[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 71 (Friday, April 12, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21879-21891]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-08525]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Chapter I

[PS Docket No. 13-75; PS Docket No. 11-60; FCC 13-33]


Improving 9-1-1 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of 
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Communications Commission proposes a range of 
approaches to ensure that providers of 9-1-1 communications services 
implement best practices and other sound engineering principles to 
improve the reliability and resiliency of the Nation's 9-1-1 networks. 
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also proposes amendments to the 
Commission's current rules to clarify and add specificity to service 
providers' obligations to notify 9-1-1 call centers of communications 
outages. This action follows an inquiry by the Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau into widespread 9-1-1 service outages during 
the ``derecho'' windstorm that affected large portions of the United 
States in June 2012, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current 
9-1-1 network configuration and service provider maintenance practices. 
The Commission requests comment on these proposals to improve the 
reliability and resiliency of 9-1-1 networks and ensure that 9-1-1 call 
centers receive timely and actionable notification of service outages.

DATES: Submit comments on or before May 13, 2013 and reply comments by 
May 28, 2013. Written comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed 
information collection requirements must be submitted by the public, 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other interested parties on 
or before June 11, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to the Federal Communications Commission, 
445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 20554. Comments may be submitted

[[Page 21880]]

electronically through the Federal Communications Commission's Web 
site: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. In addition to filing comments 
with the Secretary, a copy of any comments on the Paperwork Reduction 
Act information collection requirements contained herein should be 
submitted to the Federal Communications Commission via email to 
[email protected] and to Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of Management and Budget, 
via email to [email protected] or via fax at 202-395-
5167. For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional 
information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document. Parties wishing to file materials 
with a claim of confidentiality should follow the procedures set forth 
in Sec.  0.459 of the Commission's rules. Confidential submissions may 
not be filed via ECFS but rather should be filed with the Secretary's 
Office following the procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. Redacted 
versions of confidential submissions may be filed via ECFS.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor, 
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1214 or 
[email protected]. For additional information concerning the 
Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained 
in this document, contact Judith Boley-Herman, (202) 418-0214, or send 
an email to [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking in PS Docket No. 13-75 and PS Docket No. 11-60, 
released on March 20, 2013. The full text of this document is available 
for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC 
Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 
20554, or online at http://www.fcc.gov/document/improving-9-1-1-reliability.

I. Introduction

    1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we seek comment on 
approaches to ensure the reliability and resiliency of the 
communications infrastructure necessary to ensure continued 
availability of the Nation's 9-1-1 system, particularly during times of 
major disaster. We take this action in response to the findings and 
recommendations presented in the Public Safety and Homeland Security 
Bureau's (PSHSB or Bureau) January 10, 2013, report titled Impact of 
the June 2012 Derecho on Communications Networks and Services: Report 
and Recommendations (Derecho Report), which is available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/derecho-report-and-recommendations. In that 
report, following an extensive inquiry and review of comments, the 
Bureau found that the June 2012 derecho affecting the Midwest and Mid-
Atlantic United States severely disrupted 9-1-1-related communications 
and that these disruptions were due in large part to avoidable planning 
and systems failures within 9-1-1 service providers' networks. The 
Bureau concluded that these failures could, and would, have been 
avoided if providers had followed industry best practices and other 
sound engineering principles. Accordingly, the Bureau recommended that 
the Commission consider action in the following areas: (1) 9-1-1 
circuit auditing; (2) 9-1-1 service provider central office backup 
power; (3) physical diversity of monitor and control links; and (4) 
improved outage notification to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). 
This NPRM seeks comment on approaches to implement these 
recommendations, taking into account the evolving nature of network 
technologies, as well as the continuing migration of circuit-switched 
services to Internet Protocol (IP)-based platforms. Thus, any rules or 
other policies designed to improve 9-1-1 service reliability will be 
developed with the ongoing transition to Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-
1) in mind.

II. Discussion

A. Need for Commission Action

    2. The Commission previously has addressed communications 
reliability issues by working with service providers to develop 
voluntary best practices, and by measuring the effectiveness of those 
best practices through outage reporting. The outage reporting process 
has often been effective in improving the reliability, resiliency, and 
security of many communications services. The June 2012 derecho, 
however, revealed the limits of that approach and highlighted the 
potential benefits and importance of supplementing a voluntary approach 
with respect to critical 9-1-1 communications.
    3. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which 9-1-1 
failures during the derecho reflect the reliability of 9-1-1 networks 
nationwide. Why would PSAPs located in other parts of the Nation be 
more or less vulnerable to the effects of a storm like the derecho? To 
what extent have service providers affected by the derecho addressed 
vulnerabilities revealed by the storm, both in the affected region and 
across their entire service areas? What specific remedial actions have 
these service providers taken, particularly with respect to critical 
circuit auditing, functional central office backup power, and diversity 
of monitoring links, and when were those actions completed? Has the 
experience of the derecho caused other 9-1-1 service providers to 
reexamine their network architecture and maintenance practices, and 
what have those efforts revealed about the reliability and resiliency 
of the Nation's 9-1-1 infrastructure as a whole? What changes have been 
made to improve 9-1-1 reliability and resiliency? What assurance does 
the Commission have that these changes will persist?
    4. Although we intend the approaches in this NPRM to complement and 
strengthen--not to replace--the Commission's current approach to 
network reliability, we seek comment on the appropriate balance between 
voluntary best practices and Commission mandates as they relate to 9-1-
1 communications. In light of the many existing best practices 
addressing these issues and service providers' failure to implement 
them fully, however, we seek comment on whether there is any assurance 
that additional voluntary best practices would necessarily lead to 
effective and consistent compliance without additional Commission 
action, especially after such dangerous failures potentially affected 
millions of people. The Derecho Report noted that multiple 9-1-1 
service providers implemented best practices to varying degrees, or 
adopted key best practices in theory, with substantial exceptions in 
day-to-day operation. To what extent are network reliability best 
practices, particularly those regarding physical auditing of critical 
circuits, functional and well-maintained central office backup power, 
and diversity of network monitoring links, followed today? What 
evidence exists that they are followed? What circumstances might lead 
to these best practices not being followed? What measures can be taken 
to compensate for the failure to implement a best practice so that 9-1-
1 reliability is not impaired? What evidence exists to substantiate 
that these measures are taken routinely when best practices are not 
followed? What incentives do service providers have to implement best 
practices, and are those incentives sufficient? Beyond general 
agreement with best practices, what assurances can 9-1-1 service 
providers make to ensure rigorous implementation on a nationwide basis?
    5. Which advisory bodies do service providers look to for guidance 
regarding

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best practices, e.g., Communications Security, Reliability, and 
Interoperability Council (CSRIC), Alliance for Telecommunications 
Industry Solutions (ATIS) Network Reliability Steering Committee 
(NRSC), Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO), 
National Emergency Number Association (NENA), or other organizations? 
What best practices are followed today other than those adopted by 
CSRIC? What relevant industry standards are followed routinely? If so, 
are they preferred over the best practices adopted by CSRIC? What 
evidence exists that these standards are routinely followed? How do 
they differ from the best practices issued by CSRIC? For example, are 
there specific regional circumstances that would make it more difficult 
or expensive to perform critical circuit auditing? Do service providers 
take measures to compensate for failing to implement the best practice 
in these instances? What evidence exists to substantiate that these 
measures are actually taken? Should certain best practices be 
considered critical for some parts of the country and not others? If 
existing best practices have proven difficult for service providers to 
implement or inadequate to prevent communications outages, what can be 
done to update or revise those practices to reflect lessons learned in 
the derecho? Which best practices, specifically, should be added or 
expanded, and would such changes make service providers more likely to 
comply in the future?

B. Entities Subject to Proposals

    6. We seek comment on the class of entities to which the proposals 
put forward for consideration in this NPRM would apply. Throughout this 
NPRM we use the term ``9-1-1 service provider,'' defined in the Derecho 
Report as a communications provider ``responsible for routing and 
delivering 9-1-1 calls to PSAPs.'' These providers are typically ILECs, 
though as the Bureau explained, the transition to NG9-1-1 may broaden 
the class of entities that perform this function. Accordingly, we seek 
comment on defining the term ``9-1-1 service provider.'' We anticipate 
that the proposals in this NPRM would apply to all 9-1-1 service 
providers, and tentatively define that term to include all entities, 
including ILECs that provide 9-1-1 call routing, automatic location 
information (ALI), emergency services Internet protocol networks 
(ESInets), and similar services directly to a PSAP. Is that definition 
sufficient to capture all the entities that both now and in the future 
could provide functions necessary to the provision of such services to 
a PSAP? If not, how should this term be defined? For example, should 
any of the proposals apply to other types of wireline service 
providers, wireless service providers, interconnected VoIP service 
providers, or other potential means of reaching a PSAP as NG9-1-1 
broadens the range of entities capable of delivering 9-1-1 service? 
Should reliability standards or certification requirements extend to 
data centers and other facilities that may in the future be used to 
host NG9-1-1 components? Are there certain proposals from which non-
ILEC service providers should expressly be exempt? To the extent that 
any of the implementation approaches would impose obligations on 
entities regulated as common carriers under Title II of the 
Communications Act, should there be a mechanism for cost recovery 
beyond the 9-1-1 related tariff mechanisms already in place?

C. Implementation Approaches

    7. We seek comment on four possible approaches to implement the 
recommendations for Commission action in the Derecho Report. We seek 
input on whether each of these approaches can stand alone, or whether 
the Commission should adopt two or more options as part of an 
integrated approach (e.g., reporting, certification, performance 
reliability requirements). As noted above, these proposals are intended 
to complement, rather than to replace, the Commission's current support 
for implementation of best practices developed through cooperation with 
industry and advisory bodies. We also seek comment on the suitability 
of each of the approaches described below, as well as any other 
approaches the Commission should consider. However the Commission 
decides to proceed, a meaningful level of specificity is essential for 
any approach to be effective. We therefore seek comment on the 
suitability of existing best practices as a basis for any rules we may 
adopt. Although each proposal is intended to be flexible, commenters 
should describe in detail how they propose to implement their preferred 
approach and how those choices would advance the goals of this NPRM.
    8. We specifically seek comments from state commissions and PSAPs 
on the approaches they use to oversee 9-1-1 connectivity. Many states, 
for example, regulate 9-1-1 service provided by ILECs. Do those states 
use a reporting approach? Onsite audits? Do PSAPs that contract for 9-
1-1 services impose certification or similar requirements upon their 9-
1-1 service providers? Do they specify levels of reliability through 
service level agreements (SLAs) or require adherence to best practices? 
Are such SLAs negotiated at the PSAP, state, or service-provider level, 
and what level of 9-1-1 service do they provide? What have state 
commissions and PSAPs found to work in their oversight of 9-1-1 service 
providers, and what needs to be improved?
    9. Reporting. Under this approach, the Commission would require 
service providers to periodically report on the extent to which they 
are voluntarily implementing critical best practices, or complying with 
applicable standards established by the Commission. Would adoption of 
this reporting approach alone or as part of an integrated approach meet 
the goal of ensuring 9-1-1 reliability? What costs and benefits would 
such a reporting obligation create? Which best practices or other 
standards should be subject to reporting requirements, and are these 
standards sufficiently detailed to objectively evaluate compliance? To 
what extent would such a reporting obligation be effective in the 
absence of a companion requirement to correct deficiencies revealed in 
the reports? What performance level should the Commission use to prompt 
remedial actions based on these reports? Commenters offering support 
for this approach should specify the scope, granularity, and frequency 
of reporting they support.
    10. We note that the Commission has used reporting in the past as a 
means of ensuring a certain level of reliability in 9-1-1 services. In 
2007, in response to Hurricane Katrina, the Commission adopted rules 
requiring local exchange carriers, wireless service providers subject 
to 9-1-1 requirements, and interconnected VoIP service providers ``to 
conduct an analysis of the resiliency and reliability of their 911 
networks or systems and to submit a report to the Commission.'' The 
reports proved of limited use, however, because they lacked the 
specificity necessary to determine network reliability in individual 
cases. In light of this experience, we invite commenters to address how 
to craft a reporting requirement that would more effectively promote 
reliability of 9-1-1 services and networks and create incentives for 
service providers to maintain consistently high standards of 9-1-1 
reliability.
    11. Certification. Under this approach, the Commission would 
require providers to certify periodically that their 9-1-1 network 
service and

[[Page 21882]]

facilities comply with voluntary industry best practices, reliability 
requirements specified by the Commission or other standards. This 
approach could help ensure that senior management is aware of 
significant vulnerabilities in the 9-1-1 network and accountable for 
its decisions regarding design, maintenance, and disaster preparedness. 
Are existing best practices sufficiently detailed to serve as standards 
for certification? What performance level should the Commission use to 
prompt remedial actions based on these certifications? With respect to 
this approach, we seek comment on existing certification schemes--
whether or not directly related to the work of the Commission--that 
might serve as models for certification in this context.
    12. Do existing Commission certification schemes, such as those 
used for Consumer Proprietary Network Information or Equal Employment 
Opportunity; provide an appropriate model for addressing 9-1-1 
reliability? Why or why not? What are the tradeoffs among the various 
models? What costs and benefits would be associated with each? Is there 
sufficient justification for the Commission to adopt a new 
certification model? If so, why? Would one possible model be found in 
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to certify the 
integrity of financial reports their companies submit to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission? If so, which portions of certification under 
Sarbanes-Oxley are suitable for certifications in this context, and are 
there others that are not suitable? For example, as under Sarbanes-
Oxley, should corporate officers be personally liable for the accuracy 
of their certifications, and how would the Commission enforce such a 
requirement? What costs and benefits would be associated with this 
model?
    13. Reliability Requirements. Under a third approach the Commission 
would specify minimum standards for 9-1-1 communications reliability, 
based on recognized industry best practices. How can the Commission 
ensure that any such requirements account for sound engineering 
practices not specifically codified as CSRIC best practices, 
particularly as technologies evolve? Are there differences in the 
design and operation of particular 9-1-1 networks that the Commission 
should consider in connection with sound engineering and network 
reliability standards, and which may not be reflected fully in existing 
best practices?
    14. Compliance Reviews and Inspections. Under this approach, the 
Commission would conduct periodic compliance reviews or site 
inspections of service provider facilities to verify that 9-1-1 service 
providers are adhering to certain standards. This approach may be best 
suited as part of an integrated approach, in conjunction with rules 
setting minimum standards for compliance. We seek comment on this 
option, as well as any benefits or costs of this approach. Which 
service providers should be subject to inspections or compliance 
reviews, and how often should those inspections occur? Should reviews 
be limited to records and documentation of compliance with Commission 
requirements, or should they include physical site inspections of 
network routes? Would this approach require additional staff, both at 
the Commission and employed by service providers, to conduct 
inspections and document compliance? If so, what experience and 
training would these personnel require, and would they be likely to 
detect network design and maintenance issues such as those that led to 
9-1-1 failures during the derecho?

D. Bureau Recommendations for Improving 9-1-1 Network Reliability

    15. As explained above, for each recommendation we seek comment on 
a range of possible implementation approaches. We also seek comment on 
the relative costs and benefits of the various proposals. We also seek 
comment on any alternative proposals that may be more effective or 
efficient in improving 9-1-1 network reliability or resiliency. In 
evaluating specific proposals for Commission action, we also seek 
comment on how we can best work in cooperation with state, tribal, and 
local governments, which we have recognized are the primary 
administrators of the legacy 9-1-1 system. For each of the proposals, 
we specifically seek comments from state commissions and PSAPs on the 
approaches they use to oversee 9-1-1 connectivity.
1. Routine 9-1-1 Circuit Auditing
    16. Many of the vulnerabilities revealed by the derecho hinge on 
the concept of physical diversity. Under generally accepted 
definitions, physical diversity means that two circuits follow 
different paths separated by some physical distance so that a single 
failure such as a power outage, equipment failure, or cable cut will 
not result in both circuits failing. For example, two circuits that 
ride over the same fiber optic cable are not physically diverse, even 
though they utilize different fibers in that cable and may be logically 
diverse for purposes of transmitting data. We seek comment on this 
definition and any other concept of network diversity we should 
consider.
    17. As the Derecho Report noted, for example, a physical diversity 
audit might have revealed vulnerabilities that led to 9-1-1 and ALI 
service failures to multiple PSAPs in Northern Virginia. To what extent 
does this experience reflect vulnerabilities in 9-1-1 networks 
nationwide? Do 9-1-1 service providers perform regular, physical 
audits--not just logical analyses--of critical circuits to ensure that 
their networks remain physically diverse? If so, what specifically do 
they do and how often? What steps are taken to ensure that physical 
diversity is sustained despite the circuit rearrangements that 
frequently take place in communications networks?
    18. As a result of service providers' inconsistent auditing of 9-1-
1 circuits and avoidable single points of failure in their networks, 
the Derecho Report recommended regularly-scheduled auditing of these 
circuits, noting that it ``should lead to fewer 9-1-1 outages and 
enhance the reliability of 9-1-1 communications. If providers do not 
regularly audit the physical routes of 9-1-1 circuits and ALI links, 
they will be ill-equipped to verify diversity and understand, avoid, or 
address instances where a single failure causes loss of all E9-1-1 
circuits or all ALI links for a PSAP.'' Are there instances where 
single points of failure are unavoidable, and how should that term be 
defined? The Derecho Report concluded that the benefits of implementing 
this recommendation will likely outweigh any additional costs, given 
the large numbers of customers that can be served successfully in 
emergencies by circuits that are diverse, and the harms that could 
result from avoidable failures. The Bureau added that any burden likely 
would be modest because this obligation would apply only to a limited 
number of high-priority circuits that provide 9-1-1 service.
    19. In light of providers' apparent failure to audit circuit 
diversity adequately, notwithstanding pre-existing best practices 
bolstered by Bureau reminders, we seek comment in general on the extent 
to which providers are auditing these circuits and whether those audits 
follow established best practices. Do existing best practices provide 
sufficient guidance on this topic? If not, what, specifically, should 
new or revised best practices address? What remedial actions have 9-1-1 
service providers taken based on lessons learned in the derecho, 
whether or not they were directly affected by the storm?

[[Page 21883]]

    20. How, when, and to what degree of specificity should network 
diversity audits be conducted? Under current technologies, critical 9-
1-1 circuits include, at a minimum, 9-1-1 trunks to PSAPs and ALI/ANI 
links, but we seek comment on other transport routes or technologies 
that may also be vital for emergency response, now or in the future. 
Although some network characteristics may vary by service provider and 
location, any auditing obligation must be specifically defined to be 
effective. Should the Commission therefore adopt rules prescribing in 
some fashion how audits should be conducted, and should it conduct 
inspections or compliance reviews to enforce any such rules? How 
frequently should audits be conducted, and are there existing published 
industry standards that could serve as a model? Should the Commission 
require not only that service providers perform audits, but also that 
they take action to eliminate reasonably avoidable single points of 
failure? If so, should any single point of failure be considered 
unavoidable? Should the Commission require that audits be performed by 
independent experts or conduct periodic compliance reviews or formal 
inspections as a means of ensuring compliance? Are there complicating 
factors in performing diversity audits that the Commission should take 
note of? To what extent do leased circuits affect the ability to 
perform accurate audits? How would diversity be sustained despite 
normal circuit rearrangements and grooming?
    21. How can the Commission ensure that its guidance regarding 
transport network diversity remains current as technology changes? For 
example, in a NG9-1-1 environment, it is likely that at least some 
crucial servers will be hosted outside of central offices, in either 
commercial or government data centers. In those cases, should the 
Commission ask or require such data centers to meet physical diversity 
standards or certify that they conduct diversity audits? Would it be 
sufficient if all such servers are backed up by a redundant hot standby 
server in another data center? Would conformance with the higher tiers 
of the ANSI/TIA-942 standard be suitable for qualifying data centers to 
host critical NG9-1-1 components? How does the transition to broadband, 
IP-based networks affect the ability to conduct accurate audits? Is a 
reporting requirement the best approach for ensuring that providers 
perform 9-1-1 audits?
    22. We also seek comment on whether reports should be made publicly 
available. Should they be treated as confidential, absent a persuasive 
contrary showing, as with outage reports? Do commenters believe any 
such reports should be shared within the PSAP community, or made 
accessible to 9-1-1 industry associations (e.g., APCO, NENA)? Should 
the reports be shared with state regulators such as state public 
utilities commissions?
    23. We also seek comment on whether providers should certify that 
they are performing 9-1-1 circuit audits in conformance with best 
practices, and if so, how often they should so certify. If the 
Commission were to pursue the certification approach, to which 
standards should providers be required to certify? Do existing 
standards or guidance serve as a usable template? Beyond certifying 
that they have conducted an audit, what other information should 
service providers need to certify? For example, should they conduct 
audits under generally-accepted procedures reflected in best practices? 
Should providers certify that the circuits audited satisfied specified 
criteria for physical diversity and identify and describe exceptions in 
some fashion? How often should providers be required to file any such 
certifications, and how granular should they be? Should any 
certification requirement be accompanied by an obligation to correct 
deficiencies revealed by diversity audits?
    24. We also seek input regarding additional costs, if any, that 
would accrue to providers in implementing requirements associated with 
this recommendation through any of the approaches noted above (i.e., 
reporting, certification, performance requirements). The NPRM provides 
preliminary cost and benefit estimates and seeks comment on all aspects 
of and assumptions underlying the cost/benefit analysis.
2. Sufficient Backup Power at Central Offices
    25. The derecho raised many questions regarding backup power, 
including whether all central offices must have some form of backup 
power, and what constitutes adequate backup power. During the derecho, 
approximately 7 percent of one affected service provider's central-
office generators failed to operate properly when needed. To what 
extent is this failure rate representative of central-office backup 
power nationwide among all 9-1-1 service providers? What rate of 
generator or other backup power failures have service providers 
experienced during other recent power failures?
    26. In light of these concerns, we seek comment on whether the 
Commission should institute requirements with respect to backup power, 
including testing and maintenance of backup power equipment. How 
closely do providers adhere to existing industry best practices and 
other published guidelines on backup power? Would new or expanded best 
practices provide additional guidance necessary to help maintain 
reliable backup power? If so, would additional best practices provide 
as much assurance of rigorous compliance as any of the approaches 
proposed here? What additional best practices are needed in this area? 
How closely do providers follow generator and battery manufacturers' 
recommended maintenance schedules? We also are interested in comment 
regarding backup power test records, e.g., what types of records are 
actually maintained, and the general content of those records. How long 
are records retained, and are they shared effectively within the 
service provider's organization? As records could not always be readily 
located, does this suggest that FCC monitoring would be helpful? If a 
battery or generator fails a routine test, is that information 
communicated to management and reliably acted upon in a timely manner?
    27. If we conclude that the Commission should establish backup 
power requirements, what, more precisely, should be required? 
Acknowledging that what constitutes a ``central office'' can vary to 
some extent by service provider and location, we ask commenters to give 
views on whether and how an adequate level of backup power may differ 
based on the type of facility. Should the required level of backup 
power depend on the relationship of each central office to reliable 9-
1-1 service? Furthermore, the forecast transition to NG9-1-1 will 
likely allow some capabilities to be hosted outside of central offices 
in consolidated data centers. We seek comment on the level of backup 
power currently available at such facilities and the degree to which 
they should be required to comply with backup power standards for 9-1-1 
networks.
    28. Should the Commission require service providers to file reports 
describing their central office backup power schemes, including 
maintenance and testing? If so, how often should providers have to file 
such reports? Should reports be based on conformance with specific best 
practices, or other standards adopted by the Commission? How many 
reports would there be? We also ask what specific information should be 
included

[[Page 21884]]

in these reports, e.g., should the report be limited to factual 
discussion of existing practices, or should providers also report on 
any planned improvements? Should the report explicitly note departures 
from industry best practices? Should the reports include an inventory 
of backup power deployment in service provider central offices? Should 
providers report on the results of recent tests and their protocol for 
addressing needed repairs? Should the reports be made publicly 
available? Would a requirement help foster the sustained focus needed 
to make a difference?
    29. We also seek comment on the approach of having 9-1-1 service 
providers periodically certify that their central offices have 
sufficient backup power or conform with specific best practices. With 
this approach, to what standard(s) should providers certify? What 
existing industry backup power standards or guidance might serve as a 
usable template? Beyond certifying that their backup power meets 
minimum standards, what other factors might service providers be 
required to certify to? How often should providers be required to file 
any such certifications, and how granular should they be? Who, by 
title, should attest to the validity of the certification?
    30. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a minimum standard 
for central office backup power. Should the Commission require on-site 
backup power for a specific number of hours, whether through 
appropriately rated batteries or a backup generator with a sufficient 
fuel supply? Should we require that service providers maintain 
sufficient backup power to ensure continuity of critical communications 
and, if so, how should ``critical communications'' be defined? Should 
the Commission require service providers to have in place and implement 
plans for regular maintenance and testing of backup power equipment? If 
so, should the Commission specify a level of detail and granularity for 
those plans? Would periodic site inspections or compliance reviews be 
useful to ensure compliance? Do service providers currently test backup 
generators under actual office load, and is that method preferable to 
or more effective than others? How often do service providers employ 
tandem generator arrangements where the failure of one generator would 
result in a central office being switched immediately to battery 
backup? Should these generators be replaced or redesigned to shed 
nonessential loads? We seek comments on the benefits and drawbacks of 
each implementation approach, and compared to each other.
    31. We also seek input regarding additional costs, if any, that 
would accrue to providers who are not already rigorously implementing 
best practices, and to all providers to either report or certify. The 
cost associated with reporting and certification appears to be a 
fraction of the cost required to remediate deficiencies that these 
approaches reveal. However, the very preliminary information obtained 
by the Bureau so far suggests that remediation may not be necessary for 
a substantial majority of central offices that already have permanent 
generators and readily accessible portable generators; do not use 
tandem generator arrangements, where the failure of one generator 
results in neither generator functioning; and already have implemented 
appropriate battery and generator testing. We seek more specific 
information about the prevalence of each of these situations below, and 
on the estimated time and cost associated with remediation where 
necessary. Is the range of potential remediation costs wide enough to 
raise questions about whether the costs of remediation may exceed the 
benefits?
    32. We have identified a number of questions involving potential 
costs that appear relevant to this inquiry. How many central offices 
have a generator onsite? A portable generator that can be deployed 
promptly (e.g., within four hours)? What is the fully loaded cost of 
such a portable generator? How many central offices have batteries that 
are not tested to the manufacturer's specifications? How long does it 
take on average to test such batteries over the course of a year? What 
is the cost of doing so? Similarly, how many onsite generators are not 
tested monthly or yearly, and what would the associated incremental 
costs of such testing be? What is the likelihood of a generator's 
failing a monthly or annual maintenance test, and the associated cost 
of repairing it? How many tandem generator arrangements are there, in 
which the failure of one results in neither functioning? How much is 
already budgeted to address problems associated with the potential need 
to address these issues? The NPRM provides a preliminary analysis of 
and seeks comment on all aspects of and assumptions underlying the 
costs and benefits of: (1) Having generators available in all central 
offices; (2) more regular battery testing; (3) more regular generator 
testing; (4) repairing a generator soon after it fails a test; (5) 
eliminating a tandem generator arrangement where the failure of one 
generator results in neither generator functioning; (6). The NPRM seeks 
comment on all aspects of and assumptions underlying the cost/benefit 
analysis
3. Robust Network Monitoring Capabilities
    33. A 9-1-1 service provider typically operates one or more Network 
Operations Centers (NOCs) from which it performs, among other tasks, 
remote monitoring of its network. This monitoring enables a provider to 
detect critical facilities outages and other problems as soon as they 
occur and to deploy resources as appropriate to rectify problems. These 
NOCs typically communicate with the network elements that they monitor 
by first connecting with one or more regional aggregation points, which 
then connect to the array of network elements to be monitored. The 
diversity of these regional aggregation points, including the diversity 
of the facilities that connect them to NOCs, is vital to communications 
reliability. During the derecho, the network monitoring capabilities of 
the two primary ILECs involved were disabled within the area of the 
storm, depriving them of visibility into the status of their network 
operations and complicating their recovery efforts. In both instances, 
the loss of monitoring capability throughout the segment of the network 
affected by the storm could be attributed to a single point of failure. 
To what extent do these failures reflect vulnerabilities in network 
monitoring systems nationwide? How often do other 9-1-1 service 
providers rely on a single physical path to monitor large portions of 
their networks, and why have redundant links not been installed?
    34. Based on network monitoring failures during the derecho, the 
Bureau recommended that the Commission take action to ensure that 9-1-1 
service providers put in place ``diverse monitor and control links and 
capabilities throughout their network[s].'' We seek comment on whether 
and how to implement this recommendation. What have 9-1-1 service 
providers affected by the derecho done to ensure they will not lose 
visibility into their networks during future emergencies? To what 
extent have other 9-1-1 service providers implemented diverse 
monitoring capabilities within their networks, and do they plan 
specific, additional improvements in response to the derecho? How can 
the Commission be confident that these measures will be sustained?
    35. Should the Commission pursue the Derecho Report's 
recommendations

[[Page 21885]]

with respect to network monitoring, how should it specify the level or 
degree of ``diversity'' expected of network monitoring and control 
capabilities? For example, should the Commission define this 
``diversity'' such that the failure of one element of a service 
provider's monitoring system, for example the failure of a control 
link, cannot result in the loss of network monitoring capabilities? If 
this definition is not suitable, what would a suitable alternative be 
and why is it superior? We observe that, unlike other policy objectives 
the Bureau recommends, diversity in network monitoring is not the 
subject of a specific CSRIC best practice, although other best 
practices address circuit diversity and network monitoring in general. 
Are new or more specific best practices needed to provide guidance in 
this area? If so, what new or revised best practices are needed? Would 
additional best practices provide as much assurance of rigorous 
compliance as any of the approaches proposed here? Who should be 
charged with developing these best practices? At a minimum, the derecho 
revealed that it is a sound engineering practice to design network 
monitoring centers with visibility into the network through physically 
diverse links that help to avoid single points of failure. Where are 
these concepts addressed in industry best practices or other published 
guidelines? How will the transition to NG9-1-1 affect network 
monitoring technologies and the need for diverse monitoring links?
    36. Should the Commission require service providers to file reports 
describing the diversity of their network monitoring capabilities? If 
so, how often should such reports be filed, and how granular should 
they be? What specific information should be included in these reports? 
For example, should the reports include detailed descriptions of 
service provider monitoring and control architectures, including maps? 
What are the public safety and homeland security implications of public 
disclosure of key network routes? Should such reporting be limited to 
factual discussion of existing practices, or should providers also 
report on any planned or ongoing efforts to improve the diversity of 
their network monitoring capabilities?
    37. We also seek comment on the approach of having providers 
certify that their monitoring and control links are sufficiently 
diverse. With this approach, to what diversity standard should 
providers certify? For example, should service providers certify that 
no single points of failure exist in the network monitoring facilities 
that run between their NOCs and regional aggregation points? Beyond 
certifying that their monitoring links are sufficiently diverse, what 
other information should providers be required to certify? For example, 
should service providers be asked to certify that they have more than 
one regional aggregation point in major metropolitan areas? How often 
should providers be required to file any such certifications, and how 
granular should they be? How could existing certification schemes, such 
as section 302 of SOX, serve as models for such certification?
    38. Should the Commission require service providers to implement a 
certain level of diversity in their network monitoring and control 
capabilities? If so, how precisely should the Commission specify the 
level or degree of ``diversity'' required of network monitoring and 
control links? Should the Commission avail itself of compliance reviews 
or formal inspections as a further means of ensuring compliance with 
any such rule it adopts?
    39. The NPRM includes an analysis of the costs and benefits 
associated with ensuring more diversity in monitoring capabilities and 
seek comment on all aspects of and assumptions underlying that 
analysis.

E. Improved PSAP Notification Under Section 4.9 of the Commission's 
Rules

    40. The derecho also demonstrated that timely, clear, and 
appropriately targeted communication between 9-1-1 service providers 
and PSAPs is key during any disruption of 9-1-1 service, particularly 
in a disaster when the public requires additional emergency assistance. 
The Commission's current rules recognize that PSAPs must be notified 
when communications outages affect 9-1-1 service, but the derecho 
revealed that many PSAPs' efforts to restore service and respond to 
emergencies during the derecho were hindered by inadequate information 
and otherwise ineffective communication by service providers. Although 
we recognize that conditions often change rapidly in disaster 
situations, PSAPs--and ultimately the public--depend on communications 
providers for accurate situational awareness when outages affect public 
safety. We therefore propose amendments to Sec.  4.9 of the 
Commission's rules to clarify how service providers can more 
effectively and uniformly notify PSAPs of outages affecting 9-1-1 
service and cooperate to restore service as quickly as possible.
    41. Section 4.9 requires certain communications providers to notify 
the Commission within 120 minutes of discovering a reportable outage. 
The rule also requires specified providers to notify ``9-1-1 special 
facilities''--i.e., PSAPs--affected by an outage with ``all available 
information that may be useful'' to mitigate the outage ``as soon as 
possible by telephone or other electronic means.'' After the derecho, 
however, many PSAPs reported that they were not notified of outages or 
received inadequate information about the scope of impacts to 9-1-1 
service. The lack of specificity in this rule has led to questions 
regarding how to determine whether or how providers are complying with 
the Commission's PSAP notification requirements.
    42. During the Bureau's derecho inquiry, multiple PSAPs stated that 
they contacted their 9-1-1 service provider to report a loss of service 
before being contacted by the provider. Other PSAPs received 
notification in the form of ``cryptic'' emails that referenced problems 
in one central office but did not specify all of the jurisdictions 
affected. Furthermore, inadequate information from service providers 
during the derecho led some PSAPs to activate ineffective reroutes, or 
to attempt to reroute even though service could have been restored via 
the original route.
    43. We therefore propose revisions to Sec.  4.9 intended to clarify 
9-1-1 service providers' outage reporting obligations and better ensure 
that PSAPs receive timely and actionable notification when a 
communications outage affects 9-1-1 service. Under the proposed rules, 
service providers subject to PSAP notification requirements would be 
required to notify PSAPs of outages immediately, by telephone and in 
writing via electronic means. These notifications would include, at a 
minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated number of users 
affected or potentially affected, the location of those users, the 
actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the estimated 
time at which service will be restored, recommended actions the 
impacted facility should take to minimize disruption of service, and 
the sender's name, telephone number and email address at which the 
sender can be reached.
    44. We seek comment on this proposed language and any alternative 
revisions to Sec.  4.9 that would accomplish the goal of clarifying 
reporting obligations and ensuring that PSAPs receive more detailed 
outage notifications. To what extent do providers currently inform 
PSAPs of 9-1-1 outages, and what is included in those communications? 
What additional information would PSAPs find useful? How much 
information that would be

[[Page 21886]]

helpful to PSAPs is practically available to service providers during 
natural disasters and other emergencies? Under the proposed rule, 
service providers would be required to provide PSAP notification 
immediately. Should the Commission adopt a more specific timeframe by 
when service providers must notify PSAPs? If so, what would be an 
appropriate timeframe? Should the Commission specify a list of 
acceptable ``electronic means'' for written notifications, or do PSAPs 
and service providers prefer flexibility to choose their own methods of 
communication? Should service providers be required to keep and retain 
records of their communications with PSAPs to demonstrate compliance 
with notification requirements? To what extent do state tariffs and 
other state and local regulations impose requirements regarding outage 
reporting and communication in general between service providers and 
PSAPs?
    45. We note that the current outage reporting rules apply to a 
range of service providers beyond the ILECs that typically route 9-1-1 
calls to PSAPs under current network configurations. Should any new or 
revised PSAP notification requirements apply to all entities covered by 
Sec.  4.9, or only those considered ``9-1-1 service providers'' for 
purposes of this NPRM? Should amended notification requirements apply 
to additional service providers who are not already covered by Sec.  
4.9? Because our intent is to clarify the current rule and promote 
efficient communication between service providers and PSAPs, we begin 
with the assumption that revisions would be most effective if applied 
consistently to all providers covered by the current rule. We invite 
comment on that view, however, and seek input on the range of entities 
that should be subject to revised PSAP notification requirements.
    46. In light of the anticipated evolution toward NG9-1-1, we also 
seek comment on whether entities such as data centers and centralized 
call centers that do not fit the traditional definition of PSAPs should 
also be notified of communications outages. For example, how would the 
outage-reporting rules apply to consolidated call centers that may not 
be physically located in the affected area but still serve many of the 
functions of a traditional local PSAP? As technologies evolve, is there 
a better way to approach PSAP notification than the current rubric of 
direct communication from service provider staff to PSAP staff? For 
example, are there automated technologies such as machine-readable data 
feeds that could transmit outage information to PSAPs in a standardized 
format?
    47. Because service providers must already notify PSAPs of outages 
under current rules, we do not expect any incremental costs resulting 
from a clarification of that obligation. We do, however, seek comment 
on the costs and benefits of particular notification requirements, as 
well as the burden each approach would place on providers and PSAPs.

III. Other Matters

A. Legal Authority

    48. The NPRM includes a discussion of the Commission's legal 
authority for the prospective actions discussed above to promote the 
reliability and resiliency of communications infrastructure that is 
essential for 9-1-1 service and seeks comment on that analysis.

B. Small Entities

    49. The Commission seeks comment on the degree to which the rules 
proposed in this NPRM would affect small businesses.

C. Circumstances Beyond Providers' Control

    50. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which any action 
it takes in this area should account for circumstances beyond the 
control of the provider. What are the specific laws, regulations, and 
other challenges that would interfere with compliance with these 
requirements, and how prevalent are these challenges in specific 
localities? If cost should be considered, what are the appropriate 
criteria for deciding when a cost is truly prohibitive rather than 
merely inconvenient? Is the Commission's authority to suspend, revoke, 
amend, or waive its rules for good cause sufficient to ensure 
consideration of these factors, or should there be explicit exemptions 
in the rules themselves? If we determine that a particular state, 
local, or tribal law, regulation, or practice affirmatively impedes the 
deployment of effective 9-1-1 services to PSAPs or the deployment of 
NG9-1-1 services, would the Commission have authority to preempt that 
law, regulation, or practice? If so, under what circumstances should we 
exercise that authority?

D. Review and Sunset

    51. We also seek comment on whether the Commission should conduct a 
periodic review of any rules or other requirements that it adopts to 
ensure that those actions provide flexibility and take into account the 
continuing advancement of technology. If so, how often should such 
reviews occur, and how should the ongoing utility of each proposal be 
measured? Alternatively, we seek comment on whether the Commission 
should establish a sunset date on which any of the proposals would 
cease to apply. How should that date be determined, and should it be 
tied to a specific triggering event, e.g., demonstrated improvements in 
network reliability or the widespread adoption of NG9-1-1? Should any 
of these proposals sunset for individual service providers once they 
deploy NG9-1-1? Because certain approaches may entail upfront costs 
that decrease over time, what effect should the cost of compliance have 
on a potential sunset date? Should sunset occur automatically without 
additional Commission action, or should the Commission consider a 
possible sunset after further review? How else might the Commission 
ensure that any action it takes remains current and technologically 
appropriate over time?

E. Procedural Matters

1. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    52. An Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) for this NPRM 
is located under section titled Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis. Written public comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments 
must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the 
deadlines for comments on the NPRM indicated above.
2. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
    53. This document contains proposed new information collection 
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to 
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection 
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the 
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 
U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might further 
reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns 
with fewer than 25 employees.
3. Ex Parte Rules
    54. The proceeding of which this Notice is a part is a ``permit-
but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte 
rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any 
written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation

[[Page 21887]]

within two business days after the presentation (unless a different 
deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making 
oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the 
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise 
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was 
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during 
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of 
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the 
presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the 
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or 
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings 
(specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data 
or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the 
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex 
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must 
be filed consistent with rule Sec.  1.1206(b). In proceedings governed 
by rule Sec.  1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a 
method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and 
memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments 
thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system 
available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format 
(e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this 
proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte 
rules.
4. Comment Filing Procedures
    55. Pursuant to Sec. Sec.  1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's 
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and 
reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of 
this document. Comments should be filed in PS Docket No. 13-75. 
Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing 
System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking 
Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
    [ssquf] Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.
    [ssquf] Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file 
an original and one copy of each filing.
    Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial 
overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service 
mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, 
Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
    1. All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the 
Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445 
12th St. SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours are 
8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand deliveries must be held together with 
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of 
before entering the building.
    2. Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton 
Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
    3. U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must 
be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington DC 20554.
    People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic 
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or call the 
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-
418-0432 (TTY).
    Confidential Materials: Parties wishing to file materials with a 
claim of confidentiality should follow the procedures set forth in 
Sec.  0.459 of the Commission's rules. Confidential submissions may not 
be filed via ECFS but rather should be filed with the Secretary's 
Office following the procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. Redacted 
versions of confidential submissions may be filed via ECFS.

Initial Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    This document contains proposed information collection 
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to 
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection 
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments 
are due June 11, 2013.
    Comments should address: (a) Whether the proposed collection of 
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of 
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical 
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c) 
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information 
collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of 
information on the respondents, including the use of automated 
collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (e) 
way to further reduce the information collection burden on small 
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In addition, pursuant 
to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, 
see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might 
further reduce the information collection burden for small business 
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this IRFA of the possible 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
by the recommendations in this NPRM. Written public comments are 
requested on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the 
IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments provided in 
``Comment Period and Procedures'' of this NPRM. The Commission will 
send a copy of this NPRM, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the 
NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal 
Register.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

    2. The June 2012 Derecho storm revealed serious vulnerabilities in 
the Nation's 9-1-1 communications infrastructure that could have been 
prevented or mitigated through the implementation of best practices 
developed by industry and advisory bodies. Yet, the Bureau's inquiry 
into communications failures during and after the storm found that 
multiple 9-1-1 service providers failed to implement best practices 
related to physical circuit diversity, central office backup power, and 
network monitoring, leading to emergency communications outages 
affecting millions of Americans. In some cases, PSAPs did not receive 
timely or adequate notification of these outages, compounding the 
difficulty of providing emergency assistance until service was 
restored. A broad range of comments from state and local governments, 
as well as public safety entities themselves, support the Bureau's 
finding that such failures are unacceptable. As part of its statutory 
obligation to ensure that communications networks of all types 
``promot[e] safety of life and property,''

[[Page 21888]]

the Commission has a particular responsibility to promote reliable 
emergency communications and prevent avoidable failures.
    3. With the objective of ensuring reliability and resiliency of 9-
1-1 networks and services, the NPRM proposes to:
     Ensure that 9-1-1 service providers conduct routine 
circuit audits to verify physical diversity and identify avoidable 
single points of failure. The NPRM seeks comment of the details of this 
obligation and the extent to which providers would be required to 
fortify non-diverse circuits.
     Ensure that 9-1-1 service providers maintain adequate 
backup power in central offices, supported by appropriate testing, 
maintenance, and records retention. The NPRM seeks comment on what 
level of backup power should be considered adequate and whether current 
maintenance and recordkeeping practices are sufficient to ensure 
reliability.
     Ensure that 9-1-1 service providers maintain robust and 
resilient network monitoring capabilities, supported by diverse network 
monitoring and control links. The NPRM seeks comment on the degree of 
diversity and specific engineering practices necessary to protect 
network monitoring capabilities against single points of failure.
    4. The NPRM proposes a range of approaches by which the above 
objectives could be accomplished. For instance, 9-1-1 service providers 
could be required to report whether they have implemented relevant best 
practices, or a company representative could be required to certify 
compliance with best practices on a regular basis. The Commission could 
also codify key best practices in its rules, such as a minimum level of 
physical diversity for 9-1-1 circuits. Under the latter approach, the 
Commission could also ensure compliance though periodic site 
inspections and compliance reviews. As the NPRM notes, these 
alternatives need not be mutually exclusive and are intended as a 
starting point for discussion of which approach(es) will yield the 
greatest benefit in communications reliability at the lowest cost to 
service providers.
    5. The NPRM also proposes revisions to Sec.  4.9 of the 
Commission's rules to state with greater specificity how and when 9-1-1 
service providers must notify PSAPs affected by communications outages. 
As noted in the Derecho Report, the current rule has led to questions 
regarding whether providers are complying fully with the Commission's 
PSAP notification requirements, and whether the current requirements 
provide PSAPs with actionable information. Clarification of these 
standards could increase compliance by service providers and improve 
situational awareness for PSAPs affected by outages.
    6. The Commission traditionally has addressed communications 
reliability issues by working with service providers to develop 
voluntary best practices that address vulnerabilities in the 
communications network, and by measuring the effectiveness of those 
best practices through outage reporting. Under the Commission's current 
rules, the outage reporting process has often been effective in 
improving the reliability, resiliency, and security of many 
communications services. The June 2012 derecho, however, revealed the 
need to supplement this approach with regard to critical 9-1-1 
communications. While the NPRM supports the development of additional 
best practices, it recognizes that additional Commission action may be 
appropriate. Thus, the proposed approach would complement, rather than 
replace, the existing regime of best practices and outage reporting.

B. Legal Basis

    7. The legal basis for the rules and rule changes proposed in this 
NPRM are contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 
218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 
332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 
251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 
403, 615a-1, and 615c. The Commission also believes it has ancillary 
authority under Title I of the Communications Act to impose the 
requirements discussed in the NPRM on any 9-1-1 service providers not 
subject to express regulatory authority under Title II. Any such 
regulations would be ``reasonably ancillary'' to the goal of ensuring a 
common baseline for the reliability of 9-1-1 service on a nationwide 
basis, regardless of the regulatory status of the entity providing the 
service.

C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
Rules Will Apply

    8. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where 
feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the proposed rules adopted herein. The RFA generally 
defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the 
terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small 
governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' 
has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the 
Small Business Act. A small business concern is one which: (1) Is 
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the 
Small Business Administration (SBA).
1. Total Small Entities
    9. Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not 
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at the 
outset, three comprehensive, statutory small entity size standards. 
First, nationwide, there are a total of approximately 27.9 million 
small businesses, according to the SBA. In addition, a ``small 
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is 
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' 
Nationwide, as of 2007, there were approximately 1,621,315 small 
organizations. Finally, the term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is 
defined generally as ``governments of cities, towns, townships, 
villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of 
less than fifty thousand.'' Census Bureau data for 2011 indicate that 
there were 89,476 local governmental jurisdictions in the United 
States. We estimate that, of this total, as many as 88,506 entities may 
qualify as ``small governmental jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that 
most governmental jurisdictions are small.
2. Entities Subject to NPRM
    10. As noted in the NPRM, we seek comment on the class of entities 
to which the proposals would apply. Generally, we expect Commission 
action to focus narrowly on entities that provide key facilities for 9-
1-1 service rather than the broader class of all communications 
services capable of placing 9-1-1 calls. Like the Derecho Report, the 
NPRM defines ``9-1-1 service provider'' as a communications provider 
``responsible for routing and delivering 9-1-1 calls to PSAPs.'' Under 
current technologies, these providers are typically ILECs, although the 
transition to NG9-1-1 may broaden the class of entities that provide 9-
1-1 service in the future. The NPRM therefore asks whether the 
Commission should codify a definition of the term ``9-1-1 service 
provider'' that clarifies the extent, if any, to which the proposals 
would apply to non-ILEC providers of 9-1-1 service.
    11. We anticipate that the proposals in this Notice would apply to 
all 9-1-

[[Page 21889]]

1 service providers, and tentatively define that term to include all 
entities, including ILECs, that provide 9-1-1 call routing, ALI, 
emergency services Internet protocol networks (ESInets), and similar 
services directly to a PSAP. The transition to NG9-1-1 may allow other 
service providers to perform similar functions, and we seek comment on 
the degree to which the proposals should apply to other types of 
wireline service providers, wireless service providers, interconnected 
VoIP service providers, or other potential means of reaching a PSAP as 
NG9-1-1 broadens the range of entities capable of delivering 9-1-1 
service. We also seek comment on whether there should be a cost-
recovery mechanism for entities regulated as common carriers under 
Title II of the Communications Act to the extent not already provided 
under state tariffs.
    12. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs). Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard 
specifically for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate 
size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business 
is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. Census Bureau data for 
2007 show that there were 3,188 firms in this category that operated 
for the entire year. Of this total, 3,144 had employment of 999 or 
fewer, and 44 firms had had employment of 1,000 employees or more. Thus 
under this category and the associated small business size standard, 
the majority of these incumbent local exchange service providers can be 
considered small.
    13. The Commission has included small incumbent LECs in this 
present RFA analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the 
RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size 
standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or 
fewer employees), and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' 
The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small 
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any 
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. The Commission has 
therefore included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although 
the Commission emphasizes that this RFA action has no effect on 
Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts.

D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements

    14. The actions proposed in the NPRM could require 9-1-1 service 
providers to take a range of actions to strengthen the Nation's 9-1-1 
infrastructure in the areas of circuit diversity, central office backup 
power, and network monitoring and control. Specific regulatory 
obligations would depend upon the approach chosen to implement each of 
these objectives. Requirements for compliance could range from periodic 
reporting on whether 9-1-1 service providers are voluntarily 
implementing best practices, to mandatory standards for 9-1-1 network 
reliability codified in the Commission's rules and subject to its 
enforcement powers. Service providers also could be required to 
periodically certify that they have adequate internal controls to 
ensure network reliability and inform senior management of any 
significant vulnerabilities. Because many 9-1-1 service providers 
already implement some or all of the relevant best practices on a 
voluntary basis, the additional burden of compliance with these 
requirements may be minimal.
    15. Generally, the reporting and certification approaches would 
likely require more recordkeeping and information collection than the 
codification-and-enforcement approach, which would focus on the actual 
implementation of best practices. However, reporting and certification 
may give service providers more flexibility in designing and 
maintaining their networks while ensuring that they remain accountable 
for the results of their decisions. At a minimum, 9-1-1 service 
providers would be required to keep records of, and disclose to the 
Commission, the extent to which they have implemented the best 
practices discussed in the NPRM. At a maximum, they would be required 
to comply with reliability standards enforced by the Commission, 
potentially requiring changes to networks that do not currently meet 
these standards.
    16. The NPRM also proposes revisions to Sec.  4.9 of the 
Commission's rules to clarify service providers' obligations to notify 
PSAPs of 9-1-1 outages. The NPRM seeks comment on this objective, as 
well as on the substantive terms of the reporting obligation.

E. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    17. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, 
which may include (among others) the following four alternatives: (1) 
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities.
    18. The approaches proposed in the NPRM are intended to complement 
and strengthen, not to replace, the Commission's current approach of 
encouraging service providers to voluntarily implement best practices 
and measuring compliance through outage reporting. Thus, small entities 
with limited resources would continue to enjoy many of the benefits of 
the current regime, including a general focus on network performance 
and reliability rather than specific design requirements. The 
Commission has traditionally considered this approach a more flexible 
and less costly alternative to more comprehensive regulation, and the 
NPRM would preserve those advantages in large part.
    19. To the extent that the NPRM would impose new obligations on 
small entities, we seek comment on alternatives including (1) the 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities. Which of the proposed approaches do small entities find 
particularly difficult or costly to comply with, and how could those 
difficulties be addressed through modifications or exemptions? What 
would be the effect on public safety of exemptions from 9-1-1 service 
requirements, regardless of cost?

F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rule

    None.

IV. Ordering Clauses

    20. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

[[Page 21890]]

including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
    21. Accordingly, it is ordered pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 
4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 
309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 201(b), 
214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 
309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c, that this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in PS Docket No. 13-75 and PS Docket No. 11-60 is adopted.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4

    Telecommunications.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.

Proposed rules

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 4 as follows:

PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154, 
155, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b).

0
2. Section 4.9 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(4), (c)(2)(iv), 
(e)(5), (f)(4), and (g)(1)(i) to read as follows:


Sec.  4.9  Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.

    (a) * * *
    (4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in 
paragraph (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which case they also shall notify 
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any 
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911 
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages 
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that 
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating 
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information 
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated 
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those 
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the 
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions 
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of 
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at 
which the sender can be reached. Not later than 72 hours after 
discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically an 
Initial Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than 
thirty days after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit 
electronically a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission. 
The Notification and the Initial and Final reports shall comply with 
all of the requirements of Sec.  4.11.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (iv) Potentially affecting a 911 special facility (as defined in 
paragraph (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which case they also shall notify 
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any 
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911 
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages 
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that 
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating 
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information 
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated 
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those 
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the 
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions 
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of 
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at 
which the sender can be reached.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (5) That potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in 
paragraph (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which case they also shall notify 
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any 
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911 
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages 
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that 
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating 
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information 
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated 
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those 
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the 
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions 
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of 
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at 
which the sender can be reached. In determining the number of users 
potentially affected by a failure of a switch, a concentration ratio of 
8 shall be applied. For providers of paging service solely, however, 
the following outage criteria shall apply instead of those in 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section. Notification must be 
submitted if the failure of a switch for at least 30 minutes duration 
potentially affects at least 900,000 user-minutes. Not later than 72 
hours after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit 
electronically an Initial Communications Outage Report to the 
Commission. Not later than thirty days after discovering the outage, 
the provider shall submit electronically a Final Communications Outage 
Report to the Commission. The Notification and the Initial and Final 
reports shall comply with all of the requirements of Sec.  4.11.
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in 
paragraph (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which case they also shall notify 
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any 
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911 
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages 
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that 
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating 
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information 
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated 
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those 
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the 
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions 
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of 
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at 
which the sender can be reached. Not later than 72 hours after 
discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically an 
Initial Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than 
thirty days after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit 
electronically a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission. 
The Notification and the Initial and Final reports shall comply with 
all of the requirements of Sec.  4.11.
* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (1) * * *

[[Page 21891]]

    (i) Within 240 minutes of discovering that they have experienced on 
any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an 
outage of at least 30 minutes duration that potentially affects a 911 
special facility (as defined in paragraph (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which 
case they also shall notify immediately by telephone and in writing via 
electronic means, any official who has been designated by the 
management of the affected 911 facility as the provider's contact 
person(s) for communications outages at that facility, and the provider 
shall convey all available information that may be useful to the 
management of the affected facility in mitigating the effects of the 
outage on efforts to communicate with that facility. This information 
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated 
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those 
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the 
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions 
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize the 
disruption of service, and the sender's name, telephone number and 
email address at which the sender can be reached; or
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2013-08525 Filed 4-11-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P