13. The licensee shall complete a “new” firearms background check or reinvestigation for individuals who have:
   a. Had a break in employment of greater than 7 consecutive calendar days (1 week) with the licensee or the licensee’s security contractor.
   b. Transferred to the employment of the licensee or the licensee’s security contractor. A satisfactorily completed firearms background check performed by a previous employer or completed for employment within a State other than the State in which the individual will be performing armed duties, is not transferable.

14. The licensee shall notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone within 72 hours after removing an individual from armed duties as a result of the discovery of any disqualifying status or event. Applicable telephone numbers are specified in Appendix A. “U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and Classified Mailing Addresses,” to 10 CFR Part 73. Notification timeliness shall commence from time of discovery by the licensee or the time of reporting by the individual security officer. The licensee is not required to notify the NRC if the individual security officer has disclosed the disqualifying event or status to the licensee as specified in Appendix B.4. “Weapons Qualification and Requalification Program,” to 10 CFR Part 73.

For further information contact:


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the applicant) submitted its Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Completion and Operation of WBN Unit 2 (June 2007), (FSEIS) by letter dated February 15, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080510469), pursuant to Part 51 of Title 10 of the Code of the Federal Regulations (10 CFR).

On June 30, 1976, TVA submitted an application for an operating license for WBN Unit 2, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50. An updated operating license application was submitted on March 4, 2009. The proposed action in response to the updated application is the issuance of an operating license that would authorize TVA to possess, use, and operate a second light-water nuclear reactor (the facility), WBN Unit 2, located on the applicant’s site in Rhea County, Tennessee. The WBN Unit 2 would operate at a steady-state power level of 3411 megawatts thermal. A notice of receipt and availability of the updated application, which included the FSEIS, was published in the Federal Register on May 1, 2009 (74 FR 20350). A notice of intent to prepare a supplement to the final environmental statement, which was prepared and published in 1978 and to conduct the scoping process was published in the Federal Register on September 11, 2009 (74 FR 46799). On October 6, 2009, the NRC held two scoping meetings in Sweetwater, Tennessee, to obtain public input on the scope of the environmental review. The NRC also solicited comments from Federal, State, Tribal, regional, and local agencies.

The draft SFES was published in October 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112980199). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Notice of Filing in the Federal Register indicated a 75-day comment period, commencing on November 10, 2011, to allow members of the public to comment on the results of the NRC staff’s review. This was amended in the Federal Register on November 18, 2011, to a 45-day comment period (76 FR 71560). On December 8, 2011, two public meetings were held in Sweetwater, Tennessee. At the meetings, the NRC staff described the results of the NRC environmental review, answered questions related to the review, and provided members of the public with information to assist them in formulating their comments. Based on comments received at the public meetings, the comment period was extended by the NRC to January 24, 2012 (76 FR 80409). When the comment period ended on January 24, 2012, the NRC staff considered and addressed all the comments received.

As discussed in the Section 9.6 of the supplement, the NRC staff’s recommendation to the Commission related to the environmental aspects of the proposed action is that environmental impacts are not great enough to deny the option of issuing the operating license for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This recommendation is based on (1) the application, including the Federal Register, February 15, 2008, final Environmental Impact Statement submitted by TVA as the Environmental Report, and responses to staff requests for additional information submitted by TVA; (2) the NRC staff’s review conducted for the Final Environmental Statement to support the Operating License (FES–OL); (3)
consultation with Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies; (4) the NRC staff’s own independent review of information available since the preparation and publication of the 1978 FES–OL; and (5) the assessments summarized in this SFES, including consideration of public comments received during scoping and on the draft SFES.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of June 2013.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert J. Pascarelli,
Chief, Plant Licensing Branch II–1, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC–2013–0128]

All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I And Mark II Containments; Docket Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), License Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), EA–13–109; Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Effective Immediately)

I.

The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorizing operation of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.” Specifically, these Licensees operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containment designs.

II.

The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami highlight the possibility that events such as rare natural phenomena could challenge the traditional defense-in-depth protections related to preventing accidents, mitigating accidents to prevent the release of radioactive materials, and taking actions to protect the public should a release occur. At Fukushima Dai-ichi, limitations in time and unpredictable conditions associated with the accident significantly hindered attempts by the operators to prevent core damage and containment failure. In particular, the operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting system. These problems, with venting the containments under the challenging conditions following the tsunami, contributed to the progression of the accident from inadequate cooling of the core leading to core damage, to compromising containment functions from overpressure and over-temperature conditions, and to the hydrogen explosions that destroyed the reactor buildings (secondary containments) of three of the Fukushima Dai-ichi units. The loss of the various barriers led to the release of radioactive materials, which further hampered operator efforts to arrest the accidents and ultimately led to the contamination of large areas surrounding the plant. Fortunately, the evacuation of local populations minimized the immediate danger to public health and safety from the loss of control of the large amount of radioactive materials within the reactor cores.

The events at Fukushima reinforced the importance of reliable operation of hardened containment vents during emergency conditions, particularly, for small containments such as the Mark I and Mark II designs. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA–12–050 requiring the Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order to implement requirements for a reliable hardened containment venting system (HCVS) for Mark I and Mark II containments. Order EA–12–050 required Licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to install a reliable HCVS to support strategies for controlling containment pressure and preventing core damage following an event that causes a loss of heat removal systems (e.g., an extended loss of electrical power). The NRC determined that the issuance of EA–12–050 and implementation of the requirements of that Order were necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety.

While developing the requirements for a reliable HCVS in EA–12–050, the NRC acknowledged that questions remained about maintaining containment integrity and limiting the release of radioactive materials if the venting systems were used during severe accident conditions. The NRC staff presented options to address these issues, including the possible use of engineered filters to control releases, for Commission consideration in SECY–12–0157, “Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments” (November 26, 2012). Option 2 in SECY–12–0157 was to modify EA–12–050 to require severe accident capable vents (i.e., a reliable HCVS capable of operating under severe accident conditions). Other options discussed in SECY–12–0157 included the installation of engineered filtered containment venting systems (Option 3) and the development of a severe accident confinement strategy (Option 4). In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY–12–0157, dated March 19, 2013, the Commission approved Option 2 and directed the staff to issue a modification to EA–12–050 requiring Licensees subject to that Order to “upgrade or replace the reliable hardened vents required by Order EA–12–050 with a containment venting system designed and installed to remain functional during severe accident conditions.”

The requirements in this Order, in addition to providing a reliable HCVS to assist in preventing core damage when heat removal capability is lost (the purpose of EA–12–050), will ensure that venting functions are also available during severe accident conditions. Severe accident conditions include the elevated temperatures, pressures, radiation levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such as hydrogen and carbon monoxide, associated with accidents involving core damage, including accidents involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris.

Ensuring that the venting functions are available under severe accident conditions will support the strategies in the Mark I and Mark II severe accident management guidelines for the protection or recovery of the containment, which serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive materials. This Order will ensure that this additional severe accident venting capability is provided while also achieving, with minimal delays, the purpose of EA–12–050—to provide a reliable HCVS to control containment pressure and prevent core damage following the loss of heat removal functions.

This Order rescinds the requirements imposed in Section IV and Attachment 2 of EA–12–050 and replaces them with the requirements in Section IV and Attachment 2 of this Order. Because the requirements in EA–12–050 are now reflected in this Order, Licensees are no longer expected to comply with the