[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 191 (Wednesday, October 2, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60919-60928]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-24093]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2013-0222; EA-13-150]
In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and
Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern;
Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately)
I.
The Licensee identified in Attachment A \1\ to this Order holds a
license issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or an
Agreement State, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and 10 CFR parts 30, 32, 70, and 71, or equivalent Agreement
State regulations. The license authorizes the Licensee to possess and
transfer items containing radioactive material quantities of concern.
This Order is being issued to the Licensee identified in Attachment A
to this Order who may transport radioactive material quantities of
concern under the NRC's authority to protect the common defense and
security, which has not been relinquished to the Agreement States. The
Order requires compliance with specific additional security measures to
enhance the security for transport of certain radioactive material
quantities of concern.
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\1\ Attachment A contains sensitive information and will not be
released to the public.
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II.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets
in New York, NY, and near Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial
aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence
information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of
Safeguards and Threat Advisories to Licensees in order to strengthen
Licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack
on NRC regulated activity. The Commission has also communicated with
other Federal, State and local government agencies and industry
representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat environment
in order to assess the adequacy of the current security measures. In
addition, the Commission commenced a comprehensive review of its
safeguards and security programs and requirements.
As a result of its initial consideration of current safeguards and
security requirements, as well as a review of information provided by
the intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain
security measures are required to be implemented by Licensees as
prudent, interim measures to address the current threat environment in
a consistent manner. Therefore, the Commission is imposing
requirements, as set forth in Attachment B \2\ of this Order, on the
Licensee identified in Attachment A of this Order. These additional
security measures, which supplement existing regulatory requirements,
will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the common
defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current
threat environment. Attachment C of this Order contains the
requirements for fingerprinting and criminal history record checks for
individuals when the Licensee's reviewing official is determining
access to Safeguards Information or unescorted access to the
radioactive materials. These requirements will remain in effect until
the Commission determines otherwise.
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\2\ Attachment B contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION, and cannot be released to the public. The remainder of
the requirements contained in Attachment B that are not SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION will be released to the public.
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Some measures may not be possible or necessary for all shipments of
radioactive material quantities of concern, or may need to be tailored
to accommodate the Licensee's specific circumstances to achieve the
intended objectives and avoid any unforeseen
[[Page 60920]]
effect on the safe transport of radioactive material quantities of
concern.
In light of the continuing threat environment, the Commission
concludes that these security measures must be embodied in an Order,
consistent with the established regulatory framework. The Commission
has determined that some of the security measures contained in
Attachment B of this Order contain Safeguards Information and will not
be released to the public as per NRC's ``Order Imposing Requirements
for the Protection of Certain Safeguards Information'' (EA-13-040),
issued specifically to the Licensee identified in Attachment A to this
Order. Access to Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who
have established a need-to-know the information, are considered to be
trustworthy and reliable, and have been fingerprinted and undergone a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal
history records check in accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information'' (EA-13-041). A need-to-know means a
determination by a person having responsibility for protecting
Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards
Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual,
or Licensee duties of employment. Individuals who have been
fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the
reviewing official under the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information'' (EA-13-041) do not need to be fingerprinted again for
purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
This Order also requires that a reviewing official must consider
the results of the FBI criminal history records check in conjunction
with other applicable requirements to determine whether an individual
may be granted or allowed continued unescorted access. The reviewing
official may be one that has previously been approved by NRC in
accordance with the ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information'' (EA-13-041). Licensees may nominate additional reviewing
officials for making unescorted access determinations in accordance
with NRC Order EA-13-041. The nominated reviewing officials must have
access to Safeguards Information or require unescorted access to the
radioactive material as part of their job duties.
To provide assurance that Licensees are implementing prudent
measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the
current threat environment, the Licensee identified in Attachment A to
this Order shall implement the requirements identified in Attachments B
and C to this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that
in light of the common defense and security matters identified above,
which warrant the issuance of this Order, the public health and safety
require that this Order be immediately effective.
III.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53, 63, 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i,
161o, 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR parts 30, 32,
70, and 71, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the
licensee identified in attachment a to this order shall comply with the
following:
A. The Licensee shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State regulation or license to the contrary,
comply with the requirements described in Attachments B and C to this
Order. The Licensee shall immediately start implementation of the
requirements in Attachments B and C to the Order and shall complete
implementation before the first shipment of radioactive material
quantities of concern.
B. 1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it is unable to comply with
any of the requirements described in Attachments B or C, (2) if
compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State regulation or its license. The
notification shall provide the Licensees' justification for seeking
relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
2. If the Licensee considers that implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachments B or C to this Order would
adversely impact the safe transport of radioactive material quantities
of concern, the Licensee must notify the Commission, within twenty (20)
days of this Order, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for its
determination that the requirement has an adverse safety impact, and
either a proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in the
Attachments B or requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying
the activity to address the adverse safety condition. If neither
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to
Condition B.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required
in Condition B.1.
C. 1. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting
and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to
Safeguards Information'' (EA-13-041) only the NRC-approved reviewing
official shall review results from an FBI criminal history records
check. The Licensee may use a reviewing official previously approved by
the NRC as its reviewing official for determining access to Safeguards
Information or the Licensee may nominate another individual
specifically for making unescorted access to radioactive material
determinations, using the process described in EA-13-041. The reviewing
official must have access to Safeguards Information or require
unescorted access to the radioactive material as part of their job
duties. The reviewing official shall determine whether an individual
may have, or continue to have, unescorted access to radioactive
materials that equal or exceed the quantities in Attachment B to this
Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification and criminal history
records check are not required for individuals exempted from
fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.61 (72 FR 4945; February 2,
2007). In addition, individuals who have a favorably decided U.S.
Government criminal history records check within the last five (5)
years, or have an active federal security clearance (provided in each
case that the appropriate documentation is made available to the
Licensee's reviewing official), have satisfied the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, fingerprinting requirement and need not be
fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted
access.
2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information or
unescorted access to radioactive materials if the NRC has determined,
in accordance with its administrative review process based on
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records
check, either that the person may not have access to Safeguards
Information or that the person may not have unescorted access to a
utilization facility, or radioactive material or other
[[Page 60921]]
property subject to regulation by the NRC.
D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order. Individuals who
have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by
the reviewing official under Order EA-13-041, do not need to be
fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted
access.
E. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with this
Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being
fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on
fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check and a trustworthy
and reliability determination) that the individual may continue to have
unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the
quantities listed in Attachment B to this Order. The Licensee shall
complete implementation of the requirements of Attachments B and C to
this Order before the first shipment of radioactive material quantities
of concern.
F. 1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, submit to the Commission a schedule for completion of each
requirement described in Attachments B and C.
2. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have
achieved full compliance with the requirements described in Attachments
B and C.
G. Notwithstanding any provisions of the Commission's or an
Agreement State's regulations to the contrary, all measures implemented
or actions taken in response to this Order shall be maintained until
the Commission determines otherwise.
Licensee response to Conditions B.1, B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall
be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001. In addition, Licensee submittals that
contain specific physical protection or security information considered
to be Safeguards Information shall be put in a separate enclosure or
attachment and, marked as ``SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION--MODIFIED HANDLING''
and mailed (no electronic transmittals, i.e., no email or FAX) to the
NRC.
The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind
any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the
Licensee.
IV.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. In addition,
the Licensee and any other person adversely affected by this Order may
request a hearing of this Order within twenty (20) days of the date of
the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of
time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a
statement of good cause for the extension.
The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a
request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation,
specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the
Licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have
been issued. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing,
that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including
a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139;
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID)
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic
Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may
attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should
note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software,
and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance
in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System,
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form,
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
a hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice
[[Page 60922]]
confirming receipt of the document. The E-Filing system also
distributes an email notice that provides access to the document to the
NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the
Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the
proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the document on those
participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants
(or their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a
digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene
is filed so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-
Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's Web site
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants
filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the
document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by
first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier,
express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the
document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having
granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted
materials in their submission.
If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held the
issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to
requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
Dated this 27th day of August 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian E. Holian,
Acting Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs.
Attachment A: List of Licensees--Redacted
Attachment B: Additional Security Measures for Transportation of
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern--Revision 3
A. General Basis Criteria
These Additional Security Measures (ASMs) are established to
delineate licensee responsibility in response to the current threat
environment. The following security measures apply to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Agreement States licensees, who ship
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) as defined in
Section A .1. Shipments of RAMQC that do not fall within the NRC's
jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are not
subject to the provisions of these ASMs.
1. Licensees who are subject to this Order shall ensure that the
requirements listed in Section B below are in effect when they ship
radioactive materials that meet the following criterion:
a. Radionuclides listed in Table A, greater than or equal to the
quantities specified, or
b. For mixtures of radionuclides listed in Table A, the sum of the
fractions of those radionuclides if greater than or equal to 1, or
c. For shipments of spent nuclear fuel containing greater than or
equal to 1000 Terabecquerels (TBq) (27,000 Curies) but less than or
equal to 100 grams of spent nuclear fuel.
For shipments containing greater than 100 grams of spent nuclear
fuel, licensees shall follow the ASMs for ``Transportation of Spent
Nuclear Fuel Greater than 100 Grams,'' dated October 3, 2002.
These ASMs supersede Safeguards Advisories SA-01-01, Rev. 1, and
SA-03-02. For radioactive materials shipments containing radionuclides
not addressed by this ASM guidance will be provided by Safeguards
Advisory.
2. The requirements of these ASMs apply to a conveyance (i.e., the
requirements apply irrespective of whether the RAMQC is shipped in a
single package or in multiple packages in a single conveyance).
3. Licensees are not responsible for complying with the
requirements of these ASMs if a carrier aggregates, during transport or
storage incident to transport, radioactive material from two or more
conveyances from separate licensees which individually do not exceed
the limits of Paragraph A.1. but which together meet or exceed any of
the criteria in Paragraph A.1.
4. The requirements of these ASMs only apply to RAMQC shipments
using highway or rail modes of transportation. For multi-mode
shipments, the requirements of these ASMs apply only to the portion of
shipments that are made using highway or rail modes of transportation,
as appropriate.
5. For domestic highway and rail shipments of materials in
quantities greater than or equal to the quantities in
[[Page 60923]]
Paragraph A.1, per conveyance, the licensee shall ensure that:
a. Only carriers are used which:
1. Use established package tracking systems,
2. Implement methods to assure trustworthiness and reliability of
personnel associated with the transportation of RAMQC,
3. Maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit,
and
4. Have the capability for immediate communication to summon
appropriate response or assistance.
b. The licensee shall verify and document that the carrier employs
the measures listed above.
6. The preplanning, coordination, and tracking requirements of
these ASMs are intended to reduce unnecessary delays and shipment
duration and to facilitate the transfer of the RAMQC shipment and any
escorts at State borders.
7. Unless specifically noted otherwise, the requirements of these
ASMs do not apply to local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) personnel
performing escort duties.
8. The requirements of these ASMs apply to RAMQC domestic shipments
within the United States (U.S.), imports into the U.S., or exports from
the U.S. The requirements of these ASMs do not apply to transshipments
through the U.S. Licensees are responsible for complying with the
requirements of Section B for the highway and rail shipment portion of
an import or export which occurs inside of the U.S.
For import and export RAMQC shipments, while located at the port or
shipments on U.S. navigable waterways, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime
Transportation security regulations will be in effect and these ASMs
are not applicable. For RAMQC shipments while located at the air
freight terminal, security requirements will be performed in accordance
with the Transportation Security Administration security regulations.
For import and export RAMQC shipments, the licensee shall ensure
that the requirements of these ASMs are implemented after the
transportation package has been loaded onto the highway or rail vehicle
(except for the advance notification requirements in section B.4) and
the package begins the domestic portion of the shipment to or from the
U.S. port of entry [i.e., the package(s) departs for or from the port
of entry facility or the airfreight terminal].
B. Specific Requirements
Licensees who ship RAMQC in quantities that meet the criteria of
Paragraph A.1. shall ensure that any carriers used have developed and
implemented transportation security plans that embody the additional
security measures imposed by this Order.
1. Licensee Verification
Before transfer of radioactive materials in quantities which meet
the criterion of Paragraph A.1, per conveyance, the licensee shall:
a. For new recipient(s), verify that the intended recipient's
license authorizes receipt of the regulated material by direct contact
with the regulatory authority that issued the license (NRC Region or
Agreement State) prior to transferring the material,
b. Verify the validity of unusual orders or changes (if applicable)
that depart from historical patterns of ordering by existing
recipients,
c. Verify the material is shipped to an address authorized in the
license and that the address is valid,
d. Verify the address for a delivery to a temporary job site is
valid,
e. Document the verification and validation process, and
f. Coordinate departure and arrival times with the recipient.
2. Background Investigations
a. Background investigations are intended to provide high assurance
that individuals performing assigned duties associated with the
transport of RAMQC or access to sensitive information associated with
such transport are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, including the
potential to commit radiological sabotage.
b. For highway shipments only, the licensee shall ensure background
investigations for all drivers, accompanying individuals,
communications center managers, and other appropriate communications
center personnel have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to
impose a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check,
which includes fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to
Safeguards Information (SGI) or unescorted access to licensed material.
c. For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure background
investigations for employees filling the positions of communications
center managers and other appropriate communications center personnel
have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to impose a FBI
criminal history check, which includes fingerprinting, on those
individuals who seek access to SGI or unescorted access to licensed
material.
d. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is
high assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards
information or unescorted access to licensed material are trustworthy
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent
use of the regulated material. ``Access'' means that an individual
could exercise some physical control over the material or device
containing radioactive material.
(1) The trustworthiness, reliability, and verification of an
individual's true identity shall be determined based on a background
investigation. The background investigation shall address at least the
past three (3) years, and as a minimum, include fingerprinting and an
FBI criminal history check, verification of employment history,
education, employment eligibility and personal references. If an
individual's employment has been less then the required three (3) years
period, educational references may be used in lieu of employment
history.
(2) Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order.
(3) A reviewing official that the licensee nominated and has been
approved by the NRC, in accordance with NRC ``Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information,'' may continue to make
trustworthiness and reliability determinations. The licensee may also
nominate another individual specifically for making unescorted access
determinations using the process identified in the NRC ``Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information.'' The nominated reviewing official
must have access to Safeguards Information or require unescorted access
to the radioactive material as part of their job duties.
e. Licensees background investigation requirements may also be
satisfied for an individual that has:
(1) Current access authorization permitting unescorted access to a
power reactor facility or access to Safeguards Information,
(2) current U.S. Government-issued security clearance (based upon a
national agency check, at a minimum), or
(3) satisfactorily completed a background investigation under an
NRC-approved access authorization program.
f. Individuals shall not perform assigned duties associated with
the
[[Page 60924]]
transport of RAMQC until the licensee has confirmed that a
determination of trustworthiness and reliability, based on the
appropriate background investigation requirements in B.2.d. and B.2.e.,
has been performed and documented.
3. Preplanning and Coordination
a. As part of the shipment planning process, the licensee shall
ensure that appropriate security information is provided to and is
coordinated with affected States through which the shipment will pass
to ensure minimal delays. These discussions shall include whether a
State intends to provide escorts for a shipment.
b. The licensee shall ensure States are provided with position
information on a shipment (see Paragraph B.5.a), if requested and
practical.
c. For shipments by highway, the licensee's coordination required
in Paragraph B.3.a. shall include identification of Highway Route
Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) shipments of material and safe havens.\1\
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\1\ In general, a safe haven is a readily recognizable and
readily accessible site at which security is present or from which,
in the event of an emergency, the transport crew can notify and wait
for the local law enforcement authorities (LLEA). The following
criteria are used by the NRC to determine the safe haven sites and
licensees should use these criteria in identifying safe havens for
shipments subject to this Order:
--Close proximity to the route, i.e., readily available to the
transport vehicle.
--Security from local, State, or Federal assets is present or is
accessible for timely response.
--Site is well lit, has adequate parking, and can be used for
emergency repair or wait for LLEA response on a 24-hours-a-day
basis.
--Have additional telephone facilities should the communications
system of the transport vehicle not function properly.
--Possible safe haven sites include:
Military installations and other Federal sites having
significant security assets; secure company terminals; State weigh
stations; truck stops with secure areas; and LLEA sites, including
State police barracks.
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4. Notifications
a. The licensee shall ensure an advance notification of a shipment
is provided, or of a series of shipments, of RAMQC to the NRC. The
licensee shall ensure the notification is submitted sufficiently in
advance to ensure it is received by NRC at least seven (7) days, where
practicable, before the shipment commences physically within the U.S.
For written notifications, the notice should be addressed to: (10
CFR 2.390) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Director, Division
of Nuclear Security, M/S: T-4-D-8, Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738.
Notifications may also be submitted electronically via email to
[email protected] or via fax to 301-816-5151. (10 CFR 2.390)
b. The advance notification shall contain the following
information:
(1) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(2) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(3) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(4) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(5) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(6) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(7) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
Refer to Paragraph B.7.c. for determination of information
designation of advance notifications during preplanning, coordinating,
and reporting information activities.
c. The licensee shall ensure the information required by Paragraph
B.4.b. is provided to each State through which the shipment will pass.
The licensee shall ensure that the notification is received at least
seven (7) days, where practicable, before the U.S. highway or railroad
portion of a shipment commences.
d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
5. Communications
a. (1) For highway shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with a
telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a
communication center or is equipped with an alternative tracking system
that communicates position information to a communications center.
(2) For rail shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with either:
(i) A telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a
licensee or third-party communication center, (ii) a railroad track-
side car location monitoring systems tracking system that relays a
car's position to a railroad communications center (which can provide
position information to any separate licensee communications center per
Paragraph B.5.b), or (iii) alternate licensee monitoring system.
Additionally, licensees may use a railroad communications center to
monitor the rail portion of a shipment, in lieu of using a separate
communications center.
b. (1) For highway shipments, provide for a communication center
that has the capability to continuously and actively monitor in-
progress shipments to ensure positive confirmation of the location,
status, and control over the shipment and implement pre-planned
procedures in response to deviations from the authorized route or
notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These
procedures shall include identification of the designated LLEA
contact(s) along the shipment route.
(2) For rail shipments, provide for a communication center that has
the capability to periodically monitor in-progress shipments to ensure
positive confirmation of the location of the shipment and implement
pre-planned procedures in response to notification of actual,
attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion,
or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These procedures shall include
identification of the designated LLEA contact(s) along the shipment
route. Licensees may use a railroad communications center in lieu of
establishing a separate communications center.
c. (1) For highway shipments, ensure that a two-way
telecommunication capability is available for the transport and any
escort vehicles allowing them to communicate with each other with the
communications center, and with designated LLEAs along the route. The
communications center must be capable of contacting the designated
authorities along the shipment route.
(2) For rail shipments, ensure that a two-way telecommunication
capability is available between the train and the communications center
and between any escort vehicles and the communications center. The
communications center must be capable of contacting the designated
authorities along the shipment route.
d. A licensee may utilize a carrier or third-party communications
center in lieu of establishing such a facility itself. A commercial
communications center must have the capabilities, necessary procedures,
training, and personnel background investigations to meet the
applicable requirements of these ASMs.
e. (1) For highway shipments, provide a backup means for the
transport and any escort vehicle to communicate with the communications
center, using a diverse method not subject to the same interference
factors as the primary capability selected for compliance with
[[Page 60925]]
Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable telephone).
(2) For rail shipments, provide a backup means for the train to
talk with the communications center, using a diverse method not subject
to the same interference factors as the primary capability selected for
compliance with Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable
telephone).
f. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(1) Not later than one hour after the time when, through the course
of the investigation, it is determined the shipment is lost or stolen,
the licensee shall ensure the appropriate local law enforcement agency,
the NRC Operations Center at 301-816-5100, and the appropriate
Agreement State regulatory agency, if any, are notified.
(2) If after 24 hours of initiating the investigation, the
radioactive material cannot be located, licensee shall ensure the NRC's
Operations Center and, for Agreement State licensees, the appropriate
Agreement State regulatory agency are immediately notified.
g. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
6. Drivers and Accompanying Individuals
a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
b. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
c. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
7. Procedures, Training, and Control of Information
a. (1) For highway shipments the licensee shall ensure that normal
and contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example:
Notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and
response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment.
Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of
authentication and duress codes, provision for refueling or other
stops, detours, and locations where communication is expected to be
temporarily lost.
(2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that normal and
contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example:
Notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and
response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment.
Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of
authentication and duress codes, provision for stops, and locations
where communication is expected to be temporarily lost.
b. (1) For highway shipments, the licensee shall ensure that
personnel, including drivers, accompanying individuals, responsible
communication center managers, and other appropriate communication
center personnel are trained in and understand the normal and
contingency procedures.
(2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that personnel,
including the appropriate train crew members and responsible railroad
communication center managers, and other appropriate railroad
communication center personnel are trained in and understand the normal
and contingency procedures.
c. Information to be protected as Safeguards Information--Modified
Handling, shall include, but is not limited to:
(1) Integrated transportation physical security plans.
(2) Schedules and itineraries for shipments. For shipments that are
not inherently self disclosing, schedule and itineraries information
may be decontrolled 2 days after a shipment is completed. For shipments
that are inherently self disclosing, schedule may be released as
necessary after departure.
(3) Details of alarm and communications systems, communication
protocols and duress codes, and security contingency response
procedures.
(4) Arrangements with designated LLEA (i.e., Federal, State Police,
and/or local police departments) and information on whether a State
intends to provide armed escorts for a shipment.
For preplanning; coordinating, for example with States
organizations and carriers; reporting information as described in B.1.,
B.4., and B.5. related to shipments of radioactive material, and the
radionuclides identified in Paragraph A.1, the licensee shall ensure
the information is protected at least as sensitive information (for
example, proprietary or business financial information). Licensees
shall ensure access is restricted to this information to those licensee
and contractor personnel with a need to know. Licensees shall ensure
all parties receiving this information protect it similarly.
Information may be transmitted either in writing or electronically and
shall be marked as ``Sensitive Information--Not for Public
Disclosure.''
C. Implementation Schedule
1. Licensees shall implement the requirements of this ASM within
180 days of the date of issuance of the Order or before the first
shipment of RAMQC, whichever is sooner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of
the same radionuclide should be included when the total activity
equals or exceeds the quantity of concern.
\3\ The primary values used for compliance with this Order are
Terabecquerels (TBq). The curie (Ci) values are rounded to two
significant figures for informational purposes only.
\4\ Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or
collocated if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a
locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to
the radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive
material.
\5\ If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the
ratios of the activity of each source, i, of radionuclide, n,
A(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed
for that radionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source
activity for radionuclide A) / (quantity of concern for radionuclide
A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) / (quantity
of concern for radionuclide B)] + etc......>=1.
Table A: Radionuclides of Concern
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity of Quantity of
Radionuclide concern \2\ concern \3\
(TBq) (Ci)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Am-241...................................... 0.6 16
Am-241/Be................................... 0.6 16
Cf-252...................................... 0.2 5.4
Cm-244...................................... 0.5 14
Co-60....................................... 0.3 8.1
Cs-137...................................... 1 27
Gd-153...................................... 10 270
Ir-192...................................... 0.8 22
Pm-147...................................... 400 11,000
Pu-238...................................... 0.6 16
Pu-239/Be................................... 0.6 16
Ra-226...................................... 0.4 11
Se-75....................................... 2 54
Sr-90 (Y-90)................................ 10 270
Tm-170...................................... 200 5,400
Yb-169...................................... 3 81
Combinations of radioactive materials listed (\5\) ............
above \4\..................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guidance for Aggregation of Sources
The NRC supports the use of the International Atomic Energy
Association's (IAEA) source categorization methodology as defined in
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9, ``Categorization of
Radioactive Sources,'' (2005) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf) and as endorsed by the agency's Code
of
[[Page 60926]]
Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, January
2004 (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf). The Code defines a three-tiered source categorization scheme.
Category 1 corresponds to the largest source strength (equal to or
greater than 100 times the quantity of concern values listed in Table
1.) and Category 3, the smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth the
quantity of concern values listed in Table 1.). Additional security
measures apply to sources that are equal to or greater than the
quantity of concern values listed in Table 1, plus aggregations of
smaller sources that are equal to or greater than the quantities in
Table 1. Aggregation only applies to sources that are collocated.
Licensees who possess individual sources in total quantities that
equal or exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to implement
additional security measures. Where there are many small (less than the
quantity of concern values) collocated sources whose total aggregate
activity equals or exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are to
implement additional security measures.
Some source handling or storage activities may cover several
buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The question
then becomes, ``When are sources considered collocated for purposes of
aggregation?'' For purposes of the additional controls, sources are
considered collocated if breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked
door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the
sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be aggregated
separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked source
safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both barriers are
simultaneously open, then all sources within these two barriers are
considered to be collocated. This logic should be continued for other
barriers within or behind the inner barrier.
The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has
sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two shielded
safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as follows:
The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cf-252,
0.12 TBq (3.2 Ci); Co-60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu-238, 0.3 TBq
(8.1 Ci). Application of the unity rule yields: (0.12 / 0.2) + (0.18
/ 0.3) + (0.3 / 0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7. Therefore, the sources
would require additional security measures. Shielded safe 1
has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Cs-137 source and a 0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am-241
source. In this case, the sources would require additional security
measures, regardless of location, because they each exceed the
quantities in Table 1. Shielded safe 2 has two Ir-192
sources, each having an activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case,
the sources would not require additional security measures while
locked in the safe. The combined activity does not exceed the
threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22 Ci).
Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source handling
operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during periods of
active source usage), licensees should, to the extent practicable,
consider two modes of source usage--``operations'' (active source
usage) and ``shutdown'' (source storage mode). Whichever mode results
in the greatest inventory (considering barrier status) would require
additional security measures for each location.
Use the following method to determine which sources of radioactive
material require implementation of the Additional Security Measures:
Include any single source equal to or greater than the
quantity of concern in Table
Include multiple collocated sources of the same
radionuclide when the combined quantity equals or exceeds the quantity
of concern
For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple
collocated sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate
quantities satisfy the following unity rule: [(amount of radionuclide
A) / (quantity of concern of radionuclide A)] + [(amount of
radionuclide B) / (quantity of concern of radionuclide B)] + etc.....>=
1
Attachment C: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official Is Determining
Access to Safeguards Information or Unescorted Access to Radioactive
Materials
General Requirements
Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this
attachment.
1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall
fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to
Safeguards Information (SGI) or unescorted access to radioactive
material quantities of concern (RAMQC). The Licensee shall review and
use the information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in this Order and this
attachment are satisfied.
2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this
attachment.
3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or unescorted access need not be
taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor,
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61 for
unescorted access, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal
history check (e.g. National Agency Check, Transportation Worker
Identification Credentials in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Bureau
of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives background checks and
clearances in accordance with 27 CFR Part 555, Health and Human
Services security risk assessments for possession and use of select
agents and toxins in accordance with 27 CFR Part 555, Hazardous
Material security threat assessments for hazardous material endorsement
to commercial drivers license in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572,
Customs and Border Protection's Free and Secure Trade Program \6\)
within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal security
clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted
the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history check
must be provided. The Licensee must retain this documentation for a
period of three (3) years from the date the individual no longer
requires access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials
associated with the Licensee's activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The FAST program is a cooperative effort between the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection and the governments of Canada and
Mexico to coordinate processes for the clearance of commercial
shipments at the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. Participants
in the FAST program, which requires successful completion of a
background records check, may receive expedited entrance privileges
at the northern and southern borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI
and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability
requirements of this Order, in making a determination whether to grant,
or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive
materials.
6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an
[[Page 60927]]
individual's suitability for access to SGI or unescorted access to
RAMQC.
7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination
whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted
access to RAMQC.
Prohibitions
1. A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an
individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of
information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one
(1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of
the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an
acquittal.
2. A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the
information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks
1. For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall,
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's
Division of Facility and Security, Mail Stop T-03B46M, one completed,
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRC000Z) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking
access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC, to the Director of the
Division of Facility and Security, marked for the attention of the
Division's Criminal History Program. Copies of these forms may be
obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling 1-630-829-
9565, or by email to [email protected]. Practicable alternative
formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish
procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results
in minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible
or incomplete cards.
2. The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for
completeness. Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions
or evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The
fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the
initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint
impressions cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have
the FBI Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
3. Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application.
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, or
money order, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For guidance on making
electronic payments, contact the Facility Security Branch, Division of
Facility and Security, at 301-415-7513]. Combined payment for multiple
applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently $26) is the
sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or
other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee,
and an NRC processing fee, which covers administrative costs associated
with NRC handling of Licensee fingerprint submissions. The Commission
will directly notify Licensees who are subject to this regulation of
any fee changes.
4. The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for
criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record.
Right To Correct and Complete Information
1. Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall
make available to the individual the contents of any criminal records
obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete
information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1)
year from the date of the notification.
2. If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it
is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change,
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in
the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These
procedures include either direct application by the individual
challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency)
that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to
the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history
record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28
CFR Part 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the
challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that
agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an
official communication directly from the agency that contributed the
original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency.
The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to
initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history
records check after the record is made available for his/her review.
The Licensee may make a final determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access RAMQC based upon the criminal history record only
upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the
record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access to RAMQC, the Licensee shall provide the individual
its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to
RAMQC shall not be granted to an individual during the review process.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system
of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal
information from unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual,
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining
access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. No individual authorized
to have access to the information may re-disseminate the information to
any other individual who does not have a need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if
the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the
individual's written request to re-disseminate the information
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative
of the NRC to
[[Page 60928]]
determine compliance with the regulations and laws.
5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has
been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment
or determination of access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC
(whether access was approved or denied). After the required three (3)
year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method that will
prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.
[FR Doc. 2013-24093 Filed 10-1-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P