[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 181 (Wednesday, September 18, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57418-57419]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-22688]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2013-0215]


Compliance With Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses With 
Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation 
Under Severe Accident Conditions

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Draft Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate guidance; 
request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this 
draft Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate Interim Staff Guidance 
(JLD-ISG), JLD-ISG-2013-02, ``Compliance with Order EA-13-109, Order 
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents 
Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions.'' (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML13247A417) This draft JLD-ISG provides guidance and 
clarification to assist nuclear power reactors applicants and licensees 
with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements 
to mitigate challenges to key safety functions.

DATES: Comments must be filed no later than October 18, 2013. Comments 
received after this date will be considered, if it is practical to do 
so, but the NRC staff is able to ensure consideration only for comments 
received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comment by any of the following methods 
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting 
comments on a specific subject):
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0215. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section 
of this document.
     Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, 
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, 
Mail Stop: 3WFN, 06-44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001.
    For additional direction on accessing information and submitting 
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rajender Auluck, Japan Lessons-Learned 
Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-
1025; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2013-0215 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may 
access publicly-available information related to this action by the 
following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0215.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly-available documents online in the NRC 
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the 
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number 
for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is 
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is 
referenced. The draft JLD-ISG-2013-02 is available in ADAMS under 
Accession No. ML13247A417.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
     NRC's Interim Staff Guidance Web site: JLD-ISG documents 
are also available online under the ``Japan Lessons Learned'' heading 
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/#int.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2013-0215 in the subject line of your 
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make 
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your 
comment submission. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as entering the comment submissions into 
ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove 
identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be 
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should 
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove such information before making the comment submissions available 
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

II. Background Information

    The NRC staff developed this draft JLD-ISG-2013-02 to provide 
guidance and clarification to assist nuclear power reactor applicants 
and licensees with the identification of methods needed to comply with 
requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety functions. These 
requirements are contained in Order EA-13-109, ``Order Modifying 
Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of 
Operation under Severe Accident Conditions'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13130A067). The draft ISG is not a substitute for the requirements in 
Order EA-13-109, and compliance with the ISG is not a requirement. This 
ISG is being issued in draft form for public comment to involve the 
public in development of the implementing guidance.
    The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant following 
the March 2011, earthquake and tsunami highlight the possibility that 
events such as rare natural phenomena could challenge the traditional 
defense-in-depth protections related to preventing accidents, 
mitigating accidents to prevent the release of radioactive materials, 
and taking actions to protect the public should a release occur. At 
Fukushima Dai-ichi, limitations in time and unpredictable conditions 
associated with the accident significantly hindered attempts by the 
operators to prevent core damage and containment failure. In 
particular, the operators were unable to successfully operate the 
containment venting system. These problems, along with venting the 
containments under challenging conditions following the tsunami, 
contributed to the progression of the accident from inadequate cooling 
of the core leading to core damage, to compromising containment 
functions from overpressure and over-temperature conditions, and to the 
hydrogen explosions that destroyed the reactor

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buildings (secondary containments) of three of the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
units. The loss of the various barriers led to the release of 
radioactive materials, which further hampered operator efforts to 
arrest the accidents and ultimately led to the contamination of large 
areas surrounding the plant. Fortunately, the evacuation of local 
populations minimized the immediate danger to public health and safety 
from the loss of control of the large amount of radioactive materials 
within the reactor cores.
    The events at Fukushima reinforced the importance of reliable 
operation of hardened containment vents during emergency conditions, 
particularly, for small containments such as the Mark I and Mark II 
designs. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-050 \1\ 
requiring the Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this order to 
implement requirements for a reliable hardened containment venting 
system (HCVS) for Mark I and Mark II containments. Order EA-12-050 
required licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II 
containments to install a reliable HCVS to support strategies for 
controlling containment pressure and preventing core damage following 
an event that causes a loss of heat removal systems (e.g., an extended 
loss of electrical power). The NRC determined that the issuance of EA-
12-050 and implementation of the requirements of that order were 
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the 
public health and safety.
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    \1\ ``Order Modifying Licenses With Regard To Reliable Hardened 
Containment Vents (Effective Immediately),'' EA-12-050 (March 12, 
2012) (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A043).
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    While developing the requirements for a reliable HCVS in Order EA-
12-050, the NRC acknowledged that questions remained about maintaining 
containment integrity and limiting the release of radioactive materials 
if the venting systems were used during severe accident conditions. The 
NRC staff presented options to address these issues, including the 
possible use of engineered filters to control releases, for Commission 
consideration in SECY-12-0157, ``Consideration of Additional 
Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors 
With Mark I and Mark II Containments'' (issued November 26, 2012). 
Option 2 in SECY-12-0157 was to modify EA-12-050 to require severe 
accident capable vents (i.e., a reliable HCVS capable of operating 
under severe accident conditions). Other options discussed in SECY-12-
0157 included the installation of engineered filtered containment 
venting systems (Option 3) and the development of a severe accident 
confinement strategy (Option 4). In the Staff Requirements Memorandum 
(SRM) for SECY-12-0157, dated March 19, 2013, the Commission approved 
Option 2 and directed the staff to issue a modification to Order EA-12-
050 requiring licensees subject to that order to ``upgrade or replace 
the reliable hardened vents required by Order EA-12-050 with a 
containment venting system designed and installed to remain functional 
during severe accident conditions.''
    The requirements in this order, in addition to providing a reliable 
HCVS to assist in preventing core damage when heat removal capability 
is lost (the purpose of EA-12-050), will ensure that venting functions 
are also available during severe accident conditions. Severe accident 
conditions include the elevated temperatures, pressures, radiation 
levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such as hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide, associated with accidents involving extensive core damage, 
including accidents involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten 
core debris. This order requires installation of reliable hardened 
vents that will not only assist in preventing core damage when heat 
removal capability is lost, but will also function in severe accident 
conditions (i.e., when core damage has occurred). The safety 
improvements to Mark I and Mark II containment venting systems required 
by this order are intended to increase confidence in maintaining the 
containment function following core damage events. Although venting the 
containment during severe accident conditions could result in the 
release of radioactive materials, venting could also prevent 
containment structural and gross penetration leakage failures due to 
overpressurization that would hamper accident management (e.g., 
continuing efforts to cool core debris) and ultimately result in 
larger, uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.
    On August 28, 2013, NEI submitted NEI 13-02, ``Industry Guidance 
for Compliance with Order EA-13-109,'' Revision C2 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13247A403), to provide specification for the development, 
implementation, and maintenance of guidance in response to the order 
regarding reliable hardened containment vents capable of operation 
under severe accident conditions. This ISG endorses, with 
clarifications and exceptions, the methodologies described in the 
industry guidance document NEI 13-02.

Proposed Action

    By this action, the NRC is requesting public comments on draft JLD-
ISG-2013-02. This draft JLD-ISG proposes guidance related to 
requirements contained in Order EA-13-109, ``Order Modifying Licenses 
With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation 
Under Severe Accident Conditions''. The NRC staff will make a final 
determination regarding issuance of the JLD-ISG after it considers any 
public comments received in response to this request.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of September 2013.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David L. Skeen,
Director, Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2013-22688 Filed 9-17-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P