[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 115 (Friday, June 14, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35990-35996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-14072]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2013-0128]


All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I And 
Mark II Containments; Docket Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), License 
Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), EA-13-109; Order Modifying Licenses 
With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation 
Under Severe Accident Conditions (Effective Immediately)

I.

    The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold 
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
authorizing operation of nuclear power plants in accordance with the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Part 50 of Title 10 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Domestic Licensing of 
Production and Utilization Facilities.'' Specifically, these Licensees 
operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II 
containment designs.

II.

    The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant following 
the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami highlight the possibility that 
events such as rare natural phenomena could challenge the traditional 
defense-in-depth protections related to preventing accidents, 
mitigating accidents to prevent the release of radioactive materials, 
and taking actions to protect the public should a release occur. At 
Fukushima Dai-ichi, limitations in time and unpredictable conditions 
associated with the accident significantly hindered attempts by the 
operators to prevent core damage and containment failure. In 
particular, the operators were unable to successfully operate the 
containment venting system. These problems, with venting the 
containments under the challenging conditions following the tsunami, 
contributed to the progression of the accident from inadequate cooling 
of the core leading to core damage, to compromising containment 
functions from overpressure and over-temperature conditions, and to the 
hydrogen explosions that destroyed the reactor buildings (secondary 
containments) of three of the Fukushima Dai-ichi units. The loss of the 
various barriers led to the release of radioactive materials, which 
further hampered operator efforts to arrest the accidents and 
ultimately led to the contamination of large areas surrounding the 
plant. Fortunately, the evacuation of local populations minimized the 
immediate danger to public health and safety from the loss of control 
of the large amount of radioactive materials within the reactor cores.
    The events at Fukushima reinforced the importance of reliable 
operation of hardened containment vents during emergency conditions, 
particularly, for small containments such as the Mark I and Mark II 
designs. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-050 \1\ 
requiring the Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order to 
implement requirements for a reliable hardened containment venting 
system (HCVS) for Mark I and Mark II containments. Order EA-12-050 
required licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II 
containments to install a reliable HCVS to support strategies for 
controlling containment pressure and preventing core damage following 
an event that causes a loss of heat removal systems (e.g., an extended 
loss of electrical power). The NRC determined that the issuance of EA-
12-050 and implementation of the requirements of that Order were 
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the 
public health and safety.
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    \1\ ``Order Modifying Licenses With Regard To Reliable Hardened 
Containment Vents (Effective Immediately),'' EA-12-050 (March 12, 
2012) (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A043).
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    While developing the requirements for a reliable HCVS in EA-12-050, 
the NRC acknowledged that questions remained about maintaining 
containment integrity and limiting the release of radioactive materials 
if the venting systems were used during severe accident conditions. The 
NRC staff presented options to address these issues, including the 
possible use of engineered filters to control releases, for Commission 
consideration in SECY-12-0157, ``Consideration of Additional 
Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors 
with Mark I and Mark II Containments'' (November 26, 2012). Option 2 in 
SECY-12-0157 was to modify EA-12-050 to require severe accident capable 
vents (i.e., a reliable HCVS capable of operating under severe accident 
conditions). Other options discussed in SECY-12-0157 included the 
installation of engineered filtered containment venting systems (Option 
3) and the development of a severe accident confinement strategy 
(Option 4). In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-12-
0157, dated March 19, 2013, the Commission approved Option 2 and 
directed the staff to issue a modification to EA-12-050 requiring 
licensees subject to that Order to ``upgrade or replace the reliable 
hardened vents required by Order EA-12-050 with a containment venting 
system designed and installed to remain functional during severe 
accident conditions.''
    The requirements in this Order, in addition to providing a reliable 
HCVS to assist in preventing core damage when heat removal capability 
is lost (the purpose of EA-12-050), will ensure that venting functions 
are also available during severe accident conditions. Severe accident 
conditions include the elevated temperatures, pressures, radiation 
levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such as hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide, associated with accidents involving extensive core damage, 
including accidents involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten 
core debris.
    Ensuring that the venting functions are available under severe 
accident conditions will support the strategies in the Mark I and Mark 
II severe accident management guidelines for the protection or recovery 
of the containment, which serves as a barrier to the release of 
radioactive materials. This Order will ensure that this additional 
severe accident venting capability is provided while also achieving, 
with minimal delays, the purpose of EA-12-050--to provide a reliable 
HCVS to control containment pressure and prevent core damage following 
the loss of heat removal functions.
    This Order rescinds the requirements imposed in Section IV and 
Attachment 2 of EA-12-050 and replaces them with the requirements in 
Section IV and Attachment 2 of this Order. Because the requirements in 
EA-12-050 are now reflected in this Order, licensees are no longer 
expected to comply with the

[[Page 35991]]

requirements in EA-12-050, including applicable schedule deadlines for 
submittals or implementation.
    This Order defines requirements related to containment venting 
before and during severe accident conditions, which is a subset of the 
issues related to containment performance during severe accidents 
outlined in SECY-12-0157. Other issues include improving licensees' 
severe accident management capabilities and filtering strategies to 
limit the release of radioactive materials when venting is necessary. 
For example, the importance of drywell flooding to prevent core debris 
that has breached the reactor vessel from causing containment failure 
by drywell liner melt-through in Mark I containments was discussed in 
SECY-12-0157 and during the related Commission meeting held on January 
9, 2013. The remaining issues related to filtering strategies and 
severe accident management of BWR Mark I and II containments will be 
addressed through the rulemaking process, as directed by the Commission 
in its SRM for SECY-12-0157. The rulemaking process will commence in 
June 2013 when the NRC staff begins a series of public meetings to 
support developing the regulatory basis for the proposed rulemaking.

III.

    The purpose of requiring reliable hardened vents in EA-12-050 was 
to prevent core damage when heat removal capability is lost due to 
conditions such as an extended loss of electrical power. In EA-12-050, 
the Commission determined that, in light of the events at Fukushima 
Dai-ichi and consistent with the NRC's defense-in-depth strategy, 
installation of reliable hardened containment vents to help prevent 
core damage in BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments was necessary 
to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health 
and safety.
    This Order requires installation of reliable hardened vents that 
will not only assist in preventing core damage when heat removal 
capability is lost, but will also function in severe accident 
conditions (i.e., when core damage has occurred). The safety 
improvements to Mark I and Mark II containment venting systems required 
by this Order are intended to increase confidence in maintaining the 
containment function following core damage events. Although venting the 
containment during severe accident conditions could result in the 
release of radioactive materials, venting could also prevent 
containment structural and gross penetration leakage failures due to 
overpressurization that would hamper accident management (e.g., 
continuing efforts to cool core debris) and ultimately result in 
larger, uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.
    Under the backfit provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, ``Backfitting,'' the 
NRC may require plant improvements beyond those needed to provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety 
when engineering approaches are available to provide a cost-justified 
substantial safety improvement. The staff performed a detailed 
regulatory analysis of possible improvements to Mark I and Mark II 
reliable hardened containment vents, including the option of installing 
severe accident capable vents. That analysis is available in the NRC's 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession 
No. ML12312A456. A summary of the staff's cost-benefit evaluation was 
provided in SECY-12-0157.
    As discussed in SECY-12-0157, the NRC's determination that a 
venting system should be available during severe accident conditions 
considered both quantitative assessments of costs and benefits, as well 
as, various qualitative factors. Among the qualitative factors, one of 
the more important is enhancing the defense-in-depth characteristics of 
Mark I and Mark II containments by addressing the relatively high 
probabilities that those containments would fail should an accident 
progress to melting the core. Other qualitative factors supporting 
installation of severe accident capable vents include addressing 
uncertainties in the understanding of severe accident events, 
supporting severe accident management and response, improving the 
control of hydrogen generated during severe accidents, improving 
readiness for external and multi-unit events, and reducing 
uncertainties about radiological releases and thereby improving 
emergency planning and response. The installation of a reliable, severe 
accident capable containment venting system, in combination with other 
actions such as ensuring drywell flooding capabilities, reduces the 
likelihood of containment failures and thereby enhances the defense-in-
depth protections for plants with Mark I and Mark II containments.
    The Commission has determined that requiring BWR facilities with 
Mark I and Mark II containments to make the necessary plant 
modifications and procedure changes to provide a reliable hardened 
venting system that is capable of performing under severe accident 
conditions is a cost-justified substantial safety improvement. These 
modifications are needed to protect health and to minimize danger to 
life or property because they will give licensees greater capabilities 
to respond to severe accidents and limit the uncontrolled release of 
radioactive materials. In such situations, the Commission may act in 
accordance with its statutory authority under Section 161 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require Licensees to take 
appropriate action to reduce the risks posed to the public from the 
operation of nuclear power plants.
    For Mark I containments, the preferred venting path is from the 
wetwell portion of containment because the water in the suppression 
pool provides a degree of decontamination before release to the 
environment. The benefits of the suppression pool in the scrubbing of 
possible releases when using the wetwell vents for pressure control 
were described in Generic Letter 89-16, ``Installation of a Hardened 
Wetwell Vent.'' In addition, the wetwell venting path has been 
incorporated into other parts of the mitigating strategies to address 
lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. During severe 
accidents involving molten core debris breaching the reactor vessel, 
mitigating strategies include injecting water into the containment to 
help prevent drywell liner melt-through, which would result in a 
release pathway directly into the reactor building. However, water 
injection can eventually increase the water level in the suppression 
pool to a point where venting from the wetwell would no longer be 
possible. Without venting, containment pressure would continue to 
increase, threatening containment failure. For this reason, current 
severe accident management guidelines for Mark I containments include 
provisions for venting from the drywell for containment pressure 
control if the capability of venting from the wetwell is not available. 
Because water injection in Mark II containments could similarly impede 
the ability to vent from the wetwell, the Mark II severe accident 
management guidelines also currently include provisions for use of both 
wetwell and drywell containment vents.
    In general, wetwell venting for Mark II containments provides 
similar benefits to Mark I containments in terms of scrubbing of 
possible releases. However, for Mark II containments, in the unlikely 
event of core debris melting through the reactor vessel, there is a 
potential for the core debris to cause a failure of drain line or 
downcomer pipe penetration in the floor, resulting in direct 
communication between the

[[Page 35992]]

drywell and the wetwell volume above the water in the suppression pool. 
This condition, which is referred to as suppression pool bypass, is 
described in more detail in SECY-12-0157. In a suppression pool bypass 
scenario, the primary concern is the loss of the suppression pool as a 
means of filtering the release from the vents. This loss of filtering 
capability is an issue that will be resolved as part of the NRC 
rulemaking addressing broader severe accident management and filtering 
strategies, previously described.
    For the reasons discussed above, this Order requires Mark I and 
Mark II containments to have a wetwell venting system that remains 
functional during severe accident conditions. This Order also requires 
licensees with Mark I and Mark II containments to either install a 
severe accident capable drywell venting system or develop and implement 
a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a 
licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe 
accident conditions. Although not required by this Order, licensees 
with Mark II containments may propose to provide the necessary 
containment venting capability and resolve concerns about suppression 
pool bypass scenarios by developing alternate approaches such as the 
installation of a containment drywell vent with an installed engineered 
filter. Licensees wishing to propose this or other alternatives may do 
so by requesting relaxation in accordance with Section IV of this 
Order.
    In recognition of the relative importance of venting capabilities 
from the wetwell and drywell, a phased approach to implementation is 
being used to minimize delays in implementing the requirements 
originally imposed by EA-12-050. Phase 1 involves upgrading the venting 
capabilities from the containment wetwell to provide reliable, severe 
accident capable hardened vents to assist in preventing core damage 
and, if necessary, to provide venting capability during severe accident 
conditions. Phase 2 involves providing additional protections for 
severe accident conditions through installation of a reliable, severe 
accident capable drywell vent system or the development of a reliable 
containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee 
would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident 
conditions.
    Following the issuance of this Order, the NRC staff will work with 
stakeholders to develop detailed guidance on specific capabilities and 
other aspects of implementing the requirements defined in Attachment 2 
to this Order within the schedules defined in Section IV of this Order. 
This guidance will more fully define functional requirements (e.g., 
equipment specifications) as well as acceptable approaches to technical 
requirements such as designing the containment venting system to 
minimize the reliance on operator actions. The NRC anticipates issuing 
the final interim staff guidance (ISG) for Phase 1 of this Order by 
October 31, 2013, to support licensees preparing and submitting 
integrated plans in accordance with the schedule defined in Section IV. 
The NRC staff plans to subsequently review the integrated plans and 
document those reviews in safety evaluations. The NRC anticipates 
issuing the final ISG for Phase 2 of this Order by April 30, 2015, to 
support licensees preparing and submitting integrated plans related to 
the installation of severe accident containment drywell vents or 
implementing a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it 
unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment 
drywell during severe accident conditions.
    The NRC has concluded that (1) the requirement to provide a 
reliable HCVS to prevent or limit core damage upon loss of heat removal 
capability is necessary to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate 
protection of public health and safety, and (2) the requirement that 
the reliable HCVS remain functional during severe accident conditions 
is a cost-justified substantial safety improvement under 10 CFR 
50.109(a)(3). The NRC is therefore requiring Licensee actions. In 
addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that the public 
health, safety and interest require that this Order be made immediately 
effective.

IV.

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations 
in 10 CFR 2.202, ``Orders,'' and 10 CFR Part 50, it is hereby ordered, 
effective immediately, that all licenses identified in attachment 1 to 
this order are modified as follows:
    A. The requirements in Section IV and Attachment 2 of EA-12-050 are 
hereby rescinded. Licensees are no longer required to comply with those 
requirements.
    B. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any 
Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the 
requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order except to the 
extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license. 
These Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements 
in Attachment 2 to this Order upon issuance of the associated final 
interim staff guidance (ISG) for each phase, and shall complete the two 
phases of implementation by the following dates:
     Phase 1 (severe accident capable wetwell venting system): 
No later than startup from the second refueling outage that begins 
after June 30, 2014, or June 30, 2018, whichever comes first.
     Phase 2, (severe accident capable drywell venting system): 
No later than startup from the first refueling outage that begins after 
June 30, 2017, or June 30, 2019, whichever comes first.
    C. 1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the issuance 
date of the final ISG for Phase 1, notify the Commission (1) if they 
are unable to comply with any of the Phase 1 requirements described in 
Attachment 2, (2) if compliance with any of the Phase 1 requirements is 
unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation 
of any of the Phase 1 requirements would cause the Licensee to be in 
violation of the provisions of any Commission regulation or the 
facility license. The notification shall provide the Licensee's 
justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific 
requirement.
    2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the 
Phase 1 requirements described in Attachment 2 would adversely affect 
the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the 
Commission, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final 
ISG for Phase 1, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for the 
Licensee's determination that the requirement has an adverse safety 
impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives 
specified in the requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying 
the facility to address the adverse safety condition. If neither 
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to 
Condition C.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement 
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required 
in Condition C.1.
    3. All licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the issuance 
date of the final ISG for Phase 2, notify the Commission (1) if they 
are unable to comply with any of the Phase 2 requirements described in 
Attachment 2, (2) if compliance with any of the Phase 2 requirements is 
unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if

[[Page 35993]]

implementation of any of the Phase 2 requirements would cause the 
Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any Commission 
regulation or the facility license. The notification shall provide the 
Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or variation of any 
specific requirement.
    4. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the 
Phase 2 requirements described in Attachment 2 would adversely affect 
the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the 
Commission, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final 
ISG for Phase 2, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for the 
Licensee's determination that the requirement has an adverse safety 
impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives 
specified in the requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying 
the facility to address the adverse safety condition. If neither 
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to 
Condition C.3 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement 
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required 
in Condition C.3.
    D. 1. All Licensees shall, by June 30, 2014, submit to the 
Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a 
description of how compliance with the Phase 1 requirements described 
in Attachment 2 will be achieved.
    2. All Licensees shall, by December 31, 2015, submit to the 
Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a 
description of their approach to the Phase 2 requirements described in 
Attachment 2 and how compliance will be achieved within the required 
schedule.
    3. All Licensees shall provide status reports at six (6)-month 
intervals following submittal of the Phase 1 integrated plan, as 
required in Condition D.1, which delineates progress made in 
implementing the requirements of this Order.
    4. All Licensees shall report to the Commission when full 
compliance with the requirements for Phase 1 and Phase 2, as described 
in Attachment 2, are achieved.
    Licensee responses to Conditions C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, D.1, D.2, D.3 
and D.4 above shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, 
``Written Communications.'' The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above 
conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause.

 V.

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days 
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration 
will be given to extending the time to answer or to request a hearing. 
A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request 
a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The 
answer may consent to this Order. Licensees that consent to this Order 
and waive their right to a hearing pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(d) may 
submit their answers in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 instead of 
following the requirements of the NRC E-filing Rule described below.
    If a hearing is requested by a Licensee or a person whose interest 
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating 
the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, the issue to 
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other 
person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding 
a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the 
presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order 
on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant must contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any NRC proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) 
advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request 
or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic 
Submissions,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing

[[Page 35994]]

system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon 
receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document 
and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the 
document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that 
provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General 
Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary 
that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need 
not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, 
applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) 
must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing 
request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access 
to the document via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's Web site 
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at 
[email protected], or by a toll-free call to1-866-672-7640. The NRC 
Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern 
Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at 
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With 
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve 
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use 
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted 
materials in their submission.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated this 6th day of June, 2013.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

 Attachment 1: Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licenses With Mark I and
                          Mark II Containments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2,     BWR-Mark I.
 and 3.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1     BWR-Mark I.
 and 2.
Columbia Generating Station...............  BWR-Mark II.
Cooper Nuclear Station....................  BWR-Mark I.
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and  BWR-Mark I.
 3.
Duane Arnold Energy Center................  BWR-Mark I.
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and   BWR-Mark I.
 2.
Fermi.....................................  BWR-Mark I.
Hope Creek Generating Station.............  BWR-Mark I.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant..  BWR-Mark I.
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.....  BWR-Mark II.
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2  BWR-Mark II.
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.......  BWR-Mark I.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1    BWR-Mark I & II.
 and 2.
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station...  BWR-Mark I.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2  BWR-Mark I.
 and 3.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.............  BWR-Mark I.
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1  BWR-Mark I.
 and 2.
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units   BWR-Mark II.
 1 and 2.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station......  BWR-Mark I.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 35995]]

Attachment 2: Requirements for Reliable Hardened Vent Systems Capable 
of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions at Boiling-Water Reactor 
Facilities With Mark I and Mark II Containments

    Boiling-Water Reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containments 
shall have a reliable, severe accident capable hardened containment 
venting system (HCVS) \2\. This requirement shall be implemented in two 
phases. In Phase 1, licensees of BWRs with Mark I and Mark II 
containments shall design and install a venting system that provides 
venting capability from the wetwell during severe accident conditions. 
Severe accident conditions include the elevated temperatures, 
pressures, radiation levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such 
as hydrogen and carbon monoxide, associated with accidents involving 
extensive core damage, including accidents involving a breach of the 
reactor vessel by molten core debris. In Phase 2, licensees of BWRs 
with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and install a venting 
system that provides venting capability from the drywell under severe 
accident conditions, or, alternatively, those licensees shall develop 
and implement a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it 
unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment 
drywell during severe accident conditions.
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    \2\ Unless otherwise specified in this attachment, HCVS refers 
to a reliable, severe accident capable hardened containment venting 
system. The HCVS includes a severe accident capable containment 
wetwell venting system and may also, depending on the approach taken 
for Phase 2, include a severe accident capable containment drywell 
venting system.
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A. PHASE 1 (Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Wetwell Venting System)

    The BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and 
install a HCVS, using a vent path from the containment wetwell to 
remove decay heat, vent the containment atmosphere (including steam, 
hydrogen, carbon monoxide, non-condensable gases, aerosols, and fission 
products), and control containment pressure within acceptable limits. 
The HCVS shall be designed for those accident conditions (before and 
after core damage) for which containment venting is relied upon to 
reduce the probability of containment failure, including accident 
sequences that result in the loss of active containment heat removal 
capability or extended loss of alternating current (AC) power. The HCVS 
shall meet the requirements in Sections 1, 2, and 3, below.
1. HCVS Functional Requirements
    1.1 The design of the HCVS shall consider the following performance 
objectives:
    1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the reliance on 
operator actions.
    1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize plant operators' 
exposure to occupational hazards, such as extreme heat stress, while 
operating the HCVS system.
    1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be designed to account for radiological 
conditions that would impede personnel actions needed for event 
response.
    1.1.4 The HCVS controls and indications shall be accessible and 
functional under a range of plant conditions, including severe accident 
conditions, extended loss of AC power, and inadequate containment 
cooling.
    1.2 The HCVS shall include the following design features:
    1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the capacity to vent the steam/energy 
equivalent of one (1) percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a 
lower value is justified by analyses), and be able to restore and then 
maintain containment pressure below the primary containment design 
pressure and the primary containment pressure limit.
    1.2.2 The HCVS shall discharge the effluent to a release point 
above main plant structures.
    1.2.3 The HCVS shall include design features to minimize unintended 
cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the 
site.
    1.2.4 The HCVS shall be designed to be manually operated during 
sustained operations from a control panel located in the main control 
room or a remote but readily accessible location.\3\
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    \3\ For the purposes of these technical requirements, 
``sustained operations'' means until such time that alternate 
reliable containment heat removal and pressure control is 
reestablished, independent of the HCVS, (e.g., suppression pool, 
torus, or shutdown cooling) using installed or portable equipment.
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    1.2.5 The HCVS shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of 
1.2.4, be capable of manual operation (e.g., reach-rod with hand wheel 
or manual operation of pneumatic supply valves from a shielded 
location), which is accessible to plant operators during sustained 
operations.
    1.2.6 The HCVS shall be capable of operating with dedicated and 
permanently installed equipment for at least 24 hours following the 
loss of normal power or loss of normal pneumatic supplies to air 
operated components during an extended loss of AC power.
    1.2.7 The HCVS shall include means to prevent inadvertent 
actuation.
    1.2.8 The HCVS shall include means to monitor the status of the 
vent system (e.g., valve position indication) from the control panel 
required by 1.2.4. The monitoring system shall be designed for 
sustained operation during an extended loss of AC power.
    1.2.9 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the effluent 
discharge for radioactivity that may be released from operation of the 
HCVS. The monitoring system shall provide indication from the control 
panel required by 1.2.4 and shall be designed for sustained operation 
during an extended loss of AC power.
    1.2.10 The HCVS shall be designed to withstand and remain 
functional during severe accident conditions, including containment 
pressure, temperature, and radiation while venting steam, hydrogen, and 
other non-condensable gases and aerosols. The design is not required to 
exceed the current capability of the limiting containment components.
    1.2.11 The HCVS shall be designed and operated to ensure the 
flammability limits of gases passing through the system are not 
reached; otherwise, the system shall be designed to withstand dynamic 
loading resulting from hydrogen deflagration and detonation.
    1.2.12 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the potential for 
hydrogen gas migration and ingress into the reactor building or other 
buildings.
    1.2.13 The HCVS shall include features and provisions for the 
operation, testing, inspection and maintenance adequate to ensure that 
reliable function and capability are maintained.
2. HCVS Quality Standards
    The HCVS shall meet the following quality standards:
    2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and including the second containment 
isolation barrier shall be designed consistent with the design basis of 
the plant. Items in this path include piping, piping supports, 
containment isolation valves, containment isolation valve actuators and 
containment isolation valve position indication components.
    2.2 All other HCVS components shall be designed for reliable and 
rugged performance that is capable of ensuring HCVS functionality 
following a seismic event. These items include electrical power supply, 
valve actuator pneumatic supply and instrumentation (local and remote) 
components.

[[Page 35996]]

3. HCVS Programmatic Requirements
    3.1 The Licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures 
necessary for the safe operation of the HCVS. Procedures shall be 
established for system operations when normal and backup power is 
available, and during an extended loss of AC power.
    3.2 The Licensee shall train appropriate personnel in the use of 
the HCVS. The training curricula shall include system operations when 
normal and backup power is available, and during an extended loss of AC 
power.

B. PHASE 2 (Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Drywell Venting System)

    Licensees with BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall 
either:
    (1) Design and install a HCVS, using a vent path from the 
containment drywell, that meets the requirements in Section B.1 below, 
or
    (2) develop and implement a reliable containment venting strategy 
that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the 
containment drywell before alternate reliable containment heat removal 
and pressure control is reestablished and meets the requirements in 
Section B.2 below.
1. HCVS Drywell Vent Functional Requirements
    1.1 The drywell venting system shall be designed to vent the 
containment atmosphere (including steam, hydrogen, non-condensable 
gases, aerosols, and fission products), and control containment 
pressure within acceptable limits during severe accident conditions.
    1.2 The same functional requirements (reflecting accident 
conditions in the drywell), quality requirements, and programmatic 
requirements defined in Section A of this Attachment for the wetwell 
venting system shall also apply to the drywell venting system.
2. Containment Venting Strategy Requirements
    Licensees choosing to develop and implement a reliable containment 
venting strategy that does not require a reliable, severe accident 
capable drywell venting system shall meet the following requirements:
    2.1 The strategy making it unlikely that a licensee would need to 
vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions 
shall be part of the overall accident management plan for Mark I and 
Mark II containments.
    2.2 The licensee shall provide supporting documentation 
demonstrating that containment failure as a result of overpressure can 
be prevented without a drywell vent during severe accident conditions.
    2.3 Implementation of the strategy shall include licensees 
preparing the necessary procedures, defining and fulfilling functional 
requirements for installed or portable equipment (e.g., pumps and 
valves), and installing the needed instrumentation.

[FR Doc. 2013-14072 Filed 6-13-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P