interphone controller, speaker drive module, overhead electronics units, and seat electronics unit. The NPRM resulted from an IFE systems review. The proposed actions were intended to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment in the event of smoke or flames. The flightcrew’s inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-essential electrical systems in the event of smoke or flames could result in the inability to control smoke or flames in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation.

Actions Since NPRM (76 FR 5505, February 1, 2011) Was Issued

Since we issued the NPRM (76 FR 5505, February 1, 2011), we have received new data that indicates the unsafe condition would not be adequately addressed by the proposed action. Subsequently, we are considering issuing new rulemaking that positively addresses the unsafe condition identified in the NPRM and eliminates the need for the actions proposed in the NPRM.

FAA’s Conclusions

Upon further consideration, we have determined that the unsafe condition still exists, however, we intend to address it with new AD rulemaking. Accordingly, the NPRM (76 FR 5505, February 1, 2011) is withdrawn.

Withdrawal of the NPRM (76 FR 5505, February 1, 2011) does not preclude the FAA from issuing another related action or commit the FAA to any course of action in the future.

Regulatory Impact

Since this action only withdraws an NPRM (76 FR 5505, February 1, 2011), it is neither a proposed nor a final rule and therefore is not covered under Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979).

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Withdrawal


Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 1, 2013.

Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion

We proposed to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) with a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for a new AD for certain Model 777–200 series airplanes. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 1, 2011 (76 FR 5503). The NPRM would have required installing a new circuit breaker, relays, and wiring to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the IFE systems and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment, and doing other specified actions. The actions included replacing the cabin area control panels; changing the wiring; modifying the purser station or the A–4 galley, as applicable; installing new cabin system management unit, cabin area control panel, overhead electronics unit, and zone management units operational software, as applicable; and making a change to the cabin services system (CSS) configuration database and installing the new database in the CSS components. That NPRM would also have required changing the wiring at the cabin management system in the purser station. The NPRM resulted from an IFE systems review. The proposed actions were intended to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment in the event of smoke or flames. The flightcrew’s inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-essential electrical systems in the event of smoke or flames could result in the inability to control smoke or flames in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation.

Actions Since NPRM (76 FR 5503, February 1, 2011) Was Issued

Since we issued the NPRM (76 FR 5503, February 1, 2011), we have received new data that indicates the unsafe condition would not be adequately addressed by the proposed action. Subsequently, we are considering issuing new rulemaking that positively addresses the unsafe condition identified in the NPRM and...
eliminates the need for the actions proposed in the NPRM.

**FAA’s Conclusions**

Upon further consideration, we have determined that the unsafe condition still exists, however, we intend to address it with new AD rulemaking. Accordingly, the NPRM (76 FR 5503, February 1, 2011) is withdrawn.

Withdrawal of the NPRM (76 FR 5503, February 1, 2011) does not preclude the FAA from issuing another related action or commit the FAA to any course of action in the future.

**Regulatory Impact**

Since this action only withdraws an NPRM (76 FR 5503, February 1, 2011), it is neither a proposed nor a final rule and therefore is not covered under Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979).

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Aircraft transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**The Withdrawal**


Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 1, 2013.

Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013–09429 Filed 4–19–13; 8:45 am]

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**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

14 CFR Part 39


RIN 2120–AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter France Helicopters**

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS355F, BA, B1, B2, B3, and D, and Model AS355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain tail rotor (T/R) blades. This proposed AD would require installing additional rivets to secure each T/R blade trailing edge tab (tab), and inspecting for evidence of debonding of the tab after the rivets are installed. This proposed AD is prompted by reports of T/R blade tab debonding. The actions specified by this proposed AD are intended to prevent loss of a T/R blade tab, which could result in excessive vibration and loss of control of the helicopter.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 21, 2013.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- **Federal eRulemaking Docket:** Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
- **Fax:** 202–493–2251.
- **Mail:** Send comments to the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590–0001.
- **Hand Delivery:** Deliver to the “Mail” address between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

**Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact American Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641–0000 or (800) 232–0323; fax (972) 641–3775; or at http://www.eurocopter.com/techpub. You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2001 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Gary Roach, Aviation Safety Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222–5110; email gary.b.roach@faa.gov.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Comments Invited**

We invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit only one time.

We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.

**Discussion**

The Direction Generale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the aviation authority for France, has issued DGAC AD No. F–2004–176, dated November 10, 2004, for the Eurocopter AS 350B, BA, BB, B1, B2, B3, and D helicopters, fitted with certain T/R blades. DGAC has also issued AD No. F–2004–176, dated November 10, 2004, for the Eurocopter Model AS 355F, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain T/R blades. DGAC advises of reports of T/R blade tab debonding, and that the loss of the tab leads to a significant increase in the aircraft’s vibration level. As a result, the ADs mandate compliance with the manufacturer’s service information to install additional rivets on the tabs.

**FAA’s Determination**

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, the European Aviation Safety Agency, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the DGAC AD. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all known relevant information and determined that an unsafe condition is likely to