[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 62 (Tuesday, April 1, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18328-18350]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-06956]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2014-0064]
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant
Hazards Considerations
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Biweekly notice.
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SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the
Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to
be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined
license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that
such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from March 6, 2014, to March 19, 2014. The last
biweekly notice was published on March 18, 2014.
DATES: Comments must be filed by May 1, 2014. A request for a hearing
must be filed by June 2, 2014.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting
comments on a specific subject):
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0064. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules,
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration,
Mail Stop: 3WFN-06-44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
For additional direction on accessing information and submitting
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janet Burkhardt, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1384, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
A. Accessing Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0064 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may
access publicly-available information related to this document by any
of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0064.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected].
Documents may be viewed in ADAMS by performing a search on the document
date and docket number.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2014-0064 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in you
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into
ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.
II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses and Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in Sec. 50.92 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), this means that operation of the facility
in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day
[[Page 18329]]
comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment
period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for
example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission
take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the
notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of
issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards
Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or
combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency
Rules of Practice and Procedure'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is
available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. The
NRC's regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC Library on
the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is
filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer
designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request
and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing
or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding. Each contention must consist
of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or
controverted. In addition, the requestor/petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely in
proving the contention at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner must
also provide references to those specific sources and documents of
which the petitioner is aware and on which the requestor/petitioner
intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The
petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine
dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing
held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139;
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least
ten 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should
contact the Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected],
or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital
identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its
counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the
E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic
docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer
assistance in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System,
users
[[Page 18330]]
will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's Web
site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, including
the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's
public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document
via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's public
Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email to
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at 866-672-7640. The NRC
Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern
Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC
regulation or other law requires submission of such information.
However, a request to intervene will require including information on
local residence in order to demonstrate a proximity assertion of
interest in the proceeding. With respect to copyrighted works, except
for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings
and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested
not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.
Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60
days from the date of publication of this notice. Requests for hearing,
petitions for leave to intervene, and motions for leave to file new or
amended contentions that are filed after the 60-day deadline will not
be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer that the
filing demonstrates good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(iii).
For further details with respect to these license amendment
applications, see the application for amendment which is available for
public inspection in ADAMS and at the NRC's PDR. For additional
direction on accessing information related to this document, see the
``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this
document.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
Date of amendment request: January 28, 2014.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment revises an
error made during McGuire's conversion to standard technical
specifications (TSs) in TS 3.4.12. Condition G incorrectly references
Condition E. As currently written, TS 3.4.12 Required Actions F.2 and
G.1 collectively require that an operable residual heat removal (RHR)
suction relief valve be aligned within 1 hour and that a reactor
coolant system (RCS) vent path greater than 2.75 square inches be
established within 8 hours if one of two Power Operated Relief Valves
(PORVs) is inoperable in accordance with Condition E. As such, the
proposed license amendment request revises Condition G to eliminate the
reference to Condition E on the basis that the alignment of an operable
RHR relief valve is sufficient to compensate for the loss of one PORV.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
Criterion 1: Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change has no effect on the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated since adequate low
temperature overpressure protection [(LTOP)] of the RCS is being
maintained.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve the addition or
modification of any plant equipment. The proposed change does not
involve a change in the operational limits or the design
capabilities of the LTOP system. The LTOP system remains capable of
protecting the RCS against low temperature overpressurization.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
[[Page 18331]]
Criterion 3: Does the proposed amendment involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of
the fission product barriers to perform their design functions
during and following an accident situation. These barriers include
the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment
system. The performance of the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant
system and the containment system will not be adversely impacted by
the proposed change since the ability of the LTOP system to prevent
a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier has not
been adversely impacted by the proposed change.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
Based on the above, Duke Energy concludes that the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under
the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a
finding of ``no significant hazards consideration'' is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel,
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC
28202
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
1, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: June 11, 2013.
Description of amendment request: Entergy Operations, Inc., has
requested an amendment to the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1)
Technical Specification (TS) 2.1.1.1, to add the determination of the
maximum local fuel pin centerline temperature using NRC reviewed and
approved COPERNIC fuel performance computer code. The ANO-1 TSs
currently provide similar information for other fuel performance
computer codes.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not require any physical change to any
plant systems, structures, or components, nor does it require any
change in systems or plant operations. The proposed change does not
require any change in safety analysis methods or results. Operations
and analysis will continue to be in accordance with the ANO-1
licensing basis. The peak fuel centerline temperature is the basis
for protecting the fuel and is consistent with safety analysis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change adds a new fuel centerline melt temperature
versus burnup relationship based on an NRC reviewed and approved
fuel performance computer code. The accident analyses presented in
the ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report indicate that the fuel centerline
temperature is not approached or exceeded for any of the events or
Anticipated Operational Occurrences. The existing analyses, which
are unchanged, do not affect any accident initiators that would
create a new accident.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not require any change in safety
analysis methods or results. Therefore, by adding the fuel
centerline temperature and burnup relationship as defined by the
COPERNIC code to the TS, the margin as established with the ANO-1 TS
and SAR [Safety Analyses Report] are unchanged.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
1, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: December 20, 2013, as supplemented by
March 11, 2014.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would allow for the
extension to the 10-year frequency of the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1
(ANO-1) Type A or Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) that is required by
ANO-1 Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.16, ``Reactor Building Leakage
Rate Testing Program,'' to be extended to 15 years on a permanent
basis.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment involves changes to the ANO-1 Reactor
Building Leakage Rate Testing Program. The proposed amendment does
not involve a physical change to the plant or a change in the manner
in which the plant is operated or controlled. The primary reactor
building function is to provide an essentially leak tight barrier
against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment
for postulated accidents. As such, the reactor building itself and
the testing requirements to periodically demonstrate the integrity
of the reactor building exist to ensure the plant's ability to
mitigate the consequences of an accident, do not involve any
accident precursors or initiators. Therefore, the probability of
occurrence of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly
increased by the proposed amendment.
The integrity of the reactor building is subject to two types of
failure mechanisms which can be categorized as (1) activity based
and (2) time based. Activity based failure mechanisms are defined as
degradation due to system and/or component modifications or
maintenance. Local leak rate test requirements and administrative
controls such as configuration management and procedural
requirements for system restoration ensure that the reactor building
containment integrity is not degraded by plant modifications or
maintenance activities. The design and construction requirements of
the reactor building itself combined with the reactor building
inspections performed in accordance with ASME [American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code], Section XI,
the Maintenance Rule and regulatory commitments serve to provide a
high degree of assurance that the containment will not degrade in a
manner that is detectable only by a Type A test. Based on the above,
the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in
the consequences of an accident previously evaluate.
The proposed amendment adopts the NRC-accepted guidelines of
[Nuclear Energy Institute] NEI 94-01, Revision 3-A, [``Industry
Guideline for Implementing
[[Page 18332]]
Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J''] for
development of the ANO-1 performance-based testing program.
Implementation of these guidelines continues to provide adequate
assurance that during design basis accidents, the primary
containment and its components will limit leakage rates to less the
values assumed in the plant safety analyses. The potential
consequences of extending the ILRT interval to 15 years have been
evaluated by analyzing the resulting changes in risk. The increase
in risk in terms of person-rem per year within 50 miles resulting
from design basis accidents was estimated to be acceptably small and
determined to be within the guidelines published in [NRC Regulatory
Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to
the Licensing Bases''].
Additionally, the proposed change maintains defense-in-depth by
preserving a reasonable balance among prevention of core damage,
prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation. ANO-1
has determined that the increase in Conditional Containment Failure
Probability due to the proposed change would be very small.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not
significantly increase the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment adopts the NRC-accepted guidelines of NEI
94-01, Revision 3-A, for the development of the ANO-1 performance-
based leakage testing program, and establishes a 15-year interval
for the performance of the reactor building ILRT. The reactor
building and the testing requirements to periodically demonstrate
the integrity of the reactor building exist to ensure the plant's
ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident, do not involve
any accident precursors or initiators. The proposed change does not
involve a physical change to the plant (i.e., no new or different
type of equipment will be installed) or a change to the manner in
which the plant is operated or controlled.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment adopts the NRC-accepted guidelines of NEI
94-01, Revision 3-A, for the development of the ANO-1 performance-
based leakage testing program, and establishes a 15 year interval
for the performance of the containment ILRT. This amendment does not
alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system
setpoints, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The
specific requirements and conditions of the Reactor Building Leakage
Rate Testing Program, as defined in the TS, ensure that the degree
of the reactor building structural integrity and leak-tightness that
is considered in the plant's safety analysis is maintained. The
overall reactor building leakage rate limit specified by the TS is
maintained, and the Type A, Type B, and Type C containment leakage
tests will be performed at the frequencies established in accordance
with the NRC-accepted guidelines of NEI 94-01, Revision 3-A.
Containment inspections performed in accordance with other plant
programs serve to provide a high degree of assurance that the
containment will not degrade in a manner that is not detectable by
an ILRT. A risk assessment using the current ANO-1 risk model
concluded that extending the ILRT test interval from ten years to 15
years results in an acceptably small change to the ANO-1 risk
profile.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457,
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois
Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2,
Ogle County, Illinois
Date of amendment request: August 21, 2013.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise technical specifications (TS) Section 3.7.2, ``Main Steam
Isolation Valves (MSIVs),'' to incorporate the MSIV actuator trains
into the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and provide associated
Conditions and Required Actions. The proposed amendment would also
revise surveillance requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 to identify that the MSIV
actuator trains are required to be tested.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
EGC [Exelon Generation Company, LLC] has evaluated whether or not a
significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed
amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR
50.92(c), ``Issuance of amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes provide requirements for MSIVs that have
dual actuators which receive signals from separate instrumentation
trains. The design and functional performance requirements,
operational characteristics, and reliability of the MSIVs and
actuator trains are unchanged. There is no impact on the design
safety function of the MSIVs to close (as an accident mitigator),
nor is there any change with respect to inadvertent closure of an
MSIV (as a potential transient initiator). Since no failure mode or
initiating condition that could cause an accident (including any
plant transient) is created or affected, the change cannot involve a
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously
evaluated.
With regard to the consequences of an accident and the equipment
required for mitigation of the accident, the proposed changes
involve no design or physical changes to the MSIVs or any other
equipment required for accident mitigation. With respect to MSIV
actuator train Completion Times, the consequences of an accident are
independent of equipment Completion Times as long as adequate
equipment availability is maintained. The proposed MSIV actuator
Completion Times take into account the redundancy of the actuator
trains and are limited in extent consistent with other Completion
Times specified in the Technical Specifications. Adequate equipment
availability would therefore continue to be required by the
Technical Specifications. On this basis, the consequences of
applicable, analyzed accidents are not significantly affected by the
proposed changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to incorporate requirements for the MSIV
actuator trains do not involve any design or physical changes to the
facility, including the MSIVs and actuator trains themselves. No
physical alteration of the plant is involved, as no new or different
type of equipment is to be installed. The proposed changes do not
alter any assumptions made in the safety analyses, nor do they
involve any changes to plant procedures for ensuring that the plant
is operated within analyzed limits. As such, no new failure modes or
mechanisms that could
[[Page 18333]]
cause a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated are being introduced.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in [a] margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to incorporate requirements for the MSIV
actuator trains do not alter the manner in which safety limits or
limiting safety system settings are determined. No changes to
instrument/system actuation setpoints are involved. The safety
analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change and the
proposed changes will not permit plant operation in a configuration
outside the design basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed amendments
do not involve a significant hazards consideration under the
standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding
of no significant hazards consideration is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: December 6, 2013.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise Technical Specification (TS) setpoints and allowable values for
certain area temperature instrumentation associated with the leak
detection system (LDS). The purpose of the LDS is to detect and provide
the signals necessary to isolate leakage from the reactor coolant
pressure boundary (RCPB) before pre-determined limits are exceeded. The
affected TS instrumentation monitor ambient temperature in the reactor
water cleanup system (RWCS) area, the high pressure coolant injection
(HPCI) equipment room and pipe routing area, and the reactor core
isolation cooling (RCIC) equipment room and pipe routing area. The
temperature setpoints, for the LDS instrumentation described above, are
established to provide system isolations in the event of a postulated
25 gallon per minute (gpm) steam leak.
The proposed amendment would also change the leakage design basis
from 25 gpm to 35 gpm for the turbine enclosure main steam line tunnel
temperature isolation setpoint (the setpoint of this instrumentation is
not being changed).
The licensee's amendment request indicated that the proposed
changes are being made in order to establish adequate margins such that
normal variations in the maximum operating temperatures for the
affected plant areas do not result in system isolation.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis
against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's review is
presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The LDS is a mitigating system for low energy line breaks or
leakage. The LDS includes ambient temperature instrumentation with
setpoints established to provide for system isolation in the event
of a small steam leak (e.g., 25 gpm).
The proposed changes will not alter the way any structure,
system, or component (SSC) functions, and will not alter the manner
in which the plant is operated. The proposed changes do not impact
any SSC that could cause an accident. Therefore, the proposed
amendment will not increase the probability of occurrence of an
accident previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR).
The design basis leakage values for the LDS will remain bounded
by the design basis accident analysis analyzed in the UFSAR for a
main steam line break (MSLB). In addition, the proposed amendment
will not impact the ability of any SSC to mitigate an accident as
currently evaluated in the UFSAR. Therefore, the proposed amendment
will not increase the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated in the UFSAR.
Based on the above, the proposed changes will not increase the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not alter the plant configuration (no
new or different type of equipment will be installed). The proposed
changes will not change the design function of any SSC, and will not
alter the manner in which the plant is operated. There will be no
adverse effect on plant operation or accident mitigation equipment.
The response of the plant and the operators following an accident
will not be different. In addition, the proposed changes do not
introduce any new failure modes.
Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of
the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, RCPB, and
containment) to limit the level of radiation dose to the public.
The proposed changes have no impact on the fuel cladding or
containment. With respect to the RCPB, the proposed changes to the
TS setpoints and allowable values for the RWCS, HPCI, and RCIC
instrumentation will be established to provide system isolations in
the event of a postulated 25 gpm steam leak. The 25 gpm leakage
value is the current design basis value. As such, the proposed TS
changes have no impact on the current assumptions regarding the
ability of the LDS to isolate leakage from the RCPB.
The proposed amendment would also change the leakage design
basis from 25 gpm to 35 gpm for the turbine enclosure main steam
line tunnel temperature isolation setpoint. However, the licensee's
application indicated that the increase in total coolant loss as a
result of a change in the leak detection setpoint design basis from
25 gpm to 35 gpm is insignificant compared to the bounding analysis
for the analyzed MSLB.
Based on the above, the proposed changes will not result in a
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
Acting NRC Branch Chief: John D. Hughey.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-352 and No. 50-353,
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
171, 50-277, and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 1, 2
and 3, York and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-289 and 50-320, Three
[[Page 18334]]
Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: October 30, 2013.
Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise
the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) requalification training
frequency for the affected facilities.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not increase the probability or
consequences of an accident. The proposed change does not involve
the modification of any plant equipment or affect plant operation.
The proposed change will have no impact on any safety-related
Structures, Systems, or Components. The proposed change would revise
the ERO annual requalification training frequency.
Therefore, the proposed change to the Emergency Plan
requalification training frequency for the affected sites does not
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change has no impact on the design, function, or
operation of any plant systems, structures, or components. The
proposed change does not affect plant equipment or accident
analyses. The proposed change only affects the administration
aspects of the annual emergency response organization
requalification training frequency requirements. There are no
changes to the actual training conducted.
Therefore, the proposed change to the Emergency Plan
requalification training frequency for the affected sites does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not adversely affect existing plant
safety margins or the reliability of the equipment assumed to
operate in the safety analyses. There is no change being made to
safety analysis assumptions, safety limits, or limiting safety
system settings that would adversely affect plant safety as a result
of the proposed change. Margins of safety are unaffected by the
proposed change to the frequency in the ERO requalification training
requirements.
Therefore, the proposed change to the Emergency Plan
requalification training frequency for the affected sites does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above analysis, the NRC staff proposes to determine
that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station,
Salem County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: July 30, 2013.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the technical specifications (TS) to relocate the operability
and surveillance requirements for the reactor coolant system safety/
relief valve (SRV) position instrumentation from the Hope Creek
Generating Station (Hope Creek) TS to the Hope Creek Technical
Requirements Manual (TRM).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below with the NRC staff's edits in
square brackets:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability
and surveillance requirements for the SRV position instrumentation
from the TS to the TRM. The failure of this instrumentation is not
assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event in the UFSAR
[updated final safety analysis report]. The proposed changes do not
alter the design of the SRVs or any other system, structure, or
component (SSC). The proposed changes conform to NRC's regulatory
[requirements] regarding the content of plant TS, as identified in
10 CFR 50.36, [and the regulatory guidance identified in] NUREG-
1433, and [also conform with] the NRC's Final Policy Statement
published on July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
Therefore, these proposed changes do not represent a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability
and surveillance requirements for the SRV position instrumentation
from the TS to the TRM. The proposed changes do not involve a
modification to the physical configuration of the plant or change in
the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed changes
will not impose any new or different requirement or introduce a new
accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.
Additionally, there is no change in the types or increases in
the amounts of any effluent that may be released off-site and there
is no increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability
and surveillance requirements for the SRV position instrumentation
from the TS to the TRM. This instrumentation is not needed for
manual operator action necessary for safety systems to accomplish
their safety function for the design basis events. The SRV position
instrumentation, including the acoustic monitors and the tailpipe
temperature indicators, provides only alarm and position indication
functions and does not provide an input to any automatic trip
function.
Several diverse means are available to monitor SRV position,
including the Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System.
Operability and surveillance requirements will be established in a
licensee-controlled document, the TRM, to ensure the reliability of
SRV position monitoring capability. Changes to these requirements in
the TRM will be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, providing
an appropriate level of regulatory control.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, and with the changes noted above in square brackets, it
appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, PSEG Nuclear, LLC--N21,
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
NRC Branch Chief: Meena K. Khanna.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Docket Nos.: 52-027 and 52-028, Virgil
C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3, Burke County, Georgia
Date of amendment request: December 4, 2013.
Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would amend
Combined License Nos. NPF-93 and NPF-94, for VCSNS Units 2 and 3,
respectively, in regard to the Technical Specifications (TS). The
proposed amendment updates the TS for operator usability that more
closely aligns with
[[Page 18335]]
the form and content of other improved Standard Technical
Specifications NUREGs. Specifically, the changes would result in closer
alignment with the guidance of the Technical Specifications Task Force
(TSTF) Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical
Specifications, TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, and with NUREG-1431,
Standard Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants as updated by the
NRC-approved generic changes.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required under 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, South
Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) proposes to amend the VCSNS
TS. Evaluations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 showing that the proposed
changes do not involve significant hazards considerations are
provided for each change.
However, due to the significant number of changes associated
with the upgrade effort, SCE&G has grouped similar changes into
categories to facilitate the significant hazards evaluations
required by 10 CFR 50.92. Generic significant hazards evaluations
are provided for the Administrative, More Restrictive, Relocation,
and Detail Removed categories. Each individual Less Restrictive
change is addressed by a specific significant hazards evaluation.
Because of the large volume of changes, obvious editorial or
administrative changes (e.g., formatting, page rolls, punctuation,
etc.) have not always received an explicit discussion, but are
considered to be addressed by the applicable generic significant
hazards evaluation for Administrative changes.
Each significant change to the TS is marked-up on the
appropriate page in Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's submittal and assigned a
reference number reflective of the significant hazards evaluation
type. The reference number assigned to a change is used in the
Discussion of Change (DOC) in Enclosure 1 of SCE&G's submittal which
provides a detailed description (basis) for each change supporting
the applicable significant hazards evaluation in Attachment 6 of
Enclosure 1 of SCE&G's submittal.
10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES
This generic category applies to changes that are editorial in
nature, involve the movement of requirements within the TS without
affecting their technical content, simply reformat a requirement or
clarify the TS (such as deleting a footnote no longer applicable due to
a technical change to a requirement). These changes also include non-
technical modifications of requirements to conform to TSTF-GG-05-01,
``Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Standard Technical
Specifications,'' or provide consistency with the Improved Standard
Technical Specifications in NUREG-1431.
Changes to the TS requirements categorized as Administrative are
annotated with an ``A'' in Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup of
SCE&G's submittal.
These changes are intended to make the TS more readily
understandable to plant operators and other users. The application of
the TS format and style will also assure consistency is achieved
between TS. During this reformatting and rewording process, no
technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were made to the
TS unless they were identified and justified. Because of the large
volume of changes, obvious editorial or administrative changes (e.g.,
formatting, page rolls, punctuation, etc.) do not always receive a DOC
reference number but are considered to be addressed by this generic
significant hazards evaluation for Administrative changes.
SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3, Technical
Specifications. SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes
identified as Administrative in accordance with the criteria set forth
in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each
Administrative change identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of
SCE&G's submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these
changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria
and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and
rewording the TS. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process
involves no technical changes to the TS. As such, these changes are
administrative in nature and do not affect initiators of analyzed
events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient events.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
changes will not impose any new or different requirements, or eliminate
any existing requirements.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because the
changes have no effect on any safety analyses assumptions. These
changes are administrative in nature.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR MORE RESTRICTIVE CHANGES
This generic category include changes that impose additional
requirements, decrease allowed outage times, increase the Frequency of
Surveillances, impose additional Surveillances, increase the scope of
Specifications to include additional plant equipment, broaden the
Applicability of Specifications, or provide additional actions. These
changes have been evaluated to not be detrimental to plant safety.
More restrictive changes are proposed only when such changes are
consistent with the current VCSNS, Units 2 and 3 Licensing basis; the
applicable VCSNS safety analyses; and good engineering practice such
that the availability and reliability of the affected equipment is not
reduced.
Changes to the TS requirements categorized as More Restrictive are
annotated with an ``M'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup
of SCE&G's submittal.
SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3 TS. SCE&G has
evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as More
Restrictive in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92,
``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the proposed changes
do not involve a significant hazards consideration. This significant
hazards consideration is applicable to each More Restrictive change
identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a
[[Page 18336]]
significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes
against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria and
conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes provide more stringent TS requirements.
These more stringent requirements do not result in operations that
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed
event, and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an
accident or transient event. The more restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
changes do impose different Technical Specification requirements.
However, these changes are consistent with the assumptions in the
safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The imposition of more restrictive requirements either has no
effect on or increases a margin of plant safety. As provided in the
discussion of change, each change in this category is, by
definition, providing additional restrictions to enhance plant
safety. The changes maintain requirements within the safety analyses
and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS
This generic category applies to changes that relocate entire TS
Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs). A specific DOC for each TS
identified for relocation is provided in Enclosure 1. This evaluation
will be applicable to each of the changes identified with an ``R'' in
the Enclosure 1 DOC and the associated Enclosure 2 markup of SCE&G's
submittal.
SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS, Units 2 and 3 TS. Some of the
proposed changes involve relocating certain TS LCOs to licensee
controlled documents that are subject to the provisions of 10 CFR
52.98.
SCE&G has evaluated the VCSNS TS using the criteria set forth in 10
CFR 50.36 which define the scope of the TS. LCOs identified by this
evaluation that did not meet the retention requirements specified in
the regulation are deleted from the TS.
SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as
Relocated Specifications in accordance with the criteria set forth in
10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of Amendment,'' and has determined that the
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each Relocated
Specification identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's
submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these
changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria
and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes relocate LCOs for structures, systems,
components, or variables that do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR
50.36(c)(2)(ii) for inclusion in TS. The affected structures,
systems, components, or variables are not assumed to be initiators
of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate accident or
transient events. The requirements and Surveillances for these
affected structures, systems, components, or variables are proposed
to be relocated from the TS to a licensee controlled document that
is controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed
changes only reduce the level of regulatory control on these
requirements. The level of regulatory control has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and adequate
control of existing requirements will be maintained.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because
they have no significant effect on any safety analyses assumptions,
as indicated by the fact that the requirements do not meet the 10
CFR 50.36 criteria for retention. In addition, the relocated
requirements are moved without change, and any future changes to
these requirements will be evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
The NRC prior review and approval of changes to these relocated
requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, will no longer be
required. There is no margin of safety attributed to NRC prior
review and approval. However, the proposed changes are consistent
with 10 CFR 50.36, which allows revising the TS to relocate these
requirements and Surveillances to a licensee controlled document.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR DETAIL REMOVED CHANGES
This generic category applies to changes that involve removing
details out of the TS. These details are either supported by existing
content in the TS Bases or the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or a
commitment is made to add them to the TS Bases or FSAR. The removal of
this information is considered to be less restrictive because it is no
longer controlled by the TS change process. Typically, the information
removed is descriptive in nature and its removal conforms to NUREG-1431
for format and content.
A specific DOC for each detail identified for removal is provided
in Enclosure 1 of SCE&G's submittal. This evaluation will be applicable
to each of the changes identified with a ``D'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC
and the associated Enclosure 2 markup of SCE&G's submittal.
SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3, Technical
Specifications. SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes
identified as Detail Removed in accordance with the criteria set forth
in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each Detail
Removed change identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's
submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these
changes against each
[[Page 18337]]
of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria and conclusions of the
evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes relocate certain details from the TS to
other documents under regulatory control. The FSAR will be
maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR Part 52,
Appendix D, Section VIII. The TS Bases are subject to the change
control provisions in the Administrative Controls Chapter of the TS.
Since any changes to these documents will be evaluated, no
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a
change in the methods governing normal plant operations. The
proposed changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and
adequate control of the information will be maintained. Therefore,
the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because
they have no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In
addition, the details to be moved from the TS to other documents are
not being changed. Since any future changes to these details will be
evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control mechanism,
no significant reduction in a margin of safety will be allowed. A
significant reduction in a margin of safety is not associated with
the elimination of the 10 CFR 50.90 requirement for the NRC review
and approval of future changes to the relocated details. Not
including these details in the TS is consistent with NUREG-1431,
issued by the NRC, which allows revising the TS to relocate these
requirements to a licensee controlled document controlled by 10 CFR
50.59 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII, or other TS
controlled or regulation controlled documents.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGES
This category consists of technical changes which revise existing
requirements such that more restoration time is provided, fewer
compensatory measures are needed, surveillance requirements are
deleted, or less restrictive surveillance requirements are required.
This would also include requirements which are deleted from the TS (not
relocated to other documents) and other technical changes that do not
fit a generic category. These changes are evaluated individually.
Technical changes to the TS requirements categorized as ``Less
Restrictive'' are identified with an ``L'' and an individual number in
the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup of SCE&G's submittal.
SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3, Technical
Specifications. SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed technical
changes identified as ``Less Restrictive'' individually in accordance
with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these
changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria
and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below.
L01 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 1.0, ``Definitions,'' by deleting the
definition for Actuation Device Test. Reference to ``overlap with the
ACTUATION DEVICE TEST'' that is cited in the definition of Actuation
Logic Test is replaced with ``overlap with the actuated device.''
Current Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.2.7 (``Perform ACTUATION
DEVICE TEST'') and SR 3.3.2.8 (``Perform ACTUATION DEVICE TEST for
squib valves'') are deleted from current TS 3.3.2 and Table 3.3.2-1,
Function 26, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation. The equivalent
requirement (using phrasing generally consistent with NUREG-1431) is
included in individual Specifications for the actuated devices with the
same 24-month Frequency as the deleted SRs. The impact of this
reformatting is such that more appropriate, albeit less restrictive,
actions would be applied when the associated device fails to meet the
surveillance requirement. Also, current SR 3.3.2.9 is revised to
eliminate the use of the Actuation Device Test defined term and
replaced it with verification of actuation on an actual or simulated
actuation signal.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The change involves reformatting and revising the
presentation of existing surveillance requirements (with no change
in required system or device function), such that more appropriate,
albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when the device
fails to meet the surveillance requirement. Revised surveillance
requirement presentation and compliance with TS actions are not an
initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected.
The consequences of an accident as a result of the revised
surveillance requirements and actions are no different than the
consequences of the same accident during the existing ones. As a
result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not
affected by this change.
The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of
structures, systems, and components from performing their intended
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect
the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release
assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change reformats TS requirements such that more
appropriate, albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when
the device fails to meet the surveillance requirement. However, the
proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant
as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and
equipment is not being operated in a new or different manner. There
are no setpoints, at which protective or mitigative actions are
initiated, affected by this change. This change will not alter the
manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the
function demands on credited equipment be changed. No change is
being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal
event as described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such,
no new failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
[[Page 18338]]
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While
certain actions for inoperability of actuated devices are made less
restrictive by eliminating entry into Engineered Safety Feature
Actuation System (ESFAS) Actuation and Instrumentation inoperability
actions, no action is made less restrictive than currently approved
for any associated actuated device inoperability. As such, there is
no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L02 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 5.6, ``Reporting Requirements,''
to delete TS 5.6.1, ``Occupational Radiation Exposure Report,'' and TS
5.6.4, ``Monthly Operating Reports.'' This change results in the
renumbering of TS 5.6 sections, but does not revise technical or
administrative requirements. SCE&G stated that the change is consistent
with NRC approved Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change
Traveler, TSTF-369, ``Removal of Monthly Operating Report and
Occupational Radiation Exposure Report,'' Revision 1.
SCE&G has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination published on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067) as
part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) for
TSTF-369, Revision 1. SCE&G has concluded that the proposed
determination presented in the notice is applicable to VCSNS Units 2
and 3 and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a).
L03 SCE&G proposes to amend TS to eliminate the use of the defined term
``CORE ALTERATIONS'' and incorporate changes reflected in TSTF-471-A.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the use of the term ``CORE
ALTERATIONS,'' all Required Actions requiring suspension of core
alterations, and reference to core alterations in a surveillance
requirement. With the exception of a fuel handling accident, core
alterations are not an initiator of any accident previously
evaluated. Those revised Specifications which protect the initial
conditions of a fuel handling accident also require the suspension
of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This Required Action
protects the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident and,
therefore, suspension of all other core alterations is not required.
Suspension of core alterations, except fuel handling, does not
provide mitigation of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore,
eliminating the TS presentation of core alterations does not affect
the initiators of the accidents previously evaluated and suspension
of core alterations does not affect the mitigation of the accidents
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Two events are postulated to occur in the plant conditions in
which core alterations may be made: a fuel handling accident and a
boron dilution incident. Suspending movement of irradiated fuel
assemblies to prevent a fuel handling accident is retained as
appropriate. As such, requiring the suspension of core alterations
is an overly broad, redundant requirement that does not increase a
margin of safety. Core alterations have no effect on a boron
dilution incident. Core components are not involved in the creation
or mitigation of a boron dilution incident and the shutdown margin
(Mode 5) and boron concentration (Mode 6) limits are based on
assuming the worst-case configuration of the core components.
Therefore, core alterations have no effect on a margin of safety
related to a boron dilution incident.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L04 SCE&G proposes to amend TS, Section 1.3, ``Completion Times,''
Example 1.3-3 to eliminate the Required Action A.1 and Required Action
B.1 second Completion Times, and to replace the discussion regarding
second Completion Times with a new discussion. SCE&G also proposes to
delete the second Completion Times associated with current TS 3.8.5,
``Distribution Systems--Operating,'' Required Actions A.1, B.1, C.1,
and D.1.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates certain Completion Times from the
Technical Specifications. Completion Times are not an initiator to
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences
of an accident during the revised Completion Time are no different
than the consequences of the same accident during the existing
Completion Times. As a result, the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed
change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems,
and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant
consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
[[Page 18339]]
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to delete the second Completion Time does
not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system
settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The
safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change.
The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a
configuration outside of the design basis.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L05 SCE&G proposes to amend TS to eliminate LCO 3.0.8.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Technical Specification actions to restore equipment to Operable
and to monitor plant parameters are not initiators to any analyzed
accident sequence. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
continues to ensure that plant equipment is capable of performing
mitigative functions assumed by the accident analysis. The proposed
TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and does not alter
the method of operation or control of SSCs as described in the FSAR.
The current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this
change. No additional failure modes or mechanisms are being
introduced and the likelihood of previously analyzed failures
remains unchanged.
The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration,
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change does not alter the requirement to
restore compliance with TS and to monitor plant parameter status for
appropriate manual actions. Operation in accordance with the
proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed events will
continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the analysis.
Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry
standards, will continue to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L06 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.2.5 to eliminate the increased
frequency of verifying core power distribution parameters when the On-
line Power Distribution Monitoring System (OPDMS) alarms are
inoperable. This change retains the normal 24-hour Frequency and
eliminates the 12-hour Frequency when OPDMS alarms are inoperable.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
A TS frequency for monitoring plant parameters is not an
initiator to any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation
in accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial
conditions assumed in the accident analysis are maintained.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative
functions assumed by the accident analysis. No additional failure
modes or mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of
previously analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of
fission product barriers, plant configuration, and operating
procedures as described in the FSAR will not be affected by this
change. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents
will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the OPDMS
alarms do not impact a margin of safety. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed
events will continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the
analysis. Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with
industry standards, will continue to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L07 SCE&G proposes to amend the TS 3.3.1, 3.3.4, and 3.4.5 by replacing
the TS Required Actions requiring the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) to
be opened with two Required Actions: one Required Action states
``Initiate action to fully insert all rods,'' and the other Required
Action states ``Place the Plant Control System in a condition incapable
of rod withdrawal.'' For consistency, TS Applicabilities associated
with RTB position are
[[Page 18340]]
also being revised. Applicabilities including ``RTBs closed'' are
revised to state ``Plant Control System capable of rod withdrawal or
one or more rods not fully inserted.'' Conversely, Applicabilities
including ``RTBs open'' are revised to state ``With Plant Control
System incapable of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted.''
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative
functions assumed by the accident analysis. However, the change
involves allowing methods of compliance other than establishing or
verifying RTB open or closed status to determine the condition of
the capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not. The method of
establishing this status is not an accident initiator nor involved
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does allow methods of compliance other than
establishing or verifying RTB open or closed status; however, RTB
open or closed status will continue to be one appropriate and viable
method of establishing and verifying applicable plant conditions.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the
plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While
certain interlocks depend on RTB open or close status, these
interlocks and the association with RTB is not revised. When those
interlocks are required, the position of RTBs will continue to
dictate the appropriate protection system response. Allowing
alternate methods of establishing or verifying the condition of the
capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not, does not
impact any safety analysis assumption or plant response to an
analyzed event.
As such, there is no functional change to the required plant
conditions, and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
L08 SCE&G proposes to amend the TS by deleting current TS 3.3.1,
Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, Required Actions D.1.1,
D.2.1, and D.2.2 applicable to inoperable Power Range Neutron Flux
channels.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. Overly restrictive and inappropriate Required Actions
are being deleted since adequate compensatory measures already
address the potential impact on radial power monitoring and the
appropriate compensatory and mitigative actions in the event the RTS
function is degraded for the Power Range Neutron Flux function.
Additionally, the Surveillances for TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt
Ratio (QPTR), address the requirements unique to loss of Power Range
Neutron Flux monitoring for QPTR. Eliminating overly restrictive and
inappropriate Required Actions does not impact an accident initiator
or impact mitigation of the consequences of any accident. Therefore,
this change does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates overly restrictive and
inappropriate Required Actions. However, the proposed change does
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints,
at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of actuated
devices are made less restrictive by eliminating a potentially
unnecessary power reduction, and actions that could not be
performed, no action is made less restrictive than currently
approved for similar channel inoperability.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L09 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System
(RTS) Instrumentation,'' Source Range Neutron Flux Actions in Mode 2
for one and two inoperable channels. The change allows for placing
inoperable channels in bypass and/or trip thereby allowing continued
operation.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. However, the change involves providing actions allowing
bypassing and/or tripping one or two inoperable Source Range Neutron
Flux channels. Required Actions are not an accident initiator nor
credited with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The
actions continue to assure operation consistent with the design
provisions and within the assumptions of the safety analysis.
[[Page 18341]]
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions;
however, these actions are consistent with the design provisions and
with currently approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS
actuation functions. The proposed change does not involve a physical
alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment
is being introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety
analyses. While the change involves less restrictive actions, these
actions are consistent with the design provisions and with currently
approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS actuation
Functions. These actions do not result in any conflict with the
assumptions in the safety analyses and licensing basis.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L10 SCE&G proposes to amend the TS, as follows
: TS 3.1.8 ``PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions--MODE 2,'' is revised
to delete the listing of current Function 16.b for TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor
Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation'';
Current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16, Reactor Trip System
Interlocks requirements are removed;
Current TS 3.3.1 Action M is deleted;
Current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation
System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18, ESFAS
Interlocks (with the exception of Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18.b, Reactor
Trip, P-4) requirements are removed; and
Current TS 3.3.2 Action J is deleted.
The design description and role in supporting operability of TS
required RTS and ESFAS functions re retained in the FSAR Chapter 7,
Instrumentation and Controls, as well as the TS Bases.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions explicitly
retained in TS are those assumed to actuate in the safety analysis.
The associated interlocks are necessary support functions for
Operability of these TS required RTS and ESFAS functions. The
removal of explicit interlock functions does not impact the design-
required actuation function. Plant equipment remains capable of
performing preventative and mitigative functions assumed by the
accident analysis. However, the change involves removing explicit
requirements, including actions that lead to reestablishing
operability of the assumed actuation functions; implicitly these
requirements are maintained and the actions remain viable for
reestablishing operability. Since the requirements for the safety
function Operability remains unchanged, removing the explicit
presentation of detail is not an accident initiator nor involved
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the
presentation of TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions moves the
associated interlocks from explicit treatment to becoming an
implicit support system feature, the function continues to be
required as necessary to support associated TS actuation functions.
In doing so, certain actions for inoperability of interlocks are
made more restrictive by now entering actions specific to the
supported function's inoperability which have shorter Completion
Times. However those actions are consistent with those currently
approved for inoperability of that function.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L11 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' to delete:
Current Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5, Source Range Neutron
Flux High Setpoint, third row for that function including Applicability
set ``3\(e)\,4\(e)\,5\(e)\'' and associated references to Required
Channel, Condition, and Surveillance Requirements;
Current Table 3.3.1-1, Footnote (e); and
Current Action R.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The change involves removing certain actions that apply
during inoperability of all four source range channels to provide
indication. However, requirements and associated Required Actions
continue to apply to source range channels in separate TS. The
Required Actions removed are not accident initiators nor involved
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The remaining
requirements and actions continue to assure operation within the
assumptions of the safety analysis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
[[Page 18342]]
The proposed change involves removing certain actions for
inoperability of all four source range channels; however, this
change does not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the
safety analyses and licensing basis. The proposed change does not
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR.
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of all four source
range channels to indicate are removed, requirements and associated
Required Actions continue to apply to source range channels in a
separate TS. When all source range monitoring channels are
inoperable, the remaining actions continue to assure operation
within safety analysis assumptions. These actions are consistent
with the actions presented in the NUREG-1431.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L12 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety
Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Actions related to
functions that result in valve isolation actuations. Current TS 3.3.2
Actions P, Q, R, S, T, and Z, are revised to ``Declare affected
isolation valve(s) inoperable.'' Additionally, the following current
Table 3.3.2-1 Applicability Footnotes are deleted:
(e) Not applicable for valve isolation functions whose
associated flow path is isolated;
(h) Not applicable if all main steam isolation valves
(MSIVs) are closed; and
(i) Not applicable when the startup feedwater flow paths
are isolated.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The less restrictive Required Actions are acceptable
based on the fact that the new actions are the appropriate actions
for the actuated equipment. Required Actions are not an accident
initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences of an
accident. The actions continue to assure operation within the
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved
actions for the actuated equipment.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions;
however, the actions continue to assure operation within the
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved
actions for the actuated equipment. The proposed change does not
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR.
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the
change involves less restrictive actions, the actions are consistent
with approved actions for the actuated equipment. These actions do
not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the safety
analyses and licensing basis.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L13 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.3, ``Post Accident
Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation,'' as follows:
Function 12 is revised from ``Passive Residual Heat
Removal (PRHR) Flow and PRHR Outlet Temperature,'' to ``Passive
Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the Required
Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 flow & 1 temperature,''
to ``2''.
Function 17 is revised from ``Passive Containment Cooling
System (PCS) Storage Tank Level and PCS Flow,'' to ``Passive
Containment Cooling System (PCS) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the
Required Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 level & 1
flow,'' to ``2''.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change reduces the number of required Function 12
and Function 17 channels from three to two. Requiring the minimum of
two redundant channels is consistent with NUREG-1431 requirements
for meeting Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 PAM redundancy requirements.
The change also relocates the details of the specific channels
designed to satisfy the PAM requirements to the associated Bases.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the
plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant operations.
PAM functions are not initiators of analyzed events and therefore
the revised requirements do not result in operations that
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed
event. The PAM function affected by this change is designed to
accommodate single failure to support post-accident monitoring. The
change reduces TS requirements on excess required channels; however,
single failure redundancy continues to be required. Thus, the
proposed change does not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of
an accident or transient event. The less restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis.
The TS Bases will be maintained in accordance with the change
control provisions of the TS Bases Control Program described in TS
5.5.6. Because any change to the TS Bases will be evaluated, no
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
[[Page 18343]]
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In
addition, the details being moved from the current TS to the TS
Bases are not being changed. NRC prior review and approval of
changes to these relocated requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.92, will no longer be required. Future change to these details
will be evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control
mechanism. There is no margin of safety attributed to the NRC prior
review and approval; therefore, there is no significant reduction in
a margin of safety.
L14 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.5, ``Diverse Actuation
System (DAS) Manual Controls,'' Table 3.3.5-1, ``DAS Manual Controls,''
footnote b; current TS 3.6.7, ``Passive Containment Cooling System
(PCS)--Shutdown,'' Applicability; and current TS 3.7.9, ``Fuel Storage
Pool Makeup Water Sources,'' LCO Notes 1, 2, and 3; Applicability,
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.9.1 Note, SR 3.7.9.2 Note, SR 3.7.9.3
Note, and SR 3.7.9.4 Note by deleting ``calculated'' with respect to
decay heat.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS
requirements for the facility by not expressly specifying the method
of determining the decay heat value. These less stringent
requirements do not result in operations that significantly increase
the probability of initiating an analyzed event, and do not alter
assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient
event. The less restrictive requirements continue to ensure process
variables, structures, systems, and components are maintained
consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses.
Eliminating the imposition of single method of determining the decay
heat value has no effect on or a margin of plant safety.
``Calculating'' the decay heat value remains a viable option. The
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and
licensing basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L15 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.4.8, ``Minimum [Reactor Coolant
System] RCS Flow,'' SR 3.4.8.1 from ``Verify that at least one [Reactor
Coolant Pump] RCP is in operation at >= 10% rated speed or
equivalent,'' to ``Verify that at least one RCP is in operation with
total flow through the core >= 3,000 gpm.''
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The change involves revising the acceptance criteria of
an existing surveillance requirement with no change in required
system or device function. Surveillance acceptance criteria are not
accident initiators nor involved with mitigation of the consequences
of any accident. The proposed acceptance criteria ensure that the
applicable analysis input assumptions are preserved.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the acceptance criteria of an
existing surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints,
at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the
surveillance requirement acceptance criteria is made less
restrictive by removal of design margin that accounts for minimizing
stress and wear, and increasing equipment life, and the expected
operating limit on minimum RCP speed, this margin is more
appropriately maintained in the design and in operating and
surveillance procedures.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L16 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.4.10, ``RCS Specific
Activity,'' Actions by deleting Required Action B.1, which requires
``Perform SR 3.4.10.2,'' within 4 hours.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
[[Page 18344]]
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS actions
for the facility. However, the less restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis. The performance of SR 3.4.10.2 is not related to an
accident initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences
of an accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and
licensing basis. The result of performing the additional
surveillance does not provide any additional margin of safety; as
such, eliminating the Required Action for performing the additional
surveillance does not result in a significant reduction in a margin
of safety.
L17 SCE&G proposes to amend TS as follows:
1. Current TS 3.5.2, ``Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs)--Operating,''
Condition D is revised from ``One CMT inoperable due to presence of
noncondensible gases in one high point vent,'' to ``One CMT inlet line
with noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
2. Current TS 3.5.2, Required Action D.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore CMT inlet line noncondensible gas
volume to within limit.''
3. Current TS 3.5.4, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger
(PRHR HX)--Operating,'' Condition C is revised from ``Presence of
noncondensible gases in the high point vent,'' to ``PRHR HX inlet line
noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
4. Current TS 3.5.4, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible
gas volume to within limit.''
5. Current TS 3.5.5, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger
(PRHR HX)--Shutdown, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Intact,'' Condition C
is revised from ``Presence of noncondensible gases in the high point
vent,'' to ``PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible gas volume not within
limit.''
6. Current TS 3.5.5, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible
gas volume to within limit.''
7. Current TS 3.5.6, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
(IRWST)--Operating,'' Condition B is revised from ``One IRWST injection
line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in one high
point vent,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with noncondensible
gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub not within limit.''
8. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib
valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
9. Current TS 3.5.6, Condition C is revised from ``One IRWST
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in
both high point vents,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs
not within limit.''
10. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one squib
valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to within
limit.''
11. Current TS 3.5.7, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
(IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 5,'' Condition B is revised from ``Required
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases
in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub not
within limit.''
12. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib
valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.
13. Current TS 3.5.7, Condition C is revised from ``Required IRWST
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in
both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs
not within limit.''
14. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one squib
valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to within
limit.''
15. TS 3.5.8, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
(IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 6,'' Condition B is revised from ``Required
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases
in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub not
within limit.''
16. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib
valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
17. Current TS 3.5.8, Condition C is revised from ``Required IRWST
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in
both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs
not within limit.''
18. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one squib
valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to within
limit.''
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS
requirements by not
[[Page 18345]]
expressly specifying the noncondensible gas volume limit; however,
the requirement that noncondensible gas volume be within limits is
not changed. These less stringent requirements do not result in
operations that significantly increase the probability of initiating
an analyzed event, and do not alter assumptions relative to
mitigation of an accident or transient event. The less restrictive
requirements continue to ensure process variables, structures,
systems, and components are maintained consistent with the safety
analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The
amended actions and surveillances continue assure that
noncondensible gas volumes are maintained and restored to within
acceptable limits. The change maintains requirements within the
safety analyses and licensing basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L18 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.6.8, ``Containment
Penetrations,'' LCO 3.6.8.d.2 to allow the penetration flow path to be
open provided it can be closed prior to steaming into the containment.
In conjunction, current SR 3.6.8.3 as well as the corresponding
containment Isolation function required in current TS 3.3.2,
``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,''
Table 3.3.2-1 Function 3.a for Modes 5 and 6, are removed. This removes
requirements for Operable containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and
6, allowing manual operator actions to affect any required isolation
prior to steaming into the containment.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change would remove requirements for Operable
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, allowing manual
operator action to effect any required isolation. The design
provisions for instrumented closure signals are unaffected. The
isolation status of the penetration flow path is not an initiator to
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences
of an accident with the valves open and capable of being closed
prior to steaming into the containment are no different than the
consequences of the same accident with the current requirements. The
valves are currently allowed to be open, provided they can be
isolated. The accident analysis assumes cooling water inventory is
not lost in the event of an accident. Thus, closing the valves prior
to steaming into the containment will ensure this assumption is met.
As a result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated
are not affected by this change. The proposed change does not alter
or prevent the ability of SSCs from performing their intended
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect
the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release
assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an
accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not
increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be
released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or
cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed
change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and
resultant consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to remove requirements for Operable
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, and allowing manual
operator action to isolate the purge valve penetration flow path
prior to steaming into the containment, does not alter the manner in
which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting
conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis
acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. The proposed
change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside
of the design basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L19 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.9.6 ``pH Adjustment,'' LCO and
current SR 3.9.6.1 trisodium phosphate (TSP) requirement from the
volume requirement of 560 ft\3\ to a weight requirement of 26,460 lbs.
In addition, due to this change, Condition A and Required Action A.1 is
changed to refer to ``weight'' in lieu of ``volume.''
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows for a lesser volume over time
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration. While the
total weight will remain constant and sufficient to assure safety
analysis assumptions are met, the unintended requirement to maintain
volume > 560 ft\3\, even after compaction and agglomeration is made
less restrictive. The TSP is not an initiator to any accident
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an
accident with the changed TSP weight limit are no different than the
consequences of the same accident with the current TSP limit. The
accident analysis assumes a minimum of 26,460 lbs of
[[Page 18346]]
TSP, and this value is being maintained in the TS. The assumed pH of
7.0 will be maintained using the proposed weight of TSP. This pH
will continue to augment the retention of elemental iodine in the
containment water, and thus reduce the iodine available to leak to
the environment. As a result, the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed
change does not alter or prevent the ability of SSCs from performing
their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an
initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed
change does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or
radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological
consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the
proposed change does not increase the types or amounts of
radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly
increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation
exposures. The proposed change is consistent with the safety
analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to allow for a lesser volume over time
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration, while
maintaining the total weight to assure safety analysis assumptions
are met, does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting
safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are
determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected
by this change. The proposed change will not result in plant
operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L20 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.7.2, ``Main Steam Isolation
Valves (MSIVs),'' Condition D Note to allow separate Condition entry
due to any inoperable valve covered by the LCO, not just the MSIVs.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows a separate Condition entry for each
affected flow path. The failure of the main steam line flow path
covered by the LCO to close is not an initiator to any accident
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an
accident are not affected since the inoperability in the flow path
is addressed to assure affected flow paths are isolated as assumed
in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The
proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures,
systems, and components from performing their intended function to
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant
consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to allow a separate Condition entry for each
affected flow path does not alter the manner in which safety limits,
limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation
are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not
affected by this change. The proposed change will not result in
plant operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L21 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.8.1, ``[Direct Current] DC Sources--
Operating,'' by deleting SR 3.8.1.3 Note 2.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the
accident analysis.
The proposed TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously
analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of fission
product barriers, plant configuration, and operating procedures as
described in the FSAR will not be affected by this change.
Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents
will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
[[Page 18347]]
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the
operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be
performed.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L22 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.8.2, ``DC Sources--Shutdown,''
by adding a new Condition A to address inoperable battery chargers.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the
accident analysis.
The proposed change does not involve any changes to SSCs and
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration,
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the
Operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be
performed.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L23 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 5.5.2, ``Radioactive Effluent
Control Program,'' to state that the provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR
3.0.3 are applicable to the Radioactive Effluents Control Program
surveillance frequency.
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
A TS frequency for the determination of cumulative and projected
dose contributions from radioactive effluents is not an initiator to
any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial conditions
assumed in the accident analysis are maintained. The proposed change
does not involve a modification to the physical configuration of the
plant or change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
proposed change will not impose any new or different requirements or
introduce a new accident initiator, accident precursor, or
malfunction mechanism.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
[[Page 18348]]
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to
the frequency of performing the monthly cumulative dose and
projected dose calculations, will have no effect on the plant
response to analyzed events and with therefore not impact a margin
of safety. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures that
the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide the
margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring
and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue
to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L24 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 5.5.3, ``Inservice Testing
Program,'' paragraph b from ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable
to the above required Frequencies for performing inservice testing
activities,'' to ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the
above required Frequencies and other normal and accelerated Frequencies
specified as 2 years or less in the Inservice Testing Program for
performing inservice testing activities.''
SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The frequency for inservice testing is not an initiator to any
accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR, nor is it associated with
any mitigative actions to reduce consequences. Operation in
accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial
conditions accident mitigative features assumed in the accident
analysis are maintained. The proposed change does not involve a
modification to the physical configuration of the plant or change in
the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed change
will not impose any new or different requirements or introduce a new
accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to certain
frequencies for performing inservice testing, does not significantly
degrade the reliability that results from performing the
Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the
recognition that the most probable result of any particular
surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with
the SRs. As such, there is no technical change to the requirements
and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety. Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures
that the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide
the margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate
monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will
continue to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Kathryn M. Sutton, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLC, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004-2514.
NRC Branch Chief: Lawrence Burkhart.
Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1,
Callaway County, Missouri
Date of amendment request: January 23, 2014.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise
Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12, ``Cold Overpressure Mitigation
System (COMS),'' to reflect the mass input transient analysis that
assumes an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) centrifugal charging
pump (CCP) and the normal charging pump (NCP) capable of injecting into
the reactor coolant system (RCS) when TS 3.4.12 is applicable. The
proposed amendment would additionally revise TS Table 3.3.1-1,
``Reactor Trip System Instrumentation,'' to remove unnecessary page
number references.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The TS 3.4.12 Limiting Condition for Operation provides RCS
overpressure protection by restricting coolant input capability and
providing adequate pressure relief capability during applicable
Modes. Analyses have demonstrated that one power-operated relief
valve (PORV) or one residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valve
or an RCS vent of at least 2.0 square inches is capable of limiting
the RCS pressure excursions below the COMS limits which are based on
the pressure-temperature limits of 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix G. The
analyzed mass transient for COMS is based on an assumption that one
ECCS CCP and the NCP are both capable of injection to the RCS.
The NRC has previously evaluated the allowance for an ECCS CCP
and the NCP being capable of injecting into the RCS during the TS
3.4.12 Modes of Applicability. In the safety evaluation dated April
2, 1998 related to the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Amendment No. 124,
the NRC concluded:
The mass input transient analysis assumes simultaneous injection
of both a centrifugal charging pump and the `normal' charging pump
into the water-solid RCS while the RHRS [residual heat removal
system] and the letdown line are isolated.
In the same safety evaluation, the NRC further concluded that
the change to TS Bases allowing the NCP to inject to the RCS during
COMS applicability was consistent with the TS LCO and ``therefore
allows a centrifugal charging pump and the 'normal' charging pump to
be operable under these modes of operation.''
The proposed change clarifies TS 3.4.12 to allow an ECCS CCP and
the NCP to be capable of injecting into the RCS during low RCS
pressures and temperatures, consistent with Callaway's NRC-approved
licensing basis, and also removes unnecessary page number references
from TS Table 3.3.1-1. The proposed change is thus an editorial one
that does not involve a change to the design or operation of the
plant, including the plant's safety analysis.
Accordingly, the proposed change does not adversely affect
accident initiators or
[[Page 18349]]
precursors nor does it alter any design assumptions, conditions, or
allowed configurations of the facility. In addition, the proposed
change does not affect the manner in which the plant is operated and
maintained. Finally, the proposed change does not adversely affect
the ability of structures, systems and components (SSC) to perform
their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences of an
initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits, nor does it
increase the types and amounts of radioactive effluent that may be
released offsite or significantly increase individual or cumulative
occupational/public radiation exposure.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As noted in the response to question 1, the proposed change will
not physically alter the plant (i.e., no new or different type of
equipment will be installed), nor does it change the methods
governing normal plant operation. Accordingly, the proposed change
does not introduce new accident initiators or impact assumptions
made in the safety analysis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for
operation are determined, nor are the safety analysis acceptance
criteria impacted by this change. The intent of the proposed change
is for TS 3.4.12 to continue to reflect the provisions and
limitations of the mass transient analysis that was performed for
ensuring cold overpressure protection of the RCPB [reactor coolant
pressure boundary] and which is already part of the NRC-approved
licensing basis for the facility. Consequently, there is no change
to the margin of safety, and the proposed change will not result in
plant operation or a configuration that is outside the design basis.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: John O'Neill, Esq., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
III. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses
and Combined Licenses
During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice,
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set
forth in the license amendment.
A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility
operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no
significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a
hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal
Register as indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in
10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment,
it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the action see (1) the
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as
indicated. All of these items can be accessed as described in the
``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this
document.
DTE Electric Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi 2, Monroe County,
Michigan
Date of application for amendment: January 11, 2013, as
supplemented by letter dated September 27, 2013.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Fermi 2
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to describe the methodology and
results of the analysis performed to evaluate the protection of the
plant's structures, systems and components from tornado-generated
missiles. The analysis utilized a probabilistic approach implemented
through the application of the TORMIS computer code.
Date of issuance: March 10, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days of issuance.
Amendment No.: 197.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-43: Amendment revised the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 19, 2013 (78 FR
16880). The supplemental letter dated September 27, 2013, provided
additional information that clarified the application, did not expand
the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change
the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 10, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 16, 2013.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment adopts Technical
Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-535, Revision 0,
``Revise Shutdown Margin Definition to Address Advanced Fuel Designs.''
The Shutdown Margin (SDM), the amount of reactivity by which the
reactor is subcritical, is calculated under the conservative conditions
that the reactor is Xenon-free, the most reactive control rod is
outside the reactor core, and the moderator temperature produces the
maximum reactivity. For standard fuel designs, maximum reactivity
occurs at a moderator temperature of 68 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F),
which is reflected in the temperature specified in the Technical
Specifications (TSs). New, advanced Boiling Water Reactor fuel designs
can have a higher reactivity at moderator shutdown temperatures above
68[emsp14][deg]F. Therefore, consistent with TSTF-535, Revision 0, the
amendment modified the TSs to require the SDM to be calculated at
whatever temperature produces the maximum reactivity (i.e.,
temperatures at or above 68[emsp14][deg]F). This TS improvement is part
of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process and was requested
with no modifications.
Date of issuance: March 5, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
60 days from the date of issuance.
Amendment No.: 180.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-47: The amendment revised the
Facility
[[Page 18350]]
Operating License and Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 20, 2013 (78 FR
51226).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 5, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457,
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois
Date of application for amendment: October 10, 2013.
Brief description of amendment: The change revises the date for the
performance of the Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Type A or integrated
containment leakage rate test (ILRT) described in Technical
Specification 5.5.16, ``Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.''
from ``no later than May 4, 2014,'' to ``prior to entering MODE 4 at
the start of Cycle 18.'' Additionally, a requirement is established for
Braidwood Station, Unit 2, to exit the MODEs of applicability for
containment as described in Technical Specification 3.6.1,
``Containment'' (i.e., MODEs 1-4), no later than May 4, 2014.
Date of issuance: March 19, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 14 days.
Amendment Nos.: 175 and 175.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66: The amendment
revised the Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 10, 2013 (78
FR 74183).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 19, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit
1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire
Date of amendment request: March 13, 2013, supplemented August 8,
2013, and November 22, 2013.
Description of amendment request: The amendment revised the
Seabrook Technical Specifications (TSs). The amendment modifies the
circuitry that initiates high-head safety injection by adding a new
permissive, cold leg injection permissive (P-15). This permissive
prevents opening of the high-head safety injection valves until reactor
coolant system pressure decreases to the P-15 set point.
Date of issuance: March 6, 2014.
Effective date: As of its date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 615 days.
Amendment No.: 140.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-86: The amendment revised the
License and TSs.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 30, 2013 (78 FR
25315). The supplements dated August 8, 2013, and November 22, 2013,
provided additional information that clarified the application, did not
expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not
change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 6, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile
Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2), Oswego County, New York
Date of application for amendment: July 5, 2013, as supplemented by
letter dated December 6, 2013.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment included to NMP2
Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.7, ``Standby Liquid Control (SLC)
System,'' to increase the isotopic enrichment of boron-10 in the sodium
pentaborate solution utilized in the SLC System and decrease the SLC
System tank volume. The following are the changes to the NMP2 TS 3.1.7,
``Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System:''
Revise the acceptance criterion in [Surveillance
Requirement] SR 3.1.7.10 by increasing the sodium pentaborate boron-10
enrichment requirement from >= 25 atom percent to >= 92 atom percent,
and make a corresponding change in TS Figure 3.1.7-1, ``Sodium
Pentaborate Solution Volume/Concentration Requirements.''
Revise TS Figure 3.1.7-1 to account for the decrease in
the minimum volume of the SLC system tank. At a sodium pentaborate
concentration of 13.6% the minimum volume changes from 4,558.6 gallons
to 1,600 gallons. At a sodium pentaborate concentration of 14.4%, the
minimum volume changes from 4,288 gallons to 1,530 gallons.
Date of issuance: March 14, 2014.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented prior
to the startup from the spring 2014 NMP2 refueling outage.
Amendment No.: 143.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revised
the License and Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 3, 2013 (78
FR 54284). The supplement dated December 6, 2013, provided additional
information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed, and did not change the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's initial proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal
Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 14, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service
Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1,
Fairfield County, South Carolina
Date of application for amendment: April 3, 2013.
Brief description of amendment: This amendment revised the control
room emergency filtration system Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.6.
Date of issuance: March 11, 2014.
Effective date: This license amendment is effective as of the date
of its issuance.
Amendment No.: 197.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-12: Amendment revised
the License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 6, 2013 (78 FR
47791).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 11, 2014.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of March 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2014-06956 Filed 3-31-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P