[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 249 (Friday, December 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78811-78812]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-31156]
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CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD
Sunshine Act Meeting
TIME AND DATE: January 15, 2014, 6:30 p.m.-8:30 p.m. PST.
PLACE: City Council Chambers, Civic Center Campus, 440 Civic Center
Plaza, Richmond, CA 94804.
STATUS: Open to the public.
Matters To Be Considered The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB) will convene a public meeting on January 15, 2014, starting
at 6:30 p.m. at the City Council Chambers, Civic Center Campus, 440
Civic Center Plaza, Richmond, CA 94804. At the public meeting, the
Board will consider and vote on the draft regulatory report of the
August 6, 2012, fire at the Chevron refinery that endangered 19 workers
and sent more than 15,000 residents to the hospital for medical
attention.
At the meeting, CSB staff will present to the Board the results of
the second of three reports in the CSB's investigation of this
incident. Subject to a vote by the board at the January 15 public
meeting, the draft regulatory report would recommend that California
``Develop and implement a step-by-step plan to establish a more
rigorous safety management regulatory framework for petroleum
refineries in the state of California based on the principles of the
`safety case' framework in use in regulatory regimes such as those in
the UK, Australia, and Norway.'' The recommendation urges specific
steps to accomplish this, including ensuring that workers are formally
involved in the development of a safety case report for each covered
facility. The report also urges California to work with industry in
gathering refinery safety indicator data to be shared with the public.
As detailed in the CSB draft report, a safety case regime which
would require companies to demonstrate to refinery industry
regulators--through a written ``safety case report''--how major hazards
are to be controlled and risks reduced to ``as low as reasonably
practicable,'' or ALARP. The CSB report notes that the safety case is
more than a written document; rather, it represents a fundamental
change by shifting the responsibility for continuous reductions in
major accident risks from regulators to the company.
To ensure that a facility's safety goals and programs are
accomplished, a safety case report generated by the company is
rigorously reviewed, audited, and enforced by highly trained regulatory
inspectors, whose technical training and experience are on par with the
personnel employed by the companies they oversee, the draft report
says.
The CSB's first interim report--which was voted on and approved by
the board at a public meeting in Richmond, CA, on April 19, 2013--found
that Chevron repeatedly failed over a ten-year period to apply
inherently safer design principles and upgrade piping in its crude oil
processing unit, which was extremely corroded and ultimately ruptured
on August 6, 2012. The CSB's investigation identified missed
opportunities on the part of Chevron to apply inherently safer piping
design through the use of more corrosion-resistant metal alloys. The
first interim report also found a failure by Chevron to identify and
evaluate damage mechanism hazards, which if acted upon, would likely
have identified the possibility of a catastrophic sulfidation
corrosion-related piping failure. There are currently no federal or
state regulatory requirements to apply these important preventative
measures. The investigation team concluded that enhanced regulatory
oversight with greater worker involvement and public participation are
needed to improve petroleum refinery safety.
Following the staff presentation on proposed findings and safety
recommendations, the Board will hear comments from the public.
Following the conclusion of the public comment period, the Board
will consider whether to approve the final report and recommendations.
All staff presentations are preliminary and are intended solely to
allow the Board to consider in a public forum the issues and factors
involved in this case. No factual analyses, conclusions, or findings
presented by staff should be considered final.
Only after the Board has considered the staff presentations,
listened to public comments, and adopted a final investigation report
and recommendations will there be an approved final record of the CSB
investigation of this incident.
Additional Information
The meeting is free and open to the public. If you require a
translator or interpreter, please notify the individual listed below as
the ``Contact Person for Further Information,'' at least five business
days prior to the meeting.
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating
accidents and hazards that result, or may result, in the catastrophic
release of extremely hazardous substances. The agency's Board Members
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. CSB
investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents and hazards,
including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as
inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management
systems.
Public Comment
Members of the public are invited to make brief statements to the
Board at the conclusion of the staff presentation. The time provided
for public statements will depend upon the number of people who wish to
speak. Speakers should assume that their presentations will be limited
to five minutes or less, and may submit written statements for the
record.
[[Page 78812]]
Contact Person for Further Information
Hillary J. Cohen, Communications Manager, [email protected] or
(202) 446-8094. General information about the CSB can be found on the
agency Web site at: www.csb.gov.
Dated: December 23, 2013.
Rafael Moure-Eraso,
Chairperson.
[FR Doc. 2013-31156 Filed 12-24-13; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6350-01-P