[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 68 (Wednesday, April 9, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19501-19521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-07981]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket Nos. PRM-50-104; NRC-2012-0046]
Emergency Planning Zones
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM), dated February 15, 2012, which was filed
with the NRC by Michael Mariotte on behalf of the Nuclear Information
and Resource Service (NIRS or the petitioner) and 37 co-petitioners.
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations that govern
domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities to expand
existing emergency planning zones (EPZ) around nuclear power plants,
create a new EPZ, and require the incorporation of concurrent natural
disasters in the required periodic emergency plan drills. The NRC is
denying the petition because the NRC concludes that the current size of
the emergency planning zones is appropriate for existing reactors and
that emergency plans will provide an adequate level of protection of
the public health and safety in the event of an accident at a nuclear
power plant.
[[Page 19502]]
The current EPZs provide for a comprehensive emergency planning
framework that would allow expansion of the response efforts beyond the
designated distances should events warrant such an expansion.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-104, is
closed on April 9, 2014.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0046 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this petition. You may
access publicly-available information related to this petition by any
of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search on Docket ID NRC-2012-0046. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
The NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in
the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
Based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is
referenced. In addition, for the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS
accession numbers are provided in a table in Section IV of this
document, Availability of Documents.
The NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of
public documents at the NRC's PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Doyle, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3748; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Public Comments on the Petition
III. Determination of the Petition
IV. Availability of Documents
I. The Petition
On February 15, 2012, the NIRS filed a petition for rulemaking. The
petition was docketed by the NRC and assigned Docket No. PRM-50-104
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12048B004). On April 30, 2012, the NRC published
in the Federal Register a notice of receipt and request for public
comment for PRM-50-104 (77 FR 25375). The public comment period closed
on July 16, 2012. For more information regarding the public comments
received, see Section II, Public Comments on the Petition, of this
document.
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend Sec. 50.47,
``Emergency Plans,'' of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) and appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' to 10 CFR part 50, ``Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,'' and include the
modifications in 10 CFR part 52, ``Licenses, Certifications, and
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.'' Specifically, the petitioner
requested that the NRC: (1) expand the plume exposure pathway EPZ
radius from a 10-mile radius to a 25-mile radius; (2) establish a new
50-mile radius emergency response zone, with more limited requirements
than the plume exposure pathway EPZ; (3) expand the ingestion pathway
EPZ radius from a 50-mile radius to a 100-mile radius; and (4) require
nuclear power plant licensees' emergency plans be ``tested to encompass
initiating and/or concurrent natural disasters that may affect both
accident progression and evacuation conduct.'' The petitioner asserted
that ``the requested amendments are essential for the protection of
public health and safety in light of the real-world experience of the
Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters, which were more severe and affected
a much larger geographical area than provided for in NRC regulations.''
The petitioner stated that ``[t]he NRC should amend 10 C.F.R.
50.47(c)(2) to create a three-tiered emergency planning zone. . . .''
The petitioner's three-tiered EPZ included a 25-mile plume exposure
pathway EPZ, 50-mile emergency response zone, and 100-mile ingestion
exposure pathway zone. The following paragraphs provide the
petitioner's proposed revisions to 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).
25-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ
The petitioner proposed the following revision to 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) with regard to the plume exposure pathway EPZ:
A Plume Exposure Pathway zone shall consist of an area about 25
miles (40 km) in radius. Within this zone, detailed plans must be
developed to provide prompt and effective evacuation and other
appropriate protective measures, including conducting of biannual
full-scale emergency evacuation drills. Sirens will be installed
within this zone to alert the population of the need for evacuation.
Transportation for elderly, prison and school populations shall be
provided within this zone. Emergency shelters shall be located
outside of the 25-mile zone.
The petitioner asserted that the expansion of the plume exposure
pathway EPZ from a 10-mile radius to a 25-mile radius ``would provide
no new requirements other than expansion of the EPZ.''
50-Mile Emergency Response Zone
The petitioner proposed the following revision to 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) to establish an ``emergency response zone'':
The [emergency response zone] shall be about 50 miles in radius.
Within this 50 mile zone, the licensee must identify evacuation
routes for all residents within this zone and annually provide
information to all residents within this zone about these routes and
which they are supposed to take in the event of an emergency. The
licensee must make basic pre-arrangements for potential transport of
disabled/hospital/prison populations. Emergency centers for the
public currently located less than 25 miles out shall be relocated
to 25 miles or further out. Information shall be made available to
the public within this zone through television, internet and radio
alerts, text message notices, and other appropriate means of public
communication.
The petitioner noted that this revision ``would require measures be
carried out between the new 25 mile Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ and a
new Emergency Response Zone of about a 50 mile radius.'' The petitioner
stated that the plume exposure pathway EPZ emergency evacuation
requirements and biannual exercises are not required in the emergency
response zone. The petitioner further stated ``this new zone would
provide a modest level of pre-planning that would enable rapid
expansion of the 25 mile zone when necessary. Information regarding
evacuation such as identification of evacuation routes and locations of
emergency shelters in the event of a large-scale disaster would be
identified and would be provided to members of the public annually, and
a limited number of other pre-arrangements would be made.''
[[Page 19503]]
100-Mile Ingestion Exposure Pathway Zone
The petitioner proposed the following revision to 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) with regard to the ingestion pathway EPZ:
The ingestion pathway EPZ shall be about 100 miles in radius. In
the event of a radioactive release, the deposition of radionuclides
on crops, other vegetation, bodies of surface water and ground
surfaces can occur. Measures will be implemented to protect the
public from eating and drinking food and water that may be
contaminated. Information shall be made available to the public
within this zone through television and radio alerts, text message
notices, and other appropriate means of public communication.
The petitioner stated that ``[t]he current Ingestion Exposure
Pathway Zone exists to protect food, water and anything intended for
human consumption within 50 miles of a nuclear power plant.'' The
petitioner further stated, ``[g]iven that radiation can, and does, have
far-reaching effects on food on a large radius, the Ingestion Pathway
EPZ should be expanded.''
Drills and Exercises
The petitioner proposed amending 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) with regard to
drills and exercises by adding:
Within the emergency evacuation zone full scale drills and
exercises will be conducted on a biannual basis. Every other
exercise and drill shall include a scenario involving an initiating
or concurrent regionally-appropriate natural disaster.
II. Public Comments on the Petition
The NRC received a total of 5,993 comment submissions, 5,953 in
support of the petition and 40 opposing it. There were 5,942
submissions from individuals of whom 5,940 supported the petition and 2
opposed it. Of the 5,942 submissions from individuals, 5,702 were form
letters. Of the 5,702 form letters, 2,421 expressed support for the
petition and 3,281 requested co-petitioner status. One of the form
letters requesting co-petitioner status had 1,839 signatures. Ten
submissions were from environmental, nuclear, or energy oriented
citizen activist groups. All 10 supported the petition. Two submissions
were received from organizations associated with the nuclear power
industry. Both submissions opposed the petition. Thirty-six submissions
were received from State or local government emergency management
agencies or radiation control organizations. All 36 submissions opposed
the petition. Three submissions were received from local governments.
All 3 supported the petition.
The NRC has prepared a comment response document to demonstrate how
all comments were considered and to respond to the issues identified in
the comments. The NRC's comment response document is available in ADAMS
under Accession No. ML14042A227.
The NRC identified 14 separate issues raised by the petition and
public comments. Issues 1 through 12 contain arguments for expanding
the EPZs. Issues 13 and 14 concern requirements for exercises that
include a regionally-relevant initiating or concurrent natural
disaster. Each issue and accompanying rationale is fully discussed and
evaluated in this document, followed by NRC's response.
Many comments were considered to be out-of-scope because they did
not address the merits of the petition for rulemaking. These comments
are not discussed in this document but are addressed in the NRC's
comment response document.
Issue 1. Expand EPZs because, in the event of a nuclear accident, the
need for protective actions beyond 10 miles and 50 miles is highly
likely.
One rationale used to support the petitioner's argument that EPZs
must be expanded is that protective actions beyond 10 miles and 50
miles are highly likely in the event of a nuclear accident as
demonstrated by the real-world experience from the accidents at the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station (Chernobyl) and the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima Dai-ichi). The petitioner stated that
these accidents ``were more severe and affected a much larger
geographical area than provided for in NRC regulations.''
Some commenters agreed and called for the NRC to make the emergency
planning (EP) regulations more realistic given that actual evacuations
beyond 10 miles and food interdiction efforts beyond 50 miles took
place after the accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi.
Two emergency management agencies stated that Chernobyl should not
be used as an example to justify revising EP regulations because the
design of the Chernobyl facility is not used in the United States.
The Nuclear Energy Institute disagreed that Chernobyl should be
used as an example to justify revising the EP regulations because ``the
[p]etition presents no new insights into the Chernobyl accident that
should cause the Commission to modify the conclusions reached in the
[Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, et al., 32 NRC 281 (1990)]
decision or NUREG-1251 [`Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for
Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United
States,' dated April 30, 1989 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML082030501 and
ML082030502)].''
NRC Response to Issue 1
The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertions on this issue.
The current EPZs provide a comprehensive EP framework that would allow
for expansion of the response efforts beyond the designated distances
should the events warrant such an expansion.
As specified in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), two EPZs are established around
each nuclear power plant. The technical basis for the EPZs is provided
in NUREG-0396, EPA-520/1-78-016, ``Planning Basis for the Development
of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in
Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated December 1978
(ADAMS Accession No. ML051390356). The first zone, the plume exposure
pathway EPZ, establishes an area of approximately 10 miles in radius.
Within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, detailed planning is required
for the recommendation and implementation of protective actions such as
sheltering in place or evacuation. The ingestion pathway EPZ has a
radius of approximately 50 miles from the plant. Within this EPZ,
detailed planning is required to address the potential need to
interdict foodstuffs to prevent human exposure from ingestion of
contaminated food and surface water.
The NRC remains confident that the emergency preparedness programs
in support of nuclear power plants provide an adequate level of
protection of the public health and safety and that appropriate
protective actions can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
event at an existing nuclear power plant. The NRC routinely inspects
nuclear power plant licensees' EP programs to ensure compliance with
regulations and biennially inspects a demonstration exercise that
integrates the response of offsite and onsite organizations, including
the licensee and State and local authorities. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) evaluates the offsite response in these
exercises to ensure the State and local responders (i.e., offsite
response organizations (ORO)) are capable of timely protective action
decisionmaking and implementation. Public meetings are held at the
conclusion of biennial exercises to discuss the adequacy of response
with stakeholders. This oversight process includes additional
inspection activities and reporting of
[[Page 19504]]
performance indicator data for onsite EP that provide the NRC with
oversight of EP programs between biennial exercises.
The NRC has studied the efficacy of evacuations implemented by OROs
within the United States (NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis
of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' dated January 2005 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML050250245 and ML050250219) and NUREG/CR-6981,
``Assessment of Emergency Response Planning and Implementation for
Large Scale Evacuations,'' dated October 31, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML082960499)). A key finding of the latter study was that existing
emergency planning requirements for nuclear power plants substantially
anticipate and address issues identified in the large-scale evacuations
researched. The review of NRC and FEMA emergency preparedness
regulatory, programmatic, and guidance documentation also demonstrated
that existing criteria, plans, and procedures were already in place to
address most of the issues that were experienced in the large-scale
evacuations studied. The assessment of emergency response planning and
implementation for large-scale evacuations affirmed that most of the
lessons learned in the evacuations studied were anticipated by NRC and
FEMA and were already addressed in existing planning and procedures
within the NRC and FEMA framework. Therefore, information available to
the NRC supports the conclusion that OROs are well able to protect the
public they are responsible for with the existing regulatory framework.
The required planning within the plume exposure pathway EPZ is
found in 10 CFR 50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50. This planning
is designed to provide effective response to a radiological emergency
that has the potential to develop rapidly. The need for protective
actions beyond the 10-mile EPZ would generally develop more slowly.
Protective actions to provide adequate protection beyond the plume
exposure pathway EPZ can be implemented using ORO normal and robust
response processes (as demonstrated by the previously mentioned
studies). Moreover, the NRC emergency classification scheme required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) is anticipatory, and thus is designed for offsite
protective action to begin before a radiological release. This would
cause protective actions to begin rapidly within the 10-mile EPZ and
provide time for consideration of actions beyond this EPZ should the
accident progression indicate the need. Although accidents that include
rapid releases are very unlikely, as demonstrated by the accidents at
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (Three Mile Island) and
Fukushima Dai-ichi, protective action guidance has been provided to
address such scenarios (Supplement 3 to NUREG-0654, ``Guidance for
Protective Action Strategies,'' dated November 20, 2011 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML113010596)).
The NRC disagrees with the petition's contention that the accident
at Fukushima Dai-ichi is a basis for expansion of the EPZ. The
development of protective action recommendations by the Japanese
Government, including expansion of evacuations out to 20 km (12 miles)
from the plant, supported effective and timely evacuation to minimize
the impact of the radiological releases on public health and safety.
Subsequent decisions by the Japanese Government to evacuate selected
areas based on potential long-term exposures are also similar to the
U.S. strategy to expand protective actions during an event when
conditions warrant an expansion.
The NRC is studying the accident to identify improvement areas
applicable to the United States. Following the earthquake and tsunami
at Fukushima Dai-ichi in March 2011, the NRC established a task force
referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF conducted a
systematic and methodical review of the NRC's regulations and processes
to determine if the agency should make safety improvements in light of
the events in Japan. The NTTF issued its report (the NTTF report) on
July 12, 2011, ``Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the
21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the
Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807). On
July 19, 2011, the NTTF presented its findings to the five
Commissioners (the Commission) of the NRC and proposed improvements in
multiple areas, including emergency preparedness. The NTTF considered
the existing planning structure, including the 10-mile plume exposure
pathway and 50-mile ingestion pathway emergency planning zones, and
found no basis to recommend a change to the size of the EPZs.
However, as information emerged about the events surrounding the
protective actions implemented following the accident at Fukushima Dai-
ichi, the NRC staff determined that the insights from the accident
response should be evaluated to identify potential enhancements to NRC
regulations and guidance. In SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of
Recommended Actions to Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons
Learned,'' dated October 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11272A111), the
NRC staff recommended that evaluating the basis of the EPZ size
warranted further consideration. In response to the Commission's Staff
Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0137, the NRC staff produced
SECY-12-0095, ``Tier 3 Program Plans and 6-Month Update in Response to
Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake
and Subsequent Tsunami,'' dated July 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12208A210), in which the NRC staff determined that the existing basis
for the EPZ size remains valid (including for multi-unit events).
The Commission concludes that the current size of EPZs helps to
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at an existing
nuclear power plant. In addition, as part of previously-approved
research efforts, the NRC plans a long-term action involving EPZs. The
NRC staff will use insights from the current full-scope site Level 3
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) project as well as information
obtained from the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) assessment to inform the evaluation of the
potential impacts that a multi-unit event may have on an EPZ. The
UNSCEAR is preparing a scientific report to assess the radiation doses
and associated effects on health and the environment. Also, the
Fukushima Prefecture launched the Fukushima Health Management Survey to
investigate long-term low-dose radiation exposure caused by the
accident. The survey attempts to estimate radiation exposure from the
accident and more detailed dose assessments by recreating the
whereabouts of every Fukushima prefecture resident for the four month
period beginning with the March 11th nuclear accident. The stated
primary purposes of this survey are to monitor the long-term health of
residents, promote their future well-being, and confirm whether long-
term low-dose radiation exposure has health effects. If these research
activities indicate that changes need to be made to the existing EP
regulations, the NRC will commence a rulemaking effort to make those
changes.
Issue 2. Expand EPZs because the basis for the 10-mile EPZ is flawed.
Another reason given in the petition in support of expanding the
EPZs is that
[[Page 19505]]
the basis for the 10-mile EPZ is flawed. The petitioner stated that
``[t]he NRC's existing emergency planning regulations . . . are based
primarily on experience gained by the Three Mile Island accident and on
NRC reactor safety studies conducted from the 1950s through the 1970s
(for example, WASH-1400 and NUREG-1150) and are encapsulated in NUREG-
0396.'' The petitioner stated that these studies are now outdated.
The petitioner stated that ``[s]tudies currently and previously
relied upon to justify the existing 10-mile [EPZ] . . . are based on
assumptions of reactor and fuel pool accident risk and accident
progression and consequences that are significantly underestimated
based on real-world experience and more recent understanding of the
risks of radiation. . . .''
The petitioner stated that computer models, simulations, and
evaluations of projected scenarios are not a substitute for actual,
``real-world experience.''
The Nuclear Energy Institute and the Conference of Radiation
Control Program Directors disagreed with the petitioner that the basis
for the 10-mile EPZ is flawed and asserted that, on the contrary, the
current EPZs provide a substantial margin of conservatism. They argued
that this view is supported by the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the
State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) study, and an
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Task Force report. The Nuclear
Energy Institute stated that EPZs are pragmatic tools intended to
provide dose savings and reduce early severe health effects, and they
are still appropriate. The Nuclear Energy Institute noted that in
NUREG-0396, the sizes of EPZs were based on a consideration of a full
spectrum of postulated accidents and accident consequences including
very severe accidents, such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The
Nuclear Energy Institute argued that the petitioner mischaracterized
the EPZ assumptions, the SOARCA study, the damage to the spent fuel
pools at Fukushima Dai-ichi, and U.S. nuclear power plant performance.
The Nuclear Energy Institute disagreed with the premises in the
petition that the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident demonstrated that severe
accidents are more likely than any government previously estimated and
that their effects are more widespread than previously understood.
One State Department of Environment recommended denying the
petition because ``the Petition provides no new information that
suggests the need to change the current planning basis, or warrants a
change to the size of the existing Emergency Planning Zones.''
NRC Response to Issue 2
The NRC disagrees, in large part, with the petitioner's assertions
on this issue. The NRC agrees that the technical basis for the EPZ
dates from studies conducted in the 1970s, but the petition brought
forward no technical issues to substantiate flaws in the technical
basis. The NRC would tend to agree that there is real-world experience
that contributes information relevant to EPZ efficacy, as will be
discussed. Studies have been conducted that contribute to NRC
confidence in the current EPZ basis to ensure adequate protection of
public health and safety. The original basis and studies that support
the current EPZ basis are described in this section.
The technical basis for the plume exposure pathway EPZ and
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ are provided in NUREG-0396. This NUREG-
0396 analyzes a spectrum of potential nuclear plant accidents and
determines the size of EPZs in which detailed planning would be
appropriate for the protection of public health and safety. The task
force that developed NUREG-0396 considered several possible rationales
for establishing the size of the EPZs, including risk, cost
effectiveness, and the accident consequence spectrum. After reviewing
these alternatives, the task force concluded that the objective of
emergency response plans should be to provide dose savings for a
spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides
(PAG), EPA-400-R-92-001, ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and
Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents,'' dated May 1992 (http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/er/400-r-92-001.pdf). This rationale
established bounds for the area in which detailed planning would be
required as a defense-in-depth measure. In a 1979 policy statement (44
FR 61123; October 23, 1979), the Commission endorsed NUREG-0396,
including an assumption that the planning conducted for 10 miles would
provide a substantial basis for expansion of protective actions beyond
the EPZ should it ever be necessary. All U.S. nuclear power plants
currently have approved emergency plans that include EPZs in compliance
with the regulations found in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).
The accidents considered in developing guidance and subsequent
requirements for the EPZ included rapidly progressing severe accidents
that were more threatening to public health than the Fukushima Dai-ichi
accident. The WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), ``Reactor Safety Study: An
Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated October 1975 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072350618), estimated that a
severe accident could progress to a large radiological release in as
little as 2 hours (in the boiling water reactor (BWR) case). Such
accidents were considered unlikely, but emergency preparedness is a
defense-in-depth measure required due to the potential of severe but
unlikely accidents. The accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi developed much
more slowly than the rapidly developing accidents that form the basis
for the current size of the EPZ. In Japan, adequate time was available
to evacuate the public at risk and to expand beyond the planning zone
as necessary before large radiological releases occurred. The study
used to develop the EPZ is more conservative than the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident with regard to the time available to evacuate within the
EPZ and beyond.
The NRC has conducted more recent studies that are useful for
evaluating the adequacy of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. In NUREG/CR-
6864, the NRC examined large evacuations in the United States between
1990 and 2003 to gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics involved
in those types of events. This project found that large-scale
evacuations of greater than 1,000 people from 1997 to 2003 occurred
approximately every two weeks in the United States. The study concluded
that these evacuations proceeded efficiently and effectively in terms
of evacuee health and safety, security, and issues related to
coordination, decisionmaking, and emergency response. The study showed
that State and local authorities have a robust capability to
effectively evacuate the public in response to life-threatening
emergencies. Many of the evacuations studied were implemented in an ad
hoc manner by competent local officials without the need for Federal
assistance or pre-conceived lines on a map.
In NUREG-1935, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses
(SOARCA) Report,'' dated November 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML12332A057 and ML12332A058), hypothetical evacuations within EPZs and
beyond were evaluated in response to a series of selected accident
scenarios for two U.S. nuclear power plants: the Peach Bottom Atomic
Power Station in Pennsylvania (Peach Bottom) and the Surry Power
Station in Virginia (Surry). Peach Bottom is generally representative
of U.S. operating reactors using the General Electric BWR design with a
[[Page 19506]]
Mark I containment. Surry is generally representative of U.S. operating
reactors using the Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) design
with a large, dry (subatmospheric) containment.
The SOARCA project evaluated plant improvements and changes not
reflected in earlier NRC publications. The project included system
improvements, improvements in training and emergency procedures,
offsite emergency response, and security-related improvements, as well
as plant changes such as power uprates and higher core burnup. The
project used state-of-the-art computer modeling with the MELCOR code
for accident progression analyses and the MELCOR Accident Consequence
Code System, Version 2 (MACCS2), for offsite consequence analyses.
There were several BWR accident scenarios analyzed in SOARCA, but
most of the analyses did not involve a 20-mile evacuation. One analysis
was performed modeling immediate 16- and 20-mile evacuations. It showed
no significant difference in risk to individuals when compared to
analysis using the 10-mile EPZ. The weather patterns for the SOARCA
analyses were neither advantageous nor disadvantageous in terms of risk
to individuals. This was done to support the best estimate of the risk
to the public. If worst-case weather or worst-case accidents had been
chosen, it would have reduced the probability of the event; SOARCA
attempted to identify the more important accident scenarios based on a
frequency-of-occurrence perspective. This boundary condition allowed
the study to analyze in detail the phenomena of these accidents. (A
full scope probabilistic risk analysis is underway at the NRC to
address a full range of accidents, including those less likely than the
accidents analyzed in SOARCA.) The SOARCA analyses showed no early
fatalities due to the slower-developing accidents and lower source
terms than in previous analyses and illustrated the effectiveness of
emergency preparedness when plans are implemented as written, approved,
practiced and inspected. In fact, SOARCA analyzed accidents very
similar to those at Fukushima Dai-ichi and estimated a much quicker
core melt and containment failure than what happened at the real-world
accident. Further, the latent cancer fatalities estimated in SOARCA are
based upon a worst-case assumption that all exposure, no matter how
small, results in health effects. The majority of the latent cancer
fatalities are due to the public being allowed to return to homes that
are contaminated at levels below the EPA guidance. In effect, this
exposure and the postulated health consequences have nothing to do with
the evacuation of the public, the size of the EPZ, or the Fukushima
Dai-ichi accident.
The NRC will monitor the results of the UNSCEAR efforts and their
potential implications regarding the U.S. regulatory approach to
emergency planning around nuclear power plants, including the EPZ size.
In addition, the NRC is conducting a full-scope site Level 3 PRA to
gain a better understanding of potential radiological effects of
postulated accident sequences including multi-unit sites. The NRC will
use information obtained from the UNSCEAR assessment and insights from
the full-scope site Level 3 PRA project to inform the evaluation of the
potential impacts that a multi-unit event may have on the EPZ.
Issue 3. Expand EPZs because the NRC urged U.S. citizens within 50
miles of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant to evacuate.
The petitioner noted that former NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko urged
Americans within 50 miles of Fukushima Dai-ichi to evacuate and that
this recommendation was followed by a similar statement from the U.S.
Department of State.
Several commenters stated that the call for evacuation out to 50
miles showed that the current 10-mile EPZ is outdated, inadequate, and
not realistic.
One commenter called for the NRC to take into account the realities
learned in Japan. The commenter pointed out that there are several
major U.S. cities within 50 miles of reactors with containment designs
that are similar to those at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Those cities include
Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The commenter asked if it
would be possible to evacuate those cities.
One State emergency management agency disagreed with the petitioner
and stated that the NRC order to evacuate U.S. citizens within 50 miles
of Fukushima Dai-ichi has yet to be justified scientifically.
NRC Response to Issue 3
The NRC does not agree that the EPZ for U.S. nuclear power plants
should be expanded based on the travel advisory issued to U.S. citizens
in Japan as a result of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Following the
events at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the U.S. Department of State, in
coordination with the then-Chairman of the NRC, the U.S. Department of
Energy, and other technical experts in the U.S. Government, issued a
travel warning, or advisory, to U.S. citizens within 50 miles of
Fukushima Dai-ichi to evacuate the area or take shelter indoors if safe
evacuation was not possible. The 50-mile travel advisory was based on
the limited information available at that time and the rapidly evolving
situation (U.S. Department of State Travel Warning, March 17, 2011,
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-travel20110317.html). The U.S.
Department of State routinely issues such recommendations (known as
Travel Warnings) for many different types of events, including civil
unrest, terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents.
The decisionmaking environment that existed at the time was one in
which the U.S. Government had limited and often conflicting information
about the exact conditions of the reactors and spent fuel pools at
Fukushima Dai-ichi. In its evaluation of the rapidly changing and
unprecedented event, the NRC performed a series of dose calculations.
These calculations were worst case, hypothetical computer model
analyses of consequences of releases from the Fukushima site. The
assumptions used in these calculations were discussed in detail in a
letter from former NRC Chairman Jaczko to Senator James Webb on June
17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11143A033). As a result of these
calculations, the lack of information available at that time, the
progression of events, and the uncertainty regarding the plans to bring
the situation under control, on March 16, 2011, the U.S. Department of
State issued a travel advisory for American citizens within a 50-mile
range of Fukushima Dai-ichi. This was not an evacuation order in the
sense of expected protective action decisionmaking within a U.S.
nuclear power plant EPZ, but rather a warning to U.S. citizens that the
local conditions were uncertain, the government authorities may not be
able to assure their safety, and that they should leave.
Regulatory requirements of 10 CFR part 50, NRC inspection
practices, and data channels available to the NRC would provide a
robust information stream regarding plant status and radiological
releases during a reactor accident in the United States. The NRC
maintains two resident inspectors at each plant who have unfettered
access to the site. The NRC inspectors have direct access to the plant
site, including the control room and any and all vital plant areas.
Inspectors from other sites and regional offices can be deployed if
needed. The NRC requires that direct communication links between the
NRC Incident Response Center and each plant be installed, tested, and
routinely exercised. These links provide the NRC
[[Page 19507]]
with up-to-date and reliable information about plant conditions,
radioactivity release rates, and meteorological conditions at the
plant. The availability of this information, in addition to the
information gathered by inspectors, would enable NRC staff to perform
an informed, realistic assessment instead of relying on unknowns and
worst-case scenarios. In addition, the NRC can order the plant to take
actions to mitigate the event if the NRC concludes that the appropriate
actions are not being taken by the plant operators.
The NRC concludes that the EPZs surrounding nuclear power plants in
the United States should not be expanded based on the travel advisory
issued by the U.S. Government. That advisory was based on limited
information obtained by the U.S. Government about an event in a foreign
nation. As previously explained, the NRC would have access to relevant
information during an event at one of its licensees' plants. As a
result, the NRC's response to an accident in the United States would
not resemble the U.S. Government's response to the events at Fukushima
Dai-ichi, so the fact that the U.S. Government issued a 50-mile travel
advisory should not be the basis for expanding the size of EPZs.
Issue 4. There has been little change to emergency planning regulations
in 30 years.
The petitioner claimed that the emergency planning regulations
established by the NRC in 1980 remain essentially the same today. The
petitioner stated that ``[w]ith the exception of a 2011 rule requiring
licensees to use current U.S. census data to prepare evacuation time
estimates (ETEs) and update them every 10 years, the NRC has made few
significant improvements to its offsite emergency response regulations
since they were promulgated in 1980.''
A State emergency management agency and the Nuclear Energy
Institute disagreed and stated that there have been several significant
changes to emergency planning regulations since 1980, including the
consideration of emergency preparedness exercises during the licensing
process, the frequency of participation by State and local authorities
in emergency preparedness exercises, and other topics. The Nuclear
Energy Institute also argued that the 2011 rule was broader than the
petitioner implied.
NRC Response to Issue 4
The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's comments. The statement
that emergency planning has changed little in the past 30 years
conflicts with the fact that the NRC has made numerous revisions to its
EP regulatory program over the years; in fact, the NRC's EP regulations
have been revised more than 10 times since 1980. The NRC has
continually evaluated and revised, as necessary, the requirements
associated with emergency planning, such as the following: The
consideration of emergency preparedness exercises as part of the
licensing process (50 FR 19323; May 8, 1985), the frequency of State
and local agency participation in licensee emergency preparedness
exercises (49 FR 27733; July 6, 1984), the criteria for the evaluation
of utility-prepared emergency plans in situations in which State or
local governments decline to participate further in emergency planning
(52 FR 42078; November 3, 1987), the requirements for emergency
preparedness training activities between biennial full-participation
exercises (61 FR 30129; June 14, 1996), and the requirement to consider
including potassium iodide as a protective measure for the general
public as a supplement to sheltering and evacuation (66 FR 5427;
January 19, 2001).
The most recent change was the revision to the emergency
preparedness regulations in a final rule, ``Enhancements to Emergency
Preparedness Regulations,'' published in the Federal Register on
November 23, 2011 (76 FR 72560). The areas that were addressed in this
amendment included both security-related and non-security-related
emergency preparedness issues. A total of 12 regulatory areas were
revised: On-shift staffing; emergency action levels for hostile action;
emergency response organization (ERO) augmentation and alternate
facilities during hostile action; licensee coordination with offsite
response organizations during hostile action; protection for onsite
personnel; challenging drills and exercises; backup means for alert and
notification systems; emergency declaration timeliness; Emergency
Operations Facility-performance based approach; evacuation time
estimate updating; amended emergency plan change process; and removal
of completed one-time requirements. This process took several years to
complete and involved numerous public meetings, workshops, and comment
periods that involved external stakeholders throughout the process.
The following are examples of changes to the emergency preparedness
regulations that will directly enhance the coordination between onsite
and offsite response organizations.
Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations
Licensees are required to establish relations with offsite response
organizations to coordinate emergency response efforts should they ever
be needed. The scope of offsite response organization support includes
the implementation of State and local response plans to protect public
health and safety in the event of a severe reactor accident and to
provide fire, medical, and Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) support
to the nuclear power plant site. All nuclear power plants have
established such relations, and their response in integrated exercises
is tested biennially. However, demands on offsite response organization
resources have changed in the post-September 11, 2001, threat
environment. In the unlikely event that a hostile action event takes
place at a plant, LLEA resources will have multiple duties in addition
to supporting implementation of the emergency plan. For example, police
officers designated to staff evacuation traffic control points may
instead be responding to hostile actions at the plant, or firefighters
designated to perform route alerting may instead be responding to major
fires at the plant resulting from hostile actions. This situation could
detract from offsite response organization emergency plan
implementation if plans have not been revised to address this
contingency. For a nuclear power plant to be licensed and maintain its
license, existing NRC regulations require the NRC to find that
reasonable assurance exists that a plant's emergency plans can and will
be implemented to protect public health and safety during a
radiological emergency.
The 2011 EP final rule requires licensees to ensure that adequate
planning exists for the resources necessary to implement emergency
plans during hostile action events. Licensees must verify that offsite
response organizations have plan and procedure elements to address the
need for emergency plan implementation support during all
contingencies, including hostile action events. Routine evaluation of
offsite response organization performance during biennial exercises
also addresses offsite response organizations' abilities to implement
plans during reactor accidents not involving hostile action.
Challenging Drills and Exercises
A basic principle of emergency preparedness is that licensees
conduct drills and exercises to develop and
[[Page 19508]]
maintain key skills in order to protect public health and safety in the
unlikely event of a radiological emergency. Licensees demonstrate their
ability to implement emergency plans and critique response actions
during evaluated biennial exercises. The NRC inspects licensee response
in biennial exercises, and FEMA evaluates offsite response
organizations. These programs have been in effect for many years, and
the agencies have determined that there is reasonable assurance that
protective actions can and will be implemented should they be
necessary. The 2011 EP final rule added the requirement to Sec.
IV.F.2.i of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 to require that drill and
exercise scenarios encompass a wide spectrum of events and conditions
to avoid anticipatory responses from preconditioning of participants.
Such scenarios must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases
and events, including hostile action. These drills and exercises must
emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response organizations,
as appropriate.
Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems
An alert and notification system (ANS) provides the capability to
promptly alert the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a
nuclear power plant emergency event and to inform the public of
protective actions that need to be taken. The predominant method used
around U.S. nuclear power plants for alerting the public is an ANS
based on sirens to provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites
employ other means, such as tone alert radios and route alerting, as
either primary or supplemental alerting methods. The public typically
receives information about an event and offsite protective actions via
emergency alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile
loudspeakers.
An ANS has two distinct functions. The alert function provides a
warning signal to the population indicating the need to seek additional
information regarding an event in progress. By itself, this function
provides no information about the type of event or any protective
actions that need to be taken. The notification function informs the
public about the nature of the event and any protective actions. These
functions may be performed by separate means, such as sirens for
alerting and EAS broadcasts for notification, or by one method, such as
tone alert radios and electronic hailers, that can provide both a
warning signal and an instructional message.
Nuclear power plant licensees are required by Sec. IV.D.3 of
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 to demonstrate that the ANS capability
exists. Alerting and notifying the public is a function assigned to the
State and local governments and evaluated by FEMA. The 2011 EP final
rule provides the requirement that the ANS include administrative and
physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification.
The methods of alerting the public using either the primary or backup
means is a process that involves coordination between the onsite and
offsite response organizations, and the responsibility for activation
of these systems must remain with the appropriate governmental
authorities.
Evacuation Time Estimate Updating
The implementation of protective actions, including the evacuation
of the public from the affected area surrounding a nuclear power plant,
can mitigate the consequences of a radiological emergency at the plant.
During the licensing process, applicants for a nuclear power reactor
operating license under 10 CFR part 50, or for an early site permit (as
applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, are required to
provide estimates of the time required to evacuate the public from the
various sectors and distances of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. These
ETEs are used in the planning process to identify potential challenges
to efficient evacuation, such as traffic constraints, and, in the event
of an accident, to assist the onsite and offsite emergency response
managers in making appropriate decisions regarding the protection of
the public.
The 2011 EP final rule requires that at any time during the
decennial period between national censuses, if the EPZ permanent
resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value
for the 2-mile zone or the 5-mile zone, including all affected
Emergency Response Planning Areas,\1\ or the entire 10-mile EPZ to
increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the
licensee's currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the licensee shall
update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of the population
increases. These ETEs would be used by both the licensee and the State
and local governments for development of protective action guidelines
in the event of an accident at a nuclear power facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An Emergency Response Planning Area is a local area within
the EPZ for which emergency response information is provided; the
EPZ is typically divided into Emergency Response Planning Areas
along geographic or political boundaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast to the statement in the petition that emergency
planning regulations have changed little in the last 30 years, the NRC
has made numerous revisions to its EP regulatory program during this
time period. However, the NRC does not base the need to enhance
regulations upon the age of the regulation. The NRC remains open to
specific input from stakeholders that identifies inadequate EP
regulations. When the NRC staff or stakeholders identify a deficiency
in the regulations that could result in a lack of reasonable assurance
of adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC will
consider the need to revise the regulations.
Issue 5. Expand EPZs because ad hoc expansion beyond 10 miles will not
be adequate.
The petitioner argued that ad hoc expansion of an evacuation beyond
the 10-mile EPZ will not be adequate. The petitioner stated that
``[w]aiting to see how bad an emergency gets before expanding
evacuation beyond a planned radius is not a plan of action, it is a
recipe for disaster and an abdication of responsibility.''
The petitioner stated that there were delays in detecting
radioactive contamination after the accidents at Chernobyl and
Fukushima Dai-ichi and that this ``was a failure of emergency planning
and radiation monitoring, not evidence that relocation may be taken at
a leisurely pace.''
The petitioner stated that natural disasters such as hurricanes,
tornadoes, wildfires, and floods may cause or occur concurrently with
accidents at nuclear power plants and that ``natural disasters can
greatly complicate the ability to evacuate a given area. . . .''
The petitioner stated that ``the wind blew the vast majority of the
radiation released during the first week of the Fukushima Dai-ichi
accident over the ocean and away from land.'' The petitioner stated,
``[H]ad the wind been blowing in a different direction, could Japan
have evacuated a large enough area fast enough? Would the U.S. be able
to do so in a similar scenario? The answer to both questions is almost
certainly no. And yet, this is real world data--the NRC cannot rely
upon favorable wind patterns as an emergency response measure.''
Some commenters agreed that an ad hoc expansion may not be
adequate.
Several State agencies and the Nuclear Energy Institute disagreed
and stated that EPZs are large enough to facilitate protective actions
over larger areas, if necessary. Several State and county emergency
management agencies
[[Page 19509]]
stated that Federal policies after the September 11, 2001, attacks and
Hurricane Katrina, such as the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) all-hazards approach, have
strengthened the ability to expand the response effort beyond the
existing EPZs, if necessary.
NRC Response to Issue 5
The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertions on this issue.
As specified in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), two EPZs are established around
each nuclear power plant. The technical basis for the EPZs is provided
in NUREG-0396. The first zone, the plume exposure pathway EPZ,
establishes an area of approximately 10 miles in radius. Within the
plume exposure pathway EPZ, detailed planning is required for the
recommendation and implementation of protective actions such as
sheltering in place or evacuation. The ingestion pathway EPZ has a
radius of approximately 50 miles from the plant. Within this EPZ,
detailed planning is required to address the potential need to
interdict foodstuffs to prevent human exposure from ingestion of
contaminated food and surface water. The NRC remains confident that the
emergency preparedness programs in support of nuclear power plants
provide an adequate level of protection of the public health and safety
and that appropriate protective actions can and will be taken in the
event of a radiological event at an existing nuclear power plant.
As stated previously, the NRC has studied evacuations within the
United States (NUREG/CR-6864) and found that State and local
governments are capable of protecting public health and safety through
implementation of protective actions up to and including evacuations
using both preplanned and ad hoc protective action decisionmaking.
Several large-scale evacuations were studied in NUREG/CR-6981, many
of which were conducted in an ad hoc manner. The assessment of
emergency response planning and implementation for large-scale
evacuations affirmed that most of the lessons learned in the
evacuations studied were anticipated by NRC and FEMA and were already
addressed in existing planning and procedures within the NRC and FEMA
framework.
Emergency preparedness within the EPZ is required to provide
immediate response capability. This response would address those people
most at risk (i.e., those closest to the nuclear power plant).
Immediate protection of the EPZ population allows additional time for
implementation of ad hoc actions beyond the EPZ. As stated in NUREG-
0396:
[I]t was the consensus of the [NRC-EPA] Task Force that
emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which
predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such
accidents. Beyond this generic distance it was concluded that
actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same
considerations that went into the initial action determinations.
Additionally, emergency actions could be successfully carried out
beyond the 10-mile EPZ for the following reasons:
The 10-mile emergency planning basis establishes an
infrastructure similar to that used by other offsite response
organizations, such as police and fire departments. The infrastructure
consists of emergency organizations, communications capabilities,
training, and equipment that can be used in the event of an accident at
a facility.
Coordination is enhanced by the practice of having offsite
response organizations, which include local, State, and Federal
responders, participate in training exercises with the licensee. The
studies cited previously noted a valuable contributor to effective
evacuation implementation was participation in training and drills.
The emergency notification equipment required by the NRC
(10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)) for prompt notification of the public within the
EPZ reaches beyond the plume exposure EPZ and current communications
technology enhances this process.
In addition, State and local response agencies have improved their
incident response plans and guidance following the events of September
11, 2001. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued
guidance for Federal, State, and local response to emergencies which
includes the National Response Framework, NIMS, and ICS. These guidance
documents present a framework for use during an emergency that is
scalable, is flexible, and allows for an adaptable coordinating
structure.
The DHS policy and initiatives have provided another basis for
implementing protective actions for nuclear power plant emergencies
beyond the EPZ should they ever be necessary. State and local response
organizations have recognized the possibility that actions may be
warranted beyond the established EPZs and these issues have been
included in drills and exercises. The development and implementation of
NIMS and ICS under the National Response Framework enhances State and
local response capabilities through uniform and logical management of
response resources to facilitate prompt and effective protective
measures for all populations that may be affected. The NIMS and ICS
programs are a comprehensive approach to incident management that
provides a common operating picture and interoperability for
communications and management of events. These programs are scalable,
so the response can be expanded or contracted as dictated by the event,
such as an expansion of protective actions beyond the EPZ during an
event if warranted. This allows for all levels of government response
organizations to work together efficiently for responding to
emergencies, including an event involving a nuclear power reactor.
Every nuclear power plant licensee has an approved emergency plan
that includes procedures for the necessary interactions with State and
local authorities. These emergency plans are drilled and exercised on a
regular basis and inspected during a biennial exercise (i.e., every 2
years) and include the integrated response of licensees, State and
local responders, and decisionmakers. The licensee is required by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(5) to notify State and local authorities of the emergency
status and by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) to make protective action
recommendations. This requirement includes the need to evacuate areas
beyond the EPZ should it be necessary. During biennial exercises, FEMA
evaluates the ability of ORO decisionmakers to identify the need for
protective actions.
The NRC notes that the requirement for a classification scheme for
identification of emergencies in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) is anticipatory,
which means that emergencies are declared before a radiological release
takes place. Licensees must rapidly activate emergency organizations in
response to emergency conditions and recommend protective actions in a
timely manner. The NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) also require
timely assessment of radiological conditions in response to an
accident. Additionally, State and local emergency response programs
have radiological assessment capabilities independent of licensees'
assessment resources. During a nuclear power plant emergency, the NRC
expects that radiological assessment information would be obtained by
licensees and OROs and made available to the NRC and to State and local
response organizations.
The petition did not provide examples of evacuations within the
U.S. that were unsuccessful and would cause
[[Page 19510]]
the NRC to lose confidence in the ability of State and local
authorities to implement protective actions for the public when
necessary. The NRC studies show that State and local authorities are
quite capable of protecting their citizens.
Issue 6. Expand EPZs because current planning is inadequate for
increased populations around many U.S. nuclear power plants.
The petition included ``significantly larger populations near many
existing reactor sites'' in a list of several factors that have changed
since the existing emergency planning regulations were promulgated.
The petitioner stated, ``Imagine the difficulties of using a 10
mile planning zone as the basis for a rapid expansion of the zone to 25
miles or more in a heavily urban area such as near Indian Point in New
York, Limerick in Pennsylvania or many other existing reactor sites.''
Several commenters stated that populations living near some U.S.
nuclear power plants have increased significantly since the plants were
originally licensed, and stated that this is one of the reasons why
current evacuation plans are insufficient.
NRC Response to Issue 6
The NRC disagrees that current EP planning requirements are
inadequate. The petition and commenters did not provide any evidence
that an increase in a population is a reason to expand the EPZ. The
Commission has previously stated that ``[t]hrough its standards and
required exercises, the Commission ensures that existing plans are
adequate throughout the life of any plant even in the face of changing
demographics and other site-related factors'' (Denial of Petitions for
Rulemaking, PRM-54-02 and PRM-54-03 (71 FR 74852; December 13, 2006)).
In the 2011 EP final rule, the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and
Sec. IV, ``Content of Emergency Plans,'' of appendix E to 10 CFR part
50 to require the periodic review and updating of ETEs. The NRC also
published guidance (NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of
Evacuation Time Estimate Studies,'' dated November 2011 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML113010515)) to enhance the quality of ETEs. The
population within EPZs varies broadly from a few thousand to over
270,000 people. However, even sites with large populations can achieve
general public evacuation within about 10 hours. The data available
from the ETEs show that large populations can be effectively evacuated.
A review of the evacuations studied in NUREG/CR-6864 shows that
effective evacuations of large numbers of people were routinely
accomplished, including:
Hurricane Floyd, 373,000 people (1999)
Hurricane Andrew, 650,000 people (1992)
Hurricane Georges, 1,500,000 people (1998)
Centennial Olympic Park, 60,000 people (1996)
World Trade Center, 300,000 people (2001)
World Trade Center, 150,000 people (1993)
The East Bay Hills Wildfire, 30,000 people (1991)
The NRC is not aware of data that would indicate that evacuation of
larger populations cannot be accomplished in an effective manner. The
data shows that OROs can accomplish large evacuations and this process
is generally viewed as successful.
Issue 7. Expand EPZs because the U.S. reactor fleet is aging and more
vulnerable to the occurrence of accidents.
The petition included ``increasing age and vulnerability of
operating reactors'' in a list of several factors that have changed
since the existing emergency planning regulations were promulgated to
conclude that aging U.S. reactors have a greater risk of an accident
and require an expansion of EPZs.
Commenters claimed that aging reactors are more vulnerable to
damage from earthquakes, aging concrete, human error, and Alloy 600
embrittlement.
One commenter specifically identified Indian Point Energy Center,
Diablo Canyon Power Plant, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant as
reactors that are ``more antiquated or dangerously sited.''
NRC Response to Issue 7
The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertion that aging U.S.
reactors have a greater risk of an accident. Neither the petitioner nor
the commenters provided support for their conclusions that aging
reactors have a greater risk of an accident and are more vulnerable to
damage from earthquakes, aging concrete, human error, and Alloy 600
embrittlement. Because the NRC's regulatory framework provides
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
over the lifetime of the reactors, EPZs do not need to be expanded due
to the age of the reactors.
Each operating power reactor licensee is required to maintain its
facility to ensure that the safety-related functions of preventing and
mitigating accidents are not compromised. The regulatory objective of
the Maintenance Rule, found in 10 CFR 50.65, is to require licensee
monitoring of the overall continuing effectiveness of its maintenance
programs to ensure the following:
Safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC)
and certain SSCs that are not safety-related are capable of performing
their intended functions.
For equipment that is not safety-related, failures will
not occur that prevent the fulfillment of safety-related functions.
Failures resulting in scrams and unnecessary actuations of
safety-related systems are minimized.
The NRC provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of
public health and safety, in part, through the NRC's Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP), in which the NRC ensures that an acceptable level of
licensee performance is maintained. The ROP involves inspecting
licensees, reviewing performance indicators (PI), evaluating PIs,
assessing licensee performance, and taking appropriate regulatory
actions to ensure compliance with the NRC's regulations. The ROP
continuously assesses licensee performance using performance-based
risk-informed baseline inspections and performance indicators reported
by licensees. The ROP inspections seek to evaluate licensee performance
by identifying degraded conditions and the deficient licensee
performance that led to those degraded conditions. When risk-
significant aging management performance issues are identified, the NRC
will perform additional supplemental inspections to verify that
appropriate corrective actions are taken to address recurrence of the
issues and restore compliance with aging management programs. Less
risk-significant licensee performance issues would typically be entered
into the licensee's corrective action program and corrected by the
licensee. In addition to inspection under the ROP, the NRC evaluates
operating experience and trends regarding those issues important to
safety, such as those associated with aging SSCs. Negative trends and
significant inspection findings impacting safety would be addressed
through enforcement, backfit, or rulemaking as appropriate.
The license renewal regulatory process requires that for SSCs that
are safety-related, that could affect the performance of a safety-
related function, or that are necessary to respond to specific events
regulated by the NRC,
[[Page 19511]]
aging management programs must be in place to manage the effects of
aging. The implementation of the aging management programs ensures that
SSCs retain the ability to perform their intended functions and that
the licensee's current licensing basis, which has been shown to provide
an acceptable level of safety, will be maintained in the renewal
period.
The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR part 54, ``Requirements for Renewal
of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,'' require that each
license renewal application contain technical information and
evaluations about the different types of plant aging that might be
encountered in the plant and how the licensee will manage or mitigate
those aging effects. This information must be sufficiently detailed to
permit the NRC to determine whether the effects of aging will be
managed such that the plant can be operated during the period of
extended operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the
public. If the NRC can make this determination, it will renew the
licensee's operating license and continue monitoring the licensee's
operational performance throughout the renewal period.
Issue 8. Expand EPZs because risk from spent fuel pools is too high.
The petitioner argued that the risk of accidents at spent fuel
pools is too high to ignore and, therefore, the plume exposure pathway
EPZ must be expanded to adequately protect the public. According to the
petitioner, ``real-world experience,'' improved understanding of severe
accident risks at nuclear spent fuel pools, and the fact that accidents
could cause widespread contamination with highly radioactive materials
prove that the 10-mile EPZ is inadequate. The petitioner referred to
several papers to raise issues that describe the improved understanding
of spent fuel pool severe accidents and their risks, including:
The NRC has permitted high-density storage in spent fuel
pools in the absence of a geologic repository. Under accident
conditions, including a loss of water in the pool, cooling of the spent
fuel could be difficult or ineffective in the densely packed pool,
which could result in a zirconium fire in the pool.
Spent fuel pools contain a large amount of radioactive
material with much more long-lived radioisotopes than in a reactor
core. Therefore, spent fuel pool accidents could lead to larger
releases of radioactive materials than accidents in a reactor core.
Spent fuel pools are located outside of containment.
Therefore, they are more vulnerable than the reactor to natural
disasters and terrorist attacks and have little to prevent a release to
the environment.
The petitioner further stated that the Commission previously did
not consider the effects of spent fuel pool failure as a source of
severe accident consequences, but only considered containment and core
failure in the previous denial of three similar petitions for
rulemaking (Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, et al., 32 NRC 281
(1990)). The petitioner stated that, given the information on how
serious a threat spent fuel pool accidents are, continued failure to
address the risks of spent fuel pool accidents is flawed.
Several commenters agreed with the petitioner and called for spent
fuel to be moved as quickly as possible into hardened dry cask storage.
One State agency stated that the petitioner has some valid points
regarding spent fuel, but that the utilities were forced into this
situation due to inaction by various levels of government. The primary
concern is that the health and safety of citizens is protected in the
event of a release, regardless of the source.
The Nuclear Energy Institute stated that the petitioner's
description of the damage to the Unit 3 spent fuel pool at Fukushima
Dai-ichi is inaccurate. The Nuclear Energy Institute disagreed with the
petitioner's arguments and stated that spent fuel pools are robust
structures designed to withstand severe external events. The zirconium
fire scenario has been studied extensively by the NRC for decades,
according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, and the NRC has consistently
concluded that the risk of such fires is extremely low. The Nuclear
Energy Institute pointed out that the NRC issued an Order to further
ensure that reliable spent fuel pool water level indications can be
identified by trained personnel.
NRC Response to Issue 8
The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertions on this issue.
The NRC has previously evaluated one of the papers referenced by the
petitioner, ``Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel
in the United States,'' dated April 21, 2003, Robert Alvarez, et al.,
(published in the Science and Global Security, Spring 2003) and
concluded that it fails to make the case for its central recommendation
(``Fact Sheet: NRC Review of Paper on Reducing Hazards from Stored
Spent Nuclear Fuel,'' dated August 20, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML032320620)).
The NRC concludes that both spent fuel pools and dry casks provide
adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the NRC issued Orders
to plant operators requiring several measures aimed at mitigating the
effects of a large fire, explosion, or accident that damages a spent
fuel pool. These measures were intended to deal with the aftermath of a
terrorist attack or plane crash; however, they would also be effective
in responding to natural phenomena such as tornadoes, earthquakes, or
tsunamis.
These mitigating measures include:
Controlling the configuration of fuel assemblies in the
pool to enhance the ability to keep the fuel cool and recover from
damage to the pool.
Establishing emergency spent fuel cooling capability.
Staging emergency response equipment nearby so that it can
be deployed quickly.
As an example of the ``real-world experience'' of spent fuel pool
accidents, page 28 of the petition refers to a video uploaded to
YouTube on October 18, 2011, that shows an underwater camera inspection
by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The petitioner speculated
that the spent fuel pool at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 was essentially
destroyed by the explosion of the Unit's reactor building, based on the
video not showing intact fuel rods. Since the posting of that video,
TEPCO has performed additional investigations and has confirmed that
the spent fuel in the Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 spent fuel pool remains
intact and within the racks, as far as what could be seen by the
underwater camera. See images from an underwater camera taken on
October 11 and 12, 2012, as discussed in a TEPCO press conference on
October 15, 2012. A handout from the press conference including the
images is available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_121015_01-e.pdf.
During the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi, responders did not have
reliable instrumentation to determine the water levels in the spent
fuel pools. This caused concerns that the pools may have boiled dry and
damaged the fuel. Numerous attempts were made to refill the spent fuel
pools, which diverted resources and attention from other efforts to
respond to the event. Subsequent analysis determined that the water
level in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool did not drop below the top of the
stored fuel and no significant fuel damage occurred. The lack of
information on the condition of spent fuel pools
[[Page 19512]]
contributed to a poor understanding of possible radiation releases and
adversely impacted effective prioritization of emergency response
actions by decisionmakers.
In the agency's review of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in the
NTTF report, the NRC staff noted that the low likelihood of such events
and the current mitigation capabilities at U.S. nuclear power plants
allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the United States.
These events have not undermined the emergency preparedness assumptions
or the basis for the size of the EPZs. Therefore, continued operation
and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to
public health and safety.
Current activities being undertaken by the NRC staff for the NTTF
recommendations resulting from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event are
addressing the issue of additional requirements, including developing,
implementing, and maintaining guidance and strategies to maintain or
restore spent fuel pool cooling in the event of a beyond-design-basis
external event such as a natural disaster (Order EA-12-049, ``Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,'' dated March 12,
2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736)).
The NRC issued Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'' dated March 12,
2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A682), which required all power
reactor licensees and holders of construction permits, in active or
deferred status, to implement measures to ensure that reliable spent
fuel pool water level indications can be identified by trained
personnel. Specifically, personnel must be capable of identifying: (1)
The level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool
cooling system, (2) the level that is adequate to provide substantial
radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool
operating deck, and (3) the level where fuel remains covered and at
which actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be
deferred. As noted in the Order, full implementation must be completed
no later than two refueling cycles after the licensee's submittal of an
overall integrated plan or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Construction permit holders must complete full implementation prior to
issuance of an operating license and combined operating license holders
must complete full implementation prior to initial fuel load.
The NRC staff completed a spent fuel pool risk study in 2001
(NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 28, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066)) in which the risk of spent fuel severe
accidents was evaluated and found to be low and well within the
Commission's safety goals outlined in its Policy Statement on Safety
Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants (51 FR 28044; August 4,
1986. Correction published on August 21, 1986 (51 FR 30028)). The NRC
staff published a report in October 2013 with a similar conclusion that
storage of spent fuel in a high-density configuration in spent fuel
pools is safe and that the risk of an accident resulting from the
beyond-design-basis seismic event analyzed is low (``Consequence Study
of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a
U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated October 2013 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML13256A342)). In addition, the NRC staff is embarking on
a full-scope site Level 3 PRA project, which will evaluate the severe
accident risks at a currently operating multi-unit reactor site,
including the risk from a spent fuel pool accident. The insights from
this study may be a useful input to inform or enhance regulatory
decisionmaking, potentially including emergency preparedness
requirements, as described in SECY-12-0123, ``Update on Staff Plans to
Apply the Full-Scope Site Level 3 PRA Project Results to the NRC's
Regulatory Framework,'' dated September 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12202B170).
The NRC has concluded that the risk from spent fuel pools is low
and this petition presented no new information related to spent fuel
pools for a basis to expand EPZs.
Issue 9. Emergency planning regulations must be strengthened because
there are significant concerns related to pressure suppression
containments.
The petitioner argued that there are significant concerns related
to pressure suppression containments, such as the General Electric (GE)
Mark I containment that was used at five of the units at Fukushima Dai-
ichi, and, therefore, emergency planning regulations must be
strengthened to adequately protect the public. The petitioner cited the
accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Dai-ichi to
show that hydrogen explosions, pressure spikes, and containment
failures have occurred, resulting in releases of radioactive materials.
The petitioner pointed out that there are 23 operational nuclear power
reactors with GE Mark I containments in the United States. The
petitioner claimed that they are susceptible to failure in the event of
a hydrogen explosion and that there has been much scrutiny and
criticism of their design flaws. The petitioner stated that the ``NRC
can no longer dismiss the reality of devastating nuclear accidents
based on supposedly superior U.S. reactor designs.'' The petitioner
stated that, given the history of nuclear power, the NRC must assume,
at least for emergency planning purposes, that devastating nuclear
accidents will occur in the United States.
One commenter stated that the Mark I containment is a flawed
design. Specifically, the commenter stated that the problem of
overpressure in the torus must be addressed and that valves to allow
manual release of pressure are not sufficient.
NRC Response to Issue 9
The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertions on this issue.
The petitioner is correct that there were lessons to be learned from
the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi related to pressure suppression
containments. These lessons and NRC follow-up actions are summarized in
the following paragraphs. In light of these actions, the NRC disagrees
that concerns related to pressure suppression containments support the
petitioner's position that the NRC's EP regulations need to be revised
or its overall conclusion that EPZs must be expanded. The petitioner
asked that the NRC assume that a radiological release from containment
will occur. Instead, the NRC has taken steps to enhance the performance
of these containments in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident,
as noted in the following paragraphs.
The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that
extreme natural phenomena could challenge the defense-in-depth layers
for accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency preparedness. At
Fukushima Dai-ichi, a variety of challenges significantly hindered
attempts by the responders to preclude core damage and containment
failure. The operators were unable to successfully operate the
containment venting system early in the event. The inability to reduce
containment pressure inhibited efforts to cool the reactor core. If
additional backup or alternate sources of power had been available to
operate the containment venting system
[[Page 19513]]
remotely, or if certain valves had been more accessible for manual
operation, the operators at Fukushima Dai-ichi may have been able to
depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed
operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources that
may have limited or prevented damage to the reactor core. Thus, the
events at Fukushima Dai-ichi demonstrate that reliable hardened vents
at BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are
important to maintain core and containment cooling.
Based on these lessons learned, the NRC issued Order EA-13-109,
``Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment
Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions,'' dated
June 6, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13143A334), which required all BWR
licensees with Mark I and Mark II containment designs to have a
reliable, severe accident capable hardened vent to assist in the
removal of decay heat and maintain control of containment pressure
within acceptable limits following an event that results in the loss of
active containment heat removal capability such as an extended loss of
electrical power. The hardened vent system must be accessible and
functional under a range of plant conditions, including severe accident
conditions, extended loss of electrical power, and inadequate
containment cooling. As noted in the Order, full implementation must be
completed no later than startup from the first refueling outage that
begins after June 30, 2017, or June 30, 2019, whichever comes first.
The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi have not undermined the emergency
preparedness assumptions or the basis for the size of the EPZs.
Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do
not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.
Issue 10. Expand EPZs because expansion is supported by the current
improved understanding of the health effects of radiation.
The petitioner claimed that improved understanding of the health
effects of radiation indicates that greater consideration should be
given to the effects of the release of radiation. In particular, the
petitioner referred to the National Academies Biological Effects of
Ionizing Radiation VII report, ``Health Risks from Exposure to Low
Levels of Ionizing Radiation'' (2006) (BEIR VII report), as
``confirming that any exposure to radiation--including background
radiation--increases a person's risk of developing cancer.'' The BEIR
VII report is available online from the National Academies Press at
http://www.nap.edu.
The petitioner took issue with the emergency response goal of
preventing exposure above 5 rem/year as the basis for the EPA
Protective Action Guides, as cited in the NRC's denial of a petition
for rulemaking for emergency preparedness submitted previously by the
Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill (55 FR 5603; February 16, 1990). The
petitioner stated that according to the BEIR VII report, this level of
exposure would cause cancer in more than 1 in 50 female children and
that this is a hopelessly outdated and politically indefensible policy.
The petitioner stated that the BEIR VII report clarifies that women
and children are much more susceptible to radiation exposure than the
``average man'' \2\ and regulations should protect the most vulnerable
members of the population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The petition's use of the term ``average man'' is
interpreted to refer to ``reference man,'' which is defined as a
person with the anatomical and physiological characteristics of an
average individual that is used in calculations assessing internal
dose (also may be called ``standard man''). See also the
International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 23
(1975). This publication is available for purchase online through
the publisher at http://www.icrp.org/publications.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The petitioner also stated that emergency response programs should
be designed such that exposure limits during an emergency should not be
higher than the annual exposure limits under non-emergency conditions.
The petitioner's discussion on the improved understanding of the
health effects of radiation was provided as support to the proposed
upgrades to emergency planning standards, which requested changes to
the areas for the plume exposure EPZ and ingestion exposure pathway EPZ
and to the emergency exercise requirements. No changes were proposed to
the EPA PAGs themselves.
Many commenters agreed with the opinion expressed in the petition
that the improved understanding of the health effects of radiation
support expanding the EPZs.
NRC Response to Issue 10
The NRC disagrees that these studies warrant expansion of the EPZs.
The NRC agrees that it is appropriate to continually review these and
other studies of radiation effects to ensure continued adequate
protection of public health and safety. The NRC staff reviewed the BEIR
VII report and provided an information paper, SECY-05-0202, ``Staff
Review of the National Academies Study of the Health Risks from
Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII),'' dated
October 29, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052640532), to the Commission
regarding the potential implications of the report for NRC regulations.
The NRC staff concluded that ``none of the findings in the BEIR VII
report warrant initiating immediate change to NRC regulations or
Federal Guidance.'' In the BEIR VII report, the National Academies
concluded that current scientific evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that there is a linear, no-threshold dose response
relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the development
of cancer in humans. The Commission's regulations regarding radiation
protection are based on this linear, no-threshold assumption. As stated
in SECY-12-0064, ``Recommendations for Policy and Technical Direction
to Revise Radiation Protection Regulations and Guidance,'' dated April
25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML121020108), the NRC staff found that
the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
concluded that a linear, no-threshold approach remained a prudent basis
for practical purposes of radiation protection. The same conclusion has
been drawn by the National Academy of Sciences in the BEIR VII report,
the UNSCEAR, and the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements report.
The ICRP Publication 103, ``The 2007 Recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection'' (December 2007),
contained the revised recommendations for a system of radiological
protection, which reflect an evolution from the previous
recommendations contained in ICRP Publication 60 in 1990 and in ICRP
Publication 26 in 1977. These publications are available for purchase
online through the publisher at http://www.icrp.org/publications.asp.
The ICRP makes recommendations on such topics as the quantities used in
radiological protection, biological effects of radiation, principles of
radiation protection, dose limits, and optimization. The ICRP
recommendations are generally used to inform radiation protection
policy or regulations by pertinent governmental or international
agencies, and their development has been discussed with many
international and national organizations with an interest in
radiological protection. In SECY-12-0064, the NRC staff provided the
Commission with a notation vote paper that discusses the history of
radiation
[[Page 19514]]
protection recommendations and regulations and the ICRP's 2007
recommendations and their impact on evaluating radiation risk. The
paper also discusses the NRC staff's evaluation of information in the
BEIR VII report, referenced by the petitioner. SECY-12-0064 provided
the Commission with options on whether to revise the dosimetry basis of
appendix I to 10 CFR part 50 design objective and guidance and 10 CFR
part 20 based on the ICRP 2007 recommendations. The NRC staff
recommended the option of developing the regulatory basis for a
revision of certain provisions of 10 CFR part 20 occupational dose
limits and initiating the parallel development of the regulatory basis
for revision of appendix I to 10 CFR part 50 to align with the update
of 10 CFR part 20 and to address the unique set of issues that are not
directly connected with 10 CFR part 20.
The Commission issued its SRM for SECY-12-0064 on December 17, 2012
(SRM-SECY-12-0064, ``Recommendations for Policy and Technical Direction
to Revise Radiation Protection Regulations and Guidance'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML12352A133)). In the SRM, the Commission approved in
part the NRC staff's recommendations for development of the regulatory
basis for a revision to 10 CFR part 20 and parallel alignment of
appendix I to 10 CFR part 50 with the most recent methodology and
terminology for dose assessment. The Commission also directed the NRC
staff to continue discussions with stakeholders on alternative
approaches to deal with individual protection at or near the current
dose limit.
In SECY-05-0202, the NRC staff also discussed the potential
influence of gender on radiation sensitivity as an issue that may
warrant additional consideration, and stated that the NRC staff will
continue to monitor the issue as the ICRP finalizes its new radiation
protection recommendations. The 2007 recommendations in ICRP
Publication 103 considered gender- and age-related sensitivity to
radiation (e.g., in the development of revised age-averaged and sex-
averaged tissue weighting factors) and will be one source of
information that the NRC staff considers in development of the
regulatory basis for rulemaking, as discussed in SECY-12-0064.
The petitioner stated that the emergency response goal is to
prevent exposures to 5 rem/year. This is a misinterpretation of the
basis for emergency response planning requirements, including the PAGs.
It states on page III-3 of NUREG-0396 that for a very large release of
radioactive material, the principal emergency response planning basis
goal is to prevent serious adverse health effects to individuals. To
accomplish this goal, the longer term objective of the PAGs, as stated
in Section 4.2.1 of the 1992 EPA PAG Manual (EPA-400-R092-001, ``Manual
of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear
Incidents,'' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, dated May 1992
(http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/er/400-r-92-001.pdf)), is that the
cumulative dose to an individual over 50 years will not exceed 5 rem.
In March 2013, the EPA published a draft revised PAG Manual for interim
use and public comment (http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/er/pag-manual-interim-public-comment-4-2-2013.pdf). In the 2013 EPA PAG
Manual, the EPA proposes to remove the intermediate phase PAG of 5 rem
over 50 years to avoid confusion with long-term cleanup. The longer-
term objective of the PAGs to ensure that doses in any single year
after the first will not exceed 0.5 rem remains the same as previously
in the 1992 EPA PAG Manual.
It should be noted that a PAG is not a regulatory limit or an
acceptable dose, but is instead, ``the projected dose to reference man,
or other defined individual, from an unplanned release of radioactive
material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that
dose is recommended'' (1992 EPA PAG Manual, Section 1.0). The
petitioner questioned the Commission's previous denial of petitions for
rulemaking, under dockets PRM-50-31, PRM-50-45, and PRM-50-46, to make
changes to the emergency preparedness regulations (55 FR 5603; February
16, 1990). As a basis for its denial, the Commission referred to NUREG-
0396, which clarifies that PAGs represent trigger or initiation levels
proposed as guidance to be used as the basis for taking action to
minimize impact on individuals. In other words, a PAG is ``the
projected dose . . . from an unplanned release of radioactive material
at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is
recommended'' (1992 EPA PAG Manual, Section 1.0). It states on page
III-11 of NUREG-0396:
This does not mean, however, that doses above PAG levels can be
prevented or that emergency response plans should have as their
objective preventing doses above PAG levels. Furthermore, PAGs
represent only trigger levels and are not intended to represent
acceptable dose levels. PAGs are tools to be used as a decision aid
in the actual response situation.
The currently used PAGs for the early phase of the incident
recommend evacuation (or sheltering in certain cases) at a projected
dose of 1 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) and administration
of stable iodine (e.g., potassium iodide (KI)) at a projected dose of
25 rem committed dose equivalent to the thyroid. The dose is calculated
from the estimated atmospheric release. These values are taken from the
1992 EPA PAG Manual. In the 2013 EPA PAG Manual, the EPA proposes to
change the early phase PAG for supplementary administration of KI to a
projected dose of 5 rem to the child thyroid. In planning, the ``early
phase'' of a nuclear incident is usually assumed to last for four days
for dose projection purposes. This definition of the early phase is
intended to coincide with the event initiation and primary release when
evacuation or KI administration may be warranted. Exposure to deposited
materials after four days can be addressed through other protective
measures, such as relocation, if warranted.
The ``intermediate phase'' is defined as the period beginning after
the source and releases have been brought under control and
environmental measurements are available for use as a basis for
protective actions decisions. The intermediate phase ends when the
protective actions are terminated. The intermediate phase may overlap
both the early and the late (or ``recovery'') phases. For the
intermediate phase, there are EPA PAGs for deposited radioactive
materials, where the major relevant protective action is relocation.
Dose to persons not relocated and in lesser contaminated areas may be
reduced by decontamination and spending more time in low exposure rate
areas, such as indoors. There are also PAGs published by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration for food and water. The 1992 EPA PAG Manual
states that the intermediate phase PAGs for deposited radioactive
materials should be considered mandatory only for use in planning.
During an incident, responsible officials will need to exercise their
professional judgment in the implementation of protective actions
because of unanticipated local conditions.
As explained in the 1992 EPA PAG Manual, the PAGs for the
intermediate phase of the incident recommend relocation of the general
population at a projected dose greater than or equal to 2 rem TEDE and
application of simple dose reduction techniques at a projected dose
less than 2 rem TEDE. The projected dose is due to inhalation of
resuspended materials, from exposure or intake during the first year,
and is the dose that would be received without
[[Page 19515]]
shielding from structures or application of dose reduction techniques.
The 1992 EPA PAG Manual states that the objective of these PAGs is to
assure that doses in any single year after the first year will not
exceed 0.5 rem and that the cumulative dose over 50 years (including
the first and second years) will not exceed 5 rem. In the 2013 EPA PAG
Manual, the EPA proposes to remove the intermediate phase PAG of 5 rem
over 50 years to avoid confusion with long-term cleanup. The longer-
term objective of the PAGs to ensure that doses in any single year
after the first will not exceed 0.5 rem remains.
The petitioner stated that emergency response programs should be
designed to protect against radiation levels that would exceed annual
exposure limits. The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertions on
this issue. The PAGs are established for implementing public protective
actions to minimize health effects following a low probability severe
accident that releases radioactive material to the environment in an
uncontrolled, acute manner. The considerations that establish such PAGs
differ significantly from the considerations associated with
establishing radiation protection standards for routine (i.e., high
probability) controlled releases of radioactive material to the
environment. In establishing the PAGs for emergency conditions, the EPA
followed the principle that the risk to health from a protective action
should not itself exceed the risk to health from the dose that would be
averted. Using a PAG based on the lower magnitude radiation protection
standards could place the public in the situations where the risk of
the protective action is greater than the benefit obtained from taking
the action. Appendix B, ``Risks to Health from Radiation Doses That May
Result from Nuclear Incidents,'' and Appendix C, ``Protective Action
Guides for the Early Phase: Supporting Information,'' of the 1992 EPA
PAG Manual describe in detail the EPA's bases and rationale for the
PAGs.
The rationale for the 10-mile distance for the plume exposure EPZ
and the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ is provided in NUREG-
0396, which was based on a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding
consequences, taking probability into consideration. It is stated in
NUREG-0396 that emergency response plans should be useful for
responding to any accident that would result in offsite doses in excess
of the PAGs. The early phase PAG ranges as published at that time were
used in the determination of the plume exposure EPZ distance: Projected
doses per accident of 1-5 rem to the whole body and 5-25 rem to the
thyroid.
The NRC has more recent data on reactor accident consequences and
risks in the SOARCA study, has completed a spent fuel pool accident
consequence study, and has embarked on a full-scope site Level 3 PRA
project. In SECY-12-0123, the NRC staff specifically states that
insights from the Level 3 PRA project could inform the process for
evaluating the potential impact that a multi-unit accident (or an
accident involving spent fuel) may have on the efficacy of the EPZ in
protecting public health and safety. Insights gained from the Level 3
PRA project are expected to include radiological source term
characterization to support determination as to whether the EPZ size
and response timing remains protective of public health and safety in
response to severe accidents.
Issue 11. Expand EPZs because radiation does not stop at an EPZ
boundary.
Several commenters stated that radioactive contamination would not
stop at an EPZ boundary. One commenter stated that airborne radiation
plumes from past releases including Chelyabinsk, Seversk, Chernobyl,
Three Mile Island, and Fukushima Dai-ichi have not stopped 10 miles
from the reactor site. Therefore, 10-mile EPZs need to be enlarged to
provide adequate protection of the public health and safety beyond 10
miles from the plant.
NRC Response to Issue 11
The NRC agrees that in the event of a radioactive release the plume
might not stop at the 10-mile EPZ boundary. However, the NRC disagrees
with the commenter that this requires expansion of the EPZ. As stated
previously, the basis for the EPZ is that it provides a substantial
basis for the expansion of emergency response beyond the EPZ should
that prove to be necessary. The competence of State and local
authorities to implement protective measures for the public (as
described in NUREG/CR-6864 and NUREG/CR-6981) has also been discussed
previously in response to Issues 5 and 6. Additionally, the DHS has
provided several documents that guide Federal, State, and local
response efforts should they be required for an event at a licensee
facility. These documents include FEMA's National Response Framework,
NIMS, and ICS, which were established by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-5--Management of Domestic Incidents on February 28,
2003. These programs present a framework for use in an emergency that
is scalable, is flexible, and allows for an adaptable coordinating
structure. The DHS has achieved near universal acceptance of the
National Response Framework at the Federal, State, and local levels in
the United States. The supporting systems, NIMS and ICS, are
implemented daily in response to routine emergencies nationwide, such
as response to hazardous material spills and fires.
In addition to the DHS guidelines that are used by offsite response
organizations, the current requirements for the 10-mile planning basis
used by licensees establish an infrastructure consisting of emergency
organizations, communications capabilities, training, and equipment
that are similar to other normal community emergency organizations,
such as police and fire departments that can be used in the event of an
accident at the facility. The DHS guidance and the process it outlines
would support ORO efforts to implement protective actions beyond the
plume exposure pathway EPZ if conditions warranted them.
Issue 12. Expand EPZs because current regulations do not provide
adequate protection. Amending the regulations as requested in the
petition would more likely provide adequate protection.
Many commenters agreed with the petitioner that the current
emergency planning regulations do not provide adequate protection of
the public health and safety and are outdated. Several commenters
stated that one of the lessons that should be learned from Fukushima
Dai-ichi is that the NRC's current emergency planning regulations are
inadequate. One commenter stated that while Japan and Germany are
closing their nuclear power plants, the United States continues
building new ones despite having outdated and inadequate emergency
planning regulations. Some comments stated that shadow evacuations
occurred after the accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi and Three Mile
Island and would be a problem for any future evacuation. Some
commenters stated that geography, roadways, bridges, traffic patterns,
and other site-specific features would make evacuation in an emergency
difficult or impossible.
The Nuclear Energy Institute disagreed with the petitioner and
argued that the September 11, 2001, attacks and the accidents at
Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi do not show that the current 10- and
50-mile EPZs are inadequate. The Nuclear Energy Institute and several
emergency management agencies stated that the
[[Page 19516]]
existing EPZs are based on a conservative analysis of a wide range of
accident consequences and continue to provide assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.
NRC Response to Issue 12
The NRC disagrees with the comments that current emergency
preparedness regulations do not provide adequate protection. On
December 13, 1991 (56 FR 64966), the Commission stated that ``through
its standards and required exercises, the Commission ensures that
existing plans are adequate throughout the life of a plant even in the
face of changing demographics and other site related factors.'' The
current regulations in 10 CFR 50.47 require that a finding be made by
the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency
before an initial operating license is issued. These measures are
required to be outlined in each site's radiological emergency plan. The
site-specific emergency plans must meet the 16 planning standards
listed in 10 CFR 50.47(b). Additionally, a holder of a nuclear power
reactor operating license under 10 CFR 50.54(q) is required to follow
and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in appendix E to 10
CFR part 50. All U.S. nuclear power plants currently have NRC-approved
emergency plans that include EPZs in compliance with the regulations in
10 CFR 50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50.
The FEMA approves offsite emergency response plans and evaluates
the capability of State and local agencies to implement their plans in
a biennial demonstration exercise. The ORO's evacuation planning and
protective action decisionmaking are major components of the FEMA
evaluation and are addressed in every biennial exercise. Any finding of
deficiency must be addressed by the responsible agency in order to
maintain the FEMA finding that there is adequate protection of public
health and safety.
The NRC agrees that shadow evacuations may occur and should be
appropriately considered. The NRC's guidance document for preparing
evacuation time estimate studies establishes the need to include a 20
percent shadow evacuation in the analysis (NUREG/CR-7002). The NRC
defines a shadow evacuation as an evacuation of people from areas
outside an officially declared evacuation zone. The shadow population
is considered in the analysis to account for the potential for this
population group to impede the evacuation of those under evacuation
orders. It should be recognized that 20 percent was chosen based on
data in NUREG/CR-6864 and is an estimate of the potential for shadow
evacuation. The shadow evacuation can be minimized through frequent and
effective crisis messaging by OROs. Supplement 3 to NUREG-0654 provides
guidance to assist OROs with crisis messaging.
The NRC staff has conducted considerable research into evacuations,
including the impact of shadow evacuations on evacuation outcomes. As
stated in NUREG/CR-6864:
Shadow evacuations, defined as evacuations by persons outside of
any officially declared evacuation zone(s), occurred in 18 (36%) of
the 50 \3\ case studies examined. Of those 18 cases involving shadow
evacuations, traffic movement was impacted in only five of the cases
and there was no impact on congregate care center capacity,
according to the individuals interviewed. These five cases were all
in Florida and included Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Floyd (3 cases),
and the Mims Fire. In the Mims Fire, Interstate 95 was closed due to
poor visibility from the smoke and significantly contributed to the
traffic congestion. The hurricanes that had traffic movement
problems were exceptionally large, with two cases involving over
600,000 evacuees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ These 50 evacuations were selected because they were of
sufficient size and complexity to challenge local and regional
emergency response capabilities and to provide sufficient detail to
identify the factors contributing to evacuation efficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Governor's Hurricane Task Force has since identified
improvements in the areas of decision making, traffic management,
congregate care center management, and dissemination of emergency
public information, that are expected to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of future large hurricane evacuations, and thus,
reduce impacts from shadow evacuations.
Based on this research, the NRC has confidence that shadow
evacuations generally have little impact on traffic movement and
concludes that the licensees' current emergency planning bases continue
to provide reasonable assurance of protection of the public's health
and safety.
The NRC agrees that most evacuations would be considered difficult
by those experiencing them but disagrees that evacuations would be
impossible. All U.S. nuclear power plants have provided updated ETEs to
the NRC per 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The NRC staff is not aware of any
evacuations that are impossible. A review of the evacuations studied in
NUREG/CR-6864 shows that effective evacuations of large numbers of
people were routinely accomplished, including:
Hurricane Floyd, 373,000 people (1999)
Hurricane Andrew, 650,000 people (1992)
Hurricane Georges, 1,500,000 people (1998)
Centennial Olympic Park, 60,000 people (1996)
World Trade Center, 300,000 people (2001)
World Trade Center, 150,000 people (1993)
The East Bay Hills Wildfire, 30,000 people (1991)
The petition provided no substantial information that would
indicate evacuations cannot be accomplished in support of a nuclear
power plant accident should it be necessary, or that would support its
claim that the NRC's emergency planning regulations do not provide
adequate protection of the public health and safety.
In SECY-12-0095, the NRC staff stated that the existing EP
framework of regulations and guidance to provide reasonable assurance
of adequate protection of public health and safety in a radiological
emergency. The NRC staff referred to several studies that have informed
the NRC evaluation of the adequacy of this approach. These studies,
which are discussed in more detail in the response to Issue 2, included
NUREG/CR-6864 and NUREG-1935. These studies have informed the NRC's
conclusion that the NRC's existing EP framework provides reasonable
assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety in the
event of a radiological emergency at an existing U.S. power reactor
facility.
The Commission concludes that the current size of EPZs helps to
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at an existing
nuclear power plant. In addition, as part of previously-approved
research efforts associated with Tier 3 program plans, the NRC plans a
long-term action involving EPZs. The NRC will use insights from the
current full-scope site Level 3 PRA project as well as information
obtained from the UNSCEAR assessment to inform the evaluation of the
potential impacts that a multi-unit event may have on an EPZ. If these
research activities indicate that changes need to be made to the
existing EP regulations, the NRC will commence a rulemaking effort to
make those changes.
[[Page 19517]]
Issue 13. Require EP exercises to include a regionally-relevant
initiating or concurrent natural disaster because natural disasters can
challenge nuclear safety systems.
The petitioner argued that the NRC should amend its regulations to
require that licensees include a regionally-appropriate natural
disaster in every other exercise because a natural disaster may trigger
a nuclear accident or complicate the emergency response to an accident.
The petitioner listed several recent natural disasters including
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Irene and expressed the opinion that
there is a trend due in large part to climate change. ``If this is
correct,'' the petitioner stated, ```unprecedented' natural disasters
will not only continue to occur, they will accelerate.''
The petitioner stated that natural disasters can greatly complicate
the ability to evacuate a given area.
Many commenters agreed that exercises should include a regionally-
relevant initiating or concurrent natural disaster for the reasons
provided in the petition.
Several State and county emergency management agencies stated that
many nuclear power plant licensees already incorporate natural
disasters into their drills.
NRC Response to Issue 13
The NRC agrees that natural disasters may challenge nuclear safety
systems; however, the NRC disagrees that it is necessary to modify the
regulations as proposed by the petitioner because the existing
requirements and emergency planning framework are sufficient. The
majority of nuclear power plant licensees currently incorporate natural
or destructive phenomena into their drill and exercise scenarios. This
planning helps licensees prepare for natural disasters that could
coincide with a reactor emergency. All NRC-licensed sites in the United
States have emergency action levels (EAL) in their radiological
emergency plans that include protective actions related to aspects of
natural disasters. Moreover, current activities being undertaken by the
NRC staff for the NTTF recommendations resulting from the Fukushima
Dai-ichi event are addressing the issue of additional requirements,
including training and drills, for a beyond-design-basis event such as
a natural disaster (Order EA-12-049). The proposed requirements to
perform a drill for an event that originates from a beyond-design-basis
external event and leads to a multi-unit prolonged station blackout
would involve licensees planning, preparing, and practicing for these
unlikely natural events.
The NRC notes that each U.S. nuclear power plant has an emergency
plan as a defense-in-depth measure. Emergency plans contain
contingencies for alternate evacuation routes, alternate means of
notification, and other backup plans in the event of a natural disaster
that damages the infrastructure surrounding a nuclear power plant.
Licensees exercise these plans on a regular basis. The NRC performs
oversight to verify the acceptable performance of the licensee's
response during exercises, drills, and actual incidents and events. The
FEMA provides oversight for offsite response. For Incidents of National
Significance where the critical infrastructure is severely damaged, the
DHS has a lead role as a coordinating agency to orchestrate Federal,
State, and local assets. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the
National Response Framework provides for the NRC to be a coordinating
agency for incidents involving NRC-licensed materials.
As noted in the response to Issue 1, the NTTF conducted a
systematic and methodical review of the NRC's regulations and processes
to determine if the agency should make safety improvements in light of
the events in Japan. As a result of this review, the NTTF issued SECY-
11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions
Following the Events in Japan,'' dated July 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML11186A950). SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions to be Taken
Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated September
9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11245A158), and SECY-11-0137,
``Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' were issued to establish the NRC staff's
prioritization of the recommendations. The NRC staff determined that
Recommendation 4.2, concerning strategies to mitigate the consequences
of accidents similar to those that occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi, was
a high-priority action. Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying Licenses
with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-
Design-Basis External Events,'' was issued to each power reactor
licensee and each holder of a construction permit on March 12, 2012.
The Order requires a three-phase approach for mitigating beyond-design-
basis external events. The initial phase requires the use of installed
equipment and resources to maintain or restore core cooling,
containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities. The transition
phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment and
consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be
accomplished with resources brought from offsite. The final phase
requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain those
functions indefinitely. Specifically, the Order requires the following:
(1) Licensees or construction permit holders shall develop,
implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore
core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
following a beyond-design-basis external event.
(2) These strategies must be capable of mitigating a simultaneous
loss of all alternating current (ac) power and loss of normal access to
the ultimate heat sink and have adequate capacity to address challenges
to core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
at all units on a site subject to this Order.
(3) Licensees or construction permit holders must provide
reasonable protection for the associated equipment from external
events. Such protection must demonstrate that there is adequate
capacity to address challenges to core cooling, containment, and spent
fuel pool cooling capabilities at all units on a site subject to this
Order.
(4) Licensees or construction permit holders must be capable of
implementing the strategies in all modes.
(5) Full compliance shall include procedures, guidance, training,
and acquisition, staging, or installing of equipment needed for the
strategies.
These new requirements provide a greater mitigation capability
consistent with the overall defense-in-depth philosophy, and,
therefore, provide a greater assurance that the challenges posed by
beyond-design-basis external events, such as natural disasters, to
power reactors do not pose an undue risk to public health and safety.
Issue 14. Require EP exercises to include a regionally-relevant
initiating or concurrent natural disaster because natural disasters may
affect communications during emergency response.
The petitioner stated that natural disasters can greatly complicate
the ability to provide sufficient communication to assure that
sheltering or other protective actions are taken within a given area.
[[Page 19518]]
NRC Response to Issue 14
The NRC agrees that natural disasters may affect communications
during emergency response; however, the NRC disagrees that it is
necessary to modify the regulations as proposed by the petitioner
because of the existing requirements and emergency planning framework.
The majority of nuclear power plant licensees currently incorporate
natural or destructive phenomena into their drill and exercise
scenarios. This planning helps licensees prepare for natural disasters
that could coincide with a reactor emergency. All NRC-licensed sites in
the United States have EALs in their radiological emergency plans that
include protective actions related to aspects of these natural events.
However, current activities being undertaken by the NRC for the NTTF
recommendations resulting from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event associated
with emergency preparedness communications are addressing the issue of
reliable communications following a natural disaster. The proposed
requirements to perform a drill for an event that originates from a
beyond-design-basis external event and leads to a multi-unit prolonged
station blackout would involve licensees planning, preparing, and
practicing for these unlikely natural events.
Emergency plan communications requirements and detailed guidance on
how to meet those requirements are contained in the following:
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) states that provisions should be made
for prompt communications among principal response organizations to
emergency personnel and to the public.
Section IV.E.9 of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 states that
adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency
facilities and equipment, including ``at least one onsite and one
offsite communications system; each system shall have a backup power
source.''
NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response
Facilities,'' dated February 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051390358),
offers guidance on how to meet the requirements of appendix E to 10 CFR
part 50 and discusses the onsite and offsite communications
requirements for the licensee's emergency operating facilities.
As a result of the Tier 1 recommendations in the NTTF report, the
NRC issued to each power reactor licensee and each holder of a
construction permit on March 12, 2012, a ``Request for Information
Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)
regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task
Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML12056A046). The NRC issued this information request
regarding the power supplies for communications systems to determine if
additional regulatory action is warranted. This request is based upon
NTTF Recommendation 9.3, which proposed that facility emergency plans
provide for a means to power communications equipment needed to
communicate onsite (e.g., radios for response teams and between
facilities) and offsite (e.g., cellular telephones and satellite
telephones) during a prolonged station blackout. The NRC requested that
the following assumptions be made in preparing responses to this
request for information: assume that the potential onsite and offsite
damage is a result of a large-scale natural event resulting in a loss
of all alternating current (ac) power and assume that the large-scale
natural event causes extensive damage to normal and emergency
communications systems both onsite and in the area surrounding the
site. The NRC recognizes that following a large-scale natural event, ac
power may not be available to cell and other communications
infrastructures.
The NRC requested that addressees assess their current
communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event
given the aforementioned assumptions. The NRC also requested that
consideration be given to any enhancements that may be appropriate for
the emergency plan with respect to the communications requirements of
10 CFR 50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, and the guidance in
NUREG-0696 in light of the assumptions previously stated. Also,
addressees were requested to consider the means necessary to power the
new and existing communications equipment during a prolonged station
blackout.
Addressees were requested to provide an assessment of the current
communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to
identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications
are maintained during a large-scale natural event meeting the
conditions previously described. The assessment should:
Identify any planned or potential improvements to existing
onsite communications systems and their required normal and/or backup
power supplies,
Identify any planned or potential improvements to existing
offsite communications systems and their required normal and/or backup
power supplies,
Provide a description of any new communications system(s)
or technologies that will be deployed based upon the assumed conditions
previously described, and
Provide a description of how the new and/or improved
systems and power supplies will be able to provide for communications
during a loss of all ac power.
Nuclear power plant licensees were also requested to describe any
interim actions that have been taken or are planned to be taken to
enhance existing communications systems power supplies until the
communications assessment and the resulting actions are complete, and
to provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to conduct and
implement the results of the communications assessment.
The NRC staff is evaluating the responses received from this
information request to determine their acceptability as part of the
agency's lessons learned from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi.
III. Determination of the Petition
The Commission has reviewed the petition and the public comments.
For the reasons described in Section II, Public Comments on the
Petition, of this document, the Commission does not find that the
arguments raised by the petitioner warrant changing the current
regulations. The Commission reiterates that the basis for the current
size of EPZs is valid for existing reactors and proposed new reactors.
Furthermore, the Commission has reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency at an existing nuclear power plant. For new
reactors under construction and licensed to operate, the Commission has
determined that subject to the required conditions and limitations of
the full-power license, adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Separate from this
petition, as part of previously-approved research efforts associated
with Tier 3 program plans, the NRC plans a long-term action involving
EPZs. If these research activities indicate that changes need to be
made to the existing EP regulations, the NRC will commence a rulemaking
effort to make those changes.
Because the Commission has decided that the petition does not
present
[[Page 19519]]
sufficient information to warrant changing the size of EPZs or
requiring licensees to include natural disasters in their EP exercises
at this time, the NRC cannot consider this PRM in the rulemaking
process. Therefore, the NRC is denying the petition under 10 CFR 2.803,
``Determination of petition.''
IV. Availability of Documents
The following table provides information on how to access the
documents referenced in this document. For more information on
accessing ADAMS, see the ADDRESSES section of this document.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Document ADAMS accession No./ Federal Register citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
October 1975...................... Reactor Safety Study: An ML072350618.
Assessment of Accident
Risks in U.S. Commercial
Nuclear Power Plants
(WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/
014)).
December 1978..................... Planning Basis for the ML051390356.
Development of State and
Local Government
Radiological Emergency
Response Plans in Support
of Light Water Nuclear
Power Plants (NUREG-0396).
October 23, 1979.................. Planning Basis for 44 FR 61123.
Emergency Responses to
Nuclear Power Reactor
Accidents.
February 28, 1981................. Functional Criteria for ML051390358.
Emergency Response
Facilities (NUREG-0696).
July 6, 1984...................... Emergency Planning and 49 FR 27733.
Preparedness.
May 8, 1985....................... Emergency Planning and 50 FR 19323.
Preparedness.
August 4, 1986.................... Safety Goals for the 51 FR 28044.
Operations of Nuclear
Power Plants; Policy
Statement.
August 21, 1986................... Safety Goals for the 51 FR 30028.
Operation of Nuclear
Power Plants; Policy
Statement; Correction and
Republication.
November 3, 1987.................. Evaluation of the Adequacy 52 FR 42078.
of Off-Site Emergency
Planning for Nuclear
Power Plants at the
Operating License Review
Stage Where State and/or
Local Governments Decline
to Participate in Off-
Site Emergency Planning.
April 30, 1989.................... Implications of the ML082030501, ML082030502.
Accident at Chernobyl for
Safety Regulation of
Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants in the United
States (NUREG-1251).
June 14, 1996..................... Production and Utilization 61 FR 30129.
Facilities; Emergency
Planning and Preparedness
Exercise Requirements.
January 19, 2001.................. Consideration of Potassium 66 FR 5427.
Iodide in Emergency Plans.
February 28, 2001................. Technical Study of Spent ML010430066.
Fuel Pool Accident Risk
at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants
(NUREG-1738).
August 20, 2003................... Fact Sheet: NRC Review of ML032320620.
Paper on Reducing Hazards
from Stored Spent Nuclear
Fuel.
January 31, 2005.................. Identification and ML050250245, ML050250219.
Analysis of Factors
Affecting Emergency
Evacuations (NUREG/CR-
6864).
July 18, 2005..................... NRC Bulletin 2005-002: ML051740058.
Emergency Preparedness
and Response Actions for
Security-Based Events.
October 29, 2005.................. SECY-05-0202, Staff Review ML052640532.
of the National Academies
Study of the Health Risks
from Exposure to Low
Levels of Ionizing
Radiation (BEIR VII).
October 31, 2008.................. Assessment of Emergency ML082960499.
Response Planning and
Implementation for Large
Scale Evacuations (NUREG/
CR-6981).
June 17, 2011..................... Response Letter to Senator ML11143A033.
James Webb from Chairman
Jaczko regarding NRC
Evacuation
Recommendations for the
U.S. Residents within 50
Miles of Fukushima
Reactors.
July 12, 2011..................... SECY-11-0093, Near-Term ML11186A959.
Report and
Recommendations for
Agency Actions Following
the Events in Japan.
July 12, 2011..................... Recommendations for ML111861807.
Enhancing Reactor Safety
in the 21st Century, The
Near-Term Task Force
Review of Insights from
the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Accident.
September 9, 2011................. SECY-11-0124, Recommended ML11245A158.
Actions to be Taken
Without Delay from the
Near-Term Task Force
Report.
October 3, 2011................... SECY-11-0137, ML11272A111.
Prioritization of
Recommended Actions to be
Taken in Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned.
October 18, 2011.................. Staff Requirements ML112911571.
Memorandum--SECY-11-0124-
-Recommended Actions to
be Taken Without Delay
from the Near-Term Task
Force Report.
November 20, 2011................. Guidance for Protective ML113010596.
Action Strategies
(Supplement 3 to NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1).
November 28, 2011................. Criteria for Development ML113010515.
of Evacuation Time
Estimate Studies (NUREG/
CR-7002).
January 31, 2012.................. State-of-the-Art Reactor ML120250406.
Consequence Analyses
(SOARCA) Report, Draft
Report for Comment (NUREG-
1935).
February 15, 2012................. Incoming Petition (PRM-50- ML12048B004.
104) from Mr. Michael
Mariotte.
March 12, 2012.................... Order Modifying Licenses ML12054A736.
with Regard to
Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events, NRC
Order EA-12-049.
[[Page 19520]]
March 12, 2012.................... Order Modifying Licenses ML12054A682.
with Regard to Reliable
Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation, NRC
Order EA-12-051.
March 12, 2012.................... Request for Information ML12056A046.
Pursuant to Title 10 of
the Code of Federal
Regulations 50.54(f)
regarding Recommendations
2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the
Near-Term Task Force
Review of Insights from
the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Accident.
April 25, 2012.................... SECY-12-0064, ML121020108.
Recommendations for
Policy and Technical
Direction to Revise
Radiation Protection
Regulations and Guidance.
April 30, 2012.................... Notice of Receipt of ML120820212.
Petition for Rulemaking
and Request for Comment
(77 FR 25375).
July 13, 2012..................... SECY-12-0095, Tier 3 ML12208A208, ML12165A092, ML12165A093,
Program Plans and 6-Month ML12208A210.
Status Update in Response
to Lessons Learned from
Japan's March 11, 2011,
Great Tohoku Earthquake
and Subsequent Tsunami.
September 13, 2012................ SECY-12-0123, Update on ML12202B170.
Staff Plans to Apply the
Full-Scope Site Level 3
PRA Project Results to
the NRC's Regulatory
Framework.
November 30, 2012................. State-of-the-Art Reactor ML12332A057, ML12332A058.
Consequence Analyses
(SOARCA) Report, Final
Report (NUREG-1935).
December 17, 2012................. SRM-SECY-12-0064, ML12352A133.
Recommendations for
Policy and Technical
Direction to Revise
Radiation Protection
Regulations and Guidance.
March 19, 2013.................... SRM-SECY-12-0157, ML13078A017.
Consideration of
Additional Requirements
for Containment Venting
Systems for Boiling Water
Reactors with Mark I and
Mark II Containments.
June 6, 2013...................... Order Modifying Licenses ML13143A321.
with Regard to Reliable
Hardened Containment
Vents Capable of
Operation Under Severe
Accident Conditions, NRC
Order EA-13-109.
October 9, 2013................... Consequence Study of a ML13256A342.
Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a
U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor.
March 2014........................ Comment Response Document, ML14042A227.
Petition for Rulemaking
to Expand Emergency
Planning Zones, PRM-50-
104.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of April, 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2014-07981 Filed 4-8-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P