS
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
channels. The remaining Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator
Water Level-Low-Low channels are required to be OPERABLE to support
the associated unit's required features. This change will not
physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment
will be installed). The proposed changes will maintain the minimum
requirements for Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water
Level-Low-Low channels to ensure the availability of the equipment
required to mitigate accidents assumed in the UFSAR.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the ESFAS
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
channels. The remaining Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator
Water Level-Low-Low channels are required to be OPERABLE to support
the associated unit's required features. The margin of safety is not
affected by this change because the minimum requirements for
Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
channels will be maintained to ensure the availability of the
required Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-
Low instrumentation to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a
safe shutdown condition after an abnormal operational transient or
postulated design basis accident.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.8.1, ``AC [Alternating Current] Sources--
Operating,'' Less Restrictive Change L01 (LAR, Enclosure 2, Volume
13, Revision 0, page 200 of 638):
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
opposite unit's offsite AC power sources and DGs [diesel
generators]. The opposite unit's offsite AC power sources and DGs
are required to be OPERABLE to support the associated unit's
required features. This change will not affect the probability of an
accident, since the offsite AC circuits and DGs are not initiators
of any accident sequence analyzed in the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR). Rather, offsite AC power sources and DGs
support equipment used to mitigate accidents. The consequences of an
analyzed accident will not be significantly increased since the
minimum requirements for AC power sources will be maintained to
ensure the availability of the required power to mitigate accidents
assumed in the UFSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
will ensure that sufficient onsite and offsite AC power sources are
OPERABLE as required to support the unit's required features.
Therefore, the mitigating functions supported by the onsite and
offsite AC power sources will continue to provide the protection
assumed by the accident analysis. The integrity of fission product
barriers, plant configuration, and operating procedures as described
in the UFSAR will not be affected by the proposed changes. Thus, the
consequences of previously analyzed accidents will not increase by
implementing these changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
opposite unit's offsite AC power sources and DGs. The opposite
unit's offsite AC power sources and DGs are required to be OPERABLE
to support the associated unit's required features. This change will
not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of
equipment will be installed). The proposed changes will maintain the
minimum requirements for AC power sources to ensure the availability
of the equipment required to mitigate accidents assumed in the
UFSAR.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
opposite unit's offsite AC power sources and DGs. The opposite
unit's offsite AC power sources and DGs are required to be OPERABLE
to support the associated unit's required features. The margin of
safety is not affected by this change because the minimum
requirements for AC power sources will be maintained to ensure the
availability of the required power to shutdown the reactor and
maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO [anticipated
operational occurrence] or a postulated DBA.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
ITS Section 3.8.9, ``Distribution Systems--Operating,'' Less
Restrictive Change L01 (LAR, Enclosure 2, Volume 13, Revision 0,
page 359 of 638):
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
opposite unit's distribution system. This change will not affect the
probability of an accident, since the distribution system[s] are not
initiators of any accident sequence analyzed in the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Rather, the opposite unit's
distribution system support equipment used to mitigate accidents.
The consequences of an analyzed accident will not be significantly
increased since the minimum requirements for distribution systems
will be maintained to ensure the availability of the required power
to mitigate accidents assumed in the UFSAR. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS will ensure that sufficient onsite electrical
distribution systems are OPERABLE as required to support the unit's
required features. Therefore, the mitigating functions supported by
the onsite electrical distribution systems will continue to provide
the protection assumed by the accident analysis. The integrity of
fission product barriers, plant configuration, and operating
procedures as described in the UFSAR will not be affected by the
proposed changes. Thus, the consequences of previously analyzed
accidents will not increase by implementing these changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
opposite unit's onsite electrical distribution systems. This change
will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of
equipment will be installed). The proposed changes will maintain the
minimum requirements for onsite electrical distribution systems to
ensure the availability of the equipment required to mitigate
accidents assumed in the UFSAR.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change relaxes the Required Actions for the
opposite unit's onsite electrical distribution system. The margin of
safety is not affected by this change because the minimum
requirements for onsite electrical distribution systems will be
maintained to ensure the availability of the required power to
shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition
after an AOO or a postulated DBA.
[[Page 35815]]
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
NRC Acting Branch Chief: Lisa M. Regner.
II. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and
Combined Licenses
During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice,
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set
forth in the license amendment.
A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility
operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no
significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a
hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal
Register as indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in
10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment,
it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the action see (1) the
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as
indicated. All of these items can be obtained as described in the
``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this
document.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey
Date of application for amendment: December 12, 2013.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Oyster
Creek Nuclear Generating Station technical specifications. The
amendment modifies Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler
TSTF-522, Revision 0, ``Revise Ventilation System Surveillance
Requirements to Operate for 10 Hours per Month,'' to 15 continuous
minutes.
Date of Issuance: May 27, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment No.: 282. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under
Accession No. ML14008A350; documents related to this amendment are
listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16: The amendment
revised the license and technical specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 4, 2014 (79 FR
6643).
The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 27, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, York
and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendments: July 18, 2012, as supplemented
by letters dated January 17, 2013, April 23, 2013, April 8, 2014, and
April 28, 2014.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the
Technical Specifications (TSs) to change the operability requirements
for the normal heat sink.
Date of issuance: June 5, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented
within 30 days.
Amendments Nos.: 291 and 294. A publicly-available version is in
ADAMS under Accession No. ML14136A485; documents related to these
amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the
amendments.
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56: The
amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses and the TSs.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 4, 2012 (77
FR 53928). The letters dated January 17, 2013, April 23, 2013, April 8,
2014, and April 28, 2014, provided additional information that
clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application
as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original
proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated June 5, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile
Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County, New York
Date of application for amendment: November 21, 2012, as
supplemented by letters dated March 25, July 31, September 6, November
4, December 13, 2013, and February 25, 2014.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Nine Mile
Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) Section
3.4.11, ``RCS [reactor coolant system] Pressure and Temperature (P/T)
Limits,'' by replacing the existing reactor vessel heatup and cooldown
rate limits and the pressure and temperature (P-T) limit curves with
references to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR). In
addition, a new definition for the PTLR was added to TS Section 1.1,
``Definitions,'' and a new section addressing administrative
requirements for the PTLR was added to TS Section 5.0, ``Administrative
Controls.'' Relocation of the P-T limit curves to the PTLR is
consistent with the guidance provided in NRC approved General Electric
Hitachi Nuclear Engineering Licensing Topical Report, NEDC-33178P-A,
Revision 1, ``General Electric Methodology for Development of Reactor
Pressure Vessel Pressure-Temperature Curves.'' This topical report uses
the guidelines provided in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-03, ``Relocation
of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low Temperature
Overpressure Protection System Limits.'' The proposed TS changes are
consistent with the guidance provided in GL 96-03 as supplemented by
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-419-A, ``Revise
PTLR Definition and References in ISTS [Improved Standard Technical
Specifications] 5.6.6, RCS PTLR.''
Date of issuance: May 28, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and to be implemented no
later than July 18, 2014.
Amendment No.: 145. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under
[[Page 35816]]
Accession No. ML14057A554; documents related to this amendment are
listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revised
the License and Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 12, 2013 (78 FR
15749). The supplements dated March 25, July 31, September 6, November
4, December 13, 2013, and February 25, 2014, provided additional
information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed, and did not change the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's initial proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination noticed in the Federal Register.
The staff's related safety evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 28, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service
Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1,
Fairfield County, South Carolina
Date of amendment request: October 3, 2013, as supplemented by
letter dated December 20, 2013.
Date of issuance: May 29, 2014.
Effective date: This license amendment is effective as of the date
of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.
Amendment No.: 198. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under
Accession No. ML14122A309; documents related to this amendment are
listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-12: Amendment revised
the Facility Operating License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 26, 2013 (78
FR 70595). The supplemental letter dated December 20, 2013, provided
additional information that clarified the application, did not expand
the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change
the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 29, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of June 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2014-14606 Filed 6-23-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P