mechanism assembly having P/N 48510–1 or P/N 48510–3 with a new MLG AES cam mechanism assembly having P/N 48510–5, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–32–100, Revision A, dated August 30, 2012. Accomplishing this replacement terminates the repetitive inspections required by this AD.

(k) New Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraphs (j) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–32–100, dated August 15, 2012.

(I) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANE–170, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. ATTN: Program Manager, Continuing Operational Safety, FAA, New York ACO, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516–228–7300; fax 516–794–5531. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, use those actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they were approved by the State of Design Authority (or its delegated agent, or the DAH with a State of Design Authority’s design organization approval, as applicable). You are required to ensure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(m) Related Information
(1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF–2011–01R2, dated May 21, 2013, for related information. This MCAI may be found in the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–0126.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., Q-Series Technical Help Desk, 123 Garratt Boulevard, Toronto, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada; telephone 416–375–4000; fax 416–375–4539; email thd.qseries@aero.bombardier.com; Internet http://www.bombardier.com. You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This proposed AD would require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 21, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: 202–493–2251.


• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–0126; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: (425) 917–6509; fax: (425) 917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2014–0126; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–236–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion
We have received reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. Deficiencies in the valve actuator design have resulted in latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

FAA’s Determination
We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.
Proposed AD Requirements

This proposed AD would require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. The airworthiness limitations would allow an operator to perform the operational check as either a maintenance action or a flightcrew action. The flightcrew or maintenance crew would monitor the engine spar valve lights for a few seconds immediately after moving the engine fuel condition levers. Flightcrews can perform the operational check while starting the engine or while shutting down the engine. Maintenance crews can do this operational check as a separate action that does not require actual starting of the engine.

This proposed AD would require revisions to certain operator maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with these inspections is required by section 91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)). For airplanes that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by these inspections, an operator might not be able to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (i) of this proposed AD. The request should include a description of changes to the proposed inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

Interim Action

We consider this proposed AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition identified in this proposed AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD affects 590 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We estimate the following costs to comply with this proposed AD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Labor cost</th>
<th>Parts cost</th>
<th>Cost per product</th>
<th>Cost on U.S. operators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation</td>
<td>1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$85</td>
<td>$50,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation: (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, (2) Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

§ 39.13 [Amended]

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

2. Amend § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):


(a) Comments Due Date

We must receive comments by April 21, 2014.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB, and –300 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject


(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add airworthiness limitation numbers 28–AWL–ENG and 28–AWL–APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1 and Figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in Figure 1 and Figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 7 days after accomplishing the
Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.

Perform one of the following operational checks of the Fuel Spar Valve position indication (unless checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector):

A. Operational Check during engine shutdown
   1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–11).
   2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).

B. Operational check during engine start
   1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
   2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).

C. Operational check without engine operation
   1. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position.
   2. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel.
   3. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position.
   4. Make sure L and R Engine Start Selector Switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position.
   5. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait 10 seconds.
      NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated.
      b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position.
      c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
   6. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait 10 seconds.
      NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated.
      b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position.
      c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      d. If the test fails, (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
   7. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker was collared in step C.2., remove collar and close.

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWL No.</th>
<th>Task Interval</th>
<th>Applicability</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28–AWL–ENG</td>
<td>ALI DAILY</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AWL No.** Task Interval Applicability Description

28–AWL–ENG ALI DAILY ALL Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check

Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.

Perform one of the following operational checks of the Fuel Spar Valve position indication (unless checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector):

A. Operational Check during engine shutdown
   1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–11).
   2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).

B. Operational check during engine start
   1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
   2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).

C. Operational check without engine operation
   1. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position.
   2. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel.
   3. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position.
   4. Make sure L and R Engine Start Selector Switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position.
   5. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait 10 seconds.
      NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated.
      b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position.
      c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
   6. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator.
      a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait 10 seconds.
      NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated.
      b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position.
      c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off.
      d. If the test fails, (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
   7. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker was collared in step C.2., remove collar and close.
### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

#### 28 CFR Part 32

[Docket No.: OJP (BJA) 1646]

RIN 1121–AA80

Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program

**Agency:** Office of Justice Programs, Justice.

**Action:** Notice of proposed rulemaking.

**Summary:** The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) of the U.S. Department of Justice proposes this rule to amend the regulation that implements the Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) Act and associated statutes. Generally speaking, these laws provide financial support to certain public safety officers, or their survivors and families, when such officers die, or become permanently and totally disabled, as a result of line-of-duty injuries, or when they die of heart attacks or strokes sustained within statutorily-specified timeframes of engaging or participating in certain line-of-duty activity. The proposed rule would amend the implementing regulation in order to change the definition of “Spouse.”

**Dates:** Written comments must be postmarked and electronic comments must be submitted on or before April 4, 2014. Comments received by mail will be considered timely if they are postmarked on or before that date. The electronic Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) will accept comments until Midnight Eastern Time at the end of that day.

**Addresses:** Please address all comments regarding this rule by U.S. mail, to: Hope Janke, Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, 810 7th Street NW., Washington, DC 20531; or by telefacsimile to (202) 354–4135. To ensure proper handling, please reference OJP Docket No. 1646 on your correspondence. Comments may also be sent electronically through http://regulations.gov using the electronic comment form provided on that site. An electronic copy of this document is also available at the http://regulations.gov Web site. OJP will accept attachments to electronic comments in Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, or Adobe PDF formats only. The public’s opportunity to comment through http://regulations.gov terminates at midnight Eastern Time on the day that the comment period closes. All comments received via U.S. mail, or an express mail carrier, must be postmarked on or before the day that the comment period closes.

**For further information contact:** Hope Janke, BJA, OJP, at (202) 514–6278, or toll-free at 1 (888) 744–6513.

**Supplementary information:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWL No.</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>Applicability</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28–AWL–APU</td>
<td>ALI</td>
<td>10 DAYS</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>APU Fuel Valve Position Indication Operational Check</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Concern:** The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to be uncontrollable.

Perform the operational check of the APU Fuel Valve position indication (unless checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector).

A. Operational check of the APU Fuel Valve position indication

1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the APU using standard practices.
2. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position.
3. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel in the Left Main Tank.
4. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the ON position and wait 10 seconds.
5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the OFF position.
6. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel illuminates and then goes off.
7. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11).

**Note:** Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–02 if APU is not required for flight.

**H) No Alternative Actions and Intervals**

After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

**I) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

1. The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

2. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office.

**J) Related Information**

For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: (425) 917–6509; fax: (425) 917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

### Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD: APU Fuel Valve Position Indication Operational Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWL No.</th>
<th>Task</th>
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**H) No Alternative Actions and Intervals**

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**I) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

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