[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 152 (Wednesday, August 7, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48201-48203]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-19057]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2013-0073]
Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate Interim Staff Guidance
JLD-ISG-2013-01; Guidance for Estimating Flooding Hazards Due to Dam
Failure
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Interim staff guidance; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing the
Final Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate Interim Staff Guidance
(JLD-ISG), JLD-ISG-2013-01, ``Guidance for Estimating Flooding hazards
due to Dam Failure'' (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML13151A153). This ISG provides guidance and
clarification to assist nuclear power reactors applicants and licensees
with the flooding hazard reassessment in response to Enclosure 2 of the
NRC staff's request for information, ``Request for Information Pursuant
to section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task
Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,'' dated
March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340).
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2013-0073 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may access information related to this document, which the NRC
possesses and are publicly-available, using any of the following
methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0073. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3442; email: [email protected].
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly-available documents online in the NRC
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The JLD-ISG-2013-01 is
available under ADAMS Accession No. ML13151A153.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.
NRC's Interim Staff Guidance Web site: Go to http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/isg/japan-lessons-learned.html
and refer to JLD-ISG-2013-01.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. G. Edward Miller, Japan Lessons-
Learned Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
[[Page 48202]]
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2481; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background Information
The NRC staff developed JLD-ISG-2013-01 to provide guidance and
clarification to assist nuclear power reactor licensees, applicants for
power reactor licenses, and holders of construction permits in active
or deferred status with the evaluation of flooding hazards due to dam
failure.
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake resulted in a large
tsunami, estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height, that
inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant site. The
earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across
northeastern Japan and significantly affected the infrastructure and
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan. When the
earthquake occurred, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 were in
operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for routine refueling
and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 reactor fuel was offloaded to
the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. Following the earthquake, the three
operating units automatically shut down and offsite power was lost to
the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators (EDG) started at
all six units providing alternating current (ac) electrical power to
critical systems at each unit. The facility response to the earthquake
appears to have been normal. Approximately 40 minutes following the
earthquake and shutdown of the operating units, however, the first
large tsunami wave inundated the site, followed by additional waves.
The tsunami caused extensive damage to site facilities and resulted in
a complete loss of all ac electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a
condition known as station blackout. In addition, all direct current
electrical power was lost early in the event on Units 1 and 2, and
after some period of time at the other units. Unit 6 retained the
function of one air-cooled EDG. Despite their actions, the operators
lost the ability to cool the fuel in the Unit 1 reactor after several
hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the Unit 3
reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel
shortly after the loss of cooling capabilities.
Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant,
the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the
Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a
systematic and methodical review of the NRC's regulations and
processes, and determining if the agency should make additional
improvements to these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-
ichi. As a result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive
set of recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report
and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,''
dated July 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11186A950). These
recommendations were enhanced by the NRC staff following interactions
with stakeholders. Documentation of the staff's efforts is contained in
SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the
Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated September 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML11245A158), and SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended
Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' dated
October 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11272A111).
As directed by the Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM)
for SECY-11-0093, dated August 19, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML112310021), the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations within
the context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and considered
the various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to implement the
recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the staff's
prioritization of the recommendations based upon the potential for each
recommendation to enhance safety.
As part of the SRM for SECY-11-0124, dated October 18, 2011, the
Commission approved the staff's proposed actions, including the
development of three information requests under 10 CFR 50.54(f). The
information collected would be used to support the NRC staff's
evaluation of whether further regulatory action was needed in the areas
of seismic and flooding design and emergency preparedness.
In addition to Commission direction, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Public Law 112-074, was signed into law on December
23, 2011. Section 402 of the law directs the NRC to require licensees
to reevaluate their design basis for external hazards.
In response to the aforementioned Commission and Congressional
direction, the NRC issued a request for information to all power
reactor licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR part
50 on March 12, 2012. The letter dated March 12, 2012, includes a
request that licensees reevaluate flooding hazards at nuclear power
plant sites using updated flooding hazard information and present-day
regulatory guidance and methodologies. The letter also requests the
comparison of the reevaluated hazard to the current design basis at the
site for each potential flood mechanism. If the reevaluated flood
hazard at a site is not bounded by the current design basis, licensees
are requested to perform an integrated assessment. The integrated
assessment will evaluate the total plant response to the flood hazard,
considering multiple and diverse capabilities such as physical
barriers, temporary protective measures, and operational procedures.
The NRC staff will review the licensees' responses to this request for
information and determine whether regulatory actions are necessary to
provide additional protection against flooding.
Numerous public meetings were held to receive stakeholder input on
the proposed guidance prior to its issuance formally for public
comment. On April 25, 2013 (78 FR 24439), the NRC requested public
comments on draft JLD-ISG-2013-01. In public meetings on May 2, 2013,
and May 22, 2013, the NRC staff interacted extensively with external
stakeholders to discuss, understand, and resolve public comments.
Modifications were made to the text of the ISG in response to the
public comments and the outcomes of the public meetings. Full detail of
the comments, staff responses, and the staff's bases for changes to the
ISG are contained in ``NRC Response to Public Comments'' to JLD-ISG-
2013-01, which can be found under ADAMS Accession No. ML13151A161.
Backfitting and Issue Finality
This ISG does not constitute backfitting as defined in 10 CFR
50.109 (the Backfit Rule) and is not otherwise inconsistent with the
issue finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52, ``Licenses,
Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.'' This ISG
provides guidance on an acceptable method for implementing the March
12, 2012, request for information. Neither the information request nor
the ISG require the modification or addition to systems, structures, or
components, or design of a facility. Applicants and licensees may
voluntarily use the guidance in JLD-ISG-2013-01 to comply with the
request for information. The information received by this request may,
at a later date, be used in the basis for imposing a backfit.
[[Page 48203]]
The appropriate backfit review process would be followed at that time.
Congressional Review Act
This interim staff guidance is a rule as designated in the
Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808). OMB has found that this is
not a major rule in accordance with the Congressional Review Act.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of July 2013.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David L. Skeen,
Director, Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2013-19057 Filed 8-6-13; 8:45 am]
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