[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 43 (Wednesday, March 5, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 12424-12427]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-04853]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0636; Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-037-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM); reopening of 
comment period.

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SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier proposed airworthiness directive 
(AD) for certain Airbus Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R 
airplanes; Model A300 F4-605R airplanes; Model A300 C4-605R Variant F 
airplanes; and Model A310-204 and -304 airplanes; powered by General 
Electric (GE) CF6-80C2 series engines. The NPRM proposed to require 
installing a shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an auto-relight 
function). The NPRM was prompted by reports of two single-engine 
flameout events during inclement weather. This action revises the NPRM 
by adding an additional wiring modification to a certain circuit 
breaker panel. We are proposing this AD to prevent a long engine 
restart sequence after a non-selection of continuous relight by the 
crew and a flameout event of both engines, which could result in 
reduced controllability of the airplane, especially at low altitude. 
Since these actions impose an additional burden over that

[[Page 12425]]

proposed in the NPRM, we are reopening the comment period to allow the 
public the chance to comment on these proposed changes.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 21, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact 
Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office--EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 
93 44 51; email [email protected]; Internet http://www.airbus.com. You may view this referenced service information at the 
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. 
For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 
425-227-1221.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2012-
0636; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket 
contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments 
received, and other information. The street address for the Docket 
Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES 
section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after 
receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2125; 
fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2012-0636; 
Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-037-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    We proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with an earlier NPRM for the 
specified products, which was published in the Federal Register on June 
18, 2012 (77 FR 36211). The NPRM proposed to require actions intended 
to address the unsafe condition for the products listed above.
    Since the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012) was issued, we have 
determined it is necessary to require an additional wiring modification 
of the circuit breaker panel, 105VU, to make it possible to complete 
the modification of the shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an 
auto-relight function).

Relevant Service Information

    Airbus has issued Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 
05, dated May 23, 2013; and Mandatory Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, 
Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013. The actions described in this service 
information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in 
the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) European 
Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2011-0113, dated June 
17, 2011.

Comments

    We have considered the following comments received on the NPRM (77 
FR 36211, June 18, 2012). The Air Line Pilots Association, 
International, supported the NPRM and its compliance time.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012) Based on 
Safety Record

    Based on its safety record, FedEx requested withdrawal of the NPRM 
(77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012). FedEx stated that the impact of the NPRM 
solely falls on its company; therefore, its exemplary safety record, 
superior pilot training, and performance standards should be 
significant factors in the FAA's decision regarding the need for the 
proposed AD.
    FedEx stated that a review of operational events on past and 
present airplanes operated by FedEx revealed that there are no known 
occurrences of the inclement weather flameouts that are the primary 
driver of the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012). In addition, FedEx 
stated that it has fully implemented the full authority digital engine 
control (FADEC) software upgrades required by AD 2007-21-06, Amendment 
39-15224 (72 FR 57848, October 11, 2007), on certain engines in its 
fleet. FedEx stated that the latest GE guidance indicates that the 
worldwide rate of engine flameouts has decreased significantly in the 
last several years and that the rate associated with full authority 
digital engine control (FADEC) engine models in particular has shown a 
significant decline and is now well below that of the power management 
control fleet.
    We disagree with FedEx's request. We have received reports of two 
single-engine flameout events during inclement weather. We consider 
this to be an unsafe condition that could result in reduced 
controllability of the airplane, especially at low altitude. Also, not 
all affected airplanes have FADEC-controlled engines installed.
    We consider a design solution that does not require pilot action to 
be a more robust mitigating action to address an unsafe condition. We 
have determined that it is necessary to proceed with issuing this SNPRM 
to adequately address the identified unsafe condition. Affected 
operators may request approval of an alternative method of compliance 
(AMOC) under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this SNPRM by 
submitting data substantiating that the change would provide an 
acceptable level of safety.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012) Based on 
Operational Impact

    FedEx also requested withdrawal of the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 
2012) based on operational impact. FedEx stated that the modifications 
required by the proposed AD would affect the interface between the 
flight crew and the airplane, and would alter the pilot's degree of 
control in the event of an engine event. FedEx stated that the 
modification is intended to ensure rapid relight of the engine 
following a flameout in the event that the crew does not correctly 
follow procedures and manually select the continuous relight function 
when entering an inclement

[[Page 12426]]

weather environment. FedEx stated that it is consistently following 
proper procedures and has trained crews accordingly.
    In addition, FedEx stated that there does not appear to be any 
concurrent requirement for the CF6-80C2-powered Model MD-11 airplane in 
the FedEx fleet. The current MD-11 flight manual provides for an 
optional ice detection system that automatically switches continuous 
relight on in the case of icing conditions. FedEx stated that this 
system is not required and not desired by the FedEx pilots.
    FedEx stated that in the view of the air operation division (AOD) 
flight technical operations and fleet technical pilots, a controlled 
(as opposed to automated) relight of an engine after flameout has a 
greater chance of success. FedEx stated that under the current 
configuration, the flightcrews have the capability--with guidance on 
recommended in-flight restart airspeeds and altitudes from the quick 
reference handbook (QRH)--to ensure that accessory loads have been 
reduced and the fuel flow has been managed through throttle movements 
prior to a relight attempt. FedEx stated that an automated system could 
potentially force a relight attempt under non-nominal conditions, which 
could actually delay a successful engine restart. FedEx noted an 
example would be a restart attempt when windmilling N2 is below the 
recommended restart value in the GE operating instructions.
    FedEx stated, therefore, its position is that the steps that have 
already been taken, and the controls that are currently in place to 
ameliorate the extremely small risk of an engine flameout, which could 
result in a loss-of-control event, are adequate to ensure safety under 
all flight regimes. FedEx stated that, furthermore, the proposed 
modification does not increase the level of safety in real-world terms 
to sufficiently justify the relatively high financial and operational 
impact to its company.
    We disagree with FedEx's request to withdraw this SNPRM. As stated 
previously, because we have received reports of two single-engine 
flameout events during inclement weather, this condition is unsafe and 
could result in reduced controllability of the airplane, especially at 
low altitude.
    In regard to the Model MD-11 airplanes, those airplanes are not 
included in the applicability of this SNPRM; each engine installation 
is evaluated separately from other airplane models due to their 
installation differences. The actions specified in this SNPRM are not 
the same as the actions tied to the ice protection system described in 
FedEx's comment. Also, not all affected airplanes have FADEC-controlled 
engines installed. In addition, as noted previously, we consider a 
design solution that does not require pilot action to be a more robust 
mitigating action to address an unsafe condition.
    Affected operators may request approval of an AMOC under the 
provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this SNPRM by submitting data 
substantiating that the change would provide an acceptable level of 
safety. We have not changed this SNPRM in this regard.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012) Based on 
Financial Impact

    FedEx requested that the NPRM (77 FR 36211, June 18, 2012) be 
withdrawn based on the financial impact it will have on its company. 
FedEx stated that it agrees with the FAA's estimates that the financial 
impact would be nearly $1 million to its company in material and labor, 
and it has concerns that the cost may in fact continue to increase. 
FedEx stated that to date, Airbus has revised the service information 
three times, and each of these revisions has increased the material 
costs of the modification. FedEx stated that the manpower requirements 
and lead time for the required parts have also increased significantly 
over the initial release of the service information. FedEx stated that 
it has elected to begin performing the modifications immediately upon 
release of the initial service information; therefore, it would have to 
return multiple times to perform additional work in order to meet the 
requirements of the subsequent revisions. FedEx stated that it does not 
have a high degree of confidence that the scope of this modification 
will not continue to increase and result in further cost and 
operational disruption.
    We partially agree with the commenter. We disagree to withdraw this 
SNPRM based on the financial impact as we have received reports of two 
single-engine flameout events during inclement weather, as stated 
previously. This condition is unsafe and could result in reduced 
controllability of the airplane, especially at low altitude.
    We agree, however, with FedEx that the estimated costs of 
compliance have increased with each service information revision. We 
have revised the Costs of Compliance paragraph of this SNPRM to reflect 
the updated costs in the latest service information.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.
    Certain changes described above expand the scope of the NPRM (77 FR 
36211, June 18, 2012). As a result, we have determined that it is 
necessary to reopen the comment period to provide additional 
opportunity for the public to comment on this proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this proposed AD affects 47 airplanes of U.S. 
registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this proposed AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
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                                                                                     Cost per      Cost on U.S.
              Action                      Labor cost             Parts cost           product        operators
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Modification......................  Up to 98               Up to $18,417........         $26,747      $1,257,109
                                     work[dash]hours x
                                     $85 per hour =
                                     $8,330.
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Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.

[[Page 12427]]

    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
    3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and
    4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. Amend Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Airbus: Docket No. FAA-2012-0636; Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-
037-AD.

(a) Comments Due Date

    We must receive comments by April 21, 2014.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R 
airplanes; Model A300 F4-605R airplanes, Model A300 C4-605R Variant 
F airplanes, and Model A310-204 and -304 airplanes; certificated in 
any category; all serial numbers; powered by General Electric (GE) 
CF6-80C2 series engines.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 74, Ignition.

(e) Reason

    This AD was prompted by reports of two single-engine flameout 
events during inclement weather. We are issuing this AD to prevent a 
long engine restart sequence after a non-selection of continuous 
relight by the crew and a flameout event of both engines, which 
could result in reduced controllability of the airplane, especially 
at low altitude.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Modification

    Within 6,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective date 
of this AD, whichever occurs later: Modify the airplane by 
installing a shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an auto-
relight function), in accordance with the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, 
Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013 (for Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and 
B4-605R airplanes, Model A300 F4-605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4-
605R Variant F airplanes); or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 
A310-74-2003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013 (for Model A310-204 
and -304 airplanes).

(h) Credit for Previous Actions

    This paragraph provides credit for the actions required by 
paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the 
effective date of this AD using the applicable service information 
specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD, and provided 
that the additional work in Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-
74-6003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013; or Airbus Mandatory 
Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 05, including Appendix 1, 
dated May 23, 2013; is done, as required by paragraph (g) of this 
AD.
    (1) For Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R airplanes, Model 
A300 F4-605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes: 
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 04, dated 
January 9, 2013, which is not incorporated by reference.
    (2) For Model A310-204 and -304 airplanes: Airbus Mandatory 
Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 04, dated January 9, 2013, 
which is not incorporated by reference.

(i) Other FAA AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 
39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the International Branch send it to ATTN: Dan Rodina, 
Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport 
Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-
3356; telephone (425) 227-2125; fax (425) 227-1149. Information may 
be emailed to: [email protected]. Before using any 
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or 
lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight 
standards district office/certificate holding district office. The 
AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer, use these actions if they 
are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if 
they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their 
delegated agent, or the Design Approval Holder with a State of 
Design Authority's design organization approval, as applicable). For 
a repair method to be approved, the repair approval must 
specifically refer to this AD. You are required to assure the 
product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(j) Related Information

    (1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information 
(MCAI) European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2011-
0113, dated June 17, 2011, for related information. This MCAI may be 
found in the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov 
by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2012-0636.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office--EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice 
Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; 
fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email [email protected]; 
Internet http://www.airbus.com. You may view this service 
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 
Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this 
material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 19, 2014.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2014-04853 Filed 3-4-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P