[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 249 (Friday, December 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78923-78937]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-30980]


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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION


Comparability Determination for the European Union: Certain 
Entity-Level Requirements

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Comparability Determination for Certain Requirements 
under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation.

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SUMMARY: The following is the analysis and determination of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') regarding certain 
parts of a joint request by the European Commission (``EC'') and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (``ESMA'') that the 
Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in the 
European Union (``EU'') provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative 
finding of comparability with respect to the following regulatory 
obligations applicable to swap dealers (``SDs'') and major swap 
participants (``MSPs'') registered with the Commission: (i) Chief 
compliance officer; (ii) risk management; and (iii) swap data 
recordkeeping; (collectively, the ``Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements'').

DATES: Effective Date: This determination will become effective 
immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Barnett, Director, 202-418-5977, 
[email protected], Frank Fisanich, Chief Counsel, 202-418-5949, 
[email protected], and Ellie Jester, Special Counsel, 202-418-5874, 
[email protected], Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    On July 26, 2013, the Commission published in the Federal Register 
its ``Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations'' (the ``Guidance'').\1\ In the Guidance, 
the

[[Page 78924]]

Commission set forth its interpretation of the manner in which it 
believes that section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') 
applies Title VII's swap provisions to activities outside the U.S. and 
informed the public of some of the policies that it expects to follow, 
generally speaking, in applying Title VII and certain Commission 
regulations in contexts covered by section 2(i). Among other matters, 
the Guidance generally described the policy and procedural framework 
under which the Commission would consider a substituted compliance 
program with respect to Commission regulations applicable to entities 
located outside the U.S. Specifically, the Commission addressed a 
recognition program where compliance with a comparable regulatory 
requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve as a reasonable 
substitute for compliance with the attendant requirements of the CEA 
and the Commission's regulations promulgated thereunder.
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    \1\ 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 2013). The Commission originally 
published proposed and further proposed guidance on July 12, 2012 
and January 7, 2013, respectively. See Cross-Border Application of 
Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 FR 41214 
(July 12, 2012) and Further Proposed Guidance Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 909 (Jan. 7, 2013).
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    In addition to the Guidance, on July 22, 2013, the Commission 
issued the Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations (the ``Exemptive Order'').\2\ Among other things, the 
Exemptive Order provided time for the Commission to consider 
substituted compliance with respect to six jurisdictions where non-U.S. 
SDs are currently organized. In this regard, the Exemptive Order 
generally provided non-U.S. SDs and MSPs in the six jurisdictions with 
conditional relief from certain requirements of Commission regulations 
(those referred to as ``Entity-Level Requirements'' in the Guidance) 
until the earlier of December 21, 2013, or 30 days following the 
issuance of a substituted compliance determination.\3\
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    \2\ 78 FR 43785 (July 22, 2013).
    \3\ The Entity-Level Requirements under the Exemptive Order 
consist of 17 CFR 1.31, 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 
23.603, 23.605, 23.606, 23.608, 23.609, and parts 45 and 46 of the 
Commission's regulations.
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    On May 7, 2013, the EC and ESMA (collectively, the ``applicant'') 
submitted a request that the Commission determine that laws and 
regulations applicable in the EU provide a sufficient basis for an 
affirmative finding of comparability with respect to certain Entity-
Level Requirements, including the Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements.\4\ The applicant provided Commission staff with an 
updated submission on August 6, 2013. On November 11, 2013, the 
application was further supplemented with corrections and additional 
materials. The following is the Commission's analysis and determination 
regarding the Internal Business Conduct Requirements, as detailed 
below.\5\
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    \4\ For purposes of this notice, the Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements consist of 17 CFR 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 
23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606.
    \5\ This notice does not address swap data repository reporting 
(``SDR Reporting''). The Commission may provide a comparability 
determination with respect to the SDR Reporting requirement in a 
separate notice.
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II. Background

    On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act\6\ (``Dodd-Frank Act'' or ``Dodd-
Frank''), which, in Title VII, established a new regulatory framework 
for swaps.
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    \6\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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    Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding 
section 2(i), which provides that the swap provisions of the CEA 
(including any CEA rules or regulations) apply to cross-border 
activities when certain conditions are met, namely, when such 
activities have a ``direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States'' or when they 
contravene Commission rules or regulations as are necessary or 
appropriate to prevent evasion of the swap provisions of the CEA 
enacted under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.\7\ In the three years 
since its enactment, the Commission has finalized 68 rules and orders 
to implement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. The finalized rules 
include those promulgated under section 4s of the CEA, which address 
registration of SDs and MSPs and other substantive requirements 
applicable to SDs and MSPs. With few exceptions, the delayed compliance 
dates for the Commission's regulations implementing such section 4s 
requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs have passed and new SDs and 
MSPs are now required to be in full compliance with such regulations 
upon registration with the Commission.\8\ Notably, the requirements 
under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act related to SDs and MSPs by their 
terms apply to all registered SDs and MSPs, irrespective of where they 
are located, albeit subject to the limitations of CEA section 2(i).
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    \7\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
    \8\ The compliance dates are summarized on the Compliance Dates 
page of the Commission's Web site. (http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ComplianceDates/index.htm.)
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    To provide guidance as to the Commission's views regarding the 
scope of the cross-border application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Commission set forth in the Guidance its interpretation of the 
manner in which it believes that Title VII's swap provisions apply to 
activities outside the U.S. pursuant to section 2(i) of the CEA. Among 
other matters, the Guidance generally described the policy and 
procedural framework under which the Commission would consider a 
substituted compliance program with respect to Commission regulations 
applicable to entities located outside the U.S. Specifically, the 
Commission addressed a recognition program where compliance with a 
comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve 
as a reasonable substitute for compliance with the attendant 
requirements of the CEA and the Commission's regulations. With respect 
to the standards forming the basis for any determination of 
comparability (``comparability determination'' or ``comparability 
finding''), the Commission stated:

    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign 
regulatory requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the 
applicable requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, 
the Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to, the comprehensiveness of those 
requirement(s), the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s), the comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, as well as the home jurisdiction's 
authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant. In 
this context, comparable does not necessarily mean identical. 
Rather, the Commission would evaluate whether the home 
jurisdiction's regulatory requirement is comparable to and as 
comprehensive as the corresponding U.S. regulatory 
requirement(s).\9\

    \9\ 78 FR 45342-45.
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    Upon a comparability finding, consistent with CEA section 2(i) and 
comity principles, the Commission's policy generally is that eligible 
entities may comply with a substituted compliance regime, subject to 
any conditions the Commission places on its finding, and subject to the 
Commission's retention of its examination authority and its enforcement 
authority.\10\
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    \10\ See the Guidance, 78 FR 45342-44.
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    In this regard, the Commission notes that a comparability 
determination cannot be premised on whether an SD or MSP must disclose 
comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction, 
but rather on whether information relevant to the Commission's 
oversight of an SD or MSP would be directly available to the Commission 
and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP.\11\ The

[[Page 78925]]

Commission's direct access to the books and records required to be 
maintained by an SD or MSP registered with the Commission is a core 
requirement of the CEA\12\ and the Commission's regulations,\13\ and is 
a condition to registration.\14\
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    \11\ Under Sec. Sec.  23.203 and 23.606, all records required by 
the CEA and the Commission's regulations to be maintained by a 
registered SD or MSP shall be maintained in accordance with 
Commission regulation 1.31 and shall be open for inspection by 
representatives of the Commission, the United States Department of 
Justice, or any applicable prudential regulator.
    In its Final Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 FR 858 (Jan. 7, 2013), the Commission noted 
that an applicant for registration as an SD or MSP must file a Form 
7-R with the National Futures Association and that Form 7-R was 
being modified at that time to address existing blocking, privacy, 
or secrecy laws of foreign jurisdictions that applied to the books 
and records of SDs and MSPs acting in those jurisdictions. See id. 
at 871-72 n. 107. The modifications to Form 7-R were a temporary 
measure intended to allow SDs and MSPs to apply for registration in 
a timely manner in recognition of the existence of the blocking, 
privacy, and secrecy laws. In the Guidance, the Commission clarified 
that the change to Form 7-R impacts the registration application 
only and does not modify the Commission's authority under the CEA 
and its regulations to access records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs. Commission access to a registrant's books and records is a 
fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly monitor and 
examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and the 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto. The Commission has maintained 
an ongoing dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis with 
foreign regulators and with registrants to address books and records 
access issues and may consider appropriate measures where requested 
to do so.
    \12\ See e.g., sections 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the 
CEA.
    \13\ See e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.203(b) and 23.606.
    \14\ See supra note 10.
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III. Regulation of SDs and MSPs in the EU

    On May 7, 2013, the EC and ESMA submitted a request that the 
Commission assess the comparability of laws and regulations applicable 
in the EU with the CEA and the Commission's regulations promulgated 
thereunder. The applicant provided Commission staff with an updated 
submission on August 6, 2013. On November 11, 2013, the application was 
further supplemented with corrections and additional materials.
    As represented to the Commission by the applicant, swap activities 
in the EU member states is governed primarily by the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (``EMIR'').\15\
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    \15\ EMIR: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF
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    EMIR and the Regulatory Technical Standards (``RTS'') are 
regulations with immediate, binding, and direct effect in all EU member 
states (i.e., no transposition into domestic law required). EMIR 
entered into force on August 16, 2012.
    In addition, as represented to the Commission by the applicant, 
swap activities in the EU are also governed by a number of regulatory 
requirements other than EMIR.
    Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (``MiFID)'':\16\ MiFID 
is a directive and in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, all Member States of the EU are legally bound to 
implement the provisions of MiFID by November 1, 2007, by transposing 
them into their national laws. MiFID applies in particular to 
investment firms, which comprise any legal person whose regular 
occupation or business is the provision of one or more investment 
services to third parties and/or the performance of one or more 
investment activities on a professional basis. Investment services and 
activities means any of the services and activities listed in Section A 
of Annex I of MiFID relating to any of the instruments listed in 
Section C of Annex I of MiFID. Section C of Annex 1 refers explicitly 
to swaps as well as ``other derivative financial instruments''.
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    \16\ Directive 2004/39/EC and the relevant implementing measures 
(Directive 2006/73/EC and Regulation 1287/2006). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0039:EN:NOT
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    Capital Requirements Directive (``CRD''):\17\ CRD is also a 
directive and in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, all Member States of the EU are legally bound to 
implement the provisions of CRD by December 31, 2006, by transposing 
them into their national laws.\18\
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    \17\ Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions.http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006L0048:20100330:EN:PDF.The current 
version of CRD will soon be replaced by CRD IV. CRD IV entered into 
force on June 28, 2013, and shall apply in most of its parts from 
January 1, 2014.
    \18\ Because the applicant's request and the Commission's 
determinations herein are based on the comparability of EU 
requirements applicable to entities subject to EMIR, MiFID, and CRD, 
an SD or MSP that is not subject to the requirements of EMIR, MiFID, 
or CRD upon which the Commission bases its determinations, may not 
be able to rely on the Commission's comparability determinations 
herein. The applicant has noted for the Commission that the concept 
of an MSP is not explicitly mirrored in EU legislation and so it 
cannot be confirmed that MSPs would always be covered by EMIR, 
MiFID, or CRD. However, the applicant states that the definition of 
an ``investment firm'' under MiFID is considerably wider than that 
of an SD, and thus MSP's should, in most cases, be caught within the 
definition of ``investment firm.''
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    Due to the requirement that each EU Member State transpose MiFID 
and CRD into its national law, the comparability determinations in this 
notice are based on the representations of the applicant to the 
Commission that (i) each Member State of the EU where an SD or MSP 
would seek to rely on substituted compliance on the basis of the 
comparability of the MiFID or CRD standards has completed the process 
of transposing MiFID and CRD into its national law;\19\ (ii) such 
national laws have transposed MiFID and CRD without change in any 
aspect that is material for a comparability determination contained 
herein; and (iii) such transposed law is in full force and effect as of 
the time that any SD or MSP seeks to rely on a relevant comparability 
determination contained herein. The Commission notes that to the extent 
that any of the foregoing representations are incorrect, an affected 
comparability determination will not be valid.
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    \19\ See the Web site of the European Commission for 
confirmation of the transposition of MiFID into the national law of 
each Member State, available here: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transposition/table_en.pdf. Note that the 
issue of partial implementation in the Netherlands was resolved in 
2008, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_08_05_06.htm. The Commission notes that the EC has certified to the 
Commission that each Member State in which a registered SD or MSP is 
organized has completed the transposition process (e.g., Ireland, 
UK, France, Spain, and Germany).
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    In addition to MiFID and CRD, the applicant noted that there are a 
number of proposed laws and regulations that, when implemented, would 
affect the regulation of SDs and MSPs in the EU.\20\
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    \20\ The applicant provided information regarding MiFID II and 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (``MiFIR''), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid/index_en.htm, 
stating that these two proposals are part of the legislative package 
for the review of MiFID, and that the legislative process may be 
concluded with the adoption of the final political agreement by the 
end of 2013. The applicant further stated that an additional 18 to 
24 months will be needed to adopt implementing measures, with the 
overall package to be applied by the end of 2015.
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IV. Comparable and Comprehensiveness Standard

    The Commission's comparability analysis will be based on a 
comparison of specific foreign requirements against the specific 
related CEA provisions and Commission regulations as categorized and 
described in the Guidance. As explained in the Guidance, within the 
framework of CEA section 2(i) and principles of international comity, 
the Commission may make a comparability determination on a requirement-
by-requirement basis, rather than on the basis of the foreign regime as 
a whole.\21\ In making its comparability determinations, the Commission 
may include conditions that take into

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account timing and other issues related to coordinating the 
implementation of reform efforts across jurisdictions.\22\
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    \21\ 78 FR 45343.
    \22\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory 
requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the corollary 
requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission 
will take into consideration all relevant factors, including, but not 
limited to:
     The comprehensiveness of those requirement(s),
     The scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s),
     The comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, and
     The home jurisdiction's authority to support and enforce 
its oversight of the registrant.\23\
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    \23\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In making a comparability determination, the Commission takes an 
``outcome-based'' approach. An ``outcome-based'' approach means that 
when evaluating whether a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory 
requirements are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, the corollary 
areas of the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission ultimately 
focuses on regulatory outcomes (i.e., the home jurisdiction's 
requirements do not have to be identical).\24\ This approach recognizes 
that foreign regulatory systems differ and their approaches vary and 
may differ from how the Commission chose to address an issue, but that 
the foreign jurisdiction's regulatory requirements nonetheless achieve 
the regulatory outcome sought to be achieved by a certain provision of 
the CEA or Commission regulation.
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    \24\ 78 FR 45343. The Commission's substituted compliance 
program would generally be available for SDR Reporting, as outlined 
in the Guidance, only if the Commission has direct access to all of 
the data elements that are reported to a foreign trade repository 
pursuant to the substituted compliance program. Thus, direct access 
to swap data is a threshold matter to be addressed in a 
comparability evaluation for SDR Reporting. Moreover, the Commission 
explains in the Guidance that, due to its technical nature, a 
comparability evaluation for SDR Reporting ``will generally entail a 
detailed comparison and technical analysis.'' A more particularized 
analysis will generally be necessary to determine whether data 
stored in a foreign trade repository provides for effective 
Commission use, in furtherance of the regulatory purposes of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. See 78 FR 45345.
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    In doing its comparability analysis the Commission may determine 
that no comparability determination can be made \25\ and that the non-
U.S. SD or non-U.S. MSP, U.S. bank that is an SD or MSP with respect to 
its foreign branches, or non-registrant, to the extent applicable under 
the Guidance, may be required to comply with the CEA and Commission 
regulations.
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    \25\ A finding of comparability may not be possible for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that the foreign jurisdiction has not 
yet implemented or finalized particular requirements.
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    The starting point in the Commission's analysis is a consideration 
of the regulatory objectives of the foreign jurisdiction's regulation 
of swaps and swap market participants. As stated in the Guidance, 
jurisdictions may not have swap specific regulations in some areas, and 
instead have regulatory or supervisory regimes that achieve comparable 
and comprehensive regulation to the Dodd-Frank Act requirements, but on 
a more general, entity-wide, or prudential, basis.\26\ In addition, 
portions of a foreign regulatory regime may have similar regulatory 
objectives, but the means by which these objectives are achieved with 
respect to swaps market activities may not be clearly defined, or may 
not expressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission 
concludes are critical to achieving the regulatory objectives or 
outcomes required under the CEA and the Commission's regulations. In 
these circumstances, the Commission will work with the regulators and 
registrants in these jurisdictions to consider alternative approaches 
that may result in a determination that substituted compliance 
applies.\27\
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    \26\ 78 FR 45343.
    \27\ As explained in the Guidance, such ``approaches used will 
vary depending on the circumstances relevant to each jurisdiction. 
One example would include coordinating with the foreign regulators 
in developing appropriate regulatory changes or new regulations, 
particularly where changes or new regulations already are being 
considered or proposed by the foreign regulators or legislative 
bodies. As another example, the Commission may, after consultation 
with the appropriate regulators and market participants, include in 
its substituted compliance determination a description of the means 
by which certain swaps market participants can achieve substituted 
compliance within the construct of the foreign regulatory regime. 
The identification of the means by which substituted compliance is 
achieved would be designed to address the regulatory objectives and 
outcomes of the relevant Dodd-Frank Act requirements in a manner 
that does not conflict with a foreign regulatory regime and reduces 
the likelihood of inconsistent regulatory obligations. For example, 
the Commission may specify that [SDs] and MSPs in the jurisdiction 
undertake certain recordkeeping and documentation for swap 
activities that otherwise is only addressed by the foreign 
regulatory regime with respect to financial activities generally. In 
addition, the substituted compliance determination may include 
provisions for summary compliance and risk reporting to the 
Commission to allow the Commission to monitor whether the regulatory 
outcomes are being achieved. By using these approaches, in the 
interest of comity, the Commission would seek to achieve its 
regulatory objectives with respect to the Commission's registrants 
that are operating in foreign jurisdictions in a manner that works 
in harmony with the regulatory interests of those jurisdictions.'' 
78 FR 45343-44.
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    Finally, the Commission will generally rely on an applicant's 
description of the laws and regulations of the foreign jurisdiction in 
making its comparability determination. The Commission considers an 
application to be a representation by the applicant that the laws and 
regulations submitted are in full force and effect, that the 
description of such laws and regulations is accurate and complete, and 
that, unless otherwise noted, the scope of such laws and regulations 
encompasses the swaps activities \28\ of SDs and MSPs \29\ in the 
relevant jurisdictions.\30\ Further, as stated in the Guidance, the 
Commission expects that an applicant would notify the Commission of any 
material changes to information submitted in support of a comparability 
determination (including, but not limited to, changes in the relevant 
supervisory or regulatory regime) as, depending on the nature of the 
change, the Commission's comparability determination may no longer be 
valid.\31\
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    \28\ ``Swaps activities'' is defined in Commission regulation 
23.600(a)(7) to mean, ``with respect to a registrant, such 
registrant's activities related to swaps and any product used to 
hedge such swaps, including, but not limited to, futures, options, 
other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, 
foreign currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives.'' The 
Commission's regulations under 17 CFR Part 23 are limited in scope 
to the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs.
    \29\ No SD or MSP that is not legally required to comply with a 
law or regulation determined to be comparable may voluntarily comply 
with such law or regulation in lieu of compliance with the CEA and 
the relevant Commission regulation. Each SD or MSP that seeks to 
rely on a comparability determination is responsible for determining 
whether it is subject to the laws and regulations found comparable. 
Currently, there are no MSPs organized outside the U.S. and the 
Commission therefore cautions any non-financial entity organized 
outside the U.S. and applying for registration as an MSP to 
carefully consider whether the laws and regulations determined to be 
comparable herein are applicable to such entity.
    \30\ The Commission has provided the relevant foreign 
regulator(s) with opportunities to review and correct the 
applicant's description of such laws and regulations on which the 
Commission will base its comparability determination. The Commission 
relies on the accuracy and completeness of such review and any 
corrections received in making its comparability determinations. A 
comparability determination based on an inaccurate description of 
foreign laws and regulations may not be valid.
    \31\ 78 FR 45345.
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    The Guidance provided a detailed discussion of the Commission's 
policy regarding the availability of substituted

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compliance \32\ for the Internal Business Conduct Requirements.\33\
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    \32\ See 78 FR 45348-50. The Commission notes that registrants 
and other market participants are responsible for determining 
whether substituted compliance is available pursuant to the Guidance 
based on the comparability determination contained herein (including 
any conditions or exceptions), and its particular status and 
circumstances.
    \33\ This notice does not address Sec.  23.608 (Restrictions on 
counterparty clearing relationships). The Commission declines to 
take up the request for a comparability determination with respect 
to this regulation due to the Commission's view that there are not 
laws or regulations applicable in the EU to compare with the 
prohibitions and requirements of Sec.  23.608. The Commission may 
provide a comparability determination with respect to this 
regulation at a later date in consequence of further developments in 
the law and regulations applicable in the EU.
    This notice also does not address capital adequacy because the 
Commission has not yet finalized rules for SDs and MSPs in this 
area, nor SDR Reporting. The Commission may provide a comparability 
determination with respect to these requirements at a later date or 
in a separate notice.
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V. Supervisory Arrangement

    In the Guidance, the Commission stated that, in connection with a 
determination that substituted compliance is appropriate, it would 
expect to enter into an appropriate memorandum of understanding 
(``MOU'') or similar arrangement \34\ with the relevant foreign 
regulator(s). Although existing arrangements would indicate a foreign 
regulator's ability to cooperate and share information, ``going 
forward, the Commission and relevant foreign supervisor(s) would need 
to establish supervisory MOUs or other arrangements that provide for 
information sharing and cooperation in the context of supervising [SDs] 
and MSPs.'' \35\
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    \34\ An MOU is one type of arrangement between or among 
regulators. Supervisory arrangements could include, as appropriate, 
cooperative arrangements that are memorialized and executed as 
addenda to existing MOUs or, for example, as independent bilateral 
arrangements, statements of intent, declarations, or letters.
    \35\ 78 FR 45344.
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    The Commission is in the process of developing its registration and 
supervision regime for provisionally-registered SDs and MSPs. This new 
initiative includes setting forth supervisory arrangements with 
authorities that have joint jurisdiction over SDs and MSPs that are 
registered with the Commission and subject to U.S. law. Given the 
developing nature of the Commission's regime and the fact that the 
Commission has not negotiated prior supervisory arrangements with 
certain authorities, the negotiation of supervisory arrangements 
presents a unique opportunity to develop close working relationships 
between and among authorities, as well as highlight any potential 
issues related to cooperation and information sharing.
    Accordingly, the Commission is negotiating such a supervisory 
arrangement with each applicable foreign regulator of an SD or MSP. The 
Commission expects that the arrangement will establish expectations for 
ongoing cooperation, address direct access to information,\36\ provide 
for notification upon the occurrence of specified events, memorialize 
understandings related to on-site visits,\37\ and include protections 
related to the use and confidentiality of non-public information shared 
pursuant to the arrangement.
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    \36\ Section 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.606 require a registered SD or MSP to make all records 
required to be maintained in accordance with Commission regulation 
1.31 available promptly upon request to, among others, 
representatives of the Commission. See also 7 U.S.C. 6s(f); 17 CFR 
23.203. In the Guidance, the Commission states that it ``reserves 
this right to access records held by registered [SDs] and MSPs, 
including those that are non-U.S. persons who may comply with the 
Dodd-Frank recordkeeping requirement through substituted 
compliance.'' 78 FR 45345 n. 472; see also id. at 45342 n. 461 
(affirming the Commission's authority under the CEA and its 
regulations to access books and records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs as ``a fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly 
monitor and examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and 
the regulations adopted pursuant thereto'').
    \37\ The Commission retains its examination authority, both 
during the application process as well as upon and after 
registration of an SD or MSP. See 78 FR 45342 (stating Commission 
policy that ``eligible entities may comply with a substituted 
compliance regime under certain circumstances, subject, however, to 
the Commission's retention of its examination authority'') and 45344 
n. 471 (stating that the ``Commission may, as it deems appropriate 
and necessary, conduct an on-site examination of the applicant'').
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    These arrangements will establish a roadmap for how authorities 
will consult, cooperate, and share information. As with any such 
arrangement, however, nothing in these arrangements will supersede 
domestic laws or resolve potential conflicts of law, such as the 
application of domestic secrecy or blocking laws to regulated entities.

VI. Comparability Determination and Analysis

    The following section describes the requirements imposed by 
specific sections of the CEA and the Commission's regulations for the 
Internal Business Conduct Requirements that are the subject of this 
comparability determination, and the Commission's regulatory objectives 
with respect to such requirements. Immediately following a description 
of the requirement(s) and regulatory objective(s) of the specific 
Internal Business Conduct Requirements that the requestor submitted for 
a comparability determination, the Commission provides a description of 
the foreign jurisdiction's comparable laws, regulations, or rules and 
whether such laws, regulations, or rules meet the applicable regulatory 
objective.
    The Commission's determinations in this regard and the discussion 
in this section are intended to inform the public of the Commission's 
views regarding whether the foreign jurisdiction's laws, regulations, 
or rules may be comparable and comprehensive as those requirements in 
the Dodd-Frank Act (and Commission regulations promulgated thereunder) 
and therefore, may form the basis of substituted compliance. In turn, 
the public (in the foreign jurisdiction, in the United States, and 
elsewhere) retains its ability to present facts and circumstances that 
would inform the determinations set forth in this notice.
    As was stated in the Guidance, the Commission recognizes the 
complex and dynamic nature of the global swap market and the need to 
take an adaptable approach to cross-border issues, particularly as it 
continues to work closely with foreign regulators to address potential 
conflicts with respect to each country's respective regulatory regime. 
In this regard, the Commission may review, modify, or expand the 
determinations herein in light of comments received and future 
developments.

A. Chief Compliance Officer (Sec.  3.3).

    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(k) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 3.3 generally sets forth the following 
requirements for SDs and MSPs:
     An SD or MSP must designate an individual as Chief 
Compliance Officer (``CCO'');
     The CCO must have the responsibility and authority to 
develop the regulatory compliance policies and procedures of the SD or 
MSP;
     The CCO must report to the board of directors or the 
senior officer of the SD or MSP;
     Only the board of directors or a senior officer may remove 
the CCO;
     The CCO and the board of directors must meet at least once 
per year;
     The CCO must have the background and skills appropriate 
for the responsibilities of the position;
     The CCO must not be subject to disqualification from 
registration under sections 8a(2) or (3) of the CEA;
     Each SD and MSP must include a designation of a CCO in its 
registration application;

[[Page 78928]]

     The CCO must administer the regulatory compliance policies 
of the SD or MSP;
     The CCO must take reasonable steps to ensure compliance 
with the CEA and Commission regulations, and resolve conflicts of 
interest;
     The CCO must establish procedures for detecting and 
remediating non-compliance issues;
     The CCO must annually prepare and sign an ``annual 
compliance report'' containing: (i) A description of policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance; (ii) an assessment 
of the effectiveness of such policies and procedures; (iii) a 
description of material non-compliance issues and the action taken; 
(iv) recommendations of improvements in compliance policies; and (v) a 
certification by the CCO or chief executive officer that, to the best 
of such officer's knowledge and belief, the annual report is accurate 
and complete under penalty of law; and
     The annual compliance report must be furnished to the CFTC 
within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year of the SD or MSP, 
simultaneously with its annual financial condition report.
    Regulatory Objective: The Commission believes that compliance by 
SDs and MSPs with the CEA and the Commission's rules greatly 
contributes to the protection of customers, orderly and fair markets, 
and the stability and integrity of the market intermediaries registered 
with the Commission. The Commission expects SDs and MSPs to strictly 
comply with the CEA and the Commission's rules and to devote sufficient 
resources to ensuring such compliance. Thus, through its CCO rule, the 
Commission seeks to ensure firms have designated a qualified individual 
as CCO that reports directly to the board of directors or the senior 
officer of the firm and that has the independence, responsibility, and 
authority to develop and administer compliance policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations, resolve conflicts of interest, remediate noncompliance 
issues, and report annually to the Commission and the board or senior 
officer on compliance of the firm.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(k) of the CEA and 
Commission regulation 3.3.
    MiFID Articles 13(2), 13(3) and 18 set forth the general obligation 
for investment firms (which would include SDs) to establish adequate 
policies and procedures to ensure compliance with requirements and to 
identify and properly manage conflicts of interests.
    MiFID implementing measure (Commission Directive ``MiFID L2D'') 
Articles 5, 6, 9, 21 to 23 clarify, along with ESMA guidelines, the 
application of some aspects of the MiFID articles, to ensure common, 
uniform, and consistent application of MiFID and the MiFID L2D across 
the EU. The main principles are the following:
     Investment firms must appoint a person as compliance 
officer (``CO'') responsible for the compliance function (``CF'');
     The CO must have sufficiently broad knowledge/experience 
and high level of expertise to assume responsibility for the CF and 
ensure it is effective;
     Written reports must be sent to senior management (which 
includes boards of directors) on a regular basis (at least annually as 
well as on an ad-hoc basis when significant compliance matters are 
discovered);
     The CO must only be appointed and replaced by senior 
management or supervisory function;
     The CO, but also compliance staff, must have specific 
knowledge, skills and expertise relevant to the tasks and to the 
business of the firm;
     Supervisors must ensure compliance with above requirements 
in the authorization process of investment firms and during on-going 
supervision;
     CF, under the responsibility of the CO, must monitor and 
assess the adequacy and effectiveness of measures and procedures to 
ensure compliance with regulatory obligations and to address any 
deficiencies, including the obligation to identify and manage conflicts 
of interests and maintain effective conflicts of interest policies;
     Written report to address, at least annually: The 
description of implementation and effectiveness of the overall control 
environment; the summary of major findings of the review of policies 
and procedures; the summary of inspections and reviews carried out; the 
risk identified; and the advice on any necessary remedial action;
     The CF must be involved in all material non-routine 
correspondence with supervisors;
     The CF must be involved in all significant modifications 
of the organization of the investment firm;
     The CF must be independent;
     Senior management retains ultimate responsibility to 
ensure firms' compliance with obligations; and
     Investment firms must arrange for all records necessary to 
enable supervisors to monitor compliance with requirements.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID 
standards specified above are generally identical in intent to Sec.  
3.3 by seeking to ensure firms have designated a qualified individual 
as the compliance officer that reports directly to a sufficiently 
senior function of the firm and that has the independence, 
responsibility, and authority to develop and administer compliance 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with 
the CEA and Commission regulations, resolve conflicts of interest, 
remediate noncompliance issues, and report annually on compliance of 
the firm.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the CCO requirements of MiFID are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  3.3, with the exception of 
Sec.  3.3(f) concerning certifying and furnishing an annual compliance 
report to the Commission.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of MiFID are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  
3.3(f), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  3.3 and the MiFID standards 
specified above are applicable would generally be deemed to be in 
compliance with Sec.  3.3(f) if that SD or MSP complies with the MiFID 
standards specified above, subject to certifying and furnishing the 
Commission with the annual report required under the MiFID standards 
specified above in accordance with Sec.  3.3(f). The Commission notes 
that it generally expects registrants to submit required reports to the 
Commission in the English language.

B. Risk Management Duties (Sec. Sec.  23.600-23.609)

    Section 4s(j) of the CEA requires each SD and MSP to establish 
internal policies and procedures designed to, among other things, 
address risk management, monitor compliance with position limits, 
prevent conflicts of interest, and promote diligent supervision, as 
well as maintain business continuity and disaster recovery 
programs.\38\ The Commission adopted regulations 23.600, 23.601, 
23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606 to implement the statute.\39\ The

[[Page 78929]]

Commission also adopted regulation 23.609, which requires certain risk 
management procedures for SDs or MSPs that are clearing members of a 
derivatives clearing organization (``DCO'').\40\ Collectively, these 
requirements help to establish a robust and comprehensive internal risk 
management program for SDs and MSPs with respect to their swaps 
activities,\41\ which is critical to effective systemic risk management 
for the overall swaps market. In making its comparability determination 
with regard to these risk management duties, the Commission will 
consider each regulation individually.\42\
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    \38\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(j).
    \39\ See Final Swap Dealer and MSP Recordkeeping Rule, 77 FR 
20128 (April 3, 2012) (relating to risk management program, 
monitoring of position limits, business continuity and disaster 
recovery, conflicts of interest policies and procedures, and general 
information availability, respectively).
    \40\ See Customer Documentation Rule, 77 FR 21278. Also, SDs 
must comply with Commission regulation 23.608, which prohibits SD 
providing clearing services to customers from entering into 
agreements that would: (i) Disclose the identity of a customer's 
original executing counterparty; (ii) limit the number of 
counterparties a customer may trade with; (iii) impose counterparty-
based position limits; (iv) impair a customer's access to execution 
of a trade on terms that have a reasonable relationship to the best 
terms available; or (v) prevent compliance with specified time 
frames for acceptance of trades into clearing.
    \41\ ``Swaps activities'' is defined in Commission regulation 
23.600(a)(7) to mean, ``with respect to a registrant, such 
registrant's activities related to swaps and any product used to 
hedge such swaps, including, but not limited to, futures, options, 
other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, 
foreign currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives.'' The 
Commission's regulations under 17 CFR Part 23 are limited in scope 
to the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs.
    \42\ As stated above, this notice does not address Sec.  23.608 
(Restrictions on counterparty clearing relationships). The 
Commission declines to take up the request for a comparability 
determination with respect to this regulation due to the 
Commission's view that there are not laws or regulations applicable 
in the EU to compare with the prohibitions and requirements of Sec.  
23.608. The Commission may provide a comparability determination 
with respect to this regulation at a later date in consequence of 
further developments in the law and regulations applicable in the 
EU.
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1. Risk Management Program for SDs and MSPs (Sec.  23.600)
    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 23.600 generally requires that:
     Each SD or MSP must establish and enforce a risk 
management program consisting of a system of written risk management 
policies and procedures designed to monitor and manage the risks 
associated with the swap activities of the firm, including without 
limitation, market, credit, liquidity, foreign currency, legal, 
operational, and settlement risks, and furnish a copy of such policies 
and procedures to the CFTC upon application for registration and upon 
request;
     The SD or MSP must establish a risk management unit 
independent from the business trading unit;
     The risk management policies and procedures of the SD or 
MSP must be approved by the firm's governing body;
     Risk tolerance limits and exceptions therefrom must be 
reviewed and approved quarterly by senior management and annually by 
the governing body;
     The risk management program must have a system for 
detecting breaches of risk tolerance limits and alerting supervisors 
and senior management, as appropriate;
     The risk management program must account for risks posed 
by affiliates and be integrated at the consolidated entity level;
     The risk management unit must provide senior management 
and the governing body with quarterly risk exposure reports and upon 
detection of any material change in the risk exposure of the SD or MSP;
     Risk exposure reports must be furnished to the CFTC within 
five business days following provision to senior management;
     The risk management program must have a new product policy 
for assessing the risks of new products prior to engaging in such 
transactions;
     The risk management program must have policies and 
procedures providing for trading limits, monitoring of trading, 
processing of trades, and separation of personnel in the trading unit 
from personnel in the risk management unit; and
     The risk management program must be reviewed and tested at 
least annually and upon any material change in the business of the SD 
or MSP.
    Regulatory Objective: Through the required system of risk 
management, the Commission seeks to ensure that firms are adequately 
managing the risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the 
SD or MSP, which could result in losses to counterparties doing 
business with the SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally. To this 
end, the Commission believes the risk management program of an SD or 
MSP must contain at least the following critical elements:
     Identification of risk categories;
     Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category 
of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the 
governing body;
     An independent risk management unit to administer a risk 
management program; and
     Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management 
and the governing body.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA and 
Commission regulation 23.600.
     Under MiFID Article 13(5) & MiFID L2D Article 5, 
investment firms must have effective procedures for risk assessment, 
effective control, and safeguard arrangements for information 
processing systems, sound administrative and accounting procedures, and 
internal control mechanisms.
     Under MiFID L2D Article 6, investment firms (including 
SDs) must, subject to a proportionality principle dependent on the size 
and nature of a firm's business, establish and maintain an independent 
risk management function that is responsible for the implementation of 
risk management policies and procedures and that provides reports and 
advice to senior management regarding risk management.
     MiFID L2D Article 9: Senior management (which includes 
boards of directors) must take responsibility for firms' compliance 
with regulatory obligations including risk management.
     MiFID L2D Article 9: Senior management must receive on a 
frequent basis, and at least annually, written reports on risk 
management issues, including any appropriate action taken in the event 
of deficiencies;
     MiFID L2D Article 7: Investment firms must identify the 
risks relating to the firms' activities, processes and systems, and set 
the level of risk tolerated by the firm in appropriate instances; must 
adopt effective arrangements, processes, and mechanisms to manage the 
risks relating to the firm's activities, processes and systems, in 
light of the established level of risk tolerance; must monitor the 
adequacy and effectiveness of its risk management policies and 
procedures, the level of compliance with arrangements, processes and 
mechanisms for risk management; and must monitor the adequacy and 
effectiveness of measures taken to address any deficiencies. The risk 
management strategy should address credit and counterparty risk; 
residual risk; market risk; interest rate risk; operational risk; 
liquidity risk; securitization risk; concentration risk; and risk of 
excessive leverage.
     Directive 2002/87/EC Article 9: In the case of financial 
conglomerates, risk management processes must include

[[Page 78930]]

approval and periodical review of the strategies and policies by 
governing bodies with respect to all the risks assumed; adequate 
capital adequacy policies to anticipate impacts on risk profiles and 
capital requirements; risk monitoring and controls at the level of the 
conglomerates.
     ESMA Guidelines on compliance function requirements (ESMA/
2012/388) specify that the assessment of compliance risk should involve 
the compliance function, including in the case of new business lines or 
new financial products. Identified risks should be reviewed on a 
regular basis as well as ad-hoc when necessary to ensure that any 
emerging risks are taken into consideration. A monitoring program 
covering all areas of the investment firm's activities should ensure 
that compliance risk is comprehensively monitored. Specific measures 
ensure the effectiveness, the permanence and the independence of the 
compliance function.
     MiFID L2D Articles 21 to 23: Requirements on conflicts of 
interests include the obligation to adopt measures to ensure the 
appropriate level of independence to any person working in the firm. 
This includes measures preventing or controlling the exchange of 
information, separating the supervision of relevant persons, preventing 
or limiting the possibility for a person to exercise inappropriate 
influence over others. Furthermore, firms must ensure that performance 
of multiple functions does not prevent persons from acting soundly, 
honestly, and professionally.
     MiFID Article 50: Supervisors can access documents for the 
discharge of their supervisory duties.
     CRD Annex V: Credit institutions and investment firms must 
have in place risk management procedures that cover credit, 
operational, counterparty, market, concentration, securitization, 
liquidity and interest rate risk.
     CRD Article 22: Credit institution's conformity with 
regulation is the responsibility of the institution's management body 
and is subject to ongoing supervisory review.\43\
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    \43\ The current version of CRD will soon be replaced by CRD IV. 
CRD IV entered into force on June 28, 2013, and shall apply in most 
of its parts from January 1, 2014. The new reference is Article 74 
and there will be additional detailed technical rules specifying the 
arrangements, processes and mechanisms that must be adopted to 
fulfill this requirement. Article 88 of Directive 2013/36/EU 
specifies that '' the management body defines, oversees and is 
accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements 
that ensure effective and prudent management of an institution.'' 
Article 76 specifies tasks assigned to the management body as 
regards risk management.http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=;OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF.
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    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID, 
ESMA, and CRD standards specified above are generally identical in 
intent to Sec.  23.600 by requiring a system of risk management that 
seeks to ensure that firms are adequately managing the risks of their 
swaps activities to prevent failure of the SD or MSP, which could 
result in losses to counterparties doing business with the SD or MSP, 
and systemic risk more generally. Specifically, the Commission finds 
that the MiFID, ESMA, and CRD standards specified above comprehensively 
require SDs and MSPs to establish risk management programs containing 
the following critical elements:
     Identification of risk categories;
     Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category 
of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the 
governing body;
     An independent risk management unit to administer a risk 
management program; and
     Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management 
and the governing body.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the risk management program 
requirements of MiFID, ESMA, and CRD, as specified above, are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.600, with the exception 
of Sec.  23.600(c)(2) concerning the requirement that each SD and MSP 
produce a quarterly risk exposure report and provide such report to its 
senior management, governing body, and the Commission.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of MiFID, ESMA, and CRD are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.600(c)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.600 and the MiFID, ESMA, and CRD standards specified above are 
applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  
23.600(c)(2) if that SD or MSP complies with the MiFID, ESMA, and CRD 
standards specified above, subject to compliance with the requirement 
that it produce quarterly risk exposure reports and provide such 
reports to its senior management, governing body, and the Commission in 
accordance with Sec.  23.600(c)(2). The Commission notes that it 
generally expects reports furnished to the Commission by registrants to 
be in the English language.
2. Monitoring of Position Limits (Sec.  23.601)
    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 23.601 requires each SD or MSP to establish and 
enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
monitor for, and prevent violations of, applicable position limits 
established by the Commission, a designated contract market (``DCM''), 
or a swap execution facility (``SEF'').\44\ The policies and procedures 
must include an early warning system and provide for escalation of 
violations to senior management (including the firm's governing body).
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    \44\ The setting of position limits by the Commission, a DCM, or 
a SEF is subject to requirements under the CEA and Commission 
regulations other than Sec.  23.601. The setting of position limits 
and compliance with such limits is not subject to the Commission's 
substituted compliance regime.
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    Regulatory Objective: Generally, position limits are implemented to 
ensure market integrity, fairness, orderliness, and accurate pricing in 
the commodity markets. Commission regulation 23.601 thus seeks to 
ensure that SDs and MSPs have established the necessary policies and 
procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of 
applicable position limits established by the Commission, a DCM, or a 
SEF. As part of its Risk Management Program, Sec.  23.601 is intended 
to ensure that established position limits are not breached by the SD 
or MSP.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA and 
Commission regulation 23.601.
    The applicant requests that the Commission look to the general risk 
management function requirements outlined in subsection VI(B)(1) (Risk 
Management Program) above and the general compliance function 
requirements outlined in subsection VI(A) (Chief Compliance Officer) 
above for comparable EU law and regulations that would require an SD or 
MSP to monitor for and comply with applicable position limits. For 
example:
     MiFID L2D: A firm's compliance function, under the 
responsibility of the compliance officer, must monitor and assess the 
adequacy and effectiveness of measures and procedures to ensure 
compliance with regulatory obligations and to address any deficiencies,

[[Page 78931]]

including obligations to identify and manage conflicts of interests and 
maintain effective conflicts of interest policies; and
     MiFID L2D Article 9: Senior management (which includes 
boards of directors) must take responsibility for firms' compliance 
with regulatory obligations including risk management.
    The applicant states that the foregoing MiFID standards to monitor 
the effectiveness of procedures to ensure compliance with regulatory 
obligations includes regulatory obligations of an SD or MSP, that is 
subject to such MiFID standards, to comply with applicable standards 
under the CEA, Commission regulations, and position limits set by the 
Commission, a DCM, or a SEF.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID 
standards specified above are generally identical in intent to Sec.  
23.601 by requiring SDs and MSPs to establish necessary policies and 
procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of 
applicable position limits established by applicable laws and 
regulations, including those of the Commission, a DCM, or a SEF. 
Specifically, the Commission finds that the MiFID standards specified 
above, while not specific to the issue of position limit compliance, 
nevertheless comprehensively require SDs and MSPs to monitor for 
regulatory compliance generally, which includes monitoring for 
compliance with position limits set pursuant to applicable law and the 
responsibility of senior management (including the board of directors) 
for such compliance.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the compliance monitoring 
requirements of MiFID, as specified above, are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.601. For the avoidance of doubt, the 
Commission notes that this determination may not be relied on to 
relieve an SD or MSP from its obligation to strictly comply with any 
applicable position limit established by the Commission, a DCM, or a 
SEF.
3. Diligent Supervision (Sec.  23.602)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.602 implements 
section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA and requires each SD and MSP to 
establish a system to diligently supervise all activities relating to 
its business performed by its partners, members, officers, employees, 
and agents. The system must be reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with the CEA and CFTC regulations. Commission regulation 
23.602 requires that the supervisory system must specifically designate 
qualified persons with authority to carry out the supervisory 
responsibilities of the SD or MSP for all activities relating to its 
business as an SD or MSP.
    Regulatory Objective: The Commission's diligent supervision rule 
seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with the CEA and the 
Commission's rules. To this end, through Sec.  23.602, the Commission 
seeks to ensure that each SD and MSP not only establishes the necessary 
policies and procedures that would lead to compliance with the CEA and 
Commission regulations, but also establishes an effective system of 
internal oversight and enforcement of such policies and procedures to 
ensure that such policies and procedures are diligently followed.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA 
and Commission regulation 23.602.
    Under MiFID Article 13, MiFID L2D Articles 5, 6, 11, and 12, and 
ESMA/2012/388, firms must establish policies and procedures sufficient 
to ensure compliance of the firm, as well as its managers, employees 
and agents, with all of their compliance obligations as well as rules 
on personal transactions by these persons. The applicant represents to 
the Commission that the compliance obligations of firms that are 
subject to MiFID would cover those of an SD or MSP under the CEA and 
the Commission's regulations.
    Under MiFID Article 9, directors are subject to fit and proper 
criteria. Under MiFID Article 13, firms must establish and maintain 
decision-making processes and an organizational structure specifying 
reporting lines and allocate functions and responsibilities; personnel 
must have skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for the discharge 
of their responsibilities; and internal control mechanisms must be 
maintained to secure compliance as well as internal reporting and 
communication of information at all relevant levels of the firm.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID 
standards specified above are generally identical in intent to Sec.  
23.602 because such standards seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly 
comply with applicable law, which would include the CEA and the 
Commission's regulations. Through the MiFID standards specified above, 
EU laws and regulations seek to ensure that each SD and MSP not only 
establishes the necessary policies and procedures that would lead to 
compliance with applicable law, which would include the CEA and 
Commission regulations, but also establishes an effective system of 
internal oversight and enforcement of such policies and procedures to 
ensure that such policies and procedures are diligently followed.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the internal supervision 
requirements of MiFID, as specified above, are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.602.
4. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (Sec.  23.603)
    Commission Requirement: To ensure the proper functioning of the 
swaps markets and the prevention of systemic risk more generally, 
Commission regulation 23.603 requires each SD and MSP, as part of its 
risk management program, to establish a business continuity and 
disaster recovery plan that includes procedures for, and the 
maintenance of, back-up facilities, systems, infrastructure, personnel, 
and other resources to achieve the timely recovery of data and 
documentation and to resume operations generally within the next 
business day after the disruption.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.603 is intended to 
ensure that any market disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether 
caused by natural disaster or otherwise, is minimized in length and 
severity. To that end, this requirement seeks to ensure that entities 
adequately plan for disruptions and devote sufficient resources capable 
of carrying out an appropriate plan within one business day, if 
necessary.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.603.
     Under MiFID L2D Article 5(3), firms must establish, 
implement, and maintain an adequate business continuity policy aimed at 
insuring the preservation of essential data and functions, the 
maintenance of services, and the timely recovery of such data and 
functions and timely resumption of services.
     Under MiFID Article 13(4), firms must take reasonable 
steps to ensure continuity and regularity in the

[[Page 78932]]

performance of investment services and activities, including employing 
appropriate systems, resources, and procedures to accomplish this 
requirement.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID 
standards specified above are generally identical in intent to Sec.  
23.603 because such standards seek to ensure that any market disruption 
affecting SDs and MSPs, whether caused by natural disaster or 
otherwise, is minimized in length and severity. To that end, the 
Commission finds that the MiFID standards specified above seek to 
ensure that entities adequately plan for disruptions and devote 
sufficient resources capable of carrying out an appropriate plan in a 
timely manner.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the business continuity and 
disaster recovery requirements of MiFID, as specified above, are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.603.
5. Conflicts of Interest (Sec.  23.605)
    Commission Requirement: Section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.605(c) generally require each SD or MSP to establish 
structural and institutional safeguards to ensure that the activities 
of any person within the firm relating to research or analysis of the 
price or market for any commodity or swap are separated by appropriate 
informational partitions within the firm from the review, pressure, or 
oversight of persons whose involvement in pricing, trading, or clearing 
activities might potentially bias their judgment or supervision.
    In addition, section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission regulation 
23.605(d)(1) generally prohibits an SD or MSP from directly or 
indirectly interfering with or attempting to influence the decision of 
any clearing unit of any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to provide 
clearing services and activities to a particular customer, including:
     Whether to offer clearing services to a particular 
customer;
     Whether to accept a particular customer for clearing 
derivatives;
     Whether to submit a customer's transaction to a particular 
DCO;
     Whether to set or adjust risk tolerance levels for a 
particular customer; or
     Whether to set a customer's fees based on criteria other 
than those generally available and applicable to other customers.
    Commission regulation 23.605(d)(2) generally requires each SD or 
MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition 
between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of 
any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to reasonably ensure compliance 
with the Act and the prohibitions set forth in Sec.  23.605(d)(1) 
outlined above.
    The Commission observes that Sec.  23.605(d) works in tandem with 
Commission regulation 1.71, which requires futures commission merchants 
(``FCMs'') that are clearing members of a DCO and affiliated with an SD 
or MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition 
between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of 
the FCM to reasonably ensure compliance with the Act and the 
prohibitions set forth in Sec.  1.71(d)(1), which are the same as the 
prohibitions set forth in Sec.  23.605(d)(1) outlined above.
    Finally, Sec.  23.605(e) requires that each SD or MSP have policies 
and procedures that mandate the disclosure to counterparties of 
material incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of 
a counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM or to clear a 
derivative through a DCO.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.605(c) seeks to 
ensure that research provided to the general public by an SD or MSP is 
unbiased and free from the influence of the interests of an SD or MSP 
arising from the SD's or MSP's trading business.
    In addition, Sec.  23.605(d) (working in tandem with Sec.  1.71) 
seeks to ensure open access to the clearing of swaps by requiring that 
access to and the provision of clearing services provided by an 
affiliate of an SD or MSP are not influenced by the interests of an 
SD's or MSP's trading business.
    Finally, Sec.  23.605(e) seeks to ensure equal access to trading 
venues and clearinghouses, as well as orderly and fair markets, by 
requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to counterparties any material 
incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of a 
counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, or to clear a 
derivative through a DCO.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.605(c).
     MiFID Articles 13(3) and 18 require that SDs maintain and 
operate effective organizational and administrative arrangements with a 
view to preventing conflicts of interest from adversely affecting the 
interests of its clients.
     Under MiFID L2D Articles 21 to 23, SDs are obligated to 
adopt measures to ensure the appropriate level of independence of any 
person working in the firm. This includes measures preventing or 
controlling the exchange of information, separating the supervision of 
relevant persons, and preventing or limiting the possibility for a 
person to exercise inappropriate influence over others. Furthermore, 
firms must ensure that performance of multiple functions does not 
prevent persons from acting soundly, honestly, and professionally.
     Under MiFID L2D Articles 24 to 25, SDs must maintain and 
operate effective organizational and administrative arrangements and 
take all reasonable steps designed to prevent conflicts of interest 
from adversely affecting the interests of its clients.
     Under MiFID Articles 18 and MiFID L2D Article 22, SDs must 
develop a written conflicts of interest policy appropriate to the size 
and organization of the firm that identifies circumstances that might 
give rise to conflicts entailing a material risk of damage to the 
interests of one or more clients and specify procedures to be followed 
to manage such conflicts. The general conflicts policy has to be 
disclosed to clients. Disclosure is also needed when organizational 
arrangements to manage conflicts are not sufficient to ensure, with 
reasonable confidence, that the risk of damage to client interests will 
be prevented.
     Under MiFID L2D Article 25, an SD that prepares or 
disseminates research recommendations must take reasonable care to 
ensure that research recommendations are fairly presented and must 
disclose its interests or indicate conflicts of interest concerning 
relevant investments.
     Under MiFID L2D Article 25, in addition to the conflicts 
of interest requirements set out above, steps must be taken to ensure 
that restrictions are in place to avoid conflicts with respect to 
research personnel (e.g., financial analysts), including restrictions 
on personal account dealing and inducements.
     Under MiFID L2D Article 24, research recommendations must 
also include a disclosure of interests or indicate conflicts of 
interests concerning the relevant investments.
    The applicant states that the foregoing MiFID standards would 
require any SD or MSP that is subject to such MiFID standards to 
resolve or mitigate conflicts of interests in the provision of clearing 
services by a clearing member that is linked to that SD or MSP, or 
conflicts of interests in the execution of a derivative

[[Page 78933]]

by a client on a particular execution venue, including an eligible SEF 
or DCM, or conflicts of interests in the clearing of a derivative 
through a CCP, including an eligible DCO, through measures including 
appropriate information firewalls and disclosures.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID 
standards specified above with respect to conflicts of interest that 
may arise in producing or distributing research are generally identical 
in intent to Sec.  23.605(c) because such standards seek to ensure that 
research provided to the general public by an SD is unbiased and free 
from the influence of the interests of an SD arising from the SD's 
trading business.
    With respect to conflicts of interest that may arise in the 
provision of clearing services by an affiliate of an SD or MSP, the 
Commission further finds that although the general conflicts of 
interest prevention requirements under the MiFID standards specified 
above do not require with specificity that access to and the provision 
of clearing services provided by an affiliate of an SD or MSP not be 
improperly influenced by the interests of an SD's or MSP's trading 
business, such general requirements would require prevention and 
remediation of such improper influence when recognized or discovered. 
Thus such standards would ensure open access to clearing.
    Finally, although not as specific as the requirements of Sec.  
23.605(e) (Undue influence on counterparties), the Commission finds 
that the general disclosure requirements of the MiFID standards 
specified above would ensure equal access to trading venues and 
clearinghouses by requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to 
counterparties any material incentives or conflicts of interest 
regarding the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a 
SEF or DCM, or to clear a derivative through a DCO.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the requirements found in the 
MiFID standards specified above in relation to conflicts of interest 
are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.605.
6. Availability of Information for Disclosure and Inspection (Sec.  
23.606)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.606 implements 
sections 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA, and requires each SD and MSP to 
disclose to the Commission, and an SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential 
regulator (if any) comprehensive information about its swap activities, 
and to establish and maintain reliable internal data capture, 
processing, storage, and other operational systems sufficient to 
capture, process, record, store, and produce all information necessary 
to satisfy its duties under the CEA and Commission regulations. Such 
systems must be designed to provide such information to the Commission 
and an SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential regulator within the time frames 
set forth in the CEA and Commission regulations and upon request.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.606 seeks to ensure 
that each SD and MSP captures and maintains comprehensive information 
about their swap activities, and is able to retrieve and disclose such 
information to the Commission and its U.S. prudential regulator, if 
any, as necessary for compliance with the CEA and the Commission's 
regulations and for purposes of Commission oversight, as well as 
oversight by the SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential regulator, if any.
    The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the 
regulatory objective of Sec.  23.606 unless the required information is 
available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator under the 
foreign legal regime. Thus, a comparability determination with respect 
to the information access provisions of Sec.  23.606 would be premised 
on whether the relevant information would be available to the 
Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on 
whether an SD or MSP must disclose comprehensive information to its 
regulator in its home jurisdiction.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.606.
    Under MiFID Article 13(6) & 25(2) & 50, investment firms are 
required to maintain adequate and orderly records of their business and 
internal organization. Firms must maintain at the disposal of the 
regulator, for at least five years, the relevant data relating to their 
transactions in financial instruments. Among other things, supervisors 
have the authority to access any document in any form whatsoever and to 
receive a copy of it, to demand information from any person, and to 
carry out on-site inspections.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID 
standards specified above are generally identical in intent to Sec.  
23.606 because such standards seek to ensure that each SD and MSP 
captures and stores comprehensive information about their swap 
activities, and are able to retrieve and disclose such information as 
necessary for compliance with applicable law and for purposes of 
regulatory oversight.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of MiFID with 
respect to the availability of information for inspection and 
disclosure, as specified above, are comparable to, and as comprehensive 
as, Sec.  23.606, with the exception of Sec.  23.606(a)(2) concerning 
the requirement that an SD or MSP make information required by Sec.  
23.606(a)(1) available promptly upon request to Commission staff and 
the staff of an applicable prudential regulator. The applicant has not 
submitted any provision of law or regulations applicable in the EU upon 
which the Commission could make a finding that SDs and MSPs would be 
required to retrieve and disclose comprehensive information about their 
swap activities to the Commission or any U.S. prudential regulator as 
necessary for compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, and 
for purposes of Commission oversight and the oversight of any U.S. 
prudential regulator.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of MiFID are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  
23.606(a)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  23.606 and the MiFID 
standards specified above are applicable would generally be deemed to 
be in compliance with Sec.  23.606(a)(2) if that SD or MSP complies 
with the MiFID standards specified above, subject to compliance with 
the requirement that it produce information to Commission staff and the 
staff of an applicable U.S. prudential regulator in accordance with 
Sec.  23.606(a)(2).
7. Clearing Member Risk Management (Sec.  23.609)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.609 generally 
requires each SD or MSP that is a clearing member of a DCO to:
     Establish risk-based limits based on position size, order 
size, margin requirements, or similar factors;
     Screen orders for compliance with the risk-based limits;
     Monitor for adherence to the risk-based limits intra-day 
and overnight;
     Conduct stress tests under extreme but plausible 
conditions of all positions at least once per week;

[[Page 78934]]

     Evaluate its ability to meet initial margin requirements 
at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to meet variation margin requirements 
in cash at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to liquidate positions it clears in 
an orderly manner, and estimate the cost of liquidation; and
     Test all lines of credit at least once per year.
    Regulatory Objective: Through Commission regulation 23.609, the 
Commission seeks to ensure the financial integrity of the markets and 
the clearing system, to avoid systemic risk, and to protect customer 
funds. Effective risk management by SDs and MSPs that are clearing 
members is essential to achieving these objectives. A failure of risk 
management can cause a clearing member to become insolvent and default 
to a DCO. Such default can disrupt the markets and the clearing system 
and harm customers.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.609.
     Under MiFID Article 13(5) & MiFID L2D Article 5, 
investment firms must have effective procedures for risk assessment, 
effective control, and safeguard arrangements for information 
processing systems, sound administrative and accounting procedures, and 
internal control mechanisms.
     Under MiFID L2D Article 6, investment firms must, subject 
to a proportionality principle dependent on the size and nature of a 
firm's business, establish and maintain an independent risk management 
function that is responsible for the implementation of risk management 
policies and procedures and that provides reports and advice to senior 
management regarding risk management.
     MiFID L2D Article 9: Senior management (which includes 
boards of directors) must take responsibility for firms' compliance 
with regulatory obligations including risk management.
     MiFID L2D Article 9: Senior management must receive on a 
frequent basis, and at least annually, written reports on risk 
management issues, including any appropriate action taken in the event 
of deficiencies;
     MiFID L2D Article 7: Investment firms must identify the 
risks relating to the firms' activities, processes and systems, and set 
the level of risk tolerated by the firm in appropriate instances; must 
adopt effective arrangements, processes, and mechanisms to manage the 
risks relating to the firm's activities, processes and systems, in 
light of the established level of risk tolerance; must monitor the 
adequacy and effectiveness of its risk management policies and 
procedures, the level of compliance with arrangements, processes and 
mechanisms for risk management; and must monitor the adequacy and 
effectiveness of measures taken to address any deficiencies. The risk 
management strategy should address credit and counterparty risk; 
residual risk; market risk; interest rate risk; operational risk; 
liquidity risk; securitization risk; concentration risk; and risk of 
excessive leverage.
     Directive 2002/87/EC Article 9: In the case of financial 
conglomerates, risk management processes must include approval and 
periodical review of the strategies and policies by governing bodies 
with respect to all the risks assumed; adequate capital adequacy 
policies to anticipate impacts on risk profiles and capital 
requirements; risk monitoring and controls at the level of the 
conglomerates.
     ESMA Guidelines on compliance function requirements (ESMA/
2012/388) specify that the assessment of compliance risk should involve 
the compliance function, including in the case of new business lines or 
new financial products. Identified risks should be reviewed on a 
regular basis as well as ad-hoc when necessary to ensure that any 
emerging risks are taken into consideration. A monitoring program 
covering all areas of the investment firm's activities should ensure 
that compliance risk is comprehensively monitored. Specific measures 
ensure the effectiveness, the permanence and the independence of the 
compliance function.
     MiFID L2D Articles 21 to 23: Requirements on conflicts of 
interests include the obligation to adopt measures to ensure the 
appropriate level of independence to any person working in the firm. 
This includes measures preventing or controlling the exchange of 
information, separating the supervision of relevant persons, preventing 
or limiting the possibility for a person to exercise inappropriate 
influence over others. Furthermore, firms must ensure that performance 
of multiple functions does not prevent persons from acting soundly, 
honestly, and professionally.
     MiFID Article 50: Supervisors can access documents for the 
discharge of their supervisory duties.
     CRD Annex V: Credit institutions and investment firms must 
have in place risk management procedures that cover credit, 
operational, counterparty, market, concentration, securitization, 
liquidity and interest rate risk.
     CRD Article 22: Credit institution's conformity with 
regulation is the responsibility of the institution's management body 
and is subject to ongoing supervisory review.\45\
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    \45\ The current version of CRD will soon be replaced by CRD IV. 
CRD IV entered into force on June 28, 2013, and shall apply in most 
of its parts from January 1, 2014. The new reference is Article 74 
and there will be additional detailed technical rules specifying the 
arrangements, processes and mechanisms that must be adopted to 
fulfill this requirement. Article 88 of Directive 2013/36/EU 
specifies that '' the management body defines, oversees and is 
accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements 
that ensure effective and prudent management of an institution.'' 
Article 76 specifies tasks assigned to the management body as 
regards risk management. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF.
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    Specifically, the applicants state that any SD or MSP subject to 
MiFID and CRD that is a clearing member of a CCP, including an eligible 
DCO, would be required under the foregoing EU law and regulations to:
     Establish risk-based limits based on position size, order 
size, margin requirements, or similar factors;
     Screen orders for compliance with the risk-based limits;
     Monitor for adherence to the risk-based limits intra-day 
and overnight;
     Conduct stress tests under extreme but plausible 
conditions of all positions at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to meet initial margin requirements 
at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to meet variation margin requirements 
in cash at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to liquidate positions it clears in 
an orderly manner, and estimate the cost of liquidation; and
     Test all lines of credit at least once per year.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID, 
ESMA, and CRD standards specified above are generally identical in 
intent to Sec.  23.609 because such standards seek to ensure the 
financial integrity of the markets and the clearing system, to avoid 
systemic risk, and to protect customer funds.
    The Commission notes that the MiFID, ESMA, and CRD standards 
specified above are not as specific as Sec.  23.609 with respect to 
ensuring that SDs and MSPs that are clearing members of a DCO establish 
detailed procedures and limits for clearing member risk management 
purposes.

[[Page 78935]]

Nevertheless, the Commission finds that the general requirements under 
the MiFID, ESMA, and CRD standards specified above, implemented in the 
context of clearing member risk management and pursuant to the 
statements of the applicants, meet the Commission's regulatory 
objective specified above.
    Based on the foregoing and the statements of the applicants above, 
the Commission hereby determines that the clearing member risk 
management requirements of the MiFID, ESMA, and CRD standards specified 
above are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.609.

C. Swap Data Recordkeeping (Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203)

    Commission Requirement: Sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) of the 
CEA, and Commission regulation 23.201 generally require SDs and MSPs to 
retain records of each transaction, each position held, general 
business records (including records related to complaints and sales and 
marketing materials), records related to governance, financial records, 
records of data reported to SDRs, and records of real-time reporting 
data along with a record of the date and time the SD or MSP made such 
reports. Transaction records must be kept in a form and manner 
identifiable and searchable by transaction and counterparty.
    Commission regulation 23.203, requires SDs and MSPs to maintain 
records of a swap transaction until the termination, maturity, 
expiration, transfer, assignment, or novation date of the transaction, 
and for a period of five years after such date. Records must be 
``readily accessible'' for the first two years of the five year 
retention period (consistent with Sec.  1.31).
    The Commission notes that the comparability determination below 
with respect to Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 encompasses both swap data 
recordkeeping generally and swap data recordkeeping relating to 
complaints and marketing and sales materials in accordance with Sec.  
23.201(b)(3) and (4).\46\
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    \46\ See the Guidance for a discussion of the availability of 
substituted compliance with respect to swap data recordkeeping, 78 
FR 45332-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulatory Objective: Through the Commission's regulations 
requiring SDs and MSPs to keep comprehensive records of their swap 
transactions and related data, the Commission seeks to ensure the 
effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and 
transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market 
participants.
    The Commission's regulations require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data 
in a level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to 
understand an SD's or MSP's swaps business and to assess its swaps 
exposure.
    By requiring comprehensive records of swap data, the Commission 
seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, and 
strictly comply with Commission regulations. Further, such records 
facilitate effective regulatory oversight.
    The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the 
regulatory objective of Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 unless the 
required information is available to the Commission and any U.S. 
prudential regulator under the foreign legal regime. Thus, a 
comparability determination with respect to the information access 
provisions of Sec.  23.203 would be premised on whether the relevant 
information would be available to the Commission and any U.S. 
prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on whether an SD or MSP must 
disclose comprehensive information to its regulator in its home 
jurisdiction.
    Comparable EU Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to 
the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in the EU are in full force and effect in the EU, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) 
of the CEA and Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203.
     MiFID Article 13(6): Firms are required to maintain 
records of all services and transactions undertaken by the firm that 
are sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to monitor compliance 
with MiFID and to ascertain whether the firm has complied with all 
obligations with respect to clients or potential clients.
     MiFID L2R Article 7: Firms are required to keep detailed 
records in relation to every client order and decision to deal, and 
every client order executed or transmitted.
     MiFID L2D Article 51: All required records must be 
retained in a medium available for future reference by the regulator, 
and in a form/manner that:
    o Allows the regulator to access them readily and reconstitute each 
key stage of processing each transaction;
    o Allows corrections or other amendments, and the contents of the 
records prior to such corrections or amendments, to be easily 
ascertained; and
    o Ensures that records are not manipulated or altered.
     MiFID Article 25(2): Firms must keep at the disposal of 
the regulator, for at least five years, the relevant data relating to 
all transactions in financial instruments which they have carried out, 
whether on their own account or on behalf of a client.
     CESR (now ESMA) developed recommendations on the list of 
minimum records to be kept by firms in accordance with MiFID L2D and 
the point in time at which the record should be created. It includes 
marketing communications, client information, internal procedures, 
complaints records, complaints handling, etc.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the MiFID and 
ESMA standards specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 because such standards seek to ensure the 
effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and 
transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market 
participants.
    In addition, the Commission finds that the MiFID and ESMA standards 
specified above require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data in a level of 
detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to understand an 
SD's or MSP's swaps business and to assess its swaps exposure.
    Finally, the Commission finds that the MiFID and ESMA standards 
specified above, by requiring comprehensive records of swap data, seek 
to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, seek to 
ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with applicable regulatory 
requirements (including the CEA and Commission regulations), and that 
such records facilitate effective regulatory oversight.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of MiFID and 
ESMA with respect to swap data recordkeeping, as specified above, are 
comparable to, and as comprehensive as, Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203, 
with the exception of Sec.  23.203(b)(2) concerning the requirement 
that an SD or MSPs make records required by Sec.  23.201 open to 
inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United States 
Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential regulator. The 
applicant has not submitted any provision of law or regulations 
applicable in the EU upon which the Commission could make a finding 
that SDs and MSPs would be required to make records required by Sec.  
23.201 open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the 
United States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential 
regulator.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the

[[Page 78936]]

requirements of MiFID and ESMA are comparable to and as comprehensive 
as Sec.  23.203(b)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  23.203 and the 
MiFID and ESMA standards specified above are applicable would generally 
be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  23.203(b)(2) if that SD or MSP 
complies with the MiFID and ESMA standards specified above, subject to 
compliance with the requirement that it make records required by Sec.  
23.201 open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the 
United States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential 
regulator in accordance with Sec.  23.203(b)(2).

    Issued in Washington, DC on December 20, 2013, by the 
Commission.
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
Deputy Secretary of the Commission.

Appendices to Comparability Determination for the European Union: 
Certain Entity-Level Requirements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton and 
Wetjen voted in the affirmative. Commissioner O'Malia voted in the 
negative.

Appendix 2--Joint Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler and Commissioners 
Bart Chilton and Mark Wetjen

    We support the Commission's approval of broad comparability 
determinations that will be used for substituted compliance 
purposes. For each of the six jurisdictions that has registered swap 
dealers, we carefully reviewed each regulatory provision of the 
foreign jurisdictions submitted to us and compared the provision's 
intended outcome to the Commission's own regulatory objectives. The 
resulting comparability determinations for entity-level requirements 
permit non-U.S. swap dealers to comply with regulations in their 
home jurisdiction as a substitute for compliance with the relevant 
Commission regulations.
    These determinations reflect the Commission's commitment to 
coordinating our efforts to bring transparency to the swaps market 
and reduce its risks to the public. The comparability findings for 
the entity-level requirements are a testament to the comparability 
of these regulatory systems as we work together in building a strong 
international regulatory framework.
    In addition, we are pleased that the Commission was able to find 
comparability with respect to swap-specific transaction-level 
requirements in the European Union and Japan.
    The Commission attained this benchmark by working cooperatively 
with authorities in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Switzerland to reach mutual agreement. The 
Commission looks forward to continuing to collaborate with both 
foreign authorities and market participants to build on this 
progress in the months and years ahead.

Appendix 3--Statement of Dissent by Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia

    I respectfully dissent from the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's (``Commission'') approval of the Notices of 
Comparability Determinations for Certain Requirements under the laws 
of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Switzerland (collectively, ``Notices''). While I support the narrow 
comparability determinations that the Commission has made, moving 
forward, the Commission must collaborate with foreign regulators to 
harmonize our respective regimes consistent with the G-20 reforms.
    However, I cannot support the Notices because they: (1) Are 
based on the legally unsound cross-border guidance (``Guidance''); 
\1\ (2) are the result of a flawed substituted compliance process; 
and (3) fail to provide a clear path moving forward. If the 
Commission's objective for substituted compliance is to develop a 
narrow rule-by-rule approach that leaves unanswered major regulatory 
gaps between our regulatory framework and foreign jurisdictions, 
then I believe that the Commission has successfully achieved its 
goal today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 26, 
2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Determinations Based on Legally Unsound Guidance

    As I previously stated in my dissent, the Guidance fails to 
articulate a valid statutory foundation for its overbroad scope and 
inconsistently applies the statute to different activities.\2\ 
Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') states that the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over foreign activities unless 
``those activities have a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States * * *'' 
\3\ However, the Commission never properly articulated how and when 
this limiting standard on the Commission's extraterritorial reach is 
met, which would trigger the application of Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act \4\ and any Commission regulations promulgated thereunder 
to swap activities that are outside of the United States. Given this 
statutorily unsound interpretation of the Commission's 
extraterritorial authority, the Commission often applies CEA section 
2(i) inconsistently and arbitrarily to foreign activities.
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    \2\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
    \3\ CEA section 2(j); 7 U.S.C. 2(j).
    \4\ Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, because the Commission is relying on the legally 
deficient Guidance to make its substituted compliance 
determinations, and for the reasons discussed below, I cannot 
support the Notices. The Commission should have collaborated with 
foreign regulators to agree on and implement a workable regime of 
substituted compliance, and then should have made determinations 
pursuant to that regime.

Flawed Substituted Compliance Process

    Substituted compliance should not be a case of picking a set of 
foreign rules identical to our rules, determining them to be 
``comparable,'' but then making no determination regarding rules 
that require extensive gap analysis to assess to what extent each 
jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable based on overall outcomes of 
the regulatory regimes. While I support the narrow comparability 
determinations that the Commission has made, I am concerned that in 
a rush to provide some relief, the Commission has made substituted 
compliance determinations that only afford narrow relief and fail to 
address major regulatory gaps between our domestic regulatory 
framework and foreign jurisdictions. I will address a few examples 
below.
    First, earlier this year, the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group 
(``ODRG'') agreed to a number of substantive understandings to 
improve the cross-border implementation of over-the-counter 
derivatives reforms.\5\ The ODRG specifically agreed that a 
flexible, outcomes-based approach, based on a broad category-by-
category basis, should form the basis of comparability 
determinations.\6\
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    \5\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6678-13.
    \6\ http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/odrgreport.pdf. The ODRG agreed to six understandings. 
Understanding number 2 states that ``[a] flexible, outcomes-based 
approach should form the basis of final assessments regarding 
equivalence or substituted compliance.''
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    However, instead of following this approach, the Commission has 
made its comparability determinations on a rule-by-rule basis. For 
example, in Japan's Comparability Determination for Transaction-
Level Requirements, the Commission has made a positive comparability 
determination for some of the detailed requirements under the swap 
trading relationship documentation provisions, but not for other 
requirements.\7\ This detailed approach clearly contravenes the 
ODRG's understanding.
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    \7\ The Commission made a positive comparability determination 
for Commission regulations 23.504(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), 
(b)(4), (c), and (d), but not for Commission regulations 
23.504(b)(5) and (b)(6).
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    Second, in several areas, the Commission has declined to 
consider a request for a comparability determination, and has also 
failed to provide an analysis regarding the extent to which the 
other jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable. For example, the 
Commission has declined to address or provide any clarity regarding 
the European Union's regulatory data reporting determination, even 
though the European Union's reporting regime is set to begin on 
February 12, 2014. Although the Commission has provided some limited 
relief with respect to regulatory data reporting, the lack of 
clarity creates unnecessary uncertainty, especially when the 
European Union's reporting regime is set to begin in less than two 
months.
    Similarly, Japan receives no consideration for its mandatory 
clearing requirement, even though the Commission considers Japan's

[[Page 78937]]

legal framework to be comparable to the U.S. framework. While the 
Commission has declined to provide even a partial comparability 
determination, at least in this instance the Commission has provided 
a reason: the differences in the scope of entities and products 
subject to the clearing requirement.\8\ Such treatment creates 
uncertainty and is contrary to increased global harmonization 
efforts.
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    \8\ Yen-denominated interest rate swaps are subject to the 
mandatory clearing requirement in both the U.S. and Japan.
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    Third, in the Commission's rush to meet the artificial deadline 
of December 21, 2013, as established in the Exemptive Order 
Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (``Exemptive 
Order''),\9\ the Commission failed to complete an important piece of 
the cross-border regime, namely, supervisory memoranda of 
understanding (``MOUs'') between the Commission and fellow 
regulators.
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    \9\ Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap 
Regulations, 78 FR 43785 (Jul. 22, 2013).
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    I have previously stated that these MOUs, if done right, can be 
a key part of the global harmonization effort because they provide 
mutually agreed-upon solutions for differences in regulatory 
regimes.\10\ Accordingly, I stated that the Commission should be 
able to review MOUs alongside the respective comparability 
determinations and vote on them at the same time. Without these 
MOUs, our fellow regulators are left wondering whether and how any 
differences, such as direct access to books and records, will be 
resolved.
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    \10\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-29.
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    Finally, as I have consistently maintained, the substituted 
compliance process should allow other regulatory bodies to engage 
with the full Commission.\11\ While I am pleased that the Notices 
are being voted on by the Commission, the full Commission only 
gained access to the comment letters from foreign regulators on the 
Commission's comparability determination draft proposals a few days 
ago. This is hardly a transparent process.
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    \11\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
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Unclear Path Forward

    Looking forward to next steps, the Commission must provide 
answers to several outstanding questions regarding these 
comparability determinations. In doing so, the Commission must 
collaborate with foreign regulators to increase global 
harmonization.
    First, there is uncertainty surrounding the timing and outcome 
of the MOUs. Critical questions regarding information sharing, 
cooperation, supervision, and enforcement will remain unanswered 
until the Commission and our fellow regulators execute these MOUs.
    Second, the Commission has issued time-limited no-action relief 
for the swap data repository reporting requirements. These 
comparability determinations will be done as separate notices. 
However, the timing and process for these determinations remain 
uncertain.
    Third, the Commission has failed to provide clarity on the 
process for addressing the comparability determinations that it 
declined to undertake at this time. The Notices only state that the 
Commission may address these requests in a separate notice at a 
later date given further developments in the law and regulations of 
other jurisdictions. To promote certainty in the financial markets, 
the Commission must provide a clear path forward for market 
participants and foreign regulators.
    The following steps would be a better approach: (1) The 
Commission should extend the Exemptive Order to allow foreign 
regulators to further implement their regulatory regimes and 
coordinate with them to implement a harmonized substituted 
compliance process; (2) the Commission should implement a flexible, 
outcomes-based approach to the substituted compliance process and 
apply it similarly to all jurisdictions; and (3) the Commission 
should work closely with our fellow regulators to expeditiously 
implement MOUs that resolve regulatory differences and address 
regulatory oversight issues.

Conclusion

    While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the 
Commission has made, it was my hope that the Commission would work 
with foreign regulators to implement a substituted compliance 
process that would increase the global harmonization effort. I am 
disappointed that the Commission has failed to implement such a 
process.
    I do believe that in the longer term, the swaps regulations of 
the major jurisdictions will converge. At this time, however, the 
Commission's comparability determinations have done little to 
alleviate the burden of regulatory uncertainty and duplicative 
compliance with both U.S. and foreign regulations.
    The G-20 process delineated and put in place the swaps market 
reforms in G-20 member nations. It is then no surprise that the 
Commission must learn to coordinate with foreign regulators to 
minimize confusion and disruption in bringing much needed clarity to 
the swaps market. For all these shortcomings, I respectfully dissent 
from the Commission's approval of the Notices.

[FR Doc. 2013-30980 Filed 12-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P