[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 70 (Thursday, April 11, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21567-21569]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-08511]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 70 / Thursday, April 11, 2013 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 21567]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[Docket No. PRM-73-15; NRC-2011-0251]
Installation of Radiation Alarms for Rooms Housing Neutron
Sources
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM), PRM-73-15, dated September 15, 2011,
which was filed with the NRC by George Hamawy (the petitioner). The
petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations to require the
installation of radiation alarms for rooms housing neutron sources.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-73-15, is closed
on April 11, 2013.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2011-0251 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this petition. You may
access information related to this petition, which the NRC possesses
and is publicly available, by any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0251. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly-available documents online in the NRC
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is
referenced. The PRM-73-15 is available in ADAMS under Accession No.
ML112700682.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Merri Horn, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-
8126, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Petition
On December 7, 2011, the NRC published a notice of receipt and
request for comment (76 FR 76327) of a PRM filed by George Hamawy. The
petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations to require
installation of radiation alarms for rooms housing neutron sources. The
petitioner stated that the use of alarms can be effective in preventing
source removal, especially when an in-house person may be taken hostage
to get the intruder into the room housing the source. The petitioner
noted that the construction of the neutron sources used by universities
for irradiating foils makes the source an easy target for theft. The
petitioner also noted that the source is located at the end of a rod in
the middle of a 55-gallon drum and that the drum has a cover that can
be easily removed, facilitating the removal of the source. The
petitioner stated that radiation alarms should be installed that are
connected to the Public Safety Department. The alarm would be triggered
when the source is removed.
Public Comments on the Petition
The notice of receipt of the petition for rulemaking invited
interested persons to submit comments. The comment period closed on
February 21, 2012. The NRC received two comment letters from industry,
one comment letter from an individual, and one comment letter from the
Organization of Agreement States. The commenters all opposed the
petition. Two of the commenters stated that the petition should not
apply to the well logging industry. The commenters stated that the
petition request was vague in terms of the definition of room, types of
radiation alarms, connectivity to law enforcement, the isotopes
included, and the threshold for action. Two of the commenters noted
that their sources are stored by methods approved by the NRC (or
Agreement State) and as prescribed in national standards established by
the well logging industry and that additional requirements are not
necessary. One of the commenters questioned why anyone would want to
steal a neutron source and asked if any neutron sources have ever been
stolen. The commenter also stated that natural background may contain
more radiation than the neutron sources and, therefore, a radiation
detector would not detect the removal of the sources. The commenter
also asked if it would be possible to shield the neutron source from
the detector while stealing the source. The commenter also stated that
there is no reason that any person would respond to the alarm. The
commenter stated that the best solution is to put the barrel in a
locked room. One of the commenters noted that the typical strength of a
neutron source used in a university is less than the category 2
threshold. The commenter also stated that the regulations currently
require a licensee to have security measures in place to ``secure from
unauthorized removal or access licensed materials that are stored in
controlled or unrestricted areas.''
Reasons for Denial
As noted by the commenters on the petition, the petitioner did not
provide information relative to the source strength of the neutron
sources or the particular radionuclides for which the petitioner is
requesting additional security measures be imposed by rulemaking. It is
not clear whether the petitioner is requesting rulemaking on all
neutron sources or only on the americium-241/beryllium (Am-241/Be or
Am/Be) and plutonium-239/beryllium (Pu-239/Be or Pu/Be) sources
mentioned in the petition. The NRC is taking the view that the
petitioner is requesting rulemaking for all neutron sources regardless
of source strength.
[[Page 21568]]
There are a number of different sources of neutrons, ranging from
radioactive sources to operating and research reactors and spallation
sources. Neutron sources are used in diverse applications in areas of
physics, engineering, medicine, nuclear weapons, petroleum exploration,
biology, chemistry, nuclear power, and other industries.
Radioactive materials used as neutron sources by NRC licensees
include Am-241/Be, Pu/Be, and californium-252 (Cf-252). A licensee's
decision to use a specific type of source may depend upon cost,
availability, and the dependence upon historical data with which to
compare current measurement results. The Am-241/Be and Pu/Be sources
generate neutrons by the ([alpha],n) reaction in which the americium or
plutonium decays and emits an alpha particle, which is absorbed by the
beryllium. Neutron sources that are not integrated into a specific
device, regardless of type, are generally stored surrounded by paraffin
wax or other similar low atomic number material as shielding.
Both Am-241/Be and Pu/Be sources have a wide range of uses. Neutron
sources can be used with online elemental coal analyzers and bulk
material analyzers in the coal and cement industries. Neutron
penetration into materials makes these sources useful in analytical
techniques such as radiography of aircraft components to detect
corrosion, imperfections in welds, cracks, and trapped moisture.
Moisture gauges use neutrons to find water and petroleum layers in oil
wells, known as well logging. Neutron sources can be used for gold and
silver prospecting for on-the-spot analysis, and to detect ground water
movement for environmental surveys. Neutron sources are also used as
calibration sources.
Californium-252 sources produce neutrons during spontaneous
fission. The Cf-252 splits apart producing a number of neutrons in the
process. Beyond the uses mentioned above for Am/Be and Pu/Be sources,
the neutrons from Cf-252 are employed as a treatment of certain
cervical and brain cancers where other radiation therapy is
ineffective. The Cf-252 sources are also used to start up nuclear
reactors.
The categorization of sources is established in International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Series RS-G-1.9, Categorization of
Radioactive Sources. Safety Series RS-G-1.9 provides a risk-based
ranking of radioactive sources in five categories in terms of their
potential to cause severe deterministic effects for a range of
scenarios that include both external exposure from an unshielded source
and internal exposure following dispersal. The categorization system
uses ``D values'' as normalizing factors. The ``D value'' is the
radionuclide specific activity of a source that, if not under control,
could cause severe deterministic effects for a range of scenarios that
include both external exposure from an unshielded source and internal
exposure following dispersal of the source material. Safety Series RS-
G-1.9 is available on the IAEA Web site at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.
As previously noted, neutron sources are used for a variety of
purposes and in varying source strength. Depending on the source
strength (activity), the source is considered a category 1 (higher
activity) to a category 5 (lower activity) source. The threshold is
established for each individual radionuclide. For Am-241/Be and Pu-239/
Be, a category 5 source is any source with an activity of less than
0.0006 Terabequerels (TBq) (0.016 curies (Ci)) and a category 1 source
is any source with an activity of 60 TBq (1,620 Ci) or above. For Cf-
252, the category 5 threshold is 0.0002 TBq (0.0.0054 Ci) and the
category 1 threshold is 20 TBq (540 Ci).
The NRC's regulations in Sec. 20.1801 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Security of stored material,'' and 10
CFR 20.1802, ``Control of material not in storage,'' require licensees
to: (1) Secure, from unauthorized removal or access, licensed materials
that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas; and (2) control
and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in a
controlled or unrestricted area and that is not in storage. The NRC's
regulations in 10 CFR 20.2201, ``Reports of theft or loss of licensed
material,'' require licensees to report lost, stolen, or missing
radioactive material. Further, throughout the NRC's regulations for
licensing byproduct material, there are educational and training
requirements to ensure that individuals with access to radioactive
materials have adequate knowledge and skills to safely use the
radioactive material as intended. These requirements are adequate for
the protection of most radioactive material that is not subject to 10
CFR part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials;'' however,
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Commission
determined that certain risk-significant radioactive material should be
subject to enhanced security provisions. The NRC issued several
security orders to licensees that possessed category 1 and category 2
quantities of radioactive material of 16 radionuclides or combinations.
Included in the list of radionuclides considered to be risk-significant
are Am-241/Be, Pu-239/Be, and Cf-252. In general, the orders provided
requirements for enhanced security measures for such things as license
verification before transfer, intrusion detection and response, use of
security zones, access control, and coordination with local law
enforcement agencies (LLEAs). The orders also contain requirements for
the licensee to determine the trustworthiness and reliability of
individuals permitted unescorted access to category 1 or category 2
quantities of radioactive material through fingerprinting and criminal
history checks and other elements of a background investigation.
On March 19, 2013, the NRC published the final rule (78 FR 16922)
that establishes the security requirements for category 1 and category
2 quantities of radioactive material (including Am-241/Be, Pu-239/Be,
and Cf-252) in the regulations. Once the final rule is implemented, the
security orders will be rescinded. The final rule establishes a new
part to 10 CFR, part 37, ``Physical Protection of Category 1 and
Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material.'' This final rule also
applies to material that if aggregated equals or exceeds the category 2
threshold. Both the orders and 10 CFR part 37 contain general
requirements that allow licensees flexibility in how they meet the
requirements. For example, 10 CFR part 37 requires licensees to monitor
and detect without delay all unauthorized entries into its security
zone where category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material
are stored. Part 37 of 10 CFR further requires licensees to assess
attempted or actual unauthorized entries and respond as appropriate.
However, neither the orders nor 10 CFR part 37 specifies exactly how a
particular licensee must monitor and detect such unauthorized entries.
Instead, the orders and 10 CFR part 37 allow flexibility in the methods
a licensee can select. A neutron detection alarm could be an acceptable
method.
The NRC is denying the petition because we have determined that
current NRC security requirements are adequate to protect public health
and safety. The Commission has recently determined the appropriate
activity threshold that warrants additional security measures in the 10
CFR part 37 rulemaking (category 2). The Commission did not find a need
to change the requirements applicable to
[[Page 21569]]
category 3 or lower. The petitioner has not provided sufficient reason
to readdress this decision. Additionally, the Radiation Source
Protection and Security Task Force, an interagency task force
established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, concluded in its report
to Congress and the President, ``Radiation Source Protection and
Security Task Force Report'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML062190349), dated
August 2006, that the appropriate radioactive sources (category 1 and
category 2 sources) were being protected. The Task Force also concluded
that the IAEA Code of Conduct serves as an appropriate framework for
considering which sources warrant additional protection. For its 2010
report to Congress and the President (ADAMS Accession No. ML102230141),
the Task Force conducted a reevaluation of the radionuclides that
warrant additional security and protection. The Task Force found ``that
the Category 1 and 2 quantities remain valid for sealed and unsealed
sources as the list and threshold levels of radionuclides that could
result in a significant radiological exposure device (RED) or
radiological dispersal device (RDD) event and therefore warrant
enhanced security and protection.'' The Task Force periodically
reevaluates the list of radionuclides that warrant additional security
and protection. If the radionuclides and/or thresholds change in the
future, then the NRC would consider making changes in a future
rulemaking.
For byproduct material below the category 2 thresholds, the
security of radioactive material is covered by 10 CFR 20.1801 and
20.1802. The requirement to ``secure, from unauthorized removal or
access'' and to ``control and maintain constant surveillance'' are
considered performance-based requirements. Licensees are allowed to
select methods that work best for their facility to ensure that there
is no unauthorized removal of the category 3 and lower neutron sources.
These requirements provide adequate protection for the neutron sources,
without the need to require a specific measure.
In conclusion, no new information has been provided by the
petitioner that calls into question the established thresholds
(category 2) that warrant additional security measures or the
performance based approach (non-prescriptive) for ensuring source
security. This view has been validated by the Radiation Source
Protection and Security Task Force's conclusions. Existing NRC
regulations provide the basis for reasonable assurance that the common
defense and security and public health and safety are adequately
protected. Additional rulemaking would impose unnecessary regulatory
burden and is not warranted for the adequate protection of the public
health and safety and the common defense and security.
The NRC appreciates the views of the petitioner and encourages
feedback from the public on any of the NRC processes.
For the reasons cited in this document, the NRC is denying PRM-73-
15.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of April, 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew L. Bates,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2013-08511 Filed 4-10-13; 8:45 am]
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