Eurocopter or UTC Actuation Systems/Goodrich Actuation Systems. Accordingly, we have included all costs in our cost estimate.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This proposed regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

§ 39.13 [Amended]

1. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Helicopters:


(a) Applicability

This AD applies to the following model helicopters, certificated in any category, with a part-numbered main servo-control listed below: overhauled or repaired by UTC Actuation Systems/Goodrich Actuation Systems between June 1, 2008, and September 15, 2012, inclusive; or with a serial number listed in Appendix 1 of Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service Bulletin Nos. 67.00.45 or 67.19, both Revision 1, and both dated December 5, 2012 (EASB):

1. Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, and AS332L2 helicopters with main servo-control, part number (P/N) SC7202, SC7202–(all dash numbers), SC7203, SC7203–(all dash numbers), SC7221, or SC7221–(all dash numbers), installed; and
2. Model SA330 helicopters with main servo-control P/N SC7111, SC7111–(all dash numbers), SC7202, SC7202–(all dash numbers), installed.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as missing crimping on a ball joint of a main servo-control end-fitting. This condition could result in failure of a main servo-control upper end fitting, failure of the flight controls, and loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Comments Due Date

We must receive comments by October 21, 2013.

(d) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

1. Within 85 hours time-in-service (TIS):
   (i) Using a light source, inspect the ball joint of the upper end-fitting of the main servo-control for crimping in accordance with Detail A and Detail B, Figure 1, of the EASB applicable to your model helicopter. If the ball joint is not crimped, replace the servo-control with an airworthy servo-control.
   (ii) Using a light source, inspect the ball joint of the lower end-fitting of the main servo-control for crimping in accordance with Detail A and Detail B, Figure 1, of the EASB applicable to your model helicopter. If the lower ball joint is not crimped, crimp the ball joint.
2. Prior to installing any servo-control that is affected by this AD, perform the required actions in accordance with paragraphs (e)(1) of this AD.

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

1. The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Matt Wilbanks, Aviation Safety Engineer, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222–5110; email matt.wilbanks@faa.gov.

2. For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(g) Additional Information


(h) Subject


Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on August 12, 2013.

Kim Smith,
Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013–20312 Filed 8–19–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39


RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to supersede airworthiness directive (AD) 2006–06–14, that applies to certain Airbus Model
A318–100 and A319–100 series airplanes, A320–111 airplanes, A320–200 series airplanes, and A321–100 and A321–200 series airplanes. AD 2006–06–14 requires operators to review the airplane’s maintenance records to determine the part numbers of the magnetic fuel level indicators (MFLIs) of the wing fuel tanks, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. Since we issued AD 2006–06–14, we received information that the related investigative actions of the existing AD are not fully effective and that an affected MFLI could still be installed on airplanes on which the related investigative actions were accomplished. This proposed AD would also require an inspection (improved method) to determine the part numbers of the airplane’s maintenance records to address the unsafe condition described in the AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

Discussion

On March 10, 2006, we issued AD 2006–06–14, Amendment 39–14523 (71 FR 15023, March 27, 2006), ("AD 2006–06–14"). That AD required actions intended to address an unsafe condition on Airbus Model A318–111 and −112 airplanes; Model A319–111, −112, −113, −114, −115, −131, −132, and −133 airplanes; A320–111 airplanes; Model A320–211, −212, −214, −231, −232, and −233 airplanes; Model A321–111, −112, and −131 airplanes; and Model A321–211, −212, −213, −231, and −232 airplanes. Since we issued this AD, we have issued FAA Airworthiness Directive 2011. The actions described in this proposed AD are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

Examine the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at www.regulations.gov or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2013–0698; Directorate Identifier 2012–NM–136–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

In 2005, several in-service occurrences were reported of finding wear and/or detachment of the top stop of magnetic fuel level indicators (MFLIs), either observed during tank maintenance activities, or on MFLI returned to the MFLI manufacturer. The investigation result indicated that the wear of the top stop retaining ‘S’ shaped wire had been caused by repetitive impact with the float, resulting in complete detachment of the top stop. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead an MFLI top stop to come into contact with a probe, which could, in the event of a lightning strike, create an ignition source in the fuel tank vapour space, possibly resulting in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.


Since that [French] AD was issued, it has been identified that the inspection procedure (visual check) detailed in Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320–28–1138 was not fully effective, and that affected MFLI could still be fitted on aeroplanes which have passed the inspection in accordance with the instructions of this SB.

For the reasons described above, this [EASA] AD, which supersedes DGAC France AD F–2005–108, requires a one-time inspection (improved method) to identify the type of MFLI installed and, depending on findings, replacement or repair, as applicable. This [EASA] AD also prohibits the installation of the affected MFLI on any aeroplane as replacement parts.

The repair may also include locating and removing any missing top stop, and inspecting for any damage caused to the fuel tank by a missing top stop. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

Airbus has issued Service Bulletin A320–28–1209, dated December 12, 2011. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

 FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe
condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

**Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information**

Where the MCAI states in the compliance time “whichever occurs later,” this proposed AD would require “whichever occurs earlier.” We have determined that this compliance time would address the unsafe condition in a more timely manner. We considered the manufacturer’s recommendation, and the overall risk to the fleet, including the severity of the failure and the likelihood of the failure’s occurrence. Therefore, we find that a compliance time of 49,000 flight hours after May 1, 2006, or at the next scheduled fuel tank entry after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, to complete the required actions to be warranted.

**Costs of Compliance**

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 755 products of U.S. registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Labor cost</th>
<th>Parts cost</th>
<th>Cost per product</th>
<th>Cost on U.S. operators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parts numbers review [retained actions from AD 2006–06–14, Amendment 39–14523 (71 FR 15023, March 27, 2006)]</td>
<td>Between 1 and 8 work-hours × $85 per hour = Between $85 and $680</td>
<td>None ..........</td>
<td>Between $85 and $680.</td>
<td>Between $64,175 and $513,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection for part numbers [new proposed action]</td>
<td>21 work-hours × $85 per hour = $1,785.</td>
<td>$0 ............</td>
<td>$1,785 .................</td>
<td>$1,347,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacement or repair that would be required based on the results of the proposed inspection. We have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need the replacement or repair:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Labor cost</th>
<th>Parts cost</th>
<th>Cost per product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Replace or repair</td>
<td>4 work-hours × $85 per hour = $340</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this proposed AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost estimate.

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This proposed regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

**Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (49 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**The Proposed Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

   **Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by removing airworthiness directive (AD) 2006–06–14, Amendment 39–14523 (71 FR 15023, March 27, 2006), and adding the following new AD:

   **Airbus:** Docket No. FAA–2013–0698; Directorate Identifier 2012–NM–136–AD.

(a) **Comments Due Date**

We must receive comments by October 4, 2013.
(b) Affected ADs
This AD supersedes AD 2006–06–14, Amendment 39–14523 (71 FR 15023, March 27, 2006).

(c) Applicability

(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by a report of several in-service incidents of wear and detachment of the top-stops from magnetic fuel level indicators (MFLI) in a wing fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to prevent an ignition source in the wing fuel tank in the event of a lightning strike, which could result in a fire or explosion.

(f) Compliance
You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

(g) Retained Review of Airplane Maintenance Records/Investigative and Corrective Actions

(i) New Requirement of This AD: Inspection
For all airplanes, except as provided by paragraph (k) of this AD: At the next scheduled fuel tank entry after the effective date of this AD, within 49,000 flight hours after May 1, 2006 (the effective date of AD 2006–06–14), Amendment 39–14523 (71 FR 15023, March 27, 2006), whichever occurs first, perform a special detailed inspection of the wing tank to determine which type of magnetic fuel level indicators (MFLI) are installed, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320–28–1209, dated December 12, 2011. A review of airplane maintenance records is acceptable in lieu of this inspection, if the part number and the type of the installed MFLI can be conclusively determined from that review. Paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(11) of this AD identify the affected MFLI part numbers.

(j) New Requirement of This AD: Replacement or Repair
If, during the inspection required by paragraph (i) of this AD, a MFLI with the ’S’ shaped lock-wire design is identified, take the following corrective actions in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320–28–1138, dated March 18, 2005.

(k) New Requirement of This AD: Exception for Paragraph (i) of This AD
Airplanes on which Airbus modification (mod) 27496 has been embodied in production, and on which no wing tank MFLI replacement with a part number listed in paragraph (i) (1) through (i) (11) of this AD has been made since first flight, are not affected by the requirement of paragraph (i) of this AD.

(l) New Requirement of This AD: Parts Installation Prohibition
As of the effective date of this AD, do not install on any airplane a MFLI with a part number listed in paragraph (i)(1) through (i)(11) of this AD.

(m) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANN–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the International Branch, send it to ATTN: Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANN–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1405; fax (425) 227–1149. Information may be emailed to: M–116–AMOC–REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or its delegated agent, or by the Design Approval Holder with a State of Design Authority’s design organization approval). For a repair method to be approved, the repair approval must specifically refer to this AD. You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(n) Special Flight Permits
Special flight permits, as described in Section 21.107 and Section 21.199 of the

TABLE 1 OF PARAGRAPH (J) OF THIS AD—METALLIC MFLI WITH THE TOP STOP RETAINED BY A ‘TRAPPED WIRE,’ INCLUDING APPLICABLE LOCATION (FIN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MFLI P/N</th>
<th>Applicable location (FIN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3508802–35</td>
<td>56/57OM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3508802–36</td>
<td>58/59OM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3508802–37</td>
<td>60/61OM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3508802–38</td>
<td>62/63OM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199), are not allowed.

(o) Related Information


(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus, Airworthiness Office—EAS, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; Internet http://www.airbus.com. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 9, 2013.

Jeffrey E. Duven,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013–20251 Filed 8–19–13; 8:45 am]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Piper Aircraft, Inc.

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA–28–140, PA–28–150, PA–28–160, PA–28–180, PA–28R–180, and PA–28R–200 airplanes. AD 71–21–08, Amendment 39–1312 (36 FR 19572, October 8, 1971) currently requires replacement of the fuel selector valve cover. Since we issued AD 71–21–08, it has been found that a similar fuel selector valve issue exists in additional serial numbered airplanes not identified in the existing AD. This proposed AD would add additional airplanes to the AD’s applicability section and changes the compliance time of the required actions. We are proposing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 4, 2013.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.33 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: 202–493–2251.


• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Piper Aircraft, Inc., 2926 Piper Drive, Vero Beach, Florida 32960; telephone: (772) 567–4361; fax: (772) 978–6573; email: customer.service@piper.com; Internet: www.piper.com/home/pages/Publications.cfm. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329–4148.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Wechsler, Aerospace Engineer, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, Georgia 30337; telephone: (404) 474–5575; fax: (404) 474–5606; email: gary.wechsler@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2013–0742; Directorate Identifier 2013–CE–012–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion


Actions Since Existing AD Was Issued

Since we issued AD 71–21–08, Amendment 39–1312 (36 FR 19572, October 8, 1971), a safety event in 2011 caused the loss of a Model PA–28–180C airplane and the serious injury to one occupant. A subsequent FAA investigation revealed eight additional PA–28 series events dating from 1999 to the present were the result of a similar fuel selector valve assembly issue. Additionally, the FAA was unable to determine and locate records of notification when Piper Service Letter (SL) 590, dated May 25, 1972, and Piper Service Bulletin (SB) 840, dated June 19, 1986, were released indicating a similar fuel selector valve issue existed in additional serial numbered airplanes not identified in AD 71–21–08.

Although reliable FAA records do not exist for events prior to 1995, it is likely that the AD and Piper service information referenced above was released due to the frequency of similar events occurring during the periods in which the documents were released. Piper has indicated the majority of the airplanes added to the applicability of this NPRM have likely already complied with the proposed action.

Relevant Service Information

The 2011 safety event prompted us to review the Piper Aircraft, Inc. service information history, specifically Piper Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 840, dated June 19, 1986. The service information describes applicability and where to find procedures for replacement of the fuel selector valve cover.

FAA’s Determination

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information.