[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 107 (Tuesday, June 4, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 33606-33632]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-12250]



[[Page 33605]]

Vol. 78

Tuesday,

No. 107

June 4, 2013

Part III





Commodity Futures Trading Commission





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





17 CFR Parts 37 and 38





Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility To 
Make a Swap Available to Trade, Swap Transaction Compliance and 
Implementation Schedule, and Trade Execution Requirement Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 107 / Tuesday, June 4, 2013 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 33606]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 37 and 38

RIN 3038-AD18


Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution 
Facility To Make a Swap Available to Trade, Swap Transaction Compliance 
and Implementation Schedule, and Trade Execution Requirement Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') is 
adopting regulations that establish a process for a designated contract 
market (``DCM'') or swap execution facility (``SEF'') to make a swap 
subject to the trade execution requirement pursuant to the Commodity 
Exchange Act (``CEA''). The Commission is also adopting regulations to 
establish a schedule to phase in compliance with the trade execution 
requirement. The schedule will provide additional time for compliance 
with this requirement.

DATES: The rules will become effective August 5, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nhan Nguyen, Special Counsel, Division 
of Market Oversight (``DMO'', 202-418-5932, [email protected]; Roger 
Smith, Attorney Advisor, DMO, 202-418-5344, [email protected]; or David 
Van Wagner, Chief Counsel, DMO, 202-418-5119, [email protected]; 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Sections 37.10 and 38.12 of the Commission's Regulations--Final 
Rules
    A. Sections 37.10(a) and 38.12(a)--Procedure To Make a Swap 
Available to Trade
    1. Sections 37.10(a)(1) and 38.12(a)(1)--Required Submission
    2. Sections 37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2)--Listing Requirement
    3. Submission of a Group, Category, Type or Class of Swaps
    4. Consideration of Swaps on Another SEF or DCM, or Bilateral 
Transactions
    B. Sections 37.10(b) and 38.12(b)--Factors to Consider To Make a 
Swap Available to Trade
    C. Sections 37.10(c) and 38.12(c)--Applicability
    D. Sections 37.10(d) and 38.12(d)--Removal
    E. Annual Review
    F. Notice to the Public of Available To Trade Determinations
III. Sections 37.12 and 38.11 of the Commission's Regulations--Trade 
Execution Compliance Schedule
IV. Related Matters
    A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act
    1. Proposed Information Provided by Reporting Entities/Persons
    2. Summary of Comments and Commission Response
    C. Cost-Benefit Considerations
    1. Available-to-Trade Rule
    a. Part 40 Process and Determination Factors
    b. Applicability
    c. Consideration of Section 15(a) Factors--Available-to-Trade 
Rule
    2. Trade Execution Compliance Schedule
V. List of Commenters
Text of the Regulations, Guidance and Acceptable Practices

I. Background

    Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 2(h)(8) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') to require that swap transactions 
subject to the clearing requirement must be traded on either a 
designated contract market (``DCM'') or swap execution facility 
(``SEF''), unless no DCM or SEF ``makes the swap available to trade'' 
or the transaction is not subject to the clearing requirement under 
section 2(h)(7) (the ``trade execution requirement'').\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ For example, section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, as amended by 
section 723 of the Dodd-Frank Act, provides an exception to the CEA 
section 2(h)(1) clearing requirement (``the end-user exception'') if 
one of the counterparties to a swap (i) is not a financial entity, 
(ii) is using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and (iii) 
notifies the Commission how it generally meets its financial 
obligations associated with entering into non-cleared swaps. 7 U.S.C 
2(h)(7). Under the authority given by section 2(h)(7)(C)(ii) of the 
CEA, the Commission has also adopted regulations to exempt certain 
small banks, saving associations, farm credit system institutions, 
and credit unions from the definition of ``financial entity,'' thus 
potentially allowing the transactions of those entities to qualify 
for an exemption from the clearing requirement. 17 CFR 50.5(d). The 
Commission may determine that swap transactions exempted from the 
clearing requirement pursuant to other statutory authority would 
also not be subject to the section 2(h)(8) trade execution 
requirement. For example, on April 11, 2013, the Commission 
published final rules issued under section 4(c) of the CEA to exempt 
swaps between certain affiliated entities (``inter-affiliates'') 
within a corporate group from the clearing requirement. The 
Commission determines that such swaps would not be subject to the 
trade execution requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 14, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(``Commission'') proposed regulations to establish a process for a DCM 
or SEF to notify the Commission that a swap is ``available to trade'' 
for purposes of the trade execution requirement (``Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking'' or ``FNPRM'').\2\ The proposed regulations would 
be included in part 37 and part 38 of the Commission's regulations to 
implement the available-to-trade provision in section 2(h)(8) of the 
CEA. The comment period for the FNPRM ended on February 13, 2012. The 
Commission received 32 written comments from members of the public and 
hosted a public roundtable on this topic. Commission staff also 
participated in several meetings with market participants.\3\ As a 
result of the written comments received and dialogue with market 
participants, the Commission in this final rule has revised and/or 
eliminated certain provisions that were proposed in the FNPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution 
Facility to Make a Swap Available to Trade, 76 FR 77728 (Dec. 14, 
2011). Sections 5(d)(1) and 5h(f)(1) of the CEA require DCMs and 
SEFs, respectively, to comply with any requirement that the 
Commission may impose by rule or regulation pursuant to section 
8a(5) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 12a(5), which authorizes the Commission 
to promulgate such regulations as, in the judgment of the 
Commission, that are reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the 
provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes of the CEA. In 
addition, section 721(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the 
Commission with authority to adopt rules to define ``[any] term 
included in an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act . . . made by 
[the Dodd-Frank Act].'' 15 U.S.C. 8321, as enacted by section 721 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.
    \3\ Meeting summaries are available through the Commission's Web 
site at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 20, 2011, the Commission also proposed regulations to 
establish a schedule to implement the trade execution requirement.\4\ 
The proposed regulations would be included in part 37 and part 38 of 
the Commission's regulations. The comment period for the proposed 
regulations ended on November 4, 2011. The Commission received 33 
written comments from members of the public, and after consideration of 
those comments, is adopting the final implementation schedule for the 
trade execution requirement as proposed, but with certain 
clarifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation Schedule: 
Clearing and Trade Execution Requirements under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 76 FR 58186 (Sep. 20, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final regulations adopted herein will become effective August 
5, 2013.

II. Sections 37.10 and 38.12 of the Commission's Regulations--Final 
Rules

    As proposed in the FNPRM, Sec. Sec.  37.10 and 38.12 established a 
process for a SEF or a DCM, respectively, to make a swap available to 
trade under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA.
     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and 38.12(a) set forth the 
filing procedure that SEFs

[[Page 33607]]

and DCMs would utilize to demonstrate that a swap is available to 
trade. Under the proposal, a SEF or DCM would be required to submit an 
available-to-trade determination with the Commission under the rule 
approval and self-certification procedures in part 40 of the 
Commission's regulations.
     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b) set forth eight 
factors that a DCM or SEF may consider, as appropriate, to determine 
that a swap is available to trade.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(c) and 38.12(c) required that 
upon a determination that a swap is available to trade by a SEF or DCM, 
all other DCMs and SEFs listing or offering that swap or an 
economically equivalent swap for trading must also make those swaps 
available to trade.
     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(d) and 38.12(d) required DCMs 
and SEFs to perform an annual review and assessment of their 
determinations.

A. Sections 37.10(a) and 38.12(a)--Procedure To Make a Swap Available 
to Trade

1. Sections 37.10(a)(1) and 38.12(a)(1)--Required Submission
    Under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and 38.12(a), a SEF or DCM would 
initially determine that a swap is available to trade and submit that 
determination to the Commission, either for approval or self-
certification, pursuant to the rule filing procedures of part 40 of the 
Commission's regulations.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See Sections 40.5 and 40.6 and Provisions Common to 
Registered Entities, 76 FR 44776 (Jul. 27, 2011). The Commission 
views a DCM or SEF's determination that a swap is available to trade 
as a ``trading protocol'' that falls under the definition of a 
``rule'' under Sec.  40.1 of the Commission's regulations. Section 
40.1(i) defines a rule as ``any constitutional provision, article of 
incorporation, bylaw, rule, regulation, resolution, interpretation, 
stated policy, advisory, terms and conditions, trading protocol, 
agreement or instrument corresponding thereto, including those that 
authorize a response or establish standards for responding to a 
specific emergency, and any amendment or addition thereto or repeal 
thereof, made or issued by a registered entity or by the governing 
board thereof or any committee thereof, in whatever form adopted.'' 
Therefore, SEFs and DCMs would be required to submit a determination 
to the Commission for approval or self-certification under part 40 
of the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Sec.  40.5, a registered entity may request Commission 
approval of a new rule prior to its implementation.\7\ The Commission 
has a 45-day review period to review the request and may extend the 
review period for an additional 45 days in specified circumstances.\8\ 
The Commission may also extend the review period beyond an additional 
45 days, based on a written agreement with the registered entity.\9\ 
Under Sec.  40.6, a registered entity may submit a new rule to the 
Commission under self-certification procedures. The Commission has 10 
business days to review the rule before it is deemed certified and can 
be made effective. The Commission, however, may stay the certification 
for an additional 90 days, during which time it must provide a 30-day 
public comment period.\10\ Under either procedure, the registered 
entity must initially provide an explanation and analysis of the rule 
and its compliance with the applicable provisions of the CEA, including 
the core principles, and the Commission's regulations thereunder.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 17 CFR 40.5(a).
    \8\ 17 CFR 40.5(c) and (d). In determining whether to extend the 
review period, the Commission will consider whether the proposed 
rule raises novel or complex issues, the submission is incomplete, 
or the requestor does not respond completely to Commission questions 
in a timely manner. 17 CFR 40.5(d)(1).
    \9\ 17 CFR 40.5(d)(2).
    \10\ 17 CFR 40.6(b) and (c). In determining whether to stay a 
self-certification, the Commission will consider whether the rule 
presents novel or complex issues; is accompanied by inadequate 
explanation; or is potentially inconsistent with the CEA. 17 CFR 
40.6(c)(1).
    \11\ See 17 CFR 40.5(a)(5), 40.6(a)(7)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the case of an available-to-trade determination, the 
accompanying explanation and analysis in the submission would detail 
the manner in which the SEF or DCM considered the factors in proposed 
Sec.  37.10(b) or Sec.  38.12(b).\12\ At any time during its review 
under Sec.  40.5 or during the 90-day review period under Sec.  40.6, 
the Commission may notify the registered entity that it objects to the 
proposed certification because it is inconsistent or appears to be 
inconsistent with the CEA or the Commission's regulations.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See infra note 90 and accompanying text for a list of the 
proposed determination factors in the FNPRM.
    \13\ See 17 CFR 40.5(e), 40.6(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Upon the Commission approving a SEF's or DCM's available-to-trade 
determination or permitting a SEF's or DCM's available-to-trade 
determination certification to become effective, the swap involved 
would be deemed available to trade. If that swap also is subject to the 
clearing requirement, then the swap must be executed on a SEF as a 
Required Transaction (as defined in part 37 of the Commission's 
regulations) or on a DCM in order to satisfy the trade execution 
requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA. The Commission notes that 
the trade execution requirement does not apply to swaps that are not 
subject to the clearing requirement under section 2(h)(1) of the 
CEA.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See supra note 1. The Commission addresses the methods by 
which swaps that are subject to the trade execution requirement must 
be executed on a SEF or DCM. Swaps that are subject to the trade 
execution requirement (and are not block trades as defined under 
Sec.  43.2 of the Commission's regulations) and that are traded on a 
SEF are defined as Required Transactions under part 37 of the 
Commission's regulations governing SEFs. Under Sec.  37.9(a)(2), 
Required Transactions must be executed by either (1) an Order Book, 
as defined in Sec.  37.3(a)(3); or (2) a Request for Quote System, 
as defined in Sec.  37.9(a)(3), that operates in conjunction with an 
Order Book. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap 
Execution Facilities (May 17, 2013). Swaps that are subject to the 
trade execution requirement and traded on a DCM must be executed 
pursuant to subpart J of part 38 of the Commission's regulations, 
which implements revised DCM Core Principle 9 under section 5(d)(9) 
of the CEA, as amended by section 735(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 7 
U.S.C. 7(d)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    With respect to the filing procedures set forth in proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and 38.12(a), several commenters opposed the 
procedures and recommended that all swaps subject to the clearing 
requirement under section 2(h)(1) of the CEA should be subject to the 
trade execution requirement because the Dodd-Frank Act does not specify 
a separate process to make a swap available to trade.\15\ In this 
regard, some commenters stated that under section 2(h)(8)(B) of the 
CEA, swaps subject to the clearing requirement are automatically 
subject to mandatory trade execution unless a SEF or DCM does not list 
the swap for trading.\16\ Some commenters viewed the proposed procedure 
as duplicative of the mandatory clearing determination process and 
accordingly stated that the Commission should rely on the clearing 
determination process to also determine whether a swap is available to 
trade.\17\ The commenters further stated that utilizing the clearing 
determination as the exclusive basis for finding that a swap is 
available to trade would subject more swaps to the trade execution

[[Page 33608]]

requirement and further the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 3; WMBAA Comment Letter at 3; 
AFR Comment Letter at 3; SDMA Comment Letter at 3; ODEX Comment 
Letter at 1.
    \16\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 2; AFR Comment Letter at 4; 
ODEX Comment Letter at 1. Section 2(h)(8)(B) of the CEA states that 
mandatory trade execution does not apply ``if no [DCM or SEF] makes 
the swap available to trade'' (emphasis added). 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8)(B).
    \17\ SDMA Comment Letter at 4-5; WMBAA Comment Letter at 3; 
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 3-5; AFR Comment Letter at 4. See 
infra note 90 and accompanying text for a description of the 
proposed determination factors. Under Sec.  39.5(a)(3)(ii)(A) of the 
Commission's regulations, a mandatory clearing submission must 
include information regarding the ``existence of significant 
outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate 
pricing data'' of a subject swap.
    \18\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 2; MarketAxess Comment Letter at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, some commenters stated that the process for 
determining whether a swap is available to trade is separate from the 
process for determining whether a swap is subject to the clearing 
requirement. Some of the commenters relied on the statutory language 
\19\ and legislative history \20\ of the Dodd-Frank Act to support this 
view, with some commenters arguing that ``available for trading'' 
should mean more than mere listing.\21\ As statutory support, several 
commenters stated that section 2(h)(8) of the CEA specifies two 
distinct prerequisites for subjecting a swap to mandatory trade 
execution: (1) The swap must be subject to mandatory clearing and (2) 
the swap must be made available to trade.\22\ Markit also noted that 
the language of the clearing requirement under section 2(h)(1)-(2) of 
the CEA, as enacted by the Dodd-Frank Act, does not address making a 
swap available to trade.\23\ Further, AIMA noted that the clearing 
determination factors differ from the proposed factors in an available-
to-trade determination.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Markit Comment Letter at 2; ICI Comment Letter at 3-4; 
SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 3; CEWG Comment Letter at 2; AIMA 
Comment Letter at 1.
    \20\ Some commenters cited the July 2010 Senate floor remarks of 
U.S. Senator Blanche Lincoln, in which she stated that determining 
whether a swap is available to trade should consist of more than 
conducting a listing inquiry. According to Senator Lincoln, ``[t]he 
[Commission] could consider, for example, whether there is a minimum 
amount of liquidity such that the swap can actually be traded on the 
facility. The mere `listing' of the swap by a [SEF], in and of 
itself . . . should not be sufficient to trigger the Trade Execution 
Requirement.'' Markit Comment Letter at 2 n.6; Chatham Comment 
Letter at 2-3; ICI Comment Letter at 3-4.
    \21\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 3; Bloomberg Comment 
Letter at 4; Sunguard Kiodex Comment Letter at 2; Spring Trading 
Comment Letter at 3 (Jan. 12, 2012); ICI Comment Letter at 3-4.
    \22\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 3; ICI Comment Letter at 3; 
CEWG Comment Letter at 2.
    \23\ Markit Comment Letter at 2.
    \24\ AIMA Comment Letter at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also asserted that the mandatory clearing 
determination and the proposed available-to-trade determination differ 
from one another in practical respects.\25\ For example, SIFMA AMG 
stated that whether a swap should be mandatorily cleared depends on 
whether the swap (1) can be priced for a derivatives clearing 
organization's (``DCO'') risk management purposes; and (2) is 
standardized; therefore, unlike the available-to-trade determination, 
liquidity is not a primary consideration.\26\ AIMA and Morgan Stanley 
similarly commented that stated liquidity is considered in a clearing 
determination to make certain that a DCO could adequately price the 
swap to calculate margin requirements and fulfill risk management 
requirements. They further stated that the minimum liquidity needed to 
clear a swap is lower than the minimum liquidity needed to support 
mandatory trade execution on a DCM or a SEF.\27\ Markit and FXall also 
stated that differing tenors of a given swap would be clearable if any 
tenor of that swap is cleared, but different tenors would have 
significantly different liquidity characteristics.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ MFA Comment Letter at 3; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 4; 
Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 4; AIMA Comment Letter at 1-2; FHLB 
Comment Letter at 4 n.2; ICI Comment Letter at 3-4; Markit Comment 
Letter at 3; FXall Comment Letter at 5.
    \26\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 4.
    \27\ AIMA Comment Letter at 1-2; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter 
at 4.
    \28\ Markit Comment Letter at 3; FXall Comment Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, commenters stated that only the more liquid swaps should 
be available to trade \29\ to avoid negatively affecting swap pricing 
and liquidity.\30\ Morgan Stanley and FXall stated that subjecting 
illiquid swaps to the trade execution requirement would further reduce 
liquidity in those swaps, as market participants would be reluctant to 
reveal their trading interest in low volume markets; such premature 
imposition of the trade execution requirement upon illiquid swaps would 
likely result in increasing bid-ask spreads and trading costs.\31\ ICI 
commented that the risks of low trading volume would drive market 
participants to other markets.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ MFA Comment Letter at 3; Markit Comment Letter at 2; FXall 
Comment Letter at 2-3, CEWG Comment Letter at 2; JPMorgan Comment 
Letter at 2; FHLB Comment Letter at 4 n.2; Morgan Stanley Comment 
Letter at 3; Vanguard Comment Letter at 4; ICI Comment Letter at 3-
4; Chatham Comment Letter at 2.
    \30\ Vanguard Comment Letter at 4; FXall Comment Letter at 5; 
ICI Comment Letter at 4; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 3-4.
    \31\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 3; FXall Comment Letter at 
5.
    \32\ ICI Comment Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    MFA also commented that separate processes, with adequate 
Commission oversight and public comment, would mitigate potential 
``first-mover advantage'' issues.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ MFA Comment Letter at 2. See infra discussion at note 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of the commenters who supported separate processes, some commenters 
supported the proposed filing procedures.\34\ CBOE stated that 
Sec. Sec.  40.5 and 40.6 allow for timely Commission review and have 
been successfully utilized in other areas.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ CBOE Comment Letter at 1-2; Spring Trading Comment Letter 
at 2 (Jan. 12, 2012); AIMA Comment Letter at 3 (supporting use of 
the Sec.  40.5 rule approval process only).
    \35\ CBOE Comment Letter at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters, however, opposed the proposed filing 
procedures.\36\ ISDA stated that neither Sec.  40.5 nor Sec.  40.6 
should be used because an available-to-trade determination is neither a 
trading protocol nor a rule.\37\ Some opposing commenters stated that 
the Commission, not SEFs and DCMs, should determine whether a swap is 
available to trade.\38\ Some commenters asserted that the Commission is 
more qualified to make the determination based on its access to market 
data.\39\ Several commenters also stated that SEFs and DCMs should not 
make the determination because they may have a financial incentive-
based conflict of interest to maximize the number of swaps subject to 
mandatory trade execution.\40\ Commenters expressed a related concern 
that a SEF's or DCM's determination would be influenced by a desire to 
gain a ``first-mover advantage,'' (i.e., acquiring market share in the 
trading of a particular swap before other venues can list and develop 
trading activity in that swap), which would lead to premature or ill-
advised mandatory trading of illiquid swaps on a SEF or DCM.\41\ 
Further, several commenters stated that neither Sec.  40.5 nor Sec.  
40.6 would provide the Commission with adequate time to review rule 
filings and to solicit public comment, which would allow SEFs and DCMs 
to acquire this advantage \42\ and

[[Page 33609]]

make it hard for the Commission to reject a determination.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Markit Comment Letter at 5; ISDA Comment Letter at 4-5; 
Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3; CEWG Comment Letter at 2-3; Morgan 
Stanley Comment Letter at 5-6; AIMA Comment Letter at 2-3 (opposing 
use of Sec.  40.6 certification process).
    \37\ ISDA Comment Letter at 6.
    \38\ Markit Comment Letter at 5-6; Vanguard Comment Letter at 5; 
Geneva Energy Markets Comment Letter at 2; JPMorgan Comment Letter 
at 1; CME Comment Letter at 4-5; FHLB Comment Letter at 3; FSR 
Comment Letter at 4; FXall Comment Letter at 5-6; Morgan Stanley 
Comment Letter at 5-6; CEWG Comment Letter at 6; ISDA Comment Letter 
at 3-4, 6; Tradeweb Comment Letter at 4-5.
    \39\ FHLB Comment Letter at 3-4; ISDA Comment Letter at 3; 
Markit Comment Letter at 5; FXall Comment Letter at 6.
    \40\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2; CME Comment Letter at 4-5; 
FHLB Comment Letter at 3; Markit Comment Letter at 5; CEWG Comment 
Letter at 2; ISDA Comment Letter at 3; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter 
at 5-6; AIMA Comment Letter at 2; Vanguard Comment Letter at 5; 
Geneva Energy Markets Comment Letter at 2; JPMorgan Comment Letter 
at 2.
    \41\ FXall Comment Letter at 6-7; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2; 
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 2-3; FSR Comment Letter at 2; ISDA 
Comment Letter at 3; CME Comment Letter at 4; Morgan Stanley Comment 
Letter at 5-6.
    \42\ UBS Comment Letter at 1; Chatham Comment Letter at 3; AIMA 
Comment Letter at 2; ISDA Comment Letter at 3-5; CEWG Comment Letter 
at 3; Markit Comment Letter at 5-6; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 
5.
    \43\ Markit Comment Letter at 6; ISDA Comment Letter at 3; ICI 
Comment Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters offered alternative approaches to the proposed 
process. Bloomberg recommended a separate standalone rule.\44\ Several 
commenters, however, recommended that the Commission establish a 
``pilot program'' to phase in the available-to-trade process by 
initially deeming certain highly liquid swaps as available to trade 
(and therefore making them subject to the trade execution requirement) 
for a fixed time period. Commenters stated that this approach would 
provide market participants and trading venues with time to adjust to 
the trade execution requirement \45\ and minimize market disruptions 
caused during implementation.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3 n.10.
    \45\ Vanguard Comment Letter at 4; FSR Comment Letter at 5; 
JPMorgan Comment Letter at 2.
    \46\ Markit Comment Letter at 3; Tradeweb Comment Letter at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    MarketAxess and CME recommended that only swaps that have been 
determined to be subject to the clearing requirement should be subject 
to an available-to-trade determination.\47\ Both commenters argued that 
determining whether a swap is available to trade, for purposes of the 
trade execution requirement, would be legally insignificant unless a 
swap is required to be cleared first, and thus believe that the 
Commission should first determine which swaps will be subject to the 
clearing requirement.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ CME Comment Letter at 3; MarketAxess Comment Letter at 7-8.
    \48\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Bloomberg also noted that the Commission has the authority under 
Sec.  5c(c) of the CEA to deny an available-to-trade determination only 
if it is ``inconsistent with'' the CEA or the Commission's regulations 
and requested clarification on how the Commission would interpret this 
term in this context.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3 n.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission is adopting the proposed available-to-trade process, 
subject to modifications discussed herein. The Commission agrees with 
commenters who assert that the CEA's statutory language supports an 
available-to-trade determination that is separate from a mandatory 
clearing determination.\50\ In response to comments, the Commission has 
determined that at this time, it will only review available-to-trade 
submissions for swaps that it has first determined to be subject to the 
clearing requirement under Sec.  39.5 of the Commission's 
regulations.\51\ The Commission believes that adopting a sequenced 
approach in such a manner is consistent with the trade execution 
requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA because the trade 
execution mandate only applies if a swap is (1) subject to mandatory 
clearing and (2) made available to trade by a SEF or DCM.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ In response to comments that the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
condition mandatory trade execution of a swap on an affirmative 
Commission determination, the Commission further notes that section 
8a(5) of the CEA authorizes the Commission to promulgate such 
regulations as, in its judgment, are reasonably necessary to 
effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the 
purposes of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. 12a(8). Further, section 721(b) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act provides the Commission with authority to adopt rules 
to define ``[any] term included in an amendment to the Commodity 
Exchange Act . . . made by [the Dodd-Frank Act].'' 15 U.S.C. 8321, 
as enacted by section 721 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Additionally, 
sections 5(d)(1) and 5h(f)(1) of the CEA require DCMs and SEFs, 
respectively, to comply with any requirement that the Commission may 
impose by rule or regulation pursuant to section 8a(5) of the CEA.
    \51\ Section 39.5 of the Commission's regulations sets forth a 
process under which the Commission will review swaps to determine 
whether the swaps are required to be cleared.
    \52\ Section 50.25 of the Commission's regulations establishes a 
schedule to phase in compliance with the clearing requirement by 
category of market participant. Category 1 entities, which include a 
swap dealer, a security-based swap dealer, a major swap participant, 
a major security-based swap participant, or an active fund, have 90 
days to comply with the clearing requirement. Category 2 entities, 
which include a commodity pool, private fund, or person 
predominantly engaged in activities that are in the business of 
banking or that are financial in nature, have 180 days to comply 
with the clearing requirement. Certain third-party subaccounts and 
all other swap transactions receive 270 days to comply with the 
clearing requirement. See Swap Transaction Compliance and 
Implementation Schedule: Clearing Requirement under Section 2(h) of 
the CEA, 77 FR 44441 (July 20, 2012). The Commission notes that it 
will accept for review available-to-trade determinations for swaps 
determined to be subject to the clearing requirement, prior to the 
applicable date for compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The clearing determination process, which the Commission notes is 
not initiated by a SEF or DCM, primarily focuses on the ability to 
mitigate risk through clearing by a DCO and the five statutory factors 
under section 2(h)(2)(D) of the CEA.\53\ In particular with respect to 
risk management, the Commission considers whether imposing the clearing 
requirement would mitigate systemic risk through the collateralization 
of risk exposures, which includes counterparty credit risk that arises 
between two counterparties to an uncleared swap.\54\ In this regard, 
the Commission assesses whether a particular class of swaps has 
sufficient liquidity for risk management purposes, i.e., pricing and 
margining of the cleared swaps.\55\ The Commission has noted in the 
context of clearing for interest rate swaps, for example, that DCOs do 
not focus on the liquidity of specific individual swaps from a risk 
management perspective, but rather on a portfolio basis.\56\ In 
contrast, the available-to-trade determination process will be 
initiated by a SEF or DCM and may focus primarily on whether a swap has 
sufficient trading liquidity to be subject to mandatory trade 
execution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ To make a clearing determination, the Commission must 
consider five factors: (1) The existence of significant outstanding 
notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data; 
(2) the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational 
expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructures to clear 
the contract on terms that are consistent with the material terms 
and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded; (3) 
the effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account 
the size of the market for such contract and the resources of the 
DCO available to clear the contract; (4) the effect on competition, 
including appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing; and (5) 
the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the 
insolvency of the relevant derivatives clearing organization or one 
or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of 
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property. 7 
U.S.C. 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(I)-(IV), as enacted by section 723 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.
    \54\ 77 FR 74285. In the Commission's clearing requirement final 
rule, certain classes of credit default swaps (CDS) and interest 
rate swaps (IRS) would become subject to the clearing requirement, 
i.e., cleared by a registered DCO. Per section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the 
CEA, the Commission considered the effect of clearing those classes 
of swaps on mitigating systemic risk. With respect to the proposed 
CDS indices, the Commission believes that mandatory clearing would 
(1) mitigate counterparty credit risk by allowing a DCO to become 
the buyer to every seller of those indices, and vice versa; and (2) 
collateralize risk exposures by allowing a DCO to calculate and 
collect initial margin and guaranty fund contributions. 77 FR 74297-
98. With respect to the IRS proposed to be cleared, the Commission 
believes that the three DCOs that have submitted clearing 
determinations--CME, LCH, and IDCH--would (1) mitigate counterparty 
credit risk by establishing themselves as a central counterparty to 
reduce the number of open bilateral contracts; and (2) facilitate 
collateral efficiency through a central counterparty clearing 
approach. 77 FR 74312.
    \55\ For example, the Commission has noted that higher trading 
liquidity in swaps would assist DCOs in end-of-day settlement 
procedures, as well as in managing the risk of CDS portfolios, 
particularly in mitigating the liquidity risk associated with 
unwinding a portfolio of a defaulting clearing member. 77 FR 47176.
    \56\ Specifically, liquidity is viewed by a DCO as a function of 
whether a portfolio of swaps has common specifications that are 
determinative of their economic characteristics, such that a DCO can 
price and risk manage the portfolio in a default situation. 77 FR 
74301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the proposed procedure to determine that a swap is 
available to trade, the Commission is adopting the rule as proposed and 
codifying the proposed rule text to Sec. Sec.  37.10(a)(1) and 
38.12(a)(1).\57\ The part

[[Page 33610]]

40 procedures provide a reasonable approach by allowing DCMs and SEFs--
the entities responsible for listing or offering the swaps for trading 
and supporting related trading activity--to initially determine whether 
a swap is available to trade, and therefore, subject to the trade 
execution requirement. The Commission notes that although it will have 
access to market data, SEFs and DCMs will have sufficient expertise and 
experience with respect to swaps trading to make an initial 
determination and to submit that determination to the Commission under 
the part 40 procedures. Accordingly, the part 40 procedures provide 
SEFs and DCMs with the flexibility to make an initial available-to-
trade determination while allowing for appropriate Commission review 
and regulatory oversight, as well as an opportunity for public comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ In response to ISDA's comment that neither 17 CFR 40.5 nor 
Sec.  40.6 should apply because an available-to-trade determination 
is neither a trading protocol nor a rule, the Commission notes that 
the definition of ``rule'' under 17 CFR 40.1(h) of the Commission's 
regulations would encompass an available-to-trade determination. 
Section 40.1(h) defines ``rule'' as ``any constitutional provision, 
article of incorporation, bylaw, rule, regulation, resolution, 
interpretation, stated policy, term and condition, trading protocol, 
agreement or instrument corresponding thereto, in whatever form 
adopted, and any amendment or addition thereto or repeal thereof, 
made or issued by a registered entity . . . .'' The Commission views 
an available-to-trade determination as a ``trading protocol.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also believes that the part 40 procedures should 
afford sufficient time for market participants to offer public comment 
on available-to-trade submissions and for the Commission to review such 
submissions and any related comments. In this regard, for swaps 
submitted by a SEF or DCM under the Sec.  40.5 rule approval process or 
the Sec.  40.6 rule certification process, initial available-to-trade 
determinations may present novel and complex issues that will warrant 
retention for an additional review.\58\ Under Sec.  40.6(c)(2) of the 
Commission's regulations, interested parties would have sufficient 
opportunity to comment on the certification during a 30-day mandatory 
public comment period. Therefore, swaps self-certified as available to 
trade may initially be subject to a review period of up to 100 
days.\59\ Similarly, for swaps submitted under the Sec.  40.5 rule 
approval process that present novel or complex issues, the review 
period for initial rule approval submissions may be extended for at 
least additional 45 days for the same reason.\60\ The Commission notes 
that it routinely solicits public comments for Sec.  40.5 rule approval 
submissions and anticipates that market participants would be similarly 
able to provide the Commission with comments on available-to-trade 
filings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Under Sec. Sec.  40.5(d)(1) and 40.6(c) of the Commission's 
regulations, the Commission may stay the certification of a new rule 
or rule amendment that, among other things, presents ``novel or 
complex issues that require additional time'' to review or analyze.
    \59\ Under 17 CFR 40.6(c)(3), a new rule subject to a stay would 
become effective, pursuant to its certification, at the expiration 
of the 90-day review period unless the Commission withdraws the stay 
prior to that time, or the Commission notifies the registered entity 
during the 90-day period that it objects to the proposed 
certification on the grounds that the proposed rule or rule 
amendment is inconsistent with the CEA or the Commission's 
regulations.
    \60\ As noted, under 17 CFR 40.5(d)(2), the Commission may 
extend the review period beyond an additional 45 days based on 
written agreement with the submitting SEF or DCM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission expects that over time, available-to-trade filings 
should present fewer novel or complex issues, thereby not warranting 
extensions of the applicable review period; SEFs and DCMs would likely 
submit swap determinations that are similar to previous submissions and 
the Commission would become more experienced with the process. The 
Commission, however, will continue to consider whether to stay rule 
certifications or rule approval submissions on a case-by-case basis.
    In response to Bloomberg's request for clarification, the 
Commission notes that whether a SEF's or DCM's initial determination is 
``inconsistent'' with the CEA and the Commission's rules and 
regulations would depend upon the SEF's or DCM's analysis and 
application of the determination factors to the swap submitted as 
available to trade, as discussed further below. The Commission also 
notes that a determination could also be deemed inconsistent if it does 
not consider one or more of the required factors, or the swap otherwise 
does not meet other prerequisites established in the submission 
process, discussed further below.
2. Sections 37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2)--Listing Requirement
    The FNPRM requested comment on (1) whether the Commission should 
allow a SEF or DCM to submit an available-to-trade determination for a 
swap under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and 38.12(a) if the SEF or DCM 
making the submission does not itself list that swap for trading; and 
(2) if so, whether the Commission would allow that SEF or DCM to 
consider the same swap or an economically equivalent swap that trades 
on another SEF, DCM, or primarily or solely in bilateral 
transactions.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ 76 FR 77733.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    Several commenters recommended that a SEF or DCM must list the swap 
that it submits for an available-to-trade determination.\62\ For 
example, Spring Trading and SIFMA AMG recommended that a SEF or DCM 
must list a swap for at least 90 days before submitting its 
determination.\63\ ISDA recommended that a SEF or DCM must list the 
swap during the 6-month period that it proposed for Commission review 
of the available-to-trade determination.\64\ ISDA noted that the lack 
of a listing requirement would incentivize SEFs and DCMs to try to 
submit as many determinations as possible merely to promote centralized 
trading.\65\ According to some commenters, the Commission or the 
trading facility could evaluate the data gathered \66\ and obtain 
experience \67\ during the listing period to determine whether the swap 
should be made available to trade. SDMA, however, recommended that a 
SEF or DCM should be allowed to submit a determination for a swap that 
it does not list.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 3; SIFMA AMG 
Comment Letter at 10; UBS Comment Letter at 2; Morgan Stanley 
Comment Letter at 6 n.6; ISDA Comment Letter at 7; Tradeweb Comment 
Letter at 5.
    \63\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 10; Spring Trading Comment 
Letter at 3 (Jan. 12, 2012).
    \64\ ISDA Comment Letter at 7. ISDA proposed eliminating the 
proposed Sec.  40.6 certification process and stated that the 
Commission should establish a minimum 6-month review period for 
determinations submitted by a SEF or DCM.
    \65\ ISDA Comment Letter at 6.
    \66\ ISDA Comment Letter at 7; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 10; 
Spring Trading Comment Letter at 3.
    \67\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5; UBS Comment Letter at 2; 
Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 6 n.6.
    \68\ SDMA Comment Letter at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission agrees with commenters who support a listing 
requirement and is amending the proposed rule text to adopt new 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2), which requires a SEF or DCM to 
certify that it is listing the swap for which it submits an available-
to-trade determination.\69\ The Commission believes that an initial 
determination that a swap is available to trade should be made by a SEF 
or a DCM that offers the swap for trading.\70\

[[Page 33611]]

The Commission, however, is not adopting a minimum listing period so as 
to avoid delaying the determination process, and hence implementation 
of the trade execution requirement as discussed below. The Commission 
also notes, as discussed further below, that a SEF or DCM is allowed to 
consider activity in the same swap listed on another SEF or DCM as well 
as the amount of off-exchange activity in the same swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ The Commission notes that such swap would be certified or 
approved under Sec.  40.2 or Sec.  40.3 of the Commission's 
regulations prior to listing the swap for trading.
    \70\ Bloomberg requested that a SEF submitting an available-to-
trade determination for a particular swap would be able to 
incorporate by reference, in its submission, information and 
analysis already completed by a DCO and the Commission as part of 
the mandatory clearing determination process with respect to that 
swap. Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4-5. In response to Bloomberg's 
request, the Commission views the part 40 process as flexible and 
would allow relevant information from a clearing determination to be 
referenced in an available-to-trade submission. The Commission, 
however, emphasizes that such information leading to an affirmative 
clearing determination would not automatically indicate that a swap 
is available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Submission of a Group, Category, Type or Class of Swaps
    The FNPRM requested comment on (1) whether the Commission should 
allow a SEF or DCM to submit its available-to-trade determination for a 
``group, category, type or class of swaps'' based on the factors 
proposed in Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b) of the FNPRM; and (2) how 
``group, category, type or class of swaps'' should be defined.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ 76 FR 77733.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    Some commenters stated that the Commission should allow SEFs and 
DCMs to submit determinations for a group, category, type, or class of 
swap.\72\ In defining ``group, category, type, or class'' of swap, AIMA 
stated that the Commission should take into account specific 
characteristics of certain swaps to avoid subjecting certain illiquid 
swaps to mandatory trade execution.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Spring Trading Comment Letter at 5 (Jan. 12, 2012); AIMA 
Comment Letter at 2; SDMA Comment Letter at 7; AFR Comment Letter at 
2 (inferring that mandatory trade execution should be determined for 
a ``class'' of swaps).
    \73\ AIMA Comment Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters, however, expressed concern about making 
determinations based on group, category, type or class of swap.\74\ 
SIFMA AMG and CEWG commented that swaps within a potential ``group'' 
may feature different liquidity and trading patterns,\75\ while Markit 
and ISDA stated that liquidity may differ significantly even among 
different tenors of a given swap.\76\ ISDA and Morgan Stanley also 
highlighted the difficulty at the outset of defining ``group, category, 
type or class of swap.'' \77\ Markit stated that determinations should 
be allowed for individual swaps and then applied to ``buckets'' of 
maturities and tenors.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Markit Comment Letter at 2-3; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 
11; CEWG Comment Letter at 3-4; ISDA Comment Letter at 10; UBS 
Comment Letter at 2; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 9.
    \75\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11; CEWG Comment Letter at 4. 
With respect to energy commodities, CEWG provided Henry Financial 
LD1 Fixed Swap, Henry Financial LD4 Fixed Swap, and ICE's Physical 
Basis LD1, which differ in contract size and term, as examples of 
swaps within a potential group or class that each possess different 
liquidity characteristics, thereby warranting individual 
determinations. SIFMA AMG also noted that the liquidity of interest 
rate swaps differs significantly depending on time to maturity.
    \76\ Markit Comment letter at 2; ISDA Comment Letter at 11. ISDA 
offered the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's analysis of trade 
data as a demonstration of varying trading volumes for different 
tenors of credit default swaps.
    \77\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 9.
    \78\ Markit Comment Letter at 2. Markit defines ``buckets'' as 
groups of maturities and tenors for a given swap that have similar 
liquidity measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission is allowing SEFs and DCMs to submit determinations 
for a group, category, type or class of swap to provide greater 
efficiency to the available-to-trade determination process. To address 
commenters' concerns that swaps within a group, category, type or class 
may have different liquidity and trading characteristics, a SEF or DCM 
must address, in its submission, the applicable determination factor or 
factors apply to all of the swaps within that group, category, type or 
class. Further, a SEF and DCM will be allowed to define the scope of 
the group, category, type or class of swap that it determines is 
available to trade.\79\ To the extent that a SEF or DCM possesses 
flexibility to define that scope, however, the Commission still may 
approve or deem only part or some of the swaps within that group, 
category, type or class as available to trade, based on its review.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ The Commission notes that for clearing determinations under 
Sec.  39.5, it may define a particular group, category, type or 
class of swaps for purposes of a clearing determination based on 
several considerations. 76 FR 44468. To the extent that such a 
determination is informative as to whether a proposed group, 
category, type or class of swap that is defined by a SEF or DCM is 
available to trade, the Commission may take those considerations 
into account. For example, a SEF or a DCM could define a group, 
category, type or class of interest rate swaps based on 
characteristics that include the nature of the payments streams 
(e.g., fixed-to-floating, floating-to-floating, forward rate 
agreement (FRA), or overnight indexed swap (OIS)); currency (e.g., 
U.S. dollar, euro, British pound, Japanese yen); floating rate index 
referenced (e.g., LIBOR, EURIBOR); and stated termination date 
(e.g., 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, 10-year).
    \80\ Where the Commission does not approve or deem all of the 
swaps within a group, category, type or class submitted by a SEF or 
DCM as available to trade, DMO would notify the SEF or DCM of such 
an action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Consideration of Swaps on Another SEF or DCM, or Bilateral 
Transactions
    The FNPRM requested comment on whether the Commission should allow 
a SEF or DCM, in evaluating the factors under proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.10(b) and 38.12(b), to consider (1) the same swap or an economically 
equivalent swap on another SEF or DCM; and (2) the amount of activity 
in the same swap or an economically equivalent swap available primarily 
or solely in bilateral transactions.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ 76 FR 77733.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    Several commenters stated that a SEF or DCM should be able to 
consider relevant swap activity on other SEFs and DCMs when making an 
available-to-trade determination.\82\ Vanguard commented that 
determining whether a ``meaningful'' portion of trading in the swap 
occurs on a SEF or DCM is important in determining that a swap is 
available to trade.\83\ SIFMA AMG stated that the existence of a liquid 
trading environment on SEFs and DCMs could indicate that a swap could 
be made available to trade without harm to liquidity.\84\ FXall stated 
that determinations should be based on a swap's marketwide trading 
patterns, so as to avoid unintended effects on liquidity.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ MFA Comment Letter at 3; Spring Trading Comment Letter at 6 
(Jan. 12, 2012); Markit Comment Letter at 3 (discussing importance 
of marketwide data); Vanguard Comment Letter at 5; SIFMA AMG Comment 
Letter at 6; AIMA Comment Letter at 2; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter 
at 6 n.6; FXall Comment Letter at 6 n.18; CBOE Comment Letter at 3.
    \83\ Vanguard Comment Letter at 5.
    \84\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 6.
    \85\ FXall Comment Letter at 6 n.18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also stated that a SEF or DCM should be able to 
consider swaps executed on a bilateral basis.\86\ CBOE stated that 
considering a swap's trading activity only on a SEF or DCM would 
otherwise incentivize market participants to minimize centralized 
trading in order to limit the number of swaps made available to 
trade.\87\ SIFMA AMG stated that examining the bilateral market could 
reveal a liquid trading environment, but could then raise questions as 
to whether a swap should be made available to trade.\88\ MFA and 
Vanguard recommended that the Commission utilize data for on- and off-

[[Page 33612]]

exchange trading to make the available-to-trade process more 
objective.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ MFA Comment Letter at 3; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 6; 
Markit Comment Letter at 3; FXall Comment Letter at 6; Vanguard 
Comment Letter at 5; Spring Trading Comment Letter (Jan. 12, 2012) 
at 6; CBOE Comment Letter at 3; AIMA Comment Letter at 2; Morgan 
Stanley Comment Letter at 6; SDMA Comment Letter at 7.
    \87\ CBOE Comment Letter at 3.
    \88\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 6.
    \89\ MFA Comment Letter at 3; Vanguard Comment Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission will allow a SEF or DCM to consider activity in the 
same swap listed on another SEF or DCM and the amount of off-exchange 
activity in the same swap when determining whether a swap is available 
to trade. The Commission agrees with commenters that since the 
available-to-trade determination applies marketwide, a SEF or DCM 
should be able to consider activity on other SEFs and DCMs, as well as 
activity that takes place off-exchange, to the extent that such 
information becomes available. Information about trading activity in 
the entire swaps marketplace would better inform market participants 
about how the swap trades in the overall market and provide interested 
parties with additional information and analysis to comment upon. More 
comprehensive information would also better inform the Commission in 
its evaluation of the available-to-trade submission. The Commission 
also believes that consideration of off-exchange trading could provide 
additional data and insight about a swap's trading patterns, e.g., 
trading volume or numbers and types of market participants, that would 
help a SEF or a DCM address one or more of the determination factors 
under Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b).

B. Sections 37.10(b) and 38.12(b)--Factors To Consider To Make a Swap 
Available To Trade

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b) required a SEF or DCM to 
consider, as appropriate, the following factors with respect to a swap 
that it determines is available to trade: (1) Whether there are ready 
and willing buyers and sellers; (2) the frequency or size of 
transactions on SEFs, DCMs, or of bilateral transactions; (3) the 
trading volume on SEFs, DCMs, or of bilateral transactions; (4) the 
number and types of market participants; (5) the bid/ask spread; (6) 
the usual number of resting firm or indicative bids and offers; (7) 
whether a SEF's trading system or platform or a DCM's trading facility 
will support trading in the swap; or (8) any other factor that the SEF 
or DCM may consider relevant.\90\ Under the proposed rule, no single 
factor would be dispositive, as the DCM or SEF could consider any one 
factor or any combination of factors in its determination that a swap 
is available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ As noted above, the Commission believes that the mere 
listing or offering for trading of a swap on a DCM or SEF does not 
mean that the swap is available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    Commenters expressed general support for the first seven proposed 
factors.\91\ Some commenters stated, however, that SEFs and DCMs should 
be required to consider specific factors.\92\ Some commenters also 
offered additional factors to consider, such as the ability to 
establish connectivity with new market participants without imposing 
undue burden; \93\ the level of pre-trade transparency in the existing 
market; \94\ and market depth and market breadth.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ MFA Comment Letter at 2; Markit Comment Letter at 3; 
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 3 (proposing a pilot program based on the 
proposed factors); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4; ICI Comment Letter 
at 4-5; Vanguard Comment Letter at 4; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5; 
Geneva Energy Markets Comment Letter at 2; Spring Trading Comment 
Letter at 4 (Jan. 12, 2012); AIMA Comment Letter at 1; CME Comment 
Letter at 6; FHLB Comment Letter at 4.
    \92\ For example, ISDA recommended that whether a SEF lists and 
supports trading in a swap should be a prerequisite. ISDA Comment 
Letter at 8. FSR emphasized that broad market participation must be 
shown. FSR Comment Letter at 7. Some commenters requested that SEFs 
and DCMs be required to consider both the size and frequency of swap 
transactions on SEFs, DCMs, and in bilateral transactions. AIMA 
Comment Letter at 2; ICI Comment Letter at 5 n.13; SIFMA AMG Comment 
Letter at 6.
    \93\ FSR Comment Letter at 4.
    \94\ Geneva Energy Markets Comment Letter at 2.
    \95\ SDMA Comment Letter at 7. According to SDMA, a market depth 
test consists of calculating the sum of available bids and offers at 
or near the current price for a swap at a particular time, while a 
market breadth test consists of calculating the sum of market depth 
for a particular swap or class of swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters opposed the proposed factors.\96\ In particular, 
several commenters objected to the use of ``any other factor'' in a 
determination.\97\ Eaton Vance Management and ISDA, for example, 
considered ``any other factor'' to be too broad and subjective and 
thought that it would incentivize SEFs and DCMs to make illiquid swaps 
available to trade.\98\ ICI stated that the Commission would 
effectively delegate its authority to establish available-to-trade 
standards by allowing a SEF or DCM to use this factor alone.\99\ CEWG 
similarly stated that use of non-enumerated factors by a SEF or DCM 
would create ``uncertainty and variability'' in the process.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ For example, SDMA considered the factors to be duplicative 
of the mandatory clearing determination factors set forth in section 
2(h)(2)(D) of the CEA, and therefore burdensome and costly. SDMA 
Comment Letter at 5.
    \97\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 2; ISDA Comment 
Letter at 8; ICI Comment Letter at 5; CEWG Comment Letter at 3.
    \98\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 2; ISDA Comment 
Letter at 8.
    \99\ ICI Comment Letter at 5.
    \100\ CEWG Comment Letter at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also objected to allowing a SEF or DCM to make an 
available-to-trade determination based on any one proposed factor and 
some recommended that SEFs and DCMs be required to consider all of the 
factors.\101\ Vanguard and SIFMA AMG asserted that all of the factors 
are relevant \102\ and that consideration of all factors would be 
consistent with the mandatory clearing determination process.\103\ 
CBOE, however, contended that required consideration of all the factors 
would frustrate Congress's intent for greater transparency, 
competition, and oversight of the swaps market.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ FHLB Comment Letter at 3; CEWG Comment Letter at 3; Eaton 
Vance Management Comment Letter at 3 (adopting ICI's 
recommendation); ICI Comment Letter at 2, 5; Vanguard Comment Letter 
at 4; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5; 
Chatham Comment Letter at 3; AIMA Comment Letter at 2. Markit stated 
that this approach would grant ``unfettered discretion'' to SEFs and 
DCMs to disregard a swap's actual liquidity, Markit Comment Letter 
at 3. MarketAxess stated that the Commission would lack any basis to 
reject a determination. MarketAxess Comment Letter at 8.
    \102\ Vanguard Comment Letter at 4; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 
5.
    \103\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5.
    \104\ CBOE Comment Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters requested that the Commission set objective 
threshold criteria for the proposed factors.\105\ Commenters stated 
that without objective criteria, a SEF or DCM would otherwise have 
unlimited discretion \106\ to act in its financial self-interest \107\ 
by determining that a swap is available to trade. Some commenters, 
however, acknowledged the difficulty of developing objective liquidity 
measurements.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Markit Comment Letter at 3; Spring Trading Comment Letter 
at 4; AIMA Comment Letter at 4; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4; FXall 
Comment Letter at 6; Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 3; ICI 
Comment Letter at 5-6; FSR Comment Letter at 3, 6-7. Some commenters 
recommended that the swap must (1) trade a minimum number of times 
each day; (2) feature a minimum number of market participants 
trading it; and (3) meet an overall notional trading volume over a 
set period of time. Vanguard Comment Letter at 5; ISDA Comment 
Letter at 7; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5, 7. Morgan Stanley 
recommended that the swap must (1) have resting bids and offers on 
the applicable SEF or DCM for at least half of the relevant trading 
hours for the 90-day period prior to a determination; and (2) have 
been traded an average of at least 5 times per day during the same 
period. Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 4, 6. JPMorgan recommended 
that the swap must show an actual level of liquidity on the 
applicable DCM or SEF during a sample period of at least 180 days 
prior to the submission. JPMorgan Comment Letter at 1.
    \106\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 4.
    \107\ FSR Comment Letter at 3; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 
5; ICI Comment Letter at 6.
    \108\ ICI Comment Letter at 6; Markit Comment Letter at 3; SIFMA 
AMG Comment Letter at 5-6.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 33613]]

    Some commenters recommended imposing additional requirements on 
SEFs and DCMs with respect to considering the proposed factors. For 
example, SIFMA AMG recommended that a SEF or DCM must provide detailed 
reasoning and supporting evidence for the factors that it has 
considered.\109\ CEWG recommended that a SEF or DCM should provide an 
explanation to the Commission, subject to public comment, when it 
believes that certain factors do not apply.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 2.
    \110\ CEWG Comment Letter at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission is adopting the rule as proposed under final 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b), subject to two modifications and 
minor technical corrections. The Commission acknowledges commenters' 
concerns regarding the consideration of ``any other factor'' and thus 
is removing that factor from the final rule. The Commission believes 
that removing this factor will provide market participants with a more 
precise set of factors from which a swap may be made available to 
trade, thereby improving clarity, lessening uncertainty regarding how a 
determination may be made, and promoting a more consistent 
determination process. Further, given the adoption of a listing 
requirement, the Commission is removing an additional factor--whether a 
SEF's or DCM's trading facility or platform will support trading in the 
swap. This factor contemplated, among other things, whether the SEF or 
DCM lists the swap for trading on its trading facility or platform. 
Therefore, in light of the listing requirement, this factor is 
redundant.
    As discussed above, the Commission has determined in this final 
rule that a SEF or DCM may consider activity in the same swap listed on 
another SEF or DCM and the amount of off-exchange activity in the same 
swap.\111\ Therefore, the Commission is amending the second and third 
determination factors in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(b)(2) and (3) and 
38.12(b)(2) and (3) to remove duplicative language related to this 
matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ See supra Section II.A.4--Consideration of Swaps on 
Another SEF or DCM, or Bilateral Transactions for the Commission's 
discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the remaining enumerated factors 
provide a sufficient framework from which SEFs, DCMs, the Commission 
and market participants may evaluate whether a swap is subject to the 
trade execution requirement. While each of the enumerated factors is an 
indicator of trading activity and may be relevant in a determination, 
the Commission believes that no single factor must always be 
considered, nor must a SEF or DCM consider more than one factor in a 
determination. Therefore, the Commission believes that satisfying any 
one of the determination factors would sufficiently indicate that the 
contract is available to trade. By adopting a more flexible approach, 
SEFs and DCMs will be able to accommodate swaps with different trading 
characteristics that can be supported in a centralized trading 
environment. The Commission does not believe that it is necessary for a 
SEF or DCM to analyze and demonstrate compliance with every factor in a 
submission.
    In response to SIFMA AMG's recommendation that a SEF or DCM should 
be required to provide detailed reasoning and supporting evidence for 
the factors considered, the Commission notes that Sec. Sec.  40.5(a)(5) 
and 40.6(a)(7) each requires submissions to contain an explanation and 
analysis of the determination, including the factors considered and its 
compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations. The Commission 
expects such an explanation and analysis to be clear and informative as 
to how the factor or factors apply to the swap.
    The Commission declines to adopt additional factors in the final 
rule as suggested by several commenters. The Commission believes that 
the enumerated factors provide a sufficient framework to allow: (1) A 
SEF or DCM to consider whether a swap should be subject to the trade 
execution requirement; (2) market participants to evaluate a 
determination and provide public comment; and (3) the Commission to 
evaluate a SEF's or DCM's determination that a swap is available to 
trade. Further, the Commission believes that the enumerated factors are 
broad in nature and incorporate many of the concepts recommended by 
commenters.
    The Commission acknowledges commenters' request for establishing 
objective criteria associated with the factors and reiterates the view 
expressed in the FNPRM that as centralized trading develops and the 
Commission gains experience in oversight of swap markets, the 
Commission could then consider adopting objective criteria in a future 
rulemaking based upon an empirical analysis of swap trading data.

C. Sections 37.10(c) and 38.12(c)--Applicability

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(c)(1) and 38.12(c)(1) required that upon 
the Commission deeming that a swap is available to trade based on a SEF 
or DCM submission, all other SEFs and DCMs listing or offering for 
trading such swap and/or any economically equivalent swap must make 
those swaps available to trade for purposes of the trade execution 
requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA. The Commission defined 
``economically equivalent swap'' under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(c)(2) 
and 38.12(c)(2) as a swap that the SEF or DCM determines to be 
economically equivalent with another swap after consideration of each 
swap's material pricing terms. The Commission also noted that if a DCM 
or SEF makes a swap available to trade, then the proposed rule would 
not require other DCMs and SEFs to list or offer that swap, or an 
economically equivalent swap, for trading.
Summary of Comments
    Some commenters expressed general support for the economic 
equivalence requirement because it would enforce marketwide compliance 
with the trade execution requirement,\112\ increase liquidity, and 
promote a more efficient available-to-trade process by allowing SEFs 
and DCMs to rely on existing determinations.\113\ Many commenters, 
however, viewed the proposed definition of ``economically equivalent 
swap'' as excessively broad \114\ and vague.\115\ Some commenters 
stated that the proposed definition would create uncertainty about 
which swaps are available to trade.\116\ Other commenters stated that 
the vagueness of the proposed definition would allow SEFs and DCMs to 
subject more swaps to mandatory trade execution,\117\ thereby allowing 
illiquid swaps to be available to trade.\118\ In addition, MarketAxess 
and CEWG commented that the proposed requirement is not prescribed

[[Page 33614]]

by statute.\119\ Morgan Stanley and AIMA stated that the concept itself 
is inherently ``elusive and subjective.'' \120\ Other commenters 
thought that the process would create uncertainty as to which swaps are 
subject to mandatory trade execution.\121\ SIFMA AMG stated that swaps 
with slightly different characteristics, e.g., time to maturity, could 
differ in the requisite liquidity, yet both be determined to be 
available to trade based on economic equivalence.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5.
    \113\ SDMA Comment Letter at 7.
    \114\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 3; CEWG Comment 
Letter at 5; Chatham Comment Letter at 4.
    \115\ FXall Comment Letter at 7; ICI Comment Letter at 8; ISDA 
Comment Letter at 9; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 8-9; Spring 
Trading Comment Letter at 1 (Feb. 13, 2012); UBS Comment Letter at 
2; Chatham Comment Letter at 4-5.
    \116\ MFA Comment Letter at 5; ICI Comment Letter at 8; AIMA 
Comment Letter at 3.
    \117\ MFA Comment Letter at 5; FXall Comment Letter at 7; ICI 
Comment Letter at 8; FHLB Comment Letter at 3; Morgan Stanley 
Comment Letter at 8; CEWG Comment Letter at 5-6; SIFMA AMG Comment 
Letter at 9; ISDA Comment Letter at 9; AIMA Comment Letter at 4; 
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 8-9.
    \118\ CEWG Comment Letter at 5; FXall Comment Letter at 7; 
JPMorgan Comment Letter at 3; Chatham Comment Letter at 4.
    \119\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 9; CEWG Comment Letter at 5.
    \120\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 8; AIMA Comment Letter at 
3 (based on the multitude of factors that affect the economic terms 
of a swap).
    \121\ AIMA Comment Letter at 3; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 
8; ICI Comment Letter at 8; MFA Comment Letter at 5; SIFMA AMG 
Comment Letter at 10; ISDA Comment Letter at 9; Sunguard Kiodex 
Comment Letter at 2; FXall Comment Letter at 7.
    \122\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9. Several other commenters, 
though not all in support of eliminating the proposed requirement, 
also acknowledged that two otherwise identical swaps would also 
possess different liquidity characteristics if cleared at different 
clearinghouses. FSR Comment Letter at 3; Morgan Stanley Comment 
Letter at 9; Spring Trading Comment Letter at 2 (Feb. 13, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To prevent evasion of the trade execution requirement through 
slight modification of a swap's terms, some commenters recommended that 
the Commission should rely on its anti-evasion authority under section 
6(e) of the CEA.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 10; CEWG Comment Letter at 5; 
ISDA Comment Letter at 9; AIMA Comment Letter at 4; Morgan Stanley 
Comment Letter at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    At this time, the Commission is adopting the rule as proposed with 
certain modifications under a new subsection titled, ``Applicability,'' 
for SEFs or DCMs that list or offer the same swap for trading. The 
Commission, however, is not adopting the proposed definition of 
economically equivalent swaps. The Commission intended the economic 
equivalence requirement as a means to avoid knowing or reckless evasion 
of the trade execution requirement, which could potentially occur if a 
SEF or DCM, acting in concert with a market participant, lists and 
allows trading of swaps with slightly amended terms to a swap 
previously determined to be available to trade. Given that the factors 
that could be considered may vary across different asset classes and 
products, the Commission recognizes the complexity of determining 
economic equivalence between swaps. Further, based on the comments 
received, the Commission has determined that it is not feasible, for 
purposes of determining which swaps are available to trade, to define 
``economic equivalent'' with sufficient precision and clarity.
    The Commission is also amending the rule text to clarify that once 
a swap is determined to be available to trade under part 40 of the 
Commission's regulations (i.e., the Commission approves a SEF's or 
DCM's available-to-trade submission under Sec.  40.5 or the submission 
is deemed as certified under Sec.  40.6), then all other SEFs and DCMs 
that choose to list or offer the swap for trading must do so in 
accordance with the trade execution requirement.\124\ Subsequent SEFs 
and DCMs will not be required to submit separate available-to-trade 
determinations to the Commission for a particular swap after it has 
been determined to be available to trade. Importantly, no SEF or DCM is 
required to list or offer a swap for trading even if another SEF or DCM 
has determined it is available to trade. Once a swap is available for 
trade for purposes of section 2(h)(8), however, that swap may only be 
executed on a SEF or DCM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See supra note 14 for a discussion of the methods by which 
swaps that are subject to the trade execution requirement must be 
executed on a SEF or DCM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters who recommended that the Commission rely 
on its existing anti-evasion authority, the Commission notes that its 
anti-evasion authority as constituted under section 6(e) of the CEA 
would not apply to SEFs and DCMs.\125\ Section 6(e)(5), however, would 
apply to the actions of certain market participants--swap dealers and 
major swap participants in particular--that are carried out to evade 
the trade execution requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ Section 6(e)(5) of the CEA, as amended by section 
741(b)(11) of the Dodd-Frank Act, prescribes that ``[a]ny swap 
dealer or major swap participant that knowing or recklessly evades 
or participates in or facilitates evasion of the requirements of 
section 2(h) [of the CEA] shall be liable . . .'' (emphasis added). 
7 U.S.C. 9a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Sections 37.10(d) and 38.12(d)--Removal

    The proposed rule requested comment on (1) whether the Commission 
should specify a process where a swap may be determined to be no longer 
available to trade; and (2) if so, whether the part 40 processes should 
be used for this process. The proposed rule also requested comment on 
whether such a determination should apply only to the SEF or DCM that 
seeks to make the swap no longer available to trade.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ 76 FR 77734.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    Several commenters responded to the Commission's request for 
comments related to whether the Commission should specify a process 
whereby a swap that has been determined to be available to trade may no 
longer be available to trade. Several commenters supported the 
development of a process under which a swap could be determined to be 
no longer available to trade for the purposes of the trade execution 
requirement. Commenters recommended that the Commission retain the 
authority to make such a determination \127\ based on the Commission's 
access to data demonstrating a swap's overall liquidity \128\ and the 
desire to prevent a SEF or DCM from making conflicting determinations 
with respect to the same swap.\129\ ISDA, however, recommended that 
market participants should be able to submit to the Commission that a 
swap is no longer available to trade because they would have experience 
and relevant knowledge of market trends and changes.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ MFA Comment Letter at 4; FXall Comment Letter at 7-8; ICI 
Comment Letter at 7; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11-12; Spring 
Trading Comment Letter at 7 (Jan. 12, 2012); ISDA Comment Letter at 
8-9; JPMorgan Comment Letter at 2.
    \128\ ISDA Comment Letter at 8-9; MFA Comment Letter at 4.
    \129\ FXall Comment Letter at 8; MFA Comment Letter at 4.
    \130\ ISDA Comment Letter at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters recommended use of the same factors as those used 
when making a determination that a swap is available to trade, albeit 
with objective thresholds.\131\ FXall asserted that using objective 
criteria would render the removal process ``transparent and 
impartial.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ MFA Comment Letter at 4; ICI Comment Letter at 7-8; FXall 
Comment Letter at 7-8.
    \132\ FXall Comment Letter at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters recommended that a determination that a swap is no 
longer available to trade should be subject to public notice and 
comment.\133\ Accordingly, ICI recommended against using the procedures 
under Sec. Sec.  40.5 and 40.6 because they lack adequate opportunity 
for public comment.\134\ MFA also recommended that the Commission 
provide public notice after a swap is determined to be no longer 
available to trade.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ FXall Comment Letter at 8; ICI Comment Letter at 7; Spring 
Trading Comment Letter at 7.
    \134\ ICI Comment Letter at 7.
    \135\ MFA Comment Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters stated that a determination that a swap is no 
longer available to trade should only apply to the petitioning SEF or 
DCM.\136\ Spring Trading and SDMA stated that to apply the 
determination on a marketwide

[[Page 33615]]

basis would otherwise unfairly penalize other non-petitioning SEFs or 
DCMs.\137\ ICI and MFA, however, stated that the determination should 
apply to all SEFs and DCMs that list or offer the swap for 
trading.\138\ ICI stated that applying the determination to only one 
SEF or DCM would be inconsistent with the trade execution 
requirement.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ Spring Trading Comment Letter at 7-8 (Jan. 12, 2012); SDMA 
Comment Letter at 10.
    \137\ Id.
    \138\ MFA Comment Letter at 4-5; ICI Comment Letter at 8.
    \139\ ICI Comment Letter at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission is not adopting a separate process for a SEF or DCM 
to submit a determination that a swap is no longer available to trade. 
Rather, the Commission believes that where all SEFs and DCMs that had 
listed a swap for trading, including the SEF or DCM that submitted the 
initial available-to-trade determination under part 40, no longer list 
that swap for trading on their respective facility or platform, (i.e., 
all such SEFs and DCMs have ``de-listed'' the swap),\140\ then the 
Commission would deem the swap to be no longer available to trade. In 
such a case, trading in the swap would no longer be subject to the 
trade execution requirement. The Commission believes that this approach 
is consistent with section 2(h)(8) of the CEA, which states a swap 
would otherwise not be subject to the trade execution requirement if, 
among other things, no SEF or DCM makes it available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ In some instances, a swap that is available to trade 
potentially should no longer be subject to the trade execution 
requirement, but not all SEFs and DCMs have de-listed the swap. In 
such a case, the Commission may choose to review the available-to-
trade status of such a swap, under Sec.  40.2(b) or Sec.  
40.3(a)(10) of the Commission's regulations, which authorizes 
Commission staff to request, on an ongoing basis, additional 
information, evidence, or data that meets the requirements of the 
CEA or the Commission's regulations or policies thereunder. Further, 
market participants may request that the Commission, under section 
8a(7) of the CEA, designate a swap to be no longer available to 
trade. Under section 8a(7), the Commission could initiate a 
proceeding to amend a SEF or DCM's available-to-trade designation of 
a swap if such a change is necessary for . . . the protection of 
traders'' with respect to ``other trading requirements.'' First, 
however, the Commission must request in writing that the change be 
made and provide for appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing. 
The Commission, however, acknowledges that the section 8a(7) process 
is complex and emphasizes that the process should only be invoked 
where a swap clearly should not remain available to trade, but a SEF 
or DCM has declined a request to initiate a new assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where all SEFs and DCMs no longer list that swap for trading--
denoting that open interest in that swap does not exist on any facility 
or platform \141\--the Commission would deem the swap as no longer 
available to trade because that swap would no longer meet any of the 
determination factors. The Commission, which will maintain and update a 
list of the SEFs and DCMs that list those available-to-trade swaps, 
will have access to the information and the ability to make the 
determination, without requiring a separate process. In response to 
FXall, the Commission believes that this approach would be transparent 
and impartial. In response to MFA's recommendation, the Commission will 
inform the public that a swap is no longer available to trade via 
notice pursuant to new Sec. Sec.  37.10(d) and 38.12(d) (``Removal''). 
The Commission is also delegating authority to the Director of the 
Division of Market Oversight to issue notice in this instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ Under Sec.  40.6(a) of the Commission's regulations, the 
Commission would receive notice that a SEF or DCM has de-listed a 
swap through a submission, submitted in compliance with Sec. Sec.  
40.6(a)(1) and (2) and 40.6(a)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Annual Review

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.10(d) and 38.12(d) required that a SEF or 
DCM perform an annual review and assessment of each swap that it has 
made available to trade. The proposed rule envisioned that an annual 
review would ensure that SEFs and DCMs evaluate on a regular basis 
whether swaps previously determined to be available to trade should 
continue to be ``available to trade'' for the purposes of the trade 
execution requirement. In the annual review and assessment, SEFs and 
DCMs would be required to consider the proposed factors in Sec. Sec.  
37.10(b) and 38.12(b), respectively. Upon completion of the annual 
review, a SEF or DCM would be required to provide the Commission with 
an electronic report of the review and assessment, including any 
supporting information or data, no later than 30 days after its fiscal 
year end. The proposed rule requested comment on whether SEFs and DCMs 
should conduct the review and assessment.
Summary of Comments
    Several commenters supported the proposed annual review 
requirement.\142\ Tradeweb, however, requested that the Commission 
clarify the effect of the proposed annual review process.\143\ Some 
commenters stated that additional reviews were necessary because swaps 
could become illiquid between scheduled annual reviews, yet still be 
subject to the trade execution requirement. Thus, they recommended more 
frequent reviews, such as on a quarterly basis.\144\ Several 
commenters, however, stated that the Commission, rather than SEFs, 
should conduct the review and assessment for similar reasons as those 
offered in support of allowing the Commission to exclusively determine 
whether a swap is available to trade.\145\ CME, for example, 
recommended that the Commission conduct the review by obtaining data 
from SDRs in order to minimize overall costs.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5; CME Comment Letter at 7; 
Spring Trading Comment Letter at 7 (Jan. 12, 2012).
    \143\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5.
    \144\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 8; MFA Comment Letter at 
4-5; ISDA Comment Letter at 8; AIMA Comment Letter at 2-3; Eaton 
Vance Management Comment Letter at 4; ICI Comment Letter at 7; 
Markit Comment Letter at 4; Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; JPMorgan 
Comment Letter at 2; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11; FSR Comment 
Letter at 3-4.
    \145\ Markit Comment Letter at 4; MFA Comment Letter at 4; 
Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11. CME 
recommended that the Commission conduct the review of all existing 
available-to-trade determinations within 30 days of December 31 of 
each year to minimize costs and administrative burdens. For 
determinations submitted after June 30 of a given year, the annual 
review would occur within 30 days of December 31 of the following 
year. CME Comment Letter at 7.
    \146\ CME Comment Letter at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters further recommended that market participants have 
the opportunity to participate in the process. Tradeweb recommended 
that reviews and assessments be subject to public comment because of 
their market impact.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters opposed the proposed requirement. WMBAA stated 
that an annual review and assessment would be arbitrary, time-
consuming, and offers insufficient regulatory value.\148\ Sunguard 
Kiodex asserted that periodic reviews would cause swaps' available-to-
trade status to fluctuate, therefore negating the benefit of an initial 
determination.\149\ WMBAA and SDMA recommended that a SEF or DCM be 
able to rely solely on the clearing determination review instead and 
annually renew its self-certification without submitting a report.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 4.
    \149\ Sunguard Kiodex Comment Letter at 2.
    \150\ SDMA Comment Letter at 10; WMBAA Comment Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the factors to be considered in an annual review, 
some commenters supported use of the proposed determination factors in 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b).\151\ Eaton Vance Management 
recommended that a SEF or DCM must affirmatively report each factor 
that a swap meets to continue to

[[Page 33616]]

be available to trade.\152\ Other commenters stated that the Commission 
should establish objective review and assessment criteria.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Spring Trading Comment Letter at 7 (Jan. 12, 2012); Eaton 
Vance Management Comment Letter at 4; Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5; 
SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11; MFA Comment Letter at 4; Markit 
Comment Letter at 4.
    \152\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 4.
    \153\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11; MFA Comment Letter at 4; 
Markit Comment Letter at 4; AIMA Comment Letter at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ICI and Eaton Vance Management requested that the electronic 
reports to be submitted to the Commission also be made available to the 
public.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ ICI Comment Letter at 7; Eaton Vance Management Comment 
Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission is not adopting the proposed annual review 
requirement. The Commission intended the requirement to ensure that a 
SEF or DCM would regularly evaluate trading for the swaps that it has 
determined to be available to trade for purposes of the trade execution 
requirement. Based on the approach adopted for determining that a swap 
is no longer available to trade, however, the Commission believes that 
requiring SEFs and DCMs to submit a review or assessment is not 
necessary. A SEF or DCM will likely review, on an ongoing basis, 
whether swaps listed or offered for trading on its system or platform 
should continue to be listed or offered for trading. Such a review 
would likely consider one or more factors that are similar to those 
that can be used to determine if a swap is available to trade. Further, 
if the Commission believes that a review of a swap's available-to-trade 
status is warranted, then it may request that SEFs and DCMs submit 
relevant information to conduct that review under Sec. Sec.  40.2(b) 
and 40.3(a)(10) of the Commission's regulations, respectively.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See supra note 140. Under 17 CFR 40.2(b) and 40.3(a)(10), 
when requested by Commission staff, a SEF or DCM is required to 
submit additional evidence, information, or data that demonstrates 
that a swap listed for trading meets the CEA's requirements or the 
Commission's regulations. Under Sec. Sec.  37.5 and 38.5 of the 
Commission's regulations, respectively, the Commission may also 
request a SEF or DCM to file information related to its business as 
a SEF or DCM, including trading information, in a particular form, 
manner, and time as specified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Notice to the Public of Available To Trade Determinations

    The Commission noted in the FNPRM that Sec. Sec.  40.5 and 40.6 
provide a process for notifying the public that a SEF or DCM has made 
an available-to-trade determination--SEFs and DCMs are required to post 
a notice and a copy of the rule submission on their respective Web 
sites concurrent with their filings at the Commission. The Commission 
stated that it would also post the filings on its Web site. The 
Commission also stated that it would assess the feasibility of posting 
notices of all swaps that are determined to be available to trade on an 
easily accessible page on its Web site. Commenters supported the 
proposal to provide notice to market participants through a central 
location on the Commission's Web site.\156\ SIFMA AMG stated that a 
list would help market participants comply with the rules.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ ICI Comment Letter at 10; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3 
n.9; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 12-13; AIMA Comment Letter at 4. 
SIFMA AMG and AIMA also recommended that such a centralized location 
could be operated by an independent third party.
    \157\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 13. SIFMA AMG requested that 
the Commission establish the Web site location prior to designating 
any swaps as available to trade. Id. In response to SIFMA AMG's 
comment, the Commission anticipates that this Web page will be 
established as soon as technologically feasible, and may or may not 
occur prior to the effective date of this rule. CME also requested 
that the Commission publish a list, on its Web site and in the 
Federal Register, of all swaps under current assessment. CME Comment 
Letter at 7. The Commission notes that Sec. Sec.  40.5 and 40.6 
filings will already be posted on its Web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission agrees with commenters that a centralized list would 
help market participants, as well as SEFs and DCMs, comply with the 
Commission's rules and regulations related to the trade execution 
requirement. Therefore, the Commission will post such determinations on 
its Web site where market participants can readily ascertain which 
swaps have been determined to be available to trade, and therefore 
subject to the trade execution requirement, including the SEFs and DCMs 
that list or offer those swaps for trading.

III. Sections 37.12 and 38.11 of the Commission's Regulations--Trade 
Execution Compliance Schedule

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.12(a) and 38.11(a) required market 
participants to comply with the trade execution requirement under 
section 2(h)(8) of the CEA upon the later of (1) the applicable 
deadline established under the compliance schedule for the clearing 
requirement for a swap,\158\ or (2) 30 days after the swap is first 
made available to trade on either a SEF or DCM.\159\ In the proposed 
rule, the Commission noted that while the available-to-trade 
determination could precede the clearing requirement and vice versa, 
the trade execution requirement would not be in effect until the 
clearing requirement takes effect.\160\ The Commission sought comment 
as to whether 30 days would be sufficient for necessary technological 
linkages to be established between (1) DCOs, DCMs, and SEFs; and (2) 
DCMs, SEFs, and market participants.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ The Commission proposed to phase in compliance with the 
clearing requirement, and the trade execution requirement thereof, 
by category of market participant. As proposed, Category 1 entities, 
which included a swap dealer, a security-based swap dealer, a major 
swap participant, a major security-based swap participant, or an 
active fund, would have 90 days to comply with the clearing 
requirement. Category 2 entities, which include a commodity pool, 
private fund, employee benefit plan, or person predominantly engaged 
in activities that are in the business of banking or are financial 
in nature, would have 180 days to comply with the clearing 
requirement. Certain third-party subaccounts and all other swap 
transactions would receive 270 days to comply with the clearing 
requirement. With the exception of removing employee benefit plans 
from Category 2 and allowing such plans 270 days to comply with the 
clearing requirement, the Commission adopted this compliance 
schedule generally as proposed. See Swap Transaction Compliance and 
Implementation Schedule: Clearing Requirement under Section 2(h) of 
the CEA, 77 FR 44441 (July 20, 2012).
    \159\ See Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation 
Schedule: Clearing and Trade Execution Requirements under Section 
2(h) of the CEA, 76 FR 58186 (Sep. 20, 2011). In this final rule, 
the Commission is finalizing the compliance and implementation 
schedule for the trade execution requirement, and therefore, 
addresses the relevant comments submitted in response to this 
proposed rule.
    \160\ 76 FR 77731 n.38.
    \161\ 76 FR 58192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Comments
    Some commenters generally supported the proposed compliance 
schedule for the trade execution requirement,\162\ but Tradeweb 
commented that a 30-day implementation period may not be sufficient for 
a class of swaps that is available to trade for the first time and 
recommended that the Commission maintain the authority to set an 
appropriate implementation period on a case-by-case basis for a class 
of swaps, with input from SEFs, DCMs, and market participants.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ Chris Barnard Comment Letter at 2 (Sep. 23, 2011); 
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 2-4 (Nov. 4, 2011); Better Markets 
Comment Letter at 2 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \163\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters recommended that the trade execution requirement 
should become effective only after the clearing requirement is fully 
implemented.\164\ MFA commented that allowing mandatory trade execution 
to become effective simultaneously with mandatory clearing would 
potentially dilute market participants' resources to comply with both 
requirements.\165\ MFA also recommended that all market participants be 
required to comply with

[[Page 33617]]

the trade execution requirement at the same time, rather than through a 
phased-in approach, to avoid fragmenting market liquidity.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ AIMA Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 3, 2011); MarkitSERV 
Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 2011); Citadel Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 
4, 2011); MFA Comment Letter at 7 (Nov. 4, 2011); Vanguard Comment 
Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011) (recommending 180-day compliance period 
between the effective date of the clearing requirement and the trade 
execution requirement).
    \165\ MFA Comment Letter at 10-11.
    \166\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters stated that the proposed schedule does not afford 
adequate time for market participants to comply with the trade 
execution requirement, particularly with regards to the proposed 30-day 
post-determination implementation period.\167\ JPMorgan and UBS stated 
that where a SEF or DCM submits a swap as available to trade using 
Sec.  40.6, market participants could be required to transfer their 
existing trading in that swap onto a SEF or DCM within only 40 days of 
the submission.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ JPMorgan Comment Letter at 3-4; UBS Comment Letter at 2; 
ICI Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 2 
(Nov. 4, 2011); Westpac Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 4, 2011); Regional 
Banks Comment Letter at 7 (Nov. 4, 2011); FHLBanks Comment Letter at 
5 (Nov. 4, 2011); ICI Comment Letter at 9; ISDA Comment Letter at 
11; AIMA Comment Letter at 2-3; UBS Comment Letter at 2; ISDA 
Comment Letter at 11; ACLI Comment Letter at 2.
    \168\ JPMorgan Comment Letter at 3; UBS Comment Letter at 2. 
Based on proposed Sec. Sec.  37.12(a) and 38.11(a), commenters 
assumed that 30 days after the swap is made available to trade falls 
upon the later date than the applicable compliance date for the 
clearing requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters noted that implementing new infrastructure, 
standards, and procedures necessary to comply with the trade execution 
requirement would require a longer post-determination period.\169\ For 
example, FHLBanks commented that new infrastructure and procedures are 
necessary to ensure that swaps are properly submitted to a 
counterparty's FCM and to a DCO.\170\ Some commenters also cited the 
need for market participants to develop adequate connectivity \171\ and 
to obtain trading access \172\ to a SEF or DCM. CME commented that 
DCOs, DCMs, and SEFs would not likely be able to establish the 
requisite technological linkages within the proposed 30-day 
implementation period,\173\ while ICI commented that smaller market 
participants could need more than 30 days to connect to a SEF or DCM 
offering an actively traded swap.\174\ Other commenters noted that 
market participants would also need time to complete applicable 
documentation and agreements.\175\ Some commenters further stated that 
a longer implementation period would promote greater competition among 
trading venues and mitigate a SEF's or DCM's attempt to capture market 
share.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ JPMorgan Comment Letter at 3-4; ISDA Comment Letter at 11; 
FHLBanks Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011); Westpac Comment Letter 
at 2-3 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \170\ FHLBanks Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \171\ FSR Comment Letter at 4; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 5; 
ICI Comment Letter at 8; ISDA Comment Letter at 11; Eaton Vance 
Management Comment Letter at 3; Chatham Comment Letter at 4; SIFMA 
AMG Comment Letter at 9; CME Comment Letter at 6-7; Westpac Comment 
Letter at 3 (Nov. 21, 2011); ICI Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \172\ MFA Comment Letter at 4; Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; 
SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9; AIMA Comment Letter at 3; CME Comment 
Letter at 6-7.
    \173\ CME Comment Letter at 2 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \174\ ICI Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \175\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9; ICI Comment Letter at 9; 
AIMA Comment Letter at 3; CME Comment Letter at 7; ISDA Comment 
Letter at 11; Westpac Comment Letter at 3; FIA/ISDA/SIFMA Comment 
Letter at 8 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \176\ Chatham Comment Letter at 4; FXall Comment Letter at 7; 
ICI Comment Letter at 8; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters provided several suggestions for a longer post-
determination period. Several commenters recommended a 90-day period 
after a swap is made available to trade,\177\ while Chatham and FSR 
recommended at least a 6-month period.\178\ SIFMA AMG recommended an 
implementation period of at least 90 days after the swap becomes 
subject to the trade execution requirement,\179\ while some commenters 
recommended a similar period of at least 6 months,\180\ particularly 
for market participants who are neither swap dealers or major swap 
participants.\181\ SIFMA AMG and Vanguard stated that the period could 
be shortened over time as market participants become more experienced 
with centralized trading.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ FXall Comment Letter at 7; ICI Comment Letter at 9; CME 
Comment Letter at 6-7; Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; Bloomberg 
Comment Letter at 5; Westpac Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \178\ Chatham Comment Letter at 4; FSR Comment Letter at 4.
    \179\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9.
    \180\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 3; ISDA Comment 
Letter at 11.
    \181\ Westpac Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 4, 2011); FHLBanks 
Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \182\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9; Vanguard Comment Letter at 
6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    The Commission is adopting Sec. Sec.  37.12(a) and (b) and 38.11(a) 
and (b) as proposed with minor technical corrections, but is also 
amending the proposed rule text to clarify that market participants 
must comply with the trade execution requirement upon the later of (1) 
the applicable deadline established under the compliance schedule for 
the clearing requirement for a swap,\183\ or (2) 30 days after the 
available-to-trade determination for that swap is deemed approved under 
Sec.  40.5 or deemed certified under Sec.  40.6 by the Commission as 
available to trade. As noted earlier, the Commission anticipates that 
because of the novel nature of the available-to-trade determinations, 
the initial determinations would likely be subject to a stay under 
Sec.  40.6 for an additional 90-day review period or an extension of 
the 45-day review period under Sec.  40.5 for an additional 45 days. 
Accordingly, the Commission's part 40 rule review procedures should 
provide market participants with adequate advance notice of the 
possible application of the trade execution requirement to a particular 
swap. The Commission believes that this period, along with the 
subsequent 30-day post-determination implementation period, is a 
sufficient amount of time for SEFs, DCMs, and market participants to 
become familiar and comply with the trade execution requirement. Taken 
in concert with the implementation schedule adopted for swaps subject 
to clearing requirement, the Commission also believes that this time is 
sufficient with respect to mandatory trade execution for an individual 
swap or a group, type, category, or class of swaps.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ See supra note 52.
    \184\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that the phased-in compliance schedule for the 
clearing requirement previously adopted by the Commission may lead to 
phased-in compliance with the trade execution requirement, the 
Commission supports this approach. The Commission believes that the 
phased-in schedule for the former requirement--which accounts for a 
market participant's ability to comply based on risk profile, 
compliance burden, resources, and expertise--also applies with respect 
to compliance with the latter requirement. The Commission further notes 
that the concerns about fragmenting market liquidity caused by a 
phased-in approach are mitigated by (1) the phasing-in of similar 
entities, who transact similar volumes of swaps, under similar 
timelines and (2) the relatively compact timeframe in which market 
participants in all three clearing implementation and compliance 
categories must comply with the trade execution requirement.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission notes that a trading facility could still 
clear and list a swap for trading after it is determined to be subject 
to the trade execution requirement, but prior to the effective date.

[[Page 33618]]

IV. Related Matters

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires federal agencies, 
in promulgating regulations, to consider the impact of those 
regulations on small entities.\186\ The Commission has previously 
established certain definitions of ``small entities'' to be used by the 
Commission in evaluating the impact of its regulations on small 
entities in accordance with the RFA.\187\ The Commission has previously 
determined that DCMs and SEFs are not ``small entities'' for purposes 
of the RFA.\188\ The subject of this rulemaking also provides a 
compliance schedule for a new statutory requirement, section 2(h)(8) of 
the CEA, and does not itself impose significant new regulatory 
requirements.\189\ Accordingly, the Commission received no comments on 
the Chairman's certification of the impact of the rules contained 
herein on small entities. Therefore, the Chairman, on behalf of the 
Commission, hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that the rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \187\ 47 FR 18681-31 (Apr. 30, 1982).
    \188\ See 47 FR 18618, 18619 (Apr. 30, 1982) discussing DCMs; 66 
FR 45604, 45609 (Aug. 29, 2001) discussing DTEFs; 76 FR 1214, 1235 
discussing SEFs.
    \189\ 76 FR 58193.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act (``PRA'') \190\ imposes certain 
requirements on federal agencies in connection with their conducting or 
sponsoring any collection of information as defined by the PRA. An 
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a registered entity is not 
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays 
a currently valid control number by the Office of Management and Budget 
(``OMB''). This final rule contains new collection of information 
requirements within the meaning of the PRA. Accordingly, in connection 
with the FNPRM, the Commission submitted an information collection 
requested, titled ``Parts 37 and 38--Process for a Swap Execution 
Facility or Designated Contract Market to Make a Swap Available to 
Trade'' and supporting documentation to OMB for its review and approval 
in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11, and requested 
that OMB approve and assign a new control number for the collections of 
information covered by the FNPRM. Additionally, pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission, in the FNPRM, requested comments from 
the public on the proposed information collection requirements in order 
to, among other items, evaluate the necessity of the proposed 
collections of information and minimize the burden of the information 
collection requirements on respondents. On September 12, 2012, OMB 
assigned control number 3038-0099 to this collection of information, 
but withheld final approval pending the Commission's resubmission of 
the information collection, which includes a description of the 
comments received on the collection and the Commission's responses 
thereto.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the adoption of Sec. Sec.  37.12(a) and 38.11(a)--
the trade execution compliance schedule--as stated in the prior 
proposed rule, this requirement will not require a new collection of 
information from any persons or entities.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ 76 FR 58193.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission protects proprietary information according to the 
Freedom of Information Act and 17 CFR part 145, ``Commission Records 
and Information.'' In addition, section 8(a)(1) of the CEA strictly 
prohibits the Commission, unless specifically authorized by the CEA, 
from making public ``data and information that would separately 
disclose the business transactions or market positions of any person 
and trade secrets or names of customers.'' \192\ The Commission is also 
required to protect certain information contained in a government 
system of records according to the Privacy Act of 1974.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ 7 U.S.C. 12(a)(1).
    \193\ 5 U.S.C. 552a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Proposed Information Provided by Reporting Entities/Persons
    In the FNPRM, the Commission estimated that 50 registered entities 
will be required to file part 40 rule submissions and annual reports.
    Based on the previously estimated hours of burden under part 40 and 
the estimated additional time that a SEF or DCM would require to review 
applicable factors and data to make a determination, the Commission 
estimated that the hourly burden for a SEF or DCM under proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and 38.12(a) to submit an available-to-trade 
determination would be 8 hours per submission. The Commission, however, 
did not provide an average annual hours of burden for each SEF or DCM 
to submit available-to-trade determinations under proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.10(a) and 38.12(a) because, as stated in the FNPRM, it is not 
feasible to determine the number of part 40 rule submission filings, on 
average, that each SEF or DCM would submit, as the number of swap 
contracts to be traded on a DCM or SEF and the number of those swaps 
that a SEF or DCM will eventually submit as available to trade is 
presently unknown.
2. Summary of Comments and Commission Response
Sections 37.10(a) and 38.12(a)--Process To Make a Swap Available To 
Trade
    MarketAxess and SDMA characterized the proposed approach as 
burdensome and commented that it would require SEFs to expend a 
significant amount of time and resources.\194\ MarketAxess recommended 
an alternative ``recognition and notification'' process in which a SEF 
or DCM provides notice to the Commission that a swap is available to 
trade when it becomes subject to the clearing requirement.\195\ 
MarketAxess stated that this approach would allow SEFs to use their 
resources in a more efficient manner.\196\ SDMA supported the part 40 
approach, but stated that a SEF should determine if a swap is available 
to trade based on whether the swap is required to be cleared, not based 
on the enumerated factors.\197\ Sunguard Kiodex also recommended an 
alternative approach--a real-time ``illiquidity'' test that would 
temporarily permit off-facility trading in a swap based on certain 
market observations--that would require less time and reduce 
costs.\198\ WMBAA and Spring Trading commented that the Commission's 
estimate of the hours of burden for a SEF or DCM to make an available-
to-trade determination are too low based on the different types of 
personnel that would be involved in a determination.\199\ Spring 
Trading estimated that each rule filing would require at least 15-20 
hours.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 7-8; SDMA Comment Letter at 
4-5.
    \195\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 6.
    \196\ Id. at 7.
    \197\ SDMA Comment Letter at 6-7.
    \198\ Sunguard Kiodex Comment Letter at 3.
    \199\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 5; Spring Trading Comment Letter 
at 5 (Jan. 12, 2012).
    \200\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that the alternative approaches proposed by 
commenters would eliminate a separate formal determination process. As 
stated in the preamble, however, the Commission believes that 
determining whether a swap is available to trade and whether a swap 
should be mandatorily cleared should remain separate

[[Page 33619]]

processes because each inquiry addresses different concerns. Further, 
adopting a real-time ``illiquidity'' test would require objective 
criteria, which the Commission has declined to adopt at this time.
    The Commission acknowledges the comments from WMBAA and Spring 
Trading regarding the resources required to make a determination. 
Therefore, the Commission is revising its estimate of the hours of 
burden to reflect the addition of additional personnel that would 
process and analyze trading data, for which the Commission estimates 
this hourly burden to be 8 hours per submission. The Commission is also 
adopting a listing requirement in the final rule under new Sec. Sec.  
37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2), which requires a SEF or DCM to certify 
that it is listing the swap for which it submits an available-to-trade 
determination. The Commission notes that the listing process is 
governed by Sec. Sec.  40.2 and 40.3 of the Commission's regulations, 
for which it has previously estimated the average hourly burden to be 2 
hours per submission in a previous rulemaking.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ 76 FR 77734.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Commission revises its estimate of the total 
hourly burden to be 16 hours per submission.

C. Cost-Benefit Considerations

Introduction
    Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to prevent a repeat of the 
harm caused by the 2008 financial crisis by establishing a 
comprehensive new regulatory framework for swaps and security-based 
swaps.\202\ Among other things, the legislation seeks to promote market 
integrity, reduce risk, and increase transparency within the financial 
system and swaps markets. Consistent with the view that several 
weaknesses contributed to the crisis,\203\ Title VII establishes a 
multidimensional regulatory approach designed to ``mitigate costs and 
risks to taxpayers and the financial system.'' \204\ Provisions 
designed to move the transaction of swaps from primarily opaque, over-
the-counter (``OTC'') markets--which traditionally feature bilateral 
negotiation and execution--to registered swap execution facilities 
(``SEFs'') and designated contract markets (``DCMs'')--which provide 
market participants and the public with improved swap market 
transparency--represent an important element of this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ Dodd-Frank Act section 701, et seq.
    \203\ See, e.g., Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, ``The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the 
United States'' at xxiv (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. (listing 
uncontrolled leverage; lack of transparency, capital and collateral 
requirements; speculation; interconnection among firms; and 
concentrations of risk in the market as contributing factors).
    \204\ S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 92 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In particular, section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA 
to, among other things, move swap trading and execution to SEFs and 
DCMs.\205\ Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act added a trade 
execution requirement,\206\ which requires that swap transactions 
subject to the clearing requirement under section 2(h)(1) of the CEA be 
executed on a SEF or a DCM, unless no SEF or DCM ``makes the swap 
available to trade'' or the clearing exception under section 2(h)(7) of 
the CEA applies.\207\ Taken together, these provisions are intended to 
transform the swaps market from one in which prices for bilaterally-
negotiated contracts are privately quoted--typically by dealers who, 
unlike non-dealer market participants (typically the ``buy-side''), 
enjoy asymmetric information advantages--to one in which bid/offer 
prices for swap contracts are accessible to multiple market 
participants to compare, assess, and accept or reject.\208\ With this 
release, in conjunction with the Commission's final rulemaking 
establishing SEFs\209\ and the final rulemaking defining appropriate 
minimum block sizes for swaps,\210\ the Commission is implementing the 
trade execution requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ SEFs are a new type of regulated marketplace modeled 
largely on the existing Commission-regulated DCM structure. Section 
1a(50) of the CEA, as enacted by section 721 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
defines a SEF as ``a trading system or platform in which multiple 
participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting 
bids and offers made by multiple participants in the facility or 
system, through any means of interstate commerce, including any 
trading facility, that (A) facilitates the execution of swaps 
between persons; and (B) is not a designated contract market.'' 7 
U.S.C. 1a(50). Section 5h(a)(1) of the CEA, as amended by the 
section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act, prohibits any person from 
operating a facility for the trading and processing of swaps unless 
the facility is registered as a SEF or a DCM. 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
    \206\ CEA section 2(h)(8), 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8).
    \207\ 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7).
    \208\ Asymmetric information exists when one counterparty to a 
transaction has more or better information than the other 
counterparty. In some instances, a dealer could have an information 
advantage over a non-dealer, and vice versa. Abuse of this advantage 
is likely to contribute to market failure. By definition, bilateral 
negotiations imply lower levels of transparency of orders, quotes, 
trades and transaction prices. In the context of swap markets, as 
dealers are on one side of a large fraction of trades, they are 
privy to better information on prevailing market conditions and 
valuations relative to their non-dealer counterparties. See ``An 
Analysis of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives Transactions: Implications 
for Public Reporting,'' Michael Fleming, John Jackson, Ada Li, Asani 
Sarkar, and Patricia Zobel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Reports, no. 557, at 6 n.14 (Mar. 2012). Major derivatives dealer 
activity accounts for 89 percent of the total interest rate swap 
activity in notional terms. Id.
    \209\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap 
Execution Facilities (May 16, 2013).
    \210\ See Procedures to Establish Appropriate Minimum Block 
Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility Swaps and Block Trades (May 
16, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this release, the Commission is adopting final rules (1) 
specifying the process by which a swap is made ``available to trade,'' 
thereby making it subject to the trade execution requirement under 
section 2(h)(8) of the CEA (``available-to-trade rule''); and (2) 
establishing the compliance schedule of the trade execution 
requirement, following a Commission determination that a swap is both 
required to be cleared and is available to trade (``trade execution 
compliance schedule'').\211\ More specifically, these rules allow SEFs 
and DCMs to designate swaps that they list or offer for trading as 
``available to trade,'' \212\ thereby requiring market participants who 
transact such swaps (and who are subject to the clearing requirement 
under section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA) to comply with the trade execution 
requirement in carrying out these transactions. Swaps that are subject 
to the trade execution requirement (and are not block trades as defined 
under Sec.  43.2 of the Commission's regulations) must be executed in 
accordance with other separately promulgated rules that implement the 
Dodd-Frank Act's swap exchange trading requirements and are intended to 
provide improved price transparency for swap transactions.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ CEA section 2(h)(8), 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8).
    \212\ See supra note 1.
    \213\ The rules establishing SEFs focus on measures to promote 
pre-trade transparency and trade execution of swaps. To comply with 
the trade execution requirement, swaps that are traded on a SEF must 
be executed as Required Transactions. Under Sec.  37.9(a)(2), 
Required Transactions must be executed by either (1) an Order Book, 
as defined in Sec.  37.3(a)(3); or (2) a Request for Quote System, 
as defined in Sec.  37.9(a)(3). See Core Principles and Other 
Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities (May 16, 2013). Swaps 
that are subject to the trade execution requirement, under section 
2(h)(8) of the CEA, and traded on a DCM must be executed pursuant to 
subpart J of part 38 of the Commission's regulations, which 
implements revised DCM Core Principle 9 under section 5(d)(9) of the 
CEA, as amended by section 735(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 7 U.S.C. 
7(d)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Operating in concert with the statutory requirements and other 
rules,\214\ the rules adopted in this rulemaking are designed to 
provide a process that fosters swaps becoming available to trade, and 
therefore subject to the trade execution requirement; this,

[[Page 33620]]

indirectly will counter information asymmetry and in turn, the 
informational advantage enjoyed by dealers to the potential detriment 
of other market participants. In this way, these rules will promote a 
competitive market environment with improved price discovery and 
characterized by narrower spreads and more reliable prices. Ultimately, 
these rules will benefit the financial system as a whole by creating a 
more efficient marketplace where market participants will be able to 
take into account the price at which recent transactions have occurred 
when determining at what price to quote or place orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See part 37 and subpart J of part 38 of the Commission's 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that some of the costs related to the 
application of these rules are a consequence of the Congressional trade 
execution requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA. For example, 
those market participants who are not eligible for the end-user 
exception under section 2(h)(7) of the CEA\215\ will not have the 
option to execute swaps made available to trade on a bilateral basis, 
even if they consider it more costly or less convenient to execute 
trades on a SEF or a DCM. As described further below, the Commission 
was cognizant of these costs in adopting these final rules, and has, 
where appropriate, attempted to mitigate the costs while observing CEA 
section 2(h)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ The Commission may determine that swap transactions 
exempted from the section 2(h)(1) clearing requirement pursuant to 
other statutory authority would also not be subject to the section 
2(h)(8) trade execution requirement. See supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Statutory Mandate To Consider the Costs and Benefits of the 
Commission's Action: Section 15(a) of the CEA
    Section 15(a) \216\ of the CEA requires the Commission to consider 
the costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a regulation 
under the CEA or issuing certain orders. Section 15(a) further 
specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated in light of 
the following five broad areas of market and public concern: (1) 
Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price 
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public 
interest considerations. The Commission considers the costs and 
benefits resulting from its discretionary determinations with respect 
to the section 15(a) factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ CEA section 15(a), 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this rulemaking to implement the trade execution requirement, 
the Commission is exercising its discretion to adopt the available-to-
trade rule and the trade execution compliance schedule. The discussion 
that follows considers the section 15(a) factors for each set of rules 
separately. Prior to the section 15(a) consideration for each set of 
rules, the Commission discusses the costs, benefits, and alternatives 
to the approach adopted in these final rules as well as relevant 
comment letters.\217\ With respect to the available-to-trade rule, 
costs, benefits, and alternatives are further broken out and discussed 
separately for various components of the process--Part 40 Process and 
Determination Factors, and Applicability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ The Commission solicited comments to aid its consideration 
of the costs and benefits resulting from (1) the proposed available-
to-trade rule, 76 FR 77733, and (2) the proposed trade execution 
compliance schedule. 76 FR 58192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Quantifying the costs and benefits to SEFs and DCMs is not 
reasonably feasible for many aspects of the available-to-trade rule 
because costs will depend, among other things, on the future business 
decisions of SEFs and DCMs. The Commission expects that the costs and 
benefits with respect to the available-to-trade rule will vary, based 
on the specific circumstances of the individual SEFs, DCMs, and market 
participants. Where the Commission is unable to quantify the costs and 
benefits, the Commission identifies and considers the costs and 
benefits of these rules in qualitative terms.
    Given the novelty of the trade execution requirement--the mandatory 
trading of swaps on a new type of entity, SEFs, or on DCMs--the 
Commission is inherently limited by a lack of available data in 
attempting to quantify the costs and benefits of implementing the trade 
execution compliance schedule. As discussed further below, the 
Commission is not aware of any analog to another requirement that would 
provide information that is sufficient to ascertain such costs and 
benefits in quantitative terms. Accordingly, the Commission identifies 
and considers the costs and benefits of the compliance schedule in 
qualitative terms.
1. Available-to-Trade Rule
a. Part 40 Process and Determination Factors
    Final Sec. Sec.  37.10 and 38.12 govern the process that a SEF or 
DCM must use to determine whether a swap is available to trade for 
purposes of the trade execution requirement. For a swap to be subject 
to the trade execution requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA, a 
SEF or DCM must have first determined that a swap is available to 
trade. The Commission views this determination as a trading protocol 
issued by the SEF or DCM (and therefore as a ``rule,'' as defined in 
Sec.  40.1 of the Commission's regulations); as a rule, the SEF or DCM 
must submit the determination to the Commission in accordance with the 
procedures contained in part 40 of the Commission's regulations. Final 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and 38.12(a) set forth the procedure for a SEF or 
DCM to submit the determination under Sec.  40.5 or Sec.  40.6 of the 
Commission's regulations.
    Final Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b) require a SEF or DCM to 
consider, as appropriate, six factors with respect to each swap when 
determining whether a swap is available to trade: (1) Whether there are 
ready and willing buyers and sellers; (2) the frequency or size of 
transactions; (3) the trading volume; (4) the number and types of 
market participants; (5) the bid/ask spread; or (6) the usual number of 
resting firm or indicative bids and offers. No single factor must 
always be considered as to whether a swap is available to trade; 
therefore, the SEF or DCM may consider any one or more of the factors 
in its initial determination. In its submission to the Commission under 
Sec.  37.10(a) or Sec.  38.12(a), a SEF or DCM must describe how it 
considered the factors that it deems appropriate.
Costs
Costs to SEFs and DCMs
    In the proposed rule, the Commission estimated that conducting the 
assessment and submission process in Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) and 
38.12(a) and (b) could be performed internally by one compliance 
personnel of the SEF or DCM over approximately eight hours on average. 
The Commission further estimated that the cost per hour for one 
compliance personnel to be $43.25 per hour; \218\ therefore, it would 
cost each SEF and DCM $346 per rule submission to comply with the 
proposed requirements.\219\ The Commission also noted that this 
estimate was general in nature and that it would be difficult to 
determine the number of hours involved with reasonable precision, given 
the novelty of the process.\220\ The

[[Page 33621]]

Commission solicited comments on the costs associated with Sec. Sec.  
37.10(a) and (b) and 38.12(a) and (b), i.e., assessing whether a swap 
is available to trade and submitting a determination pursuant to part 
40 of the Commission's regulations.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ See Report on Management & Professional Earnings in the 
Securities Industry 2010, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association at 4 (Sept. 2010). The report lists the average total 
annual compensation for a compliance specialist (intermediate) as 
$58,878. The Commission estimated the personnel's hourly cost by 
assuming an 1,800 hour work year and by multiplying by 1.3 to 
account for overhead and other benefits.
    \219\ 76 FR 77735.
    \220\ The Commission also noted that certain additional factors 
could affect these estimates, such as the complexity of the swap's 
terms. Id.
    \221\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters claimed that the Commission's estimate for the 
number of personnel required to carry out the process was low.\222\ For 
example, WMBAA stated that the Commission under-estimated the different 
types of personnel that would be required to make an available-to-trade 
determination, which include information technology professionals, 
operations staff, legal and compliance staff, and management.\223\ 
Spring Trading anticipated that the Commission would require large 
amounts of data and analysis from SEFs and DCMs to support their 
determinations; therefore, the costs required to make a determination 
and submit a filing would be similar to the effort required by a DCM to 
assess whether a new futures contract is susceptible to 
manipulation.\224\ WMBAA also asserted that the initial costs of 
implementing the new procedure would be higher than the Commission's 
proposed projection.\225\ MarketAxess commented that the process would 
require SEFs to expend significant resources, which would pose a 
barrier to entry and lead to fewer trading platforms for market 
participants.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 5; Spring Trading Comment Letter 
at 5 (Jan. 12, 2012).
    \223\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 5.
    \224\ Spring Trading Comment Letter at 5 (Jan. 12, 2012). The 
Commission has noted that the costs of compliance with DCM Core 
Principle 3--Contracts Not Readily Subject to Manipulation, as 
codified in Sec.  38.200 of the Commission's regulations--consist of 
supplying supporting information and documentation to justify the 
contract specifications of a new product. That process is governed 
by the product listing submission procedures codified in Sec. Sec.  
40.2 and 40.3 of the Commission's regulations.
    \225\ Id.
    \226\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters did not provide alternative numerical estimates or 
discuss the magnitude of costs that would be imposed by the 
determination process. Based on the qualitative comments received from 
WMBAA and Spring Trading, however, the Commission is revising its 
estimated cost of conducting the assessment and submission process to 
reflect the addition of an economist to the estimate of necessary 
personnel. The Commission agrees with Spring Trading that SEFs and DCMs 
may analyze trading data in considering the factors under Sec. Sec.  
37.10(b) and 38.12(b); the compliance personnel would likely be 
assisted by an economist in carrying out such an analysis over 
approximately eight hours on average. Further, the Commission is also 
revising its estimates based on updated wage rate data. The 
Commission's updated estimate of the cost per hour for one compliance 
personnel is $42.16 per hour \227\ and $64.60 per hour for one 
economist.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ See Report on Management & Professional Earnings in the 
Securities Industry 2011, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association at 4 (Oct. 2011). The FRPRM calculated the proposed 
estimate for the assessment and submission process based on salary 
information in the 2010 report. See supra note 218. The 2011 report 
lists the average total annual compensation for a compliance 
specialist (intermediate) as $58,371. The Commission estimated the 
personnel's hourly cost by assuming an 1,800 hour work year and by 
multiplying by 1.3 to account for overhead and other benefits.
    \228\ See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012-13 Edition, Economists, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/economists.htm. The 
report lists the average total annual compensation for an economist 
as $89,450. The Commission estimated the personnel's hourly cost by 
assuming an 1,800 hour work year and by multiplying by 1.3 to 
account for overhead and other benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is also adopting a listing requirement under final 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2) that requires the SEF or DCM to 
demonstrate that they have listed or offered for trading the swap for 
which they are submitting an available-to-trade determination. A SEF or 
DCM incurs costs to list or offer a swap for trading pursuant to Sec.  
40.2 and 40.3 of the Commission's regulations, which requires a product 
filing that includes, among other things, a ``concise explanation and 
analysis'' of the product, that the Commission has acknowledged as de 
minimis.\229\ Although a SEF or DCM may decide to list a product for 
trading without a desire to submit an available-to-trade determination, 
to the extent that the SEF or DCM lists a product exclusively to meet 
the requirements of Sec. Sec.  37.10(a)(2) or 38.12(a)(2), the 
Commission estimates that it would take one compliance personnel 
approximately 2 hours, on average, to submit a product filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ For further Commission discussion of the costs associated 
with listing or offering a product for trading under Sec. Sec.  40.2 
and 40.3 of the Commission's regulations, see Provisions Common to 
Registered Entities, 76 FR 44776, 44787 (Jul. 27, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, the Commission estimates that it would cost a SEF and 
DCM a maximum of $938.40 per rule submission filing to comply with 
final Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) and 38.12(a) and (b).
    With respect to MarketAxess's comment, the Commission does not 
believe that the costs associated with the determination process pose a 
barrier to entry for trading platforms. The rule does not affirmatively 
require a SEF or DCM to first submit to the Commission that a swap is 
available to trade via a part 40 filing in order to list or offer that 
swap for trading on its platform. If one SEF or DCM makes the swap 
available to trade through the part 40 process, then other SEFs and 
DCMs who subsequently choose to list or trade the swap are only 
required to do so through methods of execution consistent with the 
trade execution requirement. The Commission notes that in order to 
register and operate as a SEF, a trading platform or facility must 
already be able to demonstrate that they offer certain minimum 
functionality in terms of methods of execution (i.e., a central limit 
order book (``CLOB'') or request-for-quote (``RFQ'') system).\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap 
Execution Facilities (May 16, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission specifically designed the process to mitigate costs 
by allowing SEFs and DCMs to utilize existing personnel and 
infrastructure to carry out the determination and submission process 
under part 40 procedures. Further, the process affords SEFs and DCMs 
the flexibility to consider any one or more enumerated factors in 
determining that a swap is available to trade. This flexibility will 
allow them to tailor their considerations, while also managing costs of 
research and analysis, by selecting from a range of factors. Moreover, 
the Commission believes that the costs will decrease for both SEFs and 
DCMs as they become more familiar with using the part 40 procedures to 
make a swap available to trade. The Commission also believes that the 
part 40 process will require fewer resources as centralized trading 
develops and SEFs and DCMs become more familiar with the types of swaps 
that can be made available to trade.
    The Commission believes that Spring Trading's comparison between 
the costs of the process and the costs to assess whether a new futures 
contract is susceptible to manipulation rests on a flawed analogy. The 
costs of the latter are based upon the Commission's annual burden hours 
estimate, in the aggregate, for the information collection requirements 
under Sec. Sec.  40.2 and 40.3 of the Commission's regulations,\231\ 
estimated per registered entity to be 200 hours based on 100 responses 
and an estimated average of 2 hours per

[[Page 33622]]

response.\232\ The Commission's estimate of 18 hours to comply with 
final Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) and 38.12(a) and (b), however, is 
based upon a single submission of an available-to-trade 
determination.\233\ It is not feasible at this time to estimate the 
average number of rule submissions that a SEF or DCM will file per 
year; therefore, the Commission believes that the burden hours estimate 
for the information collection requirements under Sec. Sec.  40.2 and 
40.3 is not illustrative here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ 76 FR 44790.
    \232\ Id.
    \233\ As discussed above, the Commission estimates the 
assessment and submission process in Sec. Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) and 
38.12(a) and (b) for each submission will be performed by one 
compliance personnel and one economist over approximately eight 
hours each on average. In addition, the Commission estimates that it 
would take one compliance personnel approximately 2 hours, on 
average, to comply with the listing prerequisite under Sec. Sec.  
37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2) by submitting a product filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs to Market Participants
    Some commenters also stated that the process would impose direct 
costs on market participants. For example, Chatham stated that end-
users would have to expend resources to monitor whether swaps are 
subject to the trade execution requirement, and if so, connect to a SEF 
or DCM that offers or lists that swap for trading.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ Chatham Comment Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also expressed concern that the available-to-trade 
determination process would impose indirect costs on market 
participants. These commenters maintained that SEFs and DCMs would be 
incentivized to exploit the process by indiscriminately determining 
that swaps are available to trade. Making determinations in this 
manner, they claimed, would lead to illiquid swaps trading on a SEF or 
DCM, which could result in increasing swap price volatility; increased 
spreads; misleading market prices; and front-running behavior.\235\ 
Chatham commented that end-users would encounter higher hedging and 
swap execution costs, particularly from swap dealers passing on the 
costs of higher volatility.\236\ ISDA stated that those costs would 
deter market participants from executing hedge transactions.\237\ FSR 
stated that improper determinations by a SEF or DCM, such as one 
primarily driven by the desire to capture market share rather than on 
the merits, would compel market participants to avail themselves of 
exemptions to the trade execution requirement, thus undermining the 
goal of promoting a centralized trading market.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ AIMA Comment Letter at 1; CME Comment Letter at 6; Morgan 
Stanley Comment Letter at 3; CEWG Comment Letter at 4.
    \236\ Chatham Comment Letter at 2.
    \237\ ISDA Comment Letter at 4.
    \238\ FSR Comment Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding the fact that commenters did not provide data to 
support or monetize their cost concerns, the Commission has 
qualitatively considered their comments about the direct and indirect 
costs of the available-to-trade determination process. First, with 
respect to the direct costs cited by Chatham--that end-users would have 
to follow which swaps are subject to mandatory trade execution and 
connect to a SEF or DCM to trade that swap--these costs are primarily 
attributable to the statutory trade execution requirement and not to 
the Commission's action in this final rule. The costs incurred by 
market participants to connect to a SEF or DCM are attendant to 
complying with the trade execution requirement. While the number of 
swaps subject to the trade execution requirement will be affected by 
this final rule in conjunction with business decisions by SEFs and 
DCMs, market participants (as well as SEFs and DCMs) would incur these 
costs for any swap subject to the statutory trade execution 
requirement. While commenters did not provide any quantitative 
estimates regarding connectivity costs, the Commission understands that 
clearing firms' connectivity services to DCMs can be bundled into the 
clearing services provided by clearing firms, and expects that this 
will occur at SEFs as well. Hence, the connectivity costs arising 
directly from the trade execution requirement are likely to be subsumed 
into the costs of complying with the mandatory clearing 
requirement.\239\ It is also possible that SEFs and DCMs will bundle 
connectivity costs into transaction fees. Moreover, SEFs and DCMs have 
an incentive to keep connectivity costs low in order to attract market 
participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ Depending on their individual business needs, market 
participants could also use connectivity services provided by 
independent software vendors to trade swaps subject to the trade 
execution requirement. These costs may also be bundled into 
transaction fees. The Commission also notes that it is typically the 
case that for most new contracts, DCMs tend to waive execution and 
other fees during the initial six to twelve months after listing, 
and such fee waivers are meant to help mitigate any incremental 
costs for market participants to connect to a new platform or trade 
a new product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, while there may be some attendant search costs, the 
Commission's approach in this final rule greatly minimizes the costs to 
market participants to monitor whether a SEF or DCM is subject to the 
trade execution requirement. Under existing practice for part 40 rule 
submissions, the Commission will post a notice and copy of all 
available-to-trade submissions on its Web site. The Commission also 
intends to establish an updated, centralized list of all of the swaps 
that are available to trade. This will provide market participants with 
a single reference for knowing whether a particular swap has been 
determined to be available to trade.
    With respect to the potential indirect costs imposed upon market 
participants if illiquid swaps are made available to trade and become 
subject to the trade execution requirement, the Commission acknowledges 
the concerns of commenters. The Commission, however, believes that the 
part 40 process is appropriate and well-suited to moderate this 
possibility and views the adopted determination factors as probative of 
whether an actual trading market exists.\240\ Mandating SEFs and DCMs 
to consider these factors prior to making a determination will compel 
them at the outset to internally consider the benefits versus the costs 
that will be incurred to list and subsequently support trading in a 
particular swap. The Commission also believes that the transparency of 
the process (e.g., submissions must be posted on the submitting SEF or 
DCM's Web site and will be posted on the Commission's Web site as 
well), coupled with Commission review and potential for public comment, 
provides an important backstop to protect the integrity of the 
determinations that are submitted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ The Commission believes that market participants can use 
any or each of the factors to demonstrate that active trading is 
occurring for a particular swap. For example, a high frequency of 
transactions, narrow bid/ask spread, or large trading volume would 
indicate execution of transactions for that swap. A large number of 
buyers or sellers, or a large number of resting firm or indicative 
bids and offers would also indicate an active market based on the 
presence of market participants seeking to execute transactions in 
that swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Benefits
    The process set forth in Sec. Sec.  37.10 and 38.12 will advance 
the Congressional goal of promoting swap execution and developing a 
centralized trading market that facilitates price discovery in the 
manner as described below.
    Most importantly, the adopted process in the final rule will 
provide an up-to-date, singular reference for SEFs, DCMs, and market 
participants for identifying which swaps are available to trade, and 
therefore subject to the trade execution requirement. Sections 37.10(a) 
and 38.12(a) prescribe the use of the part 40 process for the 
submission of rules for Commission review and approval (Sec.  40.5) or 
the self-certification

[[Page 33623]]

of rules (Sec.  40.6).\241\ Under these processes, SEFs and DCMs must 
submit an initial available-to-trade determination to the Commission 
either for rule approval or as a self-certification; both require 
Commission review. If appropriate, the Commission may approve a Sec.  
40.5 or Sec.  40.6 rule submission within the designated timeframes. 
SEFs and DCMs will be familiar with this process; part 40 is already 
used by DCMs for other rule filings and similarly will be used by SEFs 
going forward. Part 40 further requires SEFs and DCMs to post a copy 
and notice of their submissions on their respective Web sites; the 
Commission also posts that information on its own Web site. Therefore, 
the adopted process will allow market participants to know (1) whether 
a particular swap has been submitted as available to trade; (2) whether 
that swap has been deemed as available to trade by the Commission; and 
(3) when the swap was made or will be made available to trade. In those 
submissions, SEFs and DCMs must consider the six enumerated factors 
under Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b) as appropriate, which provides 
other SEFs, DCMs, and market participants with information about the 
basis for determining that a swap is available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ Part 40 of the Commission's regulations governs regulatory 
obligations of registered entities, which include DCMs and SEFs 
under section 1(a)(40) of the CEA, with respect to, among other 
things, the certification or approval of new products for trading; 
and the certification or approval of rules governing the SEF or DCM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The process adopted in Sec. Sec.  37.10 and 38.12 also increases 
transparency for market participants and the public. Under part 40, 
submissions must contain an explanation of how the SEF or DCM 
determined that a swap is available to trade, including the 
consideration of one or more of the relevant factors listed in 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b), as well as a brief explanation of any 
substantive opposing views. The part 40 process allows the Commission 
to go back to the submitting entity in the case that an insufficient 
explanation of the determination is provided.\242\ In addition, when 
warranted (e.g., when a submission presents novel or complex issues), 
market participants and the public will have the opportunity to provide 
public comment on the merits of the SEF or DCM's submission directly 
through the Commission's Web site.\243\ Therefore, part 40 will not 
only inform market participants of the justifications for and against 
an available-to-trade determination, but provides an opportunity for 
market participants and the public to submit their own views as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ Under rule approval process, the Commission may extend the 
review period of a determination submitted if, among other things, 
the submission is incomplete. Sec.  40.5(d)(1). Under the self-
certification process, the Commission may stay the certification if, 
among other things, the rule submission is accompanied by an 
inadequate explanation. Sec.  40.6(c)(1).
    \243\ Under Sec.  40.6(c)(2) of the Commission's regulations, 
the Commission will provide a 30-day public comment period where the 
available-to-trade determination submitted is subject to a stay 
because, among other things, it presents novel or complex issues 
that require additional time to analyze. As discussed in section 
II.A.1 of the preamble to the final rule, the Commission will also 
provide an opportunity to submit public comment for determinations 
submitted to the Commission under the Sec.  40.5 rule approval 
process. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The adopted process also provides SEFs and DCMs with flexibility in 
determining whether a swap is available to trade. Under Sec. Sec.  
37.10(b) and 38.12(b), a SEF or DCM may consider any one or more of the 
enumerated factors in its initial determination, given that the 
Commission believes that no single factor must always be considered. 
Accordingly, this approach allows SEFs and DCMs to submit swaps with 
different trading characteristics to the Commission as available to 
trade. Rather than require SEFs and DCMs to respond to a rigid set of 
determination criteria, this flexibility was designed to encourage SEFs 
and DCMs to make a broader range of swaps subject to the trade 
execution requirement.
    The Commission anticipates that these benefits will produce a more 
efficient process and consistent determinations over time. Under the 
part 40 procedures, SEFs and DCMs will submit to the Commission, for 
further review with the potential for public comment, an initial 
determination of whether a swap is available to trade. This approach 
will (1) benefit market participants during the initial stages of 
implementation by providing them, in circumstances as described above, 
with an opportunity to comment on determinations and (2) help the 
Commission track and maintain a record of which swaps are subject to 
the trade execution requirement.
    The transparency and flexibility offered under the adopted 
processes will further the development of a centralized trading market, 
consistent with the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act.\244\ By requiring 
a submission that details the analysis and justifications behind an 
available-to-trade determination, the part 40 procedures provide the 
Commission with a well-established protocol for reviewing whether swaps 
should be subject to the trade execution requirement. The procedures 
set forth in the final rule provide the building blocks for the 
development of a robust and liquid centralized trading market, 
consisting of a diverse array of offered or listed swaps, thus inviting 
market participation. Competition between SEFs and DCMs is expected to 
increase the number of swaps available for trading on SEFs and DCMs, 
thereby encouraging innovation and inviting broader market 
participation. Growth in swaps trading on SEFs and DCMs will benefit 
market participants by increasing price transparency and facilitating 
price discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ See CEA section 5h(e), as enacted by section 733 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e) (stating that one of the Act's 
objectives is ``to promote the trading of swaps on swap execution 
facilities and to promote pre-trade price transparency in the swaps 
market''); CEA section 5(d)(9)(A), as amended by section 735(b) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(9) (stating under a DCM core 
principle that ``the board of trade shall provide a competitive, 
open and efficient market and mechanism for executing transactions 
that protects the price discovery process of trading in the 
centralized market of the board of trade'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consideration of Alternatives
    Several commenters recommended that swaps subject to the clearing 
requirement should be subject to the trade execution requirement 
without an additional available-to-trade determination. Some of these 
commenters stated that the CEA does not specify a formal process with 
determination factors.\245\ Other commenters asserted that the clearing 
determination considers a swap's trading liquidity and therefore 
already addresses whether the swap should be subject to mandatory trade 
execution.\246\ Several commenters stated that requiring trading 
facilities to consider the enumerated factors in an available-to-trade 
determination would be ``inefficient and burdensome'' and waste limited 
regulatory resources.\247\ MarketAxess asserted that allowing a SEF or 
DCM to (1) recognize that a swap is available to trade based on the 
clearing determination and (2) notify the Commission that it is listing 
the swap, thereby making the swap subject to

[[Page 33624]]

mandatory trade execution, would not require the Commission, or a SEF 
or DCM to expend any resources.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 3; WMBAA Comment Letter at 
3; AFR Comment Letter at 2-3; ODEX Comment Letter at 1; SDMA Comment 
Letter at 3-4.
    \246\ SDMA Comment Letter at 4-5; WMBAA Comment Letter at 3; 
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 5. AFR claimed that a DCO can only 
clear a class of swaps if a reasonable level of market liquidity is 
demonstrated; otherwise, the DCO could not establish the 
statistically expected loss levels in a liquidation of positions so 
as to set an initial margin level. AFR Comment Letter at 4.
    \247\ SDMA Comment Letter at 5-6; WMBAA Comment Letter at 3; 
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 7-8.
    \248\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission considered the costs and benefits of subjecting 
swaps to mandatory trade execution based on whether the swap must be 
cleared rather than through a separate available-to-trade 
determination. While the Commission recognizes that adopting a distinct 
determination process may impose some additional costs on SEFs and 
DCMs, it believes that these costs are warranted by the benefits that 
market participants will realize from the process: transparency and 
knowledge that only swaps that are either deemed certified or approved 
by the Commission as available to trade are subject to the trade 
execution requirement. This process insulates against SEFs or DCMs 
engaging in inconsistent or improper determinations to subject swaps to 
the trade execution requirement. As previously stated, the Commission 
expects the cost of making a determination to decrease over time as 
SEFs, DCMs, and market participants become more knowledgeable about the 
process and gain more experience in considering the factors to make a 
swap available to trade.
    Several commenters proposed that the Commission, not SEFs and DCMs, 
should maintain the exclusive authority to determine whether a swap is 
available to trade.\249\ Commenters expressed concern that illiquid 
swaps would become subject to the trade execution requirement if SEFs 
and DCMs were allowed to make the determination based on their 
incentives to maximize the number of swaps traded on a facility or 
platform.\250\ CME stated a Commission-based review of whether a swap 
is available to trade would lead to a more ``logical and efficient'' 
use of Commission and industry resources.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ Markit Comment Letter at 5-6; Vanguard Comment Letter at 
5; Geneva Energy Markets Comment Letter at 2; JPMorgan Comment 
Letter at 1; CME Comment Letter at 4-5; FHLB Comment Letter at 3; 
FSR Comment Letter at 4; FXall Comment Letter at 5-6; Morgan Stanley 
Comment Letter at 5-6; CEWG Comment Letter at 6; ISDA Comment Letter 
at 3-4, 6; Tradeweb Comment Letter at 4-5.
    \250\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2; Vanguard Comment Letter at 
5; Geneva Energy Markets Comment Letter at 2; JPMorgan Comment 
Letter at 1-2; CME Comment Letter at 4-5; FHLB Comment Letter at 3; 
ISDA Comment Letter at 3-4; Markit Comment Letter at 5; CEWG Comment 
Letter at 2; Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 5-6; AIMA Comment 
Letter at 2; FXall Comment Letter at 6-7; Tradeweb Comment Letter at 
2-3; FSR Comment Letter at 2.
    \251\ CME Comment Letter at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that benefits are maximized under the 
approach adopted, rather than an alternative under which the Commission 
would hold sole authority to determine whether a swap is available to 
trade. The part 40 approach leverages the trading expertise of SEFs and 
DCMs to determine whether a swap is available to trade, while the 
Commission's authority to review these determinations under part 40 
will help ensure that they are appropriate. The Commission expects that 
SEFs and DCMs will have an understanding of the markets that they list 
for trading and will regularly communicate with market participants 
about liquidity in their markets. Accordingly, the Commission believes 
that SEFs and DCMs are best positioned to make appropriate available-
to-trade determinations. Relying on SEFs and DCMs, who would be 
incentivized to make swaps available to trade, to initiate the 
determination process in consultation with market participants will 
also facilitate innovation and promote swaps trading in accordance with 
section 5h(e) of the CEA. By allowing SEFs and DCMs to make these 
determinations, the Commission will be able to focus on its 
responsibilities in conducting market oversight.
    The Commission has also considered whether a SEF or DCM should be 
able to submit an available-to-trade determination for a swap that it 
does not list or offer for trading. While SDMA responded in the 
affirmative,\252\ several other commenters stated that a SEF or DCM 
should be required to list the swap for a period of time prior to 
submitting a determination.\253\ ISDA stated that the lack of such a 
requirement would otherwise incentivize SEFs and DCMs to submit as many 
determinations as possible, merely to promote centralized trading.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ SDMA Comment Letter at 9.
    \253\ Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 3; SIFMA AMG 
Comment Letter at 10; UBS Comment Letter at 2; Morgan Stanley 
Comment Letter at 6 n.6; ISDA Comment Letter at 7; Tradeweb Comment 
Letter at 5.
    \254\ ISDA Comment Letter at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has determined that a listing requirement supports 
the integrity of the available-to-trade determination process. 
Moreover, the Commission expects that a SEF or DCM will have no 
business incentive to submit an available-to-trade determination for a 
swap that it has no intention of listing for trading. While the 
Commission recognizes that the listing SEF or DCM will likely incur 
some cost to submit an available to trade determination, the Commission 
believes that those costs would necessarily be accompanied by a stream 
of benefits once the swap is subject to the trade execution 
requirement. Accordingly, the Commission has adopted a listing 
requirement under new Sec. Sec.  37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2). As 
discussed above, the Commission believes that a SEF or DCM will incur 
de minimis costs to list or offer a swap for trading under the part 40 
procedures for listing a product for trading--the Commission estimates 
that it would take one compliance personnel approximately 2 hours, on 
average, to submit a product filing.
    The Commission has also considered the costs and benefits of, and 
requested comment on, whether or not a SEF or DCM should (1) be allowed 
to submit its available-to-trade determination for a ``group, category, 
type or class of swap''; and (2) be allowed to consider the 
determination factors under Sec. Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b) for the 
same swap on another SEF or DCM, or activity primarily or solely in 
bilateral transactions. Because each of the adopted provisions is 
permissive rather than compulsory in nature, neither should impose 
costs upon SEFs and DCMs relative to the alternative of not providing 
such allowances. SEFs and DCMs will internally analyze the costs and 
benefits before availing themselves of either provision, and forego the 
opportunity if not warranted by the perceived benefits. Should a SEF or 
DCM choose to submit a ``group, category, type or class of swap,'' the 
adopted approach would impose fewer costs than requiring a submission 
for each individual swap.
    The Commission has identified the benefits of both provisions 
relative to the alternatives of not providing such allowances. First, 
allowing a SEF or DCM to submit a determination for a group, category, 
type or class of swap would promote economies of scale and streamline 
the process for SEFs, DCMs, and the Commission; rather than submit 
separate determinations for individual swaps with similar 
characteristics, a SEF or DCM may elect to include them in a single 
filing.\255\ Based on its review, however, the Commission may approve 
or deem only part or some of the swaps within that group, category, 
type or class as available to trade. Second, allowing a SEF or DCM to 
consider activity in the same swap that is listed on another trading 
platform or in the bilateral market would yield information about how 
that swap trades in the overall market and better inform market 
participants and the Commission

[[Page 33625]]

about how the swap may trade in a centralized environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ The Commission notes that it also considers swaps as a 
group, category, type or class in other instances, such as for 
clearing determinations. See supra note 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters recommended that the Commission pursue an 
alternative approach that would establish objective threshold criteria 
for the determination factors.\256\ For example, Markit and FSR 
commented that without objective thresholds, SEFs and DCMs would not be 
able to determine that a swap is available to trade with regards to its 
liquidity.\257\ ICI and Eaton Vance Management stated that buy-side 
market participants would indirectly incur higher trading costs in the 
event that a swap with limited liquidity were to trade on a SEF or 
DCM.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ Markit Comment Letter at 3; Spring Trading Comment Letter 
at 4; AIMA Comment Letter at 4; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4; FXall 
Comment Letter at 6; Vanguard Comment Letter at 5; SIFMA AMG Comment 
Letter at 5; JPMorgan Comment Letter at 1; ISDA Comment Letter at 7; 
Eaton Vance Management Comment Letter at 3; ICI Comment Letter at 6; 
Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 6; FSR Comment Letter at 6-7.
    \257\ Markit Comment Letter at 3; FSR Comment Letter at 3, 6-7.
    \258\ ICI Comment Letter at 6; Eaton Vance Management Comment 
Letter at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission does not deem the risk of limited liquidity swaps 
becoming available to trade as significant relative to the benefits of 
the final rule's flexible approach. As such, the Commission does not 
believe that establishing objective threshold criteria would provide a 
sufficient benefit to warrant imposing additional administrative 
burdens--the Commission would first be required to determine which 
swaps (among a wide variety) may potentially be available to trade, and 
establish and update criteria for those swaps. Market participants 
would then have to fulfill the burden of processing and analyzing trade 
data to demonstrate that those criteria are met for swaps that they 
submit. The rule, as adopted, allows the Commission to consider data 
and other objective factors submitted by SEFs and DCMs, or the comments 
from other market participants during the determination process. The 
Commission will review and assess each available-to-trade submission to 
ensure that it is consistent with the CEA and the Commission's 
regulations. Further, the Commission believes that the adopted approach 
promotes greater swaps trading on SEFs and DCMs, in accordance with the 
statutory objectives of the CEA, by providing the flexibility to make 
swaps with different trading characteristics available to trade, rather 
than imposing rigid threshold criteria.
    Several commenters recommended that SEFs and DCMs must consider and 
demonstrate that a swap is available to trade based on more than one 
factor.\259\ Many of these commenters stated that SEFs and DCMs should 
be required to consider all of the enumerated factors; \260\ Vanguard 
and SIFMA AMG, for example, supported this approach because they 
believed that all of the factors are relevant in determining if a swap 
is available to trade.\261\ Bloomberg commented that the factors are 
all important indicators of an actual trading market and recommended 
mandatory consideration of all of them, given the implications of 
making a swap available to trade and potential conflicts of 
interest.\262\ FHLB commented that a determination should be based on 
multiple factors.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ FHLB Comment Letter at 3; Markit Comment Letter at 3; ICI 
Comment Letter at 5; CEWG Comment Letter at 3.
    \260\ Markit Comment Letter at 3; ISDA Comment Letter at 7; 
Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 4; FSR Comment Letter at 3; ICI 
Comment Letter at 5; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 7.
    \261\ Vanguard Comment Letter at 4; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 
5.
    \262\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4.
    \263\ FHLB Comment Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has considered the range of alternatives suggested 
by some commenters with respect to more specific or mandatory 
consideration of the determination factors, but believes that requiring 
consideration of every factor or a specific set of factors would 
require additional effort on the part of the SEFs or DCMs without 
significant added benefit.\264\ In the event that a SEF's or DCM's 
submission does not adequately support an available-to-trade 
determination, the Commission, under part 40, may request additional 
information in order to complete its review \265\ or extend the review 
period. The adopted approach achieves the goal of making swaps 
available for centralized trading, while allowing SEFs and DCMs the 
flexibility to subject swaps with different trading characteristics to 
the trade execution requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ The Commission notes that a SEF or DCM, if it chooses, may 
consider more than one factor in determining if a swap is available 
to trade.
    \265\ Under Sec. Sec.  40.5(c)(2)(ii) and 40.6(a)(8), the 
Commission may request that a registered entity to supplement the 
submission with additional information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters supported incorporating a process for 
determining whether a swap is no longer available to trade; \266\ some 
recommended using the same factors as those used to determine whether a 
swap is available to trade, albeit with objective thresholds.\267\ 
Commenters were split on the issue of applicability; some expressed 
that a determination that a swap is no longer available to trade should 
apply only to individual SEFs or DCMs,\268\ while others recommended 
that such a determination should apply on a marketwide basis, 
consistent with how the trade execution requirement is applied.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ MFA Comment Letter at 4; FXall Comment Letter at 7-8; ICI 
Comment Letter at 7; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11-12; Spring 
Trading Comment Letter at 7 (Jan. 12, 2012); ISDA Comment Letter at 
8-9; JPMorgan Comment Letter at 2.
    \267\ MFA Comment Letter at 4; ICI Comment Letter at 7-8; FXall 
Comment Letter at 7-8.
    \268\ Spring Trading Comment Letter at 7-8 (Jan. 12, 2012); SDMA 
Comment Letter at 10.
    \269\ MFA Comment Letter at 4-5; ICI Comment Letter at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that inclusion at this time of a separate 
process for determining that a swap is no longer available to trade is 
unnecessary and unwarranted by the limited, if any, benefit that would 
be afforded. In this circumstance, to impose a requirement for the last 
SEF or DCM that ceases to list a swap for trading to submit an official 
determination that the swap is no longer available to trade would be 
unnecessary.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ The Commission acknowledges the concern that the de-
listing of swaps by one or more SEFs or DCMs may affect the 
liquidity in the market for such swaps, or could be a reflection of 
reduced liquidity in such markets, and that such reduced liquidity 
could affect the costs of executing such swaps on a SEF or DCM. In 
such circumstances where swaps are de-listed by SEFs or DCMs, 
however, the Commission may review the available-to-trade status of 
such a swap under part 40 of the Commission's regulations; 
additionally, section 8a(7) of the CEA affords market participants 
an avenue to request the Commission to designate a swap as no longer 
available to trade. See supra note 140.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposed, and several commenters supported, a 
requirement that each SEF or DCM (1) conduct an annual review and 
assessment of each swap it has made available to trade to determine 
whether or not each of these swaps should continue to be available to 
trade; and (2) submit an electronic copy of the review and assessment, 
including any supporting information or data, to the Commission no 
later than 30 days after its fiscal year end. The Commission estimated 
that it would cost each DCM an additional $1,730 per review to comply 
with the proposed requirement.\271\ Some commenters recommended more 
frequent reviews in order to identify illiquid swaps on a timelier 
basis.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ 76 FR 77735.
    \272\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 8; MFA Comment Letter at 
4-5; ISDA Comment Letter at 8; AIMA Comment Letter at 2-3; Eaton 
Vance Management Comment Letter at 4; ICI Comment Letter at 7; 
Markit Comment Letter at 4; Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; JPMorgan 
Comment Letter at 2; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 11; FSR Comment 
Letter at 3-4.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 33626]]

    Other commenters, however, opposed the requirement. MarketAxess 
commented that conducting annual assessments would require SEFs and 
DCMs to allocate substantial resources.\273\ WMBAA stated that the 
proposed requirement is arbitrary, time-consuming, and offered 
insufficient regulatory value, and that the costs and burdens of an 
annual review would be higher than the Commission's projections.\274\ 
Sunguard Kiodex asserted that periodic reviews would cause swaps' 
statuses to fluctuate, therefore negating the benefit of an initial 
determination.\275\ WMBAA and SDMA alternatively recommended that a SEF 
or DCM annually renew its self-certification based on the clearing 
determination review.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 9.
    \274\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 5.
    \275\ Sunguard Kiodex Comment Letter at 2.
    \276\ SDMA Comment Letter at 10; WMBAA Comment Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In line with its reasoning for not adopting a separate process for 
determining that a swap is no longer available to trade, the Commission 
is also not adopting an annual review and assessment requirement. A 
swap will no longer be available to trade when all relevant SEFs and 
DCMs have de-listed the swap; in the ordinary course of business, the 
Commission believes that a SEF or DCM will already assess whether it 
should continue to list or offer a swap for trading. Such an assessment 
would likely consider similar factors, such as trading volume, to those 
used to determine that a swap is available to trade. Therefore, the 
Commission believes that imposing a separate review and assessment 
requirement would necessitate duplicative and costly effort with 
limited, if any, additional benefit. In response to commenters who 
support more frequent reviews to identify illiquid swaps that should no 
longer be available to trade, the Commission notes that market 
participants themselves may request that a SEF or DCM review and assess 
an available-to-trade determination. The Commission may also request 
relevant information from SEFs and DCMs to conduct a review and 
assessment.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Applicability
    Sections 37.10(c) and 38.12(c) of the final rule require that once 
a swap is deemed to be available to trade, then all other SEFs and DCMs 
listing or offering the same swap must do so in accordance with the 
trade execution requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA.\278\ The 
Commission did not identify alternatives to this requirement. Further, 
the Commission also requested, but did not receive, comments on 
alternatives to the proposed requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ See supra note 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs
    The Commission anticipates that final Sec. Sec.  37.10(c) and 
38.12(c) will impose some minimal costs for SEFs and DCMs related to 
monitoring and identifying swaps to discern whether a swap is available 
to trade on another SEF or DCM, and therefore would be subject to the 
trade execution requirement. The Commission has almost entirely 
eliminated these costs by assuming the responsibility for maintaining a 
public record of all of the swaps that are subject to the trade 
execution requirement in an accessible, central location on its Web 
site.
    The Commission solicited comments on the costs associated with 
Sec. Sec.  37.10(c) and 38.10(c) and received one comment. WMBAA stated 
that the ongoing surveillance necessary to determine which swaps have 
been made available to trade would impose excessive costs on SEFs and 
DCMs.\279\ WMBAA, however, did not provide an estimate of such costs or 
further substantiate its claim. Therefore, the Commission does not deem 
WMBAA's comment sufficient to alter its belief that these costs will be 
minimal, given that the Commission will maintain on its Web site a 
centralized list of all swaps that are available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Benefits
    Sections 37.10(c) and 38.12(c) promote trading on SEFs and DCMs, 
consistent with the trade execution requirement under section 2(h)(8) 
of the CEA. Specifically, swaps traded on a SEF will be executed as 
Required Transactions under Sec.  37.9 of the Commission's regulations, 
which means that they will be executed via an Order Book or RFQ. Swaps 
that are subject to the trade execution requirement and traded on a DCM 
must be executed pursuant to subpart J of part 38 of the Commission's 
regulations, which implements revised DCM Core Principle 9, as amended 
by section 735(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Core Principle 9 requires DCMs 
to ``provide a competitive, open, and efficient market and mechanism 
for executing transactions that protects the price discovery process of 
trading in the centralized market of the board of trade.'' Accordingly, 
market participants in these swaps will benefit from the pre-trade 
transparency and price discovery associated with trading on DCMs and 
SEFs as well as the application of other DCM and SEF core principles. 
The Commission also anticipates that greater competition among SEFs and 
DCMs will lower bid-ask spreads and transaction costs for some market 
participants.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 34 (2010) (quoting International 
Risk Analytics co-founder Christopher Whalen, ``[t]he absence of an 
exchange trading mandate provides `supra-normal returns paid to the 
dealers in the closed OTC derivatives market [and] are effectively a 
tax on other market participants, especially investors who trade on 
open, public exchanges''').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Consideration of Section 15(a) Factors--Available-to-Trade Rule
Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    In crafting the final rule to provide a method for determining that 
a swap is subject to the trade execution requirement under section 
2(h)(8) of the CEA, the Commission has endeavored to create a regime 
that foremost will protect market participants and the public. Under 
the final rule, a SEF or DCM must consider certain factors specified by 
the Commission under Sec.  37.10(b) or Sec.  38.12(b), respectively, in 
determining that a swap is available to trade. A SEF or DCM must also 
submit such determinations to the Commission, either for approval or 
under self-certification procedures, pursuant to part 40 of the 
Commission's regulations. Part 40 also requires SEFs and DCMs to post a 
notice and a copy of rule submissions on their Web site concurrent with 
the filing of the submissions with the Commission. The Commission, 
consistent with current practice, will also post SEF and DCM rule 
submission filings on its Web site. Therefore, under the final rule, 
SEFs, DCMs, and market participants will have full information about 
the factors that a SEF or DCM considered in determining that a swap is 
available to trade, the procedure for a SEF or DCM to submit a swap as 
available to trade, the swaps that are presently available to trade, 
and the progress of swaps under review. Accordingly, the final rule 
promotes the protection of market participants by ensuring transparency 
in the available-to-trade process.
    The final rule will also promote the protection of market 
participants and the public by providing for Commission review and 
encouraging public comment in appropriate circumstances. Under the 
final rule, the Commission will review the SEF's or DCM's available-to-
trade determination. To facilitate this review, part 40 requires

[[Page 33627]]

SEFs and DCMs to provide the Commission with, and to post on their Web 
sites, a brief explanation of any substantive opposing views in rule 
filings, and allow for a public comment period when warranted.
    The final rule also will promote the protection of market 
participants and the public by ensuring that transactions in swaps that 
are available to trade and subject to the trade execution requirement 
are executed on regulated SEFs and DCMs in accordance with section 
2(h)(8) of the CEA, rather than the bilateral OTC market. Therefore, 
these swaps will be transacted with the pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency that swap execution on SEFs and DCMs provide, reducing 
search costs relative to the bilateral OTC market, and potentially 
lowering bid-ask spreads.
    At the same time, the final rule will further promote the 
protection of market participants and the public by providing for a 
Commission review of the available-to-trade process. SEFs and DCMs will 
have considerable discretion on the application and consideration of 
the factors to make swaps available to trade, which may vary depending 
on the nature of the relevant swap market. This approach will enable 
SEFs and DCMs to utilize their expertise in the markets in which they 
list swaps for trading to determine which swaps should be available to 
trade, subject to Commission review of these determinations to ensure 
that they are consistent with the CEA and the Commission's regulations, 
and therefore for market participants and the public.
Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
    The final rule promotes the trading of swaps on SEFs and DCMs by 
establishing a process that specifies when a swap is available to 
trade; once a swap is deemed available to trade, that swap must be 
traded on a SEF or DCM if it is subject to the clearing requirement. 
Accordingly, the adopted process will promote market efficiency and 
competitiveness by (1) informing market participants of when the trade 
execution requirement applies and (2) prescribing the methods by which 
all market participants may execute a particular swap, depending on 
whether the trade execution requirement applies.
    The final rule further promotes market efficiency by tasking SEFs 
and DCMs with the primary responsibility and discretion to consider any 
one or several factors in determining whether a swap is available to 
trade. This approach reflects the Commission's view that SEFs and DCMs 
have (or will have) the expertise and ability to form reasonable 
conclusions about which swaps should be subject to the trade execution 
requirement and which swaps should not be traded pursuant to mandatory 
trade execution. By assigning primary responsibility to SEFs and DCMs 
in this manner--subject to Commission review to assure consistency with 
the CEA and the Commission's regulations--the Commission believes that 
the final rule further promotes both market efficiency and integrity. 
Further, by assuming the responsibility for maintaining an up-to-date 
list of swaps made available to trade, the Commission is also 
mitigating the search costs for market participants to identify whether 
a swap is available to trade on SEF or a DCM, thereby promoting the 
overall efficiency of the swaps markets for SEFs, DCMs and market 
participants.
Price Discovery
    As stated above, the final regulations are expected to promote the 
trading of swaps on SEFs and DCMs. Swaps that are subject to the 
clearing requirement must be executed on a SEF or DCM, in a manner 
consistent with the trade execution requirement, if made available to 
trade on a SEF or DCM. By providing the procedural mechanism to 
establish when a swap is available to trade--an issue on which the 
statute is silent--the rule operationalizes the trade execution 
requirement. Accordingly, the rule reinforces price discovery promoted 
through mandatory trade execution. For example, swaps traded on DCMs 
that are made available to trade would be subject to DCM Core Principle 
9, which requires DCMs to ``provide a competitive, open, and efficient 
market and mechanism for executing transactions that protects the price 
discovery process of trading in the centralized market of the board of 
trade.'' \281\ Under Sec.  37.9 of the Commission's regulations, SEFs 
will be required to provide an order book or an RFQ method of trade 
execution that offers pre-trade price transparency for swaps listed or 
offered for trading that are available to trade. This pre-trade 
transparency promotes price discovery for swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(9); subpart J of part 38 of the Commission's 
regulations, which implements revised DCM Core Principle 9, as 
amended by section 735(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sound Risk Management Practices
    The enhanced pre-trade and post-trade transparency and price 
discovery in contracts that have been made available to trade, and thus 
subject to the trade execution requirement, under the procedures set 
out in this rule will promote sound risk management practices by 
ensuring that market participants and clearing organizations are able 
to base their risk management decisions on publicly available prices 
discovered on the competitive and efficient markets offered by SEFs and 
DCMs. As trading on SEFs and DCMs is not relationship-based, as is 
typical of trading in the OTC market, market participants will have 
access to a broader range of risk management options in the form of 
swaps that are available to trade.
Other Public Interest Considerations
    The final regulations are not expected to affect public interest 
considerations other than those identified above.
2. Trade Execution Compliance Schedule
    Final Sec. Sec.  37.12 and 38.11 establishes a compliance schedule 
following a determination that a swap is subject to the trade execution 
requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA. Market participants are 
required to comply with the trade execution requirement upon the later 
of (1) the applicable deadline established under the compliance and 
implementation schedule for the clearing requirement for a swap under 
section 2(h)(1) of the CEA; \282\ or (2) 30 days after the swap is 
first made available to trade on either a SEF or DCM. Absent this final 
rule, market participants would have been required to comply with the 
trade execution requirement immediately after a swap is determined to 
be available to trade and required to be cleared. To provide further 
flexibility to registrants and market participants, the Commission is 
exercising its discretion to stagger implementation of the trade 
execution requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ The Commission has adopted the final compliance and 
implementation schedule for the clearing requirement under section 
50.25(b). Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation Schedule: 
Clearing Requirement Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 FR 44441 
(July 20, 2012). See supra note 158.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For reasons discussed below, the cost and benefits associated with 
requiring mandatory trade execution immediately upon making a swap 
available to trade and requiring it to be cleared, or after some longer 
versus shorter period of delay, are not susceptible to meaningful 
quantification. Costs and benefits associated with trade execution are 
independent of costs and benefits of implementing mandatory trade 
execution itself and pertain exclusively to the pace of implementation. 
The Commission is not aware of any analog,

[[Page 33628]]

to either an immediate or delayed requirement, to comply with the trade 
execution requirement that would produce data useful in estimating the 
difference in costs and benefits between the two approaches. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Commission identifies and 
considers the costs and benefits of this rule in qualitative terms.
Costs
    The Commission solicited comments regarding costs associated with 
Sec. Sec.  37.12 and 38.11, including the costs and benefits of any 
alternative compliance schedule proposed. Although the Commission 
requested quantification of those costs discussed, commenters did not 
provide specific estimates in dollar terms.
    The Commission recognizes that the compliance schedule entails 
certain initial costs to the market and public--in particular, a delay 
in obtaining the benefits of pre-trade price transparency and price 
discovery. The Commission believes, however, that such costs are 
warranted because incurring them at the outset facilitates the ability 
to more fully realize the intended pre-trade price transparency and 
price discovery benefits upon the compliance date and thereafter. As 
discussed below in connection with the benefits of this rule, this 
compliance schedule provides market participants with sufficient time 
to transition trading from the OTC markets to SEFs and DCMs. Absent 
this window for transition, market participants would likely encounter 
an impaired ability to manage their risks and adequately hedge their 
positions. Further, the inability of market participants to execute 
swaps on SEFs and DCMs as they engage in necessary transaction 
activities would likely reduce liquidity in certain swaps and increase 
transaction costs for other market participants.
    In response to requests for comment on the compliance schedule, 
some commenters stated that 30 days would be insufficient for market 
participants to comply with the trade execution requirement.\283\ For 
example, ISDA and AIMA expressed concern that such a compressed 
schedule would preclude market participants from hedging their 
exposures,\284\ while CME commented that DCOs, DCMs, and SEFs would not 
be able to establish technological linkages within 30 days.\285\ MFA 
stated that the Commission's compliance schedule could require 
simultaneous compliance with the trade execution requirement and the 
clearing requirement, which would require devoting resources to both 
efforts and create a significant burden.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ JPMorgan Comment Letter at 3-4; UBS Comment Letter at 2; 
ICI Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 2 
(Nov. 4, 2011); Westpac Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 4, 2011); Regional 
Banks Comment Letter at 7 (Nov. 4, 2011); FHLBanks Comment Letter at 
5 (Nov. 4, 2011); ICI Comment Letter at 9; ISDA Comment Letter at 
11; AIMA Comment Letter at 2-3; ACLI Comment Letter at 2.
    \284\ ISDA Comment Letter at 11; AIMA Comment Letter at 2-3.
    \285\ CME Comment Letter at 2 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \286\ MFA Comment Letter at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that the final rule does not impose a fixed 30-day 
requirement, the Commission disagrees that the schedule is overly 
costly or onerous. In response to commenters concerned that 30 days 
would be insufficient to achieve compliance, the Commission notes that 
the implementation period for the trade execution requirement may vary 
depending on the timing of the available-to-trade determination and the 
clearing determination. In some, if not many, instances, market 
participants will have more than 30 days after a swap is made available 
to trade to comply. For example, depending upon when a swap is deemed 
as available to trade and the amount of time a particular market 
participant is afforded to comply with the clearing requirement under 
the Commission's final schedule (90 days, 180 days, or 270 days), the 
30th day after a swap is deemed as available to trade pursuant to the 
part 40 procedures may occur prior to the date in which the market 
participant must comply with the clearing requirement. Further, part 40 
review procedures will provide market participants advance awareness 
that a swap may potentially be deemed as available to trade, during 
which time market participants logically should undertake initial 
transition planning in the event that the swap is ultimately deemed as 
available to trade.\287\ Moreover, certain prerequisite activities, 
such as establishing SEF or DCM connectivity, will be carried out 
infrequently or on a one-time basis, such that a longer implementation 
period would not be necessary when preparing to comply with the trade 
execution requirement for future swap trading.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ Similarly, where a swap first becomes subject to the 
clearing requirement before being made available to trade, the 
clearing determination would alert market participants to the fact 
that specific classes of swaps may become subject to the trade 
execution requirement.
    \288\ Under the Sec. Sec.  37.10(a)(2) and 38.12(a)(2) of the 
final rule, a SEF or DCM that submits a swap as available to trade 
must certify that it is listing it for trading on its own trading 
system or platform. This requirement will ensure that a minimum 
level of connectivity is present between a SEF or DCM and market 
participants prior to determining whether it is available to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Benefits
    The compliance schedule set forth in final Sec. Sec.  37.12 and 
38.11 will allow market participants to comply with the trade execution 
requirement in an organized and timely manner, while mitigating 
potential disruptions to trading during the transition. The schedule 
will afford market participants the opportunity to resolve logistical 
issues prior to trading swaps on a SEF or DCM,\289\ such as 
establishing connectivity to a registered trading facility or platform; 
notifying customers and completing or amending any applicable legal 
documentation; and revising internal standards and procedures. The 
additional time will facilitate a greater number of potential swap 
counterparties who are prepared to participate in centralized trading, 
thereby increasing competition, pre-trade price transparency, and price 
discovery. Increasing the number of potential market participants will 
also promote market liquidity and reduce the costs of using swaps to 
manage risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ The Commission believes that DCMs will be prepared to 
comply with the trade execution requirement to a certain extent 
because they may have the infrastructure in place to facilitate the 
trading of swaps. DCMs may require fewer technology, legal 
arrangements, and changes to operational patterns. As the Commission 
noted in the proposed rule, however, they may still have to update 
their internal policies and procedures. 76 FR 58190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consideration of Alternatives
    Tradeweb commented that 30 days may not be sufficient to achieve 
compliance for a class of swaps that is being made available to trade 
for the first time, and recommended that the Commission set an 
appropriate implementation period on a case-by-case basis, with input 
from SEFs, DCMs, and market participants.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission, however, believes that a case-by-case approach is 
neither feasible nor necessary to establish an appropriate 
implementation period for different classes of swaps. The data needed 
to precisely determine the optimal time period--accommodating a 
reasonable transition while not unduly delaying the benefits of trade 
execution--does not yet exist; such data would be obtained from the 
transition process itself. Further, the adopted approach will allow the 
Commission to accommodate a large number of submissions for different 
classes of swaps through the transition process. Accordingly, the 
Commission believes that it is more appropriate to opt for an approach 
that is flexible and provides market participants with notice and

[[Page 33629]]

certainty, rather than one that attempts to assign a definite time 
period for swaps on a case-by-case basis.
    The Commission views the ideal implementation period for a class of 
swaps to depend on, among other factors, how the class of swaps is 
defined, and the number and complexity of those swaps within that 
class. This amount of time also depends on the nature, experience, and 
resources of the market participant to whom the requirement applies. 
The Commission's adopted approach accounts for the latter consideration 
by incorporating the implementation periods for the clearing 
requirement--90, 180, and 270 days--that are based on the type of 
market participant.\291\ Where a swap first becomes subject to the 
clearing requirement before being made available to trade, the clearing 
determination would alert market participants to the fact that specific 
classes of swaps may become subject to the trade execution requirement. 
Therefore, the rule as adopted addresses Tradeweb's concern by 
providing sufficient flexibility to accommodate different classes of 
swaps, without the added complexity of instituting an compliance 
schedule that applies on a case-by-case basis. In contrast, a case-by-
case approach would likely increase the administrative burden by 
requiring an additional review and determination process, thereby 
further delaying the benefits of the trade execution requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \291\ See supra note 158.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters recommended a longer implementation period, 
i.e., more than 30 days after a swap is made available to trade, 
ranging from 90 to 180 days after a swap is made available to 
trade.\292\ Some commenters also recommended establishing the 
implementation period after the swap becomes subject to the trade 
execution requirement.\293\ Other commenters recommended that the trade 
execution requirement should not apply until full implementation of the 
clearing requirement.\294\ Commenters generally stated that lengthening 
the implementation period would provide market participants with 
adequate time to establish new infrastructure, standards, and 
procedures;\295\ develop adequate connectivity \296\ and obtain trading 
access;\297\ and complete documentation and agreements.\298\ Tradeweb, 
however, stated that 30 days would be adequate to comply with the trade 
execution requirement for individual swaps.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ FXall Comment Letter at 7; ICI Comment Letter at 9; CME 
Comment Letter at 6-7; Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; Bloomberg 
Comment Letter at 5; Westpac Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 4, 2011); 
Chatham Comment Letter at 4; FSR Comment Letter at 4.
    \293\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9; Eaton Vance Management 
Comment Letter at 3; ISDA Comment Letter at 11; Westpac Comment 
Letter at 3 (Nov. 4, 2011); FHLBanks Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 
2011).
    \294\ AIMA Comment Letter at 3 (Nov. 3, 2011); MarkitSERV 
Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011); Citadel Comment Letter at 5 
(Nov. 4, 2011); MFA Comment Letter at 7 (Nov. 4, 2011); Vanguard 
Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \295\ JPMorgan Comment Letter at 3-4; ISDA Comment Letter at 11; 
FHLBanks Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011); Westpac Comment Letter 
at 2-3 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \296\ FSR Comment Letter at 4; Bloomberg Comment Letter at 5; 
ICI Comment Letter at 8; ISDA Comment Letter at 11; Eaton Vance 
Management Comment Letter at 3; Chatham Comment Letter at 4; SIFMA 
AMG Comment Letter at 9; CME Comment Letter at 6-7; Westpac Comment 
Letter at 3 (Nov. 21, 2011); ICI Comment Letter at 5 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \297\ MFA Comment Letter at 4; Vanguard Comment Letter at 6; 
SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9; AIMA Comment Letter at 3; CME Comment 
Letter at 6-7.
    \298\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9; ICI Comment Letter at 9; 
AIMA Comment Letter at 3; CME Comment Letter at 7; ISDA Comment 
Letter at 11; Westpac Comment Letter at 3; FIA/ISDA/SIFMA Comment 
Letter at 8 (Nov. 4, 2011).
    \299\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 4 (Nov. 4, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the adopted approach appropriately 
balances the benefits of attaining mandatory trade execution as 
expeditiously as possible with the need for sufficient preparation time 
for compliance. As noted above, 30 days represents a minimum duration 
of time provided for compliance. Depending on when a swap is submitted 
and deemed available to trade, market participants may also utilize the 
time afforded under the clearing implementation schedule to complete 
the requisite activities necessary to trade on a SEF or DCM. The 
Commission also notes that the final rule requires that a SEF or DCM 
submitting a swap as available to trade must already list it for 
trading. This requirement will ensure that a minimum level of 
connectivity is present between a SEF or DCM and market participants 
prior to determining whether it is available to trade.
Consideration of Section 15(a) Factors--Trade Execution Compliance 
Schedule Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    An extended implementation period will help facilitate an orderly 
transition of swaps trading to a centralized market structure. The 
inability of SEFs and DCMs to comply with the trade execution 
requirement by any particular designated date risks excluding market 
participants from transacting swaps that are subject to mandatory trade 
execution; this would reduce overall liquidity and increase the costs 
of executing those swaps for other market participants. Thus, absent a 
reasonable implementation schedule, market participants could 
potentially be exposed to higher market risk due to increased costs of 
hedging their positions or the inability to hedge their positions. The 
implementation period allows for timely compliance and protects market 
participants by mitigating the potential disruptions to the transition 
to trading on a SEF or DCM.
Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
    The implementation period promotes efficiency in the markets by 
providing additional time for market participants to identify and 
resolve technical or logistical issues related to trading on a SEF or 
DCM in a manner consistent with the trade execution requirement. By 
enabling a broader group of market participants to comply with the 
trade execution requirement in a timely manner, the implementation 
period will facilitate competition in the centralized market, which in 
turn will promote greater pre-trade price transparency and price 
integrity in the market.
Price Discovery
    By providing adequate time to prepare for such trading, the 
implementation period will facilitate an orderly transition to 
centralized trading and mitigate instances in which some market 
participants would not be prepared to enter the market by the given 
compliance date. In doing so, the Commission is affording the 
opportunity for the maximum number of potential swap counterparties to 
participate, thereby enhancing the price discovery process.
Sound Risk Management Practices
    The implementation period reflected in the final rule should ensure 
that market participants have adequate time to comply with the trade 
execution requirement and will be prepared to transact swaps on a SEF 
or DCM. As a result, market participants should be able to maintain 
hedges that have been executed through swap transactions, thereby 
mitigating market and counterparty risks. Moreover, a compliance 
schedule that facilitates SEF and DCM swap execution by the greatest 
number of potential market participants, as does the final rule, 
indirectly promotes market liquidity, thereby reducing the overall 
costs of utilizing swaps for risk management purposes.

[[Page 33630]]

Other Public Interest Considerations
    The final regulations are not expected to affect public interest 
considerations other than those identified above.

V. List of Commenters

1. Alternative Investment Management Association (``AIMA'')
2. Americans for Financial Reform (``AFR'')
3. American Council of Life Insurers (``ACLI'')
4. Asset Management Group, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (``SIFMA AMG'')
5. Bloomberg
6. CBOE Futures Exchange (``CBOE'')
7. Chatham Financial (``Chatham'')
8. Chris Barnard
9. Citadel
10. CME Group (``CME'')
11. Commercial Energy Working Group (``CEWG'')
12. Eaton Vance Management
13. Federal Home Loan Banks (``FHLB'')
14. Fifth Third Bank, PNC Bank, Regions Bank, U.S. Bank National 
Association (``Regional Banks'')
15. Financial Services Roundtable (``FSR'')
16. Futures Industry Association (``FIA'')
17. FX Alliance (``FXall'')
18. Geneva Energy Markets, LLC
19. ICAP
20. International Swaps and Derivatives Association (``ISDA'')
21. Investment Company Institute (``ICI'')
22. Javelin Capital Markets
23. JP Morgan
24. Managed Funds Association (``MFA'')
25. MarketAxess Holdings, Inc. (``MarketAxess'')
26. Markit
27. MarkitSERV
28. Morgan Stanley
29. ODEX Group, Inc. (``ODEX'')
30. Spring Trading, LLC (``Spring Trading'')
31. Swaps & Derivatives Market Association (``SDMA'')
32. Sunguard Kiodex LLC (``Sunguard Kiodex'')
33. Tradeweb Markets LLC (``Tradeweb'')
34. UBS Securities LLC (``UBS'')
35. Vanguard
36. Westpac Banking Corporation (``Westpac'')
37. Wholesale Markets Brokers' Association, Americas (``WMBAA'')

List of Subjects

17 CFR Part 37

    Registered entities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Swap 
execution facilities, Swaps.

17 CFR Part 38

    Designated contract markets, Registered entities, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Swaps.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Commission amends 17 
CFR part 37 and part 38 as follows:

PART 37--SWAP EXECUTION FACILITIES

0
1. The authority citation for part 37 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6c, 7, 7a-2, 7b-3 and 12a, as 
amended by Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).


0
2. Subpart A, as amended elsewhere in this issue of the Federal 
Register, is further amended by adding Sec. Sec.  37.10 through 37.12 
to read as follows:

Subpart A--General Provisions

Sec.
* * * * *
37.10 Process for a swap execution facility to make a swap available 
to trade.
37.11 [Reserved].
37.12 Trade execution compliance schedule.


Sec.  37.10  Process for a swap execution facility to make a swap 
available to trade.

    (a)(1) Required submission. A swap execution facility that makes a 
swap available to trade in accordance with paragraph (b) of this 
section, shall submit to the Commission its determination with respect 
to such swap as a rule, as that term is defined by Sec.  40.1 of this 
chapter, pursuant to the procedures under part 40 of this chapter.
    (2) Listing requirement. A swap execution facility that makes a 
swap available to trade must demonstrate that it lists or offers that 
swap for trading on its trading system or platform.
    (b) Factors to consider. To make a swap available to trade, for 
purposes of section 2(h)(8) of the Act, a swap execution facility shall 
consider, as appropriate, the following factors with respect to such 
swap:
    (1) Whether there are ready and willing buyers and sellers;
    (2) The frequency or size of transactions;
    (3) The trading volume;
    (4) The number and types of market participants;
    (5) The bid/ask spread; or
    (6) The usual number of resting firm or indicative bids and offers.
    (c) Applicability. Upon a determination that a swap is available to 
trade on any swap execution facility or designated contract market 
pursuant to part 40 of this chapter, all other swap execution 
facilities and designated contract markets shall comply with the 
requirements of section 2(h)(8)(A) of the Act in listing or offering 
such swap for trading.
    (d) Removal--(1) Determination. The Commission may issue a 
determination that a swap is no longer available to trade upon 
determining that no swap execution facility or designated contract 
market lists such swap for trading.
    (2) Delegation of Authority. (i) The Commission hereby delegates, 
until it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight or such other employee or employees as the Director may 
designate from time to time, the authority to issue a determination 
that a swap is no longer available to trade.
    (ii) The Director may submit to the Commission for its 
consideration any matter that has been delegated in this section. 
Nothing in this section prohibits the Commission, at its election, from 
exercising the authority delegated in this section.


Sec.  37.11  [Reserved].


Sec.  37.12  Trade execution compliance schedule.

    (a) A swap transaction shall be subject to the requirements of 
section 2(h)(8) of the Act upon the later of:
    (1) The applicable deadline established under the compliance 
schedule provided under Sec.  50.25(b) of this chapter; or
    (2) Thirty days after the available-to-trade determination 
submission or certification for that swap is, respectively, deemed 
approved under Sec.  40.5 of this chapter or deemed certified under 
Sec.  40.6 of this chapter.
    (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any counterparty from 
complying voluntarily with the requirements of section 2(h)(8) of the 
Act sooner than as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.

PART 38--DESIGNATED CONTRACT MARKETS

0
3. The authority citation for part 38 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6c, 6d, 6e, 6f, 6g, 6i, 6j, 
6k, 6l, 6m, 6n, 7, 7a-2, 7b, 7b-1, 7b-3, 8, 9, 15, and 21, as 
amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
4. Add Sec.  38.11 to subpart A to read as follows:

[[Page 33631]]

Sec.  38.11  Trade execution compliance schedule.

    (a) A swap transaction shall be subject to the requirements of 
section 2(h)(8) of the Act upon the later of:
    (1) The applicable deadline established under the compliance 
schedule provided under Sec.  50.25(b) of this chapter; or
    (2) Thirty days after the available-to-trade determination 
submission or certification for that swap is, respectively, deemed 
approved under Sec.  40.5 of this chapter or deemed certified under 
Sec.  40.6 of this chapter.
    (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any counterparty from 
complying voluntarily with the requirements of section 2(h)(8) of the 
Act sooner than as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.

0
5. Add Sec.  38.12 to subpart A to read as follows:


Sec.  38.12  Process for a designated contract market to make a swap 
available to trade.

    (a)(1) Required submission. A designated contract market that makes 
a swap available to trade in accordance with paragraph (b) of this 
section, shall submit to the Commission its determination with respect 
to such swap as a rule, as that term is defined by Sec.  40.1 of this 
chapter, pursuant to the procedures under part 40 of this chapter.
    (2) Listing requirement. A designated contract market that makes a 
swap available to trade must demonstrate that it lists or offers that 
swap for trading on its trading system or platform.
    (b) Factors to consider. To make a swap available to trade, for 
purposes of section 2(h)(8) of the Act, a designated contract market 
shall consider, as appropriate, the following factors with respect to 
such swap:
    (1) Whether there are ready and willing buyers and sellers;
    (2) The frequency or size of transactions;
    (3) The trading volume;
    (4) The number and types of market participants;
    (5) The bid/ask spread; or
    (6) The usual number of resting firm or indicative bids and offers.
    (c) Applicability. (1) Upon a determination that a swap is 
available to trade on any designated contract market or swap execution 
facility pursuant to part 40 of this chapter, all other designated 
contract markets and swap execution facilities shall comply with the 
requirements of section 2(h)(8)(A) of the Act in listing or offering 
such swap for trading.
    (d) Removal--(1) Determination. The Commission may issue a 
determination that a swap is no longer available to trade upon 
determining that no swap execution facility or designated contract 
market lists such swap for trading.
    (2) Delegation of Authority. (i) The Commission hereby delegates, 
until it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight or such other employee or employees as the Director may 
designate from time to time, the authority to issue a determination 
that a swap is no longer available to trade.
    (ii) The Director may submit to the Commission for its 
consideration any matter that has been delegated in this section. 
Nothing in this section prohibits the Commission, at its election, from 
exercising the authority delegated in this section.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on May 17, 2013, by the Commission.
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
Deputy Secretary of the Commission.

    Note:  The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendices To Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap 
Execution Facility to Make a Swap Available to Trade, Swap Transaction 
Compliance and Implementation Schedule, and Trade Execution Requirement 
Under the Commodity Exchange Act--Commission Voting Summary and 
Statements of Commissioners

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton and 
Wetjen voted in the affirmative; Commissioners Sommers and O'Malia 
voted in the negative.

Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler

    I support the final rulemaking to implement a process for swap 
execution facilities (SEFs) and designated contract markets (DCMs) 
to ``make a swap available to trade'' (MAT). Today's rule also 
finalizes the Commission's separate rule proposal to phase in 
compliance for the trade execution requirement.
    Completion of these two rules facilitates the congressionally 
mandated critical reform promoting pre-trade transparency in the 
swaps market.
    The trade execution provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires that swaps be traded on 
SEFs or DCMs if they are (1) subject to mandatory clearing, and (2) 
made available to trade. Such platforms allow multiple participants 
the ability to trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by 
multiple participants with all participants given impartial access 
to the market.
    The MAT rule establishes a flexible process for a SEF or DCM to 
make a swap available to trade. The SEFs and DCMs first will 
determine which swaps they wish to make available to be traded on 
their platforms. Then these determinations will be submitted to the 
Commission either as self-certified by the trading platform or for 
approval under the Commission's Part 40 rules.
    The phase-in rule would provide market participants with 30 days 
after the SEF's or DCM's self-certification or submission is deemed 
approved prior to such swaps being subject to the trade execution 
mandate.
    Those swaps that are made available to trade and thus subject to 
the trade execution requirement will be publicly posted on the 
Commission's Web site.

Appendix 3--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia--May 
16, 2013

    I respectfully dissent from the Commission's approval today of 
the rule establishing Process for a Designated Contract Market or 
Swap Execution Facility to Make a Swap Available to Trade under 
Section 2(h)(8) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).
    I supported the proposed rule because I wanted to solicit public 
comment and engage market participants in an open discussion on how 
the Commission should implement the available-to-trade provision in 
section 2(h)(8) of the CEA.
    During the comment period, the Commission received 33 comment 
letters and held a roundtable \300\ to solicit public views on this 
matter. The commenters provided various recommendations but in 
general virtually all of them rejected the proposal; the Commission 
would be hard pressed to point to one comment letter that supported 
the Commission's approach. Unfortunately, despite this strong 
feedback from the public, the Commission has chosen to follow its 
original proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ January 30, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I recognize the challenge that the Commission is facing in 
interpreting the ``make available to trade'' provision. 
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide the Commission with any 
guidance as to how and under what conditions the trade execution 
mandate must be triggered. Nevertheless, a lack of direction from 
Congress should not be an excuse for the Commission to come up with 
an unworkable rule.
    As I explain below, the rule provides illusory comfort that the 
Commission will have a legal authority to review and, if necessary, 
challenge a mandatory trading determination made by a Swap Execution 
Facility (SEF) or Designated Contract Market (DCM). In fact, the 
only authority that the Commission has is to ``rubber stamp'' a SEF 
or DCM's initial determination.

Sections 40.5 and 40.6 of the Commission's Regulations Do Not Provide 
an Appropriate Avenue for a Made Available-to-Trade Determination

    I have deep reservations about the process that the Commission 
is proposing for ``making a swap available to trade.''
    First, the Commission's determination under the rule approval 
process (Sec.  40.5) or the rule certification process (Sec.  40.6) 
is

[[Page 33632]]

intended to apply to only one particular DCM or SEF that requested 
such rule approval or submitted such rule certification. However, 
under this rule, an available-to-trade determination has a far 
reaching effect. It binds not only the requesting SEF or DCM but the 
entire market, thus forcing all SEFs and all DCMs to trade a 
particular swap by using more restrictive methods of execution.
    Second, the Part 40 process does not give the Commission any 
legal authority to object to a SEF or DCM's made available-to-trade 
determination. Under the rule approval procedures, the Commission 
must approve a rule unless such rule is inconsistent with the CEA or 
the Commission's regulations.\301\ Similarly, a new rule subject to 
stay will become effective, pursuant to its certification, unless 
the rule is inconsistent with the CEA or the Commission's 
regulations.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \301\ Commission Regulation Sec.  40.5(b)
    \302\ Commission Regulation Sec.  40.6(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    How will the Commission be able to point to a provision in the 
CEA or in the regulations that is inconsistent with one or all 
subjective factors?

The Commission's Determinations Must Be Based on Objective Criteria

    In essence, the rule allows a SEF or a DCM to make a made 
available-to-trade determination based solely on factors it deems 
relevant, while ignoring other considerations that may be of vital 
importance to the trading liquidity of a particular contract. The 
Commission needs to require more than a simple ``consideration'' of 
these factors.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \303\ Commission Regulations Sec.  37.10(b) and 38.12(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The lack of specific objective criteria for determining trading 
liquidity introduces uncertainty into the market and makes it 
unfeasible for the Commission to have any meaningful regulatory 
oversight over the made available-to-trade determination process.

The Commission's Factors Are Not Supported by Data

    I agree with the commenters who requested that the Commission 
implement a pilot program or perform an in-depth study of various 
classes of swaps to determine the appropriate criteria for a made 
available-to-trade determination.\304\ A better approach would be 
for the Commission to review trading data currently submitted to the 
Commission pursuant to the Swap Data Repository (SDR) rules and 
after thorough analysis, come up with objective criteria that would 
define trading liquidity. Instead, the Commission chose to implement 
a flawed process that does not lead to any substantive analysis of 
trading liquidity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ Tradeweb Markets Comment Letter at 3-5 (Feb. 13, 2012); 
ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 8-9 (March 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission Failed to Establish a Process for Removing Made 
Available-to-Trade Determinations

    Without providing any reasoning, the Commission has decided that 
only after all SEFs and all DCMs have de-listed a particular swap, 
will such swap be deemed by the Commission to be no longer 
available-to-trade.\305\ This process lacks any logical or legal 
basis and is the exact opposite of what is required to make the 
initial available-to-trade determination. The initial made 
available-to-trade determination provides that, if one SEF or DCM 
determines a swap to be made available to trade, then such swap is 
deemed to be made available-to-trade on all SEFs or DCMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ Commission Regulations Sec. Sec.  37.10(c), 37.10(d), 
38.12(c), 38.12(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Again, the Commission neglects to analyze swap transaction data 
that it receives from SDRs. In my view, if a swap does not have 
sufficient trading liquidity to be traded in a more restrictive 
manner on a SEF or DCM, as determined by the Commission's broader 
view of market trading data, then such product must be determined by 
the Commission to be no longer available-to-trade.

Conclusion

    Due to the above concerns, I respectfully dissent from the 
decision of the Commission to approve this final rule for 
publication in the Federal Register.

[FR Doc. 2013-12250 Filed 6-3-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P