[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 152 (Wednesday, August 7, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48224-48229]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-19211]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2013-06]
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0196; Notice No. 13-13]
Lac-M[eacute]gantic Railroad Accident Discussion and DOT Safety
Recommendations
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory and Announcement of Emergency Meeting
of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee.
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SUMMARY: A recent catastrophic railroad accident occurred in Canada
when an unattended freight train containing hazardous materials rolled
down a descending grade and subsequently derailed. It is currently
estimated that this accident resulted in 42 fatalities, and 5 persons
are still reported to be missing. In response, FRA issued Emergency
Order No. 28 regarding the securement of trains, and FRA and PHMSA
(collectively, DOT) are also issuing this safety advisory. This safety
advisory discusses the circumstances surrounding the accident and makes
certain safety-related recommendations to railroads operating in the
United States. This safety advisory also provides notice of FRA's
intent to schedule an emergency meeting of the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee to discuss this accident and potential regulatory actions to
prevent similar future accidents from occurring.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas J. Herrmann, Acting Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493-6404; Joseph St. Peter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493-6047; or Charles Betts, Director, Standards and Rulemaking
Division, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 366-8553.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Incident Summary
On July 6, 2013, a catastrophic accident involving a freight train
containing loaded tank cars of petroleum crude oil occurred in the town
of Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, on the Montreal, Maine & Atlantic
Railway (MMA). While the accident is still being investigated by
Canadian authorities and no final determinations have been made, the
following is known based on preliminary information released by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada.\1\
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\1\ This accident occurred in Canada and DOT is neither
responsible for determining, nor has jurisdiction to investigate,
the cause of this accident. Further, Canadian authorities have not
yet determined the cause of this accident. As such, nothing in this
safety advisory is intended to attribute a definitive cause to this
accident or place responsibility for the incident on the acts or
omissions of any specific person or entity.
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According to Rail Safety Advisory Letters issued by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada on July 19, 2013, the incident is
summarized as follows. At approximately 10:45 p.m. (EDT) on July 5,
2013, an MMA train was proceeding eastward from Montreal, Quebec, to
St. John, New Brunswick. The train was approximately 4,700 feet long,
weighed over 10,000 tons and consisted of five locomotives, a loaded
box car, and 72 loaded tank cars containing petroleum crude oil (Class
3, UN 1267). At approximately 11:00 p.m. the train stopped near mile
post 7.40 near Nantes, Quebec. At that location the single operator
secured the train and departed, leaving the train unattended on
mainline track with a descending grade of approximately 1.2 percent.
At approximately 11:50 p.m., a local resident reported a fire on
the lead locomotive (MMA 5017) of the train and the local fire
department was called and responded with another MMA employee. At
approximately midnight, in accordance with established operating
procedures, the lead locomotive was shut down and the fire
extinguished. After the fire was extinguished, the fire department and
the MMA employee left the site.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. the next day, it appears that the train
began rolling and picking up speed down the descending grade toward the
town of Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec. Near the center of town, the train
derailed. The locomotives separated from the train and came to a stop
approximately \1/2\ mile from the derailment site. The box car and 63
of the loaded tank cars derailed. A number of derailed tank cars
released product resulting in multiple explosions and subsequent fires.
At this time, it is estimated that there were 42 fatalities and 5
persons are still missing. There was also extensive damage to the town,
and approximately 2,000 people were evacuated from the surrounding
area.
Transport Canada Emergency Directive
In response to this accident, Transport Canada (the Canadian
government department responsible for regulating transportation safety
in Canada) issued an emergency railroad directive pursuant to Section
33 of the Canadian Railway Safety Act.\2\ The directive ordered
railroad companies in Canada to ensure that:
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\2\ Available online at: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/backgrounders-safety-locomotives-7292.html. Additionally, in
response to this accident, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
issued Rail Safety Advisory Letter--09/13 regarding the securement
of equipment and trains left unattended; available online at: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/sur-safe/letter/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-617-09-13.asp.
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Within five days of the issuance of the directive, all
unattended controlling locomotives on a main track and sidings are
protected from unauthorized entry into the cab;
The directional controls, commonly known as reversers, are
removed from any unattended locomotives, preventing them from moving
forward or backward, on a main track or sidings;
Their company's special instructions on hand brakes are
applied to any locomotive attached to one or more cars that are left
unattended for more than one hour on a main track or sidings;
In addition to complying with their company's special
instructions on hand brakes referred to in the item immediately above,
the automatic brake is set in full service position and the independent
brake is fully applied for any locomotive attached to one or more cars
that are left unattended for one hour or less on a main track or
sidings;
No locomotive attached to one or more loaded tank cars
transporting dangerous goods is left unattended on a main track; and
No locomotive attached to one or more loaded tank cars
transporting dangerous goods is operated on a main track or siding with
fewer than two persons qualified under their company's requirements for
operating employees.
Transport Canada explained in the emergency directive that the
cause of
[[Page 48225]]
the accident in Lac-M[eacute]gantic remains unknown at this time.
However, the emergency directive stated that, ``. . . in light of the
catastrophic results of the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident and in the
interest of ensuring the continued safety and security of railway
transportation, there is an immediate need to clarify the regime
respecting unattended locomotives on main track and sidings and the
transportation of dangerous goods in tank cars using a one person crew
to address any threat to the safety and security of railway
operations.'' As such, Transport Canada exercised its statutory
emergency directive authority to order railroad companies in Canada to
comply with the above-listed requirements. In addition, Transport
Canada also issued an accompanying order pursuant to paragraph 19(a)(1)
of the Canadian Railway Safety Act directing railroad companies in
Canada to formulate or revise certain railroad operating rules,
respecting the safety and security of unattended locomotives,
uncontrolled movements, and crew size requirements. The order provides
that rules should be based on an assessment of safety and security
risks, and shall at a minimum:
Ensure that the cab(s) of unattended controlling
locomotives are secure against unauthorized entry;
Ensure that the reversers of unattended locomotives are
removed and secured;
Prevent uncontrolled movements of railway equipment by
addressing, at a minimum:
[cir] The application of handbrakes based on factors including but
not limited to:
[cir] Tonnage, gradient, location and fatigue of the operator;
[cir] The application of independent and automatic brakes; and
[cir] The application of temporary or permanent derails as a
secondary line of [defense] at high risk locations such as sidings used
for storage or main track used for crew change-off, or in high risk
conditions including consideration of the type of goods being
transported and environmental conditions, in order to prevent movement
due to tampering or accidental release of brakes from defective
components;
Ensure the security of stationary railway equipment
transporting ``dangerous goods'' as this expression is defined in
section 2 of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act; and
Provide for minimum operating crew requirements
considering technology, length of train, speeds, classification of
dangerous goods being transported, and other risk factors.
Emergency RSAC Meeting
The Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) is a group composed
of railroad industry, labor, and governmental representatives. FRA
established the RSAC in 1996 to develop recommendations on new
regulatory standards and other rail safety program issues through a
collaborative process with all segments of the rail community. FRA
consults with the RSAC regularly regarding the development of its
regulatory program, and also to advise the RSAC of emerging issues and
statutory requirements, and to discuss other identified needs. The RSAC
may consider a variety of approaches to address safety issues,
including the use of industry standards, which can complement and be
incorporated into FRA regulations.
In light of the Lac-M[eacute]gantic railroad accident, FRA is
scheduling an emergency meeting of the RSAC to discuss the accident.
FRA will publish a Federal Register notice to announce the date, time,
and location of this meeting. At this emergency meeting FRA intends to
address the safety requirements that were issued in Emergency Order No.
28, and the recommendations made in this safety advisory. FRA also
plans to discuss the safety implications and potential costs and
benefits of the requirements in Transport Canada's emergency directives
discussed above, and safety-related initiatives going forward,
including possible new RSAC tasks to implement such safety-related
initiatives.
FRA requests that both freight and passenger railroads be prepared
to discuss the Transport Canada directive requiring that two-person
crews operate trains carrying hazardous materials on main track. FRA
believes initiatives to require a minimum of two crewmembers for over-
the-road trains (including both passenger and freight trains) could
enhance safety. At the emergency RSAC meeting FRA expects to discuss
the formulation of a task statement regarding appropriate train crew
size for an RSAC working group to consider. FRA also requests that RSAC
representatives be specifically prepared to discuss two other
requirements contained in Emergency Order No. 28. First, FRA intends to
discuss the appropriate types and quantities of hazardous materials
that should preclude trains transporting such materials from being left
unattended on main track and sidings. Emergency Order No. 28 currently
specifies certain types and quantities of hazardous materials that
trigger requirements regarding train attendance and securement
procedures, but FRA would like to explore the issue further in
conjunction with PHMSA. FRA also intends to discuss the various
criteria and evaluation processes railroads have used, or intend to
use, to formulate plans they may choose to adopt that identify
locations where it is safe and suitable to leave trains unattended and
secured on main track or sidings outside of yards or terminals.
DOT's Review of the Lac M[eacute]gantic Accident's Safety Implications
Canadian authorities investigating this accident have not yet
identified the accident's cause. However, the known facts at this point
raise apparent safety-related implications in several areas in which
DOT regulates in the United States. In developing this safety advisory
and in preparing to participate in the emergency RSAC meeting, DOT has
considered particular existing Federal railroad and hazardous materials
safety regulations, existing industry practices, and relevant accident
and inspection data. As mentioned above, FRA has already issued
Emergency Order No. 28 to address securement-related safety issues.
Another area of concern is resultant dangers that occur when trains
transporting hazardous materials are involved in accidents, in addition
to broader concerns involving the securement of unattended rolling
equipment. Transport Canada's emergency directive and accompanying
order also raised potential human factor issues regarding crew size for
trains transporting hazardous materials.
Transportation of Hazardous Materials
DOT is making two recommendations in this safety advisory that
relate to the requirements in PHMSA's Hazardous Materials Regulations
(49 CFR Parts 171-180; HMR). In addition to the two recommendations,
the discussion below addresses the safety implications regarding the
transportation of petroleum crude oil, and hazardous materials
generally, by rail. As illustrated at Lac-M[eacute]gantic, it is often
the hazardous materials being transported in a train that have the
potential to cause the most harm.
Nonetheless, the transportation of hazardous materials by rail is
extremely safe, and the vast majority of hazardous materials shipped by
rail each year arrive at their destinations safely and without
incident. In calendar year 2011, for example, out of the approximately
2.2 million shipments of hazardous materials transported by rail, there
were only 20 accidents in which a hazardous
[[Page 48226]]
material was released. In these accidents, a total of 66 hazardous
materials cars released some amount of product. DOT has developed and
enforces a comprehensive regulatory framework for the safe rail
transportation of hazardous materials. This comprehensive regulatory
program serves to mitigate the safety risk associated with the rail
transportation of hazardous materials. However, as this accident, and
accidents such as the 2005 Graniteville, South Carolina incident in
which a single breached railroad tank car containing chlorine resulted
in nine fatalities indicate, both DOT and the rail industry must remain
vigilant and continually seek to improve safety.
The train involved in the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident was a unit
train of tank cars containing petroleum crude oil. Industry statistics
demonstrate that, in terms of rail originations, crude oil shipments
are the fastest growing of all hazardous materials shipped by rail.
According to the Association of American Railroads' (AAR) Annual Report
of Hazardous Materials Transported by Rail for 2012, the number of
crude oil originations has increased by 443% since 2005. Further, since
2005, rail shipments of ethanol have increased by a similar percentage.
DOT anticipates that for the foreseeable future rail shipment
originations of crude oil will remain high.\3\ Both ethanol and crude
oil are classified as Class 3 flammable or combustible liquids by the
HMR.
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\3\ The U.S. Energy Information Administration anticipates that
crude oil rail export capacity from the Bakken region, located
mostly in North Dakota, will increase over the next two years. See
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10431. Much of the
near term growth in rail originations is currently a function of how
quickly tank car manufacturers can produce new cars to meet the
demand for tank cars, primarily for Bakken crude oil. The rise in
rail originations in crude oil is subject to changes in the number
of tank cars available, price of crude oil, and overall production
of crude oil in that region, and is also dependent on whether, or
how quickly, additional pipeline export capacity from that region
comes online. However, for the foreseeable future, all indications
are for continued growth of rail originations of crude in that
region as new tank car fleets come online to meet demand. Bakken
crude oil is primarily shipped via rail to refineries located near
the U.S. Gulf Coast or also to pipeline connections, most notably to
connections located in Oklahoma. Crude oil is also shipped via rail
to refineries on the East Coast and, to a lesser extent, refineries
in other regions of the U.S. See Association of American Railroads
Moving Crude Oil by Rail (May 2013), https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Back ground-Papers/Crude-oil-by-rail.pdf.
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The causes of rail accidents involving trains carrying hazardous
materials are often related to railroad operational or mechanical
failures. For example, as based on FRA's accident reporting data for
the period from 2008 through 2012, railroad accident causes were
allocated as follows: Human factors (35.7 percent); track and
structures (34.5 percent); equipment (12.7 percent); signal and train
control (2.4 percent); and miscellaneous (14.7 percent). DOT has taken
a variety of actions to address these accident causes, including the
promulgation of FRA's human factors regulation on operational tests and
inspections involving handling equipment, switches, and fixed derails,
passenger hours of service rules, regulations requiring the
installation of positive train control systems on certain lines,
regulations governing the use of distracting electronic devices by
railroad operating employees, regulations governing conductor
certification, the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking on the
training of certain railroad employees, the issuance of a notice of
proposed rulemaking regarding railroad track inspection practices, and
the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking to require system
safety programs on certain passenger railroads.
As applicable to the rail transportation of hazardous materials,
and particularly tank car crashworthiness in instances when accidents
do occur, PHMSA has issued numerous regulations designed to improve the
accident survivability of rail tank cars carrying hazardous materials.
Most recently, in 2009, PHMSA issued a final rule requiring newly
constructed tank cars designed to carry materials toxic-by-inhalation
(TIH materials or materials poisonous-by-inhalation (PIH materials)) to
have increased side and head-impact puncture resistance by requiring a
combination of thicker outer jackets and/or inner shells and the use of
full head shields where not already mandated by regulation.\4\ The rule
also establishes enhanced standards and features to protect the valves,
top fittings and nozzles of newly constructed TIH materials tank cars
and imposes a 50 mile-per-hour (``mph'') speed limit for all trains
transporting loaded tank cars containing TIH materials.
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\4\ 74 FR 1770 (Jan. 13, 2009).
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Further, PHMSA is currently formulating an advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking addressing, among other items, safety improvements
to DOT Specification 111 tank cars, which are commonly used to
transport crude oil and ethanol. DOT has also scheduled a public
meeting on August 27-28 to discuss improving the safety of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. As the above discussion
indicates, DOT has already taken steps to provide for the safety of
transportation of hazardous materials by rail, and will continue to
evaluate the need for additional safety measures as details of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident become known.
DOT's HMR-related recommendations below are in regard to the proper
classification of crude oil and the HMR's requirements regarding
railroad and hazardous materials offeror and carrier safety and
security plans. First, the HMR require that an offeror \5\ of a
hazardous material properly classify and describe the hazardous
material. See 49 CFR Sec. 173.22. To attest compliance with the HMR,
an offeror of a hazardous material must also certify that the hazardous
material being offered into transportation is offered in compliance
with the HMR. In the case of petroleum crude oil, relevant properties
to properly classify the material include: Flash point, corrosivity,
specific gravity at loading and reference temperatures, and the
presence and concentration of specific compounds such as sulfur (as
found in sour crude oil). The classification requirements in the HMR
ultimately determine the appropriate and authorized selection of the
packaging, the fill densities and outage, accompanying hazard
communications (markings, labels and placards), transportation safety
and operational controls, and safety and security planning; and, if
necessary, they enable the most effective and informed emergency
response.
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\5\ See 49 CFR 171.8 for the definition of ``person who offers''
or ``offeror.''
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Crude oil transported by rail often derives from different sources
and is then blended, so it is critical that offerors properly classify
a hazardous material and select the proper HMR-authorized packaging for
transportation of that hazardous material. Section 173.150(f) of the
HMR allows flammable liquids such as petroleum crude oil with a flash
point at or above 38 [deg]C (100[emsp14][deg]F) that do not meet the
definition of any other hazard class to be reclassified as a
combustible liquid, and excepts such combustible liquids from certain
HMR requirements, to include the requirement that the material be
transported in a DOT-specification bulk packaging.\6\ As such, AAR 211
class cars are permitted, in certain instances, to be used to transport
crude oil that has been classified as a Packing Group III
[[Page 48227]]
material with a relatively high flash point. This distinction has
safety implications if the crude oil being transported has been
improperly classified and actually has a lower flash point and is a
Packing Group I or II flammable liquid material. As such, DOT
recommends that offerors evaluate their processes for testing,
classifying, and packaging the crude oil that they offer into
transportation via railroad tank car as required by Part 173 of the
HMR. The frequency and type of testing should be based on an offeror's
knowledge of the hazardous material, with specific consideration given
to the volume of hazardous material shipped, the variety of sources
that the hazardous material is generated from, and the processes that
generate the hazardous material.
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\6\ Section 172.102, Special Provision B1, states, ``If the
material has a flash point at or above 38 [deg]C (100[emsp14][deg]F)
and below 93 [deg]C (200[emsp14][deg]F), then the bulk packaging
requirements of Sec. 173.241 of this subchapter are applicable.''
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With regard to DOT's next HMR-related recommendation, the HMR also
include requirements that specifically address safety and security
plans for the transportation of certain hazardous materials.
Specifically, Subpart I part 172 requires security plans to include an
assessment of transportation security risks for shipments of hazardous
materials (e.g., a large bulk quantity of Class 3 material such as
crude oil meeting the criteria for Packing Group I or II). See 49 CFR
172.800-802. This assessment at a minimum must include elements
addressing personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route
security. The plan must also include security duties for each position
or department that is responsible for implementing the plan as well as
the training of hazardous materials employees. DOT is recommending that
offerors and carriers of hazardous materials review their plans adopted
in accordance with subpart I of part 172 of the HMR that govern the
safety and security of the transportation of railroad tank cars
containing hazardous materials. DOT recommends that after such review
offerors and carriers of hazardous materials evaluate whether their
existing plans adequately address known or potential safety and
security risks and, as necessary, amend the plans as to ensure the
continued safe and secure transportation of railroad tank cars
containing hazardous materials.
Securement of Unattended Equipment
Next, with regard to the securement of unattended equipment, FRA
accident data indicates that approximately 8.5% of human factor-caused
accidents from calendar year 2011 until April 2013 were the result of
improper securement. Existing Federal regulations, at 49 CFR part 232,
require that railroads adopt procedures to ensure that unattended
equipment is secured. FRA conducts inspections on a regular basis to
monitor compliance with these applicable railroad securement procedures
that railroads adopt in accordance with FRA's securement regulation. A
review of FRA's inspection data indicates that since 2010, FRA
inspectors have conducted 163,510 observations for compliance with
railroad procedures adopted to comply with FRA's securement
requirements for both passenger and freight trains at Sec. 232.103 and
at 49 CFR part 238. FRA inspectors have discovered 5,236 instances
where these railroad securement procedures were not complied with, and
recommended violations in 1,625 of those instances. FRA's Emergency
Order No. 28 was based, in part, on the above information, and requires
railroads in the United States to adopt certain additional securement
procedures to prevent accidents like the one that occurred at Lac-
M[eacute]gantic when trains make uncontrolled movements.
In addition to those requirements conveyed in the emergency order,
this safety advisory makes additional train securement-related
recommendations. Existing Federal regulations, at 49 CFR part 217,
require that railroads conduct operational tests to ensure their
employees' compliance with railroad operating rules, and particularly
those rules which are most likely to cause the most accidents or
incidents. See 49 CFR 217.9(c)(1). As the above statistics indicate, a
failure to comply with railroads' securement procedures account for
approximately 8.5% of human factor caused accidents. When these
accidents are viewed in light of the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident, it
is clear that compliance with Federal regulation and accompanying
railroad procedures governing the securement of unattended equipment is
safety-critical. Thus, DOT is recommending that railroads evaluate
their current operational testing practices for securement-related
rules compliance, and determine whether their current testing practices
are sufficient, both in quality and quantity of the operational tests
performed.
In making this recommendation, FRA also notes that past audits of
railroads' operational testing records indicate, that in certain
instances, there are significant discrepancies between the number of
operating rules compliance failures that railroads record when compared
with the ratio of operating rule failures that FRA inspectors observe
during compliance inspections. DOT encourages railroads to use the
recommendations in this safety advisory to ensure that their
operational testing practices, particularly as related to securement
and all human factor-related operating rules, are evaluated for
effectiveness. Operational testing should regularly take place under
all operation conditions in which railroad employees perform duties.
DOT encourages railroads to utilize all tools at their disposal, to
include checking locomotive downloads to monitor compliance with
railroad rules requiring certain actions be taken (e.g., air brake
release) to verify that a sufficient number of handbrakes have been set
to prevent a train's movement. FRA plans to place particular emphasis
on its inspection efforts related to monitoring railroad compliance
with securement procedures.
Two additional recommendations below also relate to preventing the
unauthorized movement of trains. The first of these recommendations
relates to removing the reverse lever (reverser), when the lever is
capable of being removed from the control stand by a train crewmember,
from the controlling locomotive of any train left unattended on a main
track outside of yard limits. Emergency Order No. 28 addresses
requirements regarding the status of the reverser for trains
transporting certain hazardous materials that are left unattended on
mainline track or mainline sidings outside of a yard or terminal. The
recommendation in this safety advisory is meant to address any train or
locomotive consist left unattended on main track outside of yard or
terminal, regardless of commodity being transported. Railroads are
currently required by 49 CFR 232.103(n)(4) to adopt procedures to
govern the status of the reverse lever (reverser) on unattended
locomotives. Typically, the rules adopted by railroads to comply with
Sec. 232.103(n)(4) require that the reverser of an unattended
locomotive be removed from the control stand but do not require that
the lever otherwise be removed from a train or secured. In an effort to
ensure that any persons, primarily railroad trespassers, are unable to
easily initiate unauthorized movements of any unattended trains outside
of yard limits, DOT is recommending that railroads amend their
procedures adopted to comply with Sec. 232.103(n)(4) to require that
when the reverser is removed from the controlling locomotive of an
unattended train that the lever is actually removed from the cab or
otherwise secured in a place where a trespasser cannot readily access
the lever. As the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident illustrates, the
uncontrolled movement of a train can have catastrophic consequences.
DOT will also evaluate
[[Page 48228]]
whether future regulatory activities should require railroad procedures
be amended to enhance requirements governing access to an unattended
train's reverser lever. DOT looks forward to discussing this issue and
receiving information from the industry regarding this issue at the
emergency RSAC meeting.
The Transport Canada emergency directive also contained a provision
regarding the status of a train's automatic and independent brakes when
a train is left unattended on a main track or siding for one hour or
less. Existing Sec. 232.103(n)(4) of FRA's regulations requires that
railroads adopt and comply with procedures governing the status of the
independent and automatic brake valves (in addition to the status of
the reverser lever as discussed directly above) when locomotives are
left unattended. Traditionally, such rules adopted to comply with Sec.
232.104(n)(4) in the United States already require that a train's
independent and automatic brakes be applied when a train is left
unattended for any period of time. Thus, DOT has chosen not to address
that item in this safety advisory, but plans to discuss this topic
along with all of the items addressed by the Transport Canada emergency
directive and order at the emergency RSAC meeting.
Next, DOT is also recommending that railroads evaluate risks at
locations where trains are regularly left unattended on main track
outside of yard limits, such as at crew change points. DOT recommends
that after identifying locations where increased risks exist (for
example, due to grade conditions or trespasser accessibility to
unattended trains at particular locations) railroads adopt procedures
to mitigate such risks that could result in unauthorized or
uncontrolled train movements. DOT understands that many railroads that
transport hazardous materials by rail may have already implemented
certain portions of such an evaluation in complying with 49 CFR
172.800-172.820 of the HMR, which as discussed above govern planning
requirements for the transportation of hazardous materials. DOT also
recognizes that railroads may undertake such evaluations if they choose
to submit a plan to DOT regarding where trains containing certain
hazardous materials may be left unattended, as described in Emergency
Order No. 28. However, DOT recommends that such analysis/evaluation of
how to mitigate risks be undertaken specifically for locations on main
track where all trains are regularly left unattended outside of yard
limits, as whether or not a train contains hazardous materials, an
uncontrolled or unauthorized movement of such train can have
catastrophic consequences, especially on main track where passenger
trains might also travel.
Human Factors
Finally, Transport Canada's emergency directive and order implicate
other human factors issues such as crew size, personnel available to
secure trains, operator fatigue, and the possible use of derails as a
secondary line of defense against runaway trains at certain, higher
risk, locations. DOT is making two recommendations below regarding
these issues. First, DOT is making a recommendation regarding railroad
crew staffing practices. Transport Canada's directive contained a
specific requirement that railroads in Canada operate trains carrying
loaded hazardous materials tank cars over main track and sidings with
at least two crew members. DOT believes that railroad safety is
enhanced through the use of multiple crew members and recommends below
that railroads review their crew staffing practices for over-the-road
train movements of trains transporting 20 or more tank car loads of
Class 3 flammable or combustible liquids, as well as certain of the
amount and type of hazardous materials specified in AAR's Circular No.
OT-55-M, October 1, 2012 (Circular),\7\ and, as necessary, amend those
practices to ensure safety. DOT intends to explore with the RSAC the
appropriate level of crew staffing for over-the-road train operations.
As mentioned above, at the emergency RSAC meeting FRA expects to ask
the RSAC to consider the creation of a task statement regarding
appropriate crew size for both freight and passenger operations for an
RSAC working group to consider.
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\7\ Available online at: http://boe.aar.com/CPC-1242_OT-55-M.pdf.
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DOT is also recommending below that railroads evaluate all of the
other human factors raised by Transport Canada with regard to train
operations in the United States, particularly as related to train
operations on main track, and amend those procedures as necessary. FRA
plans to address this recommendation, and, as discussed above, also
plans to address any other items at the emergency RSAC meeting that are
raised in Transport Canada's emergency directive and order that are not
otherwise addressed in Emergency Order No. 28 or this safety advisory.
Recommended Railroad Actions: In light of the above discussion, and
in an effort to maintain safety of the Nation's rail system, DOT
recommends that railroads:
1. Review with their employees the circumstances of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident described in this Safety Advisory.
2. DOT believes that railroad safety is enhanced through the use of
multiple crew members. Accordingly, railroads should review their crew
staffing practices for over-the-road trains that transport:
(a) Five or more tank car loads of any one or any combination of
materials poisonous by inhalation as defined in 49 CFR 171.8, and
including anhydrous ammonia (UN 1005) and ammonia solutions (UN
3318); or
(b) 20 rail car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any
one or any combination of materials listed in (a) above, or, any
Division 2.1 flammable gas, Class 3 flammable liquid or combustible
liquid, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosive, or hazardous substance listed in
49 CFR 173.31(f)(2).\8\
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\8\ See 49 CFR 173.115 for the definition of Division 2.1
flammable gas, 173.120 for definition of Class 3 flammable liquid;
and 173.50 for the definition of the various classes of explosives.
After such review, DOT recommends that railroads amend existing
practices as necessary to ensure the safe movement of trains containing
the above-listed hazardous materials on main track and sidings. DOT
intends to explore with the RSAC the appropriate level of crew staffing
for over-the-road train operations.
3. Amend their procedures adopted to comply with 49 CFR
232.103(n)(4) by requiring that the reverser lever of the controlling
locomotive of a train or locomotive consist be either removed from the
cab of the controlling locomotive or otherwise secured (when such
reversers are capable of being removed by a train crewmember) to
prevent unauthorized movement of any train or locomotive consist left
unattended on mainline track or mainline siding outside of a yard or
terminal.
4. Review both their operational testing programs (as adopted in
accordance with 49 CFR 217.9) and relevant accident data related to the
securement of unattended equipment to determine whether it is
appropriate to increase the frequency of, or to otherwise enhance,
operational tests performed to determine the extent of railroad
employee compliance with operating rules governing the proper
securement of unattended equipment. DOT also recommends that railroads
ensure that their operational tests are conducted under all operational
conditions, and that the results of such operational tests are
accurately reflected
[[Page 48229]]
in the records required to be kept by 49 CFR 217.9(d).
5. Conduct system-wide evaluations to identify particular hazards
(e.g., grade, train commodity, trespasser accessibility) which increase
securement and other safety risks at crew change locations and other
locations where any trains or rolling equipment are regularly left
unattended. After identifying hazards at these locations, railroads
should adopt procedures to mitigate risks that could result in
unauthorized or uncontrolled train movements.
6. Review the other requirements in Transport Canada's emergency
directive and order, to include human factor requirements such as
operator fatigue, the use of derails as a secondary line of defense at
high risk locations, and available personnel to secure a train, and, as
necessary, amend the procedures governing these issues to ensure the
safety of train operations, particularly as they relate to train
operations conducted on main track.
Recommended Hazardous Materials Actions: In light of the above
discussion, and in an effort to maintain safety of the Nation's rail
system, DOT recommends that:
1. Offerors evaluate their processes to ensure that hazardous
materials are properly classed and described in accordance with the
HMR.
2. Offerors and carriers of hazardous materials review their safety
and security plans adopted in accordance with subpart I of part 172 of
the HMR. Offerors and carriers evaluate whether the existing plans
adequately address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en-
route security and, as necessary, amend the plans as to ensure the
continued safe and secure transportation of railroad tank cars
containing hazardous materials.
DOT encourages railroad and hazardous material industry members to
take actions that are consistent with the preceding recommendations,
and to take other complementary actions to help ensure the safety of
the Nation's railroads. DOT may modify this safety advisory, issue
additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate actions
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its rail
and hazardous materials safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC, on August 2, 2013.
Robert Lauby,
Acting Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety
Officer, Federal Railroad Administration.
Magdy El-Sibaie,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2013-19211 Filed 8-6-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P