[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 182 (Thursday, September 19, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57470-57472]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-22848]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0650; Notice No. 23-13-01-SC]


Special Conditions: Eclipse, EA500, Certification of Autothrottle 
Functions

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Eclipse EA500 
airplane. This airplane as modified by Innovative Solutions and Support 
(IS&S) will have a novel or unusual design feature(s) associated with 
the autothrottle system (ATS). The applicable airworthiness regulations 
do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design 
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety 
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a 
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing 
airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is September 11, 
2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark S. Orr, FAA, Programs and 
Procedures Branch, ACE-114, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service, 901 Locust; Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 
telephone (816) 329-4151; facsimile (816) 329-4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On April 15, 2011, Innovative Solutions and Support (IS&S) applied 
for a supplemental type certificate for an update to the aircraft 
software to activate the previously installed autothrottle provisions 
in the EA500. The EA500 is a pressurized monoplane with provisions for 
up to six persons (standard seating five people) and may be operated as 
a single or two pilot aircraft (reference Minimum Flight Crew 
Limitation, AFM 06-122204 Rev 4 section 2-4). The airplane is operated 
under 14 CFR part 91 with standard systems installed and under 14 CFR 
part 135 with additional equipment installed. The Eclipse Model EA500 
was certificated under part 23 by the FAA on September 30, 2006 (Type 
Certificate A00002AC) with autothrottle provisions (i.e., motors and 
controls) installed yet rendered inactive through ``collaring'' of the 
ATS motor Electronic Circuit Breaker (ECB). Under the original Type 
Certification program, no certification credit was received nor the 
regulatory basis established for the autothrottle functions of the 
Eclipse Model EA500 aircraft.
    Current part 23 airworthiness regulations do not contain 
appropriate safety standards for autothrottle system (ATS) 
installations, so special conditions are required to establish an 
acceptable level of safety. Part 25 regulations contain appropriate 
safety standards for these systems, so the intent for this project is 
to apply the language in Sec.  25.1329 for the autothrottle, 
substituting Sec.  23.1309 and Sec.  23.143 in place of the similar 
part 25 regulations referenced in Sec.  25.1329.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Sec.  21.101, IS&S must show that the 
EA500, as changed, continues to meet the applicable provisions of the 
regulations incorporated by reference in A00002AC or the applicable 
regulations in effect on the date of application for the change. The 
regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate are 
commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The 
regulations incorporated by reference in A00002AC are as follows:

    14 CFR Part 23 through Amendment 55 (except 14 CFR 23.1303 
Amendment 23-62), Part 34 through Amendment 34-3, and Part 36 
through Amendment 36-26.
    Special Conditions:

23-128-SC for Engine Fire Extinguishing System
23-121-SC for Electronic Engine Control System
23-112A-SC for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

    Equivalent Levels of Safety Findings:

ACE-02-19: 14 CFR 23.777(d) and 23.781 Fuel Cutoff Control
ACE-05-32: 14 CFR 23.1545(a) and 23.1581(d) for Indicated Airspeeds
ACE-05-34: 14 CFR 23.181(b), Dynamic Stability
ACE-05-35: 14 CFR 23.1353(h), Storage Battery Design and 
Installation
ACE-05-36: 14 CFR 23.1323(c), Airspeed Indicating System
ACE-06-01: 14 CFR 23.1545(b)(4), Airspeed Indicator
ACE-06-05: 14 CFR part 23, Appendix H, Sec.  H23.5, Installation of 
an Automatic Power Reserve System
ACE-07-04: 14 CFR 23.1545(b)(4), Airspeed Indicator
ACE-08-12, 14 CFR 23.201(b)(2) Wings Level Stall, and 23.203(a), 
Turning Flight and Accelerated Turning Stalls for flight into known 
icing (FIKI)

    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., part 23) do not contain adequate or appropriate 
safety standards for the EA500 because of a novel or unusual design 
feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 
Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type 
certificate to modify any other model included on the same type 
certificate to incorporate the same or similar novel or unusual design 
feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model 
under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, the EA500 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust 
emission requirements of part 34 and the noise certification 
requirements of part 36.

[[Page 57471]]

    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type-
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The EA500 will incorporate the following novel or unusual design 
features: Innovative Solutions and Support (IS&S) has applied for a 
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) to update the aircraft software for 
implementation of an autothrottle function on the EA500 aircraft. 
Included with the software upgrade is the activation of previously 
installed autothrottle provisions. Since the current part 23 
airworthiness regulations do not contain appropriate safety standards 
for ATS installations, special conditions are required to establish an 
acceptable level of safety. Part 25 regulations contain appropriate 
safety standards for these systems, so the intent for this project is 
to apply the language in Sec.  25.1329 for the autothrottle, 
substituting Sec.  23.1309 and Sec.  23.143 in place of the similar 
part 25 regulations referenced in Sec.  25.1329. In addition, proper 
function of the ATS must be demonstrated according to Sec.  23.1301 in 
a manner acceptable to the administrator, as prior evaluations of the 
system components included in the existing type design did not include 
demonstration of proper installed function on the ground or in the air.

Discussion

    Part 23 at this time does not sufficiently address autothrottle 
technology and safety concerns. Therefore, special conditions must be 
developed and applied to this project to ensure an acceptable level of 
safety has been obtained. For approval to use the ATS during flight, 
the Eclipse EA500 airplane must demonstrate compliance to the intent of 
the requirements of Sec.  25.1329, applying the appropriate part 23 
references to Sec.  23.1309 (to include performing FHA/SSA to determine 
the appropriate/applicable Software and Airborne Electronic Hardware 
assurance levels) and Sec.  23.143 and the following special 
conditions:
    The following special conditions, derived from Sec.  25.1329, are 
issued for the Eclipse EA500 airplane:

    (a) Quick disengagement controls for the autothrust functions 
must be provided for each pilot. The autothrust quick disengagement 
controls must be located on the thrust control levers. Quick 
disengagement controls must be readily accessible to each pilot 
while operating the thrust control levers.
    (b) The effects of a failure of the system to disengage the 
autothrust functions when manually commanded by the pilot must be 
assessed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 23.1309.
    (c) Engagement or switching of the flight guidance system, a 
mode, or a sensor may not cause the autothrust system to effect a 
transient response that alters the airplane's flight path any 
greater than a minor transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of 
this section.
    (d) Under normal conditions, the disengagement of any automatic 
control function of a flight guidance system may not cause a 
transient response of the airplane's flight path any greater than a 
minor transient.
    (e) Under rare normal and non-normal conditions, disengagement 
of any automatic control function of a flight guidance system may 
not result in a transient any greater than a significant transient, 
as defined in paragraph (l)(2) of this section.
    (f) The function and direction of motion of each command 
reference control, such as heading select or vertical speed, must be 
plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each control if necessary to 
prevent inappropriate use or confusion.
    (g) Under any condition of flight appropriate to its use, the 
flight guidance system may not produce hazardous loads on the 
airplane, nor create hazardous deviations in the flight path. This 
applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a 
malfunction, and assumes that the pilot begins corrective action 
within a reasonable period of time.
    (h) When the flight guidance system is in use, a means must be 
provided to avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin from the 
speed range of the normal flight envelope. If the airplane 
experiences an excursion outside this range, a means must be 
provided to prevent the flight guidance system from providing 
guidance or control to an unsafe speed.
    (i) The flight guidance system functions, controls, indications, 
and alerts must be designed to minimize flightcrew errors and 
confusion concerning the behavior and operation of the flight 
guidance system. Means must be provided to indicate the current mode 
of operation, including any armed modes, transitions, and 
reversions. Selector switch position is not an acceptable means of 
indication. The controls and indications must be grouped and 
presented in a logical and consistent manner. The indications must 
be visible to each pilot under all expected lighting conditions.
    (j) Following disengagement of the autothrust function, a 
caution (visual and auditory) must be provided to each pilot.
    (k) During autothrust operation, it must be possible for the 
flightcrew to move the thrust levers without requiring excessive 
force. The autothrust may not create a potential hazard when the 
flightcrew applies an override force to the thrust levers.
    (l) For purposes of this section, a transient is a disturbance 
in the control or flight path of the airplane that is not consistent 
with response to flightcrew inputs or environmental conditions.
    (1) A minor transient would not significantly reduce safety 
margins and would involve flightcrew actions that are well within 
their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase 
in flightcrew workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or 
cabin crew.
    (2) A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction 
in safety margins, an increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort to 
the flightcrew, or physical distress to the passengers or cabin 
crew, possibly including non-fatal injuries. Significant transients 
do not require, in order to remain within or recover to the normal 
flight envelope, any of the following:
    (i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength.
    (ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are greater than those 
specified in Sec. 23.143(c).
    (iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might 
result in further hazard to secured or non-secured occupants.

    The applicant must also functionally demonstrate independence 
between the left and right ATS installation to prove they cannot have a 
single point failure that is not extremely improbable that 
inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or to substantial uncommanded 
thrust changes and transients, in both engines simultaneously.

Discussion of Comments

    Notice of proposed special conditions No. 23-13-01-SC for the 
Eclipse EA500 airplane was published in the Federal Register on July 
31, 2013, (78 FR 46295). No comments were received, and the special 
conditions are adopted as proposed.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the 
EA500. Should IS&S apply at a later date for a supplemental type 
certificate to modify any other model included on A00002AC to 
incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special 
conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model EA500 of airplanes. It is not a rule of general 
applicability and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA 
for approval of these features on the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

Citation

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the

[[Page 57472]]

Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Eclipse EA500 airplanes modified by 
IS&S.
    1. Certification of Autothrottle Functions under Part 23.
    The following special conditions, derived from Sec.  25.1329, are 
issued for the Eclipse EA500 airplane:

    (a) Quick disengagement controls for the autothrust functions 
must be provided for each pilot. The autothrust quick disengagement 
controls must be located on the thrust control levers. Quick 
disengagement controls must be readily accessible to each pilot 
while operating the thrust control levers.
    (b) The effects of a failure of the system to disengage the 
autothrust functions when manually commanded by the pilot must be 
assessed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 23.1309.
    (c) Engagement or switching of the flight guidance system, a 
mode, or a sensor may not cause the autothrust system to effect a 
transient response that alters the airplane's flight path any 
greater than a minor transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of 
this section.
    (d) Under normal conditions, the disengagement of any automatic 
control function of a flight guidance system may not cause a 
transient response of the airplane's flight path any greater than a 
minor transient.
    (e) Under rare normal and non-normal conditions, disengagement 
of any automatic control function of a flight guidance system may 
not result in a transient any greater than a significant transient, 
as defined in paragraph (l)(2) of this section.
    (f) The function and direction of motion of each command 
reference control, such as heading select or vertical speed, must be 
plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each control if necessary to 
prevent inappropriate use or confusion.
    (g) Under any condition of flight appropriate to its use, the 
flight guidance system may not produce hazardous loads on the 
airplane, nor create hazardous deviations in the flight path. This 
applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a 
malfunction, and assumes that the pilot begins corrective action 
within a reasonable period of time.
    (h) When the flight guidance system is in use, a means must be 
provided to avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin from the 
speed range of the normal flight envelope. If the airplane 
experiences an excursion outside this range, a means must be 
provided to prevent the flight guidance system from providing 
guidance or control to an unsafe speed.
    (i) The flight guidance system functions, controls, indications, 
and alerts must be designed to minimize flightcrew errors and 
confusion concerning the behavior and operation of the flight 
guidance system. Means must be provided to indicate the current mode 
of operation, including any armed modes, transitions, and 
reversions. Selector switch position is not an acceptable means of 
indication. The controls and indications must be grouped and 
presented in a logical and consistent manner. The indications must 
be visible to each pilot under all expected lighting conditions.
    (j) Following disengagement of the autothrust function, a 
caution (visual and auditory) must be provided to each pilot.
    (k) During autothrust operation, it must be possible for the 
flightcrew to move the thrust levers without requiring excessive 
force. The autothrust may not create a potential hazard when the 
flightcrew applies an override force to the thrust levers.
    (l) For purposes of this section, a transient is a disturbance 
in the control or flight path of the airplane that is not consistent 
with response to flightcrew inputs or environmental conditions.
    (1) A minor transient would not significantly reduce safety 
margins and would involve flightcrew actions that are well within 
their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase 
in flightcrew workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or 
cabin crew.
    (2) A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction 
in safety margins, an increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort to 
the flightcrew, or physical distress to the passengers or cabin 
crew, possibly including non-fatal injuries. Significant transients 
do not require, in order to remain within or recover to the normal 
flight envelope, any of the following:
    (i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength.
    (ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are greater than those 
specified in Sec. 23.143(c).
    (iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might 
result in further hazard to secured or non-secured occupants.

    The applicant must also functionally demonstrate independence 
between the left and right ATS installation to prove they cannot have a 
single point failure that is not extremely improbable that 
inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or to substantial uncommanded 
thrust changes and transients, in both engines simultaneously.

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on September 11, 2013.
Earl Lawrence,
Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-22848 Filed 9-18-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P