DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
[Docket No. DHS–2013–0064]

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) Opportunity With the Department of Homeland Security for the Production and Associated Research of Purpose Bred Explosive Detection Canines


ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), located in Washington, DC, and the Transportation Security Administration/Org of Law Enforcement—Federal Air Marshal Service (TS&A/OLE–FAMS), specifically the Canine Training and Evaluation Section at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX, are seeking industry collaborators to aid in continuing the use of selective breeding and data gathering to determine the most significant genetic and behavioral characteristics of explosive detection canines. The role of the industry collaborator(s) in this CRADA will be to continue breeding a colony of 8 Labrador Retrievers based on approved selective criteria, gather data based on existing Government established protocols, and to partner with other institutions to scientifically advance the selective breeding of purpose bred explosives detection canines based on existing data supplemented by the continued gathering of data associated with the observation and measurement of canine health and performance.

DHS S&T and TS&A/OLE–FAMS are seeking CRADA collaborators that own or have access to the technological components for, have the technological expertise in, and have proven track records of success in the fields of: High quality husbandry for the breeding of canines; understanding, collection and analysis of quantitative behavior trait measurement; application of quantitative techniques to improve genetic lines (Inbreeding Coefficients, Estimated Breeding Values, Linkage Analysis, Selection Indexes, etc); knowledge of advanced techniques (prenatal imprinting, olfactory imprinting, maternal oriented social learning, litter oriented social learning, early environmental conditioning, self search-self reward) to ensure proper canine development and its potential epigenetic impact, and experience in preparing dogs for consignment evaluations by TSA/OLE–FAMS, and other DHS stakeholder community operational canine program evaluators.

The proposed term of the CRADA can be up to thirty-six (36) months.

DATES: Submit comments on or before October 18, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Mail comments and requests to participate to Mr. Don Roberts, (ATTN: Don Roberts, Mailing Address: S&T EXD Stop 0206, Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane, Washington, DC 20528–0202).

Submit electronic comments and other data to don.roberts@hq.dhs.gov. The preferred method of communication for this Notice is through electronic correspondence.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information on DHS CRADAs: Marlene Owens, (202) 254–6671.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Requirements

Potential Collaborators

1. Should possess facilities to safely provide for the care and housing of 8 adult breeding females and up to 50 puppies each year. This should include housing areas, working/search areas, exercise areas, and separate whelping/weaning areas.

2. Should have experience and knowledge in how to properly rear a dog from birth to a year of age specifically to enhance its potential to be an effective explosives detection dog.

3. Should be veterinarians or have close working relationships with veterinarians familiar with canine reproduction and maintaining the health of developing working detection dogs. This should include veterinary expertise in screening for genetic faults that would preclude such dogs from being future working dogs (hip structure, elbow structure, no ocular anomalies or other genetic disease known to impact this breed).

4. Should be able to demonstrate their involvement and understanding in current behavioral canine research and be able to adapt their rearing schemes based on DHS S&T sponsored research by other academic institutions.

5. Should be able to demonstrate familiarity with and the ability to conduct ongoing behavioral testing of developing canines in the context of their potential to be working explosives detection dogs.

6. Should be able to demonstrate the skill and knowledge required to perform advanced genetic analysis on this population of dogs (Estimated Breeding Values, Linkage Analysis, Inbreeding Coefficients, Selection Indexes, Quantitative Genetic analysis).

7. Should be able to demonstrate knowledge of and the ability to maintain computer databases to track all data associated with this population.

DHS S&T/TS&A/OLE–FAMS Role (includes but not limited to):

1. Provide existing data in the form of paper record and/or database on over 500 dogs bred since 2002;

2. Provide TSA subject matter experts to demonstrate, coordinate, and educate on how prior data was collected;

3. Provide previously written reports that suggest new and improved methodology of collecting future canine behavior data; and

4. Provide 8 breeding female Labrador Retrievers from proven stock of detection canines.

Period of Performance: 36 months from date of Agreement.

Selection Criteria

DHS S&T/TS&A/OLE–FAMS reserves the right to select CRADA collaborators for all, some, or none of the proposals in response to this notice. DHS S&T/TS&A/OLE–FAMS will provide no funding for reimbursement of proposal development costs. Proposals (or any other material) submitted in response to this notice will not be returned. Proposals submitted are expected to be unclassified.

DHS S&T/TS&A/OLE–FAMS will select proposals at their sole discretion on the basis of:

1. How well the proposal communicates the collaborators’ understanding of and ability to meet the CRADAs goals and proposed timeline.

2. How well the proposal addresses the following criteria:

   a. Capability of the collaborator to provide equipment, materials, and personnel for the proposed effort.

   b. Capability of the collaborator to meet the requirements for canine development, behavioral testing, data analysis, and submission of supporting data and documents fulfilling the stated requirements.

   c. Preliminary data or results which support the requirements outlined above.

   Participation in this CRADA does not imply the future purchase of any materials, equipment, or services from the collaborating entities, and non-Federal CRADA participants will not be excluded from any future DHS S&T/TS&A/OLE–FAMS procurements based solely on their participation in this CRADA.

DHS, as an executive agency under 5 U.S.C. 105, is a Federal agency for the purposes of 15 U.S.C. 3710a and may enter into a CRADA. DHS delegated the authority to conduct CRADAs to the Science and Technology Directorate and its laboratories.

Dated: September 12, 2013.

Stephen Hancock,
Director, Public Private Partnerships.

[FR Doc. 2013–22639 Filed 9–17–13; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9110–9F–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

[Docket No. DHS–2013–0021]


AGENCY: Privacy Office, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of records.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of Homeland Security proposes to establish a new Department of Homeland Security system of records titled, “Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection—019 Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS) System of Records.” This system of records allows the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection to collect and maintain records on publicly available aircraft and airport data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), requests from law enforcement about suspects, tips from the public, and recordings of event and operations data in a watch log or event tracking log. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security is issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to exempt this system of records from certain provisions of the Privacy Act, elsewhere in the Federal Register. This newly established system will be included in the Department of Homeland Security’s inventory of record systems.

DATES AND COMMENTS: Submit comments on or before October 18, 2013. This new system will be effective October 18, 2013.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS–2013–0021 by one of the following methods:


Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided.

Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received go to http://www.regulations.gov.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) proposes to establish a new DHS system of records titled, “DHS/CBP—019 Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS) System of Records.” This System of Records Notice (SORN) is being published because AMOSS stores personally identifiable information in a system of records. AMOSS is a sophisticated radar processing system that supports the concerted and cooperative effort of air, land, and sea vehicles; field offices; and command and control centers staffed by law enforcement officers (LEO), detection enforcement officers (DEO), pilots, crew, and Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) support staff in monitoring approaches to the U.S. border to detect illicit trafficking and direct interdiction actions, as appropriate. AMOSS also supports domestic operations in conjunction with other domestic law enforcement agencies by tracking domestic flights, as well as providing air traffic monitoring for air defense purposes. By processing a collection of external data imposed over a zooming-capable screen, AMOSS provides a real-time picture of air activity over a wide portion of North America, thus allowing system operators to discriminate between normal and suspicious air, ground, and marine vehicle movement. Much of the external data processed by AMOSS does not contain Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and is supplied to AMOSS by means of networked external sources. For instance, global positioning systems (GPS) from CBP vehicles or law enforcement investigations, maps, datasets from radar plot data, track data, and flight plan data are all incorporated to enhance the system operator’s ability to differentiate between normal and suspicious aviation movement.

AMOSS collects PII principally from the following sources:

1. Aircraft registration and owner information, which is downloaded to AMOSS weekly from the publicly available Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Registration Database (DOT/FAA–801—Aircraft Registration System (April 11, 2000, 65 FR 19518));
2. Airport manager contact information, which is contained in a larger download of airport and aeronautical navigation data obtained from the FAA National Flight Data Center Web site (DOT/FAA–847—Aviation Records on Individuals (November 9, 2010, 75 FR 68849));
3. Suspect information entered into the AMOC watch or event track logs received from other CBP personnel or law enforcement agencies; and
4. Information from members of the public who call in to report suspicious activity to a tip line.

The majority of the PII contained in AMOSS is publicly available data, which AMOSS downloads from the FAA Registration Database. The FAA Registration Database contains airport and runway information, aircraft registration (ownership) information on U.S. registered aircraft, flight plan/route information, special use airspace identification, and navigation aids identification. The information that AMOSS extracts from the FAA Registration Database contains PII in the form of aircraft owner names and addresses and airport manager names and phone numbers.

AMOSS also contains event and operations data, which DEOs or other AMOC staff record in a watch log or event tracking log. The watch log contains records of operational activities on the floor of the AMOC. The event tracking log contains active event logs of all investigative and law enforcement actions in response to suspicious activity. The watch log and event tracking log are similar to a police blotter or journal and can include