[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 66 (Monday, April 7, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19177-19250]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-07469]
[[Page 19177]]
Vol. 79
Monday,
No. 66
April 7, 2014
Part II
Department of Transportation
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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49 CFR Part 571
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 66 / Monday, April 7, 2014 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 19178]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
[Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162]
RIN 2127-AK43
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: To reduce the risk of devastating backover crashes involving
vulnerable populations (including very young children) and to satisfy
the mandate of the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of
2007, NHTSA is issuing this final rule to expand the required field of
view for all passenger cars, trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
buses, and low-speed vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of less than
10,000 pounds. The agency anticipates that today's final rule will
significantly reduce backover crashes involving children, persons with
disabilities, the elderly, and other pedestrians who currently have the
highest risk associated with backover crashes. Specifically, today's
final rule specifies an area behind the vehicle which must be visible
to the driver when the vehicle is placed into reverse and other related
performance requirements. The agency anticipates that, in the near
term, vehicle manufacturers will use rearview video systems and in-
vehicle visual displays to meet the requirements of this final rule.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective June 6, 2014.
Compliance Date: Compliance is required, in accordance with the
phase-in schedule, beginning on May 1, 2016. Full compliance is
required on May 1, 2018.
Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions for reconsideration of
this final rule must be received not later than May 22, 2014.
Incorporation by Reference: The incorporation by reference of
certain publications listed in the standard is approved by the Director
of the Federal Register as of June 6, 2014.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must refer
to the docket and notice number set forth above and be submitted to the
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For technical issues: Mr. Markus Price, Office of Vehicle Rulemaking,
Telephone: 202-366-0098, Facsimile: 202-366-7002, NVS-121.
For legal issues: Mr. Jesse Chang, Office of the Chief Counsel,
Telephone: 202-366-2992, Facsimile: 202-366-3820, NCC-112.
The mailing address for these officials is: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act and
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
b. Safety Problem
c. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
d. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
e. Summary of Comments on the NPRM
f. Public Hearing and Workshop
g. Additional 2012 Research
h. Additional SCI Case Analysis
i. Updates to NCAP
III. Final Rule and Response to Comments
a. Summary of the Final Rule
b. Applicability
c. Alternative Countermeasures
d. Field of View
e. Image Size
f. Test Procedure
g. Linger Time, Deactivation, and Backing Event
h. Image Response Time
i. Display Luminance
j. Durability Testing
k. Phase-In
l. Remaining Issues
m. Effective Date
IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits
a. System Effectiveness
b. Benefits
c. Costs
d. Market Adoption Rate
e. Net Impact
f. Cost Effectiveness and Regulatory Alternatives
V. Regulatory Analyses
VI. Regulatory Text
I. Executive Summary
The Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007
(``K.T. Safety Act'' or ``the Act'') directs this agency to amend
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 111 \1\ ``to expand
the required field of view to enable the driver of a motor vehicle to
detect areas behind the motor vehicle to reduce death and injury
resulting from backing incidents, particularly incidents involving
small children and disabled persons.'' \2\ In other words, the K.T.
Safety Act requires that this agency conduct a rulemaking to amend
FMVSS No. 111 in a manner so as to address a safety risk identified by
Congress in the Act--namely, the risk of death and injury that can
result from backover crashes. Further, the language chosen by Congress
particularly directs the agency to consider crashes involving children
and persons with disabilities.
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\1\ FMVSS No. 111, currently titled ``Rearview mirrors'' is
renamed by today's final rule as ``Rear visibility.''
\2\ Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007,
(Public Law 110-189, 122 Stat. 639-642), Sec. 4 (2007).
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With some variations, the requirements in today's final rule
generally adopt the requirements proposed in the NPRM that expand the
required field of view in FMVSS No. 111 to include a 10-foot by 20-foot
zone directly behind the vehicle.\3\ Today's final rule applies these
requirements to all passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed
vehicles \4\, with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000
pounds or less. Given the currently available information regarding the
backover safety risk, the available backing aid technologies, etc., the
agency believes that systems fulfilling the requirements adopted by
today's final rule are the most effective and the most cost-effective
systems available for meeting the safety need specified in the K.T.
Safety Act. We believe that the systems meeting the requirements of
today's rule also afford the best protection to children and persons
with disabilities.
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\3\ Prior to adoption of today's rule, the required field of
view for passenger vehicles specified that these vehicles have an
inside rearview mirror that provides a view from 61 meters behind
the vehicle to the horizon. Multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses with a GVRW of 4,536 kg or less may certify to the
passenger car requirements or provide large planar outside mirrors
on both the driver's side as well as the passenger's side that
provide a view to the rear along the sides of the vehicle. Passenger
cars are required to have a planar outside mirror on the driver's
side that provides a view to the rear along the side of the vehicle.
This rule does not change these field of view requirements from
FMVSS No. 111, but adds additional requirements.
\4\ A low-speed vehicle is defined as a 4-wheeled vehicle, with
a GVWR of less than 3000 lbs, and whose speed attainable in 1 mile
on a paved level surface is greater than 20 mph and no greater than
25 mph. See 49 CFR Part 571.3. Like all other vehicle types covered
under today's final rule, LSVs are required to provide the driver
with a rearview image meeting the requirements specified in the
regulatory text at the end of this document regardless of whether
the vehicle has any significant blind zone. However, like other
manufacturers, low-speed vehicle manufacturers can petition NHTSA
for an exemption or for rulemaking. The issue of how today's final
rule applies to LSVs is discussed in further detail in Section III.
b. Applicability, below.
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[[Page 19179]]
Available Information Continues to Show that the NPRM Approach is the
Best Approach
After the proposed rule, the agency received public comments
through two separate comment periods and two public meetings. Further,
the agency conducted additional research to ensure that the analysis
supporting today's final rule is robust. While a significant amount of
information has been obtained since the NPRM, none of the additional
information supports the agency departing from the general approach
proposed in the NPRM. The additional information is useful because it
enables the agency to refine its understanding of the technical
capabilities of the manufacturers to meet the requirements of today's
rule and the relevant costs/benefits of today's rule. Nonetheless,
among the various types of rear visibility systems available for study,
agency testing and other currently available information support the
following claims:
(1) Drivers using rear visibility systems meeting the field of view
requirements of today's final rule avoid crashes with an unexpected
test object at a statistically significant higher rate than drivers
using the standard complement of vehicle equipment.
(2) Such systems (e.g., rearview video systems) consistently
outperform other rear visibility systems (e.g., sensors-only or mirror
systems) due to a variety of technical and driver-use limitations in
those other systems.
(3) Rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of today's
rule are the only systems that can meet the need for safety specified
by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (the backover crash risk) because
the other systems afford little or no measureable safety benefit.
(4) Systems meeting the requirements of today's final rule are not
only the most effective system at addressing the backover crash risk
but also the most cost-effective.
Thus, NHTSA's believes that the rear visibility system requirements
in today's final rule (expanding the required field of view to include
the 20-foot by 10-foot zone immediately behind the vehicle) are the
only method for addressing the backover safety risk identified in the
K.T. Safety Act that is rationally supported by the totality of the
available data.
Recent Market Developments Have Substantially Reduced Costs
The agency's latest analysis has shown that 73% of vehicles covered
under today's final rule will be sold with rearview video systems by
2018. This new development in the market means that today's rule will
require less change to the market than we had previously anticipated.
Assuming the 73% market adoption rate, it would cost $546 to $620
million to equip the remaining 27% of vehicles in 2018 without a rear
visibility system. Those systems would also produce $265 to $396
million in monetized benefits.
While we have data to demonstrate what we predict will be the state
of the market in 2018, we are unable to determine with any reasonable
certainty the precise extent to which other potential events (e.g., the
K.T. Safety Act and the rulemaking process) beyond ``pure market
forces'' might also be a factor. However, in order to reflect this
uncertainty in estimating the likely benefits and costs, NHTSA
considered different methods for establishing a baseline market
adoption rate of rear visibility systems. The purpose of this analysis
was to capture, in addition to the effects of issuing this final rule,
the potential effects of the K.T. Safety Act (and the rulemaking
process mandated by the Act) upon the rearview video system market
adoption. While assessing different alternative baselines is useful in
estimating these different market scenarios, all of these analyses
continue to show that the approach adopted in today's final rule is the
best approach for addressing the backover safety problem.
Accordingly, we have developed an analysis that presents a range of
both the benefits and costs of this rule based on a range of adoption
rates. At the top-end of the range of adoption rates is the assumption
that all current and projected installations are due purely to market
forces, meaning that 73% of the new vehicle fleet will be equipped with
rearview video systems by 2018. At the low-end of the range of adoption
rates, we adopt the assumption that half of the increase in the market
adoption trend as a result of the data from MY2014 is attributable to
``pure market forces'' and half is not.\5\ Assuming these top and low
end estimated adoption trends, the market adoption attributable to
``pure market demand'' in 2018 would be between 59% and 73%. Assuming
this range of market adoption, $546 million to $924 million in costs
and $265 million to $595 million in monetized benefits are attributable
to the final rule, the rulemaking process, and the K.T. Safety Act.
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\5\ Further information about these alternative baselines is
available in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying this
document in the docket referenced at the beginning of this document.
Table 1--Estimated Costs and Benefits Under 59% and 73% Market Adoption Scenarios
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73% Adoption 59% Adoption
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Annual Benefits (2010 $)...................................... $265 M to $396 M $398 M to $595 M
Annual Costs (2010 $)......................................... $546 M to $620 M $827 M to $924 M
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As described in detail, below, and in the Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis (FRIA), the agency believes that the top-end assumption is
both more likely than the low end (given the strong market incentives
in providing rearview video systems) and presents a better picture of
the results of issuing today's final rule. Accordingly, for ease of
presentation, the discussions of the costs and benefits presented both
in this preamble and the FRIA present only those numbers associated
with this assumption. However, the agency does present detailed
information concerning the costs and benefits of the low-end assumption
in Section IV. D. of this preamble and (in more detail) Chapter VIII.
D. of the FRIA.
Benefits Are Expected To Be Substantial
This rule is expected to decrease the risks to children, persons
with disabilities, and other pedestrians from being injured or killed
in a backover crash. Backover crashes are specifically defined as
crashes where non-occupants of vehicles (such as pedestrians or
cyclists) are struck by vehicles moving in reverse. Our assessment of
available safety data indicates that (on average) there are 267
fatalities and 15,000 injuries (6,000 of which are incapacitating \6\)
resulting from backover
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crashes every year. Of those, 210 fatalities and 15,000 injuries \7\
are attributable to backover crashes involving light vehicles
(passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), trucks, buses,
and low-speed vehicles) with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. Further,
the agency has found that children and elderly adults are
disproportionately affected by backover crashes. Our data indicate that
children under 5 years old account for 31 percent of the fatalities
each year, and adults 70 years of age and older account for 26 percent.
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\6\ The Manual on Classification of Motor Vehicle Traffic
Accidents (ANSI D16.1) defines ``incapacitating injury'' as ``any
injury, other than a fatal injury, which prevents the injured person
from walking, driving or normally continuing the activities the
person was capable of performing before the injury occurred''
(Section 2.3.4)
\7\ Due to rounding, injuries for light vehicles and all
vehicles are estimated to be 15,000.
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Rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of today's final
rule are predicted to have an effectiveness of between 28 and 33
percent--substantially higher than other systems (e.g., sensor-only
systems) that are currently available. Applying that estimated
effectiveness to the latest information on the target population, the
aforementioned systems are expected to save 58 to 69 lives each year
(not including injuries prevented) once the entire on road vehicle
fleet is equipped with systems meeting today's rules requirements
(anticipated by approximately 2054).\8\ However, because our latest
information indicates that as much as 73% of new vehicles sold will
have rearview video systems by 2018, the lives saved and injuries
prevented by equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles are approximately
a quarter of this total. Thus, we believe that there will still be 13-
15 fatalities and 1,125-1,332 injuries prevented annually that are a
result of equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles that we do not
anticipate will have rear visibility systems by 2018.\9\ While our
estimated annual benefits, beginning in model year 2018, will not be
fully realized until 2054, they will increase over time from the phase-
in date as vehicles with these systems continue to make up an
increasing percentage of the overall vehicle fleet. Taking into account
that a larger portion of miles traveled by a given model year is
achieved early in the overall life of that model year, we estimate that
roughly two thirds of the lifetime benefits for MY2018 will be realized
by 2028.
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\8\ Like all new safety standards, benefits realized from these
systems will rise steadily in proportion to the increase of new
vehicles meeting the requirements adopted today within the vehicle
fleet operating on the public roads. In other words, as new vehicles
meeting the new standard replace older vehicles, more vehicles
operating on the road will have the new safety countermeasure and
more benefits will be realized. As with all standards, it takes time
to replace the whole vehicle fleet. While the full rate of annual
anticipated benefits will likely not be realized until 2054, the
rate of annual benefits will rise each year commensurate with new
vehicle sales and the proportion of the miles traveled in those new
vehicles.
\9\ This figure shows the incremental lives saved and injuries
prevented by equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles that are not
projected to have rear visibility systems in 2018. It compares what
the data show will be the market position for adoption of rearview
video systems by 2018 and the 100% compliance requirement in 2018
(established by today's final rule). Because this figure measures
what we project the market would (in fact) be in 2018, it does not
account for any potential market adoption that is attributable to
manufacturers responding to events that are unrelated to ``pure
market forces'' (e.g., the passage of the K.T. Safety Act or this
rulemaking process). As further explained below, there are a number
of reasons why it is especially difficult in the case of this rule
to quantify the market adoption that is attributable to the K.T.
Safety Act or this rulemaking process. However, we acknowledge that
these events may have had an effect on the market adoption of
rearview video systems and we have attempted to capture this
potential effect below in section IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits.
Table 2--Estimated Annual Quantifiable Benefits
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Benefits
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Fatalities Reduced..................... 13 to 15.
Injuries Reduced....................... 1,125 to 1,332.
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In addition to the fatalities and injuries prevented, systems
meeting today's final rule are expected to yield benefits over the
lifetime of the vehicle as a result of avoiding property damage. While
damage to rear visibility systems are a potential source of additional
repair cost as a result of rear-end collisions, the agency calculates
that these costs will be offset by the benefits realized by vehicle
owners as a result of avoiding property-damage-only backing collisions
and yield a net benefit \10\ between $10 and $13 per vehicle (over the
lifetime of the vehicle). In monetary terms, the benefits that are a
result from issuing today's final rule (i.e., not counting the systems
already being installed by the automakers) are expected to be between
$265 and $396 million annually when considering both fatalities/
injuries prevented and the property-damage-only collisions avoided.
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\10\ This ``net benefit'' is a comparison between the cost of
repairing/replacing damaged rear visibility systems and the benefit
of avoiding property damage-only crashes. The costs of the rear
visibility system and other benefits of these systems are not taken
into account in this ``net benefit.''
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As the agency is conscious of the costs of today's rule and the
costs of rear visibility systems in general, the agency has made every
effort to ensure that the benefits of today's rule are as accurately
estimated as possible. Thus, various new pieces of information have
been incorporated into the analysis in today's final rule that lead to
different benefits estimates from those in the NPRM. The major
differences include a more refined target population estimate, updated
voluntary installation rate information, and more refined system
effectiveness estimates. As explained further in this document,
additional data from our crash databases \11\ enabled the agency to
more accurately estimate the size of the target population by sampling
a greater number of years of data. Further, new data regarding the rate
of adoption of rear visibility systems has enabled the agency to
project the rate of adoption through the first full compliance year in
today's rule. Finally, the agency was able to conduct additional
research since the NPRM to further examine driver use of rear
visibility systems by examining a wider range of driver demographics
and an additional vehicle type. The additional research adds to the
robustness of the agency's analysis of rear visibility system
effectiveness through a larger sampling of research participants. While
none of the aforementioned new information creates a rational basis for
the agency to alter its decision from the NPRM in any significant
fashion, the agency believes that it was prudent to ensure that the
benefits of today's rule are estimated as accurately as possible due to
the costs of this rulemaking required under the K.T. Safety Act. The
available information continues to show that rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of this rule are the most effective (and the
most cost-effective) systems at addressing the backover safety problem.
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\11\ The updates that we have incorporated into our analysis
include updates to the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS),
the National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System
(NASS-GES), and the Not-in-Traffic Surveillance (NiTS) system.
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Further, the agency notes that there continue to be substantial
benefits of this rule that are not easily quantifiable in monetary
terms. The agency recognizes that victims of backover crashes are
frequently the most vulnerable members of our society (such as young
children, the elderly, or persons with disabilities). As these persons
often have special mobility needs or are too young to adequately
comprehend danger, it seems unlikely that solutions such as increased
public awareness or audible backing warnings will be sufficient to
prevent the safety risk of backover crashes. Further, the agency
recognizes that most people place a high value on the lives of
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children and that there is a general consensus regarding the need to
protect children as they are unable to protect themselves. As backover
crash victims are often struck by their immediate family members or
caretakers, it is the Department's opinion that an exceptionally high
emotional cost, not easily convertible to monetary equivalents, is
often inflicted upon the families of backover crash victims.
Costs of Today's Final Rule
The agency acknowledges that the costs of today's rule are
significant. We anticipate rear visibility systems will cost
approximately $43 to $45 for vehicles already equipped with a suitable
visual display and between $132 and $142 for all other vehicles.
Accordingly, based on an annual new vehicle fleet of 16.0 million
vehicles and considering the number of vehicles we anticipate will
already have rear visibility systems by 2018, we believe the costs
attributable to equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles (that are not
projected to have rear visibility systems in 2018) will range from $546
to $620 million annually.\12\
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\12\ We note that the costs to low-speed vehicles are a small
portion (less than 1%) of the vehicle fleet sales each year. We have
assumed that the costs to low-speed vehicles to comply with the
requirements of today's final rule are the same as other vehicles
and taken those costs into account in this estimate.
Table 3--Estimated Installation Costs
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Costs (2010 $)
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Full system installation per $132 to $142.
vehicle.
Camera-only installation per $43 to $45.
vehicle.
Total Fleet........................ $546 M to $620 M.
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In addition to taking steps to ensure that the benefits of today's
rule are accurately estimated, the agency also took steps to ensure
that the estimated costs of this rule are accurate. Most importantly,
two pieces of additional information have enabled the agency to arrive
at a more refined estimate of the costs of today's rule that differ
from the NPRM. First, the agency has a more robust estimate of the per
unit costs of rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of
today's rule because the agency performed a tear down study that
analyzed the ``bolt-by-bolt'' costs of rear visibility systems and the
agency incorporated an analysis of the production savings that occur
over time due to efficiencies in the manufacturing process and
increases in volume. Second, the aforementioned updated adoption rate
of rear visibility systems has been incorporated not only in our
analysis of the benefits but also of the costs of today's rule. Based
on the aforementioned revised estimates for costs and benefits, the net
cost per equivalent life saved for rear visibility systems meeting the
requirements of today's final rule ranges from $15.9 to $26.3 million.
Table 4--Estimated Cost Effectiveness
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Cost per Equivalent Life Saved
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Rearview Video Systems............ $15.9 to $26.3 million *.
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* The range presented is from a 3% to 7% discount rate.
Table 5--Summary of Benefits and Costs Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (Millions 2010$) MY2018 and Thereafter
\13\
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Primary Discount rate
Benefits estimate Low estimate High estimate (%)
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Lifetime Monetized.............................. $265 $305 $305 7
Lifetime Monetized.............................. $344 $396 $396 3
Costs:
Lifetime Monetized.......................... $546 $620 $557 7
Lifetime Monetized.......................... $546 $620 $557 3
Net Impact:
Lifetime Monetized.......................... -$281 -$315 -$252 7
Lifetime Monetized.......................... -$202 -$224 -$161 3
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This Rule is the Least Costly Rule that Meets the Requirements of the
K.T. Safety Act
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\13\ The different estimates in this chart show some of the
different potential technology options. The Primary Estimate is the
lowest installation cost option (which assumes manufacturers will
use a 130[deg] camera and will utilize any existing display units
already offered in their vehicles). The Low Estimate and High
Estimate provide the estimated minimum and maximum net impacts
possible. The Low Estimate is the 180[deg] camera and assumes that
manufacturers will install a new display to meet the requirements of
today's rule. It represents the minimum overall benefit estimate as
it has the largest negative net impact. Conversely, the High
Estimate is the 180[deg] camera and assumes that manufacturers that
currently offer vehicles with display units are able and choose to
use those existing display units to meet the requirements of today's
rule. This represents the maximum overall benefit estimate because
it has the smallest negative net impact.
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Throughout this rulemaking process, the agency has been sensitive
to the costs of today's rule and has sought to ensure that the
requirements adopted impose the least amount of regulatory burden on
the economy while still achieving Congress' goal of reducing fatalities
and injuries resulting from backover crashes. Thus, through the
information received by the agency through the comment periods and
public workshops, the agency has explored and adopted various methods
in order to avoid imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens on the
industry and to afford as much flexibility as possible.
Phase-in Schedule
To that end, today's final rule establishes a flexible phase-in
schedule that affords the manufacturers the maximum amount of time
permitted by the K.T. Safety Act to achieve full compliance (48 months
after the publication of this rule). The phase-in schedule established
by today's rule, excluding small volume and multi-stage manufacturers,
is as follows:
0% of the vehicles manufactured before May 1, 2016;
10% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2016,
and before May 1, 2017;
40% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2017,
and before May 1, 2018; and
100% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1,
2018.\14\
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\14\ As further discussed below, the latest data show that the
adoption rate of rearview video systems has increased significantly
in recent years. As a result, we anticipate that many manufacturers
will be able to meet the phase-in schedule with little adjustment to
their current manufacturing plans.
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[[Page 19182]]
In addition to affording manufacturers the maximum amount of time
permitted under the K.T. Safety Act to achieve full compliance, the
agency adopts the back-loaded phase-in schedule proposed in the NPRM
and does not separately evaluate light trucks and passenger cars for
the purposes of the phase-in in order to further increase flexibility.
Further, the agency learned from the comments that, while the
rearview video systems currently used by manufacturers are able to meet
most of the requirements established in today's rule, they may not meet
the entire set of requirements beyond the field of view requirements
including the image size, linger time, response time, durability, and
deactivation requirements. While the agency continues to believe that
those requirements are essential in ensuring the quality of rear
visibility systems in the long run, today's final rule does not require
that manufacturers comply with the requirements beyond the field of
view for purposes of the phase-in period. In making this decision, the
agency notes that the estimated benefits from the NPRM would not be
significantly affected by the delayed phase-in of certain requirements,
as those estimates were based on research conducted using rear
visibility systems that were not designed to conform to all of the
aforementioned performance requirements. In addition, we have
considered the significant additional costs in compelling manufacturers
to conduct equipment redesigns outside of the normal product design
cycle. In order to avoid significantly increasing the cost of this rule
and to enable manufacturers to focus resources, instead, on deploying
rear visibility systems in a greater number of vehicles in the near
term, today's final rule delays the aforementioned requirements until
the end of the 48 month phase-in period.
Response Time Test Procedure and the ``Backing Event''
As with the phase-in schedule, the agency received various comments
regarding the timing of the presentation of the rearview image to the
driver that suggested approaches that would tend to decrease the costs
and increase flexibility for manufacturers while still preserving
ability of the required rear visibility systems to address the backover
safety problem. While today's rule adopts the proposal from the NPRM
requiring rear visibility systems to display an image of the required
field of view to the driver within 2.0 seconds after the driver places
the vehicle in the reverse direction, the agency learned through the
comments received that this requirement can be more burdensome for
manufacturers if the system response time is tested immediately after
the vehicle is started. Thus, as described further in this document,
the agency has adopted a test procedure in today's final rule to
condition the vehicle prior to evaluating rear visibility system
response time. As this test procedure is based on the available data on
real world driving conditions, the procedure affords manufacturers
additional flexibility to design the initialization process for their
rear visibility systems while still ensuring that the required rearview
image is available at a time that is useful to a driver conducting
backing maneuvers.
Further, today's final rule adopts a ``backing event'' definition
in order to afford manufacturers additional design flexibility while
still addressing the safety concerns that the agency intended to
address with the proposed linger time and deactivation requirements in
the NPRM. As further described in this document, the agency proposed
linger time and deactivation requirements in the NPRM in order to
ensure that the required rearview image is available to the driver at
the appropriate time without becoming a distraction at an inappropriate
time. Through the comments, the agency learned that the relatively
inflexible linger time and deactivation requirements proposed in the
NPRM could inhibit other safety and convenience features from being
implemented by manufacturers (e.g., views designed to assist trailer
hitching, parking, etc.). Thus, today's final rule adopts a definition
of ``backing event'' and uses this definition to establish the points
in time that the rearview image is required to be presented to the
driver while still affording manufacturers the flexibility to implement
additional safety and convenience features for the drivers.
Durability Testing and Luminance Requirements
Finally, the agency also modified the durability requirements to
apply on a component level and did not adopt the luminance requirements
to avoid imposing unnecessary testing burdens on the manufacturers
where such burdens were not likely to produce a corresponding safety
benefit. Through the comments received, the agency learned that
ensuring a minimum level of durability of rear visibility system
components can be achieved through component level testing rather than
testing at the vehicle level. Further, the agency learned that
luminance requirements alone would not ensure the quality of the image
provided to the driver and would instead unnecessarily restrict the
technologies that manufacturers can use to present the required
rearview image to the driver. Thus, as further discussed in this
document, the agency adopts the durability requirements from the NPRM
at a component level and does not adopt the luminance requirements in
today's final rule.
Other Methods to Reduce Costs and Increase Flexibility Do Not Fulfill
the K.T. Safety Act
While the agency has made the aforementioned changes to the
requirements proposed in the NPRM that are aimed at reducing costs
while still preserving the safety benefits of today's rule, other
methods to reduce costs that were explored (or suggested in the
comments received) are not adopted in today's final rule because they
do not meet the need for safety (and do not meet the requirements of
the K.T. Safety Act).
Requiring a Lower-Cost Countermeasure or Utilizing More Performance-
Oriented Standards
Throughout this rulemaking process, the agency has explored various
countermeasure technologies and evaluated their ability to address the
backover safety problem as required by the K.T. Safety Act. The agency
conducted research to evaluate the effectiveness of various currently
available technologies including additional mirrors, reverse sensors,
and rearview video systems. After extensive testing, the agency
concluded that drivers require the ability to see the area directly
behind the vehicle in order to successfully avoid striking a pedestrian
or an unexpected obstacle. In other words, rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of today's rule are the only currently
available systems that can meet the need for safety specified by
Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (backover crashes). The agency arrived
at this conclusion after observing in our research that sensor-only
systems have various technical limitations that lead to inconsistent
object detection and that drivers with sensor-only systems generally
either failed to respond to the sensor system's audio warning, or
paused only momentarily before resuming the backing maneuver. Further,
our research indicates that drivers were unable to avoid targets behind
the vehicle when assisted with additional rear-mounted mirrors such as
rear convex ``look-down'' or cross-view mirrors. We concluded that the
limited field of view and significant distortion/
[[Page 19183]]
minification in such mirrors prevent drivers from successfully
detecting and avoiding targets behind the vehicle. As these sensor-only
and mirror-based rear visibility systems have demonstrated little to no
success in inducing drivers to stop a backing maneuver to avoid a crash
with a pedestrian behind the vehicle, their lower cost is outweighed by
the substantially reduced benefits that are likely to be achieved by
these systems. Thus, the agency believes that rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of today's rule are not only the most
effective systems at addressing the backover safety problem but also
the most cost effective system. Further, to adjust the requirements in
today's rule to accommodate these other systems would not fulfill the
requirements of the K.T. Safety Act as these other systems cannot be
reasonably expected to address the backover crash problem.
Consistent with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
today's final rule establishes ``a minimum standard for motor vehicle
or motor vehicle equipment performance.'' \15\ While we acknowledge
some commenters' desire for a more performance-oriented approach to the
backover safety problem, we conclude that today's final rule is as
performance-oriented as possible while still achieving the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act's requirement that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards ``meet the need for safety.'' \16\ As Congress recognized
when it enacted the Motor Vehicle Safety Act,\17\ there is no clear
distinction between standards that regulate performance versus those
that regulate design. All safety standards necessarily will affect and
preclude certain designs because the design of vehicles and equipment
affects the quality of their performance. The extent to which a safety
standard will restrict particular design is purely a matter of
degree.\18\ Thus, to fulfill all the applicable statutory requirements,
the agency designs requirements to be as broad (i.e., performance-
oriented) as possible without hindering the standard's ability to
``meet the need for safety.'' Our decisions in today's final rule
follow this strategy. As we discuss in detail in Section III, below,
the available data show that providing a driver with a view of the area
behind the vehicle is currently the most effective way available to
reduce backover crashes, as contemplated by the K.T. Safety Act. Thus,
while today's rule requires systems to show a rearview image to the
driver (in order to meet the need for safety), the rule uses
performance-oriented requirements to enable manufacturers flexibility
in determining how to present that image to drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9).
\16\ See 49 U.S.C. 30111(a).
\17\ For example, Senator Magnuson recognized that standards are
not either performance standards or design standards (i.e., there is
not a dichotomy between the two) when he said that some safety
standards would necessarily determine the configuration of some
vehicle components. See 112 C.R. 20600 (Aug. 31, 1966).
\18\ Courts have also recognized the difficulty in applying the
distinction between performance and design standards in concrete
situations (because specifying performance often entails
restrictions on design) and did not invalidate safety standards
based on their indefinite place on the conceptual spectrum between
performance and design. See Washington v. Dept. of Transp., 84 F.3d
1222, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Wood v. General Motors Corp.,
865 F.2d 395, 416-17 (1st Cir. 1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Department
of Transp., 515 F.2d 1053515 F.2d at 1058-59 (6th Cir. 1975)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We further note, as we did in the NPRM, that technology is rapidly
evolving. Thus, while today's final rule concludes that the most
effective and currently available systems present the driver with a
rearview image, the final rule does not require that a specific
technology be used to provide a driver with an image of the area behind
the vehicle, nor does today's rule preclude manufacturers from
providing additional countermeasure technologies to supplement the
required rear visibility system.
Applying Requirements by Vehicle Type
Further, the comments suggested, and the agency considered, the
possibility of applying the rear visibility system requirements of
today's rule by vehicle type. However, today's rule does not prescribe
different requirements by vehicle type and applies the rear visibility
requirements to all motor vehicles with a GVWR less than 10,000 pounds
(except motorcycles and trailers) as directed by the K.T. Safety Act.
As described above, the available data does not show that other
currently available rear visibility systems (not meeting the
requirements in today's rule) are able to effectively address the
backover safety risk that the agency is required to address under the
K.T. Safety Act. Thus, to apply different requirements by vehicle type
in this rulemaking would mean applying the requirements of today's rule
to only certain vehicle types and excluding others.
The agency does not believe that it can exclude any vehicle types
covered by the K.T. Safety Act from this rule. While the K.T. Safety
Act affords the agency discretion to apply different requirements to
different vehicle types, the Act does not allow the agency to exclude
(and apply no requirements to) any vehicle type covered by the K.T.
Safety Act. Further, as discussed further in this preamble, the
available data indicate that all vehicle types suffer from significant
rear blind zones and contribute to backover crashes at a rate that is
similar to their proportion of the vehicle fleet.\19\ Thus, to exclude
vehicles covered under the K.T. Safety Act from the requirements in
today's rule would not only fail to meet the requirements of the K.T.
Safety Act, but would also fail to address the backover safety need. As
the vehicles covered by the K.T. Safety Act contribute proportionally
to backover crashes resulting in an injury or a fatality, the agency
believes that it is reasonable to apply the requirements of today's
rule to all vehicles with a GVWR under 10,000 pounds (except
motorcycles and trailers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ As discussed further in this document, all vehicles
contribute to backover crashes at a rate that's similar to their
proportion of the fleet. For example, passenger cars comprise 57% of
the vehicle fleet and are responsible for 52% of backover injuries.
Utility vehicles are 17% of the fleet and are responsible for 16% of
the backover injuries. Vans are 10% of the fleet and responsible for
11% of the backover injuries. Pickup trucks are 16% of the fleet and
responsible for 14% of the injuries. However, some vehicle types
contribute to more fatalities than other vehicle types.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Given the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act and the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (``Vehicle Safety Act''), the
totality of the available data continue to show that rear visibility
systems meeting the requirements in today's final rule are the most
effective and the most cost-effective countermeasure available to
address the backover safety problem identified by Congress in the K.T.
Safety Act. Data from agency testing and other currently available
information continue to show that drivers using rearview video systems
experience a statistically significant beneficial effect in avoiding a
collision with an unexpected rear obstacle. As the agency seeks to
achieve the goals of the K.T. Safety Act in the least burdensome
fashion, the agency has made various modifications to the requirements
in today's final rule. However, this final rule adopts the requirement
from the NPRM that the driver must be afforded a view of the 20-foot by
10-foot zone directly behind the vehicle. The data continue to show
that rear visibility systems with this characteristic are the most
effective solution available to address the backover safety problem
that the agency is required to address under the K.T. Safety Act. To
adopt requirements allowing countermeasures without this
[[Page 19184]]
characteristic or applying the requirements in this rule to only a
subset of the vehicle types specified in the K.T. Safety Act would not
fulfill the requirements of that Act.
Throughout this rulemaking process the agency has been sensitive to
the potential costs of today's rule and has explored multiple potential
methods for reducing the potential burden of today's rule. Although the
additional information received by the agency since the NPRM affords
the agency a more refined understanding of the potential costs and
benefits of today's rule, no comments or research data received provide
the agency with a rational basis to adopt requirements that would
permit rear visibility systems other than those permitted in today's
rule. While the costs of the rule exceed its quantifiable benefits,
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 call upon us to assess the costs and
benefits of a rulemaking, including those costs and benefits that are
difficult to quantify and, unless prohibited by statute, choose the
regulatory alternative that maximizes net benefits. Further, to the
extent permitted by law, regulations must be designed in the most cost-
effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. As summarized
later in this document and explained in detail in the accompanying
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, the agency has carefully considered
all impacts of this rule and has chosen the most cost-effective option
in meeting the statutory mandate. All available information and agency
analysis continues to demonstrate that rear visibility systems meeting
the requirements of today's rule are the most effective, least
burdensome, and most cost-effective systems that can address the
backover safety risk and fulfill the requirements of the K.T. Safety
Act. Thus, the agency has chosen the most cost-effective means of
achieving Congress's purpose in enacting the K.T. Safety Act. Moreover,
as detailed in the NPRM and again discussed here in this final rule,
the Department maintains that there are significant unquantifiable
considerations associated with this rule, in particular the young age
of many victims and the fact that many drivers involved in backover
crashes are relatives or caretakers of the victims, that support this
action.
II. Background and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act and National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
General Requirements
Subsection 2(b) of the K.T. Safety Act directs the Secretary of
Transportation to initiate rulemaking to revise FMVSS No. 111 to expand
the required field of view so as to enable drivers of motor vehicles to
detect areas behind the motor vehicle. In the same section, Congress
explained that the purpose of this requirement is to reduce death and
injury resulting from backover crashes--especially crashes involving
young children and disabled persons. The Act permitted the Secretary to
prescribe different requirements for different vehicle types. It
further allowed the Secretary to achieve the goals of the Act through
the provision of additional mirrors, sensors, cameras, or other
technology that could expand the driver's field of view.
The K.T. Safety Act did not intend to cover all motor vehicles that
are regulated under the Vehicle Safety Act.\20\ While subsection 2(e)
of the K.T. Safety Act defines the term ``motor vehicle,'' for its
purposes, as all vehicles covered under the Vehicle Safety Act, it
specifically excludes all vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating
greater than 10,000 pounds, motorcycles, and trailers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The Vehicle Safety Act defines a ``motor vehicle'' as ``a
vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured
primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does
not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.'' 49 U.S.C.
30102(a)(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that subsection 2(b) prescribes amendments to a Federal motor
vehicle safety standard, this rulemaking is governed not only by the
K.T. Safety Act, but also by the requirements of the Vehicle Safety
Act. The relevant provisions in the Vehicle Safety Act are those in
section 30111 of title 49 of the United States Code. Section 30111
states that the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor
vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be practicable, meet the
need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms. When
prescribing a motor vehicle safety standard under this chapter, the
Secretary shall consider relevant available motor vehicle safety
information; consult with appropriate State or interstate authorities
(including legislative committees); consider whether a proposed
standard is reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular
type of motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment for which it is
prescribed; and consider the extent to which the standard will carry
out the purposes of the Vehicle Safety Act.
Deadlines
Congress enacted the K.T. Safety Act on February 28, 2008. The Act
directed the Secretary to initiate rulemaking to amend FMVSS No. 111
within 12 months of enactment (February 28, 2009). The Act further
directed the Secretary to publish a final rule amending FMVSS No. 111
within 36 months of enactment (February 28, 2011). In the event that
any of the aforementioned deadlines could not be met, subsection 4
required the Secretary to establish a new deadline and notify the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate of
the new deadlines and the reasons the deadlines specified in the Act
could not be met.
On February 25, 2011, the agency determined that the deadline for
publication of today's final rule could not be met and the Secretary
sent notice to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation of the Senate as required by the K.T. Safety Act.\21\
While the NPRM was published on December 7, 2010 and provided for a 60-
day comment period, the agency determined that an additional 45-day
comment period would be necessary. The agency informed Congress of its
intent to hold a public hearing and technical workshop in order to
facilitate the exchange of ideas over the backover safety problem. The
agency also stated that additional time was required in order to
analyze the information acquired in these two public meetings. Thus, as
required by the K.T. Safety Act, the Secretary sent the aforementioned
notification and established December 31, 2011 as the new deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0148.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, due to the large volume of comments and the complexity of
the issues discussed in this rulemaking, the Secretary determined that
more time was necessary to complete the final review process. Thus, the
Secretary sent additional notifications to the required committees
establishing the new deadline of February 29, 2012.\22\ A subsequent
deadline of December 31, 2012 was established on February 28, 2012 when
the Secretary sent additional notifications to the required committees
[[Page 19185]]
explaining that further research and analysis would be necessary in
order to ensure that the final requirements are as efficient and
protective as possible.\23\ Specifically, the letter noted that
additional analysis and/or research of a wider range of driver and
vehicle types would help to ensure that the final rule is appropriate
and that the underlying analysis is robust. As further described below,
the agency conducted additional research and analysis to expand the
vehicle, driver, and obstacle presentation methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0230.
\23\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0231.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the agency completed this additional research in 2012, the
Secretary determined that additional time would be necessary to
finalize this rule and sent the notifications to the required
committees under the K.T. Safety Act establishing a deadline of January
2, 2015.\24\ Given that vehicles with rearview video systems are
increasingly prevalent in the light vehicle fleet, we believed that
additional analysis of crashes investigated by the Special Crash
Investigations program would contribute significantly to our
understanding of the backover crash problem. More specifically, the
agency attempted to identify and analyze crashes involving vehicles
with rearview video systems in order to refine further its
understanding of how the proposed requirements address the real world
safety risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0251.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As further discussed below, the agency could not identify as many
cases for analysis as it hoped (potentially because rearview video
systems are already having an impact on reducing backover crashes).
Only two cases involving vehicles with rearview video systems could be
identified and these cases are analyzed in the sections that follow.
However, due to the lack of available cases, the agency believes that
further delay of the rule is unlikely to yield much additional
information for analysis. Thus, after considering these new facts along
with the safety implications of further delay, the Department has
decided that it is appropriate to issue today's final rule at this
time--before the January 2, 2015 deadline.
Phase-in
In addition to these requirements, the K.T. Safety Act required
that the safety standards prescribed pursuant to the Act establish a
phase-in period for compliance. The Act further required that the
phase-in period prescribe full compliance with the aforementioned
safety standards no later than 48 months after issuance of the final
rule. The K.T. Safety Act instructed the Secretary to consider whether
to require a phase-in schedule based on vehicle type according to data
regarding the frequency of backover incidents for each vehicle type.
b. Safety Problem
Definition of the Backover Problem and Summary of the Available Data
In the ANPRM and NPRM, we specifically described a backover as a
type of incident, in which a non-occupant of a vehicle (e.g., a
pedestrian or cyclist) is struck by a vehicle moving in reverse. As a
majority of backover crashes occur off of public roadways, NHTSA's
traditional methodologies for collecting data as to the specific
numbers and circumstances of backover incidents could not give the
agency a complete picture of the scope and circumstances of these types
of incidents. Thus, in addition to statistics from traditional sources
such as FARS \25\ and NASS-GES \26\, our research has utilized
information from the ``Not-in-Traffic Surveillance'' (NiTS) system
which collects information about all non-traffic crashes, including
non-traffic backing crashes. Based on the aforementioned sources, NHTSA
estimated that backing crashes of all types result in approximately 410
fatalities and 42,000 injuries each year. Of those, the subset of
backover crashes (crashes involving non-occupants of vehicles such as
pedestrians and cyclists) comprises 267 fatalities and 15,000 injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) is a
nationwide census that provides yearly data regarding fatal injuries
suffered in motor vehicle traffic crashes. See NHTSA, NCSA Reports
and Publications, http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS.
\26\ The National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates
System (NASS-GES) is a nationally representative sample of police
reported motor vehicle crashes. See NHTSA, NASS General Estimates
System, http://www.nhtsa.gov/NASS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of these backover crashes, not all involve the vehicle types
contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (cars, trucks, MPVs,
and vans with GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less). When only these vehicles
are taken into account, the data indicate that a total population of
210 fatalities and 15,000 injuries \27\ are due to light vehicle
backover crashes.\28\ However, the data are less clear when examining
the distribution of backover crashes by vehicle type. Table 6
illustrates that pickup trucks and MPVs are statistically
overrepresented in backover fatalities when compared to all non-backing
traffic injury crashes and to their proportion of the vehicle fleet
with a GVWR of less than 10,000 pounds. Our analysis revealed that
while these vehicle types were statistically overrepresented in
backover-related fatalities, they were not significantly
overrepresented in backover crashes generally. In other words, these
data indicate that while these types of vehicles are proportionately
involved in backover crashes, those involving light trucks and sport
utility vehicles are more likely to be fatal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Due to rounding, injuries for both light vehicles and all
vehicles are estimated to be 15,000.
\28\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
[[Page 19186]]
Table 6--Passenger Vehicle Backover Fatalities and Injuries by Vehicle Type \29\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of Non-
Backing vehicle type Fatalities % of Estimated Estimated % of Backing % of Fleet
Fatalities injuries injuries crashes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car..................................................... 59 28 8,000 52 58 57
Utility Vehicle......................................... 56 27 2,000 16 18 17
Van..................................................... 23 11 2,000 11 7 10
Pickup.................................................. 68 33 2,000 14 15 16
Other Light Vehicle..................................... 3 2 1,000 7 2 0
Passenger Vehicles...................................... 210 100 15,000 100 100 100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FARS 2007-2011, NASS-GES 2007-2011, NiTS 2007-2011.
Note: Estimates may not add up to totals due to independent rounding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our data further indicated that young children under the age of 5
and adults over the age of 70 are disproportionately represented in
passenger vehicle backover crashes. Table 7 details the ages for
fatalities and injuries for backover crashes involving all vehicles as
well as those involving passenger vehicles only. It also details the
proportion of the U.S. population in each age category from the 2007
U.S. Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program for comparison. When
restricted to backover fatalities involving passenger vehicles,
children under 5 years old account for 39 percent of the fatalities and
adults 70 years of age and older account for 29 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Id.
Table 7--All Backover Crash Fatalities and Injuries by Victim Age \30\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Estimated Estimated % of Percent of
Age of victim Fatalities fatalities injuries injuries population
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under 5..................... 84 31 1,000 6 7
5-10........................ 8 3 1,000 4 7
10-19....................... 4 1 1,000 9 14
20-59....................... 73 27 7,000 49 55
60-69....................... 27 10 2,000 11 8
70+......................... 70 26 3,000 20 9
Unknown..................... 2 1 *0 1 ..............
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 267 100 15,000 100 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under 5..................... 82 39 1,000 6 7
5-10........................ 8 4 1,000 4 7
10-19....................... 1 1 1,000 9 14
20-59....................... 38 18 7,000 48 55
60-69....................... 19 9 2,000 11 8
70+......................... 61 29 3,000 21 9
Unknown..................... 1 0 *0 1 ..............
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 210 100 15,000 100 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * indicates estimate less than 500, Estimates do not add up to totals due to independent rounding.
Note: Source: US Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2007 Population Estimates; FARS 2007-2011, NASS-
GES 2007-2011, NiTS 2007-2011.
In addition, we examined the data specifically in regards to
children under the age of 5. Table 8 (below) presents passenger vehicle
backover fatalities by year of age for victims less than 5 years old.
Out of all backover fatalities involving passenger vehicles, 24 percent
(49 out of 210) of victims are 1 year of age and younger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Id.
Table 8--Breakdown of Backover Crash Fatalities Involving Passenger
Vehicles for Victims Under Age 5 Years \31\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Age of victim (years) fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0....................................................... 2
1....................................................... 59
2....................................................... 21
3....................................................... 11
4....................................................... 7
---------------
Total............................................... 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: US Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2007 Population
Estimates; FARS 2007-2011, NASS-GES 2007-2011, NiTS 2007-2011
[[Page 19187]]
Separately, the agency also examined the FARS and NASS-GES data
from 2007-2010 in order to determine whether or not any persons with
disabilities were involved in backover crashes. During the four-year
period between 2007 and 2010, the agency identified one case in the
FARS database involving a vision-impaired pedestrian where the backover
crash resulted in a fatality. When examining the same timeframe, the
agency identified two backover cases in the NASS-GES database that
involved persons in wheelchairs that resulted in injuries. Under both
databases, the agency found other cases where the individual was
specified as ``impaired'' (1 in FARS, and 11 in NASS-GES). While the
agency cannot identify the specific type of ``impairment'' that the
individual had at the time of the backover crash, these individuals may
have had a disability (permanent or temporary) at the time of the
backover crash.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ The FARS and NASS-GES coding system has a separate category
for individuals that were alcohol-impaired. However, the FARS and
NASS-GES coding system does not differentiate between persons that
have physical disabilities (e.g., individuals using crutches) and
persons impaired by substances that are not alcohol (e.g., wrong
dosage of medication). Thus, while persons with temporary or
permanent disabilities could be included in this category, the
database information is not specific enough for the agency to
determine what portion of these persons had a physical disability at
the time of the backover crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Crash Investigation of Backover Crashes
As reported in the ANPRM and the NPRM, NHTSA conducted an analysis
of police-reported backover crashes through a Special Crash
Investigation (SCI) program during the earlier stages of this
rulemaking. The SCI program operates by receiving notifications of
potential backover cases from several different sources including media
reports, police and rescue personnel, contacts within NHTSA, reports
from the general public, as well as notifications from the NASS. For
purposes of that analysis of SCI cases, an eligible backover case was
defined as a crash in which a light passenger vehicle's back plane
strikes or passes over a person who is either positioned to the rear of
the vehicle or is approaching from the side. These cases investigated
were more likely to be cases involving children--however, some cases
did involve adults. The majority of notifications received did not meet
the criteria for case assignment. Typically, the reasons for not
pursuing further include: (1) The reported crash configuration is
outside of the scope of the program; (2) minor incidents with no
fatally or seriously injured persons; or (3) incidents where
cooperation cannot be established with the involved parties. As an
example, many reported incidents are determined to be side or frontal
impacts, which were not investigated for the purposes of this
rulemaking. The agency was less likely to investigate a case involving
an adult unless the adult was seriously injured or killed or if the
backing vehicles were equipped with backing or parking aids.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ The SCI cases reviewed by NHTSA are available in the SCI
Electronic Case Viewer at http://www.nhtsa.gov/SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency conducted these investigations because the special crash
investigations enhance the agency's understanding of the different
circumstances that can lead to a backover crash. As the SCI cases
revealed, there are a number of variables that can lead to a backover
crash. NHTSA completed special crash investigations of 58 backover
cases.\34\ The 58 backing vehicles in these cases comprised 18
passenger cars, 22 MPVs, 5 vans (including minivans) and 13 pickup
trucks. For cases in which an estimated speed for the backing vehicle
was available, the speed of the backing vehicle ranged between
approximately 0.62 and 10 mph. Of the 58 SCI backover cases, the vast
majority (55) occurred in daylight conditions. Further, half of the
cases investigated by NHTSA involved a non-occupant fatality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ While NHTSA analyzed a total of 58 SCI cases during the
course of its research, some analyses were completed before all 58
cases were available. For example, when NHTSA analyzed crash
avoidability using data from the SCI cases only 50 cases were
available. See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases investigated by NHTSA, most of the victims were either
children (who were too short to be seen behind the vehicle), or adults
who had fallen or were bent over and were also thus not in the driver's
field of view. Specifically, 51 of the cases involved children (ranging
in age from less than 8 months old up to 13 years old) who were struck
by vehicles.\35\ Of the 8 adult victim cases investigated by NHTSA, 4
were in an upright posture either standing or walking. Of the remaining
four adult victims documented in the SCI cases, one was bending over
behind a backing vehicle to pick up something from the ground, one was
an elderly person who had fallen down in the path of the vehicle prior
to being run over, and the postural orientation of the remaining two
was unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ As the selection of SCI cases, media reports, and other
sources of information available to NHTSA on backover crashes may
tend to report more heavily on accidents involving vulnerable
populations such as children or the elderly, the information
contained in the SCI cases analyzed in this rulemaking may be over
representative of the incidence of backovers involving these
populations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on NHTSA's analysis of the quantitative data and narrative
descriptions of how the 58 SCI-documented backover crashes transpired,
NHTSA estimated the general path that the victim took prior to each
backover crash. We note that this analysis is unable to identify the
victim's location, speed, and trajectory at a time that is relevant to
the backover crash (i.e., after the vehicle has begun the backing
maneuver). However, this analysis does enhance the agency's
understanding of the varied circumstances that can lead to a backover
crash. The breakdown of the victim's path of travel prior to being
struck is as follows: 41 were approaching from the right or left of the
vehicle at some point in time prior to being struck by the vehicle, 12
were in the path of the backing vehicle, 4 were unknown, and one was
``other.''
Subsequent to the ANPRM, NHTSA further analyzed these SCI backover
cases to assess how far the vehicle traveled before striking the
victim. Distances traveled for the cases investigated by NHTSA ranged
from 1 to 75 feet. Overall, as shown in Table 9 below, this analysis
showed that in 77 percent of the real-world, SCI backover cases
investigated by NHTSA, the vehicle traveled less than 20 feet. While
the subset may or may not be nationally representative of all backing
crashes, we believe this information from the SCI cases is useful in
the development of a required visible area and the associated
development of a compliance test.
[[Page 19188]]
Table 9--Average Distance Traveled by Backing Vehicle for First 58 SCI Backover Cases and Percent of Backover Crashes That Could Be Avoided Through
Various Coverage Ranges \36\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
distance
Number of SCI traveled prior 7ft (%) 15ft (%) 20ft (%) 35ft (%)
cases to strike
(ft.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car..................................................... 18 13.7 39 56 78 89
SUV..................................................... 22 13.4 27 68 82 100
Minivan................................................. 4 31.0 25 50 50 75
Van..................................................... 1 54.5 0 0 0 0
Pickup.................................................. 13 17.2 38 69 69 92
All Light Vehicles...................................... 58 26.0 33 63 77 93
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis of Backover Crash Risk by Monte Carlo Simulation
NHTSA also calculated backover crash risk as a function of
pedestrian location using a Monte Carlo simulation.\37\ Data from a
recent NHTSA study of drivers' backing behavior,\38\ such as average
backing speed and average distance covered in a backing maneuver, were
used to develop a backing speed distribution and a backing distance
distribution that were used as inputs to the simulation. Similarly,
published data 39 40 41 characterizing walking and running
speeds of an average 1-year-old child were also used as inputs. A Monte
Carlo simulation was performed that drew upon the noted vehicle and
pedestrian motion data to calculate a probability-based risk weighting
for a test area centered behind the vehicle. The probability-based risk
weightings for each grid square were based on the number of pedestrian-
vehicle backing crashes predicted by the simulation for trials for
which the pedestrian was initially (i.e., at the time that the vehicle
began to back up) in the center of one square of the grid of 1-foot
squares spanning 70 feet wide by 90 feet in range behind the vehicle. A
total of 1,000,000 simulation trials were run with the pedestrian
initially in the center of each square.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ These distances do not indicate the distance between the
victim and the vehicle at the start of the backing maneuver because
it shows the distance that the vehicle traveled before striking the
pedestrian. The SCI cases do not have sufficient detail to enable
the agency to determine the location of the pedestrian at the
beginning of the backing maneuver.
\37\ 74 FR 9484.
\38\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H.S., and Ranney,
T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems
(ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS
811 024.
\39\ Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways, 2003 Edition. Washington, DC: FHWA, November 2003.
\40\ Milazzo, J.S., Rouphail, J.E., and Alien, D.P. (1999).
Quality of Service for Interrupted-Flow Pedestrian Facilities in
Highway Capacity Manual 2000. Transportation Research Record, No.
1678 (1999): 25-31.
\41\ Chou, P., Chou, Y., Su, F., Huang, W., Lin, T. (2003).
Normal Gait of Children. Biomedical Engineering--Applications, Basis
& Communications, Vol. 15 No. 4 August 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The output of this analysis calculated relative crash risk values
for each grid square representing a location behind the vehicle. The
results suggested that, if pedestrians were randomly distributed in
areas behind the vehicle, an area 12 feet wide by 36 feet long centered
behind the vehicle would address pedestrian locations having relative
crash risks of 0.15 and higher (with a risk value of 1.0 being located
directly aft of the rear bumper). To address crash risks of 0.20 and
higher, an area 7 feet wide and 33 feet long centered behind the
vehicle would need to be covered. The analysis showed that an area
covering approximately the width of the vehicle out to a range of 19
feet would encompass risk values of 0.4 and higher.
c. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
In response to the K.T. Safety Act, NHTSA initiated rulemaking to
amend FMVSS No. 111 to improve a driver's ability to see areas to the
rear of a motor vehicle to reduce backover incidents by publishing an
ANPRM in the Federal Register on March 4, 2009. In addition to
complying with the statutory deadline for initiating rulemaking, we
published the ANPRM in order to solicit public comment on the current
state of research and the efficacy of available countermeasures. In
this notice, we acknowledged the backover safety problem and its
disproportionate effect on small children and the elderly. We further
described our ongoing research efforts and presented a series of
specific questions for public comment.
The research presented in the ANPRM focused on four major topic
areas. The first area involved the nature of backover incidents and
backing crashes generally. We presented the details of documented
backover incidents, including the locations of backover victims, the
paths the victims took to enter the path of the vehicle, and the
visibility characteristics of the vehicles involved. In the ANPRM, we
outlined the information we had regarding these crashes, whether the
lack of visibility played a significant role, and whether or not the
characteristics of a class or type of vehicle could be considered a
contributing factor.
The second area of focus involved the evaluation of various
strategies regarding the vehicles types and the appropriate rear
visibility countermeasure. We presented three possible strategies in
the ANPRM and requested public comment. The first strategy raised by
the ANPRM was to ensure that the vehicles which are over-represented in
terms of fatalities and injuries would have their rear field of view
improved. Such a strategy would have focused on vehicles such as pickup
trucks or MPVs, which were presumed to be overrepresented. The second
strategy explored sought to establish a minimum blind zone area for
vehicles under 10,000 pounds. Our research at the time suggested that a
vehicle's rear blind zone area may be statistically correlated with its
rate of backing crashes. Using this correlation, we conjectured that it
may have been possible to determine which vehicles warranted certain
rear visibility improvements based on the size of their rear blind
zones and the setting of a ``threshold.'' Finally we also explored the
possibility that the rear visibility countermeasures should be applied
uniformly to all vehicles contemplated by the K.T. Safety Act.
The third topic focused on the evaluation of various
countermeasures. After consulting past agency research, industry and
other outside sources, as well as conducting new research, four types
of countermeasures were presented and described in the ANPRM. These
countermeasures included direct vision (i.e., what can be seen by a
driver glancing directly out a vehicle's windows), rear-mounted convex
mirrors, rear object detection sensors
[[Page 19189]]
(such as ultrasonic or radar-based devices), and rearview video (RV)
systems. While we noted that research was still ongoing, the ANPRM
described how these systems work, how well they perform in identifying
pedestrians, and how effectively drivers may use them.
Finally, the fourth topic involved consideration of technical
specifications and test procedures that could be used to describe and
evaluate the performance aspects of direct view, rear-mounted convex
mirrors, rear object detection sensors, and rearview video (RV)
systems. The agency presented preliminary information on potential
technical specifications and test procedures and solicited information
on how these specifications and procedures should be refined for the
purposes of developing repeatable compliance tests.
In addition to presenting these four areas of research, NHTSA also
requested comment on more than forty specific questions in the ANPRM.
We requested public input on a variety of topics including studies on
the effectiveness of various indirect rear visibility systems (i.e.,
devices that aid a driver in seeing areas around a vehicle, such as
mirrors or video systems) that have been implemented in the U.S. and/or
abroad, and technological possibilities that could enhance the
reliability of existing technologies. Further, the agency sought
information on the costs of implementation of all available
technologies to develop more robust cost and benefit estimates.
In response to the ANPRM, the agency received comments from 37
entities, including industry associations, automotive and equipment
manufacturers, safety advocacy organizations, and 14 individuals.
Generally, the comments covered the main research areas detailed in the
ANPRM. With regard to the issue of which vehicles most warrant improved
rear visibility, vehicle manufacturers generally desired to focus any
expansion of rear visibility on the particular types of vehicles (i.e.,
trucks, vans, and MPVs within the specified weight limits) that they
believed posed the highest risk of backover crash fatalities and
injuries. However, vehicle safety organizations and equipment
manufacturers generally suggested that all vehicles need to have
expanded rear fields of view.
With regard to the issue of what technology would be effective at
expanding the rear field of view for a driver, commenters discussed
additional mirrors, sensors, and rearview video combined with sensors.
Some commenters provided input regarding test procedure development and
rear visibility countermeasure characteristics, such as visual display
size and brightness, and graphic overlays superimposed on a video
image. Some also discussed whether it is appropriate to allow a small
gap in coverage immediately behind the rear bumper. Finally, commenters
generally agreed with the cost estimates provided by the agency.
However, the Consumers Union and Magna comments did suggest that our
estimates of the cost of individual technologies seemed high and that
there would be larger cost reductions over time than the agency had
indicated.
Because the ANPRM had an extremely broad scope, the comments
addressed a wide variety of issues and provided a large amount of
information. A more extensive discussion of the ANPRM, the comments
that the agency received in response, and our analysis and response to
these comments is available in the NPRM. However, specific comments on
the ANPRM which are relevant to our discussion of today's final rule
are also referenced by issue in section III, Final Rule and Response to
Comments.
d. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
After evaluating the comments on the ANPRM and conducting
additional research, we published an NPRM on December 7, 2010.\42\ In
that notice, we proposed to apply the rear visibility requirements to
all passenger cars, MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less by specifying an area behind the vehicle
that a driver must be able to see when the vehicle is in reverse gear.
The proposal tentatively concluded that drivers need to be able to see
a visual image of a 32-inch tall cylinder with a 12-inch diameter
behind the vehicle over an area 5 feet to either side of the vehicle
centerline by 20 feet in longitudinal range from the vehicle's rear
bumper surface. We further proposed various performance criteria for
the visual display including luminance, rearview image response time,
and image linger and driver deactivation restrictions, as well as
durability requirements. Pursuant to the K.T. Safety Act, the NPRM also
proposed a phase-in schedule for compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ 75 FR 76186.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NPRM proposed to apply rear visibility improvements to all
passenger cars, MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a GVWR
of 10,000 pounds or less because the available data showed no clear
basis for excluding certain vehicles. As noted above, the ANPRM and the
commenters on the ANPRM explored various possibilities for establishing
rear visibility countermeasures which would be applied based on vehicle
type (such as MPVs, trucks, and buses) or based on a blind zone
threshold. However, as the available data indicated that substantial
numbers of fatalities and injuries are caused by all types of light
vehicles, we did not propose in the NPRM to limit the application of
rear visibility countermeasures by vehicle type. Further, our data
showed that applying the rear visibility countermeasure by a blind zone
area threshold lacked a sufficient statistical basis. The available
data demonstrated that vehicles with comparatively small blind zones
still had similar backover crash rates as other vehicles. In addition,
the agency concluded that applying rear visibility countermeasures to
all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less would most closely
follow the intent of Congress in the K.T. Safety Act. Thus, the NPRM
proposed to apply the rear visibility improvements to all vehicles
contemplated by Congress under the K.T. Safety Act.
We also expressed in the NPRM our view that rearview video systems
represent the most effective technology available to address the
problem of backover crashes. Our data showed that rear-mounted convex
mirrors and sensor-based object detection systems offered few benefits
compared to rearview video systems due to system performance and driver
use issues. Studies conducted by NHTSA showed that sensors and mirrors,
while able to detect pedestrians to some degree, simply did not induce
the driver response needed to prevent backover crashes. The NPRM noted
that a sensor-activated warning of the presence of an obstacle often
does not lead to a successful (i.e., timely and sufficient) crash
avoidance response from the driver unless the driver is also provided
with visual confirmation of obstacle presence. Thus, the NPRM proposed
to afford the driver a visual display which offered a view of the area
immediately behind the vehicle.
In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that the area covered by the
proposed rearview countermeasure should be 20 feet by 10 feet. In
making this determination, we used various sources of information
including the comments received from the ANPRM, the available safety
data, our review of special investigations of backover crashes, and a
computer simulation. For example, we examined the typical distances
that backover-crash-involved vehicles traveled from the location at
[[Page 19190]]
which they began moving rearward to the location at which they struck a
pedestrian. We tentatively concluded that an area with a width of 10
feet (5 feet to either side of a rearward extension of the vehicle's
centerline) and a length of 20 feet extending backward from a
transverse vertical plane tangent to the rearmost point on the rear
bumper encompasses the highest risk area for children and other
pedestrians to be struck. Thus, we proposed in the NPRM that test
objects, of a particular size, within that area must be visible to
drivers when they are conducting backing maneuvers.
In the NPRM we also expressed our view that, in order to maintain
the level of effectiveness that we have seen in our testing of existing
rearview video systems, we needed to propose a minimum set of
performance requirements. Specifically, the NPRM set forth requirements
for the performance of the visual display luminance, a minimum rearview
image size, a rearview image response time requirement, durability
requirements for exterior components, and provisions against driver
deactivation and excessive rearview image linger. In drafting these
proposed requirements, the agency strove to afford manufacturers
flexibility to meet these requirements as they see fit (such as through
the development of new technologies). Since we stated in the NPRM that
most, if not all, rearview video systems that would likely be used by
manufacturers to meet the proposed minimum set of requirements already
met these requirements, we did not believe that the adoption of these
additional requirements would increase the cost of this existing
technology.
Further, pursuant to section 2(c) of the K.T. Safety Act, we
proposed a phase-in schedule that would be completed within 48 months
of the publication of the final rule. Because we anticipated publishing
a final rule by the statutory deadline of February 28, 2011, we noted
that the rule must require full compliance not later than February 28,
2015. However, we were conscious of the fact that, for safety standard
compliance purposes, model years begin on September 1 and end on August
31 and that February 28 falls in the middle of a model year. Thus, the
agency tentatively concluded that vehicle manufacturers would need, as
a practical matter, to begin full compliance at the beginning of that
model year, i.e., on September 1, 2014. Accordingly, NHTSA proposed the
following phase-in schedule:
0% of the vehicles manufactured before September 1, 2012;
10% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2012, and before September 1, 2013;
40% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2013, and before September 1, 2014; and
100% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2014.
Finally, the NPRM also proposed a compliance test with which to
evaluate the field of view and image size requirements. The proposed
test would utilize a photography camera with an imaging sensor located
at the eye point of a 50th percentile male. The test procedure would
then take a photograph of the test objects designed to simulate the
height and width of an 18-month-old toddler as they are presented in
the rear visibility system display. This photograph would then be used
to assess the compliance of the rear visibility system by determining
if the required portions of the seven test objects, located along the
perimeter of the required field of view, are visible and displayed at a
sufficient size.
e. Summary of Comments on the NPRM
In response to the NPRM, the agency received comments from a wide
variety of commenters including trade associations, manufacturers,
advocacy groups, parts suppliers, and individuals. The advocacy groups
submitting comments included KidsAndCars.org, the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Automotive Occupant Restraints Council,
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Consumers Union, and the
Advocates for Highway Safety (the Advocates). In addition to the trade
associations representing manufacturers including the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers (the Alliance), the National Truck Equipment
Association (NTEA), the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association
(MEMA), the School Bus Manufacturers Technical Council, and Global
Automakers, we also received comments from individual vehicle
manufacturers such as Toyota Motor North America (Toyota), Volkswagen
Group of America (Volkswagen), Porsche Cars North America (Porsche),
Ford Motor Company (Ford), American Honda Motor Co. (Honda), Mercedes-
Benz USA (Mercedes), General Motors Company (General Motors), and BMW
Group (BMW). Additionally, the equipment manufacturers commenting on
the NPRM included Brigade Electronics (Brigade), Gentex Corporation
(Gentex), Magna Mirrors and Magna Electronics (Magna), Sony Electronics
(Sony), Panasonic Corporation of North America (Panasonic), Sense
Technologies, Rosco Vision Systems (Rosco), Rearscope North America
(Rearscope), Continental, Valeo, IFM Electronic (IFM), and Delphi.
Finally, the agency also received approximately 150 comments from
individual commenters. In general, the commenters expressed support for
the goals of this rulemaking pursuant to the K.T. Safety Act. However,
many offered various recommendations on the most appropriate manner
through which to achieve those goals.
The primary issue raised by the advocacy groups concerned our
proposed test procedure for evaluating compliance with the field of
view requirement. The advocacy groups were concerned that, as the
proposed test procedure did not require that the field of view begin at
the bumper, nor did it require that a large portion of the first row of
test objects (placed 1 foot behind the bumper) be visible, significant
blind spots can exist in a theoretically compliant rear visibility
system. Citing the SCI cases and the Monte Carlo simulation used by the
agency to determine the proposed coverage area of the field of view
requirement, the advocacy groups requested that the final rule address
these potential blind zones. Another issue raised by the advocacy
groups involved their recommendation that image response time be
reduced to 1.0 second or less. The advocacy groups asserted that there
is a significant safety risk that drivers may begin backing their
vehicles without the benefit of the rear visibility system if they are
not promptly presented with the required field of view.
On the other hand, while vehicle manufacturers generally support
the rule, the most significant concern raised by the manufacturer
comments focused on the cost and feasibility of specific performance
requirements within the proposed phase-in schedule. First, the
manufacturers asserted that the agency was wrong to assume, as it did
in the NPRM, that most rearview video systems that are currently in use
by the manufacturers would meet all of the proposed requirements in the
NPRM. For example, many manufacturers commented that their current
rearview video systems would not be able to meet the response time
requirement under certain situations. The NPRM proposed a response time
requirement which prescribed that the compliant rearview image must be
displayed within 2.0 seconds of selecting the reverse gear. The
manufacturers commented that many of their rear visibility systems
require initialization time and would not be able to meet the response
time if the reverse gear was selected soon after the vehicle is
activated. Thus, many
[[Page 19191]]
manufacturer comments requested various vehicle preconditions that
would accommodate their rear visibility system initialization process.
Similarly, the manufacturers were concerned their existing systems
would not fully meet all of the image size, display luminance,
deactivation, and linger time requirements.
As a result, the manufacturers were concerned that the proposed
phase-in schedule would require that the manufacturers conduct
redesigns to their existing rear visibility systems outside of the
normal product development cycle. They contended in their comments that
such a scenario would significantly increase the costs and burdens of
compliance. Thus, the manufacturers requested that the agency delay
some of the aforementioned requirements until the end of the statutory
phase-in deadline in order afford manufacturers time to redesign their
rear visibility systems in conjunction with the normal vehicle redesign
schedule.
The equipment manufacturer comments, to varying degrees, contended
that their products were able to meet the proposed requirements in the
NPRM. Generally, commenters such as Sony, Magna, and Gentex expressed
confidence that their products can be used to bring a vehicle into
compliance with the proposed requirements. However, other suppliers,
such as Sense Technologies, IFM Electronic, and Valeo, stated that the
NPRM should not have concluded that technologies such as mirrors and
sensors were not suitable countermeasures. In addition, suppliers
offered comments as to the potential new rear visibility systems
technologies that were being developed (such as automatic brake
intervention, combination sensor/video systems, infrared or Doppler
radar systems, etc.). Thus, many supplier comments requested that the
agency avoid setting requirements that restrict the development of new
technologies and rearview functions.
Finally, individual commenters expressed either general support or
general opposition to the goals of this rule. The individual commenters
expressing support for this rule generally cite the vulnerability of
the population that is most likely to be victimized by this safety
risk. A significant portion of these commenters either suffered a
significant personal loss due to a backing crash or had an acquaintance
who suffered a significant personal loss due to a backing crash. On the
other hand, commenters opposed to this rule cited its high costs and
questioned its potential effectiveness. Of these commenters, many
opined that the more prudent manner in which to address the safety
risks related with backover incidents is through driver training and
education.
f. Public Hearing and Workshop
After publishing the NPRM, the agency decided to further solicit
comments from the public by holding a public hearing and a technical
workshop. On March 2, 2011, the agency published a notice in the
Federal Register announcing these events.\43\ The technical workshop
was held on March 11, 2011 at NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center
in East Liberty, Ohio. The goal of this workshop was to provide a forum
in which interested commenters could demonstrate their specific
concerns with the agency's proposed test procedure. The public hearing
was held on March 23, 2011, at the NHTSA headquarters in the U.S.
Department of Transportation in Washington DC. This hearing provided an
opportunity for the agency to hear from advocacy groups, organizations
that provide rearview countermeasures, and the families of backover
crash victims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ 76 FR 11417.
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The participants in the technical workshop included representatives
from Volkswagen, Sense Technologies, the Alliance, Global Automakers,
Honda, Ford, Mitsubishi, and KidsAndCars.org. The participants
generally presented areas they believed could be clarified regarding
the proposed test procedure. The majority of the areas discussed were
also presented in the various comments submitted in response to the
NPRM such as durability testing, deactivation issues, and luminance
testing. However, certain unique comments (such as concerns regarding
vehicle loading procedure, rearview mirror positioning, etc.) were
discussed during the technical workshop. These issues will be
identified and responded to in conjunction with the written comments in
the sections that follow.
The participants in the public hearing included KidsAndCars.org,
the National Consumers League, the Consumers Union, Sense Technologies,
Annabelle's Angels, the Advocates, the Consumer Federation of America,
and family members of victims of backover crashes including the
Auriemma, Ivison, Dahlen, Gridley, Gulbransen, Nelson, and Anthony
families. The participants in the public hearing expressed general
support for the proposed rule. In addition to reiterating some of the
technical comments that the advocacy groups submitted on the NPRM,
participants in the public hearing generally underscored the high non-
economic and human cost that is associated with backover incidents.
KidsAndCars.org noted that in 70 percent of the cases that they have
compiled, the child victim was a direct relative of the driver. Mr.
Patrick Ivison, a 16 year old who was a victim of a backover crash as a
toddler, also testified to the many challenges that he faces by living
with the lifelong injuries that he suffered. Participants also noted
other unquantifiable costs such as parents who commit suicide when they
are unable to forgive themselves for their involvement in a backover
crash.
The families of victims cited the inability of drivers to see
behind vehicles as an important danger. Many of their cases involved
drivers who had walked around the rear of the vehicle or had been
present at the rear of the vehicle shortly before entering the vehicle
and beginning the reverse maneuver. The Consumers Union also noted
observational evidence that children often walk along the rear bumpers
of vehicles as they travel to the other side of the vehicle. In
general, the participants in the public hearing refuted the idea that
victims of backover incidents are limited to irresponsible parents or
caretakers.
g. Additional 2012 Research
As described above, the agency conducted additional research and
analysis covering a wider range of driver and an additional vehicle
type. Specifically, the additional testing parameters examined whether
variations in driver and vehicle type would have any impacts on NHTSA's
estimates regarding drivers' use of backing aid technologies to avoid
backover crashes.
Research Design--Wider Range of Vehicle Types and Drivers
In order to examine whether variations in driver and vehicle type
would have any unanticipated impacts on NHTSA's estimates, the agency
conducted additional testing utilizing a sedan. Further, the agency
sought to more closely balance the ratio of male and female
participants in this latest study and include a broader age range among
the study participants.
In terms of vehicle type, NHTSA's previous studies had focused on
minivans and crossover utility vehicles to examine drivers' use of
backing aid technologies. While we acknowledge that vehicles have
different blind zones (and that this would intuitively have an impact
on the backover crash risk), the agency believes that our previous
[[Page 19192]]
research evaluating human behavior using a single vehicle can be
applied across the vehicle fleet. We believe this is appropriate
because the data show that virtually all vehicles have a blind zone
that covers at least the area directly behind the vehicle where our
Monte Carlo simulation suggested that backover crash risk is the
highest. Thus, the agency's previous studies, for example utilizing the
Honda Odyssey to examine effectiveness in avoiding backover crashes,
should approximate the vast majority of vehicles on the road.
However, the agency decided to conduct an additional study using a
midsized sedan (the Nissan Altima). We note that the choices of vehicle
type for testing were constrained to vehicles that had significant
numbers of drivers both with and without cameras. Thus, we were unable
to test vehicles at the extremes for large or small blind zone sizes.
However, we reasoned that while drivers of a smaller vehicle may not
have an actual improved view of the what the Monte Carlo simulation
indicates would be relevant area behind the vehicle, as compared to a
minivan or SUV, it may be possible that their behavior can be different
due to drivers' own perception of the size of the vehicle blind zone.
Thus, additional testing was designed to ensure that this factor would
not have any unanticipated effects on NHTSA's estimates on the ability
of drivers to use backing aid technologies to avoid backover crashes.
In terms of driver demographics, the agency more closely balanced
the ratio of male and female participants in the 2012 study. Further,
the agency sought to include a broader age range among the study
participants (earlier studies had participants between the ages of 25
and 55). The agency believes that the participants in NHTSA's earlier
studies can approximate the performance of drivers involved in backover
crashes because (when faced with a potential backover crash situation)
all drivers are unable to see the relevant areas behind the vehicle
with the greatest crash risk. Further, we assumed that different
characteristics between various driver demographics (such as age or
gender) would not affect drivers' use of backing aid systems. However,
the agency decided to examine further this assumption as well. While
all drivers would have the same opportunity to view a pedestrian using
a rearview video system, NHTSA decided to include participants with a
broader set of driver demographic characteristics to see whether or not
the inclusion of these drivers would lead to a statistically different
result due to potential unforeseen factors (e.g., comfort level with
the system). Thus, NHTSA's 2012 research included drivers of broader
age and gender characteristics.
Research Design--New Test Object Presentation (Laterally Moving Test
Object)
In addition to examining a different type of vehicle and a wider
range of drivers, the agency also had the opportunity to examine how
drivers would react to a different obstacle presentation method.
Through this test, the agency sought to determine if a different test
object presentation could have any unanticipated effects on the
agency's estimates of the driver's ability to use backing aid
technologies to avoid backover crashes. Thus, separately, the new
research also included a different backover test where the test object
laterally moved into the vehicle's backing path from the passenger side
of the vehicle (in addition to utilizing the original test object
presentation method where the test object would pop-up behind the
vehicle).
As the intent of these studies was to isolate the ability of the
driver to use the backing aid technology to avoid a backover crash with
a test object that is otherwise unseen and unanticipated, the agency
designed its previous tests to utilize a pop-up test object
presentation.\44\ Because the agency is aware that many cases involve
drivers who walked around their vehicles before getting into the
vehicle and starting a backing maneuver, we designed this pop-up test
method to represent the surprise presence of the pedestrian--including
the pedestrian's movement into the vehicle's backing path. The pop-up
presentation method is a reasonable representation of a person that is
either not visible to the driver using the standard vehicle equipment
(for the duration of the backing maneuver), or visible to the driver
using the same equipment (but was not observed by the driver). We
believe that the pop-up presentation method is a reasonable estimate of
these two conditions because the test object is presented to the test
participant after he/she has begun the backing maneuver. In other
words, the presentation of the test object is limited to the time after
the test participant has checked his/her surroundings and decided that
they could conduct a backing maneuver. As there is no evidence to
suggest that any significant portion of the victims of backover crashes
were a result of a driver intentionally backing over a pedestrian, the
aforementioned two situations likely represent the vast majority of
situations in which persons are injured or killed in backover crashes.
We assume that a driver who has observed a person moving behind the
vehicle using rearview mirrors would attempt to stop immediately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ The test presented the pop-up test object only after the
driver had backed the vehicle a specified distance. In other words,
the driver began his backing maneuver before the test object
appeared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the agency is aware that backover crashes involve a wide
variety of factors (e.g., the movement of the pedestrian, the time at
which the vehicle's backing maneuver begins, the trajectory/speed of
the vehicle, etc.). Thus, the agency's new research included a
different obstacle presentation method to help determine whether the
new obstacle presentation could have any unanticipated effects on the
driver's ability to use the rearview video system. By maintaining
consistency with the pop-up test object presentation method (e.g., in
vehicle model, obstacle presentation time in the rearview video system,
etc.), the agency designed a similarly reasonable test to approximate
the surprise presence of a pedestrian (that measures the same crash
situations as the pop-up presentation method).\45\ In doing so, the
agency sought to determine whether driver use of the rearview video
system would be statistically different if the test object was
presented in a fashion where it approached the vehicle laterally from
the passenger side. Thus, the agency's 2012 research included the new
presentation method where the test object enters the vehicle's backing
path from the passenger side in addition to the original pop-up test
object presentation method.
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\45\ Further information on the test parameters are available in
the research report (Rearview Video System Use by Drivers of a Sedan
in an Unexpected Obstacle Event). This report is available in Docket
No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253.
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Summary of Research Test Conditions
For those aforementioned reasons, the agency tested three different
conditions as outlined in Table 10, below. In all test conditions for
the 2012 research, the agency used the Nissan Altima (a midsized sedan)
as the test vehicle. Further, the agency closely balanced the ratio of
male and female participants and included drivers above age 18.
[[Page 19193]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.004
Research Results
The test conditions described above can be used to answer two
questions. The first is whether or not (using the same pop-up test
object presentation method) the new drivers and vehicle type (more
balanced gender distribution, the different vehicle type, and the
broader age range) would contribute to a result that was statistically
different. The second is whether or not (using similar driver
demographic characteristics and the same vehicle) the different test
object presentation method (moving test object versus pop-up test
object) would produce a statistically different result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ The baseline (no system) test condition with a pop-up test
object was not tested in NHTSA's 2012 research. As in NHTSA's
previous studies, the pop-up test object is presented in the
vehicle's blind zone and the driver does not have an opportunity to
view the test object through the vehicle mirrors or direct vision.
In NHTSA's previous studies, no driver was able to avoid a collision
with the pop-up test object without the use of a rear visibility
system. As the Nissan Altima blind zone also prevents the driver
from seeing the area where the pop-up test object would deploy,
drivers would likewise be unable to avoid a collision with the pop-
up test object in the baseline test condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After completing 143 tests using the three aforementioned test
conditions, the agency obtained the following results:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.005
Among all of NHTSA's test conditions in the 2012 research
(including both test object presentation methods), the rearview video
system increased drivers' ability to avoid crashes with the test
objects. In each of the cases, the difference between the baseline (no
rear visibility system) condition and the rearview video system
condition was statistically significant. In other words, all of the
test data continue to show that rearview video systems have a
statistically significant effect of improving the driver's ability to
avoid a backover crash.
However, in spite of the aforementioned new test parameters
(vehicle/driver types and obstacle presentation method) that were
introduced into NHTSA's 2012 research, the results do not show that the
new test parameters created statistically different results from
NHTSA's previous studies.\47\ When comparing the results of the Nissan
Altima pop-up obstacle tests (with the additional driver demographic
characteristics) to NHTSA's previous studies using the Honda Odyssey
and the same test object presentation method, the results do not show
that the inclusion of the different vehicle type and additional driver
demographic characteristics led to a statistically different
result.\48\ Finally,
[[Page 19194]]
when comparing the results of the moving test object presentation
method and the pop-up test object presentation method (utilizing the
same vehicle and driver demographic characteristics), the results also
did not show a statistical difference.\49\
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\47\ While the agency's research included as many participants
as time and resources permitted, the agency's new research
parameters yielded lower, but not statistically different
effectiveness estimates compared to its previous research. We
acknowledge that testing additional participants may have enabled
the agency to detect a statistical difference between these factors.
However, the agency is not currently aware of any research that can
indicate what this difference would be.
\48\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253, Rearview Video System
Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle Scenario. While
this comparison shows that the data does not indicate a
statistically different result due to the combination of the new
driver demographics and vehicle type, the data also does not
indicate whether or not the individual driver or vehicle type
factors could have yielded a statistically different result. We note
that in a separate analysis of the data from NHTSA's previous
studies using the Honda Odyssey (where obstacle presentation,
participant age, and vehicle type are all consistent) the male and
female drivers did not crash with the test objects at statistically
different rates.
\49\ An analysis of the statistical significance of the
difference between the pop-up and moving test object presentation
methods is available in the research report titled ``Rearview Video
System Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle
Scenario.'' See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253.
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h. Additional SCI Case Analysis
As described above, the agency began a new effort to identify and
analyze SCI cases that involved vehicles with rearview video systems.
The agency's intention was to examine any such cases available in order
to better understand how the performance requirements proposed in the
NPRM address the real world backover safety risk.\50\
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\50\ The agency's SCI program conducts detailed investigations
for specific crashes that fall under a variety of crash types that
NHTSA has decided to research (e.g., backover crashes). As a part of
this program, NASS reports to NHTSA any cases that fall under the
crash types that NHTSA has identified when sampling police
jurisdictions. In addition, SCI teams search the internet and other
sources to help identify these cases. For this particular research
effort, NHTSA specifically instructed the SCI program to identify
cases from their respective sources of information that are backover
crashes involving vehicles with rearview video systems. We also
instructed the SCI program to conduct a search of any existing
reported cases to identify whether any were backover crashes
involving vehicles with rearview video systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the volume of comments received and the issues raised on
those comments, the agency believed that SCI case analysis may indicate
whether some of those concerns raised in the comments warrant further
analysis. For example, in the NPRM, the agency proposed to test the 20-
foot by 10-foot zone behind the vehicle using various test objects and
the agency subsequently received various comments on whether testing
using those test objects would ensure that the rearview video system
would cover the areas behind the vehicle associated with the greatest
backover crash risk. The agency reasoned, that an SCI case where a
rearview video system was installed on the vehicle could offer
additional insight into whether a crash happened under circumstances
where a rearview video system covering the required portions of the
test objects did not show the pedestrian behind the vehicle. After
reviewing all the available cases prior to today's final rule, the
agency identified two cases involving vehicles with rearview video
systems.
Case No. DS11008: In the first case, an elderly man
driving a 2006 Prius (equipped with an OEM \51\ rearview video system)
struck an elderly woman in his driveway.\52\ The technical report
states that the elderly man was reversing the Prius along the driveway
at a private residence when he struck an elderly woman standing in the
driveway directly behind the vehicle. The driver stated that he did not
remember whether he used any of the vehicle's mirrors or the vehicle's
rearview video system but recalls looking straight ahead prior to the
impact with the non-motorist. The driver stopped the vehicle after
hearing yelling. The non-motorist sustained a contusion to the left
knee and possible left rib fractures. She was transported to a local
hospital several hours after the incident.
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\51\ OEM refers to equipment that was originally installed on
the vehicle as produced by the manufacturer.
\52\ Case No. DS11008. The technical report is available at the
SCI XML Case Viewer Web site (http://www-nass.nhtsa.dot.gov/nass/sci/SearchForm.aspx).
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Case No. CR13011: In the second case, a 30-year-old male
driver of a 2010 BMW X5 (equipped with an OEM rearview video system)
struck a non-motorist while reversing his vehicle in a parking lot.\53\
The narrative in the report states that the non-motorist had stopped
directly behind the vehicle because the non-motorist was distracted by
flying birds. The driver selected the reverse gear (automatically
activating the vehicle's rearview video system) and released his foot
from the brake. The driver reapplied the brake as soon as he identified
the non-motorist in the rearview image. However, the vehicle did not
come to a complete stop before striking the non-motorist. The driver
stated that when the vehicle is first started, the display (that is
used to show the rearview image) has a boot sequence. The driver stated
that he allowed the vehicle to begin reversing prior to the rearview
image appearing in the vehicle display. The non-motorist sustained no
significant injury and stood up unassisted after the incident. The non-
motorist declined further medical treatment after being evaluated by
paramedics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Case No. CR13011. The technical report is available at the
SCI Electronic Case Viewer Web site (http://www-nass.nhtsa.dot.gov/BIN/logon.exe/airmislogon).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While neither of these two cases provides conclusive data, the
second (Case No. CR13011) seems to suggest that an important
characteristic for rearview video systems intending to address the
backover safety problem is the ability of the system to quickly show
the rearview image. As shown by the facts leading up to the accident in
Case No. CR13011, a rearview video system that is still initializing
after the vehicle has begun reversing may not afford the driver enough
time to identify a pedestrian behind the vehicle and avoid a backover
crash.
Although the information in these two cases are useful, the agency
does not believe that conducting further analysis between now and
January 2, 2015 will substantially add to our understanding.\54\ After
examining all of the cases that the agency has investigated up to this
point (only two of which involve vehicles with rearview video systems),
it seems unlikely that many additional cases involving rearview video
systems will be available for analysis by January 2, 2015. Given this
expectation and the safety impact of further delay of today's final
rule, the Department decided to complete the analysis of the available
cases and report the results of the analysis at this time so that the
Department could move forward with issuing today's final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ In addition to analyzing SCI cases with rearview video
systems, the agency also considered analyzing rearview video systems
currently installed in the vehicle fleet to see whether there was
sufficient data to measure the real world impact of rearview video
systems. The agency reasoned that it might be possible to measure
this impact because: (1) The adoption of rearview video systems in
new vehicle sales has been increasing substantially in recent years,
and (2) the available testing data (coupled with the agency's
difficulty in identifying SCI cases with rearview video systems)
suggest that these systems would have a beneficial effect in
reducing backover crashes. However, after analyzing the cumulative
installation of rearview video systems in the vehicle fleet (i.e.,
identifying the number of vehicles currently on the roads that have
these systems), the agency determined that too little data exist at
this point in time to enable the agency to measure the current
impact of rearview video systems on reducing backover injuries and
fatalities. Our data on cumulative sales show that, in MY 2011,
nearly 20% of passenger cars and light trucks were sold with a
rearview video system. However, the total fleet (all vehicles
currently operating on U.S. roads) with rearview video systems in
2011 was only 2.8%. Given the target population of this rule (210
fatalities and 15,000 injuries), we concluded that too little data
exist at this time to make any conclusions about the impact of
rearview video systems in reducing injuries and fatalities at this
time. Further details about this analysis is available in the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying this rule in the docket
referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Updates to NCAP
As stated in the Department's letter to Congress establishing the
January 2, 2015 deadline for issuing today's final rule, NHTSA would
consider updating its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) to include
information about rearview video systems and recommend to consumers
vehicle models with this important safety feature. While this
[[Page 19195]]
update to NCAP would be a separate agency consideration from today's
final rule, we reasoned that it would be appropriate to consider
updates to NCAP on this subject given the large amount of available
information on backover crashes and their countermeasures that can be
useful for consumers. Since then, NHTSA issued a request for comments
to consider a plan for updating NCAP \55\ and has issued a final
decision notice to implement this change to the program \56\ after
considering the public comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ 78 FR 38266.
\56\ 78 FR 59866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our final decision notice, the agency adopted a plan to update
NCAP based on the request for comments and the public comments
received. In essence, the agency decided to include rearview video
systems as a ``Recommended Advanced Technology Feature'' \57\ on the
NCAP Web site (www.safercar.gov). As long as a vehicle model has a
rearview video system meeting three performance criteria,
www.safercar.gov will recognize the vehicle model a having a
``Recommended Advanced Technology Feature.'' The three performance
criteria are based on the proposed field of view, image size, and
response time requirements in the NPRM for this rulemaking. After
considering the available information on the backover safety problem
and the public comments, we determined that systems meeting these three
criteria would be appropriate for ensuring that rearview video systems
recommended by NCAP are systems that are suitable for assisting drivers
in avoiding backover crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ On www.safercar.gov, NCAP gives recommendations to
consumers about various advanced technologies that the data show are
able to address major crash problems. The Web site offers
comparative information on the vehicle models offered for sale in
the United States and shows which of those models have ``Recommended
Advanced Technology Features.'' However, beyond simply communicating
to consumers that these vehicles have these technologies,
identifying a system as a ``Recommended Advanced Technology
Feature'' also communicates to consumers that the system meets
certain minimum performance criteria (criteria that ensure that the
system was designed as a safety system as opposed to, for example, a
convenience feature).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the agency took this action to update NCAP, we acknowledged
(in both the request for comments and the final decision notice) that
updating NCAP to incorporate recommendations for vehicle models with
rearview video systems is not a substitute for the action taken by the
agency in today's final rule. However, we believe that this update to
NCAP (to include rearview video systems) is appropriate and
complementary to the agency's actions in today's final rule for a few
reasons. First, we believe that all the available research on rearview
video systems shows that these systems are able to help drivers avoid
backover crashes. Second, there is no reason for the agency to delay
informing consumers about the backover safety risk and encouraging
manufacturers to install these systems on their vehicle models to help
consumers avoid these crashes. Third, we believe that consumers should
have an easy way to identify vehicle models with rearview video systems
and compare vehicle models based on their installation of ``Recommended
Advanced Technology Features.'' Fourth, NCAP criteria also help to
encourage manufacturers to develop rearview video systems in a way that
addresses the backover safety problem (as opposed to developing these
systems as merely parking convenience features). Fifth, even after the
promulgation of today's final rule, we believe that the latest update
to NCAP will continue to encourage manufacturers to install rearview
video systems on their vehicles ahead of the full compliance date
(i.e., during the phase-in period).
III. Final Rule and Response to Comments
a. Summary of the Final Rule
With a few notable exceptions, today's final rule adopts the
performance requirements from the proposed rule in the NPRM. While also
responding to concerns raised by commenters, today's rule adopts the
following four requirements largely without change. First, this rule
adopts the NPRM proposal that required manufacturers to install rear
visibility systems that enable a driver to view an area encompassing 5
feet laterally (to each side) from the longitudinal centerline of the
vehicle and extending 20 feet rearward of the vehicle's rear bumper.
Second, it also defines the required field of view through the
placement of seven test objects along the perimeter of the field of
view. Third, the required portions of these test objects that must be
seen remain unchanged from the NPRM. Fourth, today's final rule also
adopts the image size requirements proposed in the NPRM and thus
requires that the three furthest test objects be displayed at an
average subtended angle of no less than 5 minutes of arc.
However, today's final rule has not adopted the same linger time
and deactivation requirements as the NPRM. In response to the
manufacturers' concerns that the linger time and deactivation
restrictions in the proposed rule may preclude certain design features,
today's final rule defines a backing event, which begins at the
selection of reverse and ends when the vehicle's forward motion
achieves either 10 mph, 10 meters, or 10 seconds in duration. Today's
final rule linger time restriction allows rear visibility systems to
remain activated until the end of the backing event. Further, today's
rule does not preclude driver deactivation of the rearview image so
long as the system defaults to the compliant field of view at the
beginning of the backing event. By amending the linger time and
deactivation restrictions in accordance with the backing event, today's
final rule addresses both the agency's safety concerns and affords the
manufacturers greater design flexibility.
While the response time requirement remains unchanged from the
NPRM, today's final rule adopts a test procedure to establish the
vehicle condition prior to testing. In their comments, manufacturers
were concerned that the vehicle software initialization process could
prevent a rear visibility system from achieving compliance when tested
immediately after a vehicle is started. They contended in their
comments that such a test condition would not be reflective of real
world use of a rear visibility system. To alleviate these concerns and
to more accurately simulate real world conditions, today's final rule
establishes a test condition in which the vehicle would be placed into
reverse not less than 4 seconds and no more than 6 seconds after the
opening of the driver's door.
Today's final rule also adopts the durability performance
requirements from the NPRM except today's rule applies those
requirements on a component level instead of a vehicle level. While the
commenters generally supported the agency's proposal of minimum
performance requirements for humidity, corrosion, and temperature
exposure, the commenters contended that these tests should be conducted
on a component level as opposed to a vehicle level because the
durability tests would present significant practical challenges if
conducted on a vehicle level. As the agency believes that a component
level test would be as effective in addressing our safety concerns as a
vehicle level test, today's rule adopts the durability requirements
from the NPRM on a component level.
Further, today's final rule makes a few important changes to the
phase-in requirements. First, unlike the NPRM, today's rule requires
that manufacturers comply with only the field of view
[[Page 19196]]
requirement during the phase-in period, and requires that manufacturers
comply with all provisions of today's final rule at the end of the 48-
month phase-in period. In the NPRM, the agency conducted its cost/
benefit analysis assuming that most currently available rear visibility
systems were compliant or could be easily made compliant with all of
the proposed requirements. Through the comment period, the agency
learned that most current rear visibility systems do not meet all of
the requirements set forth in today's final rule and could not be
easily made compliant with all of the requirements established in
today's final rule. While the agency believes that the requirements
beyond the field of view are crucial in ensuring the quality of rear
visibility systems in the long run, we have limited the phase-in
schedule to be applicable only to the field of view requirement in
order to avoid significantly increasing the costs of this rule by
requiring that manufacturers conduct expensive equipment redesigns
outside of the normal product cycle. In spite of this change, the
agency does not expect the estimated benefits of this rule to be
diminished during the phase-in period because the estimated benefits
were based on research conducted using rear visibility systems which
did not meet all the requirements established in today's final rule.
However, the agency expects that this increased flexibility during the
phase-in period will allow vehicle manufacturers to avoid incurring the
significant costs associated with redesigning rear visibility systems
outside of the normal product cycle and instead focus those resources
on installing more rear visibility systems on a greater number of
vehicles in the near term.
Second, today's final rule does not utilize separate phase-in
schedules for passenger cars and other vehicles such as MPVs and
trucks. As discussed later in this notice, we find that requiring
separate phase-ins for different types of vehicles could increase
compliance costs without leading to an increase in application of the
rear visibility countermeasure. Third, in light of the additional
flexibilities granted above, today's final rule does not adopt the
carry-forward credit system proposed in the NPRM. Finally, although the
percentage targets of the fleet to be equipped with the required rear
visibility system remain unchanged for each year, today's final rule
adjusts the phase-in schedule so that the schedule does not begin until
May 1, 2014 (with the first year requiring compliance being May 1, 2016
to April 30, 2017).
Separately, today's final rule does not adopt the luminance
requirements from the NPRM. The luminance requirements proposed in the
NPRM have significant practical challenges at this time. It is not
clear that the proposed requirements would provide the intended safety
benefits as a luminance requirement alone may not afford a driver a
clear image of the area directly behind the vehicle. As the agency is
unaware of any other practicable method of ensuring a quality display
of the area behind the vehicle without restricting reasonable
technological options, today's final rule does not contain luminance
requirements.
b. Applicability
The provisions of the K.T. Safety Act require a broad application
of improved rear visibility countermeasures by defining the term
``motor vehicle'' as vehicles less than 10,000 pounds excluding only
motorcycles and trailers. However, the K.T. Safety Act allows the
flexibility to prescribe different requirements for different types of
vehicles. Thus, in the ANPRM, the agency considered various
characteristics of the vehicles covered under the K.T. Safety Act and
requested public comment. Specifically, the agency examined the
relative backover crash risks associated with trucks, MPVs, and vans.
Further, it examined the possible association between blind zone size
and relative crash risk.
The advocacy group and equipment manufacturer commenters on the
ANPRM generally expressed support for universal applicability of rear
visibility countermeasures to vehicles contemplated by the K.T. Safety
Act. These commenters stated that widespread application affords the
greatest level of protection and that the available data show that the
backover crash problem is widely dispersed such that it should be
applied to all vehicle types. On the other hand, vehicle manufacturers
generally commented that the applicability of this rule should be
limited to vehicles with the highest risk of backover crashes. Nissan
and General Motors both recommended a maximum blind zone regulation to
determine which vehicles require the rear visibility countermeasure.
Mercedes specifically recommended that the agency limit the
countermeasures to trucks, MPVs, and vans, should NHTSA find that those
vehicles are overrepresented in the crash data.
Separately, Blue Bird suggested in its comments that smaller buses
not be included in any potential rule. Blue Bird stated that these
buses have not been involved in fatalities, that drivers of such buses
are better trained because they have commercial licenses, and that this
regulation would impose a disproportionate amount of costs on these
vehicles since small buses do not generally have navigation systems.
Conversely, Rosco commented that small buses are often used to
transport children and should be covered in any potential rules.
After consideration of the comments on the ANPRM, NHTSA proposed in
the NPRM to apply the rear visibility requirements to all vehicles with
a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (excluding motorcycles and trailers).
The agency reasoned that, to apply rear visibility requirements
consistently to all the aforementioned vehicles would best address the
backover safety risk and fulfill the intent of Congress in the K.T.
Safety Act. In regards to the safety risk, the agency noted that
backover incidents are not limited to any particular type of vehicle
and that no vehicle type provides the driver with a sufficient rear
view to avoid the types of backover crashes contemplated by Congress in
the K.T. Safety Act. Speaking specifically of MPVs, trucks, and vans,
the NPRM noted that these vehicle types are overrepresented in fatal
crashes. However, passenger cars still contribute to backover crashes
(resulting in either an injury or a fatality) at a rate that is similar
to their proportion of the vehicle fleet. Thus, the agency did not
believe it would be in the best interests of safety to limit the
rearview countermeasure to certain vehicle types. Further, the NPRM did
not include a minimum blind zone threshold to determine the
applicability of rearview countermeasures. The data available to the
agency showed a correlation between the size of the blind zone and
backing incidents when a wide area behind the vehicle is considered.
However, the data showed a weak relationship between blind zone size
and backing incidents when considering the areas immediately behind the
vehicle where the agency believes backover crashes are most likely to
occur.\58\
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\58\ We also did not see a correlation between blind zone size
and backover accidents. In 2008 we conducted an analysis based on
blind zones and crash data for 28 vehicles. We did not find a
statistically significant correlation between blind zone and
backover risk, but we have not studied this issue further since that
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While acknowledging the difficulties cited by Blue Bird, we
proposed to include small buses under the proposed rule for similar
reasons as described above. In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that
to exclude small buses
[[Page 19197]]
would be contrary to the intent of Congress in the K.T. Safety Act as
the intent of Congress was to apply improved field of view requirements
to all the vehicles covered by the K.T. Safety Act. The agency further
noted that small buses are often involved in transporting children and
do not afford a rear field of view which enables a driver to avoid the
backing incidents contemplated by Congress.
While noting that commenters on the ANPRM did not comment on the
issue of the applicability of this rule to low-speed vehicles, the
agency proposed to include low-speed vehicles under the proposed rule.
NHTSA stated in the NPRM that it could not determine, from the
available data, whether or not low-speed vehicles have been involved in
real world backover incidents. Thus, the NPRM sought data relating to
the involvement of low-speed vehicles in rear world backover incidents.
Comments
In general, the comments that the agency received in response to
the NPRM have reiterated the concerns put forward by the commenters on
the ANPRM. Both the Advocates and Brigade commented that there should
be no exclusion of any vehicles that are covered under the K.T. Safety
Act. IIHS supported these sentiments specifically stating that sport
utility vehicles should be subject to the improved rear visibility
requirements of this rulemaking. The Advocates went on to assert that
the lack of recorded case incidents should not preclude the agency from
concluding that a vehicle type (such as school buses) presents a safety
risk. The organization also contended that while the operational
conditions of certain vehicles may have additional safeguards, it is
possible that those conditions will change during the life of the
vehicle. In the example of school buses, the Advocates noted that while
school buses generally have operating procedures and experienced
drivers to safeguard children; such buses can be re-purposed for
different activities.
Conversely, different commenters expressed support for excluding
certain types of vehicles from the requirements of this rulemaking. The
School Bus Manufacturers Technical Council commented that school buses
should be excluded from the rear visibility requirements. The
organization asserted that current regulations already afford
additional and adequate rear visibility requirements for school buses.
Further, the organization reasoned that (1) school buses typically do
not transport the most vulnerable population (0-5 year olds), (2)
school children around school buses are normally supervised by adults,
and (3) school bus drivers have more stringent commercial driver's
license training. Without offering additional information, the Alliance
commented that police vehicles should not be subject to the improved
rear visibility requirements. Additionally, an individual commenter,
Mr. Ben Montgomery conveyed in his comments that rearview video systems
will add no improvement to rear visibility for low-speed vehicles and
opined that to require additional rear visibility for low-speed
vehicles would be excessive. Finally, Porsche asserted that passenger
cars should be addressed in a separate rulemaking, as passenger cars
(especially smaller vehicles) have different visibility needs. It
contended that NHTSA should not take a ``one-size fits all'' approach
to improving rear visibility.
Further, while the NPRM did not include a provision for determining
applicability of this rule based on a vehicle blind zone threshold,
IIHS continued to express concern regarding the large blind zones that
can exist on some vehicle models. The organization stated that NHTSA
should regulate the size of vehicle blind spots because manufacturers
should be precluded from making design choices which create unusually
large blind zones.
Finally, the agency received comments from individuals requesting
that today's final rule apply to vehicles not contemplated by the K.T.
Safety Act. Specifically, various individual commenters suggested that
trailers, garbage trucks, and other vehicles with a GVWR greater than
10,000 pounds often have even larger blind zones than the vehicles
included in this rulemaking and should be covered by today's final
rule.
Agency Response
For the reasons that we noted in the NPRM, today's final rule
applies to all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, except
for motorcycles and trailers, as was contemplated in the K.T. Safety
Act. It continues to be the position of this agency that the K.T.
Safety Act requires that today's final rule expand rear visibility
requirements for all vehicles covered by the Act. In addition, the
agency believes that there are compelling safety reasons for applying
the rear visibility requirements of today's final rule to all the
aforementioned vehicles. While many commenters contended that the
requirements of today's final rule should apply differently to
different vehicle types, the available data do not support such a
contention. As discussed above, backover crashes are not limited to any
particular type of vehicle and the agency is not aware of any vehicle
type that categorically provides the driver with a sufficient rear
field of view so as to avoid the types of backover incidents
contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.\59\ Thus, in addition
to the constraints placed on the agency by the K.T. Safety Act, the
agency does not believe it is appropriate to apply the requirements of
today's final rule based on vehicle type.
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\59\ The rule requires rearview video systems in all covered
vehicles, regardless of whether a driver of a particular vehicle has
full view of the zone behind the vehicle by looking directly out of
the rear of the vehicle or by looking in rearview or side mirrors.
As discussed below, the agency is aware of one LSV where this may be
the case. Manufacturers of other types of vehicles who believe the
blind zone of their particular vehicle is designed so as to enable
drivers to avoid backover crashes without a rear visibility system
are also able to petition the agency as described in that section.
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While we agree with the aforementioned commenters that school buses
and police vehicles may have unique operating conditions, such as more
stringent driver training, we do not believe that such operating
conditions sufficiently compensate for the fact that drivers of these
vehicles simply do not have access to a field of view that would enable
them to avoid backover crashes. We note that school buses and police
vehicles often operate in residential areas and can have significant
exposure to young children and the elderly.
Further, we note that the latest agency research indicate that low-
speed vehicle blind zones vary greatly within this vehicle class. Some
also contain significant blind zones similar to other passenger cars
and light trucks. However, some others may have very small blind
zones.\60\ As low-speed vehicles may have a GVWR of up to 3,000 lbs.,
these vehicles are also fully capable of causing injury and death to
vulnerable pedestrians.\61\ As backover crashes do not typically occur
at speeds above 25 mph (the top speed of low-speed vehicles), we
believe it is appropriate to include low-speed vehicles in today's
final rule. Further, the agency requested comment on low-speed vehicles
in the NPRM and sought information as to whether the agency could
reasonably conclude that low-speed vehicles present no unreasonable
risk of backover crashes, but no
[[Page 19198]]
commenter provided any substantive information on this point.
Therefore, the agency cannot reasonably exclude, as a category, low-
speed vehicles from the requirements of today's rule because the
available information suggests that the visibility needs of these
vehicles vary widely within the vehicle class.\62\
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\60\ See Mazzae, E. N. (2013), Direct Rear Visibility
Measurement Data: 2010-11 Passenger Cars and 2008-2010 Low-Speed
Vehicles, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, available
at Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0252.
\61\ However, as we mentioned in the NPRM, the agency is not
aware of any backover crash involving a low-speed vehicle. Our
information, at this point in time, continues to be the same.
\62\ The agency also considered offering an alternative
compliance option for certain low-speed vehicles, based on their
direct view visibility. However, to adopt an alternative compliance
option during the final rule stage would raise questions regarding
the scope of notice. We note that various options are available to
low-speed vehicle manufacturers who believe that their vehicles are
designed so as to enable drivers to avoid backover crashes without a
rear visibility system. Such manufacturers may petition for a
temporary exemption under 49 CFR Part 555 if they can demonstrate
that their vehicle design is as safe as vehicles complying with the
standard. They may also petition the agency for rulemaking to afford
such vehicles (offering an equivalent level of safety) an additional
compliance option in FMVSS No. 111. (See Section III. c. Alternative
Countermeasures, below, for further information on petitioning the
agency for further rulemaking). Finally, we note that the phase-in
schedule adopted by today's final rule is unlikely to require any
low-speed vehicles to comply with today's final rule until the final
100% compliance date in 2018.
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As mentioned in the NPRM, we also decline to separate passenger
cars from this rulemaking. While we acknowledge that smaller passenger
cars have different visibility needs from large MPVs and trucks, the
data show that a large and significant portion of backover crashes are
attributable to passenger cars. Further, the data indicate a positive,
but not statistically robust, relationship between the size of the
blind zone of a given passenger vehicle and the likelihood that it may
be involved in a backing crash (i.e., all types of reverse
crashes).\63\ In addition, the areas immediately behind the vehicle,
which are covered by the blind zone of virtually all vehicles, are the
areas that the Monte Carlo simulation indicates are associated with the
highest backover crash risk (risk of crashes in the reverse direction
with pedestrians or cyclists). Thus, today's final rule applies equally
to all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (regardless of the
size of the vehicle's blindzone), except for motorcycles and trailers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ As the crash data is more scarce for backover crashes, most
of our research has focused on the relationship between blind zones
and backing crashes (rather than the relationship between blind
zones and backover crashes). NHTSA performed two analyses of the
relationship between rear blind zone size and backing crash
incidence. The first used human-measured rear visibility data and is
reported in detail in the docketed 2008 NHTSA report ``Rear
Visibility and Backing Risk in Crashes'' (Docket No. NHTSA-2009-
0041-0003). The second, subsequent analysis used vehicle rear
visibility data acquired using a laser-based visibility measurement
technique and is summarized in the 2009 NHTSA report ``Rear
Visibility Measured by Laser Light Beam Simulation of Driver Sight
Line Compared to Backing Risk in Crashes'' (Docket No. NHTSA-2009-
0041-0053). These studies estimated backing crash risk from police-
reported crashes in the State Data System and compared this risk to
the rear-visibility measurements. Simple correlations and logistic
regression analysis suggested an association between the risk of a
backing crash and the blind zone measured over a extremely wide area
(50-60 feet in width by 50 feet longitudinal distance). However, the
results were significantly weaker for blind zones measured in areas
that we believe a driver would be using for a typical backing
maneuver and for the longitudinal sight distance. NHTSA's also
examined the relationship between blind zone size and backover
crashes in 2008 and did not find a relationship. That study compared
the 28 vehicles with available crash data and the agency has not
updated the study since.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we decline to regulate the size of vehicle blind zones
(independently from determining the applicability of rearview
countermeasures) in this rulemaking as suggested by the IIHS. While
blind zone sizes were researched and explored in this rulemaking, this
was done as a possible approach in which the agency could determine
whether certain vehicle types should be required to have different rear
visibility countermeasures. As regulating the size of the blind zone
(independent of the purpose of detecting pedestrians immediately behind
the vehicle) was never explored in this rulemaking process, we decline
to include such a requirement in today's final rule.
Finally, we also decline to extend today's final rule to cover
trailers, garbage trucks, and other vehicles not contemplated by the
K.T. Safety Act. While we acknowledge that many of these vehicles may
also have significant blind zones, we have concentrated our research
and rulemaking efforts on the vehicles mandated by Congress. We believe
that, by focusing on the vehicles types covered in the K.T. Safety Act,
this rulemaking is able to more appropriately address the types of
crashes that Congress sought to avoid. To include and accommodate
vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or more (many of which are used for
commercial purposes), the agency may be required to utilize a
significantly different approach with different requirements and test
procedures that may not be as closely tailored to avoiding the types of
crashes contemplated by the K.T. Safety Act. Further, we note that
backover crashes involving vehicles with a GVWR less than 10,000 lbs
represent a significant majority of both fatalities and injuries. As
this rulemaking has continuously focused exclusively on vehicles
covered by the K.T. Safety Act, to introduce requirements regarding
other vehicles in today's final rule would raise questions regarding
the sufficiency of the scope of notice of this rulemaking. Thus,
today's final rule declines to introduce such requirements at this
time.
c. Alternative Countermeasures
The provisions of the K.T. Safety Act require this rulemaking to
expand the required field of view in order to enable drivers to detect
areas behind the motor vehicle in order to reduce death and injuries
resulting from backing incidents. Congress emphasized that the
objectives of the K.T. Safety Act may be met through the provision of
technologies such as additional mirrors, sensors, and cameras. In the
NPRM, the agency understood Congress' intent as not to require that a
driver literally see a rearview image because such a reading would
render the aforementioned reference to sensors in the text of the K.T.
Safety Act superfluous--thereby violating a basic canon of statutory
interpretation. Accordingly, NHTSA has conducted research into the
effectiveness of each of the suggested countermeasure technologies,
reported its findings in both the ANPRM and NPRM, and has received
comments in response to both notices.
The agency has consistently noted that a successful rear visibility
countermeasure must not only accurately detect objects behind the
vehicle, but must also induce sufficient braking so as to avoid the
crash. In the ANPRM, we examined the results noting the ongoing efforts
of various studies intended to evaluate the effectiveness of mirror,
sensor, and rearview video countermeasure systems. We outlined our
observations which indicated that rear-mounted convex mirrors generally
have a field of view of approximately 6 feet radially from the location
of the mirror and significantly distort the image of the reflected
objects.\64\ Further, while cross-view mirrors offer a greater range of
view, they do not enable a driver to detect areas directly behind the
vehicle.\65\ With regard to sensor systems, we noted that while
commercially available systems have been designed as parking aids as
opposed to safety devices, they have inconsistent performance for
detecting small children.\66\ Further, the ANPRM cited a General
Motors-sponsored study \67\ which indicated that sensor warnings
generally failed to induce drivers to brake with sufficient force to
avoid a backover crash. We also noted
[[Page 19199]]
in the ANPRM that our research indicated that drivers equipped with
both rearview video systems and sensor systems seemed to avoid
obstacles less successfully than drivers equipped with video-only
systems.\68\ We conjectured that drivers may have looked at the video
system less when also equipped with a sensor system, but we requested
public comment on possible reasons for this observed trend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ 75 FR 76197.
\65\ Id.
\66\ 75 FR 76198.
\67\ 74 FR 9495; Green, C. and Deering, R. (2006). Driver
Performance Research Regarding Systems for Use While Backing.
Society of Automotive Engineers, Paper No. 2006-01-1982.
\68\ 74 FR 9496.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters on the ANPRM, including the Consumers Union,
KidsAndCars.org, IIHS, Blue Bird, Magna, and Nissan stated that rear
mounted mirror systems are generally not adequate for avoiding the
backover crashes contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.
Several other commenters, including the Alliance and Mercedes,
suggested that adopting the ECE R.46 regulation would help to prevent a
substantial number of backover crashes. They reasoned that the ECE R.46
regulation, which allows for convex driver side view mirrors (as
opposed to the current FMVSS No. 111 requirement of a planar driver
side view mirror), would afford drivers additional time to avoid
backover crashes which involve pedestrians moving into the vehicle's
reversing path from the side.
Further, multiple commenters on the ANPRM, such as Delphi and
Ackton, suggested that NHTSA's research may have underestimated the
effectiveness of sensor systems as the available sensor systems were
designed as parking aids and not for the purpose of detecting objects
such as pedestrians. Other commenters such as Magna and Continental
suggested that future applications of sensor technologies such as
infrared systems and sensor-initiated automatic braking were in active
development and would yield greater accuracy and effectiveness for
sensor countermeasure technologies. Conversely, commenters such as IIHS
noted that drivers' slow and inconsistent reactions to sensor warnings
should preclude NHTSA from requiring or allowing sensors in lieu of
rearview video systems.
After the ANPRM, the agency conducted additional research in order
to better determine the effectiveness of each countermeasure. Our
additional research after the ANPRM indicated that drivers utilizing
either the rear-mounted convex mirrors or the cross-view mirror systems
were unable to avoid the unexpected obstacles that were presented
during the test.\69\ Further, the same study found that even in tests
with consistent (100%) object detection by the vehicle sensors, drivers
reacted to the sensor warning in a way that avoided the backover crash
in only 18 percent of the tests.\70\ Similar to the results of the
General Motors study noted in the ANPRM, our research, including a 2010
study, found that sensor warnings tended to induce drivers to apply
some measure of braking or stop momentarily, but did not induce drivers
to come to a complete stop so as to avoid the backover crash.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ 75 FR 76222-23. In its 2005 NPRM proposing to require
straight trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of between
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) and 11,793 kilograms (26,000 pounds)
to be equipped with a rear object detection system, the agency had
tentatively estimated the effectiveness of mirrors using a 1984
pilot study by Federal Express that purported to show a 33%
effectiveness estimate for its trained drivers using backing mirror
systems. See 70 FR 53753. While the agency cited these values in a
previous notice, the pilot study results were never made available
for public review and therefore could not be evaluated during the
research for this rulemaking. Thus, we have utilized the data from
the agency's research which show that drivers utilizing rear-mounted
convex mirrors or the cross-view mirror systems were unable to avoid
the unexpected obstacles that were presented during the test.
\70\ While the NPRM (at 75 FR 76223) stated that drivers avoided
the staged backover crash test objects only 7 percent of the time
(as opposed to 18 percent), the NPRM data did not include results
from the study where NHTSA conducted a similar controlled backover
experiment to see if drivers would react better to rear visibility
countermeasures in a setting where they expected the presence of
children (the study was conducted in a day care parking lot). The
NPRM referenced this study (at 75 FR 76226) and indicated that this
study would be placed into the docket. Further, the agency docketed
the results from this study on December 3, 2010 (Docket No. NHTSA-
2010-0162-0001)--shortly before the publication of the NPRM.
However, as NHTSA was unable to include the results from the day
care study at that time, we have included those results in our
analysis for today's final rule. We have included these results in
our analysis. For further information, please reference Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0162-0001 and the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis
prepared in support of this rule (available in the docket number
referenced at the beginning of this document).
\71\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001, Drivers' Use of
Rearview Video and Sensor-Based Backing Aid Systems in a Non-
Laboratory Setting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given this additional research and the comments on the ANPRM, the
agency stated in the NPRM that rearview video systems are the most
effective, currently available technology in aiding drivers to avoid
the backover crashes contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.
Thus, the NPRM tentatively concluded that drivers need to have access
to a visual image of an area measuring 5 feet to either side of the
vehicle centerline and extending 20 feet behind the vehicle's rear
bumper in order to successfully avoid a backover crash. However,
conscious of the potential for new technologies and differing
approaches to providing the driver with the required field of view, the
proposed rule did not preclude the additional use of mirrors and/or
sensors to complement a system producing the required field of view.
Comments
Several equipment manufacturer comments disputed the agency's
conclusion in the NPRM that a rearview image is necessary in order to
enable a driver to effectively avoid a backover crash. Such commenters
contended, for various reasons, that the rear visibility requirements
should not preclude systems that do not provide a rearview image. For
example, Sense Technologies noted that the research completed by NHTSA
did not accurately evaluate the effectiveness of sensor and mirror
systems. In terms of sensors, Sense Technologies noted that NHTSA's
studies utilized ultrasonic sensors instead of Doppler sensors (which
it asserted are more reliable). Sense Technologies asserted that
Doppler radar-based systems should have been considered and that visual
warnings should supplement--and not replace--auditory warnings. In
regard to mirrors, Sense Technologies noted that cross-view mirrors are
intended to be utilized in conjunction with a sensor or a rearview
video system and their effectiveness should not have been evaluated
based on testing as a stand-alone product. It further advocated that
cross-view mirrors are more effective at detecting pedestrians that
move laterally into the vehicle's blind zone.
Other equipment manufacturers expressed similar concerns by stating
that the final rule should not preclude systems that do not provide a
rearview image. Valeo supported this sentiment by arguing that
manufacturers should be able to choose which system or combination of
systems is best suited to achieve the goal of preventing backovers.
Similarly, Rearscope commented that the requirements should permit the
consumer to choose the technology or combinations of technologies that
would be suitable. Rearscope also contended that these technologies
must be further researched and that rulemaking should be delayed until
this research can be completed. Finally, IFM Electronic also stated
that the final rule should not preclude a system that does not provide
a rearview image such as its 3D Photonic Mixer Device, which it claimed
will be more effective than the ``2D'' rearview image required under
the proposed rule.
On the other hand, some equipment manufacturers expressed support
for the NPRM's conclusion that a rearview image is necessary to enable
drivers to effectively avoid backover crashes.
[[Page 19200]]
Brigade agreed that sensors do not provide adequate protection because
the commercially available systems do not detect small children
reliably and that if a single system must be chosen, it should be a
video system. Magna also agreed that sensors alone are ineffective by
stating that ultrasonic waves do not travel through dry air with
sufficient speed so as to react quickly enough to a moving object
behind the vehicle. However, both of these commenters expressed support
for combination sensor and video systems as a possibility for providing
increased protection to pedestrians.
Other commenters on the NPRM also expressed support for combination
sensor and video systems. For example, the Consumers Union commented
that audible cues would be useful to prompt the driver to look at the
rearview image when an obstacle is detected. Similarly, the Automotive
Occupant Restraints Council asserted that a combination system can
compensate for the fact that the driver cannot be looking at a rearview
image and looking backwards at the same time. While noting support for
combination systems, Rosco agreed with the proposed rule that the final
rule should not require specific additional equipment beyond the
rearview image. Rosco contended that this will afford manufacturers the
flexibility to utilize additional driver aids as required by different
market segments. In its comments, Gentex cautioned against concluding
that combination systems would be inferior to video-only systems as
studies have not been conducted on combination systems involving a
rearview mirror-mounted display.
Separately, several commenters stated that the final rule should
not preclude future technologies that may develop and instead should
encourage the development of advanced rear visibility systems. Delphi
and MEMA suggested that an NCAP-type system be established to encourage
the development of new rear visibility technologies. In addition,
Continental and BMW expressed concern that the proposal would inhibit
technologies such as thermal imaging and automatic pedestrian detection
with automatic braking.
Separately, some commenters expressed support for a system which
would activate the vehicle brakes automatically upon detecting a
pedestrian. The Automotive Occupant Restraints Council suggested in its
comments that a rear visibility system would be more effective if the
electronic stability control system would intervene to prevent the
driver from a backover crash if the system detects that such a crash is
imminent. IFM also suggested that a vehicle should automatically
intervene to stop the vehicle when a backover crash is imminent
regardless of whether the vehicle utilizes a sensor or a visual system.
Finally, Ford continued to express the opinion that NHTSA should
consider alternatives for passenger cars such as adopting the ECE R.46
requirements for side view mirrors. Further, Brigade generally
suggested in its comments that there would be a great advantage in
harmonizing the requirements of this rulemaking with those of ECE R.46.
Agency Response
We acknowledge that some commenters disagreed with our tentative
conclusion in the NPRM regarding the current need for providing a
visual image of the area immediately behind the vehicle. However, we
continue to believe, based on the types of currently available
technology, the weight of the research, our consideration of the public
comments, and other available information, that systems affording
drivers the ability to see the area behind their vehicles are the most
effective way of achieving Congress' goal of reducing backover crashes.
The technology used to achieve that goal must not only detect the
pedestrian behind the vehicle, but also effectively influence the
driver to stop his or her backing maneuver. The agency continues to
believe that in order to identify an effective technology for reducing
backover crashes one must evaluate not only system performance, but
also driver performance when assessing the overall effectiveness of a
backover crash countermeasure. When taking these considerations into
account, the data show that systems (such as sensor-only systems) that
do not afford drivers a view of the area behind the vehicle do not
effectively assist drivers in avoiding the backover crashes
contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.
Ultrasonic Sensor Systems Do Not Effectively Assist Drivers in Avoiding
Backover Crashes
To be effective, a sensor-only system that does not afford the
driver a view of the area behind the vehicle must reliably detect the
presence of a person, detect a person at a sufficient distance, and
drivers must react appropriately to avoid the crash.\72\ A sufficient
distance means a distance greater than the distance that a vehicle
travels between the time when the person first enters within the
detection zone of the sensors and the time when the driver brings the
vehicle to a halt. Reliable detection means that the system must issue
a warning to the driver when a person, regardless of size or
orientation, is located within the detection zone of the sensor system.
Appropriate driver response means that the driver heeds the warning of
the system and reacts so as to avoid the crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ These three requirements closely follow the three factors
considered in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Crash
avoidability (FA), system detection reliability
(FS), and driver use of the system (FDR)--
discussed further in Section IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits,
infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultrasonic sensor systems are the most common type of sensor system
found in automotive applications. However, through its research, the
agency has found various significant limitations on the ability of
these systems to perform sufficiently in the three aforementioned
areas. First, the available data indicate that the ability of sensor-
only systems to detect reliably an object that is within its design
range varies significantly depending on the material and the surface
area of the object. In the static tests run in NHTSA's 2006 sensor
study,\73\ the agency conducted tests of sensor-only systems using test
objects that were easily detected by those systems (e.g., a 36-inch
traffic cone and a 40-inch PVC pole) to determine the extent of the
ultrasonic sensor detection range. The sensors generally detected the
objects at a range between 5 and 8 feet.\74\ However, the performance
of the ultrasonic sensor systems deteriorated significantly when the
agency tested objects that were smaller (i.e., had less surface area)
and/or did not reflect sensor signals as well. In the agency's
research, 1 and 3-year-old children (and Anthropomorphic Dummies) were
detected poorly by the sensors.\75\ A
[[Page 19201]]
shorter traffic cone, with better reflectivity than the children and
child-like objects, was detected significantly better by all tested
systems.\76\ On the other hand, although the adult test objects have
similar material qualities to the children, despite also having poor
reflectivity, detection was better because they have greater surface
area when compared to children.\77\ Thus, the data indicate the
ultrasonic sensors are less able to detect children within their design
detection zone as children generally do not reflect sensor signals as
well as the test objects in the 2006 study and children generally do
not have a large surface area to compensate for poor sensor signal
reflectivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Mazzae, E.N., Garrott, W.R., (2006) Experimental Evaluation
of the Performance of Available Backover Prevention Technologies.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 810 634.
\74\ We believe that these objects illustrate the design
detection range of the sensor systems as they are objects that can
be easily detected by these systems and were the objects that were
most consistently detected at the greatest range in our testing. The
only system that could detect beyond 5-8 feet was the Lincoln
Navigator system which utilized two ultrasonic sensors and a radar
sensor. Our general observations of this setup indicate that, while
the radar sensor on the Navigator had a significantly greater range
that the ultrasonic sensors, it also was significantly less
consistent in detecting across its detection area than the
ultrasonic sensors.
\75\ NHTSA's 2006 sensor study tested 1 and 3 year old
Anthropomorphic Dummies (ATDs) (29.4 inches and 37.2 inches in
height, respectively) dressed in clothing. The study found that
these ATDs were inconsistently detected by some systems when placed
in locations close to the vehicle bumper and that all the tested
systems could only detect the ATDs reliably up to a range between 2
and 6 feet. See Mazzae E.N., (2006) Experimental Evaluation of the
Performance of Available Backover Prevention Technologies, supra.
This study also found similar (but slightly worse in certain
locations) results with real children aged 1 and 3 (30 inches and 40
inches tall, See id. respectively).
\76\ NHTSA's 2006 sensor study found that a 28 inch traffic
cone--slightly shorter than both the ATDs and the real children--
could be detected up to a range of 5 to 8 feet. See id.
\77\ The 2006 sensor study also found that an adult male was
detected about as well as the idealized test objects (i.e., the
system could detect the adult male up to a distance of between 5 and
8 feet rearward of the rear bumper). See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the ability of ultrasonic sensor systems to reliably detect
an object that is within its design range also varies significantly
depending on the height/orientation of the object. Regardless of the
surface area or reflectivity of an object, an object may be
imperceptible to the ultrasonic sensor system if it is too close to the
ground. For example, even though an adult that is lying on the floor
has a large surface area to compensate for poor reflectivity, the data
show that he/she will not be detected in this situation because the
ultrasonic sensor systems have not been mounted/programmed so as to
detect objects close to the ground. While the aforementioned 36-inch
traffic cone was reliably detected up to a distance of between 5 and 8
feet in the 2006 sensor study, the same systems in that study were
virtually unable to detect the 12-inch traffic cone (which had the same
general material and composition as the 36-inch traffic cone).\78\ One
of the systems improved with detecting the 18-inch traffic cone.\79\
However, systems were generally not able to match the detection zone of
the 36-inch traffic cone until the traffic cone height was increased to
at least 28 inches.\80\ Thus, even though sensor systems tested by
NHTSA had a design detect range extended up to between 5 and 8 feet,
the above data demonstrate that there can be considerable areas where
objects are not detectable within this design detection range when
considering shorter test objects or certain object orientations.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Of the systems that detected the 12 inch cone, they were
only able to do so at distances greater than 4 feet but no greater
than 8 feet from the bumper. In other words, for short objects, even
the best sensors systems had a significant zone between the
vehicle's bumper and 4 feet from the bumper where the 12 inch
traffic cone was undetectable. See id.
\79\ See id.
\80\ See id.
\81\ The NHTSA 2006 sensor study also tested an adult male lying
down parallel to the vehicle bumper at different locations.
Detection by all systems was inconsistent and only one system could
detect the adult close to the bumper. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, even if the object is easily detected by the sensors, the
design detection range of the ultrasonic sensor systems is generally
not sufficient to enable a driver to avoid a backing crash. Although
the data show that ultrasonic sensors detect adults up to between 5-8
feet from the vehicle bumper, drivers backing at a speed greater than
approximately 2.0 mph will be unlikely to avoid the crash.\82\ The data
show that, it would take between 4.7 to 6.4 feet to stop the vehicle
from 2.0 mph and 13.4 to 17.5 feet to stop the same vehicle from 5.0
mph.\83\ Further, the available data suggest that most drivers conduct
backing maneuvers at speeds greater than 2.0 mph.\84\ Thus, in
situations where the pedestrian enters the sensor design detection zone
after the vehicle has started backing, it is unlikely that the driver
will avoid the crash (even assuming perfect sensor detection and quick
driver response).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ For reference, the NHTSA 2006 sensor study measured the
idling speed of the vehicles (i.e., speed when vehicle is in reverse
and no brake or throttle is being applied) in the study. Of the
vehicles utilized by NHTSA in that study, the idling speed ranged
from 4.0 mph to 7.0 mph. This data suggest that vehicles traveling
backward at an idle engine speed travel at speeds that can be double
the 2.0 mph speed where drivers can be reasonably expected to bring
a vehicle to stop within 5-6 feet. See Mazzae E.N., (2006)
Experimental Evaluation of the Performance of Available Backover
Prevention Technologies, supra.
\83\ See id. The agency calculated these distances based on a
start time that assumed the vehicle is already traveling at the
given speed (2.0 mph or 5.0 mph). Then the calculation took into
account driver reaction time (i.e., time it takes for driver to
apply brakes after receiving a warning), sensor system detection
response time (i.e., time between the presentation of the test
object and the system warning signal), and brake application time
(i.e., time between initiation of braking and maximum deceleration
rate is reached). The agency further assumed that vehicles decreased
speed at a constant rate (the maximum deceleration rate) once the
initial brake application time had elapsed. Driver reaction time was
1.17 seconds. See Mazzae, E.N., Baldwin, G.H.S., Barickman, F.S.,
Forkenbrock, G.J. (2003) Examination of driver crash avoidance
behavior using conventional and antilock brake systems, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 809 561. Brake
application time was assumed to be 0.25 seconds and system response
time ranged from 0.18 to 0.74 seconds. See Mazzae E.N., (2006)
Experimental Evaluation of the Performance of Available Backover
Prevention Technologies, supra.
\84\ In NHTSA's 2008 driver use study, drivers conducted backing
maneuvers and at average speed of 2.26 mph and drivers' average
maximum backing speed was 3.64 mph. See Mazzae, E.N., et al. (2008)
On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems (ORSDURVS),
supra. A separate NHTSA study from 1995 also found similar results
by observing that the average maximum backing speeds were generally
3.0 mph (when excluding the extended backing maneuvers that can be
as fast as 11 mph). See Huey, R. Harpster, H., Lerner, N., (1995)
Field Measurement of Naturalistic Backing Behavior. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration. DOT HS 808 532.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, our research continues to indicate that drivers tend not
to react in a timely and sufficient manner in response to sensor
warnings to avoid a backover crash with an unexpected pedestrian. In
NHTSA's 2008, 2009, and 2010 studies on driver use of these systems,
drivers only avoided collisions with the unseen test object using
sensor systems in 18% of the cases despite the fact that the sensor
system detected the object and warned the driver in all cases.\85\ In
both the NHTSA studies mentioned above and in a GM study referenced in
the ANPRM,\86\ many drivers responded to a sensor warning by exhibiting
precautionary behavior (e.g., braking slightly or stopping the vehicle
to check surroundings again). However, very few stopped fully to avoid
the crash. In GM's study, 87% collided with the test object, but 68% of
drivers exhibited precautionary behavior.\87\ Thus, even when assuming
that the driver is backing at a sufficiently low speed and that the
sensor system detects the rear obstacle perfectly, drivers often do not
react appropriately so as to avoid the crash when the obstacle is
unexpected or unseen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ See Mazzae, E.N., et al. (2008) On-Road Study of Drivers'
Use of Rearview Video Systems (ORSDURVS), supra, see also Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0162-0001, Drivers' Use of Rearview Video and Sensor-
Based Backing Aid Systems in a Non-Laboratory Setting. Drivers
utilizing rearview video systems avoided the collision in 48% of the
tests and drivers utilizing no countermeasure avoided the collision
in 0% of the tests.
\86\ See ANPRM, 74 FR 9495, see also Green, C. and Deering, R.
(2006) Driver Performance Research Regarding Systems for Use While
Backing, SAE Paper No. 2003-01-1982.
\87\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, after considering the above data, the agency does not believe
that ultrasonic sensor-based systems meet the need for safety (i.e.,
able to detect pedestrians and lead to a sufficient percentage of
drivers avoiding the backover crash). These systems leave little room
for driver error/indecision and poor system reliability with regard
[[Page 19202]]
to object detection. As shown above, these systems generally do not
detect persons reliably in their detection zones. Their ability to
detect humans can degrade significantly due to material composition
(e.g., clothing), surface area, and height/orientation. Even assuming
perfect detection, ultrasonic sensor systems do not have adequate range
to assist drivers in avoiding crashes with pedestrians that appear in
the sensor detection zone after the backing maneuver has begun. In
addition, typical driver reactions to the sensor system warnings do not
result in crashes being averted. These limitations lead the agency to
conclude in today's final rule that sensor-only systems would not
adequately address the backover crash problem that Congress directed
NHTSA to address in the K.T. Safety Act.
Redesigning Ultrasonic Systems Is Unlikely To Improve Driver
Performance
The agency is aware that many ultrasonic systems have been designed
as parking aids (i.e., mounted at certain angles and programmed so that
they pick up large objects as opposed to small children) and that
certain adjustments to these systems may increase the likelihood that
these systems will detect people and children. However, the potential
solutions that the agency is aware of do not seem to adequately address
the safety need in question in this rulemaking. Should the agency
design a test procedure that addresses the concerns regarding poor
detection of children, manufacturers may adjust the pitch of their
sensors and sensitivity of their sensors to detect the agency's test
objects designed to mimic children. However, in this scenario, the
sensors would also detect curbs and other objects resulting in a
greater number of false positives (i.e., issue alerts when no obstacle
exists behind the vehicle) than they currently do when mounted so as to
only detect large objects (such as a parked car). As mentioned above,
the available research indicates that drivers generally do not react
sufficiently to warnings regarding objects behind the vehicle when they
cannot visually confirm the presence of an obstacle or when drivers do
not expect the presence of an obstacle. The agency's concern that
drivers do not trust the sensor warnings would be aggravated by the
potential solutions to improve ultrasonic sensor performance (that
would also increase false positives). Therefore, the agency does not
believe that redesigning ultrasonic sensor systems is practicable at
this time and would not help drivers avoid the types of backover
crashes contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.
Other Sensor-Only Systems Also Do Not Effectively Assist Drivers in
Avoiding a Backover Crash
While the agency is aware of other sensor technologies and that
there are potential future technologies that may perform better than
ultrasonic sensors, the agency is not aware of any currently available
sensor-only system that has demonstrated safety benefits that equal or
exceed rearview video systems. For example, although radar systems have
a longer detection range when compared to ultrasonic sensor systems,
radar-based sensor systems exhibit similar tendencies to produce false
positives as ultrasonic sensors (their ability to detect objects varies
significantly based on the size, orientation, and composition of the
object). Another example of an alternative sensor-only system is the
Doppler radar systems suggested by Sense Technologies. While Doppler
radar based systems can also detect at a greater range than ultrasonic
sensors, the agency is not aware of any source of Doppler radar systems
for automotive applications that presents a safety advantage over
rearview video systems. To date, the agency is not aware of any OEM
vehicle manufacturer that has elected to utilize Doppler radar systems
on their vehicles. Further, the agency is aware of only one supplier
that provides Doppler systems for automotive applications and it
currently sells these systems for around $300 (an amount that exceeds
the estimated costs of both rearview video and ultrasonic sensor-based
systems).\88\
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\88\ See Sense Technologies, http://www.sensetech.com.
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Further, the Doppler radar system presents various technical
challenges that could also create safety concerns. First, the increased
range of radar systems, including Doppler radar systems, can lead to an
increase in false positives. Second, Doppler radar sensors rely on a
change in relative speed in order for the object to be detected. This
is a safety concern for the agency because this type of system would
not warn the driver in a situation where a stationary pedestrian is
located close to the bumper prior to the beginning of the backing
maneuver. It will only warn the driver after the driver has begun
accelerating into the pedestrian behind the vehicle. Given the short
distance that can exist between the vehicle and the pedestrian, it is
unlikely that the driver would be able to avoid a crash in these types
of situations. Third, moving pedestrians can change direction and
velocity. These changes in direction and velocity could affect the
propensity of the Doppler radar to warn the driver as they can
contribute to significant changes in relative speed (i.e., if the
pedestrian is traveling at the same speed as the vehicle at one moment,
but no longer doing so in the next moment, the warning may be
inconsistent). These inconsistent warnings can also degrade the
driver's ability to heed the warning and bring the vehicle to a stop
before the crash. Finally, any potential sensor system must still
address the fact that drivers tend not to react sufficiently to sensor
warnings so as to avoid a crash--regardless of its ability to reliably
detect pedestrians.
As in the case of the Doppler radars, the agency is not aware of
any other types of currently available sensor-only systems that can
address the backover safety concern better than rearview video systems.
Sensor systems do not meet the need for motor vehicle safety in the
types of backover crashes contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety
Act not only because of the aforementioned technical limitations in the
systems, but also because of the significant evidence that drivers do
not react sufficiently to sensor warnings in order to avoid these
crashes. While the agency's research focused mostly on ultrasonic
sensor systems, the agency does not believe that any other type of
sensor-based system would provide more benefits than rearview video
systems.
Possible Future Developments Regarding the Rearview Image
The agency is aware of the development of potential technologies
(such as automatic braking) which may address both the agency's
concerns of accurate pedestrian detection and ensuring an appropriate
and sufficient response to such detection without the necessity of
providing an image of the area behind the vehicle. However, the
available research at this time does not afford the agency sufficient
information to develop performance requirements or assess the
effectiveness of such systems to accurately detect pedestrians behind
the vehicle and avoid a crash. During the course of this rulemaking, no
commenter (on the ANPRM, on the NPRM, at the public hearing, or at the
technical workshop) was able to provide information that would enable
the agency to develop a minimum set of performance requirements capable
of anticipating the design, benefits, and any associated safety risks
of these new and future systems. Further, no commenter offered
information regarding the ability of such systems to
[[Page 19203]]
more accurately detect pedestrians behind the vehicle when compared to
the various sensor-based systems tested by the agency. While it may be
possible that automatic braking or other future systems offer
comparable or greater protection to the public without the use of a
rearview image, the agency is not currently aware of any established,
objective, and practicable way of testing such systems to ensure that
they offer a minimum level of protection to the public.
Thus, the agency continues to believe that drivers of vehicles
using technologies that do not afford some type of automatic
intervention (e.g., automatic braking) need visual confirmation of the
presence and nature of an unexpected obstacle in order to be motivated
to take the steps necessary to avoid a backover crash. Rear visibility
systems and the agency's performance requirements will need to address
not only sensor system accuracy but also the aforementioned human
factors findings (the ability of drivers to heed the sensor warning and
take the appropriate action to avoid a backover crash) if they are to
be effective in reducing backover crashes. If systems that can
effectively and reliably avoid backover crashes without presenting the
driver with an image of the area behind the vehicle become available in
the future, it will then be feasible for the agency to evaluate their
potential and use that information to consider whether any regulatory
changes are desirable. While the agency shares the desire of a number
of commenters for requirements that are technologically as neutral as
possible, the agency emphasizes the statutory requirement to ensure
that its performance requirements ``meet the need for motor vehicle
safety.'' NHTSA believes that, under the current circumstances, the
requirements in today's final rule are as technologically neutral as
the agency can make them and still ensure that they ``meet the need for
motor vehicle safety.'' We continue to believe that providing a driver
with a view of the area behind the vehicle is currently the most
effective way available to reduce backover crashes, as demanded by the
K.T. Safety Act.
The Agency Continues To Encourage Future Research and Will Consider
Future Rulemaking
NHTSA has made regulatory decisions within this rule based upon the
best currently available scientific data and information. Consistent
with its obligations under Executive Order (E.O.) 13563, Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review (Jan. 18, 2011), and E.O. 13610 on the
retrospective review of regulations, NHTSA will review relevant new
evidence and may propose revisions to the rule as necessary and
appropriate to reflect the current state of the evidence and improve
this regulatory program. NHTSA has already begun to obtain and review
additional empirical evidence relevant to the real-world effectiveness
of rearview video systems. NHTSA will gather and analyze additional
data in this area--for example by monitoring trends in fatalities and
injuries from backover crashes and additional information collections
associated with other rulemakings or safety-related efforts. NHTSA also
may consider additional collections of information that may trigger the
Paperwork Reduction Act, and, would notify the public of these
collections through the separate Federal Register Notices required
under that Act. Further information collected by NHTSA could be used to
inform future analyses. NHTSA may also identify and pursue additional
issues for new research or conduct further research with regards to
existing issues addressed in the rule.
Further, we note that the public (including industry) is able to
petition NHTSA to modify the requirements of FMVSS No. 111 pursuant to
the procedures established in 49 C.F.R. Part 552. Such modifications
may be necessary in the future to accommodate new rear visibility
system designs and the agency would consider these modifications in
consultation with the public through the notice and comment rulemaking
process. As we noted above, we encourage petitioners to provide data to
demonstrate that new rear visibility systems can effectively address
the backover safety problem by showing that these systems are not only
able to accurately detect pedestrians behind the vehicle, but also
induce drivers to react to avoid the crash. The agency would encourage
petitioners to provide any relevant information regarding new potential
systems that could be similar (but not limited to) the types of
laboratory tests examined by the agency during this rulemaking process.
We acknowledge that the research relevant for evaluating a new
technology would vary depending on the type of technology considered.
For example, an evaluation of an automatic braking system would ideally
consider any relevant data on the system's ability to reliably detect a
pedestrian behind the vehicle and apply the brakes. We further
encourage petitioners to provide any relevant data or suggestions on
how the agency could objectively test potential new systems. In
summary, the agency will consider petitions for rulemaking to
accommodate new systems designed to prevent backover crashes and the
agency encourages petitioners to provide as much information as
possible to enable the agency to effectively consider the petition.
Combination Systems Utilizing More Than One Countermeasure
Further, while we acknowledge the Consumers Union and the
Automotive Occupant Restraints Council's comments encouraging the
agency to examine combining sensors and rearview video systems, we
decline to require any additional countermeasure technologies beyond a
visual rear visibility system in today's final rule. As we noted in the
ANPRM, our research seemed to indicate that drivers with multiple-
technology rear visibility systems avoided unexpected obstacles less
successfully than drivers equipped with video-only systems. While we
requested comment on this counter-intuitive finding, the agency is
currently not aware of any additional research that could help quantify
any potential increase in safety benefit through requiring multiple
countermeasure technologies. Accordingly, we do not believe that it is
appropriate to require any additional rearview countermeasures at this
time.
However, we note that today's final rule does not preclude
manufacturers from utilizing sensors, mirrors, or other potential
future technologies to augment the functionality of the rear visibility
systems required by today's final rule. Technologies such as the cross-
view mirrors suggested by Sense Technologies, thermal imaging systems
suggested by Continental and BMW, the 3D Photonic Mixer Device
suggested by IFM, and automatic brake intervention as suggested by the
Automotive Occupant Restraints Council may be used by manufacturers to
supplement the rear visibility systems installed to meet the
requirements of today's final rule. However, as mentioned above, the
agency currently does not have data to adequately assess the potential
safety benefits of these additional systems. Conversely, the agency
also does not wish to preclude the development of new potential
rearview safety features which may reduce crash risk more effectively
than those supplemental systems we have investigated. A system that
successfully sensed a human behind the vehicle and automatically
applied the brakes could be more effective than a system that provides
an image and relies upon the driver to see
[[Page 19204]]
the image and respond in a timely manner.\89\ However, the agency has
not evaluated a production version of such a system to be able to
accurately determine its possible benefits, disadvantages and costs.
Thus, while today's final rule does not include any provisions that
require the aforementioned technologies; it also does not preclude
their application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ As described above, the agency continues to be interested
in any relevant research that shows the effectiveness of such
systems (e.g., in accurately detecting persons behind the vehicle)
and an objective manner with which to test these potential new
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCAP-Type Evaluation of Rear Visibility Systems
Additionally, MEMA and Delphi suggested that the agency encourage
the development of new rearview technologies through an NCAP-type
system. As we noted above, the agency has already updated NCAP to
include rearview video systems. However, this recent update to NCAP did
not change the program in the manner suggested by the commenters. The
new update offers comparative information on vehicle models and their
equipment levels (i.e., allows consumers to identify the models that
have rearview video systems). However, it does not include comparative
information assessing the different types of rear visibility systems
relatively against each other.
As in our earlier discussion of alternative countermeasure
technologies, we believe that additional research would be needed in
order to develop the appropriate test procedures that can objectively
evaluate and offer useful comparative consumer information on
additional countermeasure technologies in the manner suggested by the
commenters. While the agency does not preclude the possibility of
developing such test procedures in the future, it is unable to
implement such a program as a part of today's final rule.
Convex Side View Mirrors
Finally, we disagree with Ford and Brigade that today's rule should
adopt the requirements in ECE R.46 for driver-side side view rearview
mirrors. As we noted in the NPRM, the convex driver-side side view
mirrors permitted by the ECE R.46 regulation do not enable the driver
to detect pedestrians directly behind the vehicle, so they would not be
able to cover the highest risk areas directly behind the vehicle. Thus,
we did not propose a change to the driver-side side view mirror
requirement in the NPRM nor do we adopt such a change today. We decline
to amend FMVSS No. 111 to match the requirements of ECE R.46 in today's
final rule.
d. Field of View
The NPRM proposed a field of view minimum requirement that covers 5
feet from either side of the vehicle center line to 20 feet
longitudinally from the vehicle's rear bumper and a test procedure to
ensure compliance as delineated by the seven test objects shown below
in Figure 1. Commenters generally expressed concern in regards to three
aspects of this proposal: (1) Whether the 20-foot by 10-foot field of
view coverage area is appropriate, (2) whether the test procedure and
test objects appropriately cover all the necessary areas behind the
vehicle, and (3) whether or not visual overlays (such as guidance
markers or controls) are considered when evaluating the field of view
performance requirement. The following paragraphs will respond to these
concerns in turn.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
[[Page 19205]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.000
BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
Coverage Area
In the ANPRM, the agency solicited comment on what areas behind the
vehicle should be visible to the driver in order to best improve
safety. In doing so, the agency tentatively suggested a 50-foot by 50-
foot area coverage area as a possible option. In response to the
lateral requirements, multiple organizations (such as Sony, the
Advocates, and KidsAndCars.org) stressed the importance of covering the
possibility that children may enter the area directly behind the
vehicle from each side. In terms of longitudinal distance, advocacy
groups such as the Advocates, KidsAndCars.org, and the Consumers Union
recommended that any ``gaps'' between the rear coverage zone and the
vehicle's rear bumper
[[Page 19206]]
should be eliminated. The Advocates further noted that there should be
``no reason why a rearview video system could not provide an optimal
coverage area that . . . extends at least 20-feet behind the vehicle.''
However, other organizations such as the Automotive Occupant Restraints
Council, General Motors, and Honda stated that a small gap (of
approximately a foot or less) would be advantageous in lowering the
costs of the system while still providing an adequate amount of
protection.
After considering the comments on the ANPRM and the data from the
SCI and Monte Carlo simulation research, the agency proposed in the
NPRM a minimum field of view that covers 5 feet from either side of the
vehicle centerline over an area extending 20 feet behind the vehicle's
rear bumper. In regard to the lateral coverage area, we noted in the
NPRM that while the Monte Carlo simulation data shows that there is at
least a small level of crash risk as far as 9 feet laterally to each
side from the vehicle centerline, the vast majority of the crash risk
is encompassed within an area extending 5 feet laterally from the
vehicle centerline. We further noted that while the Monte Carlo
simulation data shows that some level of crash risk extends as far as
33 feet longitudinally from the rear vehicle bumper, the actual SCI
case data show that 77 percent of the backover crashes would have been
covered by a 20-foot longitudinal field of view.\90\ Thus, in
considering the available data, the agency proposed a 20-foot by 10-
foot minimum field of view coverage area in the NPRM and proposed to
test this coverage area using seven test objects placed along the
perimeter of the 20-foot by 10-foot zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ 75 FR 76228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments
In response to the NPRM's proposed minimum field of view, the
commenters raised various concerns. First, the Advocates expressed
concern that manufacturers are not required to cover the area between
the test objects. They stated that it could be possible for two cameras
to be used to display all the required test objects but create a large
blind zone in the areas between the test objects. Second,
KidsAndCars.org stated in its comments that a 180-degree (horizontal
angle) camera would offer the most protection as it would help the
driver detect children that enter the path of the moving vehicle from
the side. Sony similarly advocated for a more stringent field of view
requirement that induces manufacturers to use 180-degree cameras. Sony
stated that this would help cover lateral intrusions and that using
180-degree cameras would not create a significant increase in cost.
Third, General Motors, Volkswagen, and the Alliance suggested in
their comments that the required field of view should not be wider than
the width of the vehicle because the outboard targets will be visible
in the rear view mirrors and because this penalizes smaller vehicles.
Fourth, Sense Technologies questioned whether using a minimum field of
view requirement is appropriate as it is prejudicial towards
technologies that do not present the rearview in the form of an image
and does not offer the same coverage as its product of persons/objects
entering into the path of the backing vehicle from the side. Finally,
the IIHS commented that the 20-foot longitudinal field of view coverage
is inconsistent with the Monte Carlo research data because the data in
the ANPRM does not show a clear inflection point at 20 feet and that
there is a 0.3 probability of a pedestrian being struck by a vehicle at
up to 27 feet.
Agency Response
Today's final rule adopts the minimum field of view requirement
proposed in the NPRM, which extends 20 feet longitudinally from the
vehicle's rear bumper and 5 feet to either side of the vehicle
centerline as delineated by the seven test objects. After considering
all the comments received on the NPRM, we believe that the proposed
field of view continues to be the most appropriate.
However, as the Advocates points out in its comments, it is
conceivable that a manufacturer could comply with the proposed field of
view requirement while still leaving a significant blind zone by using
two cameras to cover only the test objects along the perimeter of
required field of view. While it is unlikely that a manufacturer may
utilize this configuration, we agree with the Advocates that this is a
safety risk as such a configuration would likely create a blind zone
where there is the highest risk for a backover crash. In order to
address this concern, we have amended the definition of ``rearview
image'' to require that the image be ``detected by means of a single
source.'' We believe that this definition more accurately reflects the
research and the discussion in this rulemaking which has continuously
utilized only one camera when considering the rearview video system
countermeasure option. We agree with the Advocates that this point was
not made explicit in the proposed rule regulatory text and today's
final rule adopts the aforementioned definition in order to avoid such
confusion.
On the other hand, we do not agree with KidsAndCars.org and Sony
that the agency should specify a 180-degree camera requirement or
increase the field of view so as to induce a 180-degree camera
requirement. As noted previously, a goal of this rulemaking has been to
increase the required field of view available to drivers while
affording manufacturers flexibility in selecting methods to achieve
that field of view. Thus, we decline to specify a camera angle
requirement as suggested by KidsAndCars.org.
We also decline to expand the required field of view in order to
induce manufacturers to utilize 180-degree cameras as suggested by
Sony. We believe that any modification to the required field of view
should be based on the associated crash risks of the different areas
behind the vehicle as opposed to the type of equipment we anticipate
manufacturers will use to fulfill those requirements. While the agency
acknowledges the concerns of Sony and KidsAndCars.org that pedestrians
may enter the backing path of the vehicle from the left or right, the
agency continues to believe that the 20-foot by 10-foot area covers the
relevant areas behind the vehicle with the highest crash risk. In
making this assessment, the agency examined both data from the SCI
cases and from the Monte Carlo simulation.
While as many as 41 of the SCI cases involved the crash victims
entering the backing path of the vehicle from the left or right sides,
the data do not identify accurately the location, direction, and speed
of the crash victim at the beginning of the backing maneuver because
SCI cases are post-crash analyses of real world crashes. In these
analyses, the agency is only able to reconstruct the events of the
accidents using its best estimates based on the available information.
Therefore, a more refined assessment of the crash risks associated with
the areas to the left or right of the vehicle from which pedestrians
may enter the path of the backing vehicle is not possible through the
SCI case data.
However, through the Monte Carlo simulation, the agency has been
able to assess the crash risks associated with the areas to the left
and right of the backing vehicle. As mentioned previously, the Monte
Carlo simulation assigns crash risks to 1-foot by 1-foot areas behind
the backing vehicle based on the location of the pedestrian at the
moment the vehicle begins its backing maneuver. In other words, the
Monte Carlo simulation generates the
[[Page 19207]]
probability that a pedestrian, positioned at a given location behind
the vehicle at the beginning of the backing maneuver, would be struck
by the backing vehicle. The Monte Carlo data show that the vast
majority of the crash risk is encompassed within an area extending 5
feet laterally of the vehicle's longitudinal centerline. The agency
believes that the data from the Monte Carlo simulation cover the
lateral intrusion crash risk contemplated both by Sony and
KidsAndCars.org because the Monte Carlo data show that pedestrians
originating from locations beyond 5 feet laterally from the vehicle
centerline at the beginning of the backing maneuver have a
significantly reduced risk of being struck by the backing vehicle.
Absent any additional information regarding the crash risks
associated with the areas beyond 5 feet laterally from the vehicle's
longitudinal centerline, we believe that the 10-foot wide lateral
specification for the field of view requirement in the NPRM is
appropriate for today's final rule. In addition, while we acknowledge
Sony's comment that the costs of implementing requirements for 180-
degree cameras may be less than anticipated in the NPRM, we note that
it did not provide any additional information that the agency could use
to provide a more accurate estimate. Although the agency has attempted
to better quantify the costs of the various technologies that can be
used to fulfill the requirements of today's final rule, we are not
aware of additional supportive information regarding the crash risks of
the areas that would be encompassed by an expanded field of view. Thus,
we decline to modify the field of view in today's final rule for the
sole purpose of encouraging manufacturers to utilize a wider angle
camera.
In addition, we do not agree with the IIHS that the available data
do not support the establishment of the 20-foot longitudinal field of
view requirement. In setting the longitudinal requirement for the field
of view, the agency also examined both the SCI and Monte Carlo
simulation data and established the 20-foot requirement based on these
data. While the agency does not believe that the SCI cases can help
assess lateral crash risk, the agency believes that the SCI case data
are more useful in assessing the longitudinal crash risks associated
with backover crashes. Unlike assessing the crash risks resulting from
side incursions where the position and trajectory of the pedestrian at
the beginning of the backing maneuver is crucial, the assessment of the
longitudinal crash risk can be derived from the distance traveled by
the backing vehicle before striking the pedestrian. Unlike the position
of the pedestrian, the position of the vehicle and the distance it
traveled can be accurately determined through SCI cases. Thus, the
agency believes that the SCI case data are useful in determining the
longitudinal crash risks behind a backing vehicle.
However, unlike in the evaluation of the lateral crash risks, the
Monte Carlo simulation data do not afford the agency a clear inflection
point where the agency could reasonably delineate a limit. In previous
documents released by the agency, the data from the Monte Carlo
simulation were truncated in order to simplify our presentation of the
information. After the NPRM was published, we docketed \91\ the raw
data results from the Monte Carlo simulation. These data show a gradual
decrease in crash risk as the distance increases from the rear of the
vehicle. Thus, while the agency relied on the Monte Carlo simulation
data to determine the lateral boundaries of the field of view
requirement, the agency believes it is more appropriate to consider the
SCI case data in conjunction with the Monte Carlo simulation data to
determine the longitudinal boundaries for the field of view because the
SCI case data do contain a clear inflection point where the agency can
reasonably establish a limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0220
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We acknowledge the comment from IIHS that a crash risk probability
of 0.3 exists beyond the 20-foot mark in the Monte Carlo simulation.
However, we do not believe the agency can reasonably rely upon the data
change from a probability of 0.3 to 0.2 to establish a standard because
the raw data from the Monte Carlo simulation show a gradual decrease in
crash risk as the distance from the rear of the vehicle increased.
However, when the Monte Carlo simulation data is considered in
conjunction with the SCI case data, we believe it is rational to
conclude that the 20-foot longitudinal requirement will cover all the
areas behind the vehicle that are associated with the highest crash
risk.
For the purposes of delineating the longitudinal extent of the
required field of view, the SCI backover case data show a clear drop in
number of crashes where the impact of the crash victim occurred after
the vehicle had traveled 20 feet. When considering these data along
with the data from the Monte Carlo simulation that show a probability
crash risk of approximately 0.3 at 20 feet from the vehicle bumper, the
agency believes that it is rational to conclude that a longitudinal
requirement of 20 feet will cover the relevant areas behind the vehicle
associated with the highest crash risk. For those reasons, today's
final rule adopts the proposed requirements from the NPRM which require
a 20-foot by 10-foot field of view as delineated by seven test objects
located along its perimeter.
We also do not agree with the Alliance's comment that the width of
the test object placement should be proportional to the width of the
vehicle, and we have maintained the test object locations at a width of
5 feet to the left and right of the longitudinal centerline of the
vehicle for the purposes of today's final rule. As in our response to
Sony's comment on increasing the required field of view, we note here
that the data from the Monte Carlo simulation indicate that the vast
majority of the crash risk is encompassed within an area extending 5
feet laterally from the vehicle centerline.\92\ Further, we believe
that a consistent field of view requirement does not significantly
penalize narrower vehicles because we anticipate that similar equipment
will be used to comply with today's final rule irrespective of vehicle
width and there are no data to indicate that narrower or small vehicles
are responsible for fewer instances of backover crashes (resulting in
either fatalities or injures). Finally, as we are unaware of any
potential safety or other benefit in altering the required field of
view according to vehicle width, and we are conscious of the increased
complexity of compliance that can result from certifying vehicles to
different fields of view, we believe that it is appropriate to
establish a single field of view requirement for all vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ The Monte Carlo simulation analysis we described in
previous sections of this document shows that most of the crash risk
in areas behind the vehicle are between 5 feet left and right of the
vehicle centerline (assuming a vehicle width of six feet). See
Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we do not agree with Sense Technologies that a field of
view requirement is not appropriate for this rulemaking. While we
understand the concern that, by requiring a view, certain types of
backover countermeasures are not sufficient by themselves, our research
to date shows that systems that afford drivers the ability to see the
pedestrian behind the vehicle are the most successful at helping
drivers avoid striking the pedestrian. While products like cross view
mirrors can help increase a driver's left and right field of view, the
research has shown that they do not
[[Page 19208]]
allow a driver to detect objects within the backing path of the
vehicle. The relative merits of sensor and mirror systems were further
explored earlier in this document as well as in the NPRM and ANPRM.
Test Objects
It has been the agency's position that test objects should be used
to evaluate the field of view and that these test objects should be
based on the height and width dimensions of a toddler. In the ANPRM,
the agency suggested utilizing test object dimensions based on a 1-
year-old toddler since 26 percent of victims in backover crashes were
1-year-old toddlers. Commenters on the ANPRM suggested that utilizing
the average dimensions of an 18-month-old toddler may be a more
appropriate representation of the data presented in the SCI cases. In
the NPRM, the agency noted the small difference in average dimensions
between the 1-year-old and 18-month-old toddlers \93\ and agreed with
the principle of basing the test object on the dimensions of the 18-
month-old toddler. Thus, the NPRM proposed a cylindrical test object
with a height of 32 inches and a diameter of 12 inches, consistent with
an 18-month-old toddler.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ 75 FR 76222; CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36
months: Boys; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles.
Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001) CDC, Clinical Growth
Charts. Birth to 36 months: Girls; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age
percentiles. Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency further proposed in the NPRM to demonstrate vehicles'
compliance with the minimum field of view requirement by placing seven
test objects (with the aforementioned dimensions) along the perimeter
of the 20-foot by 10-foot minimum coverage area behind the vehicle. As
the agency was conscious that it may not be feasible for certain
vehicles to mount a rearview camera above 32 inches, we proposed to
require the entire height and width of each test object be visible only
for those test objects located 10 feet or farther from the rear bumper
of the vehicle. However, for the remaining test objects F and G
(located only 1 foot behind the rear bumper of the vehicle), we
proposed that a width of 5.9 inches must be visible along any point on
the test object. The agency reasoned that this criterion would result
in a 5.9 inch square or larger portion of a child be visible. Since 5.9
inches corresponds to the average width of an 18-month-old toddler's
head, the agency believed that this would give the driver sufficient
information to result in visual recognition of a child.
For testing purposes, two different design patterns were proposed
for the test objects. To aid in the assessment of whether or not the
required 150 mm (5.9 inch) width of test objects F and G are visible,
the NPRM proposed to place a 150 mm wide stripe, of a contrasting
color, over the entire height of these two test objects. As discussed
later in this document, the NPRM proposed that test objects A through E
be marked with a horizontal band covering the upper-most 150 mm of the
height of each test object in order to aid in the assessment of the
required image size.
Comments
In response to the NPRM, the advocacy groups expressed a number of
concerns with the proposed visibility requirements as they relate to
the test objects. First, the Advocates were concerned that the
requirement that only 5.9 inches of the width of the F and G test
objects be visible could allow a blind zone to exist as high as 38
inches vertical from the ground next to the bumper and extend at a
descending angle rearward as far as 9 feet into the required field of
view. Second, the Advocates, KidsAndCars.org, and the Consumers Union
commented that the final rule should eliminate the 1-foot (0.3-meter)
gap between the rear bumper and test objects F and G. These
organizations claimed that this gap creates a blind zone directly
behind the bumper which has a high probability of backover crashes
(according to the Monte Carlo simulation). Conversely, Magna commented
that many current rearview video systems do cover the rear bumper
surface and do not have a 0.3-meter gap behind the bumper even though
the test objects may be 0.3 meters away from the bumper.
On the other hand, the manufacturers generally raised two issues in
their comments regarding the proposed test procedure. First, the
Alliance expressed concern that low-profile vehicles, such as an Audi
R8, will not have a camera mounted high enough to capture all the test
objects because the vehicle's height is below the height of the test
objects. Volkswagen suggested NHTSA resolve this concern by
establishing that the field of view be limited by the height of the
mounting point of the camera. Second, by noting that the agency assumed
in the NPRM that a 130-degree camera would be able to cover the
required field of view, Porsche, the Alliance, Volkswagen, and BMW all
expressed concern that the 130-degree camera will not be able to cover
all of the required portions of each test object because test objects F
and G are located beyond a 130-degree angle coverage from the vehicle
centerline. These commenters expressed concern that the location of the
F and G test objects will effectively require a wider angle camera.
Conversely, Magna noted in its comments that a 130-degree camera can
sufficiently cover the field of view when the mounting height and angle
are taken into account. Thus, Magna asserted that there is no need to
utilize a 180-degree camera as some commenters suggested.
Various commenters also noted that the visibility requirement for
test objects F and G do not include height requirements. Global
Automakers sought clarification in its comments as to where the 150 mm
(5.9 inch) width will be measured on test objects F and G. Similarly,
Delphi and MEMA requested that NHTSA clarify the specific portions of
the F and G test objects that must be viewable (without making a
specific recommendation). On the other hand, Sony's comments suggested
a 150-mm by 150-mm requirement for the area that must be visible on the
F and G test objects in order to address concerns regarding the lack of
a vertical specification.
The agency also received comments on the visual composition of the
test objects. The Alliance requested clarification on whether or not
test objects F and G can be rotated in order to aim the 150-mm stripe
towards the camera during the test. Honda further sought clarification
as to whether the proposed rule required a 150-mm radius or
circumference of the F and G test objects be visible. Delphi commented
that the vertical stripe on test objects F and G does not clearly show
the portions of the test object that must be viewable and instead
suggested a pattern of 4-in. by 4-in. squares to be painted on the test
objects. Additionally, MEMA sought clarification as to what a ``color
that contrasts with both the rest of the test object and the test
surface'' means in the test procedure under paragraph S14.1.3
describing the test object. Finally, Volkswagen recommended that all
test objects be marked with the same pattern in order to simplify the
test procedure.
Agency Response
After considering the aforementioned comments, we have concluded
that the field of view test object requirements, as proposed in the
NPRM, are most appropriate for today's final rule. We have considered
the scenario described by the Advocates in which a camera is mounted so
as to provide a view of only the top of test objects F and G, and then
the full height of test objects D and E. We believe that such an
arrangement is highly unlikely because the camera
[[Page 19209]]
angle would be aimed primarily toward the sky. Such a rear visibility
system would have a camera mounted intentionally to meet the bare
minimum of our requirements, while offering no apparent benefit to the
consumer or to the manufacturer. It seems unlikely that such a
configuration would meet the vehicle manufacturer's customer
expectations and does not apparently allow the manufacturer to avoid
incurring any costs--making this situation unlikely in the real world.
In addition to this situation being highly unlikely, the agency
believes that the proposed width-only requirements for test objects F
and G are necessary because they enable the field of view requirements
to apply to all different vehicle types and sizes. As we are conscious
of the fact that vehicle size and rear configuration can vary widely
between small low-speed vehicles, low riding sports cars, and buses up
to a GVWR of 10,000 pounds, we have designed the field of view test
object requirements to be applicable to all the aforementioned vehicle
types. In order to preclude manufacturers from utilizing the unlikely
camera arrangement described by the Advocates, this rule would need to
require that manufacturers construct vehicles so as to enable the rear
visibility system see a larger portion of the F and G test objects. As
this would likely unnecessarily restrict vehicle design, we have
concluded that the unlikelihood of a manufacturer electing to pursue
the camera arrangement described by the Advocates does not warrant the
additional costs associated with increasing the field of view
requirements for the F and G test objects.
The agency also does not agree with the Consumers Union, the
Advocates, and KidsAndCars.org that the placement of the F and G test
objects, 0.3 meters from the vehicle's rear bumper, creates a blind
zone that may create a significant safety risk. We note that the center
axis of each of the test objects designated F and G is located 1.52
meters (5 feet) laterally from the vehicle longitudinal centerline and
0.3 meters rearward of the vehicle's rear bumper. Because the location
specifications the test objects are defined according to each test
object's center axis, the requirement that the rear visibility system
cover a 150-mm width of test objects F and G (each with a diameter of
0.3 meters) will effectively require the field of view to cover a
significant area inward of 0.3 meters behind the vehicle bumper (at a
lateral distance of 1.52 meters from the vehicle's longitudinal
centerline). The agency acknowledges that a rear visibility system
meeting the above requirements many not cover the required 150-mm width
of a test object with a center axis less than 0.3 meters rearward of
the vehicle bumper at the lateral distance of 1.52 meters from the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline. However, the agency is currently not
aware of any vehicle, covered by today's final rule, which has a
vehicle width which exceeds 1.52 meters on either side from the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline. Accordingly, a child located in
front of the F or G test objects, and outside of the required field of
view, would not be struck by a reversing vehicle.
In order to be struck by a reversing vehicle, the child must move
towards the vehicle centerline. As the child moves towards the vehicle
centerline, the possible blind zone that can exist behind the bumper
will be significantly smaller than 0.3 meters. Because blind zones will
be significantly decreased for areas behind vehicles that are within
the width of the vehicle, the agency does not believe that rear
visibility systems which meet the requirements of today's final rule
will be unable to view a 150-mm width of any test object located
directly along the bumper of any vehicle covered by today's final rule.
While today's final rule does not include test objects at locations
directly along the vehicle bumper in order to accommodate the wide
variety of vehicle sizes and designs covered by today's final rule, we
believe the requirements in today's rule are a reasonable proxy for
ensuring that test objects in those locations would be sufficiently
visible to the driver through the required rear visibility system.
Further, because the test objects utilized in today's rule are designed
to simulate the height and width of an 18-month-old toddler, we do not
believe that the locations for the F and G test objects 0.3 meters
behind the vehicle rear bumper will create a significant safety risk.
Today's final rule also denies the Alliance's request that the
agency afford additional accommodation for vehicles that have low-
mounted rear visibility systems. Specifically, we do not agree with
Volkswagen that rear cameras mounted at a lower height than the height
of the test objects will be unable to cover all the required vertical
portions of the field of view. As mentioned earlier, we designed the
field of view requirements conscious of the fact that vehicle height
can vary greatly and we are unaware of any camera that has a vertical
angle limitation which would prevent it from easily being mounted at a
pitch which covers the full height of test objects A through E.
Separately, we also disagree with Porsche, the Alliance, Volkswagen,
and BMW that a 130-degree camera is unable to cover the required
horizontal portions of the field of view. We believe that the diagrams
presented by the commenters regarding the inability of the 130-degree
camera to cover test objects F and G (located 5 feet laterally from the
vehicle center line and 1 foot longitudinally from the rear bumper)
failed to consider the three-dimensional properties of a camera's
viewing angles. As Magna commented, a 130-degree camera can readily
cover the 150-mm width requirements of test objects F and G when
mounting height and camera pitch is considered. We further note, that
in testing conducted by the agency, the vast majority of vehicles were
capable of meeting the field of view requirements as proposed in the
NPRM.\94\ Thus, today's final rule adopts those requirements from the
NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0133, Vehicle Rearview Image
Field of View and Image Quality Measurement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's final rule also responds to the commenters' concern
regarding the portions of test objects F and G that must be visible. We
confirm, in today's notice, that the visibility requirements for those
test objects are width-only (and do not include a vertical
specification). As stated above, the 150-mm width represents the width
of the average 18-month-old toddler's head. We continue to believe that
if a horizontal width of 150 mm of the F and G test objects is visible
through the rearview image, that a sufficient area of the average 18-
month-old child will be visible to the driver such that a driver can
visually recognize the child and avoid a crash. As noted above, we are
cautious against increasing a vertical specification of the F and G
test objects (as suggested by Sony) because we are conscious that the
requirements of today's final rule must be flexible enough to
accommodate a wide variety of vehicles and configurations. We also note
that to require a vertical specification would increase the cost and
complexity of the test procedure by requiring some level of vertical
measurement of the F and G test objects. While horizontal measurement
requirements are easily confirmed using the vertical stripe pattern
adopted in today's final rule for test objects F and G, measuring the
vertical distance along those test objects presents greater practical
challenges. Thus, in the absence of a clear increase in potential
safety benefit, we decline to include a vertical specification for the
required view of the F and G test objects.
[[Page 19210]]
In this document, we also seek to address and clarify the various
commenters' concerns regarding the placement and orientation of the
test objects. As Honda indicated in its comments, the proposed
regulatory text in the NPRM did not clearly identify whether the 150-mm
width requirement for test objects F and G would be measured along the
circumference of the test object or would be measured in some other
manner. We agree that this uncertainty should be clarified and have
modified the regulatory text to indicate that the 150-mm width
requirement will be measured along the circumference of test objects F
and G. In a related matter, we acknowledge the Alliance's concern
regarding whether or not test objects F and G can be rotated in order
aim the 150-mm-vertical stripe towards the camera. We note that the
requirements from the proposed rule (and adopted in today's final rule)
merely requires that a 150-mm width of test objects F and G be visible
and does not restrict the orientation of the vertical stripe on those
test objects.
However, we do not agree with Delphi and Volkswagen regarding their
recommendations on the visual patterns that should be used for the test
objects. It seems that, as the 4-inch by 4-inch squares proposed by
Delphi would not correspond easily to any of the requirements of
today's final rule, it would not aid in the assessment of whether or
not a given rear visibility system can meet the requirements in today's
final rule. Further, we decline to adopt the same visual pattern for
all test objects as recommended by Volkswagen because the different
patterns are intended to aid in the assessment of different
requirements. The horizontal stripe on test objects A, B, and C assists
in evaluating compliance with the image size requirement whereas the
vertical stripes on the F and G test objects assist in evaluating
compliance with the field of view requirement. Accordingly, we adopt
the visual patterns for all the test objects as proposed in the
regulatory text in the NPRM in today's final rule.
Finally, we acknowledge MEMA's concern that the test procedure does
not specify what constitutes a ``color that contrasts with both the
rest of the cylinder and the test surface.'' However, similarly to the
orientation of the F and G test objects, the requirements of today's
final rule merely state that a 150-mm-wide portion of the test objects
(along the circumference) must be visible and that test objects A, B,
and C must be displayed at an average subtended angle of no less than 5
minutes of arc. Using a contrasting color band primarily assists in the
accurate measurement of the test object image width using the
photographic data. Therefore, any color may be used in order to
determine the compliance of a given rear visibility system.
Overlays
In the ANPRM, NHTSA solicited comments regarding different methods
of presenting information to drivers. Multiple commenters responded
with information regarding the use of overlays as visual warnings or
indicators to help assist drivers. In the NPRM, the agency chose not to
propose any requirements regarding overlays, but acknowledged the
potential benefit of using overlays in conjunction with sensor-based
technologies to better assist the driver.
Comments
In their comments on the NPRM, the manufacturers were concerned
that overlays will obscure the required view of the test objects during
the field of view test procedure and cause their systems to be
considered non-compliant. Commenters such as the Alliance suggested
that overlays (such as guidelines, arrows, icons, controls) are
generally helpful to drivers and that, in practice, they will not
operate to obscure an entire child. Specifically, Global Automakers
suggested that the agency account for overlays by extending the width-
only, 150 mm requirements of test objects F and G to apply to test
objects A through E as well. Additionally, Global Automakers was
concerned that as certain overlays may react to driver input from the
steering wheel, the overlays on the video screen may be in different
positions depending on the position of the steering wheel. Thus, it
suggested that the test condition should specify that the steering
wheel should be in the straight ahead position during the test. Honda's
comments also expressed support for specifying the position of the
steering wheel in the test condition.
Agency Response
The agency agrees with the commenters that video image overlays may
have potential to add safety-related features to rear visibility
systems.\95\ On the other hand, the agency is also conscious that such
overlays have the potential to be applied to the rearview image in both
safe and unsafe manners. Depending on their size, location, and
orientation, overlays have the potential to create unsafe blind zones
in the rearview image and to mask small obstacles, such as children.
However, without further research, the agency is not currently aware of
a practical method of regulating these aspects of the use of overlays.
The agency currently is not aware of any data which would support
threshold values for regulating the size, location, and orientation of
overlays. Thus, today's final rule does not limit the use of overlays
so long as the overlays do not violate any of the existing requirements
established by today's final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Several commenters stated that future rear visibility
systems may be able to perform advanced functions such as object
detection which could utilize overlays to warn drivers of
pedestrians located behind the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we note that overlays can be designed to appear
automatically in the rearview image in locations which cover the
required portions of the test objects. In such a situation (e.g.
guidelines showing the backing path of a vehicle which pass through any
of test objects A through E), the overlays would violate the field of
view requirements of today's final rule. However, as discussed in the
sections below, today's final rule allows manufacturers to design
systems which permit drivers to modify the field of view so long as a
field of view compliant with today's final rule is displayed, by
default, at the beginning of each backing event. Therefore, overlays
would not violate the requirements of today's final rule if manually
activated by the driver or if they do not cover any of the required
portions of the test objects when displayed automatically.
While today's final rule contains no specific provisions regulating
overlays, we also decline to create special exclusions or
accommodations for overlays as suggested by various commenters.
Although we agree that overlays have the potential to add safety-
related features to the rear visibility system, we do not agree with
the Alliance and other commenters that suggest that overlays cannot
operate in practice to obscure a child. Thus, we decline to amend the
field of view requirements so as to disregard overlays or to apply the
same 150 mm width-only requirement to all the test objects as suggested
by Global Automakers. We note that while the F and G test objects have
width-only requirements in order to accommodate the large degree of
size variation that can exist in vehicles covered by today's final
rule, there is no similar concern for the remaining test objects.
However, we acknowledge the Global Automakers' concern that on-
screen overlays may react to driver use of the steering wheel and that
the steering wheel position can affect a vehicle's compliance with the
requirements of
[[Page 19211]]
today's final rule. Like the non-interactive overlays above, the agency
is currently unaware of a practicable method of separating safe
applications of overlays from unsafe applications of overlays. Thus,
today's final rule also does not establish any specific provisions
regulating the use of overlays which react to steering wheel
orientation.
However, in order to ensure test repeatability, the agency
clarifies the steering wheel test condition by stating in the test
procedure that the steering wheel will be placed in a position where
the longitudinal centerline of all vehicle tires are parallel to the
vehicle longitudinal centerline. This steering wheel position is meant
to simulate the straight ahead steering wheel position suggested by
Global Automakers. Using this test condition, overlays in the form of
guidelines which show the backing path of the vehicle would be
prohibited from covering the required portions of the test objects when
the steering wheel is placed in the straight ahead position. We believe
that this steering wheel position is appropriate because it is likely
the position which most closely reflects the real world driving
conditions experienced by drivers conducting a backing maneuver along a
driveway connecting a place of residence to a street. While we
acknowledge that not all backing maneuvers will be conducted along a
straight path, we believe that straight ahead steering wheel position
most appropriately approximates the likely steering wheel positions
during a backing maneuver when compared to the other available steering
wheel positions.
The agency agrees that overlays can be designed to enhance the
safety features of the rear visibility system. While we have not made
any special accommodations for overlays, we expect that most of the
currently used overlays will comply (or can easily be adjusted to
comply) with our current requirements. By establishing the steering
wheel condition and clarifying how the requirements of today's rule
apply to overlays, we do not expect that existing overlay designs will
prevent rearview video systems from meeting the requirements of today's
rule. However, the agency remains concerned that future overlay designs
have potential to operate unsafely depending on their size,
orientation, and placement in the rearview image. Although the agency
is currently unaware of a practicable method of regulating these
aspects of the overlays, we expect that manufacturers will design
overlays conscious of the fact that the rear visibility system is
required by the provisions of today's final rule for an important
safety purpose. We note that our decision not to regulate overlays does
not relieve manufacturers from designing their system overlays so as to
afford their customers a reasonable ability to see the required field
of view.
e. Image Size
Beginning with the ANPRM, the agency has consistently expressed the
position that the display of the required rear visibility system should
produce images of a sufficient size so as to enable a driver to discern
that objects are present behind the vehicle. Through the ANPRM, NHTSA
requested comment on potential solutions to this problem such as
including requirements restricting image size, overall display size,
display resolution, image distortion, or image minification. In
response to the ANPRM, multiple commenters advocated for various
overall display size requirements based on different methods of
calculating what a person can reasonably see. For example, Ford
suggested that a 2.4-inch screen would be sufficient based on the
measurement technique of New South Wales' Technical Specification No.
149 and its experience regarding customer acceptance of screens of this
size. Magna cited studies conducted by General Motors and the Virginia
Tech Transportation Institute which indicated that screens of 3.5
inches or larger led to the highest rates of crash avoidance.
Rather than propose a minimum overall display size as commenters
suggested, the NRPM proposed to regulate the image size as measured by
the apparent size of test objects as displayed to the driver through
the rear visibility system. In general, NHTSA is concerned with setting
performance standards which directly address the safety concern while
still affording manufacturers as much design flexibility as possible.
Thus, the NPRM did not include a minimum overall display size as a
driver's ability to perceive an object displayed is affected not only
by the display size, but also by the display location within the
vehicle. To avoid setting restrictions on both the size and the
location of the display within vehicle, the NPRM proposed to adopt an
image size requirement which regulates how large the displayed objects
will appear to the driver.
Thus, the NPRM proposed that test objects A, B, and C, (the three
test objects located 20 feet behind the rear vehicle bumper in the
field of view test procedure) be displayed with sufficient size
resulting in an average subtended visual angle of no less than 5
minutes of arc \96\ when tested in accordance with the proposed test
procedures.\97\ Additionally, each of the individual test objects A, B,
and C may not be displayed at a size resulting in a subtended visual
angle of less than 3 minutes of arc. This proposed requirement was
based on research originally published by Satoh, Yamanaka, Kondoh,
Yamashita, Matsuzaki and Akisuzuki in 1983 which examined the
relationship between an object's visual subtended angle, and the
subject ability of a person to perceive that object. This study
concluded that an object must subtend to at least 5 minutes of arc in
order for a person to make judgments about the object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ A minute of arc is a unit of angular measurement that is
equal to one-sixtieth of a degree. The angle which an object or
detail subtends at the point of observation; usually measured in
minutes of arc. If the point of observation is the pupil of a
person's eye, the angle is formed by two rays, one passing through
the center of the pupil and touching the left edge of the observed
object and the other passing though the center of the pupil and
touching the right edge of the object.
\97\ As discussed later in this document, a test procedure which
takes a still photograph of the rearview image from the simulated
eye point of the 50th percentile male driver was proposed in order
to evaluate compliance of a rear visibility system with both the
image size requirements discussed in this section and the field of
view requirements discussed previously. The image size is then
measured using an in-photo ruler as reference as detailed in the
proposed regulatory text in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NPRM also noted that NHTSA had previously based regulatory
requirements, in part, on the Satoh research. For example, the school
bus mirror requirements contained in paragraph S9.4 of FMVSS No. 111
require that the worst-case test object (cylinder P) be displayed at a
subtended angle of no less than 3 minutes of arc. The NPRM reasoned
that a value less than 3 minutes of arc is appropriate for school bus
mirrors because school bus drivers are specifically trained not only to
operate commercial vehicles, but also to use the school bus-specific
mirrors. Further, the cross-view mirrors required by paragraph S9.4 of
FMVSS No. 111 are intended for use while the school bus is stationary--
thus affording the driver as much time as necessary to assess the
objects in the mirror. As the images presented in passenger vehicles
are intended for average drivers during moving situations, the NPRM
tentatively concluded that an image size requirement based on the 5
minutes of arc recommendation from the Satoh research would be the most
appropriate to address the safety risk contemplated by Congress in the
K.T. Safety Act.
[[Page 19212]]
Comments
In response to the NPRM, the Advocates noted two concerns with the
proposed requirements. First, the Advocates stated that the proposed
requirements are not supported by the Satoh research as the proposed
rule allows for an average of 5 minutes of arc over the three rearmost
test objects instead of a minimum of 5 minutes arc for each test object
that the Satoh research indicates would be the minimum necessary for a
driver to perceive the displayed object. Second, the Advocates stated
that the test procedure should take into account the different image
sizes that may result from the different possible eye points of
different drivers such as the 95th percentile male and the 5th
percentile female.
Separately, MEMA noted in its comments that the 5 minutes of arc
standard is based on a study that assumes drivers possess 20/20 vision.
Since most states allow persons to obtain driver's licenses with 20/40
vision, MEMA suggested that the final rule should require greater image
size. Supporting MEMA's concerns, Delphi added that the requirement
should be amended to 10 minutes of arc.
Finally, Ms. Kathleen Hartman commented that the display location
should be near the back window so that a driver is able to both look
backwards and look at the display simultaneously. However, both Gentex
and Brigade expressed an opinion against regulating the location of the
rearview display. Gentex reasoned that, since drivers are accustomed to
viewing the rearview mirror during and before backing maneuvers, the
rule should not preclude manufacturers the option to place the rear
visibility system's display in the rearview mirror that may increase
the likelihood that drivers would utilize such a system.
Agency Response
The agency has considered all the comments presented and continues
to believe that the requirements and test method proposed in the NPRM
for image size are most appropriate for today's final rule. We do not
agree with the Advocates that an image size requirement which requires
an average of 5 minutes of arc is not supported by the Satoh research.
The test method, proposed in the NPRM and adopted by today's final
rule, utilizes a still image camera to take a photograph of the
rearview display with an in-photo ruler as reference. The visual angle
subtended by the test objects is then calculated using information
derived from the in-photo ruler, the distance between the camera and
the rearview image, and the formula provided in the regulatory text. As
the Satoh research concluded that an object must subtend to at least 5
minutes of arc in order for a person to make judgments about the
object, today's final rule requires that test objects A, B, and C be
displayed at an average subtended angle of no less than 5 minutes of
arc. In response to the Advocates' comment on the averaging method, the
agency does not anticipate large differences in the actual apparent
size of the three furthest objects, nor do we anticipate any individual
test object having an actual apparent size significantly less than 5
minutes. Thus, we adopt in today's final rule the requirements and test
method proposed in the NPRM as there is data to indicate that a minimum
subtended angle of 5 minutes of arc would yield greater safety benefits
than an average subtended angle of 5 minutes of arc.
Considering the Advocates' request to establish apparent image size
requirements for both a 95th percentile male as well as a 5th
percentile female, we conclude in today's final rule that such a
requirement would increase compliance costs without any significant
benefit to safety. The agency previously explored this issue by
calculating a simple mirror and seat configuration. We found that the
subtended angle calculation does not vary greatly with the driver's
seated height. In the configuration calculated by the agency, with a
mirror height of 31.5 inches above the driver's seat and a 24 inch
nominal distance to the driver's eye, the difference between a 5th
percentile female and a 95th percentile male apparent image size was
only 0.03 minutes of arc for a nominal apparent image size of 5 minutes
arc. As requiring manufacturers to certify compliance to varying driver
seating positions would increase costs without providing any
significant safety benefit, this final rule continues to use the single
measurement location close to the 50th percentile male which is
intended to best approximate the eye points of most drivers.
As the agency was conscious of the existence of both in-mirror and
in-dash rearview displays, our intent in the NPRM was to afford
manufacturers the flexibility to place the rearview display in a
location that is most appropriate for use by their customers. This
final rule continues to allow flexibility with regard to the location
of the display. We note the comments from Gentex which reasoned that
drivers are most accustomed to viewing the rearview mirror during and
before backing maneuvers. We also note Ms. Hartman's request that the
agency require a display located such that the driver must look
rearward. While the agency is not currently aware of data that show
that a rear-mounted display or in-mirror display is the most
appropriate location for the rearview image, today's final rule does
not restrict these configurations. Consistent with our current rearview
mirror requirements, today's final rule will exclude head restraints as
an obstruction to the rearview display in the test procedure. Through
this limited exclusion, we acknowledge the possibility that
manufacturers may wish to utilize rear-mounted displays. While we note
the separate safety benefit that is afforded by the head restraints
required in FMVSS No. 202 and 202a, we believe that a driver who is
looking rearward will move in such a way as to avoid the head restraint
as an obstacle in his or her view a rearview display.
Finally, the agency declines to raise the minimum requirement that
objects subtend to an angle of 5 minutes of arc as suggested by MEMA
and Delphi. While the agency acknowledges that states allow drivers
that do not have 20/20 vision to operate motor vehicles, we also
recognize that these furthest locations and apparent image sizes will
increase as the vehicle moves closer to them. Further, as mentioned
above, the agency is interested in ensuring that certain display
locations (such as the rearview mirror) are not precluded as an option
for compliance. As an increased image size requirement (such as the 10
minutes of arc suggested by Delphi) would require a significantly
larger display (which can preclude a manufacturer from installing an
in-mirror rear visibility system), we believe that such a requirement
is unnecessarily design restrictive without yielding significant
benefits to safety. Therefore, today's final rule adopts image size
requirements which remain unchanged from those proposed in the NPRM.
f. Test Procedure
In the ANPRM, NHTSA suggested that the test procedure currently
utilized in FMVSS No. 111 for evaluating compliance of school bus
mirrors could be modified for the purposes of this rule. Such a
procedure would set up a still photography camera such that its imaging
sensor is located at the eye point of a 50th percentile male. A
photograph would be taken of the test objects as they are presented in
the rearview image via the rear visibility system display. This
photograph would then be used to assess the compliance of the rear
visibility system.
[[Page 19213]]
The NPRM tentatively concluded, as suggested in the ANPRM, that an
adapted version of the school bus mirror test in FMVSS No. 111 would be
appropriate for evaluating compliance with this rule. In order to
develop an objective and repeatable test, the proposed test procedure
established additional elements of the test such as an ambient light
condition, vehicle load test conditions, a driver seating position, and
a ``test reference point'' to determine the location of the still
imaging sensor. This proposed test procedure was designed to evaluate
compliance with not only the field of view requirements but also the
image size requirements of the proposed rule. The proposed regulatory
text in the NPRM specified the instructions on how to conduct the
proposed test. However, the commenters on the NPRM had various concerns
regarding the proposed test procedure.
Test Reference Point
In the NPRM, we proposed to establish a ``test reference point''
which would simulate the eye point (eye location) of a 50th percentile
male. In the ANPRM, NHTSA requested comment as to the appropriateness
of utilizing the eye point of the 50th percentile male as not only the
test reference point for evaluating compliance of a rear visibility
system, but also as a reference point for measuring a vehicle's rear
visibility without an additional rear visibility system.\98\ In
response to the ANPRM, commenters offered a variety of suggestions.
General Motors suggested this rule apply a requirement consistent with
the rear visibility requirements already existing in FMVSS No. 111 and
utilize the 95th percentile eye-ellipse during the test procedure.
Similarly, Nissan recommended that the rule adopt the eye ellipse
method from SAE Standard J941 (which was incorporated by FMVSS No. 104
and also FMVSS No. 111). Further, the Alliance recommended that the eye
reference points for this rule be harmonized with the equivalent
standards from ECE R.46. Separately, Sony and the Consumers Union
suggested the agency include tests for the other scenarios such as the
5th percentile female or the 25th percentile female. However, Honda
cautioned that including multiple eye reference points may unduly
increase costs, especially for evaluating mirror-based countermeasures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ In the ANPRM, the agency also considered whether or not
this rulemaking should limit the application of the rearview
countermeasure to vehicles with a blind zone larger than a certain
threshold. In that situation, the measurement of the vehicle's rear
blind zone size would have also required a ``test reference point''
to determine the applicability of the rule. Thus the ANPRM solicited
comments on the test reference point for both contexts. While many
of the comments to the ANPRM in regards to the test reference point
were in the context of evaluating the rear blind zone threshold,
these comments are relevant to the more narrow discussion regarding
the appropriateness of the proposed test reference point for
evaluating compliance of the rearview countermeasure itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NPRM tentatively concluded that a test reference point
simulating the eye point of the 50th percentile male driver is the most
appropriate for this rule. Using the anthropometric data from a NHTSA-
sponsored study of the dimensions of 50th percentile male drivers
seated with a 25-degree seat-back angle (``Anthropometry of Motor
Vehicle Occupants'' \99\), the NPRM proposed specifications for the
left and right infraorbitale (a point just below each eye), the head/
neck joint center at which the head rotates about the spine, the
location of the center of the eye in relation to the infraorbitale, and
the point in the mid-sagittal plane (the vertical/longitudinal plane of
symmetry of the human body) of the driver's body along which the
forward-looking eye mid-point can be rotated. All of these
specifications were given in relation to the hip location of a driver
in the driver seating position (the H point). For a further discussion
of these specifications, please reference the NPRM.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Schneider, L.W., Robbins, D.H., Pfl[uuml]g, M.A. and
Snyder, R.G. (1985). Anthropometry of Motor Vehicle Occupants;
Volume 1--Procedures, Summary Findings and Appendices. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 806 715.
\100\ 75 FR 76232.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using these specifications, the NPRM proposed a test procedure
whereby an initial forward-looking eye midpoint of the driver
(Mf) is located 632 mm vertically above the H point and 96
mm aft of the H point. Further, the proposed procedure located the
head/neck joint center (J) 100 mm rearward of the forward-looking eye
midpoint and 588 mm vertically above the H point. A point of rotation
(J2) would then be determined by drawing an imaginary
horizontal line between the forward-looking eye midpoint
(Mf) and a point vertically above the head/neck joint center
(J). Finally, the proposed test procedure would locate the test
reference point (Mr) by rotating the forward-looking eye
midpoint about the aforementioned point of rotation until the straight-
line distance between test reference point and the center of the visual
display reaches the shortest possible value. The locations of these
points are visually represented in Figure 2.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
[[Page 19214]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.001
BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
Comments
In response to the NPRM, the agency received comments requesting
that the values proposed in the test procedure be harmonized with other
test procedures already utilized in other FMVSSs. The Alliance noted
that while the forward looking eye midpoint of the driver
(Mf) is located 632 mm vertically above the H point in the
proposed rule, FMVSS No. 104 references a horizontal plane 635 mm
vertically above the H point. In order to increase consistency across
the various standards, the Alliance requested that the final rule place
the forward looking eye midpoint of the driver (Mf) 635 mm
above the H point. Toyota's comments also expressed support for the
Alliance comments on this issue.
Agency Response
After reviewing the comments from Toyota and the Alliance, we agree
that the requirements of FMVSS No. 104 and
[[Page 19215]]
today's final rule should be harmonized. We note that, as the
requirements for other regulated equipment in FMVSS No. 111 incorporate
the eye point defined in FMVSS No. 104, utilizing the eye point from
FMVSS No. 104 would have the effect of harmonizing the agency's test
procedures across FMVSS No. 111. The 632 mm eye point referenced in the
proposed rule was established using an eye point for the 50th
percentile male driver. As previously noted in our discussion on image
size, the agency has analyzed the sensitivity of moving the eye point
for testing purposes. Our calculations found that the difference
between a 5th percentile female and a 95th percentile male apparent
image size was only 0.03 minutes of arc for a nominal apparent image
size of 5 minutes arc. Based on that analysis, we believe that a 3 mm
testing height modification from the requirements proposed in the NPRM
does not have any significant impact on the test results. As such a
modification would decrease the complexity of compliance with FMVSS No.
111 as a whole, we agree with the Alliance and Toyota that an eye
height of 635 mm above the H point is most appropriate for today's
final rule.
Measurement Procedure Camera Positioning
In the NPRM, we also proposed a measurement procedure which located
a 35 mm or larger format still camera, video camera, or digital
equivalent such that the center of the camera's image plane is located
at point Mr (as defined above in our discussion of the test
reference point). The test procedure further instructed that the camera
lens be directed at the center of the visual display's rearview image.
Comments
Two concerns were raised during the technical workshop in regards
to this procedure. First, the Alliance requested clarification as to
what constitutes the image plane in the camera. Second, the Alliance
also recommended that the agency set a test condition regarding the
position and orientation of the rearview mirror during testing. Such a
condition would ensure that when the camera lens is directed to the
center of the visual display's rearview image, a rearview mirror
mounted display would also be facing the camera in the test procedure.
Agency Response
In response to the Alliance's first concern regarding the image
plane, we note that the image plane is the film or sensor location
within the camera used pursuant to this test procedure. This
clarification is consistent with the manner in which agency has
conducted the test procedure for school bus mirrors in FMVSS No. 111.
In response to the Alliance's second concern, we agree that for
adjustable displays such as in-mirror displays, there may be various
possible orientations which could affect the measurement of the image
size and field of view through the camera used in the test procedure.
Thus, we have clarified in the test procedure in today's final rule
that an adjustable display will be adjusted such that it is normal to
the vector established by points Mr and J2 or as
close to normal as the adjustment mechanism will permit if the range of
adjustment will not allow the display to be positioned normal to the
vector established by Mr and J2. This additional
specification will ensure that any adjustable rearview display will be
oriented such that it is facing the camera used pursuant to this test
procedure.
Driver Seating Position
In the ANPRM, we noted that the driver vertical seating position
recommended by manufacturers for agency crash tests is generally at the
lowest adjustable position. We requested comment on whether this
adjustment position would be suitable for the 50th percentile male. In
response, Nissan, General Motors, and the Alliance indicated that their
comments on the ANPRM regarding the test reference position were also
applicable in regards to driver seating position. Honda also reiterated
its concern that a regulation accommodating varying driver sizes would
increase costs, especially when applied to mirror-based
countermeasures.
After considering these comments, the NPRM proposed a driver
seating position which utilized the recommendation from the ANPRM that
the driver seating position be adjusted to the lowest possible vertical
setting. In order to add clarity, the NPRM also proposed to adjust the
driver seat position to the midpoint along its longitudinal adjustment
range. Finally, the NPRM also proposed that a three dimensional SAE
J826 (rev. Jul 95) manikin be used to adjust the driver seat back angle
to 25 degrees.
Comments
In its comments on the NPRM, the Alliance suggested that the Driver
Seating Position condition in the proposed test procedure be harmonized
with the test procedure in FMVSS No. 208. Specifically, the
organization requested that the test procedure specify the seat back
angle be adjusted to the ``nominal design riding position'' recommended
by the manufacturer. It further recommended that the agency clarify
that if no midpoint exists in the longitudinal adjustment range, the
closest adjustment position to the rear of the midpoint should be used.
These suggestions were supported by both Toyota and Volkswagen.
Agency Response
The agency has considered these comments on the driver seating
position. However, we decline to adopt the nominal seating position
test condition as proposed by the Alliance in today's final rule.
Unlike in FMVSS No. 208, we believe it is necessary to specify the
seating position in FMVSS No. 111 because these standards address
different safety concerns. While FMVSS No. 208 regulates crash
protection, FMVSS No. 111 regulates rear visibility. Unlike in FMVSS
No. 208, minor variations in the seating position can significantly
affect the eye point used to evaluate compliance with the requirements
of today's final rule (particularly with respect to the possibility
that certain interior features of vehicle cabin can become obstacles
between the specified eye point in the test procedure and the rearview
image). Because the seating position is an important condition which
can significantly affect the test results, the agency does not believe
it is appropriate to allow manufacturers to certify using a nominal
seating position (defined by the manufacturers) in this rule. To
evaluate compliance using the nominal seating position in this rule
would introduce a variable into the test procedure which may affect the
objectivity and repeatability of the test procedure. Thus, today's
final rule does not adopt a nominal seating position test condition as
requested by the commenter.
However, we agree with the Alliance that the regulatory text should
clarify the longitudinal adjustment setting of the driver seat should
no adjustment position exist at the exact longitudinal midpoint. We
agree with the Alliance's recommendation that in this situation, the
closest adjustment position to the rear of the longitudinal midpoint
should be used. Thus, today's final rule adjusts the regulatory text
accordingly in paragraph S14.1.2.5.1.
Lighting Conditions
In the ANPRM, NHTSA requested comment on possible lighting
conditions that could be used during the test procedure. In response to
the ANPRM, KidsAndCars.org and Rosco commented that the rear visibility
[[Page 19216]]
systems should be required to work during nighttime conditions. General
Motors and Sony also offered different low-light ambient lighting
conditions such as 3 and 5 lux but recommended that the vehicle's
reverse lights be activated during the test. Finally, the Automotive
Occupant Restraints Council recommended that the test condition specify
a minimum and maximum ambient light condition that simulates daytime
driving conditions. The NPRM tentatively agreed with the Automotive
Occupant Restraints Council. We reasoned that since 95 percent of the
SCI backover cases occurred during daytime conditions, conducting the
compliance test in a worst-case nighttime condition may be an
unnecessarily challenging requirement relative to real world
conditions. Thus, we proposed in the NPRM an ambient lighting condition
of 10,000 lux and proposed that the ambient lighting condition be
measured at the center of exterior surface of the vehicle's roof.
Comments
In response to the NPRM, the Consumers Union, the Advocates, and
KidsAndCars.org suggested the agency adopt lighting conditions that are
intended to simulate nighttime conditions. KidsAndCars.org commented
that in approximately 30% of backover incidents that they have
reviewed, the backover incident occurred during nighttime lighting
conditions. Thus, these organizations suggested that it is necessary to
specify the test conditions to reflect low-light conditions.
On the other hand, Global Automakers commented that because the
majority of backover incidents occur during daytime conditions which
can vary from 10,000 lux to 100,000 lux, automakers should have the
option of setting the ambient lighting conditions to above 10,000 lux
during testing. Honda requested that the agency set a tolerance level
in order to allow for consistent and repeatable testing. Separately,
Global Automakers requested clarification in the technical workshop as
to how the agency would measure the ambient lighting condition at the
center of the exterior surface of the vehicle's roof if the vehicle is
designed with a removable roof panel or convertible top.
Agency Response
While we acknowledge the concerns expressed by the advocacy groups
regarding the performance of rear visibility systems under low light
conditions, we do not specify (in today's final rule) low light test
conditions which would establish minimum requirements for low light
performance of rear visibility systems. As noted in the NPRM, the vast
majority of the SCI cases reviewed by the agency occurred during
daylight hours. Accordingly, the proposed rule in the NPRM did not
include provisions regulating performance under night time or low-light
testing conditions. While we acknowledge that approximately 30% of the
cases reviewed by KidsAndCars.org occurred during night time hours, the
data still demonstrate that a large majority of backover crashes occur
during daylight hours. We also note that the agency currently requires
backup lamps on all the vehicles covered by today's final rule. FMVSS
No. 108 contains various minimum photometric intensity requirements
depending on the angle in which measurement is taken. For the downward
angles (angles pointing towards the ground), the minimum requirements
can range between 30 candela and 160 candela. While we acknowledge that
these lamps do not provide the same lighting conditions as normal
daylight conditions, we believe that these lamps will augment the
ability of rear visibility systems to successfully detect pedestrians
behind the vehicle.
Finally, we note that the current test procedure has been designed
for daytime conditions and might not be objective if it were performed
under low light conditions because the view of each test object's
visibility would be less clear. In other words, under low light
conditions, the current test procedure does not offer a clear and
objective method for distinguishing between rear visibility systems
that can sufficiently display the required portions of the test objects
(under low light conditions) from those that cannot. Without additional
research, the agency is currently unaware of a test procedure that it
can use to determine objectively the sufficiency of the view of the
required portions of the test objects in low light conditions. Thus, we
decline to adopt a low-light testing condition as requested by
KidsAndCars.org in today's final rule.
However, even though the agency is unable to establish minimum low
light performance standards for rear visibility systems in today's
final rule, we expect that manufacturers will design their rear
visibility systems so as to afford their customers the reasonable
ability to utilize this important safety equipment under a variety of
lighting conditions. In addition, the agency plans to monitor the rear
visibility systems utilized to meet the requirements of today's final
rule and will initiate additional rulemaking to establish minimum low
light performance requirements for rear visibility systems should
additional requirements become necessary in the future.
Separately, the agency declines to adopt the recommendations of
Global Automakers and Honda to allow for a lighting tolerance above
10,000 lux. While we agree that lighting conditions under the sun can
be as bright as 100,000 lux, such a testing condition would be
impracticable to achieve in a lab testing environment. However, we do
agree with the commenters that the lighting condition should allow the
testing facility a level of tolerance. We believe this is appropriate
in order to reduce the burden of requiring such precision in this test
condition and do not believe that this change will have any practical
impact of the results of the test. Thus, we have modified the
regulatory text in today's final rule to allow for a range of lighting
conditions between 7,000 lux and 10,000 lux in order to simulate dim
daylight conditions which can be achieved in a test laboratory setting.
Finally, we acknowledge Global Automaker's inquiry regarding the
measurement procedure for the ambient lighting for vehicles with
removable roof panels or convertible tops. In response, we note that
the ambient lighting test procedure would assume that such roof panels
or convertible tops are in place so that the measurement of the ambient
lighting condition can be measured from the center of the exterior
surface of the vehicle's roof.
Other Vehicle Test Conditions
In addition to the test reference point, driver seating position,
and lighting conditions, the NPRM also proposed other test conditions
to ensure test repeatability. These conditions specified that the
vehicle tires be inflated to the manufacturer's recommended cold
inflation pressure, the fuel tank is full, and that vehicle is carrying
the simulated weight of the driver and four passengers. The weight of
each driver or passenger is simulated at 68 kg in the NPRM with 45 kg
being loaded in the seat pan and 23 kg on the floorboard.
Comments
In its comments on the NPRM, the Alliance noted that the proposed
vehicle loading test conditions in the proposed rule differed from the
loading conditions for the other requirements in FMVSS No. 111. The
Alliance recommended that, given the minimal impact that these loading
conditions will have on the field of view
[[Page 19217]]
measurement, the loading requirements should be harmonized for both the
rearview mirror and rearview camera tests at simply the average
occupant weight of 68 kg. In addition, the Alliance requested clarity
during the technical workshop in regards to how the vehicle would be
loaded if there are more than 5 designated seating positions.
Separately, Honda expressed concern in its comments that no vehicle
testing condition is specified in regards to the positioning of vehicle
openings such as hatches and doors. As openings (such as hatches) may
contain rearview cameras, Honda requested that the regulatory text
specify that the hatches and doors of the vehicle are closed during the
test procedure.
Agency Response
Considering the Alliance's comment concerning the occupant weight,
the agency notes that the weight distribution may not be critical in
many vehicle configurations. However, we are concerned that in some
cases it may impact the vehicle's pitch in a way that alters the
outcome of the visibility test. Unlike the mirror requirements of FMVSS
No. 111, today's final rule does not require the rear visibility system
to be adjustable in the horizontal and vertical direction, therefore
the potential impacts of vehicle pitch because of weight is more
critical than in the mirror provisions of FMVSS No. 111. Furthermore,
the agency believes that splitting the weight about the seat and floor
pan more accurately simulates an actual vehicle occupant. Accordingly,
we decline to amend the vehicle loading requirements as requested by
the Alliance.
However, we agree with the Alliance that the loading conditions
proposed in the NPRM did not clearly state how the vehicle would be
loaded if a vehicle has more than 5 designated seating positions. Thus,
we have amended the regulatory text in today's final rule to specify
that when a vehicle has more than 5 designated seating positions, the
68 kg weights simulating each of the five occupants shall be placed in
the driver's designated seating position and any other available
designated seating position in the vehicle.
We also acknowledge Honda's concern that the vehicle test condition
does not specify that all the vehicle doors and hatches must be closed
during the test. We agree with Honda that many rear visibility systems
may have exterior components which collect the rearview image from a
source mounted on a rear hatch or trunk lid. We further agree that
opening or closing these trunk lids or rear hatches have the potential
to affect test results for compliance purposes. Therefore, we are
specifying in the test procedure in today's final rule that rear trunk
lids and hatches are closed and latched in their normal vehicle
operating state during the test.
Display Obstructions
In addition to the aforementioned concerns, Global Automakers and
Honda expressed concern in their comments that certain vehicle interior
design features may obscure the rearview display during testing.
Comments
Honda explained in its comments that they have designed rearview
displays that are placed some distance behind a protective transparent
cover. It requested clarification on how measurements of such images
displayed in these screens would be accomplished. Also expressing this
concern, Global Automakers commented that the test procedures specify
these protective covers be removed during testing. Further, Global
Automakers also requested clarification as to whether or not dashboard
intrusions, which may partially obstruct the view of the display screen
from the perspective of the testing view point, would affect the
compliance of the view screen.
Agency Response
In order for today's final rule to be effective, it is necessary
for the driver of the vehicle to see the required portions of the test
objects in the rearview image. We define visibility based on a picture
taken of the rearview image, at a defined point which approximates the
eye point of a 50th percentile male driver, showing various test
objects located behind the vehicle. If this view is obstructed by
vehicle equipment (such as dashboard intrusions), the ability for the
driver to detect objects behind the vehicle may be compromised. While
we acknowledge that drivers are able to adjust their head position in
order to accommodate certain small obstructions, this rule establishes
at least a central location that is free of obstructions so that most
drivers will be able to easily adjust their head (if needed) in order
to see the entire rearview image. Thus, today's final rule makes no
special accommodation for dashboard intrusions that obscure portions of
the rearview image. The required portions of the test objects, as shown
in the rearview image, must be visible to the driver from the eye point
defined in the test procedure.
Finally, we acknowledge Honda's concern that certain rearview
displays may be placed behind transparent covers that may affect the
ability to affix a ruler to the rearview display as described the test
procedure. Depending on the specific situation, we note that it may be
necessary to remove the transparent cover or use an alternative method
to obtain the measurement of the subtended angle. The agency believes
that, as long as the measurement of the subtended angle is valid,
accommodating rear visibility systems with transparent covers over the
rearview display in the performance of the test will not alter the test
results.
g. Linger Time, Deactivation, and Backing Event
As part of the agency's effort to ensure the rearview image
presents the required field of view at the appropriate time, the agency
has explored the possibility of restricting when the rearview image may
be displayed. In the ANPRM, the agency noted that a maximum linger time
(which discontinues the rear view display after a certain period of
time) may be desirable in order to prevent driver distraction. However,
the ANPRM also expressed our concern that some linger time may be
desirable in certain instances where frequent interchange between
reverse and forward directions are common (such as during trailer
hitching or parallel parking). Thus, the agency tentatively suggested a
linger time requirement of not less than 4 seconds but no greater than
8 seconds.
During the comment period for the ANPRM, commenters raised a
variety of suggestions for an appropriate restriction on image linger
time. Nissan suggested that there is little utility for extending the
linger time greater than 200 milliseconds whereas General Motors
suggested an image linger time of 10 seconds or a speed based limit of
5 mph. The Alliance, on the other hand, suggested 10 seconds or 20 kph
(12.4 mph). Further, both General Motors and the Alliance commented
that a maximum linger time would address the agency's concern and that
it is not necessary to specify a minimum time. In considering these
comments, the agency agreed that a maximum linger time would
sufficiently address NHTSA's safety concern and that a minimum linger
time requirement is not necessary. Accordingly, we noted the
commenters' findings based on actual driving data and proposed in the
NPRM a maximum linger time of 10 seconds.
In addition to the linger time requirement, we proposed in the NPRM
a deactivation restriction. This
[[Page 19218]]
requirement was designed to ensure that the safety feature required by
this rule would not be permanently or accidentally disabled. Thus, in
addition to the maximum linger time requirement, the proposed
regulatory text in the NPRM stated that the ``rearview image shall not
be extinguishable by any driver-controlled means.''
Comments
Vehicle and equipment manufacturers expressed various concerns
regarding these two proposed requirements. The first concern was
expressed primarily by the vehicle manufacturers in regards to only the
linger time requirement. In their comments, the vehicle manufacturers
asked for flexibility in the manner in which they can approach the
maximum linger time requirement. Similar to its comments on the ANPRM,
the Alliance requested that manufacturers be afforded three linger time
requirement options: (1) A time based option of 10-15 seconds, (2)
speed based option of 5-10 mph, and forward travel distance based
option of less than 10 meters. The organization contended that
manufacturers need the ability to set the linger time that is
appropriate for the consumer expectations for each specific type of
vehicle. Other manufacturers also requested that the agency adopt
variations of the Alliance recommendation. BMW suggested a 10 mph, 10
seconds, or 10 meters linger time requirement, whereas Mercedes-Benz
requested a linger time of up to 15 seconds in order to accommodate its
current system designs.
The second concern is expressed by both vehicle and equipment
manufacturers with regard to both the proposed linger time and
deactivation restrictions. In general, the commenters expressed concern
that the deactivation and linger time restrictions could function to
prohibit designs which include camera/video features other than the
field of view required by this rule. For example, the Alliance and Sony
suggested that the proposed rule could preclude manufacturers from
offering certain additional views such as ``trailer tow zooming'' and
``top view'' displays. To address this, both recommended that the
standard require the video display default to a FMVSS No. 111-compliant
view, but afford the option to the driver of manually switching the
view. Additionally, Global Automakers and Honda were concerned that the
deactivation requirement could preclude driver controlled overlays on
the screen. They contended that some of these elements need to be
displayed concurrently with the rearview image in order to properly
afford the driver the ability to adjust various aspects of the rearview
display (such as screen brightness and contrast). Volkswagen also
commented that the deactivation requirement would prohibit visual
display screens that can be pushed back into a stow position that are
not visible to the driver. Finally, Sony commented that the maximum
linger time could preclude views such as a 360-degree view which
drivers may wish to use while the vehicle is in motion to enhance
situational awareness.
Separate from the aforementioned main concerns, the agency also
received comments questioning the appropriateness of these requirements
in this rule. First, Honda's comments suggested that the linger time
should not be a requirement because the rearview image is no more
distracting than a simple rearview mirror and further requested that
any linger time requirement not affect the driver's use of other camera
features. Sony expresses a similar concept stating that the linger time
requirement does not advance the goals of this rulemaking because the
requirement is focused on preventing driver distraction as opposed to
increasing rear visibility. Additionally, Rosco contended that NHTSA
should exclude commercial vehicles from the linger time requirement
because those vehicles may utilize the camera for lane changing safety
and other uses. And finally, Brigade expressed agreement in its
comments with NHTSA's analysis that a minimum linger time would not be
necessary as it would restrict designs that would alter the view
displayed after the vehicle direction selector is shifted away from
reverse.
Agency Response
After reviewing the comments, we agree with the arguments advanced
by many commenters regarding the need for increased flexibility to
accommodate different vehicle designs and additional camera functions.
The agency remains concerned that the rearview image may become a
distraction to drivers during forward driving maneuvers and that
drivers may permanently or accidentally deactivate the rearview safety
feature. However, the agency does not intend to preclude this design
flexibility in today's final rule and believes that the following
revisions appropriately balance our safety concerns with the
commenters' request for design flexibility.
Thus, today's final rule addresses the concerns of the
aforementioned commenters through establishing a ``backing event'' that
would serve as the reference for the maximum linger time and
deactivation requirements. Today's final rule includes an additional
definition which defines a backing event as ``an amount of time which
starts when the vehicle's direction selector is placed in reverse, and
ends at the manufacture's choosing, when the vehicle forward motion
reaches either; (a) a speed of 10 mph, (b) a distance of 10 meters
traveled, or (c) a continuous duration of 10 seconds.'' In light of
this new definition, today's final rule requires that within 2.0
seconds of the beginning of each backing event, a rearview image
compliant with today's final rule must be displayed and that rearview
image must not be displayed beyond the end of the backing event.
However, today's final rule permits manufacturers to design the vehicle
to enable the driver to manually select a different view during the
backing event so long as the default view presented to the driver at
the beginning of each backing event is compliant with the requirements
of today's rule.
Since the agency agrees with both the Alliance and BMW that the
appropriate end of a backing event can vary depending on the type of
maneuvers anticipated to be performed in each vehicle model, we have
established a ``backing event'' definition in today's final rule which
affords such flexibility. Further, the agency does not anticipate the
additional flexibility included in today's final rule to have a
discernible impact on safety. We agree with the parking example from
BMW's comment that the optional 10-meter limit is reasonable based on
the likelihood that when vehicles travel forward at a greater distance
than 10 meters, the driver's intention to park in a given spot has
concluded. Likewise, the agency believes that in situations such as a
trailer hitching maneuver, a driver whose speed has increased to 10 mph
will have concluded that maneuver and should no longer be presented
with this rule's required rearview image. After one of these limits has
been reached, the backing event is finished. Therefore, if the
transmission is then shifted to reverse, a new backing event is
initialized and the rearview image defined in this rule must then be
displayed.\101\
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\101\ We note that the requirement to show the FMVSS No. 111-
compliant field of view at the beginning of each backing event
differs from the test procedures used to assess the performance
criteria for rearview video systems for the purposes of NCAP. As
explained in the NCAP final decision notice, we verify conformity
with the NCAP field of view criterion by assessing the initial view
shown by the system after an ignition cycle. We made this decision
in NCAP because we believed that prior to today's final rule (and
during this rule's phase-in period) consumers would benefit from
information on rearview video systems being listed as a
``Recommended Advanced Technology Feature'' even if these systems
did not show the default view at the beginning each backing event.
On balance, we believed that consumers would realize many benefits
from systems that at least show the relevant field of view at the
beginning of each ignition cycle and NCAP should recommend those
systems to consumers. However, in light of the decision in today's
final rule to accommodate manufacturers' prior system designs during
the phase-in period (by delaying implementation of the performance
requirements beyond the field of view), we believe it is appropriate
for the long-term performance requirements to require the default
view (that is compliant with FMVSS No. 111) at the beginning of each
backing event. By using these slightly different approaches in NCAP
and in today's final rule, we believe that the agency can maximize
the value of information given to consumers in the short-term and
the safety benefits of rear visibility systems in the long-term.
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[[Page 19219]]
Considering the comments on additional views, the agency does not
intend to restrict currently available alternative views such as ``top
view'' and ``trailer mode'' or other potential views that may be
developed in the future. Additionally, the agency recognizes that
screen adjustments such as brightness and contrast are consistent with
the goal of affording the driver a clear view behind the vehicle and
may reasonably be overlaid on top of the required rearview image as
long as they are manually activated by the driver. However, the agency
does believe that the field of view defined by this final rule is vital
to ensuring that drivers are able to avoid the backover crashes
contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act. To reasonably balance
this safety concern while still affording the aforementioned
flexibility of design, today's final rule does not restrict
manufacturers from providing a driver-controlled means by which the
rearview image defined in this rule can be altered, provided that the
vehicle displays the required rearview image at the beginning of every
backing event.
On the other hand, the agency does not agree with Sony and Honda
that this rule should not provide restrictions against excessive linger
time. We do not agree that the rearview image display is no more
distracting than a rearview mirror as an illuminated display has
fundamentally different properties when compared to a mirror. For
instance, the prolonged illumination of the required image at night
would be particularly distracting when the vehicle is traveling
forward. Furthermore, unlike mirrors required on passenger cars and
trucks, the required field of view coverage under this rule does not
provide useful information for the driver while the vehicle is moving
forward. We also do not agree that driver distraction is not a proper
concern of this rulemaking. As in every rule, NHTSA desires to be
cautious and avoid situations that can potentially increase safety
risks.
Finally, today's final rule also does not include an exclusion from
the linger time requirement for commercial vehicles as requested by
Rosco. Rosco requested this additional flexibility as it could be
advantageous for certain vehicles such as small school buses, airport
shuttles, or local delivery vehicles to constantly monitor the rear of
the vehicle. While the rearview image defined in this final rule has
been designed to enable a driver to detect pedestrians such as small
children directly behind the vehicle during backing maneuvers, we have
not evaluated the safety implications of using this rearview image in
high speed forward moving situations as it was not part of the safety
problem today's rule is designed to address. Further, as stated above,
the agency desires to be very cautious not to increase safety risk by
allowing this novel application of the rearview safety equipment.
Therefore, today's final rule does not include any exclusion that would
allow commercial vehicles to continue to display the required image
after the end of a backing event.
h. Image Response Time
The agency has expressed concern that if the rear visibility system
does not display the required field of view promptly, the safety
benefit of this system will be reduced because drivers may begin
backing maneuvers before the field of view is displayed. Thus, in both
the ANPRM and NPRM, the agency has explored a response time requirement
that would limit the amount of time that can pass between driver's
selection of the reverse gear and the video screen display of the
required field of view. The ANPRM requested comment on a possible
resolution to this issue by suggesting a preliminary maximum response
time of 1.25 seconds. After considering the comments on the ANPRM, the
agency proposed a 2.0 second response time requirement in the NPRM.
In proposing the 2.0 second requirement, the agency cited two
technological limitations that necessitated a longer maximum response
time. First, the agency took note that both GM and Gentex indicated a
need for additional tolerances for their systems to produce the
required image in part because their systems conduct image quality
control checks before displaying the image. Both manufacturers stated
in their comments that a required image response time of 1.25 may
adversely affect the image quality displayed.
Second, the agency noted that liquid crystal displays (LCDs)
require time to warm-up before they can display an image and that this
time may vary depending on the location of the visual display. The
agency acknowledged that in-mirror displays (which are only activated
when the reverse gear is selected) may require additional warm-up time
when compared to in-dash displays (which may be already in use for
other purposes such as route navigation). For these reasons, the
proposed rule in the NPRM extended the image response time requirement.
As the agency was not aware of any rationale that justified extending
the response time requirement beyond 2.0 seconds, the agency stated
that a 2.0 second response time would be appropriate.
Separately, the NPRM took note of the comments from the Advocates
which recommended that vehicles be equipped with an interlock feature
which would prevent the vehicle from reversing until the rear
visibility system has fully initialized. The Advocates contended that
this feature would ensure that drivers have the required field of view
available when the driver commences the backing maneuver. In response
to the Advocates' comment, NHTSA expressed concern that such a feature
may cause annoyance with drivers. While we did not propose an interlock
requirement in the NPRM, we requested comment on the merits of such a
feature.
Comments
Generally, the advocacy groups have commented that the response
time should be reduced. These groups share the agency's concern that if
drivers are not quickly presented with the required field of view, they
may begin their backing maneuvers without waiting for the rear view
display. Therefore, the Advocates stated that the standard should
require a 1.0 second maximum response time and require an interlock
feature for vehicles that do not meet the 1.0 second requirement.
Similarly, the Consumers Union suggested the agency adopt the 2.0
second requirement or a shorter technologically feasible response time
and that we grant no allowance for system initialization. The Consumers
Union noted that image response time can be significantly longer when
the vehicle is first initializing.
Conversely, the manufacturers were generally concerned that the 2.0
second response time requirement proposed in the NPRM is too stringent
when
[[Page 19220]]
considered with the system initialization process. Global Automakers
suggested that the 2.0 second response time is inappropriate for
situations where the vehicle is shifted into reverse immediately after
starting the engine. They contended that this is an abnormally quick
process compared to real world conditions and recommended that the
agency establish a test procedure where the vehicle is running for at
least 10 seconds before shifting the vehicle into reverse and measuring
the 2.0 second response time. Using similar reasoning, the Alliance and
Volkswagen proposed a 3.0 second response time requirement when tested
within 4-20 seconds of opening the driver side door. The Alliance and
Mercedes-Benz also stated that this change is necessary in order to
accommodate existing rear view systems, which have not been designed to
meet the 2.0 second response time requirement. They cautioned that
requiring the manufacturers to change these designs apart from the
normal product cycle would significantly increase costs. On the other
hand, Honda did not request any change to the response time requirement
because their newer systems will be redesigned to meet the proposed
requirement. Thus, they requested that the image response time
requirement be delayed until the end of the phase-in period.
The equipment manufacturers generally stated in their comments that
their products will be able to meet the proposed 2.0 second response
time requirement. Magna stated that the proposed requirement in the
NPRM ``appears to be both technically and practically achievable.''
However, Panasonic echoed the manufacturers' concerns by asking the
agency to consider the initialization process, ambient conditions, and
the drop in voltage experienced during engine crank start. On the other
hand, Brigade cautioned that drivers may not wait for a delayed image
and requested a 1.0 second response time requirement. Finally, Magna
noted that the research conducted by this agency seems to indicate that
drivers with video displays may wait for the display to appear before
commencing the backing maneuver.
Additionally, the manufacturers and one supplier requested that the
test condition for image response time specify an ambient room
temperature in order to accommodate for response time variation due to
temperature. Magna requested that the test condition for response time
be set to 20 degrees Celsius +/- 5 degrees Celsius. On the other hand,
Volkswagen and the Alliance recommended that the test condition be set
to a temperature of 70 +/- 10 degrees Fahrenheit. During the technical
workshop, the Alliance also recommended that the agency specify a test
condition for the gear position for manual vehicles which could be
initiated with the transmission in the reverse position.
Finally, in response to our request for comment on the merits of
interlocks in the NPRM, Magna commented that drivers would view an
interlock feature, which removes direct and immediate control from the
driver, with ill-regard. The company stated that drivers often may need
to reverse a vehicle quickly at a red light-controlled intersection in
order to avoid being struck by a reversing vehicle in front which has
unintentionally intruded into the intersection. The Alliance raised
similar arguments by raising the concern that drivers may need to
reverse quickly when conducting three-point turns in traffic. Further,
the Alliance stated it is unaware of any practical methods of
incorporating such an interlock into a vehicle without creating a
danger of sudden acceleration as such a feature would create a
disconnect between the driver's command and the vehicle response.
NCAP Request for Comments and Final Decision Notice
The agency also examined this particular issue in the context of
updating NCAP to include rearview video systems. In the NCAP request
for comments, the agency stated (in order to address the aforementioned
concerns from manufacturers regarding the state of the vehicle prior to
testing) its plan to use a vehicle conditioning procedure prior to
assessing the NCAP image response time criterion. The procedure
announced in the NCAP request for comments was as follows:
Image response time test procedure. The temperature inside the
vehicle during this test is any temperature between 15 [deg]C and 25
[deg]C. Immediately prior to commencing the actions listed in
subparagraphs (a)-(c) of this paragraph, all components of the
rearview video system are in a powered off state. Then:
(a) Open the driver's door,
(b) activate the starting system using the key,\102\ and
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\102\ We stated in our NCAP request for comments that the terms
``starting system'' and ``key'' have the same meanings that these
terms have in FMVSS No. 114, Theft protection and rollaway
prevention. See 49 CFR Part 571.114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) place the vehicle in reverse at any time not less than 4
seconds after the driver's door is opened.
We intended this procedure to establish not only the state of the
vehicle's rear visibility systems prior to testing, but also to
establish the temperature conditions during the test. We believed that
this procedure established an appropriate balance between ensuring that
the view of the area behind the vehicle associated with the highest
crash risk is available to the driver in a timely fashion and affording
the vehicle manufacturers all reasonable design flexibility. We
reasoned that a vehicle conditioning procedure lasting no less than 4.0
seconds would be appropriate because our naturalistic driving data
\103\ indicate that approximately 90% of drivers do not select the
reverse gear to begin the backing maneuver less than 4.25 seconds after
opening the vehicle's door.\104\ In other words, only approximately 10%
of the time drivers enter their vehicle and select the reverse gear in
less than 4.25 seconds. Thus, we believed that a vehicle conditioning
procedure that could test a vehicle in as little as 4.0 seconds after
the beginning of the procedure would most closely mimic the vast
majority of real world conditions.
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\103\ These data are information NHTSA prepared in support of
the research report titled ``On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of
Rearview Video Systems.'' See Mazzae, E. N., et al. (2008). On-Road
Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems (ORSDURVS), supra. A
summary of these naturalistic driving data prepared for that study
(as it pertains to the length of time drivers take to select the
reverse gear) is available in Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0227.
\104\ The naturalistic driving data indicate that 90% of drivers
did not select the reverse gear less than 4.25 seconds after the
system began collecting data. The systems used in this study may
have initialized as a result of triggers which can include the door
opening, the door unlocking, or using the key fob. While the agency
acknowledges that the system may have begun recording data before
the door was opened, we continue to believe that approximately 90%
of drivers did not select the reverse gear in less than 4.25
seconds. The agency believes that the time difference resulting from
the different triggers would only affect the test results for
drivers who took around 4.25 seconds to select the reverse gear
because drivers taking significantly longer than 4.25 seconds to
select the reverse gear most likely would not have selected the
reverse gear in less than 4.25 seconds even if the system began
recording data upon unlocking the vehicle door or using the key fob.
The agency further believes that, for drivers that take around 4.25
seconds to select the reverse gear, the data recording must have
been initialized while the driver was very close to opening the
vehicle door in order for the driver to complete all the tasks
required in order to start the vehicle engine and select the reverse
gear in around 4.25 seconds. Thus, while the data from the
naturalistic study indicate that 90% of drivers selected the reverse
gear not less than 4.25 seconds after the system began recording
data and not after the driver opened the door, we continue to
believe that approximately 90% of drivers selected the reverse gear
not less than 4.25 seconds after opening the door.
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In response to our NCAP request for comments, various manufacturers
stated
[[Page 19221]]
a need for a maximum vehicle conditioning procedure time. They
explained that vehicles are often designed to power down their
electronic systems after a certain amount of time has elapsed. For
example, GM recommended a maximum procedure time of 60 seconds and Ford
recommended a maximum time of 5 seconds. We agreed in our NCAP final
decision notice with the commenters that the vehicle conditioning
procedure should have a maximum time limit. We therefore established a
maximum test procedure time of 6.0 seconds. When we designed the
vehicle conditioning procedure, we intended to test the system as
closely to 4.0 seconds as possible to mimic real world driving
conditions. Thus, in order to establish a practical test that clearly
defined the conditions under which the system would be tested, we
stated that the rearview video systems in NCAP would be assessed after
the vehicle was conditioned according to the conditioning procedure
that lasted between 4.0 to 6.0 seconds.\105\
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\105\ In addition, we note that the NCAP final decision notice
and the accompanying test procedure document also added clarifying
details to the test procedure. It established: (1) A minimum width
that the driver door should be opened (234 mm--or 9.2 in--the width
of a 50th percentile male's chest); (2) that driver door is
considered open at the ``first detected movement when the door edge
of the driver's door is no longer flush with the exterior body panel
at the B-pillar;'' and (3) that the driver door is shut afterwards.
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Agency Response
We share the advocacy groups' concerns that drivers may begin their
backing maneuvers without the benefit of the rear visibility system if
they are not presented with the rearview image quickly enough. As we
discussed in our analysis of SCI cases involving rearview video
systems, the 2013 case involving a BMW X5 demonstrated the importance
of having a response time requirement that is as stringent as
technologically feasible. If the response time of vehicle's rear
visibility system had been longer in that case, it is possible that the
injuries to the pedestrian would have been more severe.
However, we are unable to reduce the response time below 2.0
seconds in today's final rule for a variety of reasons. First, we
believe that to reduce the response time requirement below 2.0 seconds
would unnecessarily restrict potentially safety-beneficial
alternatives. When we consider both in-dash and in-mirror displays, we
believe the current state of technology does not seem to be able to
consistently achieve a response time of less than 2.0 seconds. Because
in-mirror displays are generally not designed to be used for other
purposes such as navigation or infotainment applications, in-mirror
displays generally are only powered when the rearview image is
required. Using currently available technology, it does not seem
feasible for these displays to power up and display the required field
of view in less than 2.0 seconds. However, as the agency is aware of
the possibility that in-mirror displays may be a more natural location
for certain drivers or vehicle types and such systems may have a
shorter initialization time than in-dash displays, we believe it is not
in the interests of safety to establish a response time requirement
which would preclude this type of display.
Second, the data show that approximately 95% of drivers do not
begin backing the vehicle until at least 1.0 second has elapsed after
the vehicle has been placed into reverse.\106\ Thus, for the vast
majority of drivers, the rearview image will be available in less than
one second after the driver is ready to begin the backing the vehicle.
As the naturalistic driving data available to the agency currently
reflect the behavior of drivers that are accustomed to backing without
the assistance of the rear visibility system or viewing the rear
visibility system as a convenience feature rather than a safety
feature, the agency believes that it is reasonable to anticipate that,
through further incorporation and driver education regarding rear
visibility systems, drivers will become accustomed to waiting an
additional (less than) 1.0 second for the rearview image to appear.
While we encourage manufacturers to drive the rear visibility system
image response time to a minimum, as well as to educate their customers
regarding the proper use of this important safety feature, to require a
response time below 2.0 seconds would unnecessarily restrict rear
visibility systems from using in-mirror displays. Therefore, after
considering all of these factors, today's final rule adopts the
proposed requirement from the NPRM which requires that the rearview
image be displayed within 2.0 seconds \107\ of the start of a backing
event.\108\
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\106\ Mazzae, E. N., et al. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers'
Use of Rearview Video Systems (ORSDURVS), supra. Our data analysis
currently does not enable us to conclude how far drivers generally
travel between the 1.0 second after some drivers start backing the
vehicle and the 2.0 second response time requirement. To ascertain
this information, we would need to consider not only the time at
which drivers generally begin their backing maneuvers, but also the
rate at which they accelerate their vehicles and the speed to which
they accelerate. In our studies, we observed a variety of average
backing speed (e.g., 3.3 ft/second and 1.5 ft/second in Studies 1
and 3, respectively). However, we do not have information that
indicates at what rate drivers accelerate the vehicle. As the rate
of acceleration is crucial towards understanding how much distance a
driver generally covers in the first second of the backing maneuver,
we do not believe the current data enable us to make any conclusions
on this matter.
\107\ We note that, in response to the NCAP request for
comments, the Alliance commented (without any additional reasoning)
that a 3.0 second response time is the most appropriate. Similarly,
GM commented that a 2.5 second response time is needed to
accommodate systems using integrated console displays (as opposed to
in-mirror displays). They reasoned that integrated console displays
would take longer to initialize than in-mirror displays. As we
stated in our NCAP final decision notice, these comments did not
compel the agency to change the 2.0 second response time criterion
for the purposes of NCAP. We reiterated our concern that, even if a
system shows the appropriate view of the area behind the vehicle at
an appropriate size, the driver will not be able to avoid a crash if
the system is not active when the vehicle is moving in reverse. We
also restated that the 2.0 second image response time was proposed
originally in the NPRM for this rulemaking to accommodate in-mirror
displays that would take longer than integrated console display to
initialize because they are not normally activated prior to the
backing maneuver for other purposes (e.g., for infotainment or
navigation functions). Without any reasoning to support why
integrated console displays now require additional time beyond that
of the in-mirror displays to initialize, we declined to extend the
response time criterion for the purposes of NCAP. In addition, for
the purposes of today's final rule, we believe the same facts
continue to be true. Thus, we also conclude in today's final rule
that 2.0 seconds is the appropriate response time.
\108\ As discussed previously in this document, today's final
rule establishes a backing event which begins when the vehicle is
placed into reverse. Thus, altering the response time requirement to
2.0 seconds after the beginning of the backing event does not
substantively change this requirement from the proposed rule in the
NPRM.
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However, in regard to initialization time, the agency recognizes
that for compliance testing purposes it is important to establish the
state of the vehicle prior to the transmission being shifted into
reverse. We acknowledge the difficulties noted by the manufacturers
that the system initialization process may impede the ability of the
rear visibility system to display the required rearview image within
2.0 seconds. We further note the aforementioned naturalistic driving
data that indicate that approximately 90% of drivers do not select the
reverse gear to begin the backing maneuver less than 4.25 seconds after
opening the vehicle's door. Thus, we believe that the NPRM, which would
have required the 2.0 second response time regardless of vehicle state,
did not fully account for real world driving situations that provide
time for the vehicle's rear visibility system to initialize.
However, we decline to adopt the specific recommendations from the
manufacturers as they do not reflect real world driving conditions as
reflected in
[[Page 19222]]
the available data. While we note that manufacturers currently use
various triggers to begin the initialization process, we believe that
both the 10 second initialization condition recommended by Global
Automakers and the 4 to 20 second initialization condition recommended
by the Alliance is not appropriate for this safety equipment. As it
does not seem reasonable to expect drivers to wait 10-20 seconds for
rear visibility systems to initialize before commencing their backing
maneuvers, following the manufacturer's recommendation would aggravate
our safety concern that drivers may begin backing maneuvers before the
rearview image is available.\109\
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\109\ For the same reason, we do not adopt the suggestion from
the Global Automakers' comments to the NCAP request for comments
suggesting that the vehicle conditioning procedure begin when the
vehicle ignition is activated. While we recognize that manufacturers
may design their rearview video systems to activate at the same time
as the ignition, we do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to
adjust the vehicle conditioning procedure for the image response
time to begin at that point. Nothing in the vehicle conditioning
procedure adopted in today's final rule precludes manufacturers from
designing their systems to initialize when the vehicle's ignition is
activated. However, to adjust the vehicle conditioning procedure to
begin at a later time would aggravate our safety concern that the
rearview image may not be available to drivers when they begin their
backing maneuvers.
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Thus, in an effort to address the aforementioned safety concern
while not imposing a regulatory burden that does not reflect real world
driving conditions, the agency is adopting the vehicle conditioning
test procedure from the NCAP final decision notice that will condition
the vehicle prior to the rearview image response time testing in
section S14.2 of today's final rule. For the reasons we stated above
(and in the NCAP final decision notice) we believe that the 4.0 to 6.0-
second vehicle conditioning procedure adopted for the purposes of NCAP
would also be suitable for assessing compliance with the requirements
adopted in today's final rule. We believe that this procedure
establishes an objective and practicable testing method that
appropriately addresses the safety need (i.e., ensuring that the
rearview image is available during the backing maneuver) while also
affording manufacturers as much design flexibility as possible.
In this procedure, the vehicle condition will be established by
opening the driver's side door,\110\ closing the driver's side
door,\111\ activating the vehicle's starting system using the key, and
selecting the vehicle's reverse direction. This procedure, starting
with the opening of the vehicle door, and ending with selecting the
vehicle's reverse direction,\112\ will occur in no less than 4.0
seconds and no more than 6.0 seconds in order to reflect the
naturalistic driving data mentioned above. While the requirements of
today's final rule do not impose the burden on testing facilities to
place the vehicle into reverse at exactly 4.0 seconds, today's rule
allows for the agency to test for compliance with the 2.0 second
rearview image response time requirement at any point between 4.0 and
6.0 seconds after the initiation of the test procedure.
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\110\ As in the NCAP test procedure, today's final rule includes
various details in the test procedure to clearly define the
conditions of the test. However, instead of specifying a minimum
width that the driver door should be opened, today's rule states
that the driver door is open ``to any width.'' We believe that this
test condition is more appropriate in this context for a few
reasons. First, it defines the possible conditions under which the
vehicle may be tested. Second, it does not require a testing
facility to test under an exact door opening width condition when
the performance requirements are based on time measured from the
point when the door opens. In other words, the exact width at which
the door is opened is not determinative of the outcome of the test
so long as the door is opened. Today's final rule also adopts the
clarifying detail to define when the driver door is open. The test
procedure states that ``driver door is open when the edge of the
driver's door opposite of the door's hinge is no longer flush with
the exterior body panel'' We believe that, given the importance of
timing in this test procedure, it is important to establish as
clearly as possible when the test procedure begins. However, this
language is slightly different from the NCAP test procedure (which
assumed the door opening would also be along the B-pillar) in order
to accommodate any vehicles with driver doors that open using a
different mechanism.
\111\ We've adopted this procedure from the NCAP test procedure
as well as we believe this more fully simulates the real world
conditions under which the systems will operate (i.e., drivers will
not generally begin backing maneuvers without first closing the
door).
\112\ We note that the NCAP final decision notice adopted a
vehicle conditioning procedure that ended with the ``selection of
the reverse direction'' of the vehicle as opposed to placing the
vehicle in the reverse direction. We received comments in response
to the NCAP request for comments seeking clarification about how the
agency would determine whether the vehicle was in reverse. Some
commenters suggested using the vehicle's backup lamps as a
reasonable proxy for determining that the vehicle is in reverse. We
responded in the NCAP final decision notice by stating our intention
that the vehicle conditioning procedure begin with the selection of
the reverse direction. We also stated that, while it is possible
that the activation of the backup lamps is a reasonable proxy for
determining when reverse has been selected, it is not the only valid
method. We believe that these clarifications on when the vehicle
conditioning procedure ends are also useful for the purposes of
today's final rule. Thus, we have adopted this language in S14.2.
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However, the agency recognizes that current visibility systems
response times vary considerably between manufacturers and even within
each manufacturer. We further recognize that the aforementioned test
procedure will not accommodate all the available rear visibility
systems currently used by manufacturers. However, as noted by Honda in
its comments, we believe that newer systems have been (and will be)
developed to reduce initialization and response time. We further
acknowledge the Alliance's concern that compelling the immediate
compliance of all rear visibility systems with the response time
requirements would significantly increase costs by forcing
manufacturers to conduct expensive redesigns outside of the normal
product cycle. Thus, as will be further discussed later in this
document, we have adjusted the phase-in schedule in today's final rule
to no longer require that manufacturers comply with the image response
time requirement until the end of the 48-month statutory phase-in
deadline.
In addition to the aforementioned test condition, we also agree
with Magna, Volkswagen, and the Alliance that large discrepancies in
ambient room temperature may create unnecessary variation in response
time testing. We agree with Magna's recommendation and believe that a
temperature condition range from 15 degrees Celsius to 25 degrees
Celsius most closely approximates the temperature environment and
capabilities of the available testing facilities. Thus, today's final
rule adopts the temperature condition range of between 15 and 25
degrees Celsius (as measured from the interior of the vehicle) from the
NCAP final decision notice to ensure test repeatability.
Separately, we decline to specify a manual transmission gear
position as suggested by the Alliance in the technical workshop. As the
test conditions in S14.2 now specify that the compliance technician
shall place the vehicle direction selector into reverse, there is no
need to specify a gear position for manual transmissions because the
conditions in S14.2 assume that the transmission condition cannot be in
reverse prior to the beginning of the test.
Finally, the agency has considered the Advocates' suggestion of
requiring an interlock which would prohibit the vehicle from moving in
reverse prior to the rearview image being active. The agency has
particular concern with both the technical aspects of such a
requirement as well its potential unintended consequences. As mentioned
earlier in this document, the agency is particularly cautious that it
does not wish to create additional, unintended safety risks. We
acknowledge interlocks as a possible solution to the safety concern
that drivers may begin backing maneuvers without the benefit of the
rearview image. However, we are also cautious of
[[Page 19223]]
the possibility that such a requirement could lead to increased safety
risks (such as when conducting three-point turns in traffic). Without
additional research, the agency does not believe that it can thoroughly
evaluate the economic costs, the safety benefits, and the potential
safety risks of such a requirement at this time. Therefore, this final
rule does not incorporate an interlock requirement.
i. Display Luminance
In order to ensure adequate visibility for the driver of the test
objects in the display under a variety of conditions, the agency
suggested in the ANPRM that a minimum brightness requirement may be
necessary. In response to the ANPRM, the agency received one comment
from Gentex suggesting that a 500 cd/m\2\ would be appropriate. Based
on this comment, the NPRM proposed to require that when tested in
accordance with the proposed test procedure, the luminance of an
interior visual display used to present the rearview image shall not be
less than 500 cd/m\2\. While the display units that had been reviewed
by the agency seemed to have adequate display brightness, the agency
reasoned that it is necessary to propose a minimum brightness level in
order to ensure that drivers can see the rearview image under all
lighting conditions.
Comments
The comments on the NPRM generally agreed that the 500 cd/m\2\
requirement is inappropriate and cited a number of concerns. First, the
manufacturers stated that the 500 cd/m\2\ requirement is too bright for
most driving situations. The Advocates supported the concerns of the
manufacturers that the 500 cd/m\2\ requirement is set too high. Second,
the manufacturers stated that simply regulating display brightness is
not a practicable standard because there are many different factors
(such as contrast ratio, color chromaticity, uniformity, reflectance,
etc.) which contribute to the quality of the video display. Finally,
both manufacturers and suppliers such as Panasonic and Brigade stated
that display luminance must be driver-adjustable in order to be
practicable in all real-world driving conditions.
However, commenters suggested different approaches in setting a
practicable standard. The Advocates suggested that the agency adopt SAE
J1757 in place of the 500 cd/m\2\ requirement. Toyota's comments
supported the Advocates' suggestion of SAE J1757, but also recommended,
in the alternative, that the agency consider ISO 15008. On the other
hand, comments from the Alliance assert that the requirements of FMVSS
No. 101 would adequately regulate display luminance. Further, Ford
stated in its comments that FMVSS No. 101 currently does not regulate
video displays and would require changes to the regulatory text to
apply in this situation.
Finally, two commenters raised concerns regarding the proposed test
procedure for display luminance. Global Automakers expressed concern
that many of the parameters for the display luminance test have not
been specified and requested that NHTSA specify parameters such as
temperature, positioning of the measuring device, etc. Additionally,
Panasonic requested in its comments that the testing procedure require
an all-white screen test pattern.
Agency Response
The agency continues to believe that the ability of a driver to
view a display with a high-quality rearview image is important.
However, the agency has elected not to include minimum display
performance requirements in today's final rule without conducting
additional research. After reviewing the comments on the NPRM, the
agency believes that specifying objective and practicable requirements
in this area of performance has many complex challenges and the agency
is not aware of any performance requirements that can objectively and
practicably address our concern.
We note that while the commenters stated that the single value 500
cd/m\2\ luminance requirement for a display performance will not be
appropriate under the majority of ambient lighting conditions, the
agency did not intend for rearview displays to achieve 500 cd/m\2\
under all driving conditions. The NPRM proposed that rearview displays
achieve 500 cd/m\2\ under the conditions specified in the test
procedures and did not seek to preclude manufacturers from providing
drivers the means with which to adjust the display luminance. However,
the agency agrees with the commenters that display luminance alone does
not provide a complete evaluation of the screen's ability to provide
the driver with a rear image suitable for detecting objects such as
children behind the vehicle. For instance a display that provides a
very bright image, but does not provide adequate contrast, will not
provide an image where an object within the field of view is
discernible. Similarly, two screens with identical luminance and
contrast can manage glare in ways that are different enough to provide
significantly different display performance in various ambient
conditions. Additionally, the agency notes that adopting only a
luminance requirement may be unnecessarily restrictive of technologies
such as transflective LCD technologies which can combine traditional
backlighting and reflective lighting in order provide improved image
quality in all ambient lighting conditions.
In response to commenters' suggestion that that the agency instead
consider adopting SAE J1757 or ISO 15008, NHTSA has reviewed these
industry standards and has concluded that they are not suitable for
incorporation in this rule. In regards to the Advocates suggestion that
the agency adopt SAE J1757, the agency found that SAE J1757 provides
detailed test processes for measuring various aspects that influence
display performance. However, SAE J1757 does not provide threshold
values for which the agency could use in setting minimum performance
requirements. Thus, the agency does not believe SAE J1757 is
appropriate for this rule. Similarly, the agency also considered ISO
15008. While ISO 15008 offers minimum standards in relation to basic
factors such as character legibility and color recognition, we agree
with as the Alliance's comments which noted that the ISO industry
standard is not intended to apply to displays which utilize video
images such as those that will likely be used by the manufacturers to
fulfill the requirements of today's final rule. ISO 15008 specifically
states that it is not applicable to more complex display technologies
such as head up displays, maps/navigation systems, and rearview
cameras. For these reasons, NHTSA believes that ISO 15008 is also
inappropriate for incorporation into this rule.
Separately, NHTSA has considered both the Alliance and Ford's
comments regarding utilizing the illumination requirements of FMVSS No.
101 to regulate display luminance. For the reasons mentioned above
regarding the complexity of the factors that determine display
performance, the agency no longer believes that adopting only a
luminance requirement will adequately ensure display performance. Thus,
we decline to adopt the changes suggested by the Alliance and Ford
which would utilize the performance tests from FMVSS No. 101 to
regulate display performance in today's final rule.
For the aforementioned reasons, the agency concludes today that we
are not aware of any performance requirements that can objectively and
practicably address our concern regarding the importance for the driver
to have access
[[Page 19224]]
to a display which presents a high-quality rearview image. However, as
the agency previously noted in the ANPRM, we are currently not aware of
any display units installed by manufacturers which do not have adequate
display performance under a majority of lighting conditions. Further,
we recognize that the display performance aspect of the rear visibility
system is readily apparent to a driver. Therefore, the agency expects
vehicle manufacturers to continue to use capable displays in order to
meet the expectations of their customers. Additionally, we note that
our decision to not include minimum display performance requirements in
today's final rule does not relieve the manufacturers from providing a
reasonable level of display performance to ensure that their customers
are able to successfully utilize this important safety feature.
Finally, given the agency's decision not to include a minimum
display performance requirement, we note that the concerns cited by
Global Automakers and Panasonic in regards to the display luminance
test procedure are no longer applicable to today's final rule.
j. Durability Testing
In the ANRPM, the agency expressed concern regarding the
reliability of rear visibility systems and how well such systems would
perform under prolonged exposure to varying weather conditions. In
response to the ANPRM, IIHS commented that current rear visibility
systems have a wide range of quality in regards to weather resistance
and recommended NHTSA pursue a minimum standard. On the other hand,
Sony commented that cameras utilized in rear visibility systems are
generally well protected against the elements. Considering these
comments, the NRPM proposed to include vehicle level durability
performance requirements which stated that the rear view system must
still be able to display a compliant field of view after exposure to
corrosion, humidity, and temperature tests. We reasoned that adopting
existing requirements from our lighting standard (FMVSS No. 108) would
be appropriate as exterior rear visibility system components are
typically mounted similarly to vehicle lamps and are exposed to similar
weather conditions.
Comments
In general, the comments from manufacturers state that the
durability requirements proposed in the NPRM were impracticable as they
were proposed as vehicle standards. The Alliance noted that the
durability tests that were modeled after FMVSS No. 108 are frequently
performed at the component level when certified to FMVSS No. 108.
Global Automakers further stated that conducting these tests at the
vehicle level creates impracticable challenges. For example, its
members are unaware of any facility that will be able to perform the
temperature variation test on an item as large as a whole vehicle.
On the other hand, comments from suppliers took varying positions.
For example, Rosco agreed with the manufacturers that the standard
should require a component test instead of a vehicle test because
commercial vehicles have varying body styles and it would be
impractical to test all the different vehicle configurations. Sony
commented that its systems should not have any problem meeting the
durability requirements as they were proposed in the NPRM. Using a
different approach, Brigade recommended in its comments that the agency
instead consider ISO standards and consider adopting the International
Protection (dust/water resistance) rating of IP67 as a minimum standard
for durability. More specifically, Bosch recommended that the agency
consider the following standards: IEC 600068-2-1 Cold, IEC 60068-2-2
Dry Heat, IEC 60068-2-11 Salt Mist, IEC 60068-2-14 Temperature Cycling,
IEC 60068-2-27 Shock, IEC 60068-2-30 Damp Heat, IEC 60068-2-38
Temperature and Humidity Cycling, IEC 60068-2-52 Salt Mist, ISO 16750-1
General Environment, ISO 16750-2 Electric Loads, ISO 16750 Mechanical
Loads, ISO 16750 Climatic Loads, and ISO 16750 Chemical Loads.
Separately, Global Automakers requested clarification as to the
test procedure and whether or not the durability tests would be
performed in succession of each other.
Agency Response
Based on the comments received, the agency agrees that the vehicle
based durability requirements of the NPRM are impracticable and
therefore has adjusted these requirements to apply only to external
components. We believe that the requirements, as proposed in the NPRM,
would impose unnecessary certification costs without providing
significant additional safety benefits to the public beyond those
achievable through component level testing. We continue to be concerned
that component failure as a result of temperature variations, water
incursion, or corrosion may pose a safety risk to pedestrians and
believe that the tests proposed in the NPRM are the appropriate tests
to address this safety concern. However, we believe that testing
durability at a component level will provide substantially similar
protections to the public. Thus, in lieu of a vehicle standard, the
agency adopts the durability standards proposed in the NPRM for
external components.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ In addition to adopting the proposed durability
requirements from the NPRM on a component level, today's final rule
also makes a technical adjustment to the proposed salt spray test
procedure by using a newer version of the same ASTM salt spray
testing procedure. The NPRM proposed to subject the vehicle to two
24-hour cycles of salt spray testing in accordance with ASTM
Standard B117-73 (with one hour of rest in between each cycle). This
procedure proposed in the NPRM was the 1973 version of the ASTM
``Standard Method of Salt Spray (Fog) Testing.'' While this ASTM
standard does not establish threshold values for how long to expose
a given test specimen to the salt spray testing, it does provide the
methodology for conducting the test (e.g. specifications for the
water used in the test, the test chamber, etc.). Since the agency
has already incorporated by reference the 2003 version of this same
standard (ASTM B117-03) in FMVSS No. 106, the agency decided to
review both ASTM B117-73 and ASTM B117-03 to determine if it would
be more appropriate to incorporate the newer standard in today's
final rule. After conducting our review, we have concluded that
there are no differences between the 2003 version and 1973 version
of ASTM B117 that would lead to any significant changes in the
results of the salt spray testing. While we discovered that in
various instances (such as the water specifications and air supply
specifications) the 2003 version of the test procedure is more
specific (has a narrower tolerance range) than the 1973 version of
the test, the agency does not believe this will significantly alter
the test results or the burden of conducting the test. As in the
NPRM, the test specimens would still be subjected to two 24-hour
salt spray cycles with 1 hour of rest in between. Thus, as the
agency believes that the 2003 version of the ASTM standard may be
more readily available to the public and that the 2003 version does
not contain any significant changes as compared to the 1973 version,
the agency has decided to incorporate the 2003 version of ASTM B117
into today's final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Component Level Testing
The agency agrees with the Alliance that the durability
requirements in the NPRM contain considerable technical challenges for
a vehicle testing facility and that component level testing would be
more appropriate. A test facility capable of evaluating a vehicle for
the proposed temperature exposure test would require a vehicle sized
chamber to maintain a 176 [deg]F temperature and within 5 minutes
reduce the temperature to 32 [deg]F. The agency recognizes that
although such test facilities exist on a much smaller scale for
component level equipment such as vehicle lighting, a vehicle sized
chamber capable of removing the internal energy (heat) stored within
the mass of a vehicle and the air within the chamber would require
considerably greater power. Similarly, the agency agrees that precise
control of both temperature and humidity required by
[[Page 19225]]
the proposed humidity exposure test for a vehicle is not practical for
testing the rear visibility system. Finally, the agency notes that a
vehicle based corrosion test would require considerable quantities of
salt solution and application nozzles. While such a test facility may
be practical for the corrosion test, the agency believes that a
component level test is capable of achieving similar evaluations with
much less cost. Thus, today's final rule adopts the durability tests
proposed in the NPRM, but instead applies these tests on a component
level.
We believe that individual components, which are exposed to the
exterior of the vehicle, can be tested using an appropriate test
fixture to simulate the critical areas of interest and potential
failure. In order to accomplish this, the agency is specifying in the
regulatory text that an environmental test fixture be used during
compliance testing to simulate the body condition with respect to the
external components' orientation and sealing. We believe that proper
consideration of the orientation is an important factor in evaluating
both a component's ability to dissipate heat as well as to manage
water. Additionally we believe that a proper camera to body seal
simulation is important in predicting the level of performance of the
component's resistance to water intrusion when installed on the actual
vehicle. We believe that considering such conditions, component level
testing can achieve similar results as the vehicle tests presented in
the NPRM.
Adoption of Temperature, Humidity, and Salt Tests From the NPRM
The agency believes that the tests proposed in the NPRM are a
reasonable proxy for ensuring that rear visibility systems will not be
prone to failure when subjected to prolonged exposure to a range of
typical environmental conditions, representative of those experienced
in real-world vehicle use. The agency continues to believe that,
because the exterior components of rear visibility systems will be
mounted on a vehicle in locations which are exposed to similar weather
conditions as vehicle lamps, tests based on the requirements of FMVSS
No. 108 are appropriate. These durability tests from FMVSS No. 108
appropriately ensure that manufacturers account for various unique
design challenges that are present in automotive applications of the
components that the agency anticipates will be used in rear visibility
systems. The agency is concerned that without proper consideration and
testing, a rear visibility system utilizing a camera may experience
electronic component failure when exposed to thermal cycles. Likewise,
the lens portion of the optical system of the camera may be prone to
fogging or water intrusion as a result of exposure to humidity
variations or road spray conditions and thereby not provide a visible
rearview image.
The temperature and humidity tests both account for the ability of
rear visibility system exterior components to manage condensation. The
agency believes that is one of the most likely areas of failure for
rear visibility systems because designing exterior components with both
the ability to manage potential condensation inside the component,
during humidity and temperature variations, while also managing
external water intrusion is a particularly difficult engineering
challenge. The failure to manage either of these two water sources may
damage the rear visibility system. Further, it is important that
exterior components on a rear visibility system be designed to resist
salt corrosion. Unlike equipment designed for other applications,
equipment designed for application on a motor vehicle are exposed to a
significant amount of salt during normal use as many vehicles subject
to the requirements in today's final rule will be used on roads that
have been treated with salt for cold weather conditions.
To further ensure that the proposed tests in the NPRM are
appropriate for application to rear visibility systems, the agency has
evaluated several currently available rearview camera systems, on a
component level, utilizing a procedure based on the durability tests
proposed in the NPRM.\114\ As the agency anticipated, the majority of
rearview camera systems it evaluated performed well. However, because
these results were not consistent over the entire set of rearview
camera systems evaluated, the agency questions whether all rear
visibility systems used to fulfill the requirements of today's final
rule will perform well when subjected to the aforementioned tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Mazzae, E. N., Andrella, A. (2011). Rear Visibility System
Durability Testing Applied to Model Year 2010-2012 Light Vehicles.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Docket No. NHTSA-
2010-0162-0226.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe these types of system failures can create safety risks
and are the likely modes of failure for rear visibility systems.
Therefore, the agency believes that rear visibility systems should be
designed to resist these typical ambient conditions. Thus, while the
agency does not adopt the proposal in the NPRM to conduct these
durability tests on a vehicle level, the agency believes that these
tests continue to be important for ensuring the real-world reliability
of these important safety systems and adopts these tests on a component
level.
Consideration of Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards
As required under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act, the agency examined standards from various standards organizations
in order to ascertain if any voluntary industry consensus standards
were suitable for inclusion in today's final rule. Similarly to the
comments from Bosch and Brigade, we concluded that various aspects of
certain ISO standards and the IP rating system address similar concerns
that are covered by the durability tests adopted in today's final rule.
However, we have not included those standards in today's final rule for
several reasons.
First, while we agree with Bosch that ISO 16750-1 General
Environment, ISO 16750-2 Electric Loads, ISO 16750 Mechanical Loads,
ISO 16750 Climatic Loads, or ISO 16750 Chemical Loads can be used to
evaluate a rear visibility system's ability to resist environmental
conditions, we decline to adopt them in their entirety because these
standards cover performance requirements beyond those being considered
by the agency. The aforementioned ISO standards are collections of
various other voluntary industry standards which address many aspects
of performance that are useful for a manufacturer designing a vehicle
but not suitable for inclusion in a minimum safety standard. Beyond the
safety concerns that we identified in the paragraphs above, the
aforementioned ISO standards include aspects of performance such as
vibration/shock load protection and chemical resistance. In addition to
raising questions as to whether such additional requirements would be
within the scope of notice of this rulemaking, these voluntary
consensus standards cover aspects of performance where the agency does
not anticipate frequent failure. For example, the vibration/shock load
standard may be useful in evaluating the performance of other motor
vehicle equipment, but does not seem to be as crucial for a rear
visibility system where the agency anticipates manufacturers will use
equipment with few (if any) vulnerable moving parts.\115\ Further, the
agency does not anticipate rear visibility system components to fail
due to an inability to resist chemicals as rear visibility components
generally have a smaller
[[Page 19226]]
exterior surface than other exterior vehicle equipment and therefore
have limited exposure to chemicals such as gasoline and windshield
washer fluids. Additionally, these components will likely be designed
and mounted so as to dissipate liquids in order to meet our humidity
and salt spray performance standards. Thus, while the agency encourages
manufacturers to design rear visibility systems to be as reliable as
possible, the agency does not adopt any of the aforementioned ISO
standards as they cover additional aspects of performance that are not
suitable for inclusion in a minimum safety standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ For this same reason, we are not adopting IEC 60068-2-27
Shock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the agency considered the portions of the ISO standards
which directly address temperature, humidity, and salt resistance.
These portions of the ISO standards are IEC standards which have been
designed to test the aforementioned aspects of performance. IEC 600068-
2-1 Cold, IEC 60068-2-2 Dry Heat, and IEC 60068-2-14 Temperature
Cycling address the ability of the rear visibility system exterior
component to resist significant temperature variations. IEC 60068-2-30
Damp Heat and IEC 60068-2-38 Temperature and Humidity Cycling address
the ability of those same components to manage water and dissipate
condensation. Finally, IEC 60068-2-11 Salt Mist and IEC 60068-2-52 Salt
Mist address the ability of those exterior components to resist
corrosion due to prolonged exposure to salt. While many of these
standards are suitable for manufacturer use in designing vehicles we
conclude today that they are not suitable for incorporation into
today's final rule.
In regards to the temperature variation standards, IEC 600068-2-1
Cold, IEC 60068-2-2 Dry Heat are not suitable for incorporation into
today's rule because these standards merely establish a methodology for
exposing a given component to hot and cold conditions but do not
establish threshold values that the agency could use as a standard.
Thus, the agency examined IEC 60068-2-14 Temperature Cycling which
provides a test and the associated requirements to determine the
ability of components to withstand rapid changes in ambient
temperature. This standard is similar to the temperature test we have
adopted in today's final rule except for one significant difference.
Our proposed test requires that the sample be exposed to a high
temperature and then transitioned to exposure at a low temperature
within 5 minutes. IEC 60068-2-14 Temperature Cycling requires this
transition of temperatures to take place within no more than 3 minutes.
This rate of temperature change is significantly more severe than what
we proposed, and more severe than we believe is necessary. During our
tests of the exterior components of currently available rear visibility
systems, we found that durability performance was not consistent among
all the components tested.\116\ As the rear visibility systems selected
by the agency represent the type and quality of rear visibility systems
we expect manufacturers to be using to meet the requirements of today's
rule, the agency is concerned that this significant increase in
stringency of the temperature cycle test could impose a significantly
greater burden than is necessary. Accordingly, without additional
information regarding the possible benefits to be gained by this
increased stringency, the agency does not believe it is appropriate to
adopt a standard which requires the temperature variation between hot
and cold to occur within 3 minutes at this time. Therefore, we have not
included the requirements of IEC 60068-14 in this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Mazzae, E. N., Andrella, A. (2011). Rear Visibility System
Durability Testing Applied to Model Year 2010-2012 Light Vehicles,
supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also decline to adopt the two IEC standards which evaluate the
resistance of a component to temperature cycling in a high humidity
environment. We have not adopted IEC 60068-2-30 Damp Heat because it
does not contain a temperature range at the freezing point of water.
The agency believes that it is important for our humidity test to
include a freezing temperature condition because many vehicles sold in
the United States will be regularly exposed to these temperatures. It
is important that manufacturers design rear visibility systems which
properly manage condensation and its potential to freeze within the
rear visibility system component. If such condensation is not properly
managed, the agency is concerned that freezing condensation can create
a part failure when rear visibility systems are exposed to such
temperatures.
On the other hand, IEC 60068-2-38 Temperature and Humidity Cycling
does include a testing temperature below freezing. However, it contains
a temperature range which is significantly greater than those proposed
in the NPRM. IEC 60068-2-38 Temperature and Humidity Cycling requires
that components be exposed to a high temperature of 65 [deg]C and a low
temperature of -10 [deg]C. As the purpose of the temperature cycle is
to test the ability of an exterior component to manage water
condensation which forms as the temperature decreases, we do not
believe such a large temperature range is necessary. The test included
in today's final rule includes temperatures which simulate a hot and
humid climate and then reduces that temperature to freezing. We believe
that this temperature range is sufficient to create the conditions of
water condensation on the exterior components being tested and the
freezing of that condensation. The agency is not aware of any need to
include in the humidity test temperature conditions as varied as those
from IEC 60068-2-38 Temperature and Humidity Cycling as the agency will
still test the ability of these components to resist significant
temperature variations through the temperature cycling test. Further,
as mentioned above in our discussion of IEC 60068-2-14 Temperature
Cycling, the agency does not wish to introduce requirements in today's
final rule that may be more stringent or costly than those proposed in
the NPRM without any information demonstrating an increased safety
benefit to the public. Therefore, we have not included IEC 60068-2-38
in this final rule.
In today's final rule, we also have not adopted IEC 60068-2-11 and
IEC 60068-2-52, which relate to salt mist. In our review of IEC 60068-
2-11, we found that this test is designed primarily for the purpose of
comparing the resistance to corrosion from salt mist of specimens of
similar construction. Such a test seems to be for the purpose of
ensuring that when a manufacturer is producing many copies of the same
product, they all conform to the same quality standards. As this test
is most useful as a quality/uniformity measurement, and not as a
minimum performance standard, we have chosen not to use this test in
this final rule.
However, the second salt mist test (IEC 60068-2-52) is similar to
our proposed test in many ways. As with our proposal, this test exposes
the test sample to a salt mist within a high humidity environment using
atomizers at an elevated temperature. The primary difference is that
the IEC standard cycle (specifically the severity levels (3) through
(6) which are applicable to automotive applications) expose the test
sample to a salt mist for 2 hours, and then expose the sample to a high
humidity climate for 22 hours. Our proposed test cycle subjects the
sample to a salt mist for 24 hours, with a 1 hour rest period. However,
in spite of the different durations of application for the salt mist,
we believe that the tests are similar because continued exposure to a
high humidity environment is the most
[[Page 19227]]
important condition that needs to be maintained during the test cycle.
Maintaining conditions of high-humidity is crucial because after the
application of the salt mist, increased humidity encourages corrosion.
As this condition occurs in both tests, we do not anticipate that one
test will be more or less stringent than the other.\117\ In spite of
this similarity, today's final rule adopts the salt mist test proposed
in the NPRM because it is a standard that industry has experience using
for the purposes of certifying compliance with FMVSS No. 108 and
because it also utilizes a voluntary industry consensus standard (from
ASTM \118\). Therefore, we have chosen not to use the IEC standard
60068-2-52 for the corrosion test of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ The continued application of salt mist creates a high-
humidity condition. Therefore, while one test applies the salt mist
for 2 hours and the other for 24 hours, both tests maintain a high
humidity condition for 24 hours of each test cycle.
\118\ As noted above, today's final rule utilizes the 2003
version of the ASTM standard instead of the 1973 version because the
agency has determined that there are no significant differences
between these two versions of the standard and the agency believes
that the 2003 version will be more readily accessible to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Separately, we note that Brigade suggested IP67 as an appropriate
minimum standard. The IP rating is a system which rates a component's
resistance to solid and liquid substance intrusion. The first number
following the IP letters is the solid substance intrusion rating and
the second number is the liquid substance rating. We decline to adopt
IP67 as a minimum standard because we are concerned that IP67 may be
too stringent. The number 6 in IP67 prohibits any level of solid
substance intrusion (including dust intrusion). We note that a level 5
on the same IP rating scale would permit a small amount of dust
intrusion. Dust is not one of the major failure modes that the agency
has identified and the agency is concerned that establishing a solid
substance intrusion standard of 6 may be overly stringent considering
the fact that the agency is less concerned with dust intrusion than
with the ability of the rear visibility system component to dissipate
condensation. The agency is also concerned that the use of the standard
of 7 for the liquid substance intrusion may be overly stringent.
Establishing the liquid substance intrusion standard of 7 in IP67 would
require that the component be immersed in water at a depth of up to 1
meter for a duration of 30 minutes. To test the exterior component in
this fashion, would not take into account the mounting angle/
orientation of the component (and possibly other design features) that
can be used to dissipate water. Thus, to require an IP67 rating for
rear visibility system exterior components may preclude certain water/
moisture management strategies and may be unnecessarily design
restrictive without offering any significant additional protection to
the public.
Clarification of Order of Testing
In response to Global Automakers request for clarification as to
the order of testing, we agree that the proposed test procedure in the
NPRM did not describe the order in which the tests will be performed
and when the rear visibility equipment will be evaluated for the field
of view and image size requirements. Thus, we have amended the
regulatory text to clarify that the field of view and image size
performance requirements will be evaluated at the conclusion of each of
the three durability tests.
k. Phase-In
The K.T. Safety Act requires that regulations established by this
rule prescribe a phase-in schedule which requires full compliance with
this rule no later than 48 months after the issuance of today's final
rule. The K.T. Safety Act further instructs NHTSA to consider
prioritizing different vehicle types in the phase-in schedule based on
data on the frequency by which different vehicle types are involved in
backing incidents. In comments on the ANPRM, Honda and AIAM expressed
concern over the feasibility of a 48-month phase-in schedule. They
noted that depending on the requirements of the final rule, a 48-month
phase-in schedule could require manufacturers to conduct expensive
``off-cadence'' redesigns for their vehicles outside of the normal
redesign schedule. Instead, these commenters suggested that a six year
phase-in schedule would be reasonable.
The NPRM declined to allow a six year phase-in schedule as the K.T.
Safety Act requires a phase-in schedule which mandates full compliance
by 48 months. However, in order to address the commenters' concerns,
the NPRM proposed a ``rear-loaded'' phase-in schedule with a first year
phase-in requirement that is lower than the number of vehicles already
anticipated to be equipped with rear visibility systems. Specifically,
we proposed a phase-in schedule which would have no requirements for
the first year after publication of the final rule, require 10 percent
in the second year, 40 percent in the third year, and full compliance
at the end of the 48-month statutory period. The NPRM proposed to apply
this same phase-in schedule separately to passenger cars and MPVs.
To provide additional flexibility, the NPRM proposed to include
limited carry-forward credits in order to enable manufacturers to count
early compliance towards the phase-in targets. To accomplish this, the
proposed regulatory text expanded the period during which manufacturers
could count compliant vehicles for the second and third year targets of
the phase-in period. For the second year phase-in target of 10 percent,
the proposed text allowed manufacturers to count all vehicles produced
between the publication of the final rule and the end of the second
year. For the third year phase-in target of 40 percent, the proposed
text allowed manufacturers to count all vehicles produced between the
publication of the final rule and the end of the third year (as long as
those vehicles had not been counted towards the second year's target).
As the K.T. Safety Act requires full compliance with this regulation by
the end of the 48-month period, the carry-forward credit system
proposed in the NPRM did not allow for credits to be carried beyond the
48-month deadline.
Finally, we proposed to exclude limited line, small, and multistage
manufacturers from the phase-in schedule and proposed to require that
they be fully compliant by the end of the statutory phase-in period of
48-months. The agency reasoned that small, limited line, and multistage
manufacturers face unique circumstances which necessitate additional
flexibility. We noted that these manufacturers have longer product
cycles and lack the sufficient number of product lines in order to
efficiently apply redesigns to only a portion of their fleet as
contemplated by a phase-in schedule. Thus we proposed, as we have in
previous rules that provided a phase-in, to afford these manufacturers
additional flexibility.
Comments
In response to the NPRM, the agency received comments from
manufacturers generally expressing concern that the proposed phase-in
schedule would require manufacturers to conduct expensive, ``off-
cadence'' redesigns of their vehicles. The Alliance noted that while
many manufacturers are currently installing rear visibility systems on
their vehicles, the majority of these systems are unable to meet the
entire set of performance requirements proposed in the NPRM. In order
to increase flexibility and ensure that the regulation remains
practicable, the Alliance
[[Page 19228]]
comments (supported by many of the individual manufacturer comments)
offered a number of suggestions.
First, the Alliance comments suggested delaying all requirements
other than the field of view requirements until the end of the 48-month
phase-in period. Noting the additional supply constraints from the
March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the Alliance stated that
enabling individual manufacturers to incorporate the additional
rearview image performance requirements during the 48-month phase-in
period would allow time for proper system design and validation.
Second, the Alliance recommended combining the passenger and light
truck fleets in order to maximize flexibility for meeting the phase-in
targets. General Motors asserted that the NPRM offered no support for a
separate phase-in schedule between passenger and light truck fleets.
Conversely, Porsche requested that the phase-in schedule be completely
eliminated.
Finally, the Alliance also recommended that the agency adopt
``carry forward'' credits in order to expedite the implementation of
rear visibility systems. In addition, varying suggestions from
individual manufacturers express different positions on whether or not
the carry forward credits should be allowed for use against the 48-
month, 100% compliance deadline. For example, BMW specifically
requested that carry forward credits be available for the final, 48-
month, 100% compliance deadline. Volkswagen recommended a slightly
different scenario requesting the agency allow carry forward credits
for the 48-month, 100% compliance deadline but eliminate those credits
a year after the 48-month compliance deadline.
Separately, the Alliance comments also requested that incomplete
vehicles/multistage manufacturers be afforded an additional year beyond
the normal phase in schedule. NTEA supported this concern by requesting
that multistage manufacturers be given an additional year of phase-in
time in order to have time to determine their compliance strategy after
the OEMs have come into full compliance.
Agency Response
The phase-in schedule established by today's rule, excluding small
volume and multi-stage manufacturers, is as follows:
0% of the vehicles manufactured before May 1, 2016;
10% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2016,
and before May 1, 2017;
40% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2017,
and before May 1, 2018; and
100% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2018.
The phase-in schedule proposed in the NPRM was based on an
assumption that most of the current systems met the requirements of the
rule or could be easily modified to comply with the requirements of the
rule. Based on comments received, the agency has learned that many of
the currently available systems are unable to comply with all of the
additional requirements beyond those involving the required field of
view without significant design modifications. As the agency wishes to
maximize today's final rule safety benefits while avoiding imposing a
significant additional cost burden on manufacturers beyond those
anticipated in the NPRM, today's final rule delays the compliance date
for all the performance requirements other than field of view until the
end of the 48-month phase-in deadline mandated by the K.T. Safety
Act.\119\
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\119\ We note that, during this phase-in period, manufacturers
will still have an incentive to design systems that meet the image
size and image response time criteria in NCAP. As mentioned above,
in order to be listed as a ``Recommended Advanced Technology
Feature'' in NCAP, rearview video systems will need to meet field of
view, image size, and image response time criteria that are similar
to the requirements adopted in today's final rule. While the agency
does not believe that it is practical to compel manufacturers to
redesign their systems to meet all these requirements during the
phase-in period, NCAP will still offer consumers comparative
information on rearview video systems. NCAP will help consumers
identify rearview video systems that meet these additional criteria
and are better able to assist drivers in avoiding backover crashes.
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In spite of this adjustment to the phase-in schedule, the agency
does not expect a negative impact on the estimated safety benefits of
today's final rule. While the image size, response time, deactivation,
durability and linger time requirements are important in addressing
various safety concerns, the delay of these requirements in the phase-
in is not expected to significantly affect the estimated effectiveness
because the research conducted by NHTSA utilized systems which were not
designed to conform to all of the requirements of today's final rule.
In addition, the agency believes that this adjustment to the phase-in
schedule can lead to a net increase in safety benefits as it will
enable manufacturers to focus, in the near term, their resources on
installing rear visibility systems on more vehicles instead of
utilizing those resources to conform existing rear visibility systems
to all the requirements of this rule by the second year phase-in
target.
However, the agency continues to believe that the requirements
beyond those pertaining to the field of view in today's final rule are
important to ensure the long-term quality of this important safety
equipment. The agency notes that rear visibility systems have currently
been designed to be equipped on vehicles as a cost-option or for more
expensive vehicles. As rear visibility systems are required under
today's final rule to be equipped to all vehicles with a GVWR less than
10,000 pounds, the agency is concerned with ensuring that these rear
visibility systems will meet minimum performance standards even when
installed on relatively low-cost vehicles in the future. The agency
believes that, while relieving the manufacturers of the burden of
complying with the requirements of today's rule beyond the field of
view requirements during the phase-in period can lead to a net increase
in safety benefits in the near term, all the requirements in today's
final rule are important towards ensuring the long-term quality of rear
visibility systems.
As mentioned above, the comments on the NPRM demonstrate that the
costs of bringing existing rear visibility systems into compliance with
all of the requirements of today's final rule (by the second year
phase-in target) are significantly greater than the agency anticipated.
In the NPRM we proposed a ``rear-loaded'' phase-in period which
required a second year phase-in target of 10% and a third year target
of 40% in order to afford the manufacturers a significant amount of
flexibility. However, we acknowledge the comments from the
manufacturers and agree that to require rear visibility systems which
currently do not comply with all of the requirements in today's final
rule to become compliant by the second year phase-in target would
compel manufacturers to conduct significant redesigns outside of the
normal product cycle. In the NPRM, we considered the proposed phase-in
schedule to be appropriate as we assumed that most rear visibility
systems currently available on the market would be able to meet the
requirements proposed in the NPRM. In addition, the costs/benefits
analysis in the NPRM was also based on this assumption as it did not
consider the costs of redesigning rear visibility systems within the
phase-in period. In order to avoid significantly increasing the costs
of this rule, today's final rule does not require that manufacturers
conduct costly product redesigns by the second year phase-in target. As
[[Page 19229]]
suggested by the Alliance, allowing additional flexibility for
manufacturers to incorporate the additional design changes at any point
before the 48 month deadline will allow time for proper system design
and validation.
However, today's final rule adopts the phase-in schedule proposed
in the NPRM in regards to the field of view requirements. We believe
that the field of view requirements are the most appropriate
requirements to phase-in according to the schedule adopted by today's
final rule because they are crucial requirements that enable drivers to
see and avoid striking pedestrians behind the vehicle. In addition,
testing conducted by the agency indicates that the vast majority of
rear visibility systems are currently able to meet the field of view
requirements of today's final rule. Thus, by only requiring that the
field of view requirements be phased-in according to the schedule in
today's final rule, we believe that most, if not all, current systems
can now be used to meet the phase-in requirements as anticipated in the
NPRM.
Further, today's final rule no longer requires separate phase-in
schedules for passenger cars and MPVs, trucks, low-speed vehicles, and
buses. As we have noted on many occasions, while the crash data suggest
that larger vehicles such as MPVs represent a larger portion of the
fatalities, they do not represent a disproportionate amount of backover
crashes in general. Thus, the agency agrees with the comments from
General Motors that a separate phase-in schedule would not support the
safety goals of this rulemaking. As noted in the regulatory impact
analysis, manufacturers have installed a greater portion of their rear
visibility systems on larger vehicles such as trucks and MPVs.\120\ As
the agency anticipates that manufacturers will continue this pattern
with a combined fleet phase-in schedule, the agency has added the
flexibility for manufacturers to combine their passenger car and light
truck fleets for the purposes of phase-in compliance.
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\120\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
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Considering this additional flexibility, the agency no longer
believes the carry forward credit system is necessary as suggested by
the Alliance, BMW, and Volkswagen for the following reasons. First, we
note that the carry-forward credit systems proposed by BMW and
Volkswagen cannot be implemented as they extend beyond the 48-month
``full compliance'' deadline required by the K.T. Safety Act. As we
interpret the K.T. Safety Act, allowing carry-forward credits to be
used towards the final, 100% compliance, year of the phase-in would not
constitute ``full compliance'' within the meaning of the Act. Second,
as the agency has adjusted the phase-in schedule to afford additional
flexibility through minimizing the requirements that must be met at the
beginning of the schedule, we no longer believe it is necessary to
utilize a carry-forward credit system to further alleviate the burden
of compliance. We also note that adopting a carry-forward credit system
will instead increase the compliance burden on manufacturers by
requiring manufacturers to file additional compliance documents with
the agency while still being unable to afford the additional
flexibility beyond the 48-month statutory deadline as requested by the
commenters. Therefore, today's final rule has not included a carry-
forward credit system with the phase-in schedule.
Today's final rule also adopts the exclusions proposed in the NPRM
for limited line, small, and multistage manufacturers from the phase-in
schedule and simply requires full compliance at the 48-month statutory
deadline. The agency continues to reason that small, limited line, and
multistage manufactures face unique circumstances, mentioned above,
which support the need for additional flexibility. However, due to the
restrictions in the K.T. Safety Act, we cannot accommodate the request
of multistage manufacturers to be afforded a phase-in schedule which
allows an extension beyond the 48-month deadline.
Finally, we note that the phase-in schedule has been adjusted so
that the first year of the schedule begins on May 1, 2014 (with the
first compliance year as between May 1, 2016 and April 30, 2017). The
agency believes that adjustment in the phase-in schedule is appropriate
in order to ensure that manufacturers would have the amount of time
that Congress authorized the agency to allot for the phase-in period
under the K.T. Safety Act.
l. Remaining Issues
Finally, the agency received other comments on the NPRM on the
following additional issues. We have examined these comments and
respond to them in turn in the paragraphs that follow.
Executive Order 13045
In addition to their comments mentioned above, KidsAndCars.org
noted that Executive Order 13045 requires that federal agencies
evaluate the environmental health or safety effects that an
economically significant rule may have on children and explain why the
approach selected is preferable to other potentially effective and
reasonably feasible alternatives. KidsAndCars.org stated in its
comments that this rulemaking is economically significant and that
NHTSA is required, under Executive Order 13045, to provide the
aforementioned analysis.
Agency Response
As explained below in section V, Regulatory Analyses, we agree that
Executive Order 13045 is applicable to this rulemaking. Pursuant to the
criteria set forth in Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, we agree with
KidsAndCars.org that this rulemaking is economically significant and is
subject to the requirements of Executive Order 13045. As we have noted
below in section V, the health and safety effects of this rule on
children are a central concern of this rulemaking. Thus, the
environmental health and safety effects, and the potential alternatives
to this rule are extensively discussed directly in this preamble and
the accompanying regulatory impact analysis for today's final rule.
Driver Education and Driver Distraction
As noted in above is section II, Background and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, many individual commenters stated that driver education
would contribute significantly towards reducing backover crashes. In
addition, KidsAndCars.org also commented that driver education will be
crucial in ensuring that drivers are trained and able to effectively
utilize the required rear visibility systems. In a related issue,
individual commenters also expressed concern that drivers will be
distracted by rearview images and focus on the displays instead of
being aware of their surroundings.
Agency Response
While we noted in the NPRM that driver education may lead to
greater effectiveness statistics for rear visibility systems, NHTSA
currently has not yet established a new driver education campaign to
complement this rulemaking. In the K.T. Safety Act, Congress was
concerned with the expansion of the required field of view behind the
vehicle in order to avoid backover crashes. Thus, this rulemaking
focused on the possible rearview countermeasures and how they could be
used to expand the rear field of view as contemplated by Congress. In
general, the agency is aware of the benefit of driver education when it
comes to all
[[Page 19230]]
crash avoidance technologies. We will continue to use www.safercar.gov
to support these efforts and carefully consider if any additional
action is warranted.
In addition, as described in our earlier discussion on linger time,
deactivation, and backing event, NHTSA shares the individual
commenters' concern that drivers may be distracted by the rearview
images from being aware of their surroundings. Thus, we have aimed in
today's final rule to ensure that the rearview image is presented to
the driver only under appropriate circumstances by including
restrictions on when the image shall be displayed in relation to the
defined backing event. While the agency notes that the rearview image
will divert some driver attention away from the rearview mirrors or
windows during a backing maneuver, we believe that the increased field
of view afforded to the driver through the rear visibility system will,
on the whole, increase the driver's awareness of his or her
surroundings.
Color/Real-time Rear Visibility Systems
While the NPRM did not propose specifications to require that rear
visibility systems display the rearview image in color or in real time,
two suppliers commented that such requirements would be appropriate.
Sony commented that, as third party research indicates that humans
possess a greater ability to recognize objects in a color environment,
a color camera and display system should be required. In addition,
Rosco was concerned that when a rearview video system is integrated
with various other vehicle systems, there may be a time delay in which
could affect the rear visibility system's effectiveness.
Agency Response
While the agency acknowledges the concerns from Sony and Rosco, the
agency is unaware of any rearview video systems, currently offered on
the market, which do not offer a rearview that is both in color and in
real-time. We note that, as rearview displays are items of automotive
equipment that drivers will frequently interact with, we believe it is
reasonable to expect the decision making process of manufacturers to be
significantly influenced by consumer expectations. Thus, we decline to
establish requirements in today's final rule requiring that rear
visibility systems use color displays as suggested by Sony. To do as
Sony suggests would unnecessarily complicate today's rule and the cost
of compliance as manufacturers would be required to certify not only
that their vehicles have color displays--but color displays that meet a
certain minimum standard. We also decline to set a ``real-time video''
performance standard as requested by Rosco for similar reasons. To
require manufacturers meet to real-time video performance standards
would increase the cost of compliance, while providing no demonstrated
increase in safety benefit from the rear visibility systems that we
expect manufacturers to be utilizing to meet the requirements of
today's rule.
Multistage Vehicles
In its comments, NTEA requested that testing be conducted more on
the component level in order to afford the multistage manufacturers
maximum flexibility in utilizing different cameras to meet the
standard. Further, NTEA requested confirmation that the rear visibility
camera would not have to be mounted behind temporarily attached
equipment such as a salt or sand spreader which is temporarily mounted
to the trailer hitch of a pickup truck.
Agency Response
The agency appreciates the concerns of the multistage
manufacturers. We recognize that many of the requirements of today's
final rule are dependent on the presentation of the test objects behind
the vehicle, through a rear visibility system, in relation to the
vehicle and the driver. Since the goals of today's final rule include
the driver's ability to view pedestrians within the backing path of his
or her vehicle, it is necessary to establish performance requirements
in relation to attributes such as the driver eye point and the vehicle
rear bumper. Thus, the test procedure adopted by today's final rule
inevitably must incorporate various tests on the vehicle level.
However, we note that the test procedure in today's final rule
prescribes the method by which the agency will conduct compliance
testing. Thus, it does not preclude manufacturers (such as multistage
vehicle manufacturers) from conducting testing in a different manner as
long as the rear visibility system will meet all the requirements of
today's rule when installed and tested, by the agency, according to the
test procedure described in today's rule.
Finally, we also acknowledge NTEA's concerns that temporary
equipment installed by the vehicle owner, such as salt or sand
spreaders, may be restricted by today's final rule. However, we note
that today's rule does not apply to trailers and other temporary
equipment that can be installed by the vehicle owner.
Persons With Disabilities
The K.T. Safety Act directs the agency not only to issue a
regulation to reduce death and injury resulting from backover crashes,
but to particularly examine crashes involving small children and
disabled persons. As described above, the agency examined the FARS and
NASS-GES databases to determine whether or not persons with
disabilities are frequently involved in backover crashes. While the
agency identified various cases in the databases between the years 2007
and 2010 that involved persons with disabilities, the data do not
indicate that such persons were frequently involved in backover
crashes.
The FARS and NASS-GES data (from 2007-2010) show one case that
involves a vision-impaired individual that resulted in a fatality and
two cases involving persons in a wheelchair that resulted in injuries.
As we noted above, the agency found other cases where the individual
was specified as ``impaired'' (1 in FARS, and 11 in NASS-GES). For
these cases, the agency is not able to identify whether the person was
``impaired'' due to a physical disability (temporary or otherwise) or
due to some other cause. However, even considering all the
aforementioned cases, the data suggests (on the whole) that persons
with disabilities are infrequently involved in backover crashes.
While the data do not suggest persons with disabilities are
frequently involved with backover cases, the agency believes that such
persons will benefit from the requirements of today's final rule in a
similar way to other pedestrians. While persons using wheelchairs would
generally be lower in height when compared to a standing adult, such
persons would unlikely be shorter than the 18-month-old toddler (upon
which agency has based the 0.8-meter height of its test objects). As
described in our discussion of our test objects and field of view
requirements in today's final rule, using the 0.8 meter test object
located beyond the width of the vehicle (at 5 feet to either side of
the vehicle longitudinal centerline) enables the agency to ensure that
the 18-month-old toddler will be covered by the required rear
visibility system as he/she moves towards the vehicle's longitudinal
centerline. The same is true for persons in wheelchairs. As it is
highly unlikely that a person in a wheelchair would be shorter than the
0.8 meter test object, the agency believes that such persons would be
visible in all the relevant areas behind the vehicle (through the
required rear visibility system) that are associated with the highest
crash risk.
[[Page 19231]]
Similarly, the agency believes that persons with other forms of
disabilities will also be visible to a driver using a rear visibility
system meeting the requirements of today's final rule. Persons using
crutches or other similar mobility aides will also generally be taller
than the 0.8-meter test object as these individuals are generally
standing when using their mobility aid. Further, vision- or hearing-
impaired persons will also be readily visible to the driver using a
rear visibility system meeting the requirements of today's final rule
as such a person would also be typically standing when located in the
relevant areas behind the vehicle.
Further, the available data indicate that persons with disabilities
would not move into the vehicle blind zone at a speed that is
significantly greater or different than the test speed used by NHTSA in
the 2012 research that used a moving obstacle presentation (2.3
mph).\121\ In the agency's review of the available research, the agency
found various studies that state that persons using wheelchairs
generally travel at a speed between 0.96 and 2.42 mph.\122\ As the
agency does not anticipate that persons with other types of
disabilities may move into the vehicle's blind zone at a speed greater
than persons using wheelchairs, the agency believes that drivers will
be able to use the rear visibility system required by today's final
rule to avoid backover crashes with persons with disabilities. Thus,
while the data do not indicate that persons with disabilities are
frequently involved in backover crashes, the agency believes that the
requirements in today's final rule will nonetheless enable drivers to
detect and to avoid potential backover crashes that may involve a
person with a disability.
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\121\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253, Rearview Video System
Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle Scenario.
\122\ See generally Tolerico, M.L., Ding, D., Cooper, R.A.,
Spaeth, D.M., Fitzgerald, S.G., Cooper, R., Kelleher, A., Boninger,
M.L., (2007) Assessing mobility characteristics and activity levels
of manual wheelchair users, J Rehabil Res Dev. 2007;44(4):561-71;
Kaminski, B.A, (2004) Application of a Commercial Datalogger to
Electric Powered and Manual Wheelchairs of Children, available at
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-11292004-115314/unrestricted/Thesis2.pdf; Sonenblum, S.E., Sprigle, S., Lopez, R.A.,
(2012) Manual Wheelchair Use: Bouts of Mobility in Everyday Life,
available at http://www.hindawi.com/journals/rerp/2012/753165/;
Cooper, R.A., Thorman, T., Cooper, R., Dvorznak, M.J., Fitzgerald,
S.G., Ammer W., Guo, S.F., Ph.D., Boninger, M.L., (2002) Driving
Characteristics of Electric-Powered Wheelchair Users: How Far, Fast,
and Often Do People Drive?, available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~cga/
behavior/epw-datalogger.pdf; Ikeda, H., Mihoshi A., Nomura T.,
Ishibashi T., (2003) Comparison of Electric and Manual Wheelchairs
Using an Electrocardiogram, available at http://www.union-services.com/aevs/449-452.pdf.
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Additional Research From IIHS and UMTRI
While the NCAP request for comments and final decision notices are
a separate agency action that is independent from the actions taken in
today's final rule, various commenters to the NCAP request for comments
mentioned additional research that may contain information relevant to
this rulemaking action. The first comment was from the Alliance
regarding the potential contents of a forthcoming study by the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI). The
second comment was from IIHS on data that they obtained through their
Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI).
Forthcoming UMTRI Study
The Alliance and General Motors both commented to the NCAP request
for comments that a forthcoming study from the University of Michigan
Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) examining the effectiveness
of rear video systems is likely to be available soon. They asserted
that, if the study shows that rearview video systems are already having
a significant impact on reducing crashes, then it may not be necessary
to include various performance requirements for these systems.
As we stated in the NCAP final decision notice, the agency is
encouraged that organizations continue to devote resources to
researching backover crashes. Unfortunately, this additional
information from the referenced UMTRI study is currently unavailable
for analysis. However, the agency believes that the information
resulting from this study is unlikely to alter the agency's regulatory
decisions in today's final rule. As the commenters suggest, the results
of the study may indicate that rearview video systems are already
having an effect on reducing backover crashes.
However, even if the results of the study are as the commenters
anticipate, the agency believes that minimum performance requirements
are still appropriate and necessary in order to ensure that the rear
visibility systems installed on vehicles in compliance with FMVSS No.
111 are systems that can assist drivers in avoiding backover crashes.
While the currently available systems being equipped on vehicles may
already help drivers avoid backover crashes, the available data still
indicate that the performance requirements adopted in today's final
rule address various conditions under which a poor-performing system
could lead to increased backover safety risk. As we noted above in our
discussion of SCI cases with rearview video systems, it is important
that future systems be designed to show the rearview image to the
driver as early as possible so that the driver will be able to see any
pedestrian behind the vehicle and avoid the crash.
Further, we believe that minimum performance requirements are
necessary--even if current systems meet those requirements. Without
performance requirements established in an FMVSS, NHTSA would not be
able to ensure that future systems would continue to be effective in
helping drivers avoid backover crashes.
IIHS Highway Loss Data Institute Information
Separately, IIHS commented in response to the NCAP request for
comments that they support NHTSA's efforts to promote countermeasures
that assist drivers in avoiding backover crashes. They also noted that
the available data show that rearview video systems greatly increase
visibility behind the vehicle and should create a measureable effect on
reducing backing crashes. However, they stated that the preliminary
data that they have gathered from their Highway Loss Data Institute
(HLDI), to date, provide little evidence at this time that these
systems are preventing crashes and reducing loss at a measurable
rate.\123\ We have reviewed the available information from HLDI that
shows a lack of a statistical difference in one instance and a
statistically significant increase in claims in another instance.\124\
However, due to the preliminary nature and the directional
inconsistencies in the data, we do not believe that this information
should lead the agency to conclude differently on the effectiveness of
the available technologies considered in this document.
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\123\ This apparent inconsistency between the cited substantial
increase in rear visibility and the lack of reduction in real world
insurance data claims may be associated with a few potential
factors. First, there is a limited amount of insurance data due to
these systems being relatively new. Second, these crashes are a
relatively small proportion of the overall vehicle claims. Finally,
the study considers data beyond backover crash data. This comparison
may contain confounding factors that do not reduce the utility of
this information for the purposes of IIHS, but it does not contain
information specific enough for make conclusions about rearview
video systems for the purposes of this analysis.
\124\ Bulletin Vol. 28, No. 13: December 2011 and Bulletin Vol.
29, No. 7: April 2012
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In their HLDI study, IIHS compared insurance claim frequencies for
various categories such as physical damage to the at-fault vehicle
(collision coverage)
[[Page 19232]]
and physical damage to a struck vehicle or property (property damage
liability coverage). This study focused on select Mazda and Mercedes-
Benz vehicle models with and without rearview video systems. In
general, they stated that, for these models, they did not observe
statistically significant reductions in claim frequencies and in some
cases found that cars with cameras had increased claims.\125\ For
example, in their analysis of crash data for Mercedes-Benz vehicles (a
more robust data set than the analysis of the Mazda vehicles \126\)
with and without rearview video systems, IIHS did not find a
statistically significant difference in any of the claim frequencies
(which may be partially attributable to the data's wide confidence
interval). In addition, the authors of the study of Mercedes-Benz
vehicles noted that the transmission status was unknown (i.e., whether
the vehicle was in reverse or not). Thus, for those vehicles, all crash
types were considered--including those for which rearview video systems
cannot be reasonably expected to prevent.\127\
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\125\ For Mazda vehicles ``the only significant effect on claim
frequency was a paradoxical increase in collision claims. There was
also a decrease in high-severity claims for bodily injury,
suggesting a reduction in collisions with nonoccupants.'' For
Mercedes vehicles there were no statistically significant changes in
any of the five insurance coverage types.
\126\ Mercedes vehicles had four times as many insured vehicle
years in the database as Mazda vehicles.
\127\ A more detailed discussion of these studies is available
in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis--available in the docket
referenced at the beginning of this document.
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The agency understands that the types of crashes contemplated by
Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (backover crashes) occur much less
frequently than all property damage crashes. This makes it more
difficult to find statistical significance using the Highway Loss Data
Institute methodology. As IIHS stated in their comments, this data is
still preliminary data. Further, this data is not designed to isolate
the effect of rearview video systems on the specific type of crashes
that we are addressing in this document--backover crashes. Thus, when
considering these studies as well as the other available studies
completed by NHTSA and other organizations, including all the
limitations within the methodologies, the data continue to show that
the installation of rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of
today's final rule will decrease the risk of pedestrian backover
crashes. However, with more data, the HLDI methodology may be valuable
in the future for examining the overall effect of rearview video
systems.
m. Effective Date
Section 30111(d) of title 49, United States Code, provides that a
Federal motor vehicle safety standard may not become effective before
the 180th day after the standard is prescribed or later than one year
after it is prescribed except when a different effective date is, for
good cause shown, in the public interest. Pursuant to the K.T. Safety
Act (requiring that the agency establish a phase-in schedule with a
full compliance date no later than 48 months after this final rule is
issued), today's final rule requires compliance in accordance with a
phase-in schedule. This schedule establishes May 1, 2016 as the first
compliance date with full compliance being required by May 1, 2018. For
the reasons mentioned in our discussion of the phase-in, above, the
agency believes that there is good cause and it is in the public
interest to use the aforementioned phase-in schedule. The agency
believes that the phase-in schedule contained in today's final rule
affords the manufacturers an appropriate amount of time to meet the
phase-in production targets and achieve full compliance by May 1, 2018.
IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits
Based on the data from FARS, NASS-GES, and NiTS, NHTSA estimates
that backing crashes result in 410 fatalities and 42,000 injuries
annually. Of these backing crashes, backover crashes (which involve a
vehicle striking a non-occupant of the vehicle) contribute to an
estimated 267 fatalities and about 15,000 injuries \128\ annually.
However, backover crashes involving vehicles with a GVWR of under
10,000 pounds account for an estimated 210 fatalities and 15,000
injuries annually.
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\128\ Due to rounding, injuries for light vehicles and all
vehicles are estimated to be 15,000.
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a. System Effectiveness
As we mentioned in the NPRM, three factors must be present for a
rear visibility system to avoid a backover crash and thereby provide a
safety or other benefit. We have designated these factors
FA, FS, and FDR. In the agency's
estimates regarding the effectiveness of the countermeasure required by
today's final rule, we combine all three of these factors in order to
determine the impact that countermeasures meeting the requirements of
today's final rule will have in preventing backover crashes.
Defining Factors FA, FS, and FDR
The first factor is designated as factor FA. This factor
examines whether or not the crash is one that is ``avoidable'' through
the use of the device. In this factor, the pedestrian must be within
the target range (i.e., design range) for the sensor, or the viewable
area of the camera or mirror. In other words, the details and geometric
parameters of the specific crash scenario must be such that (assuming
perfect system function and driver use) the crash would be avoidable.
In summary, factor FA separates the avoidable crash
scenarios from the unavoidable crash scenarios.
The second factor is designated as factor FS. This
factor assesses whether or not the system will detect the presence of a
pedestrian behind the vehicle and output the appropriate visual display
or otherwise warn the driver. This factor assumes that the pedestrian
is within the system's design range and that the driver will react
appropriately to the warning. In other words, this factor asks whether
or not the device will successfully detect the pedestrian that is
located within the range that the device is designed to detect. Thus,
this factor assumes that the crash is an avoidable crash in factor
FA and assumes that the driver will react in the appropriate
manner to avoid the backover crash.
Finally, the third factor is designated as FDR. This
factor examines whether or not (given that the crash is avoidable in
FA, and that the system has detected the pedestrian in
FS) the driver will be able to successfully use the
technology in order to avoid the backover crash. In this factor, the
driver must both perceive the information presented by the rear
visibility system and respond appropriately before impact with the
pedestrian. Thus, this factor evaluates the ability of drivers to use
the rear visibility system that has detected a pedestrian in an
avoidable crash situation.
Estimating FA, FS, and FDR and Total
Rear Visibility System Effectiveness
As the rear visibility systems under today's final rule are
required to display an image of the area behind the vehicle to the
driver, such systems will convey information to the driver regarding
obstacles behind the vehicle (that are within its design detection
range) 100% of the time. Thus, for the purposes of estimating the
effectiveness of the rear visibility systems required under today's
final rule, FS is 100% and the relevant factors for
discussion, are FA and FDR.
[[Page 19233]]
In order to determine FA, the agency conducted a study
that reviewed 50 SCI cases that were available at the time of the
study. The purpose of this study was to analyze whether or not the
specific crash occurred at a location that is within the zone that a
given countermeasure was designed to detect.\129\ In other words, the
study sought to identify the crashes in the 50 SCI cases studied that
would have been avoidable by the driver--assuming an ideal (or perfect)
driver response. This factor takes into consideration the fact that,
even when a rear visibility system warns the driver regarding a
potential backover crash and the driver reacts appropriately to the
warning, the physics and geometric parameters of the particular
situation may not allow for the backover crash to be avoided. In order
to determine whether or not each SCI case would have been avoidable
using a rear visibility system, the study considered factors such as
the movement of the pedestrian (e.g., direction, speed), whether or not
the pedestrian would have been visible to the driver using the rear
visibility system, the general trajectory and speed of the vehicle etc.
The study found that between 76% and 90% of the cases reviewed would
have been avoidable cases using rear visibility systems meeting the
requirements in today's final rule.\130\
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\129\ For further information, please reference the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis prepared in support of this final rule,
available in the docket number referenced at the beginning of this
document.
\130\ The agency decided to use the SCI cases to perform this
analysis due to the level of detail required in order to analyze
whether or not the totality of the facts would suggest that a case
could have been avoided with a rear visibility system. The agency is
not aware of any other source of information that could provide the
same level of detail about crashes that would enable the agency
determine circumstances of the crash such as the general trajectory/
speed of both the pedestrian and the backing vehicle. The agency
believes it is reasonable to use the results of this study to
estimate FA in this instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to determine FDR, the agency performed research
by presenting an unexpected test object (with an image of a child
pedestrian affixed to the test object) to drivers that were executing
backing maneuvers. These studies examined the likelihood that the
driver will react to the information from the rear visibility system
sufficiently so as to avoid the crash by controlling test conditions
such that the test object would always be presented in a location and
in a manner where the rear visibility system would detect the test
object (and inform the driver of the presence of the object). The
agency conducted four separate studies (designated in this discussion
as Studies 1, 2, 3, 4a, and 4b) since 2008 to examine the ability of
drivers to avoid backover crashes when utilizing rear visibility
systems.\131\ Through these studies, the agency observed drivers (with
various demographic characteristics) utilizing different rear
visibility systems and different vehicle types when subject to
different test object presentation methods. By carefully selecting the
test parameters to be changed from one iteration of the study to the
next, the agency is able to use these data to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of drivers' ability to utilize rear visibility systems
required under today's rule while also ensuring that potential
variations (such as driver and vehicle type) in real-world
circumstances will not have an unanticipated impact on the agency's
estimates. The general parameters and results of the four studies are
presented in the table below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253, Rearview Video System
Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle Scenario.
Table 12--NHTSA Research on Driver Use of Rear Visibility Systems
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Study 1 (2008) 2007
Honda Odyssey & Study 2
(2009) 2007 Honda
Odyssey
Study 3 (2010) 2007
Honda Odyssey
Study 4a (2012) 2012
Nissan Altima
Study 4b (2012) 2012
Nissan Altima
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obstacle: Centered op-Up
Centered Pop-Up
Centered Pop-Up
Laterally Moving
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test Setting: Laboratory
Daycare
Laboratory
Laboratory
Garage/Parking Lot
Garage/Parking Lot
Garage/Parking Lot
Garage/Parking Lot
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N % Crashes N % Crashes N % Crashes N % Crashes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline (No System)............................ 12 100 36 100 56 91
RV, 7.8'', in-dash.............................. 12 58 36 61
RV 4.25'', in-dash.............................. ........... ........... ........... ........... 36 67 51 69
RV, 3.5'' in-mirror............................. 10 30 23 52
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This table shows the basic information for each of the four studies
conducted by the agency. In this table, ``N'' represents the number of
participants for each test condition and the percentage of those
participants that crashed is shown. For the baseline condition, no
rearview video system was installed on the vehicle, while the size and
location of the display is shown in each of the other conditions.
By observing drivers under these various conditions, the agency
believes that a reasonable estimate for FDR can be obtained
for the rear visibility systems required by today's final rule. In each
of the agency's tests, participants performed backing maneuvers either
with or without a rear visibility system. Regardless of the specific
conditions used in the particular test (e.g., driver/vehicle type,
obstacle presentation, etc.), drivers with rearview video systems were
consistently able to avoid crashes with the test object at a rate that
is statistically greater than drivers without any rear visibility
system.
As described above, the original research referenced in the NPRM
(Studies 1 and 2 conducted in 2008 and 2009, respectively) utilized a
Honda Odyssey as the test vehicle and tested the ability of drivers to
avoid a pop-up test object located in the vehicle's blind zone. This
research included participants age 25 to 55 and a mixture of male and
female drivers. The research revealed that, while drivers were
universally unable to avoid crashes with the test object without a rear
visibility system, the drivers were able to avoid a crash with the pop-
up test object approximately 55% of the time with a rearview video
system.\132\ While the research referenced in the NPRM
[[Page 19234]]
accurately and effectively isolated the incremental benefit of the
rearview video system over a uniform set of conditions (e.g., vehicle
model, obstacle presentation, and driver demographics), NHTSA
considered other research in conjunction with the information
referenced in the NPRM in order to enhance the robustness of our
analysis for the purposes of today's final rule. Although this
additional research refines the agency's estimates of the potential
benefits of the rear visibility systems required under today's final
rule, the additional research does not alter the agency's decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ 75 FR 76228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In considering the subsequent research, the agency aimed to
investigate whether or not a different test setting, a different
vehicle type, different driver demographics, and a different obstacle
presentation method would lead to an unanticipated effect on the
agency's previous estimates on drivers' ability to utilize rear
visibility systems to avoid a backover crash. In other words, the
agency examined the available data from the additional studies to
determine if there was any evidence that the aforementioned factors
could lead to a statistically different test result.
In order to examine whether or not drivers would utilize rear
visibility systems differently in a setting where drivers may expect
the presence of children, the agency examined data from an additional
study that was conducted in a day care center parking lot (Study 3
conducted in 2010).\133\ This study showed that, given the same
vehicle, driver demographic, and obstacle presentation parameters, the
new setting (the day care center) did not influence drivers to avoid or
crash with the test object at a statistically different rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001, Drivers' Use of
Rearview Video and Sensor-Based Backing Aid Systems in a Non-
Laboratory Setting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency also conducted additional studies in 2012 (Studies 4a
and 4b) where the agency utilized an additional vehicle model (the
Nissan Altima) and expanded driver demographics (including a more
balanced distribution of male and female participants \134\ and
including participants under age 25 and over age 55). The 2012 research
contained two parts in order to enable the agency to examine whether or
not the test object presentation method would lead to statistically
different driver performance results. As discussed above, the two
studies did not indicate that the expanded driver and vehicle types or
the different obstacle presentation method caused drivers to avoid a
crash with the test object at a statistically different rate.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ While the agency sought to more evenly balance the gender
distribution in its 2012 study, the information from NHTSA's
previous studies indicate that male and female drivers did not crash
with the pop-up test object behind the vehicle at statistically
different rates. In Studies 1-3, male drivers crashed 77.8% of the
tests whereas female drivers crashed 75.5% of the tests.
\135\ See Section II, g. Additional 2012 Research, supra. As we
noted previously, testing additional participants may have enabled
the agency to observe statistically different results for some of
these new test parameters (e.g., age). The raw results of the data
in Study 4 (See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253) show that drivers
older than 55 and younger than 25 did crash with the unexpected test
object more frequently than drivers between age 25 and 55. (We did
not test different age groups in Studies 1-3 because we did not
anticipate that there would be a difference across age groups).
However, the data do not show that these differences were
statistically significant. While testing additional participants may
have revealed a statistically significant difference, the agency was
unable to identify more participants (that are familiar with the
vehicle model and the technology) for this study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the additional research examined by the agency since the NPRM
did not indicate that the additional test parameters created
statistically different results, the agency decided to incorporate the
new data as additional data points in calculating its estimate of
FDR. In other words, to perform an analysis of the driver's
ability to avoid a backover crash using rear visibility systems
required by today's final rule, the participants from Studies 3, 4a,
and 4b were combined with NHTSA's previous studies (Studies 1 and 2) as
additional test participants in order to expand the total number of
participants examined. The agency believes this is a reasonable
approach as the agency was not able to find a statistical difference
between these test participants and increasing the number of
participants considered in NHTSA's analysis will increase the overall
robustness of NHTSA's estimates regarding the ability of drivers to
avoid a backover crash when using the rear visibility systems required
by today's final rule.\136\ When considering the data from these
studies, the agency estimates that FDR is 37%. In other
words, 37% of the time, drivers would be able to avoid a backover crash
when utilizing a rear visibility system meeting the requirements of
today's final rule when the crash is an avoidable crash (under
FA).\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ While we acknowledge that the tests conducted in Study 4b
used a different object presentation method, we believe that these
results can be included and analyzed in conjunction with Studies 1,
2, 3, and 4a. As we described above in our discussion of the
research, we designed the moving test object presentation method
with test parameters that were as close to the pop-up test object
presentation method as possible (e.g., exposure time of the object
in the rearview image). We reasoned that this approach would enable
both presentation methods to mimic the same types of crash scenarios
that we believe are the most prevalent (i.e., scenarios where the
driver reacts to the unexpected presence of a pedestrian behind the
vehicle). As these methods were designed with similar parameters,
were design to mimic the same crash scenarios, and did not yield a
statistically significant difference, we believe it's appropriate to
incorporate Study 4b in our analysis of FDR. We note that
some participants were able to avoid a collision with the moving
test object in the baseline (no rearview video system) condition in
Study 4b. We have taken this baseline condition into account when
calculating the effectiveness of rearview video systems in the
moving test object presentation method.
\137\ All the available data continue to indicate that rear
visibility systems meeting the requirements of today's final rule
(e.g., rearview video systems) would be the best technology that can
address the backover safety concern that Congress directed the
agency to address. Separate from our aforementioned concern that
Study 4b lacks a clear method for isolating the incremental effect
of the rearview video system, the agency is also not aware of any
method of incorporating the data from Study 4b (in analyzing
FDR) that would produce a total system effectiveness for
rearview video systems that would be inferior to any of the other
available countermeasure technologies. Thus, while the agency
believes that it is not appropriate to incorporate the data from
Study 4b into its analysis of FDR, the agency notes that
it is unaware of any method of incorporating the data from Study 4b
that would provide a rational basis for the agency to alter its
decisions in today's final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the basis of the agency's research into these three factors, the
agency believes that the rear visibility systems required under today's
final rule will have a predicted effectiveness of between 28 and 33
percent. Below is a table showing the aforementioned effectiveness
factors and the estimated system effectiveness for each of the
regulatory alternatives considered during the rulemaking process. As
mentioned above, these effectiveness estimates differ from the NPRM
because the agency has incorporated the new information obtained from
the tests performed at the day care center parking lot and NHTSA's
subsequent study that utilized a Nissan Altima along with the pop-up
test object presentation.\138\ While the NPRM was unable to include
these updated numbers for the tests performed at the day care center
(Study 3) in its analysis, the NPRM referenced this material and NHTSA
included it in the NPRM docket.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001.
\139\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001.
\140\ In NHTSA's sensor system tests, one vehicle model was able
to detect our plastic test object placed in the test location 100%
of the time. The other detected the same test object in the same
location approximately 40% of the time. By combining the number of
trials for both vehicle models and the number of positive alerts for
both vehicle models the agency roughly estimates that sensor systems
will detect objects within their designed detection zone 84% of the
time. However, the agency believes that this figure may represent
the sensor system's performance under idealized conditions. As the
primary purpose of these studies were to determine the ability of
the driver to react to the output information from either a sensor
or rearview video system, the test object was not designed with
properties such as motion and material in mind. As discussed in
Section III, c. Alternative Countermeasures, supra, various
technical limitations on the sensors ability to detect objects
within its design detection range suggest that the ability of the
sensor system to detect a child may not be similar to the sensor
system's ability to detect a plastic test object.
[[Page 19235]]
Table 13--Estimated System Effectiveness
[In percents]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final
System effectiveness FA FS FDR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
180[deg] RV.................................... 33 90 100 37
130[deg] RV.................................... 28 76 100 37
Ultrasonic..................................... 8 49 * * * 84 18
Radar.......................................... 8 54 * * * 84 18
Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors.................... 0 33 * 100 0 **
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* FA for mirrors is taken from a separate source due to lack of inclusion in the SCI case review that generated
FA for cameras and sensors.
** FDR for mirrors is taken from a small sample size of 20 tests. It is 0% because throughout testing, drivers
did not take advantage of either cross-view or lookdown mirrors to avoid the obstacle in the test.
* * * FS for sensors was obtained from the agency's tests regarding the driver's ability to utilize sensor
systems to avoid a backover crash with a test object. Thus, this figure involves the sensors' ability to
detect the test object under idealized conditions.\140\
b. Benefits
On the basis of its application of the predicted effectiveness of
the rear visibility systems that can be utilized to satisfy the
requirements of today's final rule to the annual target population of
210 fatalities and 15,000 injuries, the agency estimates that the
requirements of today's final rule will save between 13 and 15 lives
per year and prevent between 1,125 and 1,332 injuries per year.\141\
These updated estimates are lower than the estimates in the NPRM for a
few reasons. First, the updated estimates account for the increased
market penetration of rearview video systems since the publication of
the NPRM \142\ and the projected market penetration as a result of
voluntary adoption of rear visibility systems through the year 2018.
Second, the estimates take into account new data that has revised the
size of the target population. Finally, the estimates have been revised
based on new information available regarding the effectiveness of the
rear visibility systems required under today's final rule. While this
new information refines the agency's ability to better assess the costs
and benefits of the countermeasure required in today's rule, the
available data continue to indicate that rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of today's final rule are the most effective
countermeasure for addressing the backover crashes contemplated by
Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ In order to compare the annual costs of equipping the
fleet to the benefits that can be realized from the equipped fleet,
these estimates reflect the number of lives that can be saved
annually once the full fleet of vehicles operating have been
equipped with the rear visibility systems required by today's final
rule. We anticipate that the number of vehicles with this safety
equipment will rise steadily and be in all vehicles operated on the
public roads by 2054. It also does not count any benefits that would
be attributable to systems that the manufacturers are already
installing on their vehicles prior to the first full year of
mandatory full compliance (2018).
\142\ While Model Year (MY) 2014 sales are not yet complete, the
agency has information on the models that will offer rearview video
systems as standard or optional equipment. When comparing this
information to the sales projections and historic sales trends for
each model, we are able to determine that approximately 57% of
MY2014 vehicles will have rearview video systems. Further, if the
sales trend after MY2014 continues to follow the historic sales
trend, we anticipate that 73% of MY2018 vehicles will have rearview
video systems. We discuss this issue further in the sections that
follow and additional details about our projections are in the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis available in the docket referenced at the
beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As further discussed in the sections that follow, the agency is
aware that rear visibility systems are being adopted in the market.
This adoption by the industry of rear visibility systems is estimated
and accounted for in our analysis of the costs and benefits of today's
final rule. However, the safety benefits that would be realized from
these rear visibility systems are not included as benefits in this
section because they do not result from the vehicles that are not
projected to have rear visibility systems by 2018.
For the purposes of our analysis, we have assumed that the benefit
of installing a rear visibility system is the same for each vehicle.
Therefore, the voluntary adoption of rear visibility systems due to
market factors create a proportional decline in both costs and benefits
attributable to today's rule. As the agency is not aware of any data to
indicate whether the vehicles voluntarily installed with rear
visibility systems have a higher or lower risk of being involved in a
backover crash, we have used this assumption in our analysis.
Table 14--Estimated Annual Quantifiable Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities Reduced...................... 13 to 15.
Injuries Reduced........................ 1,125 to 1,332.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond avoiding injuries and fatalities, the agency expects that
benefits will accrue over the life of the vehicle as a result of
avoiding property damage. While damage to rear visibility systems are a
potential source of additional repair cost as a result of rear-end
collisions, the agency calculates that these costs will be offset by
the benefits realized by vehicle owners as a result of avoiding
property damage only backing collisions. Across the 3 and 7 percent
discount level (over the lifetime of the vehicle), the agency expects
the net impact of rear visibility systems on property damage only
crashes is a net benefit which ranges between $10 and $13 per
vehicle.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these quantifiable benefits, the agency continues to
believe that today's final rule will contribute significantly toward
achieving many unquantifiable benefits. NHTSA believes that a simple
quantitative analysis is not sufficient when evaluating the benefits of
this rulemaking. We note that Executive Order 12866 (reaffirmed by
Executive Order 13563) refers expressly to considerations of equity by
directing that agencies, ``choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches . . . should select those approaches that maximize net
benefits (including . . . equity).'' Executive Order 13563 explicitly
states not only that each agency shall ``use the best available
techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and
costs as
[[Page 19236]]
accurately as possible,'' but also that each agency ``may consider (and
discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to
quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive
impacts.''
These values--especially equity, fairness, and distributive
impacts--are directly relevant to this final rule. There are strong
reasons, grounded in unquantifiable considerations, to take action to
prevent the deaths and injuries at issue here, including:
(1) We believe it is important to reduce the risk that drivers will
be the direct cause of the death or injury of a person, particularly a
small child at one's own place of residence or that of a relative or
close friend. In many cases, parents are responsible for the deaths of
their own children. We continue to believe that avoiding that horrible
outcome is a significant benefit which is not fully or adequately
captured in the traditional measure of the value of a statistical life.
Of course, any death of a young child is a tragedy, but we believe that
this traditional measure also does not adequately account for the value
of reducing the risk that parents will be responsible for the death of
or serious injury to their own children.
(2) We noted that 37 percent of the deaths and 7 percent of the
injuries at issue here involve young children (under the age of five),
and there is an important social interest in avoiding such deaths and
injuries. While the agency has used the Department's standard monetary
figure for the value of a statistical life, we acknowledge that various
studies have placed the value of a statistical life at a higher value
and the value of a statistical life of a child even higher. However, we
note that the literature is in a state of development.
(3) The victims of the relevant crashes here include not only
children but also people with disabilities and the elderly. Especially
in the context at issue, such people lack relevant control over the
situation and are not in a good position to protect themselves. There
are strong considerations, rooted in fairness and equity, to reduce
these risks that they face.
(4) The focus of the benefits analysis is on the prevention of
deaths and injuries, and the avoidance of property damage, but the
requirements of the rule will also provide a range of additional
benefits. Drivers will benefit in numerous ways from increases in rear
visibility. For example, parking will be simplified, especially in
congestion. The evolution of the automobile market attests to these
benefits. The agency believes that apart from the monetized values,
increase in ease and convenience will provide significant, but not yet
quantifiable, benefits to drivers.
c. Costs
The agency estimates that to equip each vehicle with a rear
visibility system compliant with the requirements of today's final rule
will cost between $132 and $142 per vehicle. For vehicles already
equipped with a suitable display, the incremental cost of equipping the
vehicle with a compliant rear visibility system is estimated to be $43
to $45. Given these per unit costs (and the current state of the
market), the agency estimates that the cost to equip the entire fleet
of new passenger vehicles sold annually (estimated at 16.0 million
vehicles) with rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of
today's final rule is between $546 and $620 million.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ These costs do not include costs attributable to systems
that will already be installed by vehicle manufacturers prior to
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These cost estimates differ from those in the NPRM, where the
agency estimated that rearview video systems would cost between $159
and $203 for each vehicle not already equipped with a suitable display
unit, $58 for each vehicle that was already equipped with a suitable
display unit, and a total fleet cost of $1.9 billion to $2.7 billion
annually.\145\ In response to these estimates, the agency received
comments from both equipment manufacturers and advocacy groups stating
that the agency had overestimated the potential costs of these
systems.\146\ Specifically, both the Advocates and the American Academy
of Pediatrics commented that the agency did not sufficiently estimate
the potential reduction of costs for rearview video systems over time
as manufacturers of such products gain experience in producing these
systems. In addition, Sony and Magna commented that they expect that
manufacturers will realize significant cost reductions through
increased production levels and refinements in the manufacturing
process. Further, Sony commented that voluntary adoption of this
technology will conservatively double by 2013--even absent a final
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ 75 FR 76236. This estimate assumed a market adoption rate
of 19.8% (across the fleet) prior to a final rule. $1.9 to $2.7
billion is the range of costs for rearview video systems only (does
not include the cost range for sensor systems).
\146\ Conversely, we note that the agency did not receive any
substantial comment stating that the agency had overestimated the
per unit price. We did receive comments from vehicle manufacturers
that our phase-in schedule would create additional design/
development costs for the industry and we believe we have
accommodated these concerns through adjusting the phase-in
requirements in today's final rule. However, those comments did not
address the long-term per-unit costs that we use to calculate the
costs of today's rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, in response to these comments, the agency reexamined the cost
estimates of the NPRM in order to obtain more accurate estimates
regarding the annual costs of today's final rule. As the first year
requiring full compliance with today's final rule is 2018, the agency
has used the following information in order to more accurately predict
the costs of today's rule in 2018.
First, the agency conducted a teardown analyses of representative
rearview video systems which afforded updated cost estimates for
individual rearview video systems that would meet the requirements of
today's rule.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the agency also took a closer look at the rate of voluntary
adoption of rear visibility systems through 2018. While the agency
agrees with Sony that (even absent today's rule) rear visibility
systems will experience increased market penetration, we did not rely
on Sony's assertion that rearview video systems will increase two-fold
by 2013. Instead, the agency took a different approach of basing its
projections of the voluntary adoption of rearview video systems in 2018
on a combination of the data on the historical adoption trend for these
systems and the agency's information on the vehicle models that will
have rearview video systems in Model Year (MY) 2014. While MY2014 sales
are not yet complete, we have information on the models that will offer
these systems (either as standard or optional equipment). When we
combine this information with the sales projections for each model, we
are able to determine that approximately 57% of MY2014 vehicles will
have rearview video systems. Further, if the sales trend after MY2014
continues to follow the historic sales trend, we anticipate that 73% of
MY2018 vehicles will have rearview video systems.\148\ We discuss this
issue further in the sections that follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the agency also agrees with the commenters that
manufacturers will realize cost reductions through increased
familiarity with the manufacturing process and through economies of
scale. However, because the agency did not receive any detailed
information from the commenters regarding the extent of these
particular possible cost savings, the agency has applied a general
learning factor (based
[[Page 19237]]
on historic data on the adoption of automotive safety technologies
\149\) to the information received from the teardown study. Using a
constant learning factor (a 7% cost savings) over each cumulative
doubling of production, the agency obtained what it believes is a more
accurate estimate of the potential cost of rearview video systems in
2018.\150\ Using this learning analysis method, the agency predicts
that the per-unit costs in 2018 will be between $132 and $142 per
vehicle (and $43-$45 per vehicle for vehicles that already have a
suitable screen).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ The agency examined the historical data for the following
automotive safety technologies: driver air bags, antilock braking
systems, manual lap/shoulder belts, adjustable head restraints, dual
master brake cylinders. See ``Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis, Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY2017-MY2025 Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks'', November 2011, Docket No. 2010-0131-0167,
(discussing our analysis of the learning curve discussion on pages
577-591).
\150\ For additional information regarding the method that the
agency used to calculate the cost savings over time due to learning,
please reference the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in
the docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the aforementioned information (the new teardown study, the
new adoption rate, and the new per-unit cost after learning), the
agency estimates that the cost to equip the entire fleet of new
passenger vehicles sold annually with rear visibility systems meeting
the requirements of today's final rule is between $546 and $620
million.
Table 15--estimated installation costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs (2010 $)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full system installation per vehicle... $132 to $142.
Camera-only installation per vehicle... $43 to $45.
Total Fleet............................ $546 M to $620 M.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the agency agrees with the commenters and conducted the
aforementioned analyses to refine its estimates of the actual costs of
today's final rule, the agency notes that these updated cost estimates
do not affect any of the agency decisions regarding the requirements in
today's final rule. The agency continues to believe that the
requirements we've adopted in today's final rule are the only effective
way of fulfilling the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act.
Separately, in estimating the above costs, the agency did not
include ultrasonic or other rear sensor systems as part of the analyses
because the systems examined by NHTSA are not able to meet the
requirements of today's final rule. However, the agency did conduct a
teardown analyses for ultrasonic sensor systems and found these systems
to be much more expensive than the agency had previously estimated. In
the NPRM, the estimated costs of various rear object sensor systems
ranged between $52 and $92 to equip each vehicle. After conducting the
teardown analyses and applying the learning factor, the agency now
estimates that to equip each vehicle with ultrasonic systems would cost
between $79 and $138.
d. Market Adoption Rate
In order to estimate the likely benefits and costs of this
regulation, NHTSA has considered different methods for establishing a
baseline market adoption rate of rear visibility systems against which
to measure the effects of the regulation. Applying OMB Circular A-4, a
baseline(s) would reflect ``what the world would look like'' in the
absence of regulation.
Towards this end, the above sections measure the impact of
equipping the vehicles that are not projected to have rear visibility
systems by 2018. Thus, we have projected (based on the available data)
what the market adoption of rear visibility systems would be by 2018
(the 100% compliance date in the phase-in schedule established by
today's final rule). By comparing this projection to 100% compliance in
2018, our analysis shows the costs and benefits that are attributable
to those remaining vehicles. The data indicate that many vehicle models
are already being sold with rear visibility systems as standard or
optional equipment. As described above, NHTSA projects that 73% of new
light-duty vehicles will be sold with rear visibility systems by 2018.
However, calculating the costs and benefits based only on these
vehicles that would not have rear visibility systems by 2018 does not
account for other potential events that could affect market adoption.
It is possible that some of the projected 73% market adoption in 2018
is attributable to events that are beyond ``pure market forces'' (e.g.,
the K.T. Safety Act and the rulemaking process). However, it is
difficult to know with any certainty how many of these vehicles would
be so equipped in the absence of this regulation, the rulemaking
process, and the K.T. Safety Act. In other words, how much of the
increase in the popularity of these systems is driven purely by market
forces and how much is the result of manufacturers acting in
anticipation of the regulation taking effect?
For several reasons NHTSA believes market forces are responsible
for the majority of the recent increase in the number of rearview video
systems projected to be installed by MY 2018. Typically, the market
forces that lead to a surge in popularity of a technology are a decline
in their cost and/or an increase in consumer demand. There is strong
evidence that both of these factors are affecting the adoption of
cameras in light-duty vehicles. For example, the increasing popularity
of other features that require screens (such as navigation and
infotainment systems) has significantly reduced the incremental cost of
adding a video system since the screen is already there. It is also
likely that consumers are beginning to better appreciate the value of
such systems for safety reasons as well as their value to assist
parking.
At the same time, NHTSA cannot rule out the possibility that some
of the recent increase in projected future installations is due to
manufacturers' anticipation of the regulation and would not be in the
fleet were it not for the statutory requirement that NHTSA issue a
regulation. If manufacturers believe that a regulation is imminent and
they are in the process of redesigning models, they may add rear video
systems now because it is usually less costly to integrate new features
at the vehicle-redesign stage than at other times.
However, there is reason to believe that this factor has been less
important than market forces. For example, some manufacturers have
begun offering rear video systems in models before the normal re-design
cycle. Such sales growth is more likely reflective of market forces
rather than regulation. In addition, at least one major car
manufacturer, Honda, had already in 2013 made rear-visibility cameras a
standard feature in 94% of its vehicles. The fact that automakers have
greatly increased the output of cars with rearview video systems
suggests the demand for those devices is largely consumer driven and
perhaps bound up with consumers' desire for the convenience of such
cameras as well as their safety benefits. Additional evidence that
adoption is market driven is that sales of aftermarket rear visibility
kits that customers themselves install, despite being under no possible
regulatory mandate to do so, are projected by industry sources to grow
very rapidly.\151\ The advertising of rearview video systems as a
safety feature by several manufacturers has
[[Page 19238]]
likely fueled further consumer demand for these devices.
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\151\ CE Outlook, ``Backup Camera Sales to Near Double,'' 2/21/
2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, we believe that now that rear visibility cameras have
become a common safety device on many models, manufacturers may have
some concern that they face potential tort liability if they market
models that do not offer this safety feature. Finally, we note that
once a manufacturer has designed a vehicle model to include a rearview
video system, regardless of the motivation for that action, a variety
of considerations, including consumer expectations and product
liability, will preclude the possibility of the manufacturer's ceasing
to offer cameras in future model years vehicles. In other words, those
are costs that the industry have already incorporated into their
production plans and thus are not affected by this rulemaking action.
Given the above, NHTSA finds substantial evidence that market
forces are driving the increase in the rate of adoption of rearview
video systems, but is unable to determine with any reasonable certainty
the precise extent to which the prospect of regulation might also be a
factor. Thus, in order to reflect this uncertainty about how to
attribute the existing market adoption rate, we have conducted an
additional analysis that presents a range of both the benefits and
costs of this rule. In developing this analysis we are attempting to
estimate the range of adoption of rear visibility systems which might
have occurred by 2018 if Congress had not passed the K.T. Safety Act,
NHTSA did not initiate a rulemaking on this subject, and no final rule
were adopted.
At the top-end of this range, we adopt the assumption that all
current and projected installations are due purely to market forces and
that none are due to the rule. We recognize that this is a strong
assumption, but we think that in light of the evidence discussed above
it is a reasonable one on which to base an upper bound of the range of
projected adoption levels. As noted above, our latest projection shows
that 73% of the new vehicle fleet will be equipped with rearview video
systems by 2018. We based this calculation on data on the historical
adoption trend of these systems and the agency's information on which
vehicle models will have these systems in MY2014. Using both historical
sales data and the information the agency has about the vehicle models
that will have rearview video systems as standard or optional equipment
in 2014, NHTSA is able to estimate that approximately 57% of MY2014
vehicles will have rearview video systems. Then, if the sales trend
after MY2014 continues to follow the historic sales trend established
up to and including 2012 and we assume that this is all attributable to
market forces (and none to the rule), we obtain a 73% baseline MY2018
rate of adoption rearview video systems.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ Further details on the agency's estimates are available in
the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis. This document can be found in
the docket cited at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the low-end of the range, we adopt the assumption that half of
the increase in the market adoption trend as a result of the data from
MY2014 is attributable to ``pure market forces'' and half is not. In
other words, we make the following two assumptions for this low end
estimate: (1) That the MY2008 to MY2012 historic adoption trend
represents ``pure market forces'' and that this trend would have
continued apart from the K.T. Safety Act and NHTSA's rulemaking process
in response to the Act; and (2) that half of the difference between
that continuation of the MY2008 to MY2012 trend (through to 2018) and
our top end of the range estimate (that produces a 73% market adoption
rate in 2018) represents a shift in ``pure market forces.'' We believe
these assumptions are appropriate as a low end of the range estimate
because we believe it is unlikely that none of the projected increase
in installation for MY2014 (and beyond) are due to market forces (i.e.,
that all is due to anticipation of the rule). However, in the case of
this rulemaking, the available information does not enable the agency
to make any reliable determinations as to what portion of the market
adoption (between our top and low end estimates) is due to ``pure
market forces'' as opposed to other factors. As discussed above, we
think the evidence supports ascribing a substantial majority of the
increased adoption rate to market forces. Thus, we believe that the top
and low-end estimates described above both represent somewhat strong
assumptions and sufficiently capture the uncertainty surrounding what
portion of the market adoption is attributable to ``pure market
forces.''
Thus, in addition to reporting our data on the market adoption in
MY2014 and our projections for 2018, this analysis considers what the
costs and benefits (the effect) of the rule, the rulemaking process,
and the K.T. Safety Act are. Using the top and low end estimated
adoption trends described above, we believe that the market adoption in
2018 would be between 59% and 73%. Assuming this range of market
adoption, we believe that $546 million to $924 million in costs and
$265 million to $595 million in monetized benefits are attributable to
today's final rule, the rulemaking process, and the K.T. Safety
Act.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Further information on these calculations is available in
the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis. This analysis is available in
the docket referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. Net Impact
Table 16 below presents the lifetime monetized benefits, lifetime
costs, and presents their difference--the net impact. The table
monetizes the aforementioned installation costs and fatality/injury
reduction benefits and combines these values with maintenance costs and
property damage only crash avoidance benefits. The costs in Table 16 do
not vary by discount rate because this part of Table 16 only includes
the costs that are incurred in order to produce the rear visibility
system and install it on the vehicle (the installation costs). All
these costs are incurred on the year the vehicle is produced. Thus, the
costs vary by 180[deg] or 130[deg] camera and display type but do not
vary by discount rate.
However, the benefits do vary by both discount rate and camera
selection. Depending on the type of equipment used by the manufacturer
(180[deg] or 130[deg] camera) and the discount rate (3% or 7%) the
agency expects today's final rule to save between 20 and 30 equivalent
lives per year.\154\ Using the most up-to-date value of a statistical
life from the Department's guidance \155\, the agency expects the
annual benefit of the rule (due to fatality and injury reduction) to be
between $206 million and $317 million. We anticipate that the benefits
from societal costs avoided due to fatality and injury reduction \156\
will be $16 million to $24 million. Further, the net benefits \157\
from property
[[Page 19239]]
damage avoided range from $44 million to $57 million. Thus, the agency
expects the total benefits from today's rule to range from $265 million
to $396 million when considering injuries avoided, fatalities avoided,
and property damage across the 3 and 7 percent discount rates.\158\
Note that for the 180[deg] camera options (the Low and High Estimates),
the lifetime monetized benefits are the same, but the cost of display
placement differs based on display type.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ These benefits do not include those lives that would be
saved by rearview video systems voluntarily installed by the
industry.
\155\ See Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a
Statistical Life in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses,
available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf.
\156\ These are costs that would be incurred as a result of a
fatality or injury that is apart from the value of the life lost or
the quality of life lost (e.g., medical costs.
\157\ While rearview video systems enable a driver to avoid
property damage only crashes in addition to crashes resulting in
injuries and fatalities, the property damage only cases also include
cases where the crash was either not avoided or unavoidable (such as
a rear-end collision) which would result in the additional expense
of repairing the rearview video system. When considering these
cases, the benefit of avoiding property damage outweighed costs of
repairing rearview video systems when such crashes were not avoided.
Thus, this value is expressed as a net benefit and is included in
the benefits section of Table 16.
\158\ The benefits estimates in this paragraph are expressed in
ranges. Each range represents the highest and lowest figure when
considering the different discount rates and camera types. However,
the same combination of camera type and discount rate do not produce
the highest and lowest figure in each of the ranges specified in
this paragraph. Thus, the sum of highest and lowest figures in
fatality/injury reduction benefits range and the property damage
only benefits range do not correspond to the highest and lowest
figures in the total benefits range. The Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis contains the exact figures that show the total monetized
benefit (as the sum of the fatality, injury, and property damage
reduction benefits) for each combination of camera type and
discount, available in the docket number referenced at the beginning
of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this case, the monetized costs outweigh the monetized benefits
and therefore the net impacts are cost figures. However, as mentioned
above, there are significant benefits to this rule that cannot be
quantified in monetary terms. The Primary Estimate is the lowest
installation cost option (which assumes manufacturers will use a
130[deg] camera and will utilize any existing display units already
offered in their vehicles). The Low Estimate and High Estimate provide
the estimated minimum and maximum net impacts possible. The Low
Estimate is the 180[deg] camera and assumes that manufacturers will
install a new display to meet the requirements of today's rule. It
represents the minimum overall benefit estimate as it has the largest
negative net impact. Conversely, the High Estimate is the 180[deg]
camera and assumes that manufacturers that currently offer vehicles
with display units are able and choose to use those existing display
units to meet the requirements of today's rule. This represents the
maximum overall benefit estimate because it has the smallest negative
net impact.
Table 16--Summary of Benefits and Costs Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (millions 2010$) MY2018 and Thereafter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discount
Benefits Primary Low High rate
estimate estimate estimate (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Monetized.......................................... $265 $305 $305 7
Lifetime Monetized.......................................... 344 396 396 3
Costs:
Lifetime Monetized...................................... 546 620 557 7
Lifetime Monetized...................................... 546 620 557 3
Net Impact:
Lifetime Monetized...................................... -281 -315 -252 7
Lifetime Monetized...................................... -202 -224 -161 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Cost Effectiveness and Regulatory Alternatives
Based on the aforementioned revised figures for costs and
quantifiable benefits, and on the relevant discount rates of 3 and 7
percent, the net cost per equivalent life saved for rearview video
systems ranges from $15.9 to $26.3 million. However, as discussed
above, the agency believes that today's rule also affords significant
unquantifiable benefits in the form of reducing a safety risk that
disproportionately affects particularly vulnerable population groups
(such as young children), and exacts a significant emotional cost on
relatives and caretakers who backover their own children. In addition,
the rear visibility systems required under today's rule are the only
effective means of addressing the backover crash safety concern and
fulfilling the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act. Further, after
considering the totality of the information, we find that the
requirements of today's rule are the most cost-effective way of
achieving the objectives of the K.T. Safety Act.
Table 17--Estimated Cost Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Equivalent Life Saved
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rearview Video Systems............ $15.9 to $26.3 million.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The range presented is from a 3% to 7% discount rate.
To devise an appropriate regulatory approach to address the safety
risks presented by backover crashes and the requirements of the K.T.
Safety Act, the agency considered various technologies and applications
of those technologies over the course of this rulemaking, beginning
with the ANPRM and continuing through to the development of this final
rule. As previously noted, the three main technologies considered
included rearview video systems, sensor systems, and additional
rearview mirrors. While various commenters suggested alternative
sensor-based systems, none of these systems were able to address our
concerns that the data indicate that without visual confirmation of the
presence of a child or other pedestrian behind the vehicle, sensors
simply did not induce a sufficient and timely response from the driver
so as to avoid the crash. While rearview video systems were the most
expensive technology considered, the agency's research found that
rearview video systems were also the only effective technology. Because
of the significantly lower effectiveness of sensor systems that do not
afford the driver a visual image of the area behind the vehicle, the
NPRM estimated a significantly higher cost per equivalent life saved
for rear object detection sensor systems than rearview video systems.
In spite of the lower per vehicle cost estimate for sensor systems in
the NPRM, their very low effectiveness resulted in the agency's
estimating that the cost per equivalent life saved by these sensor
systems would be between $95.5 and $192.3 million. While the new
information that the agency received through the day care study has
improved the estimated effectiveness of sensor systems somewhat, the
agency still estimates that the cost per equivalent life saved for
sensor systems would range from $44.6 to $94.1 million.\159\ This means
[[Page 19240]]
that sensors would cost more than twice the amount per life saved when
compared to rearview video technology. Thus, the agency continues to
believe that rearview video systems are significantly more cost
effective than rear sensor systems and that rearview video systems are
the most cost effective technology available that can address the
backover safety concern. While we believe that the statutory mandate in
the K.T. Safety Act compels the agency to take regulatory action to
address the backover safety risk (even in situations where the
regulatory action may not be cost beneficial when comparing monetized
cost to benefits), we believe that mandate is more rationally achieved
through the alternative that saves substantially more lives at
substantially less cost per life than the potential alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ For further information, please reference the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis prepared in support of this final rule,
available in the docket number referenced at the beginning of this
document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, while the agency considered the application of rear
visibility countermeasures to certain vehicle types or size, the agency
understands the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act as directing the
agency to make revisions to FMVSS No. 111 to expand the required field
of view for all vehicles with a GVWR under 10,000 pounds except for
motorcycles and trailers. Although the agency is afforded the limited
discretion of applying different rear visibility countermeasures to
different vehicle types, the agency does not believe that the
effectiveness data from our research or our cost estimates support
applying a different rear visibility countermeasure based on vehicle
type. As mentioned above, to apply sensor or mirror-based
countermeasures, instead of the rear visibility system requirements of
today's final rule, to certain vehicle types would forgo important
safety benefits. Further, such application would increase the cost per
equivalent life saved as the reduction in the costs of these
alternative countermeasures would not offset the greater reduction in
the effectiveness of the countermeasure. Given this information, the
agency concludes in today's final rule that the rear visibility systems
required in today's rule are the only effective means of achieving a
meaningful reduction in backover crash fatalities and injuries.
Therefore, after considering the aforementioned technological and
regulatory alternatives, the agency reiterates its conclusion above
that the rear visibility systems required under today's rule are not
only the single effective way of addressing the backover safety risk
and meeting the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act, but also the most
cost effective way of doing so.
V. Regulatory Analyses
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies require this agency to make
determinations as to whether a regulatory action is ``significant'' and
therefore subject to OMB review and the requirements of the
aforementioned Executive Orders. The Executive Order 12866 defines a
``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to result in a
rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
the Executive Order.
We have considered the potential impact of this final rule under
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures and have determined
that today's final rule is economically significant. This rulemaking is
economically significant because it is likely to have an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more. Thus it was reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget under E.O. 12866 and 13563. The
rulemaking action has also been determined to be significant under the
Department's regulatory policies and procedures. The regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) fully discusses the estimated costs and benefits of this
rulemaking action. The costs and benefits are also summarized in
section IV of this preamble, supra.
Executive Order 13609: Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation
The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609
provides, in part:
The regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may
differ from those taken by U.S. regulatory agencies to address
similar issues. In some cases, the differences between the
regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those of their foreign
counterparts might not be necessary and might impair the ability of
American businesses to export and compete internationally. In
meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues, international regulatory
cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective
as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such
cooperation. International regulatory cooperation can also reduce,
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements.
NHTSA is not currently aware of any ``regulatory approaches taken
by foreign governments'' that would address the safety concerns raised
in this rulemaking. While today's amendments to FMVSS No. 111 establish
new requirements, the agency is not aware of any approaches taken by
foreign governments that would address Congress' concern in the K.T.
Safety Act regarding fatalities and injuries resulting from backover
crashes. Thus, the agency is not aware of any such approach that would
be at least as protective as the approach adopted by the agency in
today's final rule.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR Part 121
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency
certifies the proposal will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. SBREFA amended the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a statement of
the factual basis for certifying that a proposal will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
I hereby certify that this proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
We believe that the rulemaking will not have a significant economic
impact on the small vehicle manufacturers because the systems are not
technically difficult to develop or install and the cost of the systems
($44 to $147) is a small proportion of the
[[Page 19241]]
overall vehicle cost for most of these specialty cars.
Today's final rule will directly affect motor vehicle manufacturers
and final-stage manufacturers. The majority of motor vehicle
manufacturers will not qualify as a small business. There are ten
manufacturers of passenger cars that are small businesses.\160\ These
manufacturers, along with manufacturers that do not qualify as a small
business, are already required to comply with the current mirror
requirements of FMVSS No. 111. Similarly, there are several
manufacturers of low-speed vehicles that are small businesses.\161\
Previously, FMVSS No. 111 did not apply to low-speed vehicles, although
they were required to have basic mirrors pursuant to FMVSS No. 500,
Low-speed vehicles (including the option of having either an exterior
driver-side mirror or an interior rearview mirror). The addition of a
rearview video system can be accomplished via the purchase of an
exterior video camera, integration of a console video screen or the
addition of an interior rearview mirror-mounted screen, and wiring to
connect the two as well as to connect them to the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ Carbon Motor, CODA, Fisker Automotive Inc., GGT Electric,
Mosler Automotive, Panoz Auto Development Company, Saleen, Shelby
American Inc., Standard Taxi, Tesla Motors Inc.
\161\ Columbia ParCar Corp., Club Car, LLC, Miles Electric
Vehicles LLC, STAR Electric Car Sales, Tomberlin, Wheego Electric
Cars, Inc., and Wildfire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the K.T. Safety Act applies to all motor vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (except motorcycles and trailers) in its
mandate to reduce backovers, all of these small manufacturers are
affected by the requirements in today's final rule. However, the
economic impact upon these entities will not be significant for the
following reasons.
(1) Potential cost increases are small compared to the price of the
vehicles being manufactured.
(2) Today's final rule provides four years lead-time, the limit
permitted by the K.T. Safety Act, and will allow small volume
manufacturers the option of waiting until the end of the phase-in
(until May 1, 2018) to meet the rear visibility requirements.\162\
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\162\ While the agency currently does not have information that
would show how long it would take for small manufacturers to
implement the requirements in today's final rule, we do not have the
statutory flexibility to afford small manufacturers more lead time
beyond the four-year statutory limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, the agency had also considered several alternatives
that could help to reduce the burden on small businesses. The agency
considered an alternative under which passenger cars would be required
to be equipped with either a visibility system or with a system that
utilizes an ultrasonic sensor that monitors the specified area behind
the vehicle and an audible warning. This alternative would have lower
installation costs but also substantially lower safety benefits. Thus,
it would have significantly higher costs per equivalent life saved.
Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
NHTSA has examined today's final rule pursuant to Executive Order
13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local governments or their representatives is
mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that
the rulemaking would not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. Today's final rule does not
have ``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express
preemption provision:
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the
standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.
49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that
preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law
addressing the same aspect of performance.
The express preemption provision described above is subject to a
savings clause under which ``[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from
liability at common law.'' 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) Pursuant to this
provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle
manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express
preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied
preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of
NHTSA's rules--even if not expressly preempted.
This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the
existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher
standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle
manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment
against the manufacturer--notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance
with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an
FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action
that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers
will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict
does exist--for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum
and a maximum standard--the State common law tort cause of action is
impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2000).
Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether
this rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action.
The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the
preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that
preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.
To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language
and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of today's final
rule and finds that this rule, like many NHTSA rules, prescribes only a
minimum safety standard. Accordingly, NHTSA does not intend that this
final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a
higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by
today's final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of
State tort law would not conflict with the minimum standard established
in this document. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied
preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.
NHTSA solicited comments from the States and other interested
parties on this assessment of issues relevant to E.O. 13132 in the
NPRM. However, we did not receive any comments with regard to this
issue.
Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
When promulgating a regulation, Executive Order 12988 specifically
requires that the agency must make every reasonable effort to ensure
that the regulation, as appropriate: (1) Specifies in clear language
the preemptive effect; (2) specifies in clear language the effect
[[Page 19242]]
on existing Federal law or regulation, including all provisions
repealed, circumscribed, displaced, impaired, or modified; (3) provides
a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general
standard, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4)
specifies in clear language the retroactive effect; (5) specifies
whether administrative proceedings are to be required before parties
may file suit in court; (6) explicitly or implicitly defines key terms;
and (7) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general
draftsmanship of regulations. Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as
follows. The preemptive effect of this final rule is discussed above in
connection with Executive Order 13132. NHTSA notes further that there
is no requirement that individuals submit a petition for
reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceeding before they
may file suit in court.
Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children From Environmental Health
and Safety Risks)
Executive Order 13045, ``Protection of Children from Environmental
Health and Safety Risks,'' (62 FR 19885; April 23, 1997) applies to any
proposed or final rule that: (1) Is determined to be ``economically
significant,'' as defined in Executive Order 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental health or safety risk that NHTSA has reason to believe
may have a disproportionate effect on children. If a rule meets both
criteria, the agency must evaluate the environmental health or safety
effects of the rule on children, and explain why the rule is preferable
to other potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives
considered by the agency.
Today's final rule is subject to Executive Order 13045 because it
is economically significant and available data demonstrate that the
safety risk addressed by this proposal disproportionately involves
children, especially very young ones. As the safety risk to children is
a central concern of this rulemaking, the issues that must be analyzed
under this Executive Order are discussed extensively in the preamble
above and in the RIA.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA) (Pub.L. 104-113), ``all Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means
to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies
and departments.'' Voluntary consensus standards are technical
standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE). The NTTAA directs us to provide Congress, through OMB,
explanations when we decide not to use available and applicable
voluntary consensus standards.
Pursuant to the above requirements, the agency conducted a review
of voluntary consensus standards to determine if any were applicable to
today's final rule. While the agency did not discover any voluntary
consensus standards that can be applied to the entirety of rear
visibility systems, we found various voluntary consensus standards
which could be utilized for durability and luminance requirements for
today's final rule. The agency considered the possibility of using
these voluntary consensus standards. However, we have found these
standards to be unsuitable for incorporation into an FMVSS at this
time. Our analysis of each of the applicable voluntary consensus
standards can be found in our discussion of the durability and
luminance requirements in earlier sections of this preamble. Further,
in response to comments, NHTSA endeavored to establish requirements
that are as performance based and technologically-neutral as possible,
to allow maximum design freedom while still meeting the performance
requirements needed for safety.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). NHTSA must comply with
that requirement in connection with this rulemaking as today's final
rule would result in expenditures by the private sector of over $100
million annually.
As noted previously, the agency has prepared a detailed economic
assessment in the RIA. In that assessment, the agency analyzes the
benefits and costs of the rear visibility systems required under
today's final rule for passenger cars, MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-
speed vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. NHTSA's analysis
indicates that today's final rule could result in private expenditures
of up to $1.7 billion annually.
The RIA and the PRIA (published in conjunction with the NPRM)
analyzed the expected benefits and costs of alternative countermeasure
options, including mirrors, cameras, and sensors, as specified in the
K.T. Safety Act. The agency subjected several types of each class of
countermeasure to thorough effectiveness testing and cost-benefit
analysis. Additionally, the agency previously published a detailed
ANPRM, NPRM, and PRIA, in order to explain its thoughts on the
technological solutions available and solicit information on costs,
benefits, and applications on all possible solutions to the safety
concern. NHTSA received a large variety of comments on the ANPRM, NPRM,
and PRIA and used that information in formulating today's final rule.
As explained in detail in the RIA and the preamble for today's
final rule, after carefully exploring all possible alternatives to meet
the statutory mandate of the Act, NHTSA concluded that rearview video
systems offer not only the highest overall benefits, but also the most
efficient cost per life saved ratio.
In addition, NHTSA has performed a probabilistic uncertainty
analysis to examine the degree of uncertainty in its cost and benefit
estimates and included that analysis in the RIA.
National Environmental Policy Act
NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that
implementation of this action would not have any significant impact on
the quality of the human environment.
Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), a person is not
required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency
unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. Today's
final rule includes a collection of information, i.e., the phase-in
reporting requirements. If approved, these requirements would require
manufacturers of passenger cars and of trucks, buses, MPVs, and low-
speed vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, to annually submit
a report for each of two years (with requirements in the phase-in
period) concerning the number of such vehicles that meet the rear
visibility system requirements. In
[[Page 19243]]
the preamble of the NPRM, the agency solicited public comment on the
following information collection request. In response, the agency did
not receive any comments.
Accordingly, the Department of Transportation is submitting the
following information collection request to OMB for review and
clearance under the PRA. The following information is identical to the
information the agency offered for public comment in the NPRM except
that the agency discovered an error in the Estimated Costs calculation
and in the estimated number of manufacturers. While the agency believes
that this information request will create a small recordkeeping burden
on the manufacturers, we do not expect that manufacturers will incur
any additional costs beyond that recordkeeping burden. Thus, we have
adjusted the Estimated Costs to be $0. In addition, while the agency
correctly calculated 42 total burden hours (2 hours per manufacturer),
the agency stated, in error, that there were 24 total manufacturers. We
have corrected the number of manufacturers to 21 and the total burden
hours continue to be 42 total hours. The agency will complete the
information collection request process before the beginning of the
phase-in schedule on May 1, 2016.
Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Title: Phase-In Production Reporting Requirements for Rear
Visibility Systems.
Type of Request: New request.
OMB Clearance Number: None assigned.
Form Number: This collection of information will not use any
standard forms.
Affected Public: The respondents are manufacturers of passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed
vehicles having a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000
pounds) or less. The agency estimates that there are approximately 21
such manufacturers.
Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting from the Collection of Information: NHTSA estimates that the
total annual burden is 42 hours (2 hours per manufacturer per year).
Two reports per manufacturer would be collected.
Estimated Costs: NHTSA estimates that the total annual cost burden,
in U.S. dollars, will be $0. No additional resources would be expended
by vehicle manufacturers to gather annual production information
because they already compile this data for their own purposes.
Summary of the Collection of Information: This collection would
require manufacturers of passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles having a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less to provide motor
vehicle production data for the following two years: May 1, 2016
through April 30, 2017; and May 1, 2017 through April 30, 2018.
Description of the Need for the Information and the Proposed Use of
the Information: The purpose of the reporting requirements will be to
aid NHTSA in determining whether a manufacturer has complied with the
requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, Rear
visibility, during the phase-in of new requirements for rear visibility
systems.
Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.
VI. Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Imports, incorporation by reference, motor vehicle safety,
reporting and recordkeeping, tires.
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as
follows:
PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
0
1. The authority citation for Part 571 of Title 49 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.
0
2. Section 571.5 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(5) and (k)(26)
to read as follows:
Sec. 571.5 Matter incorporated by reference.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(5) ASTM B117-03, ``Standard Practice for Operating Salt Spray
(Fog) Apparatus,'' approved October 1, 2003, into Sec. Sec. 571.106;
571.111.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(26) SAE Standard J826 JUL95, ``Devices for Use in Defining and
Measuring Vehicle Seating Accommodation,'' revised July 1995, into
Sec. Sec. 571.10; 571.111; 571.202; 571.202a; 571.216a.
* * * * *
0
3. Section 571.111 is amended by
0
a. Revising the section heading;
0
b. Revising S1;
0
c. Revising S3;
0
d. Adding, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Backing event,''
``Environmental test fixture,'' ``External component,'' ``Key,''
``Limited line manufacturer,'' ``Rearview image,'' ``Rear visibility
system,'' ``Small manufacturer,'' and ``Starting system'' to S4;
0
e. Adding S5.5 through S5.5.7;
0
f. Revising S6;
0
g. Adding S6.2 through S6.2.7;
0
h. Adding S14 through S14.3;
0
i. Adding S15 through S15.7; and
0
j. Adding Figures 5 and 6 to read as follows:
Sec. 571.111 Standard No. 111; Rear visibility.
S1. Scope. This standard specifies requirements for rear visibility
devices and systems.
* * * * *
S3. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, school buses,
motorcycles and low-speed vehicles.
S4. * * *
Backing event means an amount of time which starts when the
vehicle's direction selector is placed in reverse, and ends at the
manufacturer's choosing, when the vehicle forward motion reaches:
(a) a speed of 10 mph,
(b) a distance of 10 meters traveled, or
(c) a continuous duration of 10 seconds.
* * * * *
Environmental test fixture means a device designed to support the
external components of the rear visibility system for testing purposes,
using any factory seal which would be used during normal vehicle
operation, in a manner that simulates the on-vehicle component
orientation during normal vehicle operation, and prevents the exposure
of any test conditions to portions of the external component which are
not exposed to the outside of the motor vehicle.
External component means any part of the rear visibility system
which is exposed to the outside of the motor vehicle.
Key means a physical device or an electronic code which, when
inserted into the starting system (by physical or electronic means),
enables the vehicle operator to activate the engine or motor.
[[Page 19244]]
Limited line manufacturer means a manufacturer that sells three or
fewer carlines, as that term is defined in 49 CFR 583.4, in the United
States during a production year, as that term is defined in S15.
Rearview image means a visual image, detected by means of a single
source, of the area directly behind a vehicle that is provided in a
single location to the vehicle operator and by means of indirect
vision.
Rear visibility system means the set of devices or components which
together perform the function of producing the rearview image as
required under this standard.
Small manufacturer means an original vehicle manufacturer that
produces or assembles fewer than 5,000 vehicles annually for sale in
the United States.
Starting system means the vehicle system used in conjunction with
the key to activate the engine or motor.
* * * * *
S5.5 Rear visibility.
(a) Phase-in period requirements. For passenger cars with a GVWR of
4,536 kg or less manufactured on or after May 1, 2016, but not later
than April 30, 2018, a percentage of each manufacturer's production, as
specified in S15, shall display a rearview image meeting the
requirements of S5.5.1.
(b) Final requirements. Each passenger car with a GVWR of 4,536 kg
or less manufactured on or after May 1, 2018, shall display a rearview
image meeting the requirements of S5.5.1 through S5.5.7.
S5.5.1 Field of view. When tested in accordance with the procedures
in S14.1, the rearview image shall include:
(a) A minimum of a 150-mm wide portion along the circumference of
each test object located at positions F and G specified in S14.1.4; and
(b) The full width and height of each test object located at
positions A through E specified in S14.1.4.
S5.5.2 Size. When the rearview image is measured in accordance with
the procedures in S14.1, the calculated visual angle subtended by the
horizontal width of
(a) All three test objects located at positions A, B, and C
specified in S14.1.4 shall average not less than 5 minutes of arc; and
(b) Each individual test object (A, B, and C) shall not be less
than 3 minutes of arc.
S5.5.3 Response time. The rearview image meeting the requirements
of S5.5.1 and S5.5.2, when tested in accordance with S14.2, shall be
displayed within 2.0 seconds of the start of a backing event.
S5.5.4 Linger time. The rearview image meeting the requirements of
S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 shall not be displayed after the backing event has
ended.
S5.5.5 Deactivation. The rearview image meeting the requirements of
S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 shall remain visible during the backing event until
either, the driver modifies the view, or the vehicle direction selector
is removed from the reverse position.
S5.5.6 Default view. The rear visibility system must default to the
rearview image meeting the requirements of S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 at the
beginning of each backing event regardless of any modifications to the
field of view the driver has previously selected.
S5.5.7 Durability. The rear visibility system shall meet the field
of view and image size requirements of S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 after each
durability test specified in S14.3.1, S14.3.2, and S14.3.3.
S6. Requirements for multipurpose passenger vehicles, low-speed
vehicles, trucks, buses, and school buses with GVWR of 4,536 kg or
less.
* * * * *
S6.2 Rear visibility.
(a) Phase-in period requirements. For multipurpose passenger
vehicles, low-speed vehicles, trucks, buses, and school buses with a
GVWR of 4,536 kg or less manufactured on or after May 1, 2016, but not
later than April 30, 2018, a percentage of each manufacturer's
production, as specified in S15, shall display a rearview image meeting
the requirements of S6.2.1.
(b) Final requirements. Each multipurpose passenger vehicle, low-
speed vehicle, truck, bus, and school bus with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or
less manufactured on or after May 1, 2018, shall display a rearview
image meeting the requirements of S6.2.1 through S6.2.7.
S6.2.1 Field of view. When tested in accordance with the procedures
in S14.1, the rearview image shall include:
(a) A minimum of a 150-mm wide portion along the circumference of
each test object located at positions F and G specified in S14.1.4; and
(b) The full width and height of each test object located at
positions A through E specified in S14.1.4.
S6.2.2 Size. When the rearview image is measured in accordance with
the procedures in S14.1, the calculated visual angle subtended by the
horizontal width of
(a) All three test objects located at positions A, B, and C
specified in S14.1.4 shall average not less than 5 minutes of arc; and
(b) Each individual test object (A, B, and C) shall not be less
than 3 minutes of arc.
S6.2.3 Response time. The rearview image meeting the requirements
of S6.2.1 and S6.2.2, when tested in accordance with S14.2, shall be
displayed within 2.0 seconds of the start of a backing event.
S6.2.4 Linger time. The rearview image meeting the requirements of
S6.2.1 and S6.2.2 shall not be displayed after the backing event has
ended.
S6.2.5 Deactivation. The rearview image meeting the requirements of
S6.2.1 and S6.2.2 shall remain visible during the backing event until
either, the driver modifies the view, or the vehicle direction selector
is removed from the reverse position.
S6.2.6 Default view. The rear visibility system must default to the
rearview image meeting the requirements of S6.2.1 and S6.2.2 at the
beginning of each backing event regardless of any modifications to the
field of view the driver has previously selected.
S6.2.7 Durability. The rear visibility system shall meet the field
of view and image size requirements of S6.2.1 and S6.2.2 after each
durability test specified in S14.3.1, S14.3.2, and S14.3.3.
* * * * *
S14. Rear visibility test procedure.
S14.1 Field of view and image size test procedure.
S14.1.1 Lighting. The ambient illumination conditions in which
testing is conducted consists of light that is evenly distributed from
above and is at an intensity of between 7,000 lux and 10,000 lux, as
measured at the center of the exterior surface of the vehicle's roof.
S14.1.2 Vehicle conditions.
S14.1.2.1 Tires. The vehicle's tires are set to the vehicle
manufacturer's recommended cold inflation pressure.
S14.1.2.2 Fuel tank loading. The fuel tank is full.
S14.1.2.3 Vehicle load. The vehicle is loaded to simulate the
weight of the driver and four passengers or the designated occupant
capacity, if less. The weight of each occupant is represented by 45 kg
resting on the seat pan and 23 kg resting on the vehicle floorboard
placed in the driver's designated seating position and any other
available designated seating position.
S14.1.2.4 Rear hatch and trunk lids. If the vehicle is equipped
with rear hatches or trunk lids, they are closed and latched in their
normal vehicle operating condition.
S14.1.2.5 Driver's seat positioning.
S14.1.2.5.1 Adjust the driver's seat to the midpoint of the
longitudinal
[[Page 19245]]
adjustment range. If the seat cannot be adjusted to the midpoint of the
longitudinal adjustment range, the closest adjustment position to the
rear of the midpoint shall be used.
S14.1.2.5.2 Adjust the driver's seat to the lowest point of all
vertical adjustment ranges present.
S14.1.2.5.3 Using the three dimensional SAE Standard J826 JUL95
(incorporated by reference, see Sec. 571.5) manikin, adjust the
driver's seat back angle at the vertical portion of the H-point
machine's torso weight hanger to 25 degrees. If this adjustment setting
is not available, adjust the seat-back angle to the positional detent
setting closest to 25 degrees in the direction of the manufacturer's
nominal design riding position.
S14.1.3 Test object. Each test object is a right circular cylinder
that is 0.8 m high and 0.3 m in external diameter. There are seven test
objects, designated A through G, and they are marked as follows.
(a) Test objects A, B, C, D, and E are marked with a horizontal
band encompassing the uppermost 150 mm of the side of the cylinder.
(b) Test objects F and G are marked on the side with a solid
vertical stripe of 150 mm width extending from the top to the bottom of
each cylinder.
(c) Both the horizontal band and vertical stripe shall be of a
color that contrasts with both the rest of the cylinder and the test
surface.
S14.1.4 Test object locations and orientation. Place the test
objects at locations specified in S14.1.4(a)-(f) and illustrated in
Figure 5. Measure the distances shown in Figure 5 from a test object to
another test object or other object from the cylindrical center (axis)
of the test object as viewed from above. Each test object is oriented
so that its axis is vertical.
(a) Place test objects F and G so that their centers are in a
transverse vertical plane that is 0.3 m to the rear of a transverse
vertical plane tangent to the rearmost surface of the rear bumper.
(b) Place test objects D and E so that their centers are in a
transverse vertical plane that is 3.05 m to the rear of a transverse
vertical plane tangent to the rearmost surface of the rear bumper.
(c) Place test objects A, B and C so that their centers are in a
transverse vertical plane that is 6.1 m to the rear of a transverse
vertical plane tangent to the rearmost surface of the rear bumper.
(d) Place test object B so that its center is in a longitudinal
vertical plane passing through the vehicle's longitudinal centerline.
(e) Place test objects C, E, and G so that their centers are in a
longitudinal vertical plane located 1.52 m, measured laterally and
horizontally, to the right of the vehicle longitudinal center line.
(f) Place test objects A, D, and F so that their centers are in a
longitudinal vertical plane located 1.52 m, measured laterally and
horizontally, to the left of the vehicle longitudinal center line.
S14.1.5 Test reference point. Obtain the test reference point using
the following procedure.
(a) Locate the center of the forward-looking eye midpoint
(Mf) illustrated in Figure 6 so that it is 635 mm vertically
above the H point (H) and 96 mm aft of the H point.
(b) Locate the head/neck joint center (J) illustrated in Figure 6
so that it is 100 mm rearward of Mf and 588 mm vertically
above the H point.
(c) Draw an imaginary horizontal line between Mf and a
point vertically above J, defined as J2.
(d) Rotate the imaginary line about J2 in the direction
of the rearview image until the straight-line distance between
Mf and the center of the display used to present the
rearview image required in this standard reaches the shortest possible
value.
(e) Define this new, rotated location of Mf to be
Mr (eye midpoint rotated).
S14.1.6 Display adjustment. If the display is mounted with a
rotational adjustment mechanism, adjust the display such that the
surface of the display is normal to the imaginary line traveling
through Mr and J2 or as near to normal as the
display adjustment will allow.
S14.1.7 Steering wheel adjustment. The steering wheel is adjusted
to the position where the longitudinal centerline of all vehicle tires
are parallel to the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. If no such
position exists, adjust the steering wheel to the position where the
longitudinal centerline of all vehicle tires are closest to parallel to
the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle.
S14.1.8 Measurement procedure.
(a) Locate a 35 mm or larger format still camera, video camera, or
digital equivalent such that the center of the camera's image plane is
located at Mr and the camera lens is directed at the center
of the display's rearview image.
(b) Affix a ruler at the base of the rearview image in an
orientation perpendicular with a test object cylinder centerline. If
the vehicle head restraints obstruct the camera's view of the display,
they may be adjusted or removed.
(c) Photograph the image of the visual display with the ruler
included in the frame and the rearview image displayed.
S14.1.8.1 Extract photographic data.
(a) Using the photograph, measure the apparent length, of a 50 mm
delineated section of the in-photo ruler, along the ruler's edge,
closest to the rearview image and at a point near the horizontal center
of the rearview image.
(b) Using the photograph, measure the horizontal width of the
colored band at the upper portion of each of the three test objects
located at positions A, B, and C in Figure 5.
(c) Define the measured horizontal widths of the colored bands of
the three test objects as da, db, and dc.
S14.1.8.2 Obtain scaling factor. Using the apparent length of the
50 mm portion of the ruler as it appears in the photograph, divide this
apparent length by 50 mm to obtain a scaling factor. Define this
scaling factor as sscale.
S14.1.8.3 Determine viewing distance. Determine the actual distance
from the rotated eye midpoint location (Mr) to the center of
the rearview image. Define this viewing distance as aeye.
S14.1.8.4 Calculate visual angle subtended by test objects. Use the
following equation to calculate the subtended visual angles:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.006
where i can take on the value of either test object A, B, or C, and
arcsine is calculated in units of degrees.
S14.2 Image response time test procedure. The temperature inside
the vehicle during this test is any temperature between 15[deg]C and
25[deg]C. Immediately prior to commencing the actions listed in
subparagraphs (a)-(c) of this paragraph, all components of the rear
visibility system are in a powered off state. Then:
(a) Open the driver's door to any width,
(b) Close the driver's door
(c) Activate the starting system using the key, and
(d) Select the vehicle's reverse direction at any time not less
than 4.0 seconds and not more than 6.0 seconds after the driver's door
is opened. The driver door is open when the edge of the driver's door
opposite of the door's hinge is no longer flush with the exterior body
panel.
S14.3 Durability test procedures. For the durability tests
specified in S14.3.1, S14.3.2, and S14.3.3, the external components are
mounted on an environmental test fixture.
S14.3.1 Corrosion test procedure. The external components are
subjected to two 24-hour corrosion test cycles. In each corrosion test
cycle, the external components are subjected to a salt spray (fog) test
in accordance with ASTM
[[Page 19246]]
B117-03 (incorporated by reference, see Sec. 571.5) for a period of 24
hours. Allow 1 hour to elapse without spray between the two test
cycles.
S14.3.2 Humidity exposure test procedure. The external components
are subjected to 24 consecutive 3-hour humidity test cycles. In each
humidity test cycle, external components are subjected to a temperature
of 100[deg]+7[deg]-0[deg] F (38[deg]+4[deg]-0[deg] C) with a relative
humidity of not less than 90% for a period of 2 hours. After a period
not to exceed 5 minutes, the external components are subjected to a
temperature of 32[deg] +5[deg] -0[emsp14][deg]F (0[deg] +3[deg] -0[deg]
C) and a humidity of not more than 30% 10% for 1 hour.
Allow no more than 5 minutes to elapse between each test cycle.
S14.3.3 Temperature exposure test procedure. The external
components are subjected to 4 consecutive 2-hour temperature test
cycles. In each temperature test cycle, the external components are
first subjected to a temperature of 176[deg]
5[emsp14][deg]F (80[deg] 3[deg] C) for a period of one
hour. After a period not to exceed 5 minutes, the external components
are subjected to a temperature of 32[deg] +5[deg] -0[emsp14][deg]F
(0[deg] +3[deg] -0[deg] C) for 1 hour. Allow no more than 5 minutes to
elapse between each test cycle.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
[[Page 19247]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.002
[[Page 19248]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.003
BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
S15 Rear visibility phase-in schedule. For the purposes of the
requirements in S15.1 through S15.7, production year means the 12-month
period between May 1 of one year and April 30 of the following year,
inclusive.
S15.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2016 and before May
1, 2018. At any time during or after the production years ending April
30, 2017 and April 30, 2018, each manufacturer shall, upon request from
the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide information
identifying the vehicles (by make, model and vehicle identification
number) that have been certified as complying with S5.5.1 or S6.2.1 of
this standard. The manufacturer's designation of a vehicle as a
certified vehicle is irrevocable.
S15.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2016 and before May
1, 2017. Except as provided in S15.4, for passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a GVWR
of 4,536 kg or less, manufactured by a manufacturer on or after May 1,
2016, and before May
[[Page 19249]]
1, 2017, the number of such vehicles complying with S5.5.1 or S6.2.1
shall be not less than 10 percent of the manufacturer's--
(a) Production of such vehicles during that period; or
(b) Average annual production of such vehicles manufactured in the
three previous production years.
S15.3 Vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2017 and before May
1, 2018. Except as provided in S15.4, for passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a GVWR
of 4,536 kg or less, manufactured by a manufacturer on or after May 1,
2017, and before May 1, 2018, the number of such vehicles complying
with S5.5.1 or S6.2.1 shall be not less than 40 percent of the
manufacturer's--
(a) Production of such vehicles during that period; or
(b) Average annual production of such vehicles manufactured in the
three previous production years.
S15.4 Exclusions from phase-in. The following vehicles shall not be
subject to the requirements in S15.1 through S15.3 but shall achieve
full compliance with this standard at the end of the phase-in period in
accordance with S5.5(b) and S6.2(b):
(a) Vehicles that are manufactured by small manufacturers or by
limited line manufacturers.
(b) Vehicles that are altered (within the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7)
before May 1, 2017, after having been previously certified in
accordance with part 567 of this chapter, and vehicles manufactured in
two or more stages before May 1, 2018.
S15.5 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer. For the
purpose of calculating average annual production of vehicles for each
manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured by each
manufacturer under S15.1 through S15.3, a vehicle produced by more than
one manufacturer shall be attributed to a single manufacturer as
follows, subject to S15.6--
(a) A vehicle that is imported shall be attributed to the importer.
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the United States by more than one
manufacturer, one of which also markets the vehicle, shall be
attributed to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
S15.6 A vehicle produced by more than one manufacturer shall be
attributed to any one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an
express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration under 49 CFR part 585, between the manufacturer
so specified and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise
be attributed under S15.5.
S15.7 Calculation of complying vehicles.
(a) For the purposes of calculating the vehicles complying with
S15.2, a manufacturer may count a vehicle if it is manufactured on or
after May 1, 2016 but before May 1, 2017.
(b) For purposes of complying with S15.3, a manufacturer may count
a vehicle if it is manufactured on or after May 1, 2017 but before May
1, 2018 and,
(c) For the purposes of calculating average annual production of
vehicles for each manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured
by each manufacturer, each vehicle that is excluded from having to meet
the applicable requirement is not counted.
0
4. Section 571.500 is amended by adding S5(b)(11) to read as follows:
Sec. 571.500 Standard No. 500; Low-speed vehicles.
* * * * *
S5. * * *
(b) * * *
(11) Low-speed vehicles shall comply with the rear visibility
requirements specified in paragraphs S6.2 of FMVSS No. 111.
PART 585--PHASE-IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
0
5. The authority citation for part 585 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.
0
6. Add Subpart M to Part 585 to read as follows:
Subpart M--Rear Visibility Improvements Reporting Requirements
Sec.
585.121 Scope.
585.122 Purpose.
585.123 Applicability.
585.124 Definitions.
585.125 Response to inquiries.
585.126 Reporting requirements.
585.127 Records.
Subpart M--Rear Visibility Improvements Reporting Requirements
Sec. 585.121 Scope.
This part establishes requirements for manufacturers of passenger
cars, of trucks, buses, multipurpose passenger vehicles and low-speed
vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms
(kg) (10,000 pounds (lb)) or less, to submit a report, and maintain
records related to the report, concerning the number of such vehicles
that meet the rear visibility requirements in paragraphs S5.5 and S6.2
of Standard No. 111, Rear visibility (49 CFR 571.111).
Sec. 585.122 Purpose.
The purpose of these reporting requirements is to assist the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in determining whether a
manufacturer has complied with the rear visibility requirements in
paragraphs S5.5 and S6.2 of Standard No. 111, Rear visibility (49 CFR
571.111).
Sec. 585.123 Applicability.
This part applies to manufacturers of passenger cars, of trucks,
buses, multipurpose passenger vehicles and low-speed vehicles with a
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms (kg) (10,000
pounds (lb)) or less.
Sec. 585.124 Definitions.
(a) All terms defined in 49 U.S.C. 30102 are used in their
statutory meaning.
(b) Bus, gross vehicle weight rating or GVWR, low-speed vehicle,
multipurpose passenger vehicle, passenger car, and truck are used as
defined in Sec. 571.3 of this chapter.
(c) Production year means the 12-month period between May 1 of one
year and April 30 of the following year, inclusive.
Sec. 585.125 Response to inquiries.
At anytime during the production years ending April 30, 2017, and
April 30, 2018, each manufacturer shall, upon request from the Office
of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide information identifying the
vehicles (by make, model and vehicle identification number) that have
been certified as complying with the rear visibility requirements in
paragraphs S5.5 and S6.2 of Standard No. 111, Rear visibility (49 CFR
571.111). The manufacturer's designation of a vehicle as a certified
vehicle is irrevocable.
Sec. 585.126 Reporting requirements.
(a) Phase-in reporting requirements. Within 60 days after the end
of each of the production years ending April 30, 2017 and April 30,
2018, each manufacturer shall submit a report to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration concerning its compliance with the rear
visibility requirements in paragraphs S5.5 and S6.2 of Standard No. 111
(49 CFR 571.111) for its vehicles produced in that year. Each report
shall provide the
[[Page 19250]]
information specified in paragraph (b) of this section and in Sec.
585.2 of this part.
(b) Phase-in report content-- (1) Basis for phase-in production
goals. Each manufacturer shall provide the number of vehicles
manufactured in the current production year, or, at the manufacturer's
option, in each of the three previous production years. A new
manufacturer that is, for the first time, manufacturing vehicles for
sale in the United States must report the number of vehicles
manufactured during the current production year.
(2) Production of complying vehicles. Each manufacturer shall
report, for the production year being reported on, information on the
number of vehicles that meet the rear visibility requirements in
paragraphs S5.5 and S6.2 of Standard No. 111 (49 CFR 571.111).
Sec. 585.127 Records.
Each manufacturer shall maintain records of the Vehicle
Identification Number for each vehicle for which information is
reported under Sec. 585.126 until April 30, 2022.
Issued in Washington DC, on March 31, 2014 under authority
delegated in 49 CFR part 1.95.
David J. Friedman,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2014-07469 Filed 4-1-14; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P