[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 106 (Monday, June 3, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33146-33148]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-13047]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Safety Advisory 2013-04]


Importance of Clear Safety Procedures for Temporary Removal From 
Service of Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Warning Systems and Wayside 
Signal Systems

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory 2013-04 to reemphasize the 
importance of clear and precise railroad safety procedures to ensure 
the safety of the traveling public and railroad employees when highway-
rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside signal systems are 
temporarily removed from service for purposes of testing, inspection, 
maintenance, or repair. FRA previously made related recommendations to 
railroads regarding the importance of clear safety procedures to ensure 
the safety of highway-rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside 
signal systems in Safety Advisory 2002-01.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Hartman, Staff Director, Signal 
and Train Control Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, 
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (phone: 202-493-
6225, email: [email protected]), or Kathryn Shelton, Trial 
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20590 (phone: 202-493-6063, email: 
[email protected]).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    Highway-rail grade crossing warning devices and wayside train 
signals are among the most important safety systems in the railroad 
industry for preventing train collisions and highway-rail grade 
crossing accidents. Despite the high degree of reliability of these

[[Page 33147]]

systems, failures occasionally do occur. FRA regulations (Title 49 Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 234 and 236) require that grade 
crossing warning devices and wayside signals operate on the ``fail 
safe'' or ``closed circuit'' principle, which causes a system to revert 
to its safest state in the event of a failure or malfunction of a vital 
component of the system. In practical terms, fail-safe operations mean 
the grade crossing warning devices will activate to stop traffic or a 
wayside signal will stop train movement in the event of a component 
failure. However, under certain circumstances, particularly where human 
error is involved, the fail-safe features can be deactivated or 
circumvented, creating the potential for an accident. FRA has found 
that serious highway-rail grade crossing accidents and false proceed 
signal failures have occurred due to human error.
    FRA acknowledges that the railroad industry has long recognized the 
importance of having well-defined safety procedures in place to ensure 
safety when highway-rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside 
signal systems have been temporarily removed from service for purposes 
of testing, inspection, maintenance, or repair. Most railroads have had 
such safety procedures in place for many years. In 2002, FRA published 
a safety advisory about the importance of having clear safety 
procedures for the temporary removal of highway-rail grade crossing 
systems and wayside signal systems from service. Safety Advisory 2002-
01 \1\ was issued in response to a series of grade crossing accidents 
that also involved the failure of railroad personnel to follow 
appropriate safety procedures for the temporary removal of highway-rail 
grade crossing warning systems from service. Nevertheless, FRA remains 
concerned that grade crossing accidents and false proceed signal 
failures continue to occur. Thus, FRA believes it is necessary to 
reemphasize to the railroad industry the importance of reviewing and 
re-evaluating their existing safety procedures related to these events.
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    \1\ 67 FR 3258 (Jan. 23, 2002).
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    Over the past year, two serious incidents have resulted from the 
failure of railroad personnel to follow appropriate safety procedures 
when removing grade crossing warning devices and wayside signal systems 
from service for repair. A brief review of these incidents may help 
illustrate the critical importance of railroads having clear and 
precise safety procedures in place when testing, inspecting, 
maintaining, or repairing highway-rail grade crossing warning systems 
and wayside signal systems.\2\
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    \2\ Additional information pertaining to these incidents can be 
obtained from National Transportation Safety Board Safety 
Recommendations R-13-3 and -4.
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    One incident involved a fatal collision between a southbound 
passenger train and an automobile that was eastbound at a highway-rail 
grade crossing. At the time of the collision, two railroad signal 
employees were working on the grade crossing warning system. The 
warning system had been removed from service and did not activate as 
the train approached the crossing. The train was equipped with a 
forward-facing video camera that recorded (1) that the gate arms were 
in the upright position, and (2) that the grade crossing warning lights 
were deactivated as the train traveled through the highway-rail grade 
crossing and struck the automobile. The automobile driver was fatally 
injured as a result of the collision.
    The second incident involved the derailment of a passenger train 
that had entered a yard track from the main track. Locomotive video- 
and event-recorder data show that the passenger train was proceeding on 
a clear signal through a power-operated switch that had been aligned in 
the reverse position toward the yard. After traveling at a speed of 61 
mph through a turnout that was limited to 15 mph for movement onto a 5 
mph yard track, the passenger train derailed about 254 feet beyond the 
power-operated switch. Four cars and two locomotives derailed upright 
and emergency responders reported that 14 persons were injured, 8 of 
whom were transported to area hospitals.
    Preliminary information indicates that a signal employee was 
performing troubleshooting activities with jumper wires inside the 
signal bungalow just before the derailment. The signal employee was 
applying a jumper wire to energize the circuit that verified the 
position of a power-operated switch. This circumvented the signal 
system's ability to verify that the power-operated switch was aligned 
and locked in the correct position for the displayed signal aspect.
    Both of the occurrences discussed above resulted from interference 
with the normal functioning of the systems without measures being taken 
to provide for the safety of highway traffic and train operations that 
depend on the normal functioning of such systems. FRA is very concerned 
about these recent incidents and believes that issuance of this safety 
advisory is necessary in order to once again draw the attention of the 
railroad industry to this issue with the intent to reduce the 
likelihood of similar incidents occurring in the future.
    Failure to provide for the safety of highway traffic and train 
operations during all periods while the normal functioning of a system 
is interfered with is a violation of Federal rail safety regulations 
(see 49 CFR 234.209 and 236.4). FRA believes these requirements are 
vital to ensuring the safety of railroad employees, highway users, and 
the general public. Accordingly, when a system is completely or 
partially deactivated without adequate protective measures being taken, 
FRA will take firm enforcement action, which could include civil 
penalties against the companies or individuals responsible or both. 
However, preventing such serious failures in the first place is our 
primary goal and the consistent application of proper procedures is 
critical to achieving that goal.
    Railroads need to have clear and precise procedures for temporarily 
removing grade crossing warning devices and wayside signal systems from 
service when performing repairs, tests, inspections, or maintenance. 
These procedures need to address the use of jumper wires, where 
applicable, and should also help ensure that grade crossing warning 
devices and wayside signal systems are properly tested and known to be 
in proper working order before they are restored to service. Most 
railroads already have such procedures in place; however, in light of 
the incidents noted above, FRA believes that railroads should review 
existing procedures to ensure that they are adequate and should take 
steps to ensure that these safety procedures are followed.

Use of Jumper Wires

    There are situations where it may be necessary to temporarily 
circumvent the normal functioning of a grade crossing warning or 
wayside signal system. These situations include testing, inspection, 
maintenance, and repair of grade crossing warning systems or wayside 
signal systems, maintenance-of-way activity, and trains standing within 
a warning system's approach circuit for extended periods. A common 
method of circumventing the normal functioning of a grade crossing 
warning or wayside signal system is the application of jumper wires, 
which is appropriate when done in a safe manner.
    In situations involving grade crossing warning systems, it is 
critical that the system's credibility be maintained. For example, if 
maintenance-of-way work is being performed on trackage that is part

[[Page 33148]]

of a highway-rail grade crossing warning system's train detection 
circuit without the application of jumper wires, it is highly probable 
that the warning system will activate. This indicates to motorists that 
it is not safe to cross the railroad tracks when, in fact, no train is 
approaching the crossing. The integrity of the warning system would be 
compromised by the conveyance of false information to motorists, such 
that in the future, they would not necessarily comply with the warning 
system indications. Appropriate use of jumper wires or other safe means 
of circumventing the normal functioning of the system thus prevents the 
incorrect warning from being displayed to motorists. Safety is also 
maintained as long as measures are taken to provide for the safety of 
motorists and train operations.
    Temporary removal from service of grade crossing warning devices 
and wayside signal systems--through the application of jumpers or other 
means--is a safe practice, when combined with protective measures for 
highway traffic and train operations. FRA has reviewed some of the 
safety procedures for disabling grade crossing warning devices and 
wayside signal systems that are in place on the major railroads to 
determine ``best practices'' that have been developed in the industry. 
We found that the most effective safety procedures include the 
following items: (1) Requirements for signal employees to obtain proper 
authority from the train dispatcher or other appropriate personnel 
responsible for the movement of trains through the territory before 
disabling a grade crossing warning or wayside signal system; (2) 
documentation of the authority to disable the grade crossing warning or 
wayside signal system; (3) a requirement that all disabled grade 
crossing warning and wayside signal systems must be properly inspected 
and tested to ensure proper operation before being restored to service; 
and (4) a procedure for signal employees to verify with the train 
dispatcher or other appropriate personnel responsible for the movement 
of trains through the territory that the grade crossing warning system 
or wayside signal system has been properly tested before being restored 
to service.
    To mitigate the risks inherent with circumventing the normal 
functioning of a system, FRA believes it is important that individual 
railroads have standard procedures in place before interfering with the 
normal operation of a grade crossing warning or wayside signal system.

Recommended Actions

    In recognition of the need to ensure safety, FRA strongly 
recommends that:
    1. Each railroad responsible for the proper operation of a highway-
rail grade crossing warning system or wayside signal system review and 
evaluate its specific railroadwide instructions for the proper method 
for temporary removal of these systems from service. These instructions 
should address the following items:
    a. The manner in which the deactivation is authorized.
    b. The personnel designated to authorize deactivation.
    c. The protocols for notifying appropriate persons, especially 
personnel responsible for the movement of trains, that a grade crossing 
warning system or wayside signal system has been temporarily removed 
from service.
    d. The appropriate methods of providing for the safety of train 
movements while the grade crossing warning system or wayside signal 
system is temporarily removed from service.
    e. The requirements necessary to perform an inspection and 
operational test of the pertinent system components before restoring 
the grade crossing warning system or wayside signal system to service.
    f. The protocols for documenting and notifying appropriate persons 
that the grade crossing warning system or wayside signal system has 
been properly tested and restored to service.
    2. Each railroad provide regular periodic training to all affected 
employees to ensure their understanding of instructions for the proper 
procedures for the temporary removal from service of grade crossing 
warning or wayside signal systems, including the proper use of jumper 
wires.
    FRA encourages railroad industry members to take actions that are 
consistent with the preceding recommendations, and to take other 
complementary actions to help ensure the safety of the Nation's 
railroad employees. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2013-04, issue 
additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate actions 
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's 
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its rail 
safety authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on May 28, 2013.
Robert C. Lauby,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Regulatory and Legislative 
Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013-13047 Filed 5-31-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P