Records relating to security breaches within the Department of Defense including case files and reports.


3. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps (DAA–0127–2012–0004, 4 items, 4 temporary items). Master files and other records of an electronic information system used to manage the surveillance of Marine Corps installations, including sensor data and textual information.

4. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps (DAA–0127–2013–0006, 1 item, 1 temporary item). Master files of an electronic information system used to monitor the status and mission readiness of Marine Corps installations.


6. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DAA–0059–2011–0009, 22 items, 21 temporary items). Records of the Office of Foreign Missions including routine administrative files and correspondence, day-to-day operational files, and master files of an electronic information system used to support the issuance of privileges, benefits, and immunities to the foreign diplomatic community. Proposed for permanent retention are office program files.

7. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (N1–406–11–2, 3 items, 3 temporary items). Master files and output files of an electronic information system used to report on traffic data. Proposed for permanent retention are summary reports of all travel on public roads.

8. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (N1–406–11–1, 2 items, 1 temporary item). Master files of an electronic information system used to report on highway finance and motor fuel data.

9. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration (DAA–0399–2012–0002, 5 items, 2 temporary items). Records related to public affairs including working papers, community relations records, and photographs and motion pictures of non-mission activities. Proposed for permanent retention are biographies and portraits of senior officials, press releases, photographs and motion pictures of mission activities, and education files.


11. Peace Corps, Office of Safety and Security (DAA–0490–2013–0002, 2 items, 1 temporary item). Master files of an electronic information system used to report on security incidents and crimes against volunteers, trainees, or property. Proposed for permanent retention is the associated annual report.


Paul M. Wester, Jr.,
Chief Records Officer for the U.S. Government.

II

THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Notice of Permits Issued Under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.


SUMMARY: On March 31, 2003, the National Science Foundation (NSF) issued a final rule that authorized the collection of meteorites in Antarctica for scientific purposes only. In addition the regulations provide requirements for appropriate collection, handling, documentation, and curation of Antarctic meteorites to preserve their scientific value. These regulations implement the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, as amended by the Antarctic Science, Tourism and Conservation Act of 1996, (16 U.S.C 2401 et seq.), and Article 7 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty done at Madrid on October 4, 1991. The NSF is required to publish notice of the availability of Meteorite Collection Plans received under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. This is the required notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Folly A. Penhale, Division of Polar Programs, Room 755, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230 or ppenhale@nsf.gov

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A Meteorite Collection Plan has been received from Dr. Ralph Harvey of Case Western Reserve University. Interested parties are invited to submit written data, comments, or views with respect to this plan by September 4, 2013.

Nadene G. Kennedy,
Polar Coordination Specialist, Division of Polar Programs.

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[1] Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be released to the public.
implement Additional Security Measures (ASMs) for the radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 to this Order (the radionuclides of concern), to supplement the existing regulatory requirements. The ASMs included requirements for determining the trustworthiness and reliability of individuals that require unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern. Section 652 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which became law on August 8, 2005, amended Section 149 of the AEA to require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check for “any individual who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials or other property subject to regulation by the Commission that the Commission determines to be of such significance to the public health and safety or the common defense and security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks.” Section 149 of the AEA also requires that “all fingerprints obtained by an individual or entity . . . shall be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States through the Commission for identification and a criminal history records check.” Due to the 2005 revision of the AEA, the trustworthiness and reliability requirements of the ASMs were updated and the M&D licensees were issued additional Orders imposing the new fingerprinting requirements.

In late 2005, the NRC and the Agreement States began issuing Increased Controls (IC) Orders or other legally binding requirements to licensees who are authorized to possess the radionuclides of concern at IC licensee facilities. Paragraph IC 1.c, in Attachment B of the December 1, 2005 IC Order, “Increased Controls for Licenses That Possess Sources Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern,” stated that “service providers shall be escorted unless determined to be trustworthy and reliable by an NRC-required background investigation as an employee of a manufacturing and distribution licensee” (70 FR 72130). Starting in December 2007, the NRC and the Agreement States began issuing additional Orders or other legally binding requirements to the IC licensees, imposing the new fingerprinting requirements. In the December 13, 2007, Fingerprinting Order, paragraph IC 1.c of the prior Order was superseded by the requirement that “Service provider licensees shall be escorted unless determined to be trustworthy and reliable by an NRC-required background investigation” (72 FR 70901). However, the NRC did not require background investigations for non-M&D service provider licensees. Consequently, only service representatives of certain M&D licensees may be granted unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern at an IC licensee facility, even though non-M&D service provider licensees provide similar services and have the same degree of knowledge of the devices they service as M&D licensees. To maintain appropriate access control to the radionuclides of concern, and to allow M&D licensees and non-M&D service provider licensees to have the same level of access at customers’ facilities, NRC is imposing trustworthiness and reliability requirements for unescorted access to radionuclides of concern, as set forth in this Order. These requirements apply to non-M&D service provider licensees that request and have a need for unescorted access by their representatives to the radionuclides of concern at IC licensee facilities. These trustworthiness and reliability requirements are equivalent to the requirements for M&D licensees who perform services requiring unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern. In order to provide assurance that non-M&D service provider licensees are implementing prudent measures to achieve a consistent level of protection for service providers requiring unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern at IC licensee facilities, the licensee identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall implement the requirements of this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, because of potentially significant adverse impacts associated with a deliberate malevolent act by an individual with unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern, I find that the public health, safety, and interest require this Order to be effective immediately.

III

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 149, 149b, 161b, 1611, 1610, 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Parts 20, 30 and 33, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee identified in attachment 1 to this order comply with the requirements set forth in this order.

A.1. The licensee shall establish and maintain a fingerprinting program that meets the requirements of Attachment 3 to this Order for individuals that require unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern. The licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements of Attachment 3 to this Order within one hundred eighty (180) days of the date of this Order, or before providing written verification to another licensee subject to the IC requirements, or attesting to or certifying the trustworthiness and reliability of a service provider for unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern at a customer’s facility. A.2. Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, the licensee shall designate a “Reviewing Official” for determining unescorted access to the radioactive materials as listed in Attachment 2 to this Order by other individuals. The designated Reviewing Official shall be determined to be trustworthy and reliable by the licensee in accordance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to this Order and must be authorized unescorted access to the radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 to this Order as part of his or her job duties.

A.3. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if a designated Reviewing Official is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR 73.61, or has been favorably adjudicated by a U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and a FBI identification and criminal history records check within the last five (5) years, or for any person who has an active federal security clearance (provided in the latter two cases that they make available the appropriate documentation). The licensee may provide, for NRC review, written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the FBI identification and criminal history records results based upon a fingerprint identification check. The NRC will

2 Examples of such programs include (1) National Agency Check, (2) Transportation Worker Identification Credentials in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, (3) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives background checks and clearances in accordance with 27 CFR Part 555, (4) Health and Human Services security risk assessments for possession and use of select agents and toxins in accordance with 42 CFR Part 73, and (5) Hazardous Material security threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to commercial drivers license in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572. Customs and Border Protection’s Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program. The FAST program is a cooperative effort between the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the governments of Canada and Mexico to coordinate processes for the clearance of commercial shipments at the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. Participants in the FAST program, which requires successful completion of a background records check, may receive expedited entrance privileges at the northern and southern borders.

3 This documentation must allow the NRC or NRC-approved Reviewing Official to verify that the individual has fulfilled the unescorted access requirements of Section 149 of the AEA by submitting to fingerprinting and a FBI identification and criminal history records check.
determine whether, based on the written confirmation, the designated Reviewing Official may have unescorted access to the radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 to this Order, and therefore, be permitted to serve as the licensee’s Reviewing Official.

A.4. A designated Reviewing Official may not review the results from the FBI identification and criminal history records checks or make unescorted access determinations until the NRC has approved the individual as the licensee’s Reviewing Official.

A.5. The NRC will determine whether this individual (or any subsequent Reviewing Official) may have unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern, and therefore, be permitted to serve as the licensee’s Reviewing Official. The NRC-approved Reviewing Official shall be the recipient of the results of the FBI identification and criminal history records check of the other licensee employees requiring unescorted access to the radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 to this Order, and shall control such information as specified in the “Protection of Information” section of Attachment 3 to this Order.

A.6. The NRC-approved Reviewing Official shall determine whether an individual may have unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities in Attachment 2 to this Order, in accordance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to this Order.

B. Prior to requesting fingerprints from a licensee employee, a copy of this Order shall be provided to that person.

C.1. The licensee shall, in writing, within twenty-five (25) days of the date of this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it is unable to comply with any of the requirements described in this Order, including Attachment 3 to this Order, (2) if compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements would cause the licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any Commission or Agreement State regulation or its license. The notification shall provide the licensee’s justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement.

C.2. The licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements of Attachment 3 to this Order within one hundred eighty (180) days of the date of this Order.

C.3. The licensee shall report to the Commission when they have achieved full compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to this Order. The report shall be made within twenty-five (25) days after full compliance has been achieved.

C.4. If during the implementation period of this Order, the licensee is unable, due to circumstances beyond its control, to meet the requirements of this Order by January 11, 2014, the licensee shall request, in writing, that the Commission grant an extension of time to implement the requirements. The request shall provide the licensee’s justification for seeking additional time to comply with the requirements of this Order.

C.5. Licensees shall notify the NRC’s Headquarters Operations Office at 301–816–5100 within 24 hours if the results from a FBI identification and criminal history records check indicate that an individual is identified on the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Data Base.


The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the licensee.

IV

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the licensee must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order within twenty-five (25) days of the date of this Order. In addition, the licensee and any other person adversely affected by this Order may request a hearing of this Order within twenty-five (25) days of the date of the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Division of Materials Safety and State Agreements, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, and include a statement of good cause for the extension.

The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. If a person other than the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).

A request for a hearing must be filed in accordance with the NRC’s E-Filing rule, which became effective on October 15, 2007. The E-Filing Final Rule was issued on August 28, 2007, (72 FR 49139). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve documents over the internet or, in some cases, to mail copies on electronic optical storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek a waiver in accordance with the procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements associated with E-Filing, at least five (5) days prior to the filing deadline the requestor must contact the Office of the Secretary by email to hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by calling 301–415–1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any NRC proceeding in which it is participating; and/or (2) creation of an electronic docket for the proceeding (even in instances when the requestor (or its counsel or representative) already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Each requestor will need to download the Workplace Forms Viewer™ to access the Electronic Information Exchange (EIE) System, a component of the E-Filing system. The Workplace Forms Viewer™ is free and is available at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-viewer.html. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate also is available on NRC’s public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html.

Once a requestor has obtained a digital ID certificate, had a docket created, and downloaded the EIE viewer, it can then submit a request for a hearing through EIE. Submissions should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance available on the NRC’s public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the filer submits its document through EIE. To be timely, electronic filings must be

The NRC’s determination of this individual’s unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern in accordance with the process described in Enclosure 4 to the transmittal letter of this Order is an administrative determination that is outside the scope of this Order.

4 The NRC’s determination of this individual’s unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern in accordance with the process described in Enclosure 4 to the transmittal letter of this Order is an administrative determination that is outside the scope of this Order.
of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
first class mail addressed to the Office
submit documents in paper format.
2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
documents electronically must file a
7640.
The help line number is 1–866–672–
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday.
submittals.html
hearing request is filed so that they may
representative) must apply for and
obtain access to the document via the E-
document and sends the submitter an
E-Filing system time-stamps the
document on all other participants.
Filing is considered complete by first-
class mail as of the time of deposit in
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon
depositing the document with the
provider of the service.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory
proceedings will appear in NRC’s
electronic hearing docket which is
available to the public at http://
ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/; unless excluded
pursuant to an order of the Commission,
an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
or a Presiding Officer. Participants are
requested not to include personal
privacy information, such as social
security numbers, home addresses, or
home phone numbers in their filings.
With respect to copyrighted works,
except for limited excerpts that serve
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings
and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested
not to include copyrighted materials in
their works.
If a hearing is requested by the
licensee or a person whose interest is
adversely affected, the Commission will
issue an Order designating the time
and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held
the issue to be considered at such
hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the
licensee may, in addition to requesting a
hearing, at the time the answer is filed
or sooner, move the presiding officer to
set aside the immediate effectiveness of
the Order on the ground that the Order,
including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate
evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
Section III above shall be final twenty-
five (25) days from the date of this Order
without further order or proceedings. If
an extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section III shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing shall
not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
Dated this 13th day of August, 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian J. McDermott,
Director, Division of Materials Safety and
State Agreements, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental Management
Programs.

Attachment 1: List of Applicable
Materials Licenses Redacted
Attachment 2: Table 1: Radionuclides
of Concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radionuclide</th>
<th>Quantity of concern</th>
<th>Quantity of Concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(TBq)</td>
<td>(Ci)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am-241</td>
<td>0.6…………………...</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am-241/Be</td>
<td>0.6…………………...</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cf-252</td>
<td>0.2…………………...</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cm-244</td>
<td>0.5…………………...</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-60</td>
<td>0.3…………………...</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cs-137</td>
<td>1…………………....</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gd-153</td>
<td>10…………………..</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ir-192</td>
<td>0.8…………………..</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ir-192</td>
<td>400………………...</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pm-147</td>
<td>0.6…………………...</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pm-147</td>
<td>0.6…………………...</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu-239/Be</td>
<td>0.4…………………...</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu-233/Be</td>
<td>0.4…………………...</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra-226</td>
<td>0.4…………………...</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1: RADIONUCLIDES OF CONCERN—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radionuclide</th>
<th>Quantity of concern (^1) (TBq)</th>
<th>Quantity of Concern (^2) (Ci)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Se-75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Se-75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr-90 (Y–90)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr-90 (Y–90)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tm-170</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tm-170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yb-169</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yb-169</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combinations of radioactive materials listed above \(^3\) See Footnote Below \(^4\)

\(^1\) The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included when the total activity equals or exceeds the quantity of concern.

\(^2\) The primary values used for compliance with this Order are Terabecquerels (TBq). The curie (Ci) values are rounded to two significant figures for informational purposes only.

\(^3\) Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.

\(^4\) If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, \(n_A\), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide \(n\), \(Q_{n_A}\), listed for that radionuclide equals or exceeds one. \(((\text{aggregated source activity for radionuclide } A) + (\text{quantity of concern for radionuclide } A)) + (\text{aggregated source activity for radionuclide } B) + (\text{quantity of concern for radionuclide } B)) + \text{etc.} \geq 1\).

Guidance for Aggregation of Sources


The Code defines a three-tiered source categorization scheme. Category 1 corresponds to the largest source strength (equal to or greater than 100 times the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1) and Category 3, the smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1). Additional security measures apply to sources that are equal to or greater than the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1, plus aggregations of smaller sources that are equal to or greater than the quantities in Table 1. Aggregation only applies to sources that are collocated.

Licensees who possess individual sources in total quantities that equal or exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to implement additional security measures. When there are many small (less than the quantity of concern values) collocated sources whose total aggregate activity equals or exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are to implement additional security measures.

Some source handling or storage activities may cover several buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The question then becomes, “When are sources considered collocated for purposes of aggregation?” For purposes of the additional controls, sources are considered collocated if breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be aggregated separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked shielded safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both barriers are simultaneously open, then all sources within these two barriers are considered to be collocated. This logic should be continued for other barriers within or behind the inner barrier.

The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two shielded safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as follows:

- The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cl–252, 0.12 TBq (3.2 Ci); Co–60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu–238, 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). Application of the unity rule yields: \((0.12 \div 0.2) + (0.18 \div 0.3) + (0.3 \div 0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7\). Therefore, the sources would require additional security measures.

- Shielved safe \#1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Ca–137 source and a 0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am–241 source. In this case, the sources would require additional security measures, regardless of location, because they each exceed the quantities in Table 1.

- Shielved safe \#2 has two Ir–192 sources, each having an activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case, the sources would not require additional security measures while locked in the safe. The combined activity does not exceed the threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22 Ci).

Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source handling operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during periods of active source usage), licensees should, to the extent practicable, consider two modes of source usage — “operations” (active source usage) and “shutdown” (source storage mode). Whichever mode results in the greatest inventory (considering barrier status) would require additional security measures for each location.

Use the following method to determine which sources of radioactive material require implementation of the Additional Security Measures:

- Include any single source equal to or greater than the quantity of concern in Table 1.

- Include multiple collocated sources of the same radionuclide when the combined quantity equals or exceeds the quantity of concern.

- For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple collocated sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate quantities satisfy the following unity rule: \([(\text{amount of radionuclide } A) + (\text{quantity of concern for radionuclide } A)] + [(\text{amount of radionuclide } B) + (\text{quantity of concern for radionuclide } B)] + \text{etc.} \geq 1\).
Attachment 3: Requirements for Service Provider Licensees Providing Written Verification Attesting to or Certifying the Trustworthiness and Reliability of Service Providers for Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material at Customer Facilities, Including Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History Checks

A. General Requirements

Licensees subject to the provisions of this Order shall comply with the requirements of this attachment. The term “certain radioactive material” means the radionuclides in quantities equal to or greater than the quantities listed in Attachment 2 to this Order.

1. The Licensee shall provide the customer’s facility written verification attesting to or certifying the trustworthiness and reliability of an individual as a service provider only for employees the Licensee has approved in writing (see requirement A.3 below). The Licensee shall request unescorted access to certain radioactive material at customer licensee facilities only for approved service providers that require the unescorted access in order to perform a job duty.

2. The trustworthiness, reliability, and true identity of a service provider shall be determined based on a background investigation. The background investigation shall address at least the past three (3) years, and as a minimum, include fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history records check as required in Section B, verification of employment history, education, and personal references. If a service provider’s employment has been less than the required three (3) year period, educational references may be used in lieu of employment history.

3. The Licensee shall document the basis for concluding that there is reasonable assurance that a service provider requiring unescorted access to certain radioactive material at a customer facility is trustworthy and reliable, and does not constitute an unreasonable risk for unauthorized use of the radioactive material. The Licensee shall maintain a list of service providers approved for unescorted access to certain radioactive material.

4. The Licensee shall retain documentation regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of approved service providers for three years after the individual no longer requires unescorted access to certain radioactive material associated with the Licensee’s activity.

5. Each time the Licensee revises the list of approved service providers (see requirement 3 above), the Licensee shall retain the previous list for three (3) years after the revision.

6. The Licensee shall provide to a customer written certification for each service provider for whom unescorted access to certain radioactive material at the customer’s facility is required and requested. The written certification shall be dated and signed by the Reviewing Official. A new written certification is not required if an individual service provider returns to the customer facility within three years, provided the customer has retained the prior certification.

B. Specific Requirements Pertaining to Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Checks

1. The Licensee shall fingerprint each service provider to be approved for unescorted access to certain radioactive materials following the procedures outlined in Enclosure 3 of the emissary from the Licensee shall review and use the information received from the FBI identification and criminal history records check and ensure that the provisions contained in the subject Order and this attachment are satisfied.

2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in the “Right to Correct and Complete Information” section of this attachment.

3. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR 73.61, or any person who has been favorably-decided by a U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check (e.g., National Agency Check, Transportation Worker Identification Credentials in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives background checks and clearances in accordance with 27 CFR Part 535, Health and Human Services security risk assessments for possession and use of select agents and toxins in accordance with 42 CFR Part 73, Hazardous Material security threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to commercial drivers license in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Customs and Border Protection’s Free and Secure Trade Program 5) within the last five (5) years, or any person who has an active federal security clearance (provided in the latter two cases that they make available the appropriate documentation 6). Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the FBI criminal history results based upon a fingerprint identification check must be provided. The Licensee must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the date the individual no longer requires unescorted access to certain radioactive material associated with the Licensee’s activities.

4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.

5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthiness and reliability requirements of Section A of this attachment, in making a determination whether to approve and certify the individual for unescorted access to certain radioactive materials.

6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an individual’s suitability for unescorted access to certain radioactive materials.

7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination whether to approve the individual for unescorted access to certain radioactive materials.

C. Prohibitions

A Licensee shall not base a final determination to not provide certification for unescorted access to certain radioactive material for an individual solely on the basis of information received from the FBI involving; an arrest more than one (1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.

A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a
manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.

D. Right To Correct and Complete Information

Prior to any final adverse determination the Licensee shall make available to the individual the contents of any criminal records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1) year from the date of the notification.

If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to challenge, correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct application by the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR Part 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an Official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI identification and criminal history records check after the record is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final unescorted access to certain radioactive material determination based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI’s ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on unescorted access to certain radioactive material, the Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial. Unescorted access to certain radioactive material shall not be granted to an individual during the review process.

E. Protection of Information

1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure.

2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining whether to verify the individual for unescorted access to certain radioactive material. No individual authorized to have access to the information may re-disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a need-to-know.

3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history record check receives the individual’s written request to re-disseminate the information contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies information such as the individual’s name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for identification purposes.

4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under this section, available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.

5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprints and criminal history records from the FBI, or a copy if the individual’s file has been transferred:
   a. for three (3) years after the individual no longer requires unescorted access, or
   b. for three (3) years after unescorted access to certain radioactive material was denied.

After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.

[FR Doc. 2013–20261 Filed 8–19–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC–2013–0191]

Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

Background

Pursuant to Section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from July 25, 2013 to August 7, 2013. The last biweekly notice was published on August 6, 2013 (78 FR 47785).

ADDRESSES: You may submit comment by any of the following methods (unless this document describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject):

- Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 3WFN, 06A44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.

For additional direction on accessing information and submitting comments, see “Accessing Information and Submitting Comments” in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2013–0191 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access