[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 35 (Friday, February 21, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 9932-9979]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-03689]
[[Page 9931]]
Vol. 79
Friday,
No. 35
February 21, 2014
Part II
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 91, 120, and 135
Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91
Helicopter Operations; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 79 , No. 35 / Friday, February 21, 2014 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 9932]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 91, 120, and 135
[Docket No.: FAA-2010-0982; Amdt. Nos. 91-330; 120-2; 135-129]
RIN 2120-AJ53
Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91
Helicopter Operations
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule addresses helicopter air ambulance, commercial
helicopter, and general aviation helicopter operations. To address an
increase in fatal helicopter air ambulance accidents, the FAA is
implementing new operational procedures and additional equipment
requirements for helicopter air ambulance operations. This final rule
also increases safety for commercial helicopter operations by revising
requirements for equipment, pilot testing, and alternate airports. It
increases weather minimums for all general aviation helicopter
operations. Many of these requirements address National Transportation
Safety Board safety recommendations, and are already found in FAA
guidance. Today's changes are intended to provide certificate holders
and pilots with additional tools and procedures that will aid in
preventing accidents.
DATES: This rule is effective April 22, 2014. Affected parties,
however, do not have to comply with the information collection
requirements in Sec. Sec. 120.105(i), 120.215(a)(9), 135.615, 135.617,
135.619, and 135.621 until the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
approves the collection and assigns a control number under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The FAA will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of the control number assigned by OMB for these
information collection requirements.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
Sec. Sec. 135.168 and 135.605 is approved by the Director of the
Federal Register as of April 22, 2014.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How
to Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions about this
action contact Andy Pierce, Aviation Safety Inspector, Flight Standards
Service, 135 Air Carrier Operations Branch, AFS-250, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone: (202) 267-8238; email [email protected].
For legal questions about this action contact Dean E. Griffith,
Office of the Chief Counsel, AGC-220, Federal Aviation Administration,
800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267-
3073; email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). This rulemaking is
promulgated under the general authority described in 49 U.S.C. 106(f)
and 44701(a), and the specific authority set forth in section 306 of
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95), which is
now codified at 49 U.S.C. 44730.
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 44730 requires that part 135 certificate
holders providing air ambulance services comply with part 135
regulations pertaining to weather minimums and flight and duty time
when medical personnel are onboard the aircraft. The statute also
directs the FAA to conduct rulemaking on helicopter air ambulance
operations to address: (1) Flight request and dispatch procedures; (2)
pilot training standards for preventing controlled flight into terrain
and recovery from IIMC; and (3) safety-enhancing technology and
equipment, including, HTAWS, radio altimeters, and, to the extent
feasible, devices that perform the function of flight data recorders
and cockpit voice recorders. Further, section 44730 requires the
rulemaking to address: (1) Flight risk evaluation programs; and (2)
operational control centers for helicopter air ambulance services with
10 or more helicopters. In addition, the statute directs the FAA to
issue a final rule by June 1, 2012 with respect to the NPRM published
in the Federal Register on October 12, 2010 (75 FR 62640).
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Used in This Document
AC--Advisory Circular
ARC--Aviation Rulemaking Committee
AWOS--Automated Weather Observation System
CFIT--Controlled Flight into Terrain
CVR--Cockpit Voice Recorder
ELT--Emergency Locator Transmitter
EMS--Emergency Medical Service
FDR--Flight Data Recorder
FDMS--Flight Data Monitoring System
FOQA--Flight Operational Quality Assurance
GPS--Global Positioning System
HEMS--Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
HTAWS--Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR--Instrument Flight Rules
IMC--Instrument Meteorological Conditions
LARS--Light-weight Aircraft Recording System
MHz--Megahertz
MEL--Minimum Equipment List
MOU--Memorandum of Understanding
NM--Nautical Mile
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
NVG--Night Vision Goggles
NVIS--Night-Vision Imaging System
OCC--Operations Control Center
OCS--Operations Control Specialist
OpSpec--Operations Specification
PinS--Point-in-Space Approach
PV--Present Value
SAFO--Safety Alert for Operators
TAWS--Terrain Avoidance and Warning System
TSO--Technical Standard Order
VFR--Visual Flight Rules
VMC--Visual Meteorological Conditions
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
B. Related Actions
C. NTSB Recommendations
D. Congressional Action
E. Summary of the NPRM
F. General Overview of Comments
III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule
A. Weather Minimums for Helicopters Flying Under Visual Flight
Rules in Class G Airspace (Sec. 91.155)
B. Load Manifest Requirement for All Aircraft Operating Under
Part 135 (Sec. 135.63)
C. Rules Applicable to All Part 135 Helicopter Operations
1. Radio Altimeter (Sec. 135.160)
2. Safety Equipment for Overwater Operations (Sec. Sec. 1.1,
135.117, 135.167, and 135.168)
3. Pilot Testing for Recovery From IIMC, Whiteout, Brownout, and
Flat-Light Conditions (Sec. 135.293)
4. IFR Alternate Airport Weather Minimums (Sec. 135.221)
D. Rules Applicable to Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
1. Applicability of Part 135 Rules to Helicopter Air Ambulance
Operations (Sec. Sec. 135.1, 135.267, 135.271, 135.601)
2. Weather Minimums (Sec. 135.609)
3. IFR Operations at Airports Without Weather Reporting (Sec.
135.611)
4. Approach/Departure IFR Transitions (Sec. 135.613)
5. VFR Flight Planning (Sec. 135.615)
6. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (Sec. 135.617)
7. Operations Control Centers (Sec. Sec. 135.619, 120.105, and
120.215)
[[Page 9933]]
8. Briefing of Medical Personnel (Sec. Sec. 135.117, 135.621)
9. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS)
(Sec. 135.605)
10. Flight Data Monitoring System (Sec. 135.607)
11. Pilot Instrument Ratings (Sec. 135.603)
E. General Comments
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analysis
A. Regulatory Evaluation
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
C. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
D. International Trade Impact Assessment
E. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
G. International Compatibility
H. Environmental Analysis
I. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
VI. How To Obtain Additional Information
A. Rulemaking Documents
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
Table 1 Affected Entities
Table 2 Comparison of Benefits and Costs Over 10 Years by Population
Table 3 Costs Over 10 Years by Rule Provision
Table 4 VFR Minimum Altitudes and Visibility Requirements
Table 5 SBA Size Standards
Table 6 Cost and Present Value (PV) Costs for Small Air Ambulance
Operators That Apply to the Paperwork Provision
I. Executive Summary
The provisions of this rule are directed primarily toward
helicopter air ambulance operations and all commercial helicopter
operations conducted under part 135. This rule also establishes new
weather minimums for helicopters operating under part 91 in Class G
airspace.
For helicopter air ambulances, this rule requires operations with
medical personnel on board to be conducted under part 135 operating
rules and introduces new weather minimums and visibility requirements
for part 135 operations. It mandates flight planning, preflight risk
analyses, safety briefings for medical personnel, and the establishment
of operations control centers (OCC) for certain operators to help with
risk management and flight monitoring. The rule also includes
provisions to encourage instrument flight rules (IFR) operations. It
requires helicopter air ambulances to be equipped with both helicopter
terrain awareness and warning systems (HTAWS) (the HTAWS will warn
pilots about obstacles in their flight path), and flight data
monitoring systems. Finally, helicopter air ambulance pilots will be
required to hold instrument ratings.
For all helicopters operated under part 135, these rules require
that operators carry more survival equipment for operations over water.
Alternate airports named in flight plans must have higher weather
minimums than are currently required. These helicopters must be
equipped with radio altimeters and pilots must be able to demonstrate
that they can maneuver the aircraft during an inadvertent encounter
with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) to get out of those
conditions safely.
Additionally, this rule contains a provision affecting part 91
helicopter operations. The rule assigns new weather minimums to part 91
helicopter operations in Class G airspace.
Below, Table 1 shows those affected by today's new rules and how
existing rules are being changed; Table 2 shows the costs and benefits
of the rule by affected population; and Table 3 shows the cost of the
rule by rule provision.
Table 1--Affected Entities
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Requirements established by this
Affected entities rule
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Part 91--All Helicopter Operators. Revises Sec. 91.155 Class G
airspace weather minimums for part
91 helicopter operations. This rule
provides a greater margin of safety
for operators because pilots are
required to maintain a fixed amount
of visibility and would be less
likely to suddenly encounter
instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC).
Part 135--All Rotorcraft Operators Requires each rotorcraft to
be equipped with a radio altimeter
(Sec. 135.160). Radio altimeters
can greatly improve a pilot's
awareness of height above the
ground during hover, landing in
unimproved landing zones, and
landings in confined areas where a
more vertical approach may be
required. Additionally, radio
altimeters help increase
situational awareness during
inadvertent flight into instrument
meteorological conditions (IIMC),
night operations, and flat-light,
whiteout, and brownout conditions.
Adds Sec. 135.168
equipment requirements for
rotorcraft operated over water.
Helicopter operations conducted
over water will be required to
carry additional safety equipment
to assist passengers and crew in
the event an accident occurs over
water.
Revises alternate airport
weather minimums for rotorcraft in
Sec. 135.221. This rule improves
the likelihood of being able to
land at the alternate airport if
weather conditions in the area
deteriorate while the helicopter is
en route.
Revises Sec. 135.293 to
require pilot testing of rotorcraft
handling in flat-light, whiteout,
and brownout conditions and
demonstration of competency in
recovery from an IIMC. This rule
improves safety by increasing a
pilot's likelihood of escaping and
handling IIMC and other hazards.
Part 135--Helicopter Air Ambulance Requires helicopter air
Operators.. ambulance flights with medical
personnel on board to be conducted
under part 135 (Sec. Sec. 135.1,
135.601). The safety of helicopter
air ambulance flights, including
the welfare of the medical
personnel and patients on board,
will be increased when complying
with the more stringent part 135
rules rather than part 91 rules.
Requires certificate
holders with 10 or more helicopter
air ambulances to establish
operations control centers (OCC)
(Sec. 135.619) and requires drug
and alcohol testing for operations
control specialists (Sec. Sec.
120.105 and 120.215). OCC personnel
will communicate with pilots,
provide weather information,
monitor flights and assist with
preflight risk assessments
providing an additional measure of
safety for complex operations.
Operations control specialists
perform safety-sensitive functions,
similar to an aircraft dispatcher,
and therefore must be subject to
the restrictions on drug and
alcohol use.
Requires helicopter air
ambulances to be equipped with
HTAWS (Sec. 135.605). HTAWS will
assist helicopter air ambulance
pilots in maintaining situational
awareness of surrounding terrain
and obstacles, and therefore help
prevent accidents.
[[Page 9934]]
Requires helicopter air
ambulances to be equipped with a
flight data monitoring system (Sec.
135.607). This will promote
operational safety and can provide
critical information to
investigators in the event of an
accident.
Requires each helicopter
air ambulance operator to establish
and document, in its operations
manual, an FAA-approved preflight
risk analysis (Sec. 135.617). A
preflight risk analysis provides
certificate holders with the means
to assess and mitigate risk, and
make determinations regarding the
flight's safety before launch.
Requires pilots to identify
and document the highest obstacle
along the planned route (Sec.
135.615). This rule will prevent
obstacle collisions by requiring
pilots to be aware of the terrain
and obstacles along their route.
Requires safety briefings
or training for helicopter air
ambulance medical personnel (Sec.
135.621). Medical personnel will be
less likely to inadvertently
introduce risk to an operation
because of increased familiarity
with the aircraft and emergency
procedures.
Establishes visual flight
rules (VFR) weather minimums for
helicopter air ambulance operations
(Sec. 135.609). More stringent
VFR weather minimums for helicopter
air ambulances operations in
uncontrolled airspace will have the
effect of ensuring that these
operations are not conducted in
marginal weather conditions.
Permits instrument flight
rules (IFR) operations at airports
without weather reporting (Sec.
135.611). This rule is intended to
facilitate IFR operations by
helicopter air ambulance operators
and result in more aircraft
operating in a positively
controlled environment, thereby
increasing safety.
Establishes procedures for
transitioning between IFR and VFR
on approach to, and departure from,
heliports or landing areas (Sec.
135.613). This rule benefits pilots
by enabling them to access more
destinations by flying within the
IFR structure and its associated
safety benefits.
Requires pilots in command
to hold an instrument rating (Sec.
135.603). Having the skills to
navigate by instruments will assist
helicopter air ambulance pilots to
extract themselves from dangerous
situations such as inadvertent
flight into IMC.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.000
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II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
Helicopter air ambulance accidents reached historic levels during
the years from 2003 through 2008.\1\ The year 2008 was the deadliest.
In 2008, five air ambulance accidents killed 21 people, including
pilots, patients, and medical personnel. This rule addresses the causes
of 62 helicopter air ambulance accidents that occurred during the
period from 1991 through 2010. One hundred twenty-five people died in
those accidents. The FAA identified four common factors in those
accidents--inadvertent flight into IMC, loss of control, controlled
flight into terrain (which includes mountains, ground, water, and man-
made obstacles), and night conditions.
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\1\ GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air
Ambulance Safety Concerns (2009).
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Helicopter air ambulances operate under unique conditions. Their
flights are often time sensitive, which puts pressure on the pilots.
Helicopter air ambulances fly at low altitudes and under varied weather
conditions. They must often land at unfamiliar, remote, or unimproved
sites with hazards like trees, buildings, towers, wires, and uneven
terrain. In an emergency, many patients will not have a choice of
whether they want to be transported in a helicopter or not. They may be
in a medical condition that prevents them from making decisions about
transportation or indicating what they want. They cannot choose between
competing carriers because the company that responds to the scene may
be either the first one called or the only one in the area. For these
reasons, the FAA is establishing more stringent safety regulations to
protect patients, medical personnel, flightcrew members, and other
passengers onboard helicopter air ambulances.
The FAA also identified an increase in accidents in other
commercial helicopter operations. This rule addresses the causes of 20
commercial helicopter accidents that occurred from 1991 through 2010.
Thirty-nine people died in those accidents. Also from 1991 to 2010,
there were 49 accidents that occurred while the helicopter was
operating under basic VFR weather minimums and those accidents caused
63 fatalities. The FAA has determined that these accidents may have
been prevented if pilots and helicopters were better equipped for IIMC,
flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions, and for flights over
water.\2\
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\2\ Flat light is the diffused lighting that occurs under cloudy
skies, especially when the ground is snow-covered, greatly impairing
the pilot's ability to perceive depth, distance, altitude, or
topographical features when operating under VFR. See NTSB Safety
Recommendation A-02-33. Whiteout occurs when parallel rays of the
sun are broken up and diffused when passing through the cloud layer
so that they strike a snow-covered surface from many angles. The
diffused light then reflects back and forth countless times between
the snow and the cloud, eliminating all shadows, resulting in loss
of depth perception. See FAA AC 00-6A, Aviation Weather for Pilots
and Flight Operations Personnel. Brownout conditions occur when sand
or other particles restrict visibility and depth perception.
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In addition to addressing the causal factors of these accidents,
this rule also addresses National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
safety recommendations and recommendations made by the Part 125/135
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC).
B. Related Actions
The FAA has taken actions to address the problem of helicopter
accidents, such as developing standards and issuing guidance, which
were discussed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (published
October 12, 2010). In addition to the actions noted there, the FAA has
revised its guidance materials to align with the provisions of this new
rule.
ARC Recommendations
On April 8, 2003, the FAA formed the Part 125/135 ARC. This group
was tasked to perform a comprehensive review of parts 125 and 135 and
provide recommendations on rule changes. The ARC had close to 200
participants, representing a broad range of interests, and included
members of the operator community, unions, trade associations,
government, and manufacturers. The ARC worked for 2 years--from 2003 to
2005--and had eight working groups studying a wide range of subjects.
They made the recommendations for helicopter air ambulance operations
and other commercial helicopter operations that form the basis of
several of the provisions in this final rule. ARC proposals addressed
in this rulemaking include equipping helicopters with radio altimeters,
increasing weather minimums for helicopter air ambulance operations,
requiring additional safety equipment for overwater operations,
requiring pilot testing on recovery from IIMC, and revising alternate
airport weather requirements for instrument flight rules.
C. NTSB Recommendations for Helicopter Operations
Many of the requirements in this rule were developed, in part, in
response to safety recommendations from the NTSB. The following is a
list of those recommendations, what they required, and how they relate
to the rules being codified today.
Recommendations on Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
A-06-12--Recommends that the FAA require all emergency medical
services (EMS) operators to comply with 14 CFR part 135 operations
specifications during the conduct of flights with medical personnel on
board. The FAA has addressed this recommendation in Sec. 135.1, which
requires helicopter air ambulance operations to be conducted under part
135 rules.
A-06-13--Recommends that the FAA require all EMS operators to
develop and implement flight-risk evaluation programs that include
training for all employees involved in the operation, procedures that
support the systematic evaluation of flight risks, and consultation
with others in emergency medical service flight operations if the risks
reach a predefined level. The FAA has partially addressed this
recommendation in Sec. 135.617, which requires a preflight risk
analysis prior to helicopter air ambulance operations.
A-06-14--Recommends that the FAA require EMS operators to use
formalized dispatch and flight-monitoring procedures that include up-
to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment
decisions. The FAA has partially addressed this recommendation in Sec.
135.619, which requires OCCs for certificate holders with 10 or more
helicopter air ambulances.
A-06-15--Recommends that the FAA require EMS operators to install
terrain awareness and warning systems on their aircraft and to provide
adequate training to ensure that flightcrews are capable of using those
systems to safely conduct EMS operations. The FAA addressed this
recommendation in Sec. 135.605, which requires equipping helicopter
air ambulances with HTAWS.
A-09-87--Recommends that the FAA develop criteria for scenario-
based helicopter EMS pilot training that includes IIMC and hazards
unique to helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS), and determine
how frequently this training is required to ensure proficiency. The FAA
has addressed this recommendation by revising Sec. 135.293, which
would require that pilots be tested on recognizing and avoiding flat-
light, whiteout, and brownout conditions, and that they demonstrate
recovery from IIMC.
A-09-89--Recommends that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance
operators to implement a safety
[[Page 9936]]
management system program that includes sound risk management
practices. The FAA partially addressed this recommendation by requiring
elements of a safety management system program for helicopter air
ambulance operators. Section 135.607 requires equipping helicopter air
ambulances with flight data monitoring systems, which can be used to
identify risk. Sec. 135.617 requires a preflight risk analysis for
helicopter air ambulance operations, and Sec. 135.619 requires OCCs
for certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances.
A-09-90--Recommends that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance
operators to install flight data recording devices and establish a
structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available
data sources to identify deviations from established norms and
procedures and other potential safety issues. The FAA has partially
addressed this recommendation in Sec. 135.607, which requires
equipping helicopter air ambulances with flight data monitoring
devices.
Recommendations for Commercial Helicopter Operations
A-02-33--Recommends that the FAA require all helicopter pilots who
conduct commercial passenger-carrying flights in areas where flat-light
or whiteout conditions routinely occur to possess a helicopter-specific
instrument rating and to demonstrate their competency during initial
and recurrent 14 CFR 135.293 evaluation check rides. The FAA has
addressed this recommendation by revising Sec. 135.293, which requires
testing pilots for recognition and avoidance of flat-light, whiteout,
and brownout conditions, and a demonstration of recovery from IIMC.
Also Sec. 135.603, which requires an instrument rating for helicopter
air ambulance pilots, addresses this recommendation.
A-02-34--Recommends that the FAA require all commercial helicopter
operators conducting passenger-carrying flights in areas where flat-
light or whiteout conditions routinely occur to include safe practices
for operating in those conditions in their approved training programs.
The FAA has partially addressed this recommendation in Sec. 135.293,
which requires pilot testing on recognizing and avoiding flat-light,
whiteout, and brownout conditions, and a demonstration of recovery from
IIMC.
A-02-35--Recommends that the FAA require installation of radio
altimeters in all helicopters conducting commercial, passenger-carrying
operations in areas where flat-light or whiteout conditions routinely
occur. The FAA has addressed this recommendation in Sec. 135.160,
which requires installation of a radio altimeter in every helicopter
operated under part 135.
A-06-17--Recommends that the FAA require all rotorcraft operating
under 14 CFR parts 91 and 135 with a transport-category certification
to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data
recorder. The FAA has partially addressed this recommendation in Sec.
135.607, which requires equipping helicopter air ambulances with a
flight data monitoring system.
A-07-87--Recommends that the FAA require all existing and new
turbine-powered helicopters operating in the Gulf of Mexico and
certificated with five or more seats to be equipped with externally-
mounted life rafts large enough to accommodate all occupants. As
discussed below this recommendation is not addressed by this final
rule.
A-07-88--Recommends that the FAA require all off-shore helicopter
operators in the Gulf of Mexico to provide their flightcrews with
personal flotation devices equipped with a waterproof global-
positioning-system-enabled 406 megahertz (MHz) personal locater beacon,
as well as one other signaling device, such as a signaling mirror or
strobe light. The FAA partially addresses this recommendation in Sec.
135.168, which requires that helicopters used in operations beyond
autorotational distance from the shoreline be equipped with a 406 MHz
locator beacon with a 121.5 MHz homing capability and that passengers
wear life preservers when over water.
A-99-61--Recommends that the FAA amend record-keeping requirements
in Sec. 135.63(c) to apply to single-engine as well as multiengine
aircraft. As discussed below this recommendation is not addressed by
this final rule.
D. Congressional Action
On February 14, 2012, President Obama signed into law the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95). Section 306 of
the Act requires that part 135 certificate holders providing air
ambulance services to comply with part 135 regulations pertaining to
weather minimums and flight and duty time when medical personnel are
onboard the aircraft. Section 306 also directs the FAA to conduct
rulemaking on helicopter air ambulance operations which will address:
(1) Flight request and dispatch procedures; (2) pilot training
standards for preventing controlled flight into terrain and recovery
from IIMC; and (3) safety-enhancing technology and equipment including,
HTAWS, radio altimeters, and, to the extent feasible, devices that
perform the function of flight data recorders and cockpit voice
recorders. Additionally, the Act requires the rulemaking to address:
(1) Flight risk evaluation programs; and (2) operational control
centers for helicopter air ambulance services with 10 or more
helicopters.
The FAA is also directed to conduct a subsequent rulemaking
addressing pilot training standards, and the use of safety equipment
that should be worn or used by flight crewmembers and medical personnel
on helicopter air ambulance flights.
Section 318 of the Act requires the FAA to study the ``feasibility
of requiring pilots of helicopters providing air ambulance services
under part 135 . . . to use NVGs during nighttime operations.''
E. Summary of the NPRM
An NPRM was published in the Federal Register on October 12, 2010
(75 FR 62640). That notice proposed--
Revised weather minimums for all helicopter operations
under part 91.
New load manifest requirements for all aircraft operations
under part 135.
New operations, training, and equipment requirements for
all helicopter operations under part 135.
New operations, training, equipment, and flightcrew
requirements for helicopter air ambulance operations under part 135.
The comment period for that NPRM closed on January 10, 2011.
F. General Overview of Comments
The FAA received 179 comments about the proposal for this
rulemaking. Among those commenting were 32 operators, 11 manufacturers,
and 13 associations. Almost all of the commenters expressed support for
the intent of the proposal but many suggested changes to individual
requirements. Almost all of the provisions of the rule received some
comment.
III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule
This final rule affects three categories of operators--part 91
helicopter operators, part 135 helicopter operators, and helicopter air
ambulance operators in part 135. Although addressed in the NPRM, the
final rule does not contain a load manifest requirement for all
aircraft operations under part 135. Following is a discussion of the
current standards, each new rule as it was proposed, the public
comments that
[[Page 9937]]
were received about that rule, and the final rule as it is adopted
today.
A. Weather Minimums for Helicopters Flying Under Visual Flight Rules in
Class G Airspace (Sec. 91.155)
Currently, helicopters operating in Class G airspace, under VFR and
less than 1,200 feet above the surface, are required by Sec.
91.155(b)(1) to remain clear of clouds and to operate at a speed that
gives the pilot adequate opportunity to see any air traffic or
obstruction in time to avoid a collision. The FAA proposed to revise
Sec. 91.155 to establish a minimum \1/2\ statute mile visibility by
day and one statute mile visibility at night. The FAA received comments
expressing support for the proposal from the Air Medical Operators
Association (AMOA), PHI Air Medical (PHI), NTSB, the National EMS
Pilots Association (NEMSPA), members of the Association of Critical
Care Transport (ACCT), LifeFlight of Maine, and REACH Air Medical
Services, LLC (REACH). Other commenters expressed opposition based on
the FAA's accident analysis and concern over operational limitations
that are discussed below.
Accident Analysis
The Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) commented that the FAA
failed to provide documentation to support a change to Sec. 91.155 for
all general aviation and commercial helicopter operators. Kestrel Air
commented that the FAA did not correlate the air ambulance accident
rate with whether the helicopter was operating under part 91 or part
135. It noted that in the NPRM, the FAA cited emotional pressure on
pilots to fly if they believed their flight could save lives, and said
that this was considered a significant factor in the air ambulance
industry's higher accident rate. Kestrel said that this factor is
lacking in other part 91 operations, so there is no basis to presume
the proposed change would have any positive impact on these other
operators. The FAA notes that many operations under part 91, such as
firefighting, police work, crop spraying, pipeline patrol, and power
line repair can put pressure on a pilot and may be a contributing
factor in their industry's accident rate.
Air Shasta Rotor and Wing, LLC (Air Shasta) commented that in a
review of the last 5 years of NTSB non-EMS part 91 helicopter accident
data, it was ``unable to find a particular accident that could have
been avoided if the pilot did not have the proposed requirement'' of
\1/2\ mile visibility and clear of clouds. Likewise, Westlog, Inc.
(Westlog) claimed that it could not find any accidents in the last 5
years of NTSB data that could have been avoided under this change.
The FAA acknowledges that the NPRM did not contain accident data
relating to this proposed change. However, in response to these
comments, the FAA conducted a review of accidents to determine whether
NTSB accident data supports the proposal. A review of the accident
history for the period from 1991 to 2010, the same time period used for
the other provisions of this rule, showed that there were 49 helicopter
accidents resulting in 63 deaths that may have been prevented had this
rule been in place. The FAA determined that these accidents, which
occurred when visibility was less than \1/2\ mile during the day or 1
mile at night, and for which controlled flight into terrain, fog, rain,
or other adverse weather were contributing factors, may have been
prevented had the rule been in effect. Accordingly, the FAA has
determined that the accident history supports this change.
Operational Limitations
Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed change would
prevent operations that are currently being conducted safely. EAA
stated that Sec. 91.155 has been in effect since the early 1970s and
has been safely used since that time. It noted that many helicopter
operations such as firefighting, wildlife surveys, logging operations,
off-shore fish sighting surveys, herding, crop spraying, and power
line/high tension wire maintenance/surveys occur from remote field
bases, with the majority of operations occurring close to those bases.
Further, EAA stated that pilots, based on their experience, are the
best judge of what speed and visibility are acceptable for safe
operation in those circumstances and that ``to impose a visibility
limit shows the FAA does not truly understand the entire scope of what
commercial and private helicopter missions are and their combined
effect on the national economy.''
Commenters from EGLI Air Haul also believe that part 91 should
remain unchanged so that the pilot can decide whether visibility is
adequate. In support of leaving the regulation unchanged, they cited an
instance when an EGLI pilot made a decision to fly in conditions below
those proposed in the NPRM to aid survivors of an airplane crash who
were trapped on a mountainside. They contend that the proposed change
to Sec. 91.155 would have prevented this pilot from reaching the
survivors.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff's department wrote that public
safety agencies must be able to make ``go/no go'' decisions based on
the higher experience level of their pilots and knowledge of the local
flying areas. The commenter stated that weather restrictions would
limit its ability to perform numerous search and rescue missions. Air
Shasta also stated that a ``detrimental consequence of these proposed
limitations would be cancelling or delaying of search and rescue
missions'' it occasionally performs.
Westlog stated that the current requirement is safe for helicopters
operating clear of clouds because they can stop and land at zero
airspeed and commented that this helicopter operation is safer than an
airplane operating clear of clouds at night with one mile of visibility
when within \1/2\ mile of the runway under Sec. 91.155(b)(2).
Additionally, Westlog noted that it operates in coastal Oregon and
Northern California and frequents uncontrolled airports served by
automated weather observation systems (AWOS). Because coastal advection
fog is common in this area, the commenter explained, an AWOS will often
report \1/4\ mile visibility when over half the airport is clear, with
15 miles visibility or more. Westlog claimed that, even with a reported
\1/4\ mile visibility, a helicopter can take off safely under visual
flight rules by simply departing into the non-foggy area. Air Shasta
similarly commented that it has performed numerous searches when
conditions at the departure airport were below what was proposed in the
NPRM, but where it could find a point at the airport that was clear
enough to depart safely.
One commenter, Safety and Flight Evaluations, International stated
that the proposed rule would have an insufficient impact on safety
because the proposed weather minimums are equivalent to Sec.
135.205(b) and that the visibility requirements should be doubled to 1
statute mile during the day and 2 statute miles at night.
The FAA has determined that the change proposed in the NPRM is
warranted. As discussed above, the FAA has identified numerous
accidents that may have been prevented had the changes been in place.
In response to Westlog's comments about foggy conditions and readings
by an AWOS, the FAA is aware that visibility at some parts of an
airport may be sufficiently clear to conduct operations even though the
AWOS is reporting minimum visibility. Section 91.155 establishes flight
visibility requirements for part 91 VFR operations. Therefore, if the
pilot
[[Page 9938]]
determines that flight visibility \3\ meets the requirements of Sec.
91.155 at the takeoff location, despite the weather reported by the
AWOS, the pilot may take off.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See 14 CFR 1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA recognizes that this change will prohibit operations that
are currently conducted in very low visibility conditions in Class G
airspace, including civil and public aircraft operations. However, the
FAA has determined that the increased safety justifies any prohibitions
that would result. Under current regulations, an operator may apply for
a certificate of waiver from Sec. 91.155. The Administrator may issue
a certificate of waiver if a proposed operation can be safely
conducted. See 14 CFR 91.903-91.905. The FAA has determined that this
existing waiver authority will provide sufficient flexibility to
operators that can safely conduct operations when visibility is below
the requirements established in this rule.
In response to the comment by Safety and Flight Evaluations,
International that the visibility requirements should be doubled,
implementing more restrictive visibility minimums than those proposed
would be outside of the scope of the proposed rule.
Final Rule
Based on the comments received and an additional review of the
NPRM, the FAA is adopting the rule as proposed with two changes. First,
the agency has changed proposed Sec. 91.155(b)(1) to allow helicopters
to operate clear of clouds in an airport or heliport traffic pattern
within \1/2\ mile of the runway or helipad of intended landing if the
flight visibility is \1/2\ statute mile or more. The agency finds that
this revision will provide an additional measure of flexibility when
operating at night in an airport environment similar to that afforded
to airplanes under the current rule. Second, for consistency with the
existing regulation, the final rule incorporates the visibility
minimums into Sec. 91.155(a), instead of Sec. 91.155(b)(1) as
proposed in the NPRM.
B. Load Manifest Requirement for All Aircraft Operating Under Part 135
(Sec. 135.63)
Currently, Sec. 135.63 requires operators of multiengine aircraft
to complete a load manifest in duplicate and carry one copy aboard the
aircraft. No specific action is required for the second copy, but
certificate holders must retain a copy of the completed load manifest
for at least 30 days. Single engine aircraft currently have no
requirement to prepare a load manifest.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply the rule to all airplanes
and helicopters, single engine and multiengine, operating under part
135, and to clarify the requirements for preparation and transmission
of the load manifest. The proposal required that the load manifest be
sent to the certificate holder's principal base of operations or to
another location approved by the Administrator, where it must be
received before takeoff. The proposal allowed for the load manifest to
be provided electronically. It required that if the load manifest is
not received by the certificate holder's principal base of operations
before takeoff, the pilot must prepare two copies and carry one copy on
the aircraft to its destination and arrange, at the takeoff location,
for the second copy to be sent to the certificate holder or retained
until the flight is complete at a location approved by the
Administrator.
The FAA estimated this provision would impose costs of $82 million
(present value) over 10 years while the benefits were estimated at $20
million (present value) over 10 years. The FAA requested comments on
the cost of the load manifest provision.
The NTSB supported this revision and commented that it responds to
NTSB Safety Recommendation A-99-61. The Association of Air Medical
Services (AAMS), NEMSPA, Helicopter Association International (HAI),
and Angel One Transport supported the intent to maintain accurate load
manifest records, but they, and many other commenters, expressed
concerns about the cost, justification, and operational impact of this
requirement. Commenters noted the high cost of this requirement and
questioned how this provision would prevent accidents.
Based on the comments received and additional review of the NPRM,
the FAA is withdrawing the load manifest requirement proposed in the
NRPM because of the excessive cost of this provision. Therefore, the
current rule language in Sec. 135.63 remains unchanged.
The FAA notes that other regulations currently in place require
pilots to comply with the operating limitations of the aircraft and to
be familiar with all information concerning a flight, which would
include the type of information included on a load manifest. See
Sec. Sec. 91.9(a) and 91.103. Additionally, the FAA will consider
issuing guidance material in order to clarify the requirements for
preparation and transmission of the load manifest.
C. Rules Applicable to All Part 135 Helicopter Operations
1. Radio Altimeters (Sec. 135.160)
The FAA proposed a new requirement for all rotorcraft operated
under part 135 to be equipped with a radio altimeter. Commenters,
including AAMS and various ACCT members, supported this proposal. The
NTSB supported it as well and emphasized that, if adopted, this
proposal would respond to NTSB Safety Recommendation A-02-35.
Other commenters, however, objected to this provision on grounds
that radio altimeters are not effective in all situations, that the
rule would not be cost beneficial, and that not all helicopters can
incorporate radio altimeters. These comments are discussed in detail
below.
Effectiveness
PHI claimed radio altimeters have minimal impact on pilots flying
by visual reference in daytime and that the accident record shows that
radio altimeters have not prevented controlled-flight-into-terrain
accidents. NorthStar Trekking, an Alaskan operator, commented that
radio altimeters are unreliable, give erroneous information over snow-
covered surfaces, and realistically create nothing more than a
distraction in a day VFR environment. One commenter stated that TAWS is
a better investment because radio altimeters ``tell distance to where
the aircraft has already been not where it's going to impact.''
Finally, FreeFlight Systems, an avionics manufacturer, commented
that the radio altimeter should have the ``performance guarantees of
[Technical Standard Order] TSO-C87 and be designated in accordance with
DO-178B and DO-254 with at least a Level C design assurance.'' It
further stated that some radio altimeters with ``only a PMA--lacking a
TSO'' are less accurate at low altitudes which could impact the ability
to gauge altitude in critical conditions.
The FAA determined that radio altimeters are an important safety
device designed to inform the pilot of the aircraft's actual height
above the surface. Although it is true that a radio altimeter may have
minimal impact on daytime visual reference flight, this device gives
pilots an additional tool to maintain situational awareness in an
inadvertent encounter with IMC, where vision is suddenly limited due to
brownout or whiteout, or other situations where pilots lose their
reference to the horizon and the ground. Additionally, as stated in the
NPRM, a radio altimeter can aid a pilot's
[[Page 9939]]
awareness of height above the ground during hover, when landing in
unimproved landing zones, or where a more vertical approach is
required. All of these scenarios can occur during the day.
In response to the comments that a radio altimeter may not prevent
a controlled-flight-into-terrain accident, as discussed in the NPRM,
NTSB safety recommendation A-02-35 noted that radio altimeters might
aid pilots in recognizing proximity to the ground in flat-light and
whiteout conditions. Additionally, the FAA cites 29 accidents in the
final regulatory evaluation that may have been prevented by a radio
altimeter. Of the 29 accidents, 19 were classified as controlled flight
into terrain by the NTSB. A radio altimeter could have provided the
pilot with a low altitude warning, enabling the pilot to take
corrective action.
In response to NorthStar Trekking, the FAA acknowledges that, in
limited circumstances, such as when operating over dry snow or still
water, a radio altimeter may provide inaccurate altitude readings.
Improper installation of a radio altimeter may exacerbate this problem.
The FAA has determined that these infrequent inaccurate readings do not
outweigh the safety benefits that will be obtained by requiring
installation of radio altimeters in the commercial helicopter fleet.
In response to the comment that this device only tells where the
aircraft has been, meaning that it cannot detect obstacles in the
flight path, a descending altitude read-out on the radio altimeter
could alert a pilot to rising terrain or decreasing altitude over level
terrain. Accordingly, although the radio altimeter does not reveal
obstacles in the flight path, it does provide valuable information to
maintain situational awareness. The FAA agrees with the commenter that
TAWS or HTAWS are valuable tools, but is not going to extend the
requirement to equip with one of these devices to the entire part 135
helicopter population at this time. Rather, as discussed later in this
document and in the NPRM, the FAA is requiring HTAWS for helicopter air
ambulance operations because they are often conducted at night and into
unimproved landing sites.
Finally, the FAA is not requiring a radio altimeter that meets
Technical Standard Order TSO-C87. The FAA determined that an FAA-
approved radio altimeter is sufficient because the intended function is
demonstrated regardless of the type of FAA approval. A radio altimeter
may be approved in one of four ways: Under a Parts Manufacturer
Approval; under a TSO authorization; in conjunction with type
certification procedures for a product; or approved in any other manner
by the Administrator. See 14 CFR 21.303. The minimum performance of a
TSO or a parts-manufacturer-approved radio altimeter must be
demonstrated to meet the intended function.
Cost
NorthStar Trekking commented that contrary to the FAA's assertion
that the cost of radio altimeters is negligible, an altimeter costs
roughly $6,000, with an additional $500 in maintenance annually--money
that could be better spent on training, early retirement of parts,
extra pilots, and appropriate avionics that ``truly have an effect on
our overall safety. . . .'' It further stated that the accident cited
in the NPRM would not have been prevented by a radio altimeter. It
noted that the accident may have been far worse had a radio altimeter
been installed on the helicopter because of snow and fog, and had the
pilot tried to maintain a higher altitude by use of a radio altimeter
he may have flown into IMC conditions.
Westlog claimed that requiring a non-air ambulance operator to have
a radio altimeter installed is simply too onerous with very little
documented benefit. Westlog based this comment on its review of NTSB
accident data for the non-air ambulance part 135 helicopter industry.
It noted that the only non-air ambulance accident cited in the NPRM
occurred in Alaska and maintained that a radio altimeter requirement is
not justified for all geographic locations. In response to Westlog's
comment, the FAA notes that it identified 11 non-air ambulance
commercial helicopter accidents in the final Regulatory Evaluation that
might have been prevented if an operational radio altimeter had been
installed in the aircraft. These accidents were also cited in the
initial Regulatory Evaluation published in the docket with the NPRM.
With respect to the comment on the cost of a radio altimeter, in
the initial regulatory evaluation, the FAA estimated the cost of a
radio altimeter to be $5,250 (including installation), plus revenue
losses for downtime during installation. For the final regulatory
evaluation, the FAA revised this cost estimate to a $9,000 cost for the
device, which was the highest estimate given by commenters, plus $500
annually for maintenance.
Need for Flexibility
Westlog and Air Shasta expressed concern that their helicopters
cannot accommodate additional equipment. Both commenters said that if
they are forced to install a radio altimeter, they would have to remove
vital equipment, such as the artificial horizon, because there is no
room to fit anything more on the instrument panel. Several commenters,
including REACH, supported the rule, provided they were able to
continue operation without a radio altimeter within a limited period
and with acceptable alternative procedures as prescribed under minimum
equipment lists (MELs).
The final rule states that an operator must have an ``FAA-approved
radio altimeter, or an FAA-approved device that incorporates a radio
alti- meter. . . .'' The FAA recognizes that limited numbers of older
helicopters used in part 135 operations (e.g. Bell-47, Robinson R-22)
may not have adequate room on the flight deck to install a radio
altimeter. In response to these comments, the FAA is including the
ability for a certificate holder to obtain a deviation from the rule
for circumstances when a radio altimeter cannot physically be located
on the flight deck. However, we also note that an HTAWS or other device
such as a multi-function display that incorporates a radio altimeter
would be permitted under this rule. Deviation authority may not be
warranted for helicopters in which a radio altimeter can be
incorporated into the flight deck's existing configuration.
Additionally, the operator may not use information derived from a
global positioning system (GPS) as a substitute for a radio altimeter.
Finally, the FAA notes that the rule language proposed in the NPRM
exempting operators from the radio altimeter requirement when
``authorized in the certificate holder's approved'' MEL is adopted in
the final rule. The particular requirements relating to operations with
inoperable radio altimeters would be developed by FAA's Flight
Standards Service in accordance with its existing master minimum
equipment list (MMEL) process.
Compliance Date
The FAA asked for comments on the proposed 3-year compliance period
for the radio altimeter provision. The NTSB responded that the
compliance period for this requirement should be reduced to 1 year
because radio altimeters are readily available for helicopter
installation. FreeFlight Systems encouraged adoption as soon as
possible, but commented that a 3-year time frame ``seems reasonable
since affordable, light-weight equipment is already available.'' The
FAA also notes
[[Page 9940]]
comments discussed above regarding concerns about the time it takes to
obtain FAA approval for equipment installations.
The FAA is implementing the 3-year compliance period proposed in
the NPRM. We have determined, based on the comments, that part 135
helicopter operators will be able to comply with the rule in that time
period. The FAA also does not anticipate undue delay in approving radio
altimeter installations because they are readily available on the
market and installation procedures are well established.
Requirement for Helicopter Air Ambulances To Be Equipped With Radio
Altimeters and HTAWS
The FAA proposed that helicopters used in air ambulance operations
be equipped with both a radio altimeter and an HTAWS unit and asked for
comments on the safety benefits of installing both devices. The FAA is
requiring in the final rule that helicopter air ambulances be equipped
with both a radio altimeter and HTAWS. Aviation Solutions Group, LLC, a
member of ACCT, agreed with the proposal to require both technologies
to ``provide optimal situational awareness.'' This comment was echoed
by other ACCT members. LifeFlight of Maine commented that use of a
radio altimeter and HTAWS provides multiple sources of low-altitude
warnings to pilots.
We reiterate the statements in the NPRM that an HTAWS that
incorporates or works in conjunction with a radio altimeter function
would meet the requirements of Sec. 135.160 because those units
measure altitude by actively sending radio signals to the surface. They
do not rely on a preprogrammed database to derive altitude information.
Therefore an HTAWS without a radio altimeter function would not meet
the requirements of Sec. 135.160.
The rule is adopted as proposed.\4\
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\4\ Section 306(c)(3) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking that
addresses use of radio altimeters in helicopter air ambulance
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Safety Equipment for Overwater Operations (Sec. Sec. 1.1, 135.117,
135.167, and 135.168)
Currently, aircraft operating in extended overwater operations must
comply with the equipment requirements in Sec. 135.167. Current Sec.
1.1 defines extended overwater operations for helicopters as an
operation at a horizontal distance of more than 50 nautical miles (NM)
from the nearest shoreline and 50 NM from an off-shore heliport
structure. Additionally, operators must comply with overwater equipment
requirements in Sec. 91.205(b)(12) and performance requirements for
aircraft in Sec. 135.183 when conducting overwater operations.
In the NPRM, the requirements for helicopter overwater operations
were contained in a new section, Sec. 135.168. Additionally, the NPRM
proposed removing the reference to off-shore heliports from Sec. 1.1
to define extended overwater operations as operations more than 50 NM
from the nearest shoreline. The FAA proposed to amend Sec. 135.167 to
exclude rotorcraft. The FAA received comments on the framework of the
proposed rule and the equipment requirements. Based on these comments
and further review of the NPRM, the FAA has made significant revisions
to this rule.
Primarily, the FAA has removed the requirement for helicopters to
equip with life rafts when beyond autorotational distance from the
shoreline. The FAA is removing the life raft requirement proposed in
the NPRM because the cost of equipping with life rafts would not be
justified by an increase in the survivability of accidents. The FAA
reviewed accidents to ascertain the cost and benefit of each piece of
equipment proposed in the NPRM and determined that benefits from the
accidents cited in the NPRM do not justify the costs of imposing the
life raft requirement. This is for two reasons. First, there are
relatively few accidents beyond autorotational distance from the
shoreline. Second, among the accidents identified, few qualify as
survivable and, of the survivable accidents, the requirement to wear
life preservers would generate the greatest likelihood of surviving in
the water. Accordingly, the proposed life raft requirement is not being
implemented in the final rule.
The FAA is also not implementing the proposed revision to the
definition of ``extended over-water operation'' in Sec. 1.1. That
definition would have been revised so that the equipment requirements
for extended over-water operations would take effect at the same
distance from shore for helicopters and airplanes. Currently,
helicopters are allowed more flexibility. However, we are withdrawing
this revision because it was tied to the life raft proposal.
Additionally, the final rule does not adopt the changes proposed to
Sec. 135.167 which would have made that section applicable only to
airplanes. The removal of the proposed life raft requirement makes it
necessary to leave Sec. 135.167 as it is so that the existing equipage
rules, which include a life raft requirement, apply to helicopters
engaged in extended overwater operations.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the FAA is retaining the
requirements that life preservers be worn when the aircraft is operated
beyond autorotational distance from the shoreline and for helicopters
to be equipped with a 406 MHz ELT. The FAA believes it is important to
provide passengers with this base level of equipment to increase the
odds of surviving a crash into the water. As discussed above, when
conducting the accident analysis, the FAA reviewed each piece of
equipment proposed in this provision and found that, of the proposed
equipment, life preservers would generate the most benefits.
The FAA is not adopting the proposed pyrotechnic signaling device
requirement because Sec. 91.205(b)(12) currently requires aircraft
operated overwater to be equipped with ``at least one pyrotechnic
signaling device.''
406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters
This final rule requires that each helicopter have an approved
emergency locator transmitter (ELT)--ELT 406/121.5MHz. The NPRM
proposed a TSO-C126a approved 406 MHz ELT that only needed to be
carried on the rafts. The final rule language has been changed to
require that single and multiengine helicopters, not the raft, be
equipped with an ELT. This will ensure that all helicopters that
conduct operations beyond autorotational distance from the shoreline
will have the added safety benefit of a rescue locating and signaling
device. This final rule requires an ELT that transmits on the 406 MHz
frequency but also includes a low-power 121.5 MHz homing device. The
121.5 MHz frequency remains allocated to aviation emergencies and
continues to be monitored by air traffic control, flight service
stations, other emergency organizations, and aircraft. We also note
that since publication of the NPRM the FAA published TSO-C126b, dated
November 26, 2012, which does not allow using hook and loop fasteners
to secure the ELT in the aircraft.
Operators required to comply with this rule can find ELT minimum
performance standards in FAA TSO-C126b ``406 MHz Emergency Locator
Transmitter,'' dated November 26, 2012. The FAA notes that the prior
versions of the TSO, TSO-C126a dated December 17, 2008, and TSO-C126
December 23, 1992, provide minimum performance specifications for 406
and 121.5 MHz ELTs that are similar to those found in TSO-C126b. FAA
TSO-C126 refers to RTCA DO-204 ``Minimum Operational
[[Page 9941]]
Performance Standards for 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters,''
dated December 23, 1992, and FAA TSO-C126b and TSO-C126a refer to RTCA
DO-204a ``Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 406 MHz
Emergency Locator Transmitters,'' dated December 6, 2007. Accordingly,
the FAA has changed the rule language to allow TSO-C126, TSO-C126a, and
TSO-C126b approved ELTs.
RTCA DO-204 and DO-204a include minimum performance standards for
both 406 and 121.5 MHz ELTs. When beneficial to the operator, the FAA
will consider approving installations of a stand-alone 406 MHz ELT to
augment an existing 121.5 MHz ELT installation.
Life Preservers
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to include a requirement in Sec.
135.168 that occupants in overwater operations wear life preservers
equipped with a survivor locator light from takeoff until the flight is
no longer over water.
PHI asked the FAA to strike the words ``from takeoff until the
flight is no longer over water'' from the overwater life preserver
requirement of Sec. 135.168 and replace them with ``during the
overwater portion of the flight.'' AMOA asserted that the rule should
not require passengers to wear life preservers, but rather the life
preservers should ``be easily accessible'' during overwater operations.
Med-Trans proposed a change that would exempt the patients on board
medical helicopters from life preserver and briefing requirements.
Many commenters recommended that the FAA exclude patients from life
preserver requirements because wearing a life preserver could interfere
with the patient's medical care. These comments mirrored a part 125/135
ARC recommendation. The FAA did not intend to require transported
patients to wear life preservers if doing so would impede the ability
of medical personnel to treat that patient or if it would be
inadvisable for medical reasons, such as a need to keep the patient
still. Accordingly the FAA has revised Sec. 135.168(b)(1) to reflect
this intent.
The FAA agrees with commenters that passengers should be able to
don life preservers only for the overwater portion of the flight. After
reviewing the proposal, the FAA recognizes that a flight may spend
significant time over land before it travels over water. The FAA has
amended the final rule to require that occupants wear life preservers
while the helicopter is beyond autorotational distance from the
shoreline.
Applicability
As proposed in the NPRM and adopted in this final rule, Sec.
135.168 contains an operational solution that addresses commenters'
concerns about flights that only cross narrow bodies of inland water or
bays. A helicopter does not need to be equipped with a 406 MHz ELT and
life preservers if it crosses the water at an altitude within
autorotational glide distance of the shore. Autorotational distance
refers to the forward distance a helicopter can glide without engine
power. During autorotation the rotors continue turning because of the
air moving through the rotor as the helicopter loses altitude. Thus, an
operator can avoid the need for the additional safety equipment by
flying close to the shoreline or at a higher altitude. For example, for
a helicopter that has a glide ratio of 3 feet forward to 1 foot of
descent, a pilot flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet would be able to
operate at least \1/2\ mile from a shoreline without needing overwater
equipment. This provides flexibility for operators that fly over narrow
bodies of water while still providing the additional level of safety
for overwater and extended overwater operations. This standard is
consistent with current requirements under Sec. 135.183.
Final Rule
Based on the comments received and additional review of the NPRM,
the FAA has adopted Sec. 135.168 with revisions. The most significant
changes are to the requirements for helicopter overwater operations in
Sec. 135.168. The FAA has not adopted the proposed requirements for
life-rafts and pyrotechnic signaling devices or the proposed changes to
the definition of extended overwater operations in Sec. 1.1. The
proposed amendment to Sec. 135.167 is not adopted.
The final rule requires helicopters to be equipped with a 406 MHz
ELT and occupants to wear life preservers on helicopter flights
operated beyond autorotational distance from shoreline.
The FAA also notes that passenger briefing requirements proposed in
the NPRM as Sec. 135.168(d) have been moved to Sec. 135.117, Briefing
of passengers before flight. No substantive changes were made to the
briefing requirements.
These changes will take effect 3 years after this rule's
publication.
3. Pilot Testing for Recovery From IIMC, Whiteout, Brownout, and Flat-
Light Conditions (Sec. 135.293)
The FAA proposed adding new requirements to Sec. 135.293 to
require helicopter pilots to demonstrate recovery from an IIMC on an
annual basis and to understand procedures for aircraft handling in
flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions. Twelve commenters,
including AAMS, Air Methods Corporation (Air Methods), AMOA, REACH, and
the NTSB supported the proposed change. Twenty-one commenters,
including PHI, did not agree with the proposal as written.
Some commenters stated that the testing requirements should be
tailored to the certificate holder's operating environment. NorthStar
Trekking, an Alaskan operator, noted that it trains its pilots for
flat-light and whiteout conditions, but not for brownout conditions.
Jack Harter Helicopters stated that because it does not operate in
areas where whiteout or brownout are likely, it should not be required
to include those conditions in its training program. PHI stated that a
majority of its operations rarely encounter flat-light or whiteout
conditions, and mandating training for those conditions for all
operators would be an onerous requirement.
PHI also stated that this regulation would be redundant with Sec.
135.329(e)(1), which requires training specific to a certificate
holder's type of operation. The NTSB commented that the FAA should
require operators to incorporate safe practices for operations in flat-
light and whiteout conditions in their training programs.
LifeFlight of Maine and other ACCT members commented that the IIMC
recovery training should be demonstrated semi-annually. Several
individual commenters recommended quarterly training for pilots to
maintain proficiency.
AAMS, AMOA, and Air EVAC EMS commented that pilots should be able
to use simulators and flight training devices to complete this
training. The NTSB also supported increased use of simulators for
helicopter pilot training.
The FAA finds that helicopter pilots would benefit from annual
testing on all three conditions--whiteout, flat light, and brownout.
Although some conditions may be more prevalent in certain areas, such
as whiteout conditions in Alaska or brownout conditions in desert
environments, these conditions may occur year-round in many places.
This testing will help ensure that pilots have a base-level knowledge
should they encounter these conditions. To clarify, the rule requires
that pilots, on the annual written or oral test required by Sec.
135.293(a), demonstrate knowledge of procedures for aircraft handling
in flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions, and
[[Page 9942]]
methods for recognizing and avoiding these conditions. They would be
required to demonstrate a realistic course of action to escape IIMC
during the Sec. 135.293(b) competency check. As discussed in the NPRM,
the FAA intends for this demonstration to be appropriate to the
aircraft, equipment, and facilities available to the pilot during the
competency check. The FAA finds that an annual check is sufficient
because it can be incorporated into a certificate holder's existing
competency check schedule.
This new requirement does not duplicate the crewmember training
requirements of Sec. 135.329(e)(1). That section requires, in part,
crewmember training, instruction, and practice to ensure that each
crewmember remains adequately trained and proficient for each type of
operation in which that crewmember serves. While operators may include
training on flat-light, whiteout, brownout, and IIMC recovery in
training programs, this rule's amendments ensure that these topics will
be tested during a pilot's annual competency check. The FAA anticipates
that such training will be incorporated into training programs so that
pilots will be adequately prepared for their annual competency checks.
We note that the IMC recovery portion of the competency check could
be performed in a simulator or flight training device, provided that it
is consistent with that device's specific approval.
Final Rule
This rule is adopted as proposed and will take effect 60 days after
publication of the final rule.\5\ Section 135.293 requires individuals
to complete testing in the 12 calendar months prior to serving as a
pilot in part 135 operation. The FAA does not intend for pilots to be
retested before the new testing requirements take effect. Rather,
pilots must comply with the new requirement during their next Sec.
135.293 test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Section 306(c)(2) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking that
addresses pilot training standards in preventing controlled flight
into terrain and recovery from IIMC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. IFR Alternate Airport Weather Minimums (Sec. 135.221)
Current rules, as provided for in Sec. 135.221, require that to
designate an alternate airport for an IFR operation, weather reports or
forecasts for that airport must be at or above the alternate airport
landing minimums for that airport at the estimated time of arrival. In
the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a more stringent alternate
airport weather requirement for rotorcraft, based on minimums
established in Operations Specification (OpSpec) H105. Several
commenters, including the NTSB, ACCT members, PHI, and AAMS supported
the proposed change.
Kestrel Air commented that the FAA proposed this requirement
without establishing a connection between existing standards and
accidents involving part 135 helicopter operators and that there is no
accident history to support this proposal.
Safety and Flight Evaluations, International agreed that increased
weather minimums would increase the likelihood of being able to land at
the alternate if weather deteriorates. However, it also stated that
because it is often more difficult for a helicopter to fly out of a
weather system to an alternate airport, as noted in the NPRM, that
``there is little likelihood that an alternate airfield exists that
would have significantly different weather conditions than at the
primary airfield.'' Accordingly, Safety and Flight Evaluations,
International stated that the rule would discourage pilots from flying
IFR.
Kestrel Air is correct that the FAA did not cite any accidents to
support this proposal. However, as noted in the NPRM, this proposal is
based on OpSpec H105, which is issued to all part 135 helicopter
operators that conduct IFR operations. Accordingly, this rule change
will not require operational changes for these certificate holders, so
no additional costs will be incurred. OpSpec H105 has established these
minimums and the FAA does not anticipate a change in IFR usage.
This rule is adopted as proposed.
D. Rules Applicable to Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
This final rule establishes several new requirements for
certificate holders conducting helicopter air ambulance operations. It
changes the applicability section of part 135 (Sec. 135.1) to require
some operations that have been conducted under part 91 to be conducted
under part 135. Additionally, this rule establishes new equipment,
operations, and training rules for certificate holders conducting air
ambulance operations which are codified in new subpart L, Sec. Sec.
135.601-135.621.
1. Applicability of Part 135 Rules to Helicopter Air Ambulance
Operations (Sec. Sec. 135.1, 135.267, 135.271, 135.601)
The FAA proposed requiring that all helicopter air ambulance
operations with medical personnel on board be conducted under part 135
operating rules. Flights to pick up a patient, the patient transport
leg, and the flight returning to base after the patient is dropped off,
or other flights with a patient or medical personnel on board would be
conducted under part 135. The FAA received many comments from
organizations and individuals supporting and opposing this proposal.
Comments addressed the FAA's accident analysis which formed the basis
of the regulatory evaluation; whether part 135 is the appropriate part
of the regulations for this change and whether repositioning flights
should continue to be operated under part 91; potential limitations on
operations; flight and duty questions; and how the FAA defined flights
to be conducted under part 135. These comments are addressed in detail
below.
Definition of Medical Personnel
The NPRM defined ``medical personnel'' as ``persons with medical
training, including, but not limited to a flight physician, a flight
nurse, or a flight paramedic, who are carried aboard a helicopter
during helicopter air ambulance operations in order to provide medical
care.'' With this rule, any flights for medical transportation that
carry a patient or medical personnel must now be conducted under part
135 rules.
NEMSPA suggested a change in the definition of medical personnel to
``medical personnel means persons approved by State or Federal EMS
regulations who are carried aboard a helicopter during helicopter air
ambulance operations in order to provide onboard medical care.'' AMOA
requested a change in the proposed definition of medical personnel to
``persons who are carried aboard a helicopter during helicopter air
ambulance operations in order to provide onboard medical care'' because
the rule would limit the types of medical professionals often
transported and could confuse the rule.
The FAA clarifies that this definition is intended to be applied
broadly to individuals who might be carried aboard to provide care.
Requiring medical personnel to be approved under State or Federal EMS
regulations may result in preventing people currently performing these
functions from performing them any longer, because they may be licensed
medical professionals but not certified under state or federal EMS
regulation. For example, a nurse might be certified to practice by the
State board of nursing, but not under a State's EMS regulations.
Limiting the definition to this certification could also have the
[[Page 9943]]
unintentional result of allowing operators to use medical caregivers
who are not specifically certified under State or Federal EMS
regulations. As a result, these individuals would not be included in
the definition and thus the operator could avoid the part 135
requirements.
Additionally, we note that the definition of medical personnel
proposed in the NPRM referenced ``persons with medical training,
including but not limited to a flight physician, a flight nurse, or a
flight paramedic. . . .'' (See 75 FR 62621) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the definition does not apply to those persons only. Any
person with medical training who is ``carried aboard a helicopter
during helicopter air ambulance operations in order to provide medical
care'' would fall into the definition of medical personnel. The FAA
notes that it made a non-substantive change to the definition of
``medical personnel'' to clarify that the definition could apply to a
single person as well as to a group.
Accident Analysis
AMOA and PHI contended that the FAA's accident analysis used to
justify placing more operations under part 135 was flawed because it
categorized flights as occurring under part 91 when, in fact, many were
conducted under part 135 rules. Both organizations cited a 1992
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the NTSB and the FAA that
established how air ambulance accidents would be categorized. Pursuant
to the MOU, the NTSB categorized accidents involving air medical
flights without a patient on board as part 91 accidents. These
commenters maintained that many of the accidents categorized as
occurring under part 91 actually happened when the helicopter was
operating under part 135 rules even though no patient was on board. HAI
commented that its members that conduct air medical operations
``currently operate to the requirements of OpSpec A021, which are
higher than current part 135 weather minimums, on any leg of a patient
transport flight whenever medical personnel are on board. . . .''
The NTSB noted in its comment that, as detailed in its Special
Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations, 32 of
the 41 helicopter air ambulance accidents investigated by the NTSB
occurred while the aircraft was operating under the flight rules
specified in part 91.
The FAA acknowledges that the commenters correctly described the
way accidents are categorized under the MOU. In light of the
information received from the commenters, the FAA reviewed the
accidents cited in the NPRM to determine whether the accidents
categorized as part 91 accidents were properly used to justify changes
to the rule. The NPRM categorized 33 accidents (out of the 135
helicopter air ambulance accidents cited) as occurring during part 91
operations which were given as support for including those operations
in part 135.
The FAA determined that 17 of those 33 accidents occurred while the
helicopters were flying in weather minimums below those proposed and
that will be required under Sec. 135.609, accounting for 42 deaths.
Although some operations were conducted under part 135, these flights
were operated below the weather minimums for helicopter air ambulance
operations proposed in the NPRM. Therefore, the accidents may have been
prevented had these helicopters been operating under the stricter rules
adopted here and are properly included in justifying this rule.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The remaining sixteen accidents originally identified as
part 91 operations were flying above the weather minimums
established in this rule and are therefore no longer being used to
support Sec. 135.609. However, 10 of these accidents were cited in
the NPRM in support of other proposed rule provisions. The FAA finds
that these accidents are still applicable to those provisions. Six
accidents were removed from the final rule's accident analysis. See
the Final Regulatory Evaluation for a full explanation of the
accident analysis, and methodology used to review the accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Relationship Between Parts 91 and 135
AMOA, Air Evac EMS Inc. (Air Evac EMS), AAMS, NEMSPA, and PHI were
among commenters that said that applying part 135 regulations to
operations traditionally considered to be under part 91 is inconsistent
with the current regulatory framework and could introduce confusion.
Instead, these commenters said changes to enhance safety requirements
for these operations should be made by amending part 91, not part 135.
This would ensure the continuity and applicability of the current
rules.
The NTSB supported the proposal and stated that it would likely
meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-06-12. However, it also
stated that the list of flights conducted under part 135 must be as
complete as possible and should include maintenance flights, training
flights, helicopter positioning flights performed without medical
crewmembers on board, and other operations that would not be required
to be conducted under part 135 under this rule.
The commenters are correct that, as discussed in the NPRM,
currently non-patient-carrying legs of helicopter air ambulance
operations may be conducted under part 91. The FAA, through this rule,
is requiring legs with medical personnel onboard to be conducted under
part 135. The primary reason for this change is to protect medical
personnel by ensuring that those flights are conducted under the more
stringent operating rules of part 135. As noted by the NTSB, medical
personnel ``cannot be expected to meaningfully participate in the
decision-making process to enhance flight safety or to significantly
contribute to operational control of the flight.'' Accordingly, the FAA
determined that medical personnel deserve the same safety protections
that part 135 provides to patients on helicopter air ambulance flights.
Additionally, the FAA is not changing the rule language to provide
a more extensive list of flights that must be conducted under part 135.
As discussed above, the rule is clear that if medical personnel or a
patient are on board the aircraft and the flight is conducted for
medical transportation, then it must be conducted under part 135. The
non-exclusive list is intended to emphasize that the traditional three-
legged helicopter air ambulance flight (base to pick-up site, pick-up
site to drop-off site, drop-off site to base) must now be conducted
under part 135.
Further, the FAA does not anticipate that the placement of these
rules in part 135 rather than in part 91 will cause confusion for
certificate holders. It is clear that these rules only apply to part
119 certificate holders authorized to conduct helicopter air ambulance
operations under part 135. Part 135 is a logical place for the
regulations affecting this population.
The FAA received several comments about this rule's impact on
helicopter air ambulance operations. First, AMOA, Air Evac EMS, AAMS,
NEMSPA, and PHI commented on the need for flexibility from the part 135
requirements during the repositioning leg for training purposes. They
have traditionally used this leg for training newly hired second pilots
on instrument approach procedures and stated that they cannot do the
same kind of training when operating under part 135 rules as they can
when operating under part 91 rules because the pilot in training would
not be able to manipulate the controls. Commenters were concerned this
proposal could significantly inhibit IFR operations by helicopter air
ambulance operators. Second, HAI commented that a
[[Page 9944]]
requirement to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations under part
135 would prevent operators from using GPS approaches certified for
part 91 operations.
The FAA has determined that applying part 135 rules will have only
a limited effect on training. Operators may continue training pilots on
instrument approaches during flights with no passengers, medical
personnel, or patients on board. The FAA has determined that the safety
benefits of this rule outweigh the fact that certificate holders may
need to conduct additional training flights.
The FAA finds HAI's concern about limitations on GPS approaches to
be unwarranted. All instrument approaches are designed and certified to
part 97 Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) requirements. Use of
these approaches is not restricted to flights conducted under certain
operating rules. They can be used by an operator conducting flights
under part 91, 121, or 135.
The NTSB also stated that although part 91 may provide additional
``operational flexibilities due to decreased visual flight rules (VFR)
weather minimums and no flight crew rest requirements'' it believes
that these benefits ``are greatly overshadowed by the increased risk
that such operations have historically posed.''
Additionally, the FAA acknowledges that certificate holders may not
be able to conduct certain operations because of the more stringent
part 135 requirements. For example, the weather minimums may be below
part 135 standards, but would have been acceptable for a part 91
operation. Similarly, additional part 135 flights may mean that a
flightcrew member reaches flight time limitations more quickly.
Nevertheless, the FAA has determined that these restrictions are
appropriate given the increased safety of operations that are expected
as a result of this regulation. However, the FAA is not extending this
regulation to flights conducted without medical personnel onboard. The
FAA has determined that such an extension would go beyond the stated
rationale of providing additional protections to the medical personnel
and passengers onboard the helicopter.
Air Methods commented that operators should follow the weather
minimums specified in A021, which are more stringent than the baseline
part 135 weather minimums. The FAA agrees and, as discussed later, is
adopting those weather minimums into part 135 regulations applicable to
helicopter air ambulance operations.
Flight and Duty Time Limitations (Proposed Sec. Sec. 135.267 and
135.271)
As discussed in the NPRM, one impact of requiring flights
traditionally conducted under part 91 to be conducted under part 135 is
that these flights will now count toward a pilot's flight time
limitations. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed adding language to
Sec. Sec. 135.267 and 135.271 to clarify that helicopter air ambulance
operations conducted under part 135 must be included in a pilot's
flight time.
Members of ACCT support including pilot duty time limitations in
the change to require more helicopter air ambulance flights to be
conducted under part 135. The Advanced Life Support and Emergency
Response Team agreed with requiring flight time for a part 135
operation when medical personnel are on board to count toward a pilot's
daily flight time limitations and stated it already operates under this
policy.
PHI, AMOA, and Air Evac EMS commented that the current flight time
and duty limitations in Sec. 135.267 should not be altered. PHI
believes the proposal is inconsistent with FAA regulatory structure and
discriminates against the helicopter air ambulance industry without
justification. AMOA does not agree with adoption of Sec. 135.267(g).
PHI also commented that there currently are no part 135 regulations
that prevent a pilot from flying while fatigued. The commenter said
that the pertinent regulation resides in part 91, part 135 operators
must comply with part 91, and that current rest and duty requirements
do not guarantee that a pilot will not be fatigued, even if complying
with the regulations. Air Evac EMS commented that Sec. Sec. 91.13 and
135.69(a) afford sufficient protection and claimed that the best
measure against pilot fatigue is the pilot knowing when to decline a
flight request and appropriate oversight.
AMOA and Air Methods claimed that no accidents as a result of crew
rest issues were cited to support this proposal and its change is a
profound shift in the agency's regulatory structure that would cause
pilots to rush to stay within the prescribed duty period. PHI and AMOA
recommended retaining the current requirements until the FAA has
reviewed all part 135 pilot rest requirements.
PHI and numerous other commenters requested flexibility for pilot
rest requirements under circumstances beyond the control of the pilot
or operator.
The FAA did not propose any substantive changes to Sec. Sec.
135.267 and 135.271 flight time and rest requirements but instead added
language to those sections to clarify ``flight time'' as a term that
includes any helicopter air ambulance operation as defined in Sec.
135.601. As established by this rule, all helicopter air ambulance
operations with medical personnel or patients on board must be
conducted under part 135. The provisions of Sec. Sec. 135.267 and
135.271 would therefore apply to the helicopter air ambulance
operations previously conducted under part 91.
In the final rule, the FAA did not add the proposed references to
helicopter air ambulance operations in Sec. Sec. 135.267 and 135.271
because they are redundant with the amendments to Sec. 135.1. Any
operation that must be completed under part 135 must comply with the
applicable flight and duty time limitations of part 135, and this
action does not eliminate this requirement. As commenters noted,
Sec. Sec. 91.13 and 135.69 provide some safeguards, but the FAA has
determined that the flight time limitations and rest requirements of
part 135, subpart F, are the rules to follow to prevent pilot fatigue.
The FAA also notes that it received several comments about whether
circumstances beyond the control of the certificate holder would permit
exceeding the flight time limitations in Sec. 135.267. The FAA
believes that these comments mirror those submitted to the FAA in
response to a draft legal interpretation published for comment that
addresses this issue. See Docket No. FAA-2010-1259 (Dec. 23, 2010). The
FAA advises commenters that it issued a withdrawal of the referenced
interpretation in the same docket on November 7, 2013 (79 FR 66865) and
is not taking any action in this rule. To do so would be outside the
scope of the rule because the issue presented in the draft legal
interpretation is one that was not addressed in the NPRM.
Final Rule
Upon review of the NPRM, the FAA made changes to the rule text in
Sec. Sec. 135.1 and 135.601. The FAA did not adopt the proposed
changes to Sec. Sec. 135.267 and 135.271. The applicability statement
in Sec. 135.1 was revised for clarity. In Sec. 135.601, the FAA
removed the definition of helicopter air ambulance because it was
unnecessary and revised the definitions of helicopter air ambulance
operation and medical personnel for clarity. All of these changes are
non-substantive.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires helicopter air ambulance operations
to comply with part 135 weather minimums and flight and duty time
rules whenever medical personnel are onboard the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 9945]]
2. Weather Minimums (Sec. 135.609--Proposed Sec. 135.607)
Currently, part 135 regulations require visibility of at least \1/
2\ statute mile during the day and 1 statute mile at night for VFR
helicopter operations at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the
surface in Class G airspace. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to add more
stringent weather minimums for helicopter air ambulance operations. As
stated in the NPRM, this rule codifies the weather requirements of
OpSpec A021. See Table 4 below. The proposed weather minimums for
uncontrolled airspace are determined by whether the helicopter is
flying in a mountainous or non-mountainous area and whether, within
those classifications, the flight is taking place in a certificate
holder's local flying area or is a cross-country flight. The NPRM
defined a local flying area as 50 NM in any direction from an
operator's base of operation. A cross-country flying area is an area
other than a local flying area. Weather minimums are less stringent in
local flying areas because of pilots' increased familiarity with
obstacles and the operating environment. Based on the NPRM, in all
flying areas, helicopter pilots using an FAA-approved night vision
imaging system or FAA-approved HTAWS can fly in lower weather minimums
during night operations because those systems provide benefits for
avoidance of obstacles and controlled flight into terrain avoidance.
Table 4--VFR Ceiling and Flight Visibility Requirements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Night Night using an approved NVIS or HTAWS
Location -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ceiling Flight visibility Ceiling Flight visibility Ceiling Flight visibility
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonmountainous local flying 800-feet.......... 2 statute miles... 1,000-feet........ 3 statute miles... 800-feet.......... 3 statute miles.
areas.
Nonmountainous non-local flying 800-feet.......... 3 statute miles... 1,000-feet........ 5 statute miles... 1,000-feet........ 3 statute miles.
areas.
Mountainous local flying areas.. 800-feet.......... 3 statute miles... 1,500-feet........ 3 statute miles... 1,000-feet........ 3 statute miles.
Mountainous non-local flying 1,000-feet........ 3 statute miles... 1,500-feet........ 5 statute miles... 1,000-feet........ 5 statute miles.
areas.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA received support for this provision from several
commenters. The NTSB supports codifying the more stringent weather
minimums of OpSpec A021. PHI agrees with the proposal. AAMS expressed
support for this provision but opposed the requirement that operators
must designate a local flying area, commenting that there are some
areas where using cross country weather minimums would be preferable.
They recommended replacing the word ``must'' with ``may.'' Similarly,
AMOA, Air Evac EMS, and individual members of ACCT commented that a
local flying area should be optional and that the FAA should also allow
for non-contiguous local flying areas. Safety and Flight Evaluations,
International agrees with the proposal to increase the VFR weather
minimums, but disagrees with the proposed implementation and commented
that there should not be a differentiation between the weather minimums
for ``local flying areas'' and ``cross country flying areas'' and that
the proposed rule inappropriately decreases the minimums when the
aircraft is equipped with an approved night vision imaging system or
HTAWS.
Final Rule
The FAA is adopting this provision with several changes. Based on
the comments received, the FAA determined that it would be overly
restrictive to require operators to designate a local flying area that
would not be used. The certificate holder will not be required to
designate a local flying area but may do so in order to use the less
stringent weather minimums. If an operator does not designate a local
flying area, operations must be conducted in accordance with the more
restrictive non-local-flying-area minimums in the rule. Thus the change
in the rule will not negatively affect safety.
As discussed in the NPRM, a pilot must demonstrate familiarity and
detailed knowledge of the hazards and high altitude terrain in local
flying areas in order to use the lower minimums. Thus, the final rule
includes a requirement that a pilot may not use the local flying area
weather minimums unless that pilot has passed an examination given by
the certificate holder within the 12 months prior to using the local
flying area weather minimums.
Additionally, the final rule will allow non-contiguous local flying
areas rather than tying them to the certificate holder's base of
operations. This rule does not restrict the number of local flying
areas an operator may designate. The intended safety standard will be
maintained because before using the less restrictive local flying area
weather minimums pilots will demonstrate knowledge of that area. The
title of this section has been changed for clarification.
3. IFR Operations at Airports Without Weather Reporting (Sec.
135.611--Proposed Sec. 135.609)
Current part 135 regulations only permit instrument flight into and
out of airports with an on-site weather reporting source. The FAA
proposed allowing helicopter air ambulance operators to conduct IFR
operations at airports and heliports without a weather reporting
facility if they can obtain weather reports from an approved weather
reporting facility located within 15 NM of the destination landing area
and meet other pilot and equipment requirements.
The NTSB supported the proposal, agreeing that it would ``provide
an environment suitable for increased use of IFR,'' and noting that it
would partially respond to Safety Recommendation A-06-93 ``because of
the potential increase in the availability of IFR approaches for HEMS
operators.''
AMOA commented that all part 135 operators should be able to use
these procedures. The FAA did not propose permitting all part 135
operators to use these procedures in the NPRM and to
[[Page 9946]]
expand the applicability at this time would not be within the scope of
this rule. Accordingly, the FAA is not extending this requirement to
all part 135 operators.
Use of an Area Forecast as an Alternate Weather Source
Currently, OpSpec A021 is issued to helicopter air ambulance
operators and allows the use of an area forecast as an alternate
weather source. The Society of Aviation and Flight Educators noted that
the changes to OpSpec A021 were made because the FAA had determined
that navigation by instruments is safer than navigation by visual
reference. The revisions specifically included area forecasts to
facilitate greater use of the instrument flight rules system. Many
operators developed an instrument flight rules system that uses those
forecasts.
The Society of Aviation and Flight Educators contended that this
proposal would require an operator to either add an approved automated
weather station at a location within 15 NM or to operate with visual
flight rules. This, according to the commenter, would significantly
undermine the ability of operators to add instrument operations as a
safety improvement. PHI, AMOA, ACCT, MaxViz, and the Health Care
District of Palm Beach County all echoed the call for adding the area
forecast as an acceptable alternative if a weather reporting station is
not available.
The NPRM proposed a higher standard than that required by OpSpec
A021. That operations specification permits an operator to use an
approved weather reporting source if one is located within 15 NM of the
landing area but if there is not such a source within that distance
from the landing area, an area forecast may be used.
In response to comments, and upon further review, the FAA has
changed the requirements of this rule from those proposed in the NPRM.
This final rule allows IFR operations at an airport without weather
reporting if the certificate holder has an area forecast for the
vicinity of the destination landing from the National Weather Service,
a source approved by the NWS, or a source approved by the FAA. As
discussed in the NPRM, the FAA finds that an area forecast is
sufficient for the purposes of this rule because helicopter air
ambulance operators have a history of safely operating under an
exemption \8\ or under OpSpec A021, on which this rule is based. The
area forecast allowance of the exemption and OpSpec A021 is the same as
in this final rule language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Exemptions No. 9490 and 9490B (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-
2006-26407); Exemption No. 9665 (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2008-
0169); Exemption No. 6175 (Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2001-9195)
(granting authority for departures only); Exemption No. 6175G
(Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2001-9195).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot and Equipment Requirements
The FAA also revised the rule language to eliminate several
sections that were determined to be redundant with existing part 135
regulations. The redundancies removed were the requirements for pilots
to: (1) Have a current Sec. 135.297 instrument proficiency check; (2)
hold an instrument rating; (3) complete a course including a review of
IFR regulations, interpreting weather, reviewing instrument charts, and
crew resource management; (4) learn methods for determining present
visibility and ceilings; and (5) be tested on approaches authorized
under this provision. In all these cases the FAA finds that pilots who
conduct part 135 operations must already meet these standards, or that
these standards are sufficiently incorporated into current pilot
training requirements.
The FAA also deleted the proposed requirements for aircraft to be
equipped with an autopilot if used in lieu of a second in command as
required by Sec. 135.101, and for the aircraft to be equipped with
navigation equipment appropriate to the approach to be flown. Again,
this requirement is redundant with existing Sec. Sec. 135.101 (SIC)
and 135.105 (autopilot), which must be followed during part 135
operations.
In response to a comment from AMOA that the references to ``storm
scopes'' were outdated, the FAA deleted the references in proposed
Sec. 135.609(b)(2) to ``airborne weather radar'' and ``lightning
detection'' as types of severe-weather detection equipment. The final
rule requires that helicopters conducting these operations be
``equipped with functioning severe weather-detection equipment.''
Requirements for Departures
The rule requires that the weather at the departure point must be
at or above the minimums for visual flight rules for a pilot to make an
IFR departure. The pilot in command is authorized to determine whether
the weather meets the takeoff requirements of part 97 or of the
certificate holder's operation specification.
The FAA concludes that this new provision will increase instrument
flight and result in more air ambulance helicopters operating in a
positively controlled environment, thereby increasing safety.
4. Approach/Departure IFR Transitions (Sec. 135.613--Proposed Sec.
135.611)
This rule was proposed to establish weather minimums for helicopter
air ambulances that have been using an instrument approach and are now
transitioning to visual flight for landing. This section is intended to
encourage IFR operations because of their safety benefits. Pilots on an
instrument approach would, upon reaching a point in space at a minimum
descent altitude or decision altitude, continue the flight to the
landing area under visual flight rules if conditions permit. The
weather minimums that pilots will follow are based on the type of
approach the pilot is flying and the distance between the missed
approach point and the heliport or landing area. Pilots continuing on
the ``proceed visually'' segment of an instrument approach into an
airport or heliport for which the approach is designed would follow the
weather minimums on the approach chart when completing that approach.
The FAA notes that in most cases the rule permits flight under less
restrictive weather minimums than are currently allowed for cruise
flight in uncontrolled airspace. As noted in the NPRM, obstacles in the
vicinity of an instrument approach are flight-checked and marked on
instrument approach charts. It is less likely that pilots would
encounter unexpected obstacles when following an instrument approach
chart. However, if the distance of the VFR portion of the flight is 3
NM or more, then the VFR weather minimums for that class of airspace
apply. We emphasize that if a 3-NM-or-more VFR segment is flown in
Class G airspace, the applicable VFR weather minimums would be those
found in Sec. 135.609.
The rule also permits a pilot to depart with a VFR-to-IFR
transition under the less restrictive weather minimums allowed for
approaches if the pilot follows an FAA-approved obstacle departure
procedure, has filed an IFR flight plan and obtains an IFR clearance at
a predetermined location, and the transition to IFR occurs no farther
than 3 NM from the departure point. Pilots who cannot meet these
requirements must use the standard VFR weather minimums required for
that class of airspace, which would be those found in Sec. 135.609 for
Class G airspace. As noted in the NPRM, a pilot who simply flies the
reverse course of the approach used when landing would not be following
an FAA-approved obstacle departure procedure. That is because this
procedure has not been flight-
[[Page 9947]]
checked to specific departure criteria and therefore obstacle clearance
cannot be guaranteed.
A total of 21 individuals affiliated with PHI commented on the
proposal for this rule. These commenters supported the proposed rule
and noted that it is consistent with current OpSpec A021 requirements.
Commenters also noted that proposed Sec. 135.611(a)(2) contained an
incorrect cross reference to Sec. 135.611(a)(1)(i).
Safety and Flight Evaluations, International stated concerns with
the construction of some PinS approaches. First, it noted the
complexity in distinguishing between ``proceed visually'' and ``proceed
VFR,'' because the weather minimums on the approach charts apply to
``proceed visually'' segments, while the distance from the missed
approach point to the landing area dictates the weather minimums. It
stated that having various minimums was complex and would not encourage
IFR operations. Next, it noted the possibility that a pilot could reach
the missed approach point, determine that the weather meets the
requirements to proceed VFR, and then lose sight of the landing area.
This would leave the pilot unable to continue IFR because the pilot
would no longer be in protected airspace. Finally, Safety and Flight
Evaluations, International commented that ICAO has established clearer
requirements for similar operations and asked whether the proposed
requirements comply with ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services--
Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS) definitions which limits the proceed VFR
PinS procedure to no more than 3 kilometers.
As a result of this comment, the FAA revised the rule language for
clarification. During preflight planning, pilots will be able to
identify the type of approach to be flown, the distance to the
destination from the missed approach point and determine the applicable
weather minimums for the VFR segment of the flight. This section does
not apply to ``proceed visually'' segments of instrument approaches,
which are the final segments (minimum descent altitude or decision
height) of instrument approaches prior to landing. VFR flight rules do
not apply to ``proceed visually'' segments. Instead, the weather
minimums for ``proceed visually'' segments are found on the approach
chart. This section applies to the ``proceed VFR'' segments of PinS
approaches and VFR maneuvering after transitioning to VFR from an IFR
approach.
The FAA has reviewed the ICAO PANS-OPS requirements and concludes
that the ICAO operational requirements are not significantly different
from this rule. In both cases, once the pilot concludes the IFR portion
of the flight, the pilot is no longer under air traffic control and is
operating under VFR. Further, the ICAO PANS-OPS paragraph 4.1.2.2
contemplates that member States may establish minimum visibility for
PinS Proceed VFR procedures. We note that this rule does not address
instrument approach design standards. These are what dictate the length
of a segment between a missed approach point and a landing area. The
FAA expects that pilots who transition to VFR and then encounter
weather below VFR minimums would execute a missed approach procedure, a
standard procedure followed when an instrument approach cannot be
completed, if available, or follow appropriate emergency procedures.
The title of Sec. 135.613 has been changed so that it more
accurately reflects its subject. Additionally, the section has been
reorganized for clarification.
5. VFR Flight Planning (Sec. 135.615--Proposed Sec. 135.613)
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require helicopter air ambulance
pilots conducting operations under VFR to perform preflight planning to
determine the minimum safe altitude along the planned route.\9\ This
proposal would codify a provision in OpSpec A021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct rulemaking on
helicopter air ambulance operations to address ``flight request and
dispatch procedures.'' Though the benefits are less than costs for
this provision, it satisfies the Congressional mandate as required
by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, the rule requires helicopter air ambulance pilots
conducting VFR operations to evaluate, document, and plan to clear
terrain and obstacles by no less than 300 feet for day operations, and
500 feet at night. With this minimum safe cruise altitude established,
the pilot must then use it to determine the minimum required ceiling
and visibility for the flight. If the weather minimum will not permit
visual flight at the minimum safe cruise altitude, the pilot must
conduct the flight under IFR or not fly at all. The proposed rule
allowed for deviations from the planned flight path if conditions or
operational considerations make it necessary. If deviating, however,
the pilot must still observe the weather or terrain/obstruction
clearance requirements. This rule is intended to prevent obstacle
collisions by requiring pilots to be aware of the terrain and highest
obstacles along a planned route.
The FAA received 79 comments on the proposal for VFR flight
planning, including comments from several individuals affiliated with
ACCT, Air Evac EMS, PHI, and REACH. Sixty-nine commenters, including
ACCT, AMOA, PHI, Air Evac EMS, Angel One Transport, and REACH, agreed
with the proposed language.
NEMSPA strongly opposed the ``highest obstacle determination'' of
the proposed rule, commenting that this requirement would have
dangerous unintended consequences since pilots with launch time
requirements would have up to 40 percent of their available preflight
time taken up by a superfluous task, resulting in the likelihood that
some critical items will not be accomplished. This commenter further
asserted that the highest obstacle requirement should only apply when
flying outside of the local flying area in a helicopter not equipped
with a night vision imaging system or HTAWS, when the reported or
forecasted weather conditions are less than 5 statute miles visibility
and/or the ceiling is less than 3,000 feet above ground level or above
the highest obstacle on the course.
Although agreeing with this proposal, several commenters, including
AMOA, Air Evac EMS, and individual members of ACCT, recommended
applying it to all part 135 operators. The NTSB agreed with the intent
of the requirement, but believes a number of issues should be
clarified. It commented that the FAA should provide guidance for
minimum route width requirements for obstacle and terrain clearance
evaluation, because aircraft may deviate from the planned course
centerline. Several commenters also noted that requiring that obstacles
be cleared vertically is not practical when some obstacles can be
cleared by flying around them and recommended adding a corresponding
route width to the visibility minimum. The NTSB also requested that the
FAA clarify whether route evaluations must be performed before each
flight or if an approval of a flight path can be performed on a less
frequent basis for frequently flown routes.
The FAA has determined that establishing a minimum route width
would have an overly burdensome effect on helicopter air ambulance
operations and pose operational difficulties for pilots who fly in
mountainous or urban environments. A minimum route width would require
pilots to fly at an altitude sufficient to clear the obstacles within
the designated route width. As an example, a 3-mile route width
requirement could force a pilot who safely flies under visual flight
rules in a valley to operate at an altitude above
[[Page 9948]]
the highest peak because the mountains on each side would be included
in the route width. This could easily place a visual flight operator
into instrument flight conditions. The FAA recognizes that helicopter
air ambulance operations can be safely conducted under VFR, and
therefore has chosen not to impose this limitation. Operators would
need to evaluate the route prior to each VFR operation.
This requirement is intended to prevent obstacle collisions by
ensuring that pilots know the minimum safe altitude that would permit
clearance for all obstacles along the route. Therefore, the FAA
considers that VFR flight planning is not a superfluous task for pilots
with launch time requirements, but rather an important safety
requirement. Additionally, the FAA concludes that all helicopter air
ambulance operations flights conducted under VFR will benefit from this
safety requirement, and does not intend to restrict this requirement to
flights outside of the local flying or flights without a night vision
imaging system or HTAWS.
This rule requires a pilot to perform preflight planning from
takeoff to landing for each flight conducted under VFR. This rule does
not permit a pilot to conduct preflight planning on a less frequent
basis for frequently flown routes. The purpose of flight planning
before each flight is to ensure that the information used is current,
as conditions and obstacles may change between each flight. However,
the FAA notes that if a route is flown routinely, the amount of time
required to do the preflight planning may be reduced. As noted in the
NPRM, a helicopter air ambulance mission may include more than one leg.
The flight plan may be completed for the whole mission prior to the
first leg, but each subsequent leg of the mission must be reconsidered
before takeoff and amended as appropriate.
The FAA will not apply this requirement to all commercial
helicopter operations because it is not within the scope of the
rulemaking.
This requirement is adopted as proposed with minor edits for
clarification.
6. Pre-Flight Risk Analysis (Sec. 135.617--Proposed Sec. 135.615)
The FAA proposed establishing a requirement for helicopter air
ambulance operators to conduct a preflight risk analysis. The risk
analysis would focus on such variables as the characteristics of the
planned flight path, flight crewmember ability to safely conduct the
operation, weather, and whether the flight has been rejected by another
operator. The purpose of this exercise is to give certificate holders a
way to assess risk and determine whether any risks can be mitigated so
that the flight can be conducted safely.
A total of 83 commenters, including Air Methods, Advanced Life
Support and Emergency Response Team (A.L.E.R.T.), Med-Trans Corporation
(Med-Trans), NEMSPA, the NTSB, REACH, and Staff for Life commented on
this section. Several of those commenters, including ACCT, MedCenter,
MedServ International, LLC (MedServe), NEMSPA, and NTSB agreed with the
proposal.
Operational Considerations
The NTSB noted that this rule should not be a substitute for the
safety benefits that would be provided by an OCC. Other commenters,
including HAI, Med-Trans, and REACH, thought that the proposed
requirement might duplicate the requirements for an OCC or safety
management program. A.L.E.R.T. said that documenting risk assessments
for every flight would be counterproductive and would delay responses
without improving safety and that it performs a risk assessment for
every shift--not every flight. Staff for Life said that the risk
assessment is not necessary because it has never done anything to save
lives and pilots are constantly assessing the risks during preflight,
flight, and post-flight.
The FAA disagrees that a pilot's in-flight assessment of risks is a
sufficient substitute for the preflight risk assessment. Rather, they
are complementary. The purpose of assessing risk before an operation is
to be able to mitigate those risks before the operation, thereby
preventing a pilot from encountering an unmanageable situation while in
the air. It is of course possible that a pilot will encounter risks
while conducting the helicopter air ambulance operation despite having
performed a preflight risk assessment, and it is then that the pilot's
skills will be used to mitigate those risks. As discussed in the NPRM,
the FAA and the NTSB have identified several accidents which may have
been prevented had a preflight risk analysis been completed. The NTSB
concluded that ``implementation of flight risk evaluation before each
mission would enhance the safety of emergency medical services
operations.'' \10\
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\10\ NTSB, Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical
Services Operations (NTSB/SIR-06/01) 4 (Jan. 25, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rule requires the pilot in command to conduct a preflight risk
analysis before the first leg of a helicopter air ambulance operation.
As discussed in the NPRM, it would be completed before departure on the
first leg, but take into account factors that may be encountered during
the entire operation. The FAA acknowledges that certain parts of a
preflight risk analysis can be accomplished at the beginning of a
shift. However, time-sensitive components of a preflight risk analysis,
such as crew fatigue, weather, required fuel, and route-specific
information, should be conducted as close to the flight launch as
possible. A blanket analysis at the beginning of each shift may not
provide an accurate risk assessment.
The FAA acknowledges that the pre-flight risk analysis will be an
additional requirement that must be performed before beginning a
helicopter air ambulance operation and certificate holders may not be
able to launch a flight as quickly as before. The initial regulatory
evaluation estimated that the preflight risk analysis would take 10
minutes to complete. The FAA has determined that a 10-minute delay is
acceptable because of the safety benefit of identifying risks before
flight.
The FAA also understands that there will be overlap between this
requirement and the OCC requirement for certificate holders with 10 or
more helicopter air ambulances. Under that requirement, both the
operations control specialist and the pilot in command will be required
to complete and approve the risk analysis worksheet. This overlap is
intended to provide larger operations with an additional measure of
review over the flight's risk analysis.
Content of the Pre-Flight Risk Analysis
Thirty-five commenters, including Air Methods and REACH, did not
agree with the proposal to require certificate holders to establish a
procedure to determine whether another operator has refused or rejected
a flight, saying that such a procedure would be too haphazard and
unreliable to serve as a regulatory requirement. AMOA said the
provision is unfair and unrealistic without a companion requirement for
operators to report a flight rejection. PHI, like AMOA, believes
reporting of flight rejections by other operators cannot be done
uniformly unless the other operators are required to report that
information.
The FAA has communicated with State EMS medical directors, advising
them of the problem of helicopter shopping. We will continue this
outreach to emphasize the importance of obtaining the reasons for
flight refusal by helicopter air ambulance operators.
[[Page 9949]]
We will also work with emergency dispatchers and certificate holders in
sharing this information.
Two commenters, including the Society of Aviation and Flight
Educators, agreed with the requirement to obtain concurrence on the
preflight risk analysis from someone other than the flightcrew during
marginal weather. Air Methods said the requirement for managerial
approval of the preflight risk analysis when flight risk exceeds a
predetermined level is unfeasible. PHI said it has its own risk
assessment, which requires operational control management approval for
flight requests above a preset risk matrix level.
PHI requested eliminating the requirement for the pilot's signature
on the risk assessment before takeoff. Another commenter asked whether
an electronic signature would be sufficient.
The rule requires operators to establish and document, and include
in their FAA-approved preflight risk analysis, a procedure for
determining ``whether another helicopter air ambulance operator has
refused or rejected a flight request.'' The FAA understands the
commenters' concerns regarding the ability to obtain information about
flight refusals and rejections from other operators. To clarify, it is
not the intent of this rule to require a definitive declaration on the
preflight risk assessment as to whether the flight has been refused or
rejected by another operator. Rather, it would be acceptable for a
certificate holder that is called for a flight to ask the dispatcher
offering the flight if another operator has turned it down. If the
person offering the flight (emergency dispatcher, 911 operator, etc.)
does not know or cannot give the reason why the flight was turned down,
the certificate holder need only make note of that in the preflight
risk analysis and factor in that information as deemed appropriate.
Compliance with this rule does not require certificate holders to call
other operators to ask if the flight was refused or rejected or to
inform other operators that they have refused or rejected a flight. A
flight would not be presumed high risk just because there was no
definitive response from an emergency dispatcher about whether the
flight was refused or rejected by another operator. An operator
following this procedure will have fulfilled its duty with respect to
the rule.
The FAA has determined that although the flight refusal or
rejection information need not be definitive, it can yield useful
information about the potential risk of a flight. Additionally, the FAA
believes that this requirement will encourage certificate holders to
tell dispatchers why a flight is refused or rejected to provide
valuable safety information to other operators. It may also encourage
emergency dispatchers to develop procedures for obtaining this
information.
In the final rule, the FAA did not change the requirement for
management approval of flights in situations where a predetermined risk
level is exceeded. The FAA has determined that management input
provides an important second opinion on whether to conduct a flight if
the risk is not clear cut. The FAA reiterates that management
involvement must not be used to pressure pilots into conducting a
flight that the pilot has determined to be unsafe. Likewise, the FAA
emphasizes that the rule permits certificate holders leeway to develop
preflight risk assessment procedures that work for them within the
parameters set by the rule. Operators like PHI, which have established
procedures, may comply with this requirement by incorporating their
existing procedures into the mandated risk assessment.
Regarding whether an electronic signature on the preflight risk
assessment would be accepted, the final rule does not specify the
method by which a pilot must sign a preflight risk assessment. The
purpose of the risk analysis requirement is to ensure that pilots
examine the risks associated with an operation and get information to
mitigate those risks. The signature is important because it is the
pilot's verification that the information in the risk analysis is
accurate and complete. Therefore, an electronic signature would be
acceptable. FAA guidance on electronic signatures is found in Advisory
Circular (AC) 120-78 (October 29, 2002).
Other Comments
A few commenters, including Metro Aviation and REACH, stated that
the proposal for the risk assessment was unclear and left significant
room for interpretation and inconsistent or uneven enforcement. Many
commenters asked that the FAA revise its previous guidance on risk
assessment to more adequately reflect current industry best practices
and provide more consistency to the risk assessment and mitigation
process.
Some commenters asked the FAA to develop and improve the preflight
risk analysis worksheets so they can be more meaningful and useful to
pilots, crews, and operations center personnel. Four commenters,
including Air Methods, Metro Aviation, and AMOA, asked that the
requirement for FAA approval of the risk analysis procedures be
deleted. An individual commented that the requirement to retain the
records of the risk analysis for 90 days is inconsistent with the load
manifest and flight log data retention requirements.
This requirement is based on FAA Notice 8000.301, Operational Risk
Assessment Programs for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, which,
in part, provides practical examples of preflight risk assessments. The
FAA has determined that these examples, along with this rule, provide
adequate direction to certificate holders for implementation of this
rule. The FAA will provide guidance to inspectors on how to enforce
this rule. Nevertheless, the rule has been designed to allow
flexibility so that certificate holders can develop procedures
appropriate for their operations.
Finally, the FAA is not modifying the 90-day data retention
requirement. The 90-day retention will allow the operator to conduct a
quarterly review to identify trends in its operations to further
mitigate risks in future flights. This requirement is adopted as
proposed.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Section 306(d)(1) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that provides for a flight risk evaluation program in helicopter air
ambulance operations. Additionally, section 306(c)(1) requires the
rule to address flight request and dispatch procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Operations Control Centers (OCCs) (Sec. Sec. 135.619, 120.105, and
120.215)
The proposal included a new requirement that certificate holders
with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances establish OCCs staffed with
operations control specialists. These specialists would take part in
preflight risk analysis required by Sec. 135.617, maintain two-way
communications with pilots, give pilots weather information, and
monitor the progress of the flight. They would ensure that the pilot
has completed the preflight risk analysis worksheet, confirm and verify
the entries on the worksheet, and work with the pilot to mitigate any
identified risk. The specialist would also sign the risk assessment
worksheet along with the pilot. Certificate holders would be required
to train and provide enough staff for their OCCs to make sure these
services could be provided.
Applicability of the Rule
A number of commenters (including AMOA, NTSB, LifeFlight of Maine,
AAMS, Air Evac EMS, NEMSPA, PHI, and ACCT) addressed the proposed
requirement for certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air
ambulances to have an OCC.
[[Page 9950]]
These commenters objected to applying this requirement only to
operators with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances. One commenter said
that fleet size has no bearing on the stated risks a pilot faces. AMOA,
Air Evac EMS, ACCT, and PHI called the distinction ``arbitrary and
subjective'' and said this distinction does not recognize the
complexity of operating less than 10 helicopter air ambulances that are
geographically separated. All of these commenters suggested that if
there are clear benefits to the use of an OCC, then the requirements
should be applicable to all.
The NTSB commented that if operators with less than 10 helicopters
are not included in this requirement, then they ``will transport
approximately 100,000 patients or more per year without the added
safety benefit of an OCC.'' Commenters explained that while the
requirement should apply to all operators, it should be scalable for
those with less than 10 helicopters. Comments referenced AC 120-96,
which provides guidance for setting up OCCs for four levels of
operators based on size.
LifeFlight of Maine commented that all air ambulances (both rotor
and fixed wing) should have an OCC and that while 24 large certificate
holders operate 70 percent of the aircraft in the industry (as stated
in the NPRM), operators with less than 10 aircraft, who make up 68
percent of the certificate holders, are not immune to accidents and
need the extra layer of protection given by an OCC.
AAMS recommended allowing smaller operators to subcontract OCC
services from larger providers or private vendors for certain flight
tracking and communication services, while maintaining ultimate
operational control of the flight. Med-Trans and REACH asked for the
ability to contract for certain functions of an OCC with another OCC.
REACH commented that contracting would allow more operators to take
advantage of the many safety benefits of an OCC but also share the
cost. It noted that each operator would retain management authority and
operational control responsibility.
Med-Trans and REACH also suggested an alternate way of applying the
OCC requirements. They said that ``[s]everal companies currently
operate aircraft on several different certificates but only utilize one
[OCC]. Several air medical operators operate air ambulances on multiple
certificates. Operations control center functions can be conducted
without imposing a requirement for an [OCC] for each certificate.''
They stated that the rule must allow air medical operators to combine
OCC functions for multiple certificate holders that are under the same
management. They said that this will achieve the benefits of an OCC
without the additional cost. They also noted that this change would
prevent companies from establishing multiple certificates with 9 or
fewer helicopters on each to avoid the OCC requirement.
Angel One Transport, a hospital-based pediatric critical care
transport in Little Rock, Arkansas, commented that the proposed
exclusion of fixed-wing air ambulances and air ambulance operators with
less than 9 helicopters creates an ``at risk'' group in the air medical
industry. Angel One Transport said that ``as a small operator, our
program has many of the same characteristics of an OCC established in
our program's operations though we do not meet the stated letter of the
law in the NPRM.'' Angel One Transport asked the FAA to consider adding
language that allows smaller operators to have the ``functional
capabilities'' of an operations control center, noting that ``the
functions of an OCC are invaluable but the financial obligations for a
small operator to comply with such requirements are cost prohibitive.''
Another small operator, A.L.E.R.T. in Kalispell, Montana, operates
with only one helicopter. The commenter stated that the requirement for
OCCs is a good idea, but that it should be based on the number of
aircraft and not the number of dispatches or flights. It further
asserted that ``an operational control center would be very costly,
which could easily be absorbed by a larger operation but prohibitive to
a small one and not necessary.''
NEMSPA said that ``for smaller operations with a dispatch or
communications center, placing personnel in that facility who meet the
requirements for an operational control specialist should satisfy the
requirements for the facility to be an operational control center.''
LifeFlight of Maine supported extending the OCC requirements to all
operators of an air ambulance, including rotor or fixed wing, to have
an OCC regardless of size. Only one commenter, AAMS, suggested that
this compliance requirement should be based on number of hours flown
and geographical area covered rather than number of helicopters.
It is possible that a small operator with only one or two
helicopters could reach a set hourly limit, but would not have the same
level of operational complexity as a certificate holder flying the same
number of hours but with 10 or more helicopters. Nevertheless, the FAA
is requiring an OCC only for certificate holders with 10 or more
helicopter air ambulances, as proposed. As discussed in the NPRM, these
larger certificate holders will gain the most benefit from an OCC
because their operations are more complex. This requirement will cover
approximately 83 percent of the U.S. helicopter air ambulance fleet.
The FAA specifically asked for comments on whether the
applicability of this requirement should be based on the number of
operations or hours flown by each aircraft, rather than fleet size.
After evaluating the comments, the FAA has concluded that fleet size is
the best method for determining whether the OCC requirement would
apply. The fleet size requirement is easily observed and evaluated by
industry and the FAA. Additionally, the FAA does not have data that
would allow us to determine how many hours or number of operations
would constitute a complex operation, nor has the FAA received such
information during the comment period.
The FAA acknowledges that one company may hold several certificates
for helicopter air ambulance operations. In these circumstances, each
certificate would be evaluated independently rather than in the
aggregate. Provided that each certificate holder has fewer than 10
helicopters used for air ambulances in its fleet, then no OCC would be
required.
Other OCC Comments
PHI noted that OCCs were originally an invention of air medical
operators to more effectively manage operations control. PHI said its
Enhanced Operations Control Center has become a critical component in
the company's safety and risk management process as well as the OCC
within the company. PHI, however, along with AMOA, Air Evac EMS, and
ACCT, does not believe the requirement as proposed is consistent with
the highest industry standards. These commenters also believe that the
OCC requirements are too much like those for part 121 air traffic
control and dispatch functions and are not compatible with part 135 on-
demand operations. They suggested delaying implementation of the rule
until a minimum operating standard based on industry best practices
could be developed. They recommend the FAA conduct an additional study
of existing OCCs.
LifeFlight of Maine commented that AC 120-96 is inadequate for
principal operations inspectors and recommended additional guidance in
line with industry best practices. The National
[[Page 9951]]
Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists (NAACS) sought
clarification on the meaning of ``formalized dispatch'' and ``enhanced
operational procedures.''
As noted in the NPRM, the duties and training requirements of
operations control specialists are based on AC 120-96, Integration of
Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
Operations (May 2008), which provides recommendations to assist
helicopter air ambulance operators with the development and
implementation of an OCC. Also as noted, AAMS, HAI, and AMOA commented
to the NTSB that the AC is a ``product of a survey of best practices in
the air medical industry and gives guidance to other air medical
services as to the benefits of this type of operation.'' \12\ These
requirements found in the AC and in the rule are intentionally similar
to part 121, but as noted in the AC, helicopter air ambulance
operations are unique and therefore the FAA did not adopt the full part
121 aircraft dispatch requirements. We also note that the standard
adopted in this rule is a baseline that can be augmented by an
operator.
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\12\ Statement from the Association of Air Medical Services,
Helicopter Association International, and Air Medical Operators
Association to the NTSB 14 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09SH001/default.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations Control Specialists
One commenter said that the FAA should require a dispatch center
staffed with part 121 certificated dispatchers. This commenter said
that the FAA should certify dispatchers, and those dispatchers should
plan and evaluate the entire flight before contacting the pilot and
then monitor the flight's progress to destination.
The NTSB also supported FAA certification of operations control
specialists and commented that such a requirement will ensure that the
FAA has oversight over training, testing, and certification, and will
provide quality control. By requiring operations control specialists
with standard certification, NTSB asserts that this may facilitate
development of OCCs that will be able to subcontract their services to
smaller HEMS entities.
NEMSPA recommended a standard for operations control specialist
training set by the industry and approved by the FAA before any
requirement is put in place. Med-Trans, REACH, Air Evac EMS, AMOA,
California Shock Trauma Air Rescue (CALSTAR), Omniflight Helicopters,
Inc. (Omniflight), and Intermountain Life Flight do not believe that
operations control specialists should be required to obtain
certification in order to do their work. However, one individual
questioned why a certified dispatcher is not qualified to act in an
operations control position but a graduate of a company-sponsored
program is.
The FAA received comments stating that the operations control
specialist training proposed in the NPRM too closely follows the
training program for part 121 dispatchers. The FAA acknowledges that
the requirements of this rule were based on part 121 dispatcher
training rules. The topics selected for training, however, were derived
from FAA AC 120-96, which provides a recommended training curriculum
for communications specialists. The certificate holder may contract for
operations control specialist training or testing in accordance with
Sec. 135.324. The certificate holder may use a part 142 training
center or another certificate holder for operations control specialist
training and testing.
Commenters also asked for a clearer distinction between the
operations control specialists required by this rule and ``CommSpecs,''
the communication specialists currently employed in the air ambulance
industry. NAACS asked whether the aviation base curriculum for
operations control specialists would enhance safety benefits beyond the
current ``Certified Flight Communicator'' program offered by NAACS. In
response to this question, the FAA notes that the areas of required
training for an operations control specialist, derived from AC 120-96,
are specified in the rule. Compliance with this rule will enhance
safety because the training will be required and standardized for all
operations control specialists. The FAA does not believe that a
distinction between operations control specialists and CommSpecs is
necessary. This rule requires that an OCC be staffed by an operations
control specialist at all times while helicopter air ambulance flights
are being conducted. The number of persons functioning in this capacity
is not mandated, but there must be a sufficient number of them to
ensure operational control of each flight. An operator may also staff
an OCC with CommSpecs, but these persons are not mandated and they may
not perform the functions of an operations control specialist as listed
in Sec. 135.619(a)(1)-(4) unless they satisfy the qualification and
training requirements of an operation controls specialist.
Thirty-four commenters, including Air Evac EMS, Intermountain, Med-
Trans, Metro Aviation, Inc. (Metro Aviation), National Air
Transportation Association (NATA) and REACH, objected to the proposed
10-hour duty time limitation for operations control specialists. They
commented that this operations control specialist work shift limit
reflects regulations applied to part 121 dispatchers and does not
reflect any best practice or proven standard in the air medical
community. Air ambulance pilots, although only permitted to fly 8
hours, work a 12-hour shift. These commenters, including AMOA, PHI, Air
Evac EMS, and ACCT, described situations where the differences in shift
hours could interfere with completion of a mission. PHI believes that
requiring a duty day for these specialists that is less than that
required of pilots is both arbitrary and unnecessary. PHI said that the
operations control specialist requirement for a 10-hour workday
effectively adds an additional full-time employee to the OCC and
significant costs to the operator without a demonstrated benefit. REACH
remarked that it is unclear why OCC personnel should be more limited in
their duty time than flight or medical crews.
After reviewing these comments, the FAA has determined that the
proposed operations control specialist duty time is appropriate. The
FAA acknowledges that these standards may be different than what some
communications specialists may currently be practicing. However, as
discussed in the NPRM, the operations control specialist duty time
limitation is based on the duty time requirements for part 121 aircraft
dispatchers. The FAA has determined that, based on the similarities of
these positions, it is appropriate to use the same duty time
limitation. Finally, although pilots may have a longer duty period than
operations control specialists under this rule, the flight time
limitations placed on pilots within their duty periods (or subsequent
rest requirements) limits the pilot's exposure to risk.
In conjunction with the proposal for OCCs, the FAA proposed
revising Sec. Sec. 120.105 and 120.215 to add operations control
specialists to the list of persons who must be tested for drugs and
alcohol. Eleven commenters, including Air Methods, Metro Aviation, and
several individuals affiliated with REACH, argued that operations
control specialists should be exempt from part 120 drug and alcohol
testing.
Operations control specialists will be performing safety-sensitive
functions such as providing preflight weather assessment, assisting
with fuel planning and alternate airport weather minimums, and
communicating with pilots about operational concerns during flight.
These duties are similar to those
[[Page 9952]]
of an aircraft dispatcher, and thus operations control specialists
would be subject to the same restrictions on drug and alcohol use, and
to a certificate holder's drug and alcohol testing program, as
described in 14 CFR part 120.
An operations control specialist who failed a drug test, functioned
as an operations control specialist without completing training or
passing examinations, or verified false entries on a preflight analysis
worksheet, could be subject to enforcement action or civil
penalties.\13\
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\13\ See Sec. Sec. 13.14 (Civil Penalties: General); 13.16
(Civil Penalties); 120.33 (Use of Prohibited Drugs); 120.37 (Misuse
of Alcohol).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA's reference to ``formalized dispatch'' in the NPRM refers
to an established consistent process that certificate holders will use
when dispatching a flight. The term ``enhanced operational control''
involves more people than only the pilot in the flight release process.
For example, it may include the pilot and an operational control
specialist, the chief pilot, or the director of flight operations.
Section 135.619 is adopted as proposed. The wording has been
modified to ensure clarity.\14\
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\14\ Section 306(d)(2) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that requires operations control centers for helicopter air
ambulance services with 10 or more helicopters. Additionally,
section 306(c)(1) requires the rule to address flight request and
dispatch procedures.
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8. Briefing of Medical Personnel (Sec. Sec. 135.117 and 135.621--
Proposed Sec. 135.619)
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that medical personnel on
board a helicopter air ambulance flight receive a supplemental
preflight safety briefing with information specific to helicopter air
ambulance flights.\15\ This information would be in addition to the
passenger briefing currently required by Sec. 135.117. As an
alternative to the proposed preflight safety briefing, certificate
holders would be permitted to provide training every 2 years to medical
personnel through an FAA-approved training program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct rulemaking on
helicopter air ambulance operations to address ``flight request and
dispatch procedures.'' Though the benefits are less than costs for
this provision, it satisfies the Congressional mandate as required
by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB, A.L.E.R.T., LifeFlight of Maine, AAMS, and Angel One
Transport supported the requirement. LifeFlight of Maine noted that
continual educational opportunities for medical personnel will further
enhance situational awareness and promote operational safety.
AAMS, while supporting this proposal, suggested that the FAA work
with industry to develop standardized briefing criteria and procedures
in order to avoid confusion and inconsistent enforcement of this
provision. Several commenters also suggested that accommodations should
be made to permit briefings that are not as extensive as those proposed
for the rare instances when medical personnel not associated with air
medical operations are transported.
Several commenters, including the NTSB, NEMSPA, and the Society of
Aviation and Flight Educators, suggested that medical personnel safety
training be conducted on an annual basis because much of their
knowledge will degrade over time. A.L.E.R.T. made a similar suggestion,
noting that it conducts training when it hires new personnel and
annually after. AMOA, PHI, NEMSPA, the Health Care District of Palm
Beach County and Air Evac EMS recommended that the FAA develop a
standard and an approval process for a medical crew training program.
Several commenters suggested that the medical personnel training
program should be consistent with the Air Medical Resource Management
(AMRM) program supported by FAA and industry. AMOA, PHI and Air Evac
EMS also commented that it is unnecessary to require medical personnel
training record retention for an additional 60 days beyond the 24
months.
AMOA, PHI, and Air Evac EMS expressed several concerns with this
provision. They commented that a lack of formal guidance would lead to
misunderstanding of the requirements along with inconsistent
application and enforcement.
The FAA finds that medical personnel on helicopter air ambulance
flights will benefit from an increased familiarity with the helicopter
and emergency procedures due to their unique role of providing patient
care while simultaneously working around an operating helicopter. The
preflight briefing and training is intended to prevent medical
personnel from inadvertently introducing risk to the operation when
outfitting the passenger compartment for the purpose of providing
medical treatment and when providing medical care to a patient.
The FAA notes that medical personnel preflight briefing and
training is distinct from AMRM training. The AMRM program is not a
preflight safety briefing, but rather a tool used by operators to
improve communication and teambuilding skills among its employees
during air medical operations. While the FAA supports the use of the
AMRM program, it is a distinct program and unrelated to the medical
personnel preflight safety briefing/training proposed in the NPRM and
adopted in the rule.
As proposed in the NPRM and contained in the final rule, this
provision requires a briefing for medical personnel on the
physiological aspects of flight, patient loading and unloading, safety
in and around the helicopter, in-flight emergency procedures, emergency
landing procedures, emergency evacuation procedures, efficient and safe
communications with the pilot, and operational differences between day
and night operation. The FAA concludes that these requirements will
provide certificate holders with sufficient guidance on how to conduct
briefings, which will lead to consistent application and enforcement of
this provision. Additionally, as proposed in the NPRM and contained in
the final rule, this provision mandates that any certificate holder
that chooses to conduct a medical personnel training program in lieu of
preflight briefings must have an FAA-approved training program in
place. This will also ensure consistency in application and enforcement
of this provision.
The FAA will not provide exceptions or accommodations to permit
briefings that are not as extensive as those proposed for the rare
instances when medical personnel not associated with air medical
operations are transported. All medical personnel onboard a helicopter
air ambulance flight who have not received the optional training
provided for by this rule must receive the preflight safety briefing.
Medical personnel not associated with that particular operation may
still inadvertently introduce risk to the operation when on board the
flight. The preflight safety briefing will provide these medical
personnel with familiarity with the helicopter and emergency
procedures, thus reducing the risk that those personnel will affect the
overall safety of the operation. If medical personnel are not being
transported during a ``helicopter air ambulance operation'' as defined
in Sec. 135.601, the operator would only need to provide the standard
part 135 passenger briefing as found in Sec. 135.117.
The FAA has determined that medical personnel safety training will
be conducted every 24 months. The NPRM proposed training every 24
months, and although commenters suggested that training occur on an
annual basis, the FAA has determined that the required 4
[[Page 9953]]
hours of ground training and 4 hours of training in and around the air
ambulance helicopter every 24 months will provide a sufficient amount
of familiarity with the aircraft and emergency procedures.
Final Rule
Based on the comments received, the FAA is adopting the rule as
proposed with changes. The FAA concludes that requiring medical
personnel training record retention for an additional 60 days beyond
the 24 months is unnecessary and has amended the final rule to require
that records be maintained for only 24 months following the
individual's completion of training. If an incident occurs near the end
of the retention period, the FAA expects that these relevant documents
will be retained per NTSB regulation 49 CFR Sec. 380.10(d).
Additionally, we removed redundant briefing topics in Sec. 135.621
based on existing briefing requirements of Sec. 135.117.
9. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) (Sec.
135.605)
The FAA proposed a requirement for equipping helicopter air
ambulances with HTAWS. There is no existing requirement for this
equipment. One commenter stated that installation of HTAWS has been
``the single most effective technology for reducing helicopter
mishaps'' among U.S. military helicopters. The NTSB concurred with the
proposal and noted that it would meet Safety Recommendation A-06-15.
However, commenters also raised concerns over the effectiveness of
HTAWS, the need for flexibility, and the cost of the rule.
A number of commenters, including NEMSPA, questioned why the FAA
would propose mandating HTAWS, saying that its technology has not been
proven in helicopters. Commenters assert that terrain awareness and
warning systems (TAWS), the predecessor to HTAWS technology, has only
been truly tested with airplanes operating in the high altitude
instrument flight rules environment and that there is no evidence to
show that HTAWS is effective in low-level visual flight operations.
Other commenters said that this equipment is more effective in
mountainous areas than in less challenging terrain, is a ``distraction
in the cockpit,'' ``doesn't give the pilot the ability to see and avoid
weather,'' and ``doesn't keep you from spatial disorientation.'' A
number of commenters said that requiring operators to invest in this
technology today might preclude them from acquiring more effective
technology as it becomes available in the future.
EADS Cassidian Electronics stated that air ambulance operators are
the most prominent part of the flying community for which HTAWS can
assist in preventing controlled flight into terrain and obstacle strike
accidents, but the FAA should be clear about the limitations of current
HTAWS systems caused by the reliance on databases. It stated that the
vertical accuracy of the ground altitude of a database is approximately
60 feet, which does not include objects like trees, ``which seems to be
insufficient for take-off and landing.'' Databases, according to the
commenter, only include a fraction of man-made obstacles, such as power
lines, antenna masts, and wind turbines which are not included in the
database in real time. To resolve these problems, the commenter stated
that the best solution would be to require equipment with a real-time
forward-looking sensor system that would issue warnings for every
obstacle in the flight.
AAMS commented that HTAWS and night vision goggles (NVGs) should be
required together as each provides benefits that complement the other.
LifeFlight of Maine commented that HTAWS and NVGs should be a minimum
standard for night operations. Max-Viz Inc. (Max-Viz) and several
individuals commented that NVGs provide better protection from
controlled flight into terrain than HTAWS. Additionally, one individual
recommended requiring an autopilot rather than HTAWS because it is less
expensive and more effective. Several members of ACCT also stated that
autopilots are more effective than HTAWS. They claimed that HTAWS only
provides a warning to a pilot of an impending collision or altitude
loss, but the pilot's corrective actions with the flight controls
prevent controlled flight into terrain. They stated that an autopilot
would decrease the risk of controlled flight into terrain and accidents
from IIMC by holding the aircraft flight path steady and reducing a
pilot's susceptibility to spatial disorientation during IIMC recovery
maneuvers. The reasons that the FAA did not adopt NVG or autopilot
requirements in this rule are addressed in the discussion of pilot
instrument ratings, Sec. 135.603, below.
The FAA disagrees with comments that HTAWS is not proven technology
as it relates to helicopters and that it would not be effective in
preventing controlled-flight-into-terrain accidents. RTCA/DO-309
Minimum Operational Performance Standards for HTAWS and Airborne
Equipment TSO-C194 set the standards for HTAWS. The FAA and
manufacturers have installed, evaluated and certified HTAWS in
helicopters and the systems have been shown to perform their intended
function as designed in low altitude environments.
The FAA concludes that the use of HTAWS would create a safer
environment for emergency medical services flight operations by
preventing controlled flight into terrain at night or during bad
weather. As noted in the NPRM, the NTSB cites 17 accidents in its
Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations
(Jan. 25, 2006) \16\ that may have been prevented if the helicopters
had been equipped with TAWS. The FAA maintains that HTAWS will make
helicopter air ambulance pilots more aware of surrounding terrain and
obstacles and keep them from collisions. It may prevent the accidents
that happen when a pilot must take sudden and quick action to avoid a
collision and then loses control of the helicopter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The report can be accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safetystudies/sir0601.html (December, 10, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA acknowledges that there may be lags between the time when
new obstacles are erected and the time when they are put into an HTAWS
database. However, the FAA has determined that the VFR flight planning
and the VFR altitude requirements adopted here will help to offset such
a lag by providing increased situational awareness to pilots. Likewise,
the radio altimeter required under these rules will provide increased
situational awareness by providing pilots with additional information
about their altitude above the ground.
The FAA received several comments addressing the flexibility in the
rule and whether the implementation timeline is appropriate. Commenters
including AMOA and PHI expressed the need for minimum equipment list
(MEL) relief for HTAWS in the event that the unit is inoperable. Air
Methods stated that the rule's reliance on the technical standard order
(TSO) process would ``inhibit future technological benefits without a
lengthy rule changing process.'' The Health Care District of Palm Beach
County stated that, in the future, HTAWS may not be the most effective
way to achieve terrain and obstacle avoidance. AMOA commented that the
rule should be performance based to allow flexibility for incorporation
of later technology.
LifeFlight of Maine and other members of the ACCT stated that they
believed that the 3-year timeline for
[[Page 9954]]
implementation provides ample time to comply with the rule and to
finance the costs. They did not agree with extending the time to comply
or limiting the applicability of this requirement. FreeFlight Systems
also commented that the 3-year implementation period seemed reasonable.
Bristow Group noted its support for requiring all helicopters
engaged in commercial service to be equipped with HTAWS if not already
equipped with a radio-altimeter-based warning system.
The FAA acknowledges that technology could be improved over time,
but does not agree that mandating this particular type of equipment
will constrain the ability to embrace new technologies. Incorporation
by reference of new TSO requirements allows the agency to adopt revised
technological standards. The need to incorporate new TSOs into the
regulation, due to technological innovation, will not hinder adoption
of that technology in helicopter air ambulances.
In response to comments on the need for flexibility should an HTAWS
unit become inoperable, the FAA agrees that an HTAWS may meet the
requirements for MEL relief with certain conditions on the types of
operations that could be conducted while the HTAWS was inoperable. The
exact scope of such relief will be addressed through the FAA's standard
MEL process.
Based on the comments received, the FAA has determined that the
compliance date for the HTAWS requirement does not need to be extended.
Extending the HTAWS requirement to the entire commercial helicopter
population would be outside the scope of this rulemaking.
Finally, West Michigan Air Care estimated that its cost of
compliance with the HTAWS requirement would be $75,000 for its two-
helicopter air ambulance operation. The FAA notes that this estimate is
consistent with the FAA's estimate of $35,000 per helicopter for
equipment and installation, plus $7,000 for revenue loss for equipment
downtime. Additionally, while the FAA recognizes the financial burden
new equipment requirements impose on operators, providing 3 years from
the effective date of the final rule for installation will allow
certificate holders to spread the cost of compliance over that period
of time and take advantage of scheduled downtime for maintenance.
This rule is adopted as proposed with minor edits for
clarification.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Section 306(c)(3) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that addresses use of HTAWS in helicopter air ambulance operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Flight Data Monitoring System (Sec. 135.607) \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) directs the FAA to conduct rulemaking on
helicopter air ambulance operations to address ``safety enhancing
technology and equipment,'' including ``devices that perform the
function of flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders.''
Though the benefits are less than costs for this provision, it
satisfies the Congressional mandate as required by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, the FAA stated it was considering requiring helicopter
air ambulance operators to install a flight data monitoring system,
referred to in the NPRM as a light weight aircraft recording system
(LARS).\19\ Currently, Sec. 135.151 requires a cockpit voice recorder
(CVR) system in rotorcraft with a passenger seating configuration of
six or more seats and for which two pilots are required. Section
135.152 requires flight data recorders (FDRs) in rotorcraft with a
passenger seating configuration of 10 or more seats. Most helicopters
used in air ambulance operations are configured with fewer than six
passenger seats, and thus are not required to be equipped with either
CVRs or FDRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Although the NPRM did not contain proposed rule text, the
FAA provided a detailed discussion of the proposals under
consideration and asked for comments in anticipation of including an
FDMS requirement in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, the FAA invited comments on the flight data monitoring
system proposal under consideration. The FAA proposed that the flight
data monitoring system ``would be required to capture data according to
a broadly defined set of parameters including information pertaining to
the aircraft's state (such as heading, altitude, and attitude),
condition (such as rotors, transmission, engine parameters, and flight
controls), and system performance (such as full authority digital
engine control, and electronic flight instrumentation system).''
Further, as proposed, the flight data monitoring system would have to
be operated from the application of electrical power before takeoff
until the removal of electrical power after termination of flight. It
would be required to receive electrical power from the bus that
provides the maximum reliability for operation without jeopardizing
service to essential or emergency loads. Under the proposal,
certificate holders would have had 3 years to comply with the rule. The
FAA noted a flight data monitoring system can be used to promote
operational safety, and that, because so few certificate holders are
using such systems, it may be necessary to require them. Likewise, the
FAA stated that these systems can provide critical information to
investigators in the event of an accident.
The FAA received numerous comments on this proposal regarding
flight data monitoring system use in accident investigation and Flight
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs, the standards for the
flight data monitoring system, the rule's implementation date, and the
FAA's cost estimate.
Accident Investigation/Use in a FOQA Program
Many commenters supported a requirement for FOQA. LifeFlight of
Maine and members of ACCT support both a requirement to install a
flight data monitoring system and a requirement to participate in the
FOQA program, and commented that flight data monitors can assist with
accident investigation. They recommended that the FAA conduct a joint
technical study with the NTSB and air ambulance operators who are using
a FOQA program to determine the data capture rate needed to meet NTSB
accident investigation needs and what data feedback requirements would
best support FOQA programs. Eurocopter commented that FOQA use is
preferable to use in accident investigation, and the Global Helicopter
Flight Data Monitoring Steering Group commented that accident
investigation use is only reactive, but FOQA use can be proactive.
PHI supports installation and use of a flight data monitoring
system in air ambulance aircraft. It suggested requiring operators to
develop an internal process for using data collected by the system for
analysis, identification and mitigation of at-risk behaviors across the
organization, as well as development of supplemental educational
opportunities for air ambulance pilots. PHI said that the focus of the
flight data monitoring system should be to prevent accidents. It said
the emphasis should be placed on FOQA and flight data management
implementation and benefits. HAI supports and encourages flight data
monitoring technology because it has obvious safety benefits for
accident investigation and the potential for development of FOQA and
other safety programs. Alakai Technologies Corporation commented that
the requirement should be extended across all helicopter operations.
An individual commented that satellite tracking, currently in use
by his company, records flight information that can be used to help
rescue the aircraft and provides the necessary information on aircraft
operations making a flight
[[Page 9955]]
data monitoring system unnecessary. Kestrel Air stated that the cause
of most air ambulance accidents is already known and that flight data
monitoring systems do not record flight visibility data, thus adding
little value to analyzing IIMC encounters.
A FOQA program is meant to improve flight safety by providing more
information about, and greater insight into, the total flight
operations environment. This is accomplished with selective automated
recording and analysis of data generated during flight operations.
Analysis of FOQA data can reveal situations that require improvement--
in operations, in training, and in maintenance procedures, practices,
equipment, or infrastructure.
In response to comments about mandatory FOQA participation, the FAA
notes that 14 CFR part 13, Investigative and Enforcement Procedures,
states conditions under which information obtained from an approved
voluntary FOQA program will not be used in enforcement actions against
an operator or its employees. Part 193, Protection of Voluntarily
Submitted Information, contains provisions for certain protections from
public disclosure of voluntarily submitted safety-related information
when such information has been designated by an FAA order as protected
under that part. As stated in the NPRM, these protections are available
only if the data is collected by the operator as part of a voluntary
FAA-approved program. In support of this public safety objective, the
FAA has endorsed the development and implementation of voluntary FOQA
programs as a tool for continuously monitoring and evaluating
operational practices and procedures, but maintaining the voluntary
nature of the program is paramount and does not allow the FAA to
mandate FOQA for any operator.
As discussed in the NPRM, this equipment may be used to provide
significant information for investigators to determine accident
causation, which may help to prevent future accidents. In addition, the
data can be used proactively by an operator to modify operational and
maintenance procedures for increased efficiency and lower costs, to
provide immediate feedback to pilots in training, and to highlight
areas where additional training may be needed.
The final rule requires certificate holders operating helicopter
air ambulances to install and operate a flight data monitoring system
in their helicopters. The FAA is not extending this requirement to all
helicopter operations because that option was not presented in the
NPRM. Although the FAA encourages operators to take advantage of the
many uses of this data, this final rule does not require data
collection because mandating it would open up that data to FAA
surveillance, amounting to a required submission. The FAA is concerned
that such an action would discourage operators from participating in a
FOQA program.
Although operators will not be required to collect data from the
flight data monitoring system, the FAA encourages them to gather this
information and analyze it for use in improving safety in their day-to-
day operations. Based on current practice, some will choose to use the
system this way. The rule will not preclude operators from
participation in an FAA-approved FOQA program, and data submitted
voluntarily as part of a FOQA program will be protected under part 193.
The FAA anticipates that the information that this equipment can
gather may be used as a supplement to a certificate holder's training
program.
Flight Data Monitoring System Capabilities
The FAA received many comments on the flight data monitoring system
standards discussed in the NPRM, including several stating that a
regulation is not appropriate at this time. However, the FAA also
received comments in support of flight data monitoring system,
including from the NTSB.
AAMS supports installation of a flight data monitoring system on
air ambulance helicopters but says the proposal was not specific enough
to justify a regulation at this time. NORTH Flight Data Systems stated
a regulation would slow technological development of these systems. PHI
recommended that the FAA conduct a comprehensive outreach process in
partnership with certificate holders who currently have a flight data
monitoring system installed and are participating in flight data
monitoring FOQA programs. The commenter suggested this as a way to
determine what data is needed for flight data management and what are
realistic cost estimates for installing those systems and operating a
fully functional flight data monitoring FOQA program.
AMOA suggested waiting to establish a regulation until there is a
more thorough understanding of current products, but also noted the
need for MEL relief if a rule were adopted. HAI stated the technology
is not sufficiently mature at this time to justify a regulation.
Eurocopter recommended defining the required parameters in conjunction
with aircraft manufacturers before regulating. Honeywell International
also suggested the development of minimum performance specifications.
The General Aviation Safety Network commented that what was proposed,
with respect to required parameters, is too close to an FDR.
The FAA also received several comments on whether the flight data
monitoring system under the rule would need to comply with European
Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-155 or
TSO-C197.
NTSB said that a recorder that complies with ED-155 would be a
valuable aid to accident investigations and would be fully capable of
supporting a structured flight data monitoring program. The NTSB notes
that a considerable amount of work has been done by EUROCAE (with full
participation by both the FAA and the NTSB) to develop standards for
light-weight flight recording devices that would fulfill the
requirements outlined in the NPRM. The ED-155 standard covers FDR-like
data recording, CVR-like audio recording, cockpit video, and data-link
message recording. Several manufacturers are producing recorders to
this standard at a cost of less than $10,000.
FreeFlight Systems, an avionics manufacturer, said that TSO-C197
will drive up costs because it does not allow commercial-grade
operating systems. This commenter said that, rather than using a TSO, a
parts manufacturer approval (PMA) should suffice, since a flight data
monitor failure does not endanger the airframe or other systems in the
aircraft. For accident investigation purposes, FreeFlight indicated
that it produces a hardened memory unit which provides protection of
vital information in the event of a crash. It has significant
ballistics protection and can withstand a temperature of 1,100 degrees
Celsius for up to an hour.
The General Aviation Safety Network commented that no certification
should be required, except for RTCA DO-160E environmental
categorization. NORTH Flight Data Systems commented that the
``crashworthy focus'' of the NPRM will make many products undergo
redesign to meet the TSO or ED-155 standards.
The FAA agrees with the NTSB that several manufacturers have
recording systems able to record flight performance data, audio,
images, and data-link messages. This final rule is performance based
and compliance with this rule does not necessarily require
[[Page 9956]]
installation of a TSO-approved system. However, TSO-C197-approved
articles are an acceptable means of compliance with new Sec. 135.607.
This equipment must be capable of recording flight performance data.
Considering the availability of such technology, the FAA has determined
that a final rule requiring all air ambulance helicopters to equip with
a flight data monitoring system is justified. This final rule requires
installation and operation of a flight data monitoring system, but it
does not require collection of data from that equipment or development
of data collection processes.
In response to these comments, the FAA offers clarification. The
parameters described in the NPRM were meant to illustrate the type of
data that could be collected by this equipment. In the final rule, the
FAA does not specify parameters of data or specifically identify a set
of performance standards that must be met. The final rule also does not
require data collection or data analysis. It requires only that a
flight data monitoring system capable of recording flight performance
data be installed. This final rule simply requires equipment--not data
collection. The rule does not establish standards for crashworthiness
or environmental testing. This final rule uses a cost model for an
approved flight data monitoring system designed and produced under a
TSO-C197 authorization.
It would be outside the scope of the rule to require satellite
tracking of helicopter air ambulances because it was not proposed in
the NPRM. In developing the 2010 NPRM, the FAA intended that compliance
with Sec. 135.607 would be met by an FDR-like system installed and
recording on the helicopter. An operator may demonstrate that a
satellite tracking system, combined with onboard reporting, has the
capability to meet the standards in Sec. 135.607.
The FAA anticipates that relief could be granted for operations
with an inoperable flight data monitoring system. While a flight data
monitoring system is a valuable tool that can be used for accident
investigation, it is a passive device that collects information and is
not essential for safe operation in the way an oil pressure gauge would
be. The particular requirements relating to operations with an
inoperable flight data monitoring system would be developed by FAA's
Flight Standards Service for its MEL program.
Implementation Date for the Flight Data Monitoring System
AMOA recommended that the FAA not issue a rule requiring flight
data monitoring systems until there is a better understanding of
current products. PHI said that a 3-year implementation time is too
ambitious. HAI strongly supports flight data monitoring technology, but
does not believe it is sufficiently mature at this time to serve as the
basis for a regulatory equipment mandate. HAI and LifeFlight of Maine
recommend establishment of a joint FAA/industry work group to collect
relevant data and conduct a study on which to base long term guidance.
The NTSB, in discussing the work that EUROCAE has done to develop
standards for light-weight flight recording systems, said an ED-155-
compliant recorder would be an aid to accident investigation and
encouraged the FAA to include a requirement for a flight data
monitoring system in the final rule. AMOA commented that operators have
reported significant delays in the approval process for all types of
equipment installations. It asked for expedited approval for any
required new equipment
The FAA has carefully reviewed the comments that industry needs
sufficient time to manufacture, obtain and install equipment that meets
the required performance standards. After considering comments, the FAA
has determined that it is appropriate to allow 4, rather than 3 years
from the effective date of the rule for compliance. This extra year is
warranted to provide additional time for operators to obtain and
install equipment.
Cost Estimate for Flight Data Monitoring Systems
In the NPRM, the FAA estimated that the cost of a flight data
monitoring system would be $6,450 for equipment and installation, and
accompanying software would cost $750 per year. There was also a $1,913
average 10-year cost estimate for evaluation, analysis, and use of the
recorded data. The FAA asked the public to evaluate the accuracy of
this cost information and those comments are summarized below.
Bristow Group stated that this equipment is affordable and
effective and that the FAA should mandate it for all commercial
helicopters that are not already required to have FDR. It asserts that
this equipment is proven to bring safety and financial benefits to all
types of commercial helicopter operations.
Some commenters, including AMOA, PHI, LifeFlight of Maine, AAMS,
and Air Evac EMS, said that cost estimates for the flight data
monitoring system presented in the NPRM were unrealistic. They said
that equipment bought at that price would not be able to perform all
the functions mentioned in the NPRM. They also said that the FAA's
estimates had not included the cost of installation, the cost of time
out of service, or the cost of reviewing data collected by the device.
AMOA contended that there is no current device that can perform all the
functions listed in the proposal. AMOA estimated that flight data
monitoring system costs are more than $30,000, plus costs associated
with the development of supplemental type certificates, installation,
and time out of service. PHI estimated the actual cost of a complete
flight data monitoring software platform can range from $50,000 to in
excess of $120,000--a cost that does not include hardware, manpower, or
recurring service/support and training. LifeFlight of Maine stated that
one member, who is a part 135 certificate holder with an FAA approved
FOQA and a flight data monitoring system, found the costs for purchase,
installation and data collection/analysis to be $27,250 per aircraft.
AAMS stated that reports from its providers already using flight data
monitoring systems suggested that the FAA estimates for equipment
purchase and installation are 4 to 5 times too low and did not account
for program maintenance, data storage, and report development. Air Evac
EMS estimated the total cost to be more than $40,000, plus costs
associated with the development of supplemental type certificates,
installation, time out of service, and very expensive service
contracts.
PHI agreed with AMOA on the cost analysis, saying that the FAA had
``grossly underestimated'' the cost of flight data monitoring
equipment, accompanying analysis software, and flight data monitoring
FOQA program development and maintenance costs. These commenters argued
that no system on the market could accomplish all the tasks specified
in the NPRM at the price of $6,450. PHI also commented that ``another
cost driver for LARS will be the level of crash survivability
specified.'' PHI strongly urged the FAA to develop unique specific
minimum operational performance specifications (MOPS) or a TSO for
helicopter flight data monitoring systems. PHI contended that if this
equipment is held to the crashworthiness called for in ED-155, some
operators will not be able to afford it.
In response to these comments, we note that the FDM capability
described in the NPRM was meant to illustrate the type of data that
could be collected by this equipment. We did not intend to propose an
FDM system that must record all information pertaining to the
aircraft's state (such as heading, altitude, and attitude), condition
(such
[[Page 9957]]
as rotors, transmission, engine parameters, and flight controls), and
system performance (such as full authority digital engine control, and
electronic flight instrumentation system) that was discussed in the
NPRM. Under this rule, the operator would be able to determine the
parameters that the FDM would record. Our estimate of $6,450 ($5,950
plus $500 for installation) was based on a device that could meet the
intent of the proposal, not one that could capture every parameter
listed as examples in the NPRM.
However, based on the comments received, the FAA reviewed and
revised the FDMS cost estimates. In the final rule, the FAA
specifically identifies a set of performance standards that must be
met. While these performance standards are based on certain
requirements in TSO-C197 and ED-155, the final rule does not require
equipment that is compliant with TSO-C197 or ED-155. The FAA is aware
of equipment that meets TSO-C197 requirements that is currently
available for $7,000 and uses this estimate in the final rule. The FAA
also now estimates that installation would cost $8,000 (80 hours x $100
per hour) which would include time to run operational performance tests
on the FDMS. We estimate a one-time revenue loss of $7,000 per day for
installation. Therefore, the FAA estimates the total cost per
helicopter to be $22,000 ($7,000 equipment, $8,000 installation, $7,000
revenue loss). Additionally we estimate that operators will incur two,
one-time, hardware and software license fee costs of $2,500 and $750,
respectively. For detailed cost information see the accompanying
regulatory evaluation.
Final Rule
This final rule will require installation of a flight data
monitoring system capable of recording helicopter flight performance
and operational data.\20\ It will not require data collection or
prescribe standards or parameters for data collection. The flight data
monitoring system must be activated and operative from the time
electrical power is turned on before takeoff until it is turned off
after the end of the flight. Helicopter air ambulance operators will
have 4 years to comply with the rule. Helicopters equipped with an
operational FDR that meets the requirements of Sec. 135.607(a)-(b)
will be in compliance with this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Section 306(d)(2) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that addresses use of devices that perform the function of flight
data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, to the extent feasible,
in helicopter air ambulance operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rule addresses parts of NTSB Safety Recommendations A-06-17
and A-09-90.
11. Pilot Instrument Ratings (Sec. 135.603)
The FAA proposed to add Sec. 135.603 to require a helicopter air
ambulance pilot to hold a helicopter instrument rating. Currently,
Sec. 135.243(b) requires the pilot in command of a helicopter air
ambulance to hold, at a minimum, a commercial pilot certificate.
Helicopter air ambulance pilots are not currently required to hold
instrument ratings unless they will be flying under instrument flight
rules (IFR) or, when flying under visual flight rules (VFR), they will
be flying above a cloud layer (commonly called ``VFR over-the-top'').
The FAA received comments expressing support for the proposal from
commenters including the NTSB, AMOA, AAMS, Air Evac EMS, NEMSPA, and
Safety and Flight Evaluations, International.
The NTSB agreed with the requirement for a helicopter air ambulance
pilot to hold an instrument rating, but stated that helicopter air
ambulance pilots should maintain instrument currency. It commented that
instrument currency is generally acknowledged to be a skill that
deteriorates rapidly without continued practice and use. AMOA, NEMSPA,
Safety and Flight Evaluations, International and numerous individual
commenters also suggested that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance
pilots to maintain currency or routinely demonstrate the ability to
recover from IIMC. Several commenters noted that this requirement
should be applied to all commercial pilots.
Identical comments from two individuals suggested requiring
frequent short training sessions involving unplanned entry into IMC
followed by an instrument approach to landing at least quarterly in an
approved aircraft or simulator. They suggested a requirement that a
table-top PC-based navigation system trainer or similar device be used
at least monthly. They commented that the FAA should not require using
a non-motion visual flight simulator with wrap-around visual display.
They requested that the FAA prohibit flight assignment within 24 hours
of training in a non-motion visual flight simulator with wrap-around
visual display.
The FAA notes that IIMC is a common factor in helicopter air
ambulance accidents and the intent of the instrument rating requirement
is to ensure that helicopter air ambulance pilots are better equipped
to handle these situations. A pilot who receives this rating is better
equipped to maintain situational awareness and maneuver the helicopter
into a safe environment. Requiring an instrument rating, without a
requirement to maintain instrument currency, will allow a VFR operator
to expend fewer resources than required to meet full currency
requirements while ensuring that pilots have the skills necessary to
extract themselves from IIMC. Additionally, mandating instrument
currency for all commercial pilots is beyond the scope of the current
rulemaking.
To prevent IIMC accidents, Sec. 135.293 requires that pilots
demonstrate the ability to recover from IIMC during their annual
competency checks. The FAA notes that the IIMC-recovery portion of the
competency check could be performed in a simulator or flight training
device, provided that it is consistent with that device's specific
approval. Pilots who obtain the instrument rating supplemented by the
preparation for the annual competency check will be adequately prepared
to recover from IIMC.
This rule is adopted as proposed.
E. General Comments
FAA Oversight Resources/Delay in Approval/Expedited Approval Process
AMOA commented that numerous operators report significant delays in
the approval process for all types of equipment installations. It
expressed concern about the FAA's ability to inform and educate field
personnel, such as Flight Standards District Offices (FSDOs) and
headquarters inspectors, about new rule requirements. It maintained
that there are a wide range of interpretations and implementations of
rules, resulting in a lack of standardization throughout the FAA.
The FAA understands the commenter's concern and has issued guidance
for inspectors to ensure uniform application of the rule's
requirements. This rule also contains delayed compliance dates for
several of its provisions, which will give certificate holders time to
purchase and install the required equipment and to develop and
implement required procedures.
Night Vision Goggles and Autopilots
The NPRM did not propose requiring night vision goggles (NVGs) or
night vision imaging systems (NVIS). The NPRM included a statement
explaining that the FAA considered allowing NVGs as an alternate method
of compliance for the HTAWS requirement, but
[[Page 9958]]
decided that this technology might not be appropriate for all
operations and that the FAA required further study on this equipment
before allowing its use instead of HTAWS.
Numerous commenters, including AMOA, PHI, Air Evac EMS, NEMSPA,
LifeFlight of Maine, FreeFlight Systems, and AAMS expressed support for
an NVG or night vision imaging system requirement in this rule. Many
commented that night vision technology should be mandated in lieu of
HTAWS. AAMS commented that HTAWS and NVGs should be required together
as each provides benefits that complement the other. LifeFlight of
Maine commented that HTAWS and NVG should be a minimum standard for
night operations. The FAA did not receive any comments stating that the
FAA should not require NVGs or night vision imaging systems.
As stated in the NPRM, the FAA considered allowing certificate
holders to use NVGs or night vision imaging systems as an alternative
to HTAWS but did not include such a proposal in the NPRM for numerous
reasons. Night vision goggles may not be appropriate for all
operations, such as inadvertent flight into IMC. Additionally, the FAA
stated that it must conduct further research to determine the most
appropriate use of NVGs before allowing operators to use them as an
alternate means of compliance. See 75 FR 62654. The FAA is, however,
currently investigating the benefits, uses and limitations of NVGs.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Section 318 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to study the ``feasibility of
requiring pilots of helicopters providing air ambulance services
under part 135 . . . to use NVGs during nighttime operations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly the FAA received comments questioning why this rule did
not mandate an autopilot requirement. The NTSB commented that the NPRM
did not address Safety Recommendation A-09-96, which recommended that
the FAA require all EMS helicopters to be equipped with an autopilot
for single-pilot operations. NTSB believes that an autopilot is a
significant aid for unexpected high workload situations, such as IIMC.
LifeFlight of Maine, Boston MedFlight, Life Flight Network, Angel One
Transport, NEMSPA, Safety and Flight Evaluations, International,
members of ACCT, and several individual commenters also expressed
support for an autopilot requirement. Association of Air Medical
Services supported the added safety benefits of autopilot technology
but commented that further research, development, and industry
collaboration is necessary before a regulatory requirement is
considered.
The FAA did not include an autopilot requirement in the NPRM.
Therefore, mandating an autopilot unit is outside the scope of this
current rulemaking. Furthermore, the FAA concluded that requiring
autopilots on helicopter air ambulances in this current rulemaking
would be premature. Autopilot units may be cost prohibitive and not
widely available, and may pose space and weight issues for helicopters
not equipped to handle the units.
Public Aircraft Operations
The FAA received several comments from public safety organizations,
including the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the
Department of California Highway Patrol, asking about the applicability
of this rule to ``public safety operations'' or stating their
understanding that the part 135 provisions would not be applicable to
such operations. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
commented that applying the proposed rules to its public safety
operations would limit its ability to conduct its operations and
``render unusable 50% of the helicopter EMS aircraft'' in the county.
In contrast, several commenters, including AMOA, PHI, and West
Michigan Air Care, expressed support for extending the provisions of
this rule to include public aircraft operations. PHI expressed support
for requiring public aircraft operations to comply with the rules
proposed in the NPRM, stating that the thousands of passengers
transported every year by government operators should benefit from the
safety enhancements in the proposed rule. It stated that the FAA has
been inconsistent in providing civil aircraft regulatory oversight of
government operators engaged in air ambulance operations. PHI also
highlighted NTSB Safety Recommendation, A-09-130, which calls for the
FAA to seek specific legislative authority to achieve safety oversight
of helicopter air ambulance operations conducted using government-owned
aircraft. The Airborne Law Enforcement Association suggested that the
FAA establish a definition of ``public safety HEMS aircraft.''
In response, the FAA clarifies that the part 135 provisions of this
rule do not apply to public aircraft operations. The FAA has statutory
authority to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce. See
49 U.S.C. 44701(a). This authority does not extend to public aircraft
operations.
Public aircraft operation is limited by statute to certain
government operations within U.S. airspace. See 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(41),
40125. Although these operations must comply with certain general
operating rules (including those applicable to all aircraft in the
National Airspace System), other civil certification and safety
oversight regulations do not apply. Whether an operation may be
considered a public aircraft operation is determined on a flight-by-
flight basis, under the terms of the statute. The FAA considers the
following factors in making these determinations: aircraft ownership,
the purpose of the flight, and the persons on board the aircraft.
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(41)(C) includes as a public
aircraft ``an aircraft owned or operated by the government of a State .
. . or a political subdivision of [one of these] governments, except as
provided in section 40125(b).'' See Legal Interpretation to Ray
Borrato, from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for
Regulations (July 14, 2011). Section 40125(b) states that an aircraft
included in Sec. 40102(a)(41)(C) ``does not qualify as a public
aircraft . . . when the aircraft is used for commercial purposes or to
carry an individual other than a crewmember or a qualified non-
crewmember.'' ``Commercial purposes'' under the statute means ``the
transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire. . . .''
If an operator receives compensation for conducting operations it would
not be providing the service as a public aircraft operation, but as a
commercial vendor. Those flights would not qualify as public aircraft
operations and the operator would be required to comply with the
certification and operating rules of 14 CFR part 135.
To that end, we note that the part 135 provisions of this rule
would apply only to civil aircraft operations and would not apply to
public aircraft operations. Accordingly, an aircraft operator that only
performs public aircraft operations would not need to hold a part 119
operating certificate permitting part 135 operations. An operator that
conducts both public aircraft operations and civil operations would
need to hold a part 119 operating certificate and conduct its civil
operations pursuant to part 135 rules. We also note that public
aircraft operations must adhere to part 91 airspace rules; therefore,
the provisions of Sec. 91.155 would apply to both public and civil
operations.
The FAA encourages government entities that conduct public aircraft
operations to inform the local FSDO that they conduct public aircraft
operations in the FSDO's area to avoid confusion
[[Page 9959]]
about the oversight of those operations. The FAA conducts surveillance
and oversight of part 119 certificates holders, including government
entities that hold such certificates, to verify that they are complying
with appropriate rules during civil operations.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analysis
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563
directs that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact
of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies
to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they
be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written
assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or
final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this rule. We
suggest readers seeking greater detail read the full regulatory
evaluation, a copy of which we have placed in the docket for this
rulemaking.
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this final
rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is not an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is ``significant'' as defined in
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) will not
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States; and (6) will not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local,
tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold
identified above. These analyses are summarized below.
Total Benefits and Costs of This Rule
The estimated mean benefit value for the rule will be about $821
million, or $577 million present value, over ten years. The FAA
estimates the cost of this rule will be approximately $311 million, or
$243 million present value, over ten years.
Who is potentially affected by this rule?
Helicopter air ambulance operators, commercial helicopter
operators, helicopter aerial application operators, and helicopter
external load operators.
Assumptions:
The rule is expected to take effect in 2013. The time
horizon for these potential benefits is 10 years, 2013 through 2022.
All monetary values are expressed in constant 2013
dollars. We calculated the present value of the potential benefit
stream by discounting the monetary values using a 7 percent interest
rate from 2013 to 2022.
The FAA estimated that the helicopter fleet would grow at
2.8 percent per year.
Benefits of This Rule
Benefits will accrue from the implementation of new operational
procedures and additional equipment requirements for helicopter air
ambulances. This final rule also increases safety for commercial
helicopter operations by revising requirements for equipment, pilot
training, and alternate airports and it increases weather minimums for
helicopters operating under part 91. The estimated mean benefit value
for these provisions will be $821 million, or $577 million present
value, over ten years.
Costs of This Rule
The FAA estimates the cost of this rule will be approximately $311
million, or $243 million present value, over ten years.
Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the Act.
Based on the criteria used in the initial regulatory flexibility
analysis and used again here, this rule will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The FAA's
usual threshold for economic significance is a 2 percent annual
compliance cost to operating revenue. However, we elected to use a more
conservative threshold of 1 percent annual compliance cost to operating
revenue in this rulemaking. In the initial regulatory flexibility
analysis, we stated that the proposed rule would cause small air
ambulance operators to incur compliance costs such that the ratio of
annual compliance cost to annual revenue ranged between 1.76 and 1.88
percent, which we considered significant. We did not receive any
comments on this determination. In the final regulatory flexibility
analysis, we have updated the ratio of annual compliance costs to
annual revenue to a range between 1.80 to 1.87 percent, but our
determination has not changed--this rule will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small air ambulance
operators.
This final rule will impact air ambulance, air tour, on demand,
aerial application, and external load operators. The U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) classifies businesses as small based on
size standards, typically expressed as annual revenue or number of
employees. SBA publishes a table of small business size standards
matched to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes.
Table 5 shows the size standards for the entities that will be affected
by this rule.
[[Page 9960]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.001
Air Ambulance Operators
Because we did not have actual annual revenues for air ambulance
operators, we estimated them using helicopter counts as a revenue
driver. We assumed an average of 367 operations per year for each
helicopter and a charge of $7,000 per operation. The FAA estimated 35
small air ambulance operators (with estimated revenues lower than $7
million) out of the 73 air ambulance operators that will be affected by
this regulation, which we consider a substantial number of small
entities. Their ratio of annualized cost to annual revenue ranges from
1.80 to 1.87 percent. Based on the criteria used in the initial
regulatory flexibility analysis and used again here, this rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small air
ambulance operators. Accordingly, the FAA prepared a regulatory
flexibility analysis for small air ambulance operators, as described in
the next section.
Air Tour Operators
We assumed an average of 747 air tour operations per year for each
helicopter and a charge of $1,689 \22\ per air tour operation. As such,
the FAA identified 31 small air tour operators (with estimated revenues
lower than $7 million) out of the 46 air tour operators that will be
affected by this regulation, which we consider a substantial number of
small entities. Their ratio of annualized cost to annual revenue for
air tour operators ranges from 0.08 to 0.26 percent, which is not
significant. While this rule will affect a substantial number of small
air tour operators, they will not incur a significant economic impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ We multiplied the average revenue per person for 5
different operators ($380.56/person) by the average hours per
operation (0.7396 hours/operation) and by the average revenue
passengers per helicopters (6 passengers/helicopter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Demand Operators
The FAA identified 370 small on- demand operators (with 1,500 or
fewer employees) out of the 379 that will be affected by this
regulation, which we consider a substantial number of small entities.
Although their annualized compliance costs range from $980 to $72,784,
we were unable to estimate their annual revenues because average
revenue per flight for these entities is not meaningful. There are a
number of factors (e.g., length of flight, type of helicopter) that
determine the revenue for an individual flight. These factors are not
likely to result in a distribution around a meaningful average revenue.
At the higher end of the compliance cost range, the economic impact may
well be significant, but again, we cannot validate such an estimate. In
the NPRM, we asked on-demand operators to provide financial data
pertaining to the rule's impact on their operations, but we did not
receive any comments in response to this request. Therefore we still
have no annual revenue data for these operators.
Aerial Application Operators (Part 137)
We assumed an average of 81 aerial application operations per year
for each helicopter and a charge of $500 per aerial application
operation. The FAA identified 224 small aerial application operators
(with estimated revenues lower than $7 million) out of the 224 aerial
application operators that will be affected by this regulation, which
we consider a substantial number of small entities. Their ratio of
annualized cost to annual revenue is 0.01 percent, which is not
significant. While this rule will affect a substantial number of small
aerial application operators, they will not incur a significant
economic impact.
External Load Operators (Part 133)
We assumed an average of 1,159 external load operations per year
for each helicopter and a charge of $625 per external load operation.
The FAA identified 197 small external load operators (with estimated
revenues lower than $7 million) out of the 219 external load operators
that will be affected by this regulation, which we consider a
substantial number of small entities. Their ratio of annualized cost to
annual revenue is less than 0.01 percent, which is not significant.
While this rule will affect a substantial number of small external load
operators, they will not incur a significant economic impact.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Under section 603(b) of the RFA (as amended), each regulatory
flexibility analysis is required to address the following points: (1)
Reasons the agency considered the rule, (2) the objectives and legal
basis for the rule, (3) the kind and number of small entities to which
the rule will apply, (4) the reporting, recordkeeping, and other
compliance requirements of the rule, and (5) all Federal rules that may
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the rule.
Reasons the FAA Considered the Rule
Helicopter air ambulance accidents reached the highest levels in
history during the years from 2003 through 2008.\23\ The year 2008 was
the deadliest. In 2008, five air ambulance accidents killed 21 people,
including pilots, patients, and medical personnel. A total of 62
helicopter air ambulance accidents occurred during the period from 1991
through 2010, and this number included 125 fatalities and a midair
collision between two helicopter air ambulances. Commercial helicopters
other than air ambulances had accidents as well. From 1991 through
2010, these helicopters had 20 accidents and 39 fatalities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air
Ambulance Safety Concerns (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were four common factors in these accidents--night
conditions, inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological
conditions, loss of control, and controlled flight into terrain.
The impetus for this rulemaking is the number of helicopter
accidents, noted above. Helicopter air ambulances operate under unique
conditions. Their flights are often time-sensitive, putting pressure on
the pilots. Helicopter air ambulances operate at low altitudes and
under varied weather conditions. These pilots fly year-round in rural
and urban settings, over mountainous and non-
[[Page 9961]]
mountainous terrain, during the day and during the night, and in
conditions where visibility is good and in conditions where it is not.
They must often land at unfamiliar, remote, or unimproved sites with
hazards like trees, buildings, towers, wires, and uneven terrain.
In an emergency, many patients will not have a choice of whether
they want to be transported in a helicopter. They may be in a medical
condition that prevents them from making decisions about transportation
or indicating what they want. They cannot choose between competing
carriers because the company that responds to the scene may be either
the only one in the area or the first one called. For these reasons,
and those discussed previously, the FAA is establishing more stringent
safety regulations to protect patients, medical personnel and flight
crewmembers onboard helicopter air ambulances.
The Objectives and Legal Basis for the Rule
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), which requires
the Administrator to promulgate regulations in the interest of safety
for the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen and other
employees of air carriers, and 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires
the Administrator to promulgate regulations and minimum standards for
other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for safety in air
commerce and national security.
The Kind and Number of Small Entities to Which the Rule Will Apply
The FAA identified 35 small air ambulance operators on which the
rule will have a significant economic impact. We estimate that the
small air ambulance operators have annual revenues between $2.6 million
and $5.1 million.
The Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements of the
Rule
As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA will submit a copy of these sections to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for its review. The following provisions
apply to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.002
All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Rule
The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or
conflict with this rule.
Other Considerations
Affordability Analysis
For the purpose of this analysis, the degree to which small
entities can afford the cost of the rule is predicated on the
availability of financial resources. Costs can be paid from existing
assets such as cash, by borrowing, through the provision of additional
equity capital, by accepting reduced profits, by raising prices, or by
finding other ways of offsetting costs.
One means of assessing the affordability is by determining the
ability of each of the small entities to meet its short-term
obligations by looking at net income, working capital and financial
strength ratios. However, the FAA was unable to find this type of
financial information for the affected entities, and so used an
alternative way of analyzing affordability. The approach used by the
FAA was to compare estimated revenues with the annualized compliance
costs.
The average ratio of annualized costs to estimated annual revenues
for small air ambulance operators ranges from 1.80% percent to 1.87
percent. Thus, the FAA expects that small air ambulance operators will
not have trouble affording this rule.
Competitiveness Analysis
For small air ambulance operators, the average ratio of annualized
cost to estimated annual revenue ranges from 1.80 percent to 1.87
percent. For large air ambulance operators, it ranges from 0.90 percent
to 1.94 percent. For 33 out of the 38 large air ambulance operators, it
ranges from 1.74 percent to 1.94 percent. The FAA expects that, based
on these overlapping results, there will be no change in the
competitiveness of these 33 small air ambulance operators with large
air ambulance operators. However, for the remaining 5 large operators,
the average ratio of annualized compliance cost to estimated annual
revenue ranges from 0.90 percent to 0.93 percent, and this gives them a
competitive advantage over small air ambulance operators.
Alternatives
Alternative One--This alternative considers excluding the
Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) unit from the
rulemaking. Although this alternative would reduce the ratio of
annualized compliance cost to annual revenue from a range of 1.80
percent to 1.87 percent to a range of 1.61 percent to 1.68 percent,
there would also be a significant reduction in safety.
[[Page 9962]]
Conclusion--The HTAWS is a tool for situational awareness and for
helping helicopter air ambulance pilots during night operations. This
equipment enhances situational awareness in all aspects of flying
including day or night flight, and flight in instrument meteorological
conditions. The FAA believes that this equipment is a significant
safety enhancement for all aspects of helicopter operations. The
accident data shows that the HTAWS provision could have prevented many
air ambulance accidents if this equipment had been installed in the
helicopter. Also, HTAWS is a Congressional mandate under Public Law
112-95. The Act requires the FAA to conduct rulemaking on helicopter
air ambulance operations to address ``safety-enhancing technology and
equipment, including HTAWS. . . .'' Thus the FAA does not consider
excluding this requirement to be an acceptable alternative in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. Sec. 603(d).
Alternative Two--This alternative would affect the requirement for
certificate holders engaged in helicopter air ambulance operations to
have an OCC. The population affected would change from operators with
10 or more helicopters to those with 15 or more.
Conclusion--The FAA believes that operators with 10 or more
helicopters engaged in air ambulance operations comprise 83 percent of
the total air ambulance fleet in the U.S. The FAA believes that
changing the requirement to apply to operators with 15 or more
helicopters would decrease the coverage of the population to 78
percent. Furthermore, the complexity of operations considerably
increases for operators of 10 or more helicopters. Thus the FAA does
not consider this to be an acceptable alternative in accordance with 5
U.S.C. 603(d).
Minimizing the Burden on Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to consider the
impact of their regulatory proposals on small entities and to analyze
one or more significant alternatives to minimize the rule's burden on
small entities. The FAA analyzed two alternatives to minimize the
burden on small entities. We considered excluding the HTAWS unit
requirement from the final rule. Next, we considered increasing the
number of helicopters required to trigger the OCC requirement to 15.
The FAA, however, did not consider these to be acceptable alternatives
due to the significant enhancement for safety that HTAWS provides to
helicopter operations. Therefore, the FAA did not adopt this
alternative.
Conclusion
This rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small air ambulance operators. The FAA identified 35 small
air ambulance operators on which the rule will have a significant
economic impact.
D. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined the
regulations will improve safety, which is a legitimate domestic
objective and therefore not an unnecessary obstacle to foreign
commerce.
E. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $143.1 million in lieu of $100
million. This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore,
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor
may it impose an information collection requirement unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
The final rule will impose the following new information collection
requirements.
Private Sector Costs
(1) Require all rotorcraft used in part 135 operations to be
equipped with radio altimeters (Sec. 135.160). Certificate holders may
apply for a deviation from the requirement for helicopters in which a
radio altimeter cannot physically be installed in the flight deck.
Estimated number of applications for deviations from on-demand
helicopters = 94. Estimated number of applications for air tour
helicopters = 13. Time needed per deviation application = 1 hour.
Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
[[Page 9963]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.003
(2) Establish VFR ceiling and visibility requirements for
helicopter air ambulance operations conducted in class G airspace
(Sec. 135.609). These operators may designate local flying areas.
Certificate holders electing to do so would document the local flying
area in a manner acceptable to the administrator. We estimate that 50
percent of the air ambulance operators will designate local flying
areas.
Air ambulance operators = 73.
Air ambulance operators affected = 50%.
Time needed to develop local flying area = 2 hours.
Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.004
(3) Require air ambulance operators to document the highest
obstacle along the planned route prior to a VFR flight (Sec. 135.615).
Affected operators must document the procedures for performing this
task in their operations manuals.
Air Ambulance Helicopters = 1,073-1,371.
Air Ambulance operations per helicopter = 367 per year.
Flight planning time = 5 minutes per operation.
Salary of pilot = $75 per hour.
[[Page 9964]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.005
(4) Require each certificate holder performing helicopter air
ambulance operations to implement an FAA-approved pre-flight risk-
analysis program documented in its operations manual (Sec. 135.617).
Air ambulance operators = 73.
Time for chief pilot to develop risk analysis program = 30 hours.
Time for clerk to develop risk analysis worksheet and insert
program into operations manual = 30 hours.
Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.006
(5) Require pilots in command to conduct a pre-flight risk
analysis, including completion of a risk analysis worksheet before a
helicopter air ambulance operation (Sec. 135.617).
Air Ambulance Helicopters = 1,073-1,371.
Air Ambulance operations per helicopter = 367 per year.
Flight planning time = 10 minutes per operation.
Salary of pilot = $75 per hour.
[[Page 9965]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.007
(6) Require operations control specialists to participate in the
pre-flight risk analysis required by Sec. 135.617, including
acknowledging in writing the date and time the risk analysis was
completed and that the flight can be conducted safely (Sec. 135.619).
Air Ambulance Helicopters operated by certificate holders with an
OCC = 895-1,144.
Air Ambulance operations per helicopter = 367 per year.
Time spent by OCS per pilot's worksheet = 5 minutes.
Salary of operations control specialist (OCS) = $42 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.008
(7) Require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air
ambulances to establish operational control centers and document
operations control specialist duties and training in their operations
manuals. (Sec. 135.619).
Operators that need to develop the OCS training = 13.
Operators that need to change their manuals = 2.
Time for chief pilot to develop OCS training = 60 hours.
Time for clerk to develop OCS training = 30 hours.
Time for chief pilot to change manual = 1 hour.
Time for clerk to change manual = 0.5 hour.
Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
[[Page 9966]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.009
(8) Require certificate holders that do not currently have
operations control centers but will be required to have them to retain
records of the training given to operations control specialists (Sec.
135.619).
Operations control specialists = 119-152.
Time per OCS training record = 5 minutes.
Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.010
(9) Require certificate holders with operations control centers to
retain operations control specialist training records (Sec. 135.619).
Operations control specialists = 369-472.
Time per OCS training record = 5 minutes.
Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
[[Page 9967]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.011
(10) Require that medical personnel on board helicopter air
ambulance flights receive either a supplemental safety briefing or
safety training in lieu of a pre-flight briefing (Sec. 135.621).
Affected air ambulance operators = 37.
Time for chief pilot to develop training = 10 hours.
Time for clerk to incorporate training into operations manual = 10
hours.
Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.012
(11) Certificate holders choosing the option to provide safety
training would be required to retain training records for persons
receiving the training (Sec. 135.621).
Medical personnel = 5,858.
Time per medical personnel training record = 5 minutes.
Training: every 24 calendar months.
Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
[[Page 9968]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.013
Note:
Operations control specialists would be subject to certificate
holders' drug and alcohol testing programs (Sec. Sec. 120.5, 120.15).
The FAA believes that, because certificate holders currently administer
and maintain records for drug and alcohol testing for other employees
(approved under OMB Control Number 2120-0535), the cost for a clerical
person to maintain the records would be negligible.
Summary of All Burden Hours and Costs
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.014
Cost to the Federal Government
(1) Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations (Sec. 135.160).
Applications for deviations from radio altimeter requirement = 107.
Time needed for review and operations specification = 1.5 hour.
Salary of inspector at headquarters = $76 per hour.
[[Page 9969]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.015
(2) Local Flying Area (Sec. 135.609).
Air ambulance operators = 73.
Air ambulance operators affected = 50%.
Time needed to review request = 1 hour.
Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.016
(3) Review pre-flight risk analysis procedure and worksheet (Sec.
135.617).
Air ambulance operators = 73.
Time to review = 1 hour.
Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.
[[Page 9970]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.017
(4) OCS training/amendment to existing manual (Sec. 135.619).
Operators = 15.
Time to review OCS training = 1 hour.
Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.018
(5) Review Medical Personnel Training (Sec. 135.621).
Air ambulance operators = 73.
Time to review = 1 hour.
Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.
[[Page 9971]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.019
Summary of All Burden Hours and Costs Over 10 Year Period
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.020
As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA has submitted these information collection amendments
to OMB for its review. Notice of OMB approval for this information
collection will be published in a future Federal Register document.
G. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable.
The FAA has reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices and has identified the following differences.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III, Section II, Chapter 4 sets standards for
helicopter overwater equipment requirements based on performance class
and distance from land based on time at normal cruise speed. The FAA
did not adopt this requirement but instead bases the rule on existing
FAA helicopter performance criteria and distances from shore.
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.
H. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f. Additionally, the FAA reviewed
paragraph 304 of Order 1050.1E and determined that this rulemaking
involves no extraordinary circumstances.
I. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner
[[Page 9972]]
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation,
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, the
FAA requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska.
The agency received comments pertaining to this rule's application
in Alaska which are discussed in sections III.C.1 (the radio altimeter
requirement) and III.C.3 (pilot testing on recovery from inadvertent
flight into IMC, flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions) of this
final rule document. To the requirement for a radio altimeter,
NorthStar Trekking commented that this equipment can give erroneous
readings on snow-covered surfaces. In response, as discussed in
III.C.1, the FAA has determined that the safety benefits of this
equipment outweigh the possibility of infrequent inaccurate readings.
In response to the comment about pilot testing, the FAA reiterates that
pilots will benefit from demonstrating knowledge of procedures for
aircraft handling in all three conditions, because these conditions may
occur year-round in many places. As a result, the agency has determined
that there is no need to make any regulatory distinctions applicable to
intrastate aviation in Alaska.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency determined
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have Federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
is not a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order and it
is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.
VI. How To Obtain Additional Information
A. Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained by
using the Internet--
1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visit the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ or
3. Access the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
Comments received may be viewed by going to http://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the
docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic
form of all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name
of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document,
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 91
Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 120
Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Alcoholism, Alcohol testing, Aviation
safety, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Operators, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Safety-sensitive, Transportation.
14 CFR Part 135
Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
1. Revise the authority citation for part 91 to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120,
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716,
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508,
47528-47531, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180).
0
2. Amend Sec. 91.155 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) to read as
follows:
Sec. 91.155 Basic VFR weather minimums.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and Sec.
91.157, no person may operate an aircraft under VFR when the flight
visibility is less, or at a distance from clouds that is less, than
that prescribed for the corresponding altitude and class of airspace in
the following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance from
Airspace Flight visibility clouds
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class A......................... Not Applicable.... Not Applicable.
Class B......................... 3 statute miles... Clear of Clouds.
Class C......................... 3 statute miles... 500 feet below.
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 2,000 feet
horizontal.
Class D......................... 3 statute miles... 500 feet below.
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 2,000 feet
horizontal.
Class E:
Less than 10,000 feet MSL... 3 statute miles... 500 feet below.
[[Page 9973]]
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 2,000 feet
horizontal.
At or above 10,000 feet MSL. 5 statute miles... 1,000 feet below.
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 1 statute mile
horizontal.
Class G:
1,200 feet or less above the
surface (regardless of MSL
altitude)
For aircraft other than
helicopters:
Day, except as provided in 1 statute mile.... Clear of clouds.
Sec. 91.155(b).
Night, except as provided in 3 statute miles... 500 feet below.
Sec. 91.155(b).
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 2,000 feet
horizontal.
For helicopters:
Day, except as provided in \1/2\ statute mile Clear of clouds.
Sec. 91.155(b).
Night, except as provided in 1 statute mile.... Clear of clouds.
Sec. 91.155(b).
More than 1,200 feet above
the surface but less than
10,000 feet MSL
Day..................... 1 statute mile.... 500 feet below.
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 2,000 feet
horizontal.
Night................... 3 statute miles... 500 feet below.
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 2,000 feet
horizontal.
More than 1,200 feet above 5 statute miles... 1,000 feet below.
the surface and at or above
10,000 feet MSL.
.................. 1,000 feet above.
.................. 1 statute mile
horizontal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) * * *
(1) Helicopter. A helicopter may be operated clear of clouds in an
airport traffic pattern within \1/2\ mile of the runway or helipad of
intended landing if the flight visibility is not less than \1/2\
statute mile.
* * * * *
PART 120--DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM
0
3. The authority citation for part 120 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101-40103, 40113, 40120,
41706, 41721, 44106, 44701, 44702, 44703, 44709, 44710, 44711,
45101-45105, 46105, 46306.
0
4. Amend Sec. 120.105 by adding paragraph (i) to read as follows:
Sec. 120.105 Employees who must be tested.
* * * * *
(i) Operations control specialist duties.
0
5. Amend Sec. 120.215 by adding paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows:
Sec. 120.215 Covered employees.
(a) * * *
(9) Operations control specialist duties.
* * * * *
PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATIONS
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT
0
6. The authority citation for part 135 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 41706, 40113, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722, 44730, 45101-45105;
Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 58 (49 U.S.C. 44730).
0
7. Amend Sec. 135.1 by adding paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows:
Sec. 135.1 Applicability.
(a) * * *
(9) Helicopter air ambulance operations as defined in Sec.
135.601(b)(1).
* * * * *
0
8. Amend Sec. 135.117 by adding paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows:
Sec. 135.117 Briefing of passengers before flight.
(a) * * *
(9) If a rotorcraft operation involves flight beyond autorotational
distance from the shoreline, as defined in Sec. 135.168(a), use of
life preservers, ditching procedures and emergency exit from the
rotorcraft in the event of a ditching; and the location and use of life
rafts and other life preserver devices if applicable.
* * * * *
0
9. Add Sec. 135.160 to read as follows:
Sec. 135.160 Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations.
(a) After April 24, 2017, no person may operate a rotorcraft unless
that rotorcraft is equipped with an operable FAA-approved radio
altimeter, or an FAA-approved device that incorporates a radio
altimeter, unless otherwise authorized in the certificate holder's
approved minimum equipment list.
(b) Deviation authority. The Administrator may authorize deviations
from paragraph (a) of this section for rotorcraft that are unable to
incorporate a radio altimeter. This deviation will be issued as a
Letter of Deviation Authority. The deviation may be terminated or
amended at any time by the Administrator. The request for deviation
authority is applicable to rotorcraft with a maximum gross takeoff
weight no greater than 2,950 pounds. The request for deviation
authority must contain a complete statement of the circumstances and
justification, and must be submitted to the nearest Flight Standards
District Office, not less than 60 days prior to the date of intended
operations.
0
10. Add Sec. 135.168 to read as follows:
Sec. 135.168 Emergency equipment: Overwater rotorcraft operations.
(a) Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following
definitions apply--
Autorotational distance refers to the distance a rotorcraft can
travel in autorotation as described by the
[[Page 9974]]
manufacturer in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual.
Shoreline means that area of the land adjacent to the water of an
ocean, sea, lake, pond, river, or tidal basin that is above the high-
water mark at which a rotorcraft could be landed safely. This does not
include land areas which are unsuitable for landing such as vertical
cliffs or land intermittently under water.
(b) Required equipment. After April 24, 2017, except as provided
for in paragraph (c), when authorized by the certificate holder's
operations specifications, or when necessary only for takeoff or
landing, no person may operate a rotorcraft beyond autorotational
distance from the shoreline unless it carries:
(1) An approved life preserver equipped with an approved survivor
locator light for each occupant of the rotorcraft. The life preserver
must be worn by each occupant while the rotorcraft is beyond
autorotational distance from the shoreline, except for a patient
transported during a helicopter air ambulance operation, as defined in
Sec. 135.601(b)(1), when wearing a life preserver would be inadvisable
for medical reasons; and
(2) An approved and installed 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter
(ELT) with 121.5 MHz homing capability. Batteries used in ELTs must be
maintained in accordance with the following--
(i) Non-rechargeable batteries must be replaced when the
transmitter has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or when 50%
of their useful lives have expired, as established by the transmitter
manufacturer under its approval. The new expiration date for replacing
the batteries must be legibly marked on the outside of the transmitter.
The battery useful life requirements of this paragraph (b)(2) do not
apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are
essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals; or
(ii) Rechargeable batteries used in the transmitter must be
recharged when the transmitter has been in use for more than 1
cumulative hour or when 50% of their useful-life-of-charge has expired,
as established by the transmitter manufacturer under its approval. The
new expiration date for recharging the batteries must be legibly marked
on the outside of the transmitter. The battery useful-life-of-charge
requirements of this paragraph (b)(2) do not apply to batteries (such
as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during
probable storage intervals.
(c) Maintenance. The equipment required by this section must be
maintained in accordance with Sec. 135.419.
(d) ELT standards. The ELT required by paragraph (b)(2) of this
section must meet the requirements in:
(1) TSO-C126, TSO-C126a, or TSO-C126b; and
(2) Section 2 of either RTCA DO-204 or RTCA DO-204A, as specified
by the TSO complied with in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
(e) ELT alternative compliance. Operators with an ELT required by
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, or an ELT with an approved deviation
under Sec. 21.618 of this chapter, are in compliance with this
section.
(f) Incorporation by reference. The standards required in this
section are incorporated by reference into this section with the
approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce any edition other than that specified in
this section, the FAA must publish notice of change in the Federal
Register and the material must be available to the public. All approved
material is available for inspection at the FAA's Office of Rulemaking
(ARM-1), 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591 (telephone
(202) 267-9677) and from the sources indicated below. It is also
available for inspection at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030 or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
(1) U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution
Office, DOT Warehouse M30, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th
Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; telephone (301) 322-5377. Copies are also
available on the FAA's Web site. Use the following link and type the
TSO number in the search box: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/Frameset?OpenPage.
(i) TSO-C126, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Dec. 23,
1992,
(ii) TSO-C126a, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Dec.
17, 2008, and
(iii) TSO-C126b, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Nov.
26, 2012.
(2) RTCA, Inc., 1150 18th Street NW., Suite 910, Washington, DC
20036, telephone (202) 833-9339, and are also available on RTCA's Web
site at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/index.cfm.
(i) RTCA DO-204, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs), Sept. 29, 1989, and
(ii) RTCA DO-204A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT), Dec. 6, 2007.
0
11. Revise Sec. 135.221 to read as follows:
Sec. 135.221 IFR: Alternate airport weather minimums.
(a) Aircraft other than rotorcraft. No person may designate an
alternate airport unless the weather reports or forecasts, or any
combination of them, indicate that the weather conditions will be at or
above authorized alternate airport landing minimums for that airport at
the estimated time of arrival.
(b) Rotorcraft. Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator,
no person may include an alternate airport in an IFR flight plan unless
appropriate weather reports or weather forecasts, or a combination of
them, indicate that, at the estimated time of arrival at the alternate
airport, the ceiling and visibility at that airport will be at or above
the following weather minimums--
(1) If, for the alternate airport, an instrument approach procedure
has been published in part 97 of this chapter or a special instrument
approach procedure has been issued by the FAA to the certificate
holder, the ceiling is 200 feet above the minimum for the approach to
be flown, and visibility is at least 1 statute mile but never less than
the minimum visibility for the approach to be flown.
(2) If, for the alternate airport, no instrument approach procedure
has been published in part 97 of this chapter and no special instrument
approach procedure has been issued by the FAA to the certificate
holder, the ceiling and visibility minimums are those allowing descent
from the minimum enroute altitude (MEA), approach, and landing under
basic VFR.
0
12. Amend Sec. 135.293 by--
0
a. Removing the word ``and'' from the end of paragraph (a)(7)(iii);
0
b. Removing the period and adding ``; and'' in its place at the end of
paragraph (a)(8);
0
c. Adding paragraph (a)(9);
0
d. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (f) as paragraphs (d) through
(g) respectively; and
0
e. Adding new paragraph (c).
The additions read as follows:
Sec. 135.293 Initial and recurrent pilot testing requirements.
(a) * * *
(9) After the next scheduled competency check after April 22, 2014
[[Page 9975]]
for rotorcraft pilots, procedures for aircraft handling in flat-light,
whiteout, and brownout conditions, including methods for recognizing
and avoiding those conditions.
* * * * *
(c) Each competency check given in a rotorcraft must include a
demonstration of the pilot's ability to maneuver the rotorcraft solely
by reference to instruments. The check must determine the pilot's
ability to safely maneuver the rotorcraft into visual meteorological
conditions following an inadvertent encounter with instrument
meteorological conditions. For competency checks in non-IFR-certified
rotorcraft, the pilot must perform such maneuvers as are appropriate to
the rotorcraft's installed equipment, the certificate holder's
operations specifications, and the operating environment.
* * * * *
Sec. 135.297 [Amended]
0
13. Amend Sec. 135.297 by removing the reference to ``Sec.
135.293(d)'' and adding ``Sec. 135.293(e)'' in its place in the last
sentence of paragraph (c) introductory text.
0
14. Add subpart L to part 135 to read as follows:
Subpart L--Helicopter Air Ambulance Equipment, Operations, and Training
Requirements
Sec.
135.601 Applicability and definitions.
135.603 Pilot-in-command instrument qualifications.
135.605 Helicopter terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS).
135.607 Flight Data Monitoring System.
135.609 VFR ceiling and visibility requirements for Class G
airspace.
135.611 IFR operations at locations without weather reporting.
135.613 Approach/departure IFR transitions.
135.615 VFR flight planning.
135.617 Pre-flight risk analysis.
135.619 Operations control centers.
135.621 Briefing of medical personnel.
Subpart L--Helicopter Air Ambulance Equipment, Operations, and
Training Requirements
Sec. 135.601 Applicability and definitions.
(a) Applicability. This subpart prescribes the requirements
applicable to each certificate holder conducting helicopter air
ambulance operations.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this subpart, the following
definitions apply:
(1) Helicopter air ambulance operation means a flight, or sequence
of flights, with a patient or medical personnel on board, for the
purpose of medical transportation, by a part 135 certificate holder
authorized by the Administrator to conduct helicopter air ambulance
operations. A helicopter air ambulance operation includes, but is not
limited to--
(i) Flights conducted to position the helicopter at the site at
which a patient or donor organ will be picked up.
(ii) Flights conducted to reposition the helicopter after
completing the patient, or donor organ transport.
(iii) Flights initiated for the transport of a patient or donor
organ that are terminated due to weather or other reasons.
(2) Medical personnel means a person or persons with medical
training, including but not limited to flight physicians, flight
nurses, or flight paramedics, who are carried aboard a helicopter
during helicopter air ambulance operations in order to provide medical
care.
(3) Mountainous means designated mountainous areas as listed in
part 95 of this chapter.
(4) Nonmountainous means areas other than mountainous areas as
listed in part 95 of this chapter.
Sec. 135.603 Pilot-in-command instrument qualifications.
After April 24, 2017, no certificate holder may use, nor may any
person serve as, a pilot in command of a helicopter air ambulance
operation unless that person meets the requirements of Sec. 135.243
and holds a helicopter instrument rating or an airline transport pilot
certificate with a category and class rating for that aircraft, that is
not limited to VFR.
Sec. 135.605 Helicopter terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS).
(a) After April 24, 2017, no person may operate a helicopter in
helicopter air ambulance operations unless that helicopter is equipped
with a helicopter terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS) that
meets the requirements in TSO-C194 and Section 2 of RTCA DO-309.
(b) The certificate holder's Rotorcraft Flight Manual must contain
appropriate procedures for--
(1) The use of the HTAWS; and
(2) Proper flight crew response to HTAWS audio and visual warnings.
(c) Certificate holders with HTAWS required by this section with an
approved deviation under Sec. 21.618 of this chapter are in compliance
with this section.
(d) The standards required in this section are incorporated by
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce
any edition other than that specified in this section, the FAA must
publish notice of change in the Federal Register and the material must
be available to the public. All approved material is available for
inspection at the FAA's Office of Rulemaking (ARM-1), 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591 (telephone (202) 267-9677) and from
the sources indicated below. It is also available for inspection at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030 or go to
http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
(1) U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution
Office, DOT Warehouse M30, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th
Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; telephone (301) 322-5377. Copies are also
available on the FAA's Web site. Use the following link and type the
TSO number in the search box: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/Frameset?OpenPage.
(i) TSO C-194, Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System
(HTAWS), Dec. 17, 2008.
(ii) [Reserved]
(2) RTCA, Inc., 1150 18th Street NW., Suite 910, Washington, DC
20036, telephone (202) 833-9339, and are also available on RTCA's Web
site at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/index.cfm.
(i) RTCA DO-309, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
for Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS) Airborne
Equipment, Mar. 13, 2008.
(ii) [Reserved]
Sec. 135.607 Flight Data Monitoring System.
After April 23, 2018, no person may operate a helicopter in air
ambulance operations unless it is equipped with an approved flight data
monitoring system capable of recording flight performance data. This
system must:
(a) Receive electrical power from the bus that provides the maximum
reliability for operation without jeopardizing service to essential or
emergency loads, and
(b) Be operated from the application of electrical power before
takeoff until the removal of electrical power after termination of
flight.
Sec. 135.609 VFR ceiling and visibility requirements for Class G
airspace.
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the certificate holder's
operations specifications, when conducting
[[Page 9976]]
helicopter air ambulance operations in Class G airspace, the weather
minimums in the following table apply:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.021
(b) A certificate holder may designate local flying areas in a
manner acceptable to the Administrator, that must--
(1) Not exceed 50 nautical miles in any direction from each
designated location;
(2) Take into account obstacles and terrain features that are
easily identifiable by the pilot in command and from which the pilot in
command may visually determine a position; and
(3) Take into account the operating environment and capabilities of
the certificate holder's helicopters.
(c) A pilot must demonstrate a level of familiarity with the local
flying area by passing an examination given by the certificate holder
within the 12 calendar months prior to using the local flying area.
Sec. 135.611 IFR operations at locations without weather reporting.
(a) If a certificate holder is authorized to conduct helicopter IFR
operations, the Administrator may authorize the certificate holder to
conduct IFR helicopter air ambulance operations at airports with an
instrument approach procedure and at which a weather report is not
available from the U.S. National Weather Service (NWS), a source
approved by the NWS, or a source approved by the FAA, subject to the
following limitations:
(1) The certificate holder must obtain a weather report from a
weather reporting facility operated by the NWS, a source approved by
the NWS, or a source approved by the FAA, that is located within 15
nautical miles of the airport. If a weather report is not available,
the certificate holder may obtain the area forecast from the NWS, a
source approved by the NWS, or a source approved by the FAA, for
information regarding the weather observed in the vicinity of the
airport;
(2) Flight planning for IFR flights conducted under this paragraph
must include selection of an alternate airport that meets the
requirements of Sec. Sec. 135.221 and 135.223;
(3) In Class G airspace, IFR departures are authorized only after
the pilot in command determines that the weather conditions at the
departure point are at or above VFR minimums in accordance with Sec.
135.609; and
(4) All approaches must be conducted at Category A approach speeds
as established in part 97 or those required for the type of approach
being used.
(b) Each helicopter air ambulance operated under this section must
be equipped with functioning severe weather detection equipment.
(c) Pilots conducting operations pursuant to this section may use
the weather information obtained in paragraph (a) to satisfy the
weather report and forecast requirements of Sec. 135.213 and Sec.
135.225(a).
(d) After completing a landing at the airport at which a weather
report is not available, the pilot in command is authorized to
determine if the weather meets the takeoff requirements of part 97 of
this chapter or the certificate holder's operations specification, as
applicable.
Sec. 135.613 Approach/departure IFR transitions.
(a) Approaches. When conducting an authorized instrument approach
and transitioning from IFR to VFR flight, upon transitioning to VFR
flight the following weather minimums apply--
(1) For Point-in-Space (PinS) Copter Instrument approaches
annotated with a ``Proceed VFR'' segment, if the distance from the
missed approach point to the landing area is 1 NM or less, flight
visibility must be at least 1 statute mile and the ceiling on the
approach chart applies;
(2) For all instrument approaches, including PinS when paragraph
(a)(1) of this section does not apply, if the distance from the missed
approach point to the landing area is 3 NM or less, the applicable VFR
weather minimums are--
(i) For Day Operations: No less than a 600-foot ceiling and 2
statute miles flight visibility;
(ii) For Night Operations: No less than a 600-foot ceiling and 3
statute miles flight visibility; or
(3) For all instrument approaches, including PinS, if the distance
from the missed approach point to the landing area is greater than 3
NM, the VFR weather minimums required by the class of airspace.
(b) Departures. For transitions from VFR to IFR upon departure--
(1) The VFR weather minimums of paragraph (a) of this section apply
if--
(i) An FAA-approved obstacle departure procedure is followed; and
(ii) An IFR clearance is obtained on or before reaching a
predetermined
[[Page 9977]]
location that is not more than 3 NM from the departure location.
(2) If the departure does not meet the requirements of paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, the VFR weather minimums required by the class
of airspace apply.
Sec. 135.615 VFR flight planning.
(a) Pre-flight. Prior to conducting VFR operations, the pilot in
command must--
(1) Determine the minimum safe cruise altitude by evaluating the
terrain and obstacles along the planned route of flight;
(2) Identify and document the highest obstacle along the planned
route of flight; and
(3) Using the minimum safe cruise altitudes in paragraphs (b)(1)-
(2) of this section, determine the minimum required ceiling and
visibility to conduct the planned flight by applying the weather
minimums appropriate to the class of airspace for the planned flight.
(b) Enroute. While conducting VFR operations, the pilot in command
must ensure that all terrain and obstacles along the route of flight
are cleared vertically by no less than the following:
(1) 300 feet for day operations.
(2) 500 feet for night operations.
(c) Rerouting the planned flight path. A pilot in command may
deviate from the planned flight path for reasons such as weather
conditions or operational considerations. Such deviations do not
relieve the pilot in command of the weather requirements or the
requirements for terrain and obstacle clearance contained in this part
and in part 91 of this chapter. Rerouting, change in destination, or
other changes to the planned flight that occur while the helicopter is
on the ground at an intermediate stop require evaluation of the new
route in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) Operations manual. Each certificate holder must document its
VFR flight planning procedures in its operations manual.
Sec. 135.617 Pre-flight risk analysis.
(a) Each certificate holder conducting helicopter air ambulance
operations must establish, and document in its operations manual, an
FAA-approved preflight risk analysis that includes at least the
following--
(1) Flight considerations, to include obstacles and terrain along
the planned route of flight, landing zone conditions, and fuel
requirements;
(2) Human factors, such as crew fatigue, life events, and other
stressors;
(3) Weather, including departure, en route, destination, and
forecasted;
(4) A procedure for determining whether another helicopter air
ambulance operator has refused or rejected a flight request; and
(5) Strategies and procedures for mitigating identified risks,
including procedures for obtaining and documenting approval of the
certificate holder's management personnel to release a flight when a
risk exceeds a level predetermined by the certificate holder.
(b) Each certificate holder must develop a preflight risk analysis
worksheet to include, at a minimum, the items in paragraph (a) of this
section.
(c) Prior to the first leg of each helicopter air ambulance
operation, the pilot in command must conduct a preflight risk analysis
and complete the preflight risk analysis worksheet in accordance with
the certificate holder's FAA-approved procedures. The pilot in command
must sign the preflight risk analysis worksheet and specify the date
and time it was completed.
(d) The certificate holder must retain the original or a copy of
each completed preflight risk analysis worksheet at a location
specified in its operations manual for at least 90 days from the date
of the operation.
Sec. 135.619 Operations control centers.
(a) Operations control center. After April 22, 2016, certificate
holders authorized to conduct helicopter air ambulance operations, with
10 or more helicopter air ambulances assigned to the certificate
holder's operations specifications, must have an operations control
center. The operations control center must be staffed by operations
control specialists who, at a minimum--
(1) Provide two-way communications with pilots;
(2) Provide pilots with weather briefings, to include current and
forecasted weather along the planned route of flight;
(3) Monitor the progress of the flight; and
(4) Participate in the preflight risk analysis required under Sec.
135.617 to include the following:
(i) Ensure the pilot has completed all required items on the
preflight risk analysis worksheet;
(ii) Confirm and verify all entries on the preflight risk analysis
worksheet;
(iii) Assist the pilot in mitigating any identified risk prior to
takeoff; and
(iv) Acknowledge in writing, specifying the date and time, that the
preflight risk analysis worksheet has been accurately completed and
that, according to their professional judgment, the flight can be
conducted safely.
(b) Operations control center staffing. Each certificate holder
conducting helicopter air ambulance operations must provide enough
operations control specialists at each operations control center to
ensure the certificate holder maintains operational control of each
flight.
(c) Documentation of duties and responsibilities. Each certificate
holder must describe in its operations manual the duties and
responsibilities of operations control specialists, including preflight
risk mitigation strategies and control measures, shift change
checklist, and training and testing procedures to hold the position,
including procedures for retesting.
(d) Training requirements. No certificate holder may use, nor may
any person perform the duties of, an operations control specialist
unless the operations control specialist has satisfactorily completed
the training requirements of this paragraph.
(1) Initial training. Before performing the duties of an operations
control specialist, each person must satisfactorily complete the
certificate holder's FAA-approved operations control specialist initial
training program and pass an FAA-approved knowledge and practical test
given by the certificate holder. Initial training must include a
minimum of 80 hours of training on the topics listed in paragraph (f)
of this section. A certificate holder may reduce the number of hours of
initial training to a minimum of 40 hours for persons who have
obtained, at the time of beginning initial training, a total of at
least 2 years of experience during the last 5 years in any one or in
any combination of the following areas--
(i) In military aircraft operations as a pilot, flight navigator,
or meteorologist;
(ii) In air carrier operations as a pilot, flight engineer,
certified aircraft dispatcher, or meteorologist; or
(iii) In aircraft operations as an air traffic controller or a
flight service specialist.
(2) Recurrent training. Every 12 months after satisfactory
completion of the initial training, each operations control specialist
must complete a minimum of 40 hours of recurrent training on the topics
listed in paragraph (f) of this section and pass an FAA-approved
knowledge and practical test given by the certificate holder on those
topics.
(e) Training records. The certificate holder must maintain a
training record for each operations control specialist employed by the
certificate holder for the duration of that individual's employment and
for 90 days thereafter.
[[Page 9978]]
The training record must include a chronological log for each training
course, including the number of training hours and the examination
dates and results.
(f) Training topics. Each certificate holder must have an FAA-
approved operations control specialist training program that covers at
least the following topics--
(1) Aviation weather, including:
(i) General meteorology;
(ii) Prevailing weather;
(iii) Adverse and deteriorating weather;
(iv) Windshear;
(v) Icing conditions;
(vi) Use of aviation weather products;
(vii) Available sources of information; and
(viii) Weather minimums;
(2) Navigation, including:
(i) Navigation aids;
(ii) Instrument approach procedures;
(iii) Navigational publications; and
(iv) Navigation techniques;
(3) Flight monitoring, including:
(i) Available flight-monitoring procedures; and
(ii) Alternate flight-monitoring procedures;
(4) Air traffic control, including:
(i) Airspace;
(ii) Air traffic control procedures;
(iii) Aeronautical charts; and
(iv) Aeronautical data sources;
(5) Aviation communication, including:
(i) Available aircraft communications systems;
(ii) Normal communication procedures;
(iii) Abnormal communication procedures; and
(iv) Emergency communication procedures;
(6) Aircraft systems, including:
(i) Communications systems;
(ii) Navigation systems;
(iii) Surveillance systems;
(iv) Fueling systems;
(v) Specialized systems;
(vi) General maintenance requirements; and
(vii) Minimum equipment lists;
(7) Aircraft limitations and performance, including:
(i) Aircraft operational limitations;
(ii) Aircraft performance;
(iii) Weight and balance procedures and limitations; and
(iv) Landing zone and landing facility requirements;
(8) Aviation policy and regulations, including:
(i) 14 CFR Parts 1, 27, 29, 61, 71, 91, and 135;
(ii) 49 CFR Part 830;
(iii) Company operations specifications;
(iv) Company general operations policies;
(v) Enhanced operational control policies;
(vi) Aeronautical decision making and risk management;
(vii) Lost aircraft procedures; and
(viii) Emergency and search and rescue procedures, including
plotting coordinates in degrees, minutes, seconds format, and degrees,
decimal minutes format;
(9) Crew resource management, including:
(i) Concepts and practical application;
(ii) Risk management and risk mitigation; and
(iii) Pre-flight risk analysis procedures required under Sec.
135.617;
(10) Local flying area orientation, including:
(i) Terrain features;
(ii) Obstructions;
(iii) Weather phenomena for local area;
(iv) Airspace and air traffic control facilities;
(v) Heliports, airports, landing zones, and fuel facilities;
(vi) Instrument approaches;
(vii) Predominant air traffic flow;
(viii) Landmarks and cultural features, including areas prone to
flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions; and
(ix) Local aviation and safety resources and contact information;
and
(11) Any other requirements as determined by the Administrator to
ensure safe operations.
(g) Operations control specialist duty time limitations. (1) Each
certificate holder must establish the daily duty period for an
operations control specialist so that it begins at a time that allows
that person to become thoroughly familiar with operational
considerations, including existing and anticipated weather conditions
in the area of operations, helicopter operations in progress, and
helicopter maintenance status, before performing duties associated with
any helicopter air ambulance operation. The operations control
specialist must remain on duty until relieved by another qualified
operations control specialist or until each helicopter air ambulance
monitored by that person has completed its flight or gone beyond that
person's jurisdiction.
(2) Except in cases where circumstances or emergency conditions
beyond the control of the certificate holder require otherwise--
(i) No certificate holder may schedule an operations control
specialist for more than 10 consecutive hours of duty;
(ii) If an operations control specialist is scheduled for more than
10 hours of duty in 24 consecutive hours, the certificate holder must
provide that person a rest period of at least 8 hours at or before the
end of 10 hours of duty;
(iii) If an operations control specialist is on duty for more than
10 consecutive hours, the certificate holder must provide that person a
rest period of at least 8 hours before that person's next duty period;
(iv) Each operations control specialist must be relieved of all
duty with the certificate holder for at least 24 consecutive hours
during any 7 consecutive days.
(h) Drug and alcohol testing. Operations control specialists must
be tested for drugs and alcohol according to the certificate holder's
Drug and Alcohol Testing Program administered under part 120 of this
chapter.
Sec. 135.621 Briefing of medical personnel.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, prior to
each helicopter air ambulance operation, each pilot in command, or
other flight crewmember designated by the certificate holder, must
ensure that all medical personnel have been briefed on the following--
(1) Passenger briefing requirements in Sec. 135.117(a) and (b);
and
(2) Physiological aspects of flight;
(3) Patient loading and unloading;
(4) Safety in and around the helicopter;
(5) In-flight emergency procedures;
(6) Emergency landing procedures;
(7) Emergency evacuation procedures;
(8) Efficient and safe communications with the pilot; and
(9) Operational differences between day and night operations, if
appropriate.
(b) The briefing required in paragraphs (a)(2) through (9) of this
section may be omitted if all medical personnel on board have
satisfactorily completed the certificate holder's FAA-approved medical
personnel training program within the preceding 24 calendar months.
Each training program must include a minimum of 4 hours of ground
training, and 4 hours of training in and around an air ambulance
helicopter, on the topics set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this
section.
(c) Each certificate holder must maintain a record for each person
trained under this section that--
(1) Contains the individual's name, the most recent training
completion date, and a description, copy, or reference to training
materials used to meet the training requirement.
(2) Is maintained for 24 calendar months following the individual's
completion of training.
[[Page 9979]]
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a),
49 U.S.C. 44730, in Washington, DC, on February 18, 2014.
Michael P. Huerta,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
[FR Doc. 2014-03689 Filed 2-20-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P