[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 54 (Wednesday, March 20, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17251-17255]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-06397]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-69142; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2013-048]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Adopt Chapter V, Section 3 
Subparagraph (d)(iv) Regarding Obvious Error or Catastrophic Error 
Review

March 15, 2013.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ``Act'') \1\, and Rule 19b-44 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby 
given that, on March 14, 2013, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' 
or ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II 
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory 
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to adopt a subparagraph (d)(iv) to provide 
for how NASDAQ proposes to treat options errors in response to the 
Regulation NMS Plan to Address Extraordinary Market Volatility.
    The text of the proposed rule change is below; proposed new 
language is in italics.
* * * * *

Chapter V Regulation of Trading on NOM

* * * * *

Sec. 3 Trading Halts

    (a)-(c) No change.
    (d) This paragraph shall be in effect during a pilot period to 
coincide with the pilot period for the Plan to Address Extraordinary 
Market Volatility Pursuant to Rule 608 of Regulation NMS, as it may be 
amended from time to time (``LULD Plan''), except as specified in 
subparagraph (v) below. Capitalized terms used in this paragraph shall 
have the same meaning as provided for in the LULD Plan. During a Limit 
State and Straddle State in the Underlying NMS stock:
    (i)-(iii) No change.
    (iv) For a one year period following the adoption of this 
subparagraph (iv), trades are not subject to an obvious error or 
catastrophic error review pursuant to Chapter V, Sections 6(b) or 6(f). 
Nothing in this provision shall prevent trades from review on Exchange 
motion pursuant to Chapter V, Section 6(d)(i).
    (e) No change.
* * * * *

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these

[[Page 17252]]

statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. 
The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C 
below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to adopt Chapter V, Section 3(d)(iv) \3\ to 
provide for how NOM will treat options orders in response to the 
Regulation NMS Plan to Address Extraordinary Market Volatility (the 
``Plan''), which is applicable to all NMS stocks, as defined in 
Regulation NMS Rule 600(b)(47). The Exchange proposes to adopt Section 
3(d)(iv) for a one year pilot period.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The provisions of Section (d)(i) and (ii) and (e) were filed 
and became effective on February 28, 2013, with a 30 day operative 
delay, on a pilot basis. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
69120 (March 12, 2013) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-040). Section (d)(iii) was 
filed as SR-NASDAQ-2013-043. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
69069 (March 7, 2013), 78 FR 15995 (March 13, 2013).
    \4\ The Exchange will conduct its own analysis concerning the 
elimination of obvious and catastrophic error provisions during 
Limit States and Straddle States and agrees to provide the 
Commission with relevant data to assess the impact of this proposed 
rule change. As part of its analysis, the Exchange will evaluate: 
(1) The options market quality during Limit States and Straddle 
States; (2) assess the character of incoming order flow and 
transactions during Limit States and Straddle States; and (3) review 
any complaints from members and their customers concerning 
executions during Limit States and Straddle States. Additionally, 
the Exchange agrees to provide to the Commission data requested to 
evaluate the impact of the elimination of the obvious and 
catastrophic error provisions, including data relevant to assessing 
the various analyses noted above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background
    Since May 6, 2010, when the markets experienced excessive 
volatility in an abbreviated time period, i.e., the ``flash crash,'' 
the equities exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(``FINRA'') have implemented market-wide measures designed to restore 
investor confidence by reducing the potential for excessive market 
volatility. The measures adopted include pilot plans for stock-by-stock 
trading pauses,\5\ related changes to the equities market clearly 
erroneous execution rules,\6\ and more stringent equities market maker 
quoting requirements.\7\ On May 31, 2012, the Commission approved the 
Plan, as amended, on a one-year pilot basis.\8\ In addition, the 
Commission approved changes to the equities market-wide circuit breaker 
rules on a pilot basis to coincide with the pilot period for the 
Plan.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See e.g., NASDAQ Rule 4120.
    \6\ See e.g., NASDAQ Rule 4762.
    \7\ See e.g., NASDAQ Rule 4613.
    \8\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67091 (May 31, 
2012), 77 FR 33498 (June 6, 2012) (File No. 4-631) (Order Approving 
the Plan on a Pilot Basis).
    \9\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67090 (May 31, 
2012), 77 FR 33531 (June 6, 2012) (SR-BATS-2011-038; SR-BYX-2011-
025; SR-BX-2011-068; SR-CBOE-2011-087; SR-C2-2011-024; SR-CHX-2011-
30; SR-EDGA-2011-31; SR-EDGX-2011-30; SR-FINRA-2011-054; SR-ISE-
2011-61; SR-NASDAQ-2011-131; SR-NSX-2011-11; SR-NYSE-2011-48; SR-
NYSEAmex-2011-73; SR-NYSEArca-2011-68; SR-Phlx-2011-129).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan is designed to prevent trades in individual NMS stocks 
from occurring outside of specified Price Bands.\10\ As described more 
fully below, the requirements of the Plan are coupled with Trading 
Pauses to accommodate more fundamental price moves (as opposed to 
erroneous trades or momentary gaps in liquidity). All trading centers 
in NMS stocks, including both those operated by Participants and those 
operated by members of Participants, are required to establish, 
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to comply with the requirements specified in the 
Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Unless otherwise specified, capitalized terms used in this 
proposed rule change are based on the defined terms of the Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As set forth in more detail in the Plan, Price Bands consisting of 
a Lower Price Band and an Upper Price Band for each NMS Stock are 
calculated by the Processors.\11\ When the National Best Bid (Offer) is 
below (above) the Lower (Upper) Price Band, the Processors shall 
disseminate such National Best Bid (Offer) with an appropriate flag 
identifying it as unexecutable. When the National Best Bid (Offer) is 
equal to the Upper (Lower) Price Band, the Processors shall distribute 
such National Best Bid (Offer) with an appropriate flag identifying it 
as a Limit State Quotation.\12\ All trading centers in NMS stocks must 
maintain written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed 
to prevent the display of offers below the Lower Price Band and bids 
above the Upper Price Band for NMS stocks. Notwithstanding this 
requirement, the Processor shall display an offer below the Lower Price 
Band or a bid above the Upper Price Band, but with a flag that it is 
non-executable. Such bids or offers shall not be included in the 
National Best Bid or National Best Offer calculations.\13\ Trading in 
an NMS stock immediately enters a Limit State if the National Best 
Offer (Bid) equals but does not cross the Lower (Upper) Price Band.\14\ 
Trading for an NMS stock exits a Limit State if, within 15 seconds of 
entering the Limit State, all Limit State Quotations were executed or 
canceled in their entirety. If the market does not exit a Limit State 
within 15 seconds, then the Primary Listing Exchange would declare a 
five-minute trading pause pursuant to Section VII of the Plan, which 
would be applicable to all markets trading the security.\15\ In 
addition, the Plan defines a Straddle State as when the National Best 
Bid (Offer) is below (above) the Lower (Upper) Price Band and the NMS 
stock is not in a Limit State. For example, assume the Lower Price Band 
for an NMS Stock is $9.50 and the Upper Price Band is $10.50, such NMS 
stock would be in a Straddle State if the National Best Bid were below 
$9.50, and therefore unexecutable, and the National Best Offer were 
above $9.50 (including a National Best Offer that could be above 
$10.50). If an NMS stock is in a Straddle State and trading in that 
stock deviates from normal trading characteristics, the Primary Listing 
Exchange may declare a trading pause for that NMS stock if such Trading 
Pause would support the Plan's goal to address extraordinary market 
volatility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See Section V(A) of the Plan.
    \12\ See Section VI(A) of the Plan.
    \13\ See Section VI(A)(3) of the Plan.
    \14\ See Section VI(B)(1) of the Plan.
    \15\ The primary listing market would declare a Trading Pause in 
an NMS stock; upon notification by the primary listing market, the 
Processor would disseminate this information to the public. No 
trades in that NMS stock could occur during the trading pause, but 
all bids and offers may be displayed. See Section VII(A) of the 
Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposal

    The Exchange proposes to adopt new Chapter V, Section 3(d)(iv) to 
provide that trades are not subject to an obvious error or catastrophic 
error review pursuant to Chapter V, Section 6(b) or 6(f) during a Limit 
State or Straddle State.
    Currently, under Sections 6(b)(i) and (f)(i), obvious and 
catastrophic errors are calculated by determining a theoretical price 
and applying such price, based on objective standards, to ascertain 
whether the trade should be nullified or adjusted. Trades are adjusted 
pursuant to an adjustment table that, in effect, assesses an adjustment 
penalty. By adjusting trades above or below the theoretical price, the 
rule assesses a ``penalty'' in that the adjustment price is not as 
favorable as the amount the party making the error would have received 
had it not made the error.
    Pursuant to Section 6(c), the theoretical price of an option is 
determined in one of two ways: (i) If the series is traded on at least 
one other options exchange, the mid-point of the

[[Page 17253]]

National Best Bid and Offer (``NBBO''), just prior to the transaction; 
or (ii) If there are no quotes for comparison purposes, as determined 
by MarketWatch as defined in Chapter I. Recently, the Exchange amended 
Section 6(c)(i) to change the first method to provide that if the 
series is traded on at least one other options exchange, the 
theoretical price is the last National Best Bid price with respect to 
an erroneous sell transaction and the last National Best Offer price 
with respect to an erroneous buy transaction, just prior to the 
transaction.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69058 (March 7, 2013), 
78 FR 15997 (March 13, 2013) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-039). It became 
effective on February 26, 2013 and will become operative 30 days 
thereafter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange believes that neither of these methods is appropriate 
during a Limit State or Straddle State. As discussed above, during a 
Limit State or Straddle State, options prices may deviate substantially 
from those available prior to or following the State. The Exchange 
believes the new provision (once operative) would give rise to much 
uncertainty for market participants as there is no bright line 
definition of what the theoretical price should be for an option when 
the underlying NMS stock has an unexecutable bid or offer or both. 
Determining theoretical price in such a situation would be often times 
very subjective as opposed to an objective determination giving rise to 
additional uncertainty and confusion for investors. Accordingly, the 
Exchange does not believe that the approach which depends on a reliable 
NBBO in the option is appropriate during a Limit State or Straddle 
State. While in a Limit State or Straddle State, only limit orders will 
be accepted by the Exchange, affirming that the participant is willing 
to accept an execution up to the limit price. Further, because the 
Exchange system will only trade through the theoretical bid or offer if 
the Exchange or the participant (via an ISO order) has accessed all 
better priced interest away in accordance the Options Order Protection 
and Locked/Crossed Markets Plan, the Exchange believes potential trade 
reviews of executions that occurred at the participant's limit price 
and also in compliance with aforementioned Plan could result in 
uncertainty that could harm liquidity and also could create an 
advantage to either side of an execution depending on the future 
movement of the underlying stock.
    The Exchange recognizes that the second method (in Section (c)(ii)) 
affords discretion to Exchange staff in determining the theoretical 
price and thereby, ultimately, whether a trade is busted or adjusted 
and to what price. The Exchange has determined that it would be 
difficult to exercise such discretion in periods of extraordinary 
market volatility and in particular when the price of the underlying 
security is unreliable. Moreover, the theoretical price would be 
subjective. Thus, the Exchange has determined not to permit an obvious 
or catastrophic error review if there are no quotes for comparison 
purposes. The Exchange believes that adding certainty to the execution 
of orders in these situations should encourage market participants to 
continue to provide liquidity to the Exchange and thus promote a fair 
and orderly market.
    In addition, the Exchange proposes to provide that trades are not 
subject to an obvious error and catastrophic error review if pursuant 
to Section 6(b)(ii) the trade resulted from an execution price in a 
series quoted no bid. A zero bid option refers to an option where the 
bid price is $ 0.00. Series of options quoted zero bid are usually deep 
out-of-the-money series that are perceived as having little if any 
chance of expiring in-the-money. For this reason, relatively few 
transactions occur in these series and those that do are usually the 
result of a momentary pricing error.
    Specifically, under this provision, where the trade resulted in an 
execution price in a series that was, and for five seconds prior to the 
execution remained, quoted no bid and at least one strike price below 
(for calls) or above (for puts) in the same class were quoted no bid at 
the time of the erroneous execution, the trade shall be nullified. For 
purposes of this provision, bids and offers of the parties to the 
subject trade that are in any of the series in the same options class 
shall not be considered. The Exchange believes that these situations 
are not appropriate for an error review because they are more likely to 
result in a windfall to one party at the expense of another, in a Limit 
State or Straddle State, because the criteria for meeting the no-bid 
provision are more likely to be met in a Limit State or Straddle State, 
and unlike normal circumstances, may not be a true reflection of the 
value of the series being quoted. For example, in a series quoted 
$1.95-$2.00 on multiple exchanges prior to the Limit State or Straddle 
State, an order to B10@ $2.00 is likely a reasonably priced trade 
because the buyer attempted to pay $2.00 with a limit price. However, 
if that series and the series one strike below are both quoted $0.00-
$5.00, then both the seller and the buyer at $2.00 would have an 
opportunity to dispute the trade. This would create uncertainty to both 
parties and an advantage to one participant if the underlying stock 
moved significantly in their direction.

Rationale

    When NASDAQ OMX PHLX (``PHLX'') Rule 1092 was first adopted, the 
Commission stated that it ``* * * considers that in most circumstances 
trades that are executed between parties should be honored. On rare 
occasions, the price of the executed trade indicates an `obvious error' 
may exist, suggesting that it is unrealistic to expect that the parties 
to the trade had come to a meeting of the minds regarding the terms of 
the transaction. In the Commission's view, the determination of whether 
an `obvious error' has occurred, and the adjustment or nullification of 
a transaction because an obvious error is considered to exist, should 
be based on specific and objective criteria and subject to specific and 
objective procedures. * * * The Commission believes that Phlx's 
proposed obvious error rule establishes specific and objective criteria 
for determining when a trade is an `obvious error.' Moreover, the 
Commission believes that the Exchange's proposal establishes specific 
and objective procedures governing the adjustment or nullification of a 
trade that resulted from an `obvious error.' ''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49785 (May 28, 
2004), 69 FR 32090 (June 8, 2004) (SR-Phlx-2003-68).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2008, PHLX amended Rule 1092 to adopt the catastrophic error 
provision. In doing so, the Exchange stated that it had ``* * * weighed 
carefully the need to assure that one market participant is not 
permitted to receive a windfall at the expense of another market 
participant that made an Obvious Error, against the need to assure that 
market participants are not simply being given an opportunity to 
reconsider poor trading decisions. The Exchange states that, while it 
believes that the Obvious Error Rule strikes the correct balance in 
most situations, in some extreme situations, trade participants may not 
be aware of errors that result in very large losses within the time 
periods currently required under the rule. In this type of extreme 
situation, the Exchange believes its members should be given more time 
to seek relief so that there is a greater opportunity to mitigate very 
large losses and reduce the corresponding large wind-falls. However, to 
maintain the appropriate balance, the Exchange believes members should 
only be given more time when the execution price is

[[Page 17254]]

much further away from the theoretical price than is required for 
Obvious Errors so that relief is only provided in extreme 
circumstances.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58002 (June 23, 
2008), 73 FR 36581 (June 27, 2008) (SR-Phlx-2008-42) (Notice of 
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change 
Relating to Catastrophic Errors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange believes that this proposal is consistent with those 
principles because it strikes the aforementioned balance. The Exchange 
is proposing to decline to review trades, which is specific and 
objective. Furthermore, the proposal more fairly balances the potential 
windfall to one market participant against the potential 
reconsideration of a trading decision under the guise of an error, and 
thereby results in more certainty during periods of extreme market 
volatility.
    The Exchange notes that there are additional protections in place 
outside of the Obvious and Catastrophic Errors Rule, specifically pre-
trade protections. First, SEC Rule 15c3-5 requires that, ``financial 
risk management controls and supervisory procedures must be reasonably 
designed to prevent the entry of orders that exceed appropriate pre-set 
credit or capital thresholds, or that appear to be erroneous.''\19\ 
Secondly, the Exchange has price checks applicable to limit orders that 
reject limit orders that are priced sufficiently far through the NBBO 
that it seems likely an error occurred. The requirements placed upon 
broker-dealers to adopt controls to prevent the entry of orders that 
appear to be erroneous, coupled with Exchange functionality that 
filters out orders that appear to be erroneous serve to sharply reduce 
the incidence of errors arising from situations, for example, where 
participants mistakenly enter an order to pay $20 for an option that is 
offered at $2. Accordingly, the Exchange believes it is appropriate to 
eliminate any potential protection applying the obvious or catastrophic 
error rule might provide during Limit States and Straddle States, as 
its application may produce inequitable results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (November 
3, 2010), 75 FR 69791 (November 15, 2010) (S7-03-10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange may still review transactions in the interest of 
maintaining a fair and orderly market and for the protection of 
investors, on its own motion, determine to review trades that are 
believed to be erroneous that occur during a Limit State or a Straddle 
State in accordance with Chapter V, Section 6(d)(i). The Exchange 
believes that this safeguard will provide the flexibility for the 
Exchange to act when necessary and appropriate to nullify or adjust a 
transaction, while also providing market participants with certainty 
that trades they effect with quotes and/or orders having limit prices 
will stand irrespective of subsequent moves in the underlying security. 
The right to review on Exchange motion transactions that occur during a 
Limit State or Straddle State under this provision would also allow the 
Exchange to account for unforeseen circumstances that result in obvious 
or catastrophic errors for which a nullification or adjustment may be 
necessary in order to preserve the interest of maintaining a fair and 
orderly market and for the protection of investors. The Exchange 
understands that this provision is specifically limited to maintaining 
a fair and orderly market for the protection of investors and will 
administer it in a manner that is consistent with the principles of the 
Act. The Exchange will create and maintain records relating to the use 
of the authority to act on its own motion during a Limit State or 
Straddle State, including when the Exchange received requests to act on 
its motion and determined not to as well as any complaints related to 
the Exchange's use of such authority.
    Various Exchange staff have, over time, spoken to a number of 
member organizations about how to treat obvious and catastrophic errors 
during a Limit State or Straddle State, with no one viewpoint 
particularly emerging; rather, the Exchange staff has heard a variety 
of views, mostly focused on having many trades stand, on fairness and 
fair and orderly markets and on being able to re-address the details 
during the course of the pilot, if needed.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with 
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\20\ in general, and with 
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\21\ in particular, requires that the rules 
of an exchange be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts 
and practices, promote just and equitable principles of trade, foster 
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, 
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and 
facilitating transactions in securities, remove impediments to and 
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market 
system, and, in general, protect investors and the public interest, 
because it should provide certainty about how errors involving options 
orders and trades will be handled during periods of extraordinary 
volatility in the underlying security. The Exchange further believes 
that it is necessary and appropriate in the interest of promoting fair 
and orderly markets to exclude transactions executed during a Limit 
State or Straddle State from Section 6(b). The Exchange believes the 
application of the current rule will be impracticable given the lack of 
a reliable NBBO in the options market during Limit States and Straddle 
States, and that the resulting actions (i.e., nullified trades or 
adjusted prices) may not be appropriate given market conditions. This 
change would ensure that limit orders that are filled during a Limit 
State or Straddle State would have certainty of execution in a manner 
that promotes just and equitable principles of trade, removes 
impediments to, and perfects the mechanism of a free and open market 
and a national market system. Moreover, given that options prices 
during brief Limit States or Straddle States may deviate substantially 
from those available shortly following the Limit State or Straddle 
State, the Exchange believes giving market participants time to re-
evaluate a transaction would create an unreasonable adverse selection 
opportunity that would discourage participants from providing liquidity 
during Limit States or Straddle States. In this respect, the Exchange 
notes that by rejecting market orders and stop orders, and cancelling 
pending market orders and stop orders, only those orders with a limit 
price will be executed during a Limit State or Straddle State. 
Therefore, on balance, the Exchange believes that removing the 
potential inequity of nullifying or adjusting executions occurring 
during Limit States or Straddle States outweighs any potential benefits 
from applying certain provisions during such unusual market conditions. 
Additionally, as discussed above, there are additional pre-trade 
protections in place outside of Section 6 that will continue to 
safeguard customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
    \21\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. 
Specifically, the proposal does not impose an intra-market burden on 
competition, because it will apply to all members. Nor will the 
proposal impose a burden on competition among the options exchanges, 
because, in addition

[[Page 17255]]

to the vigorous competition for order flow among the options exchanges, 
the proposal addresses a regulatory situation common to all options 
exchanges. To the extent that market participants disagree with the 
particular approach taken by the Exchange herein, market participants 
can easily and readily direct order flow to competing venues. The 
Exchange believes this proposal will not impose a burden on competition 
and will help provide certainty during periods of extraordinary 
volatility in an NMS stock.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were either solicited or received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the Exchange consents, the Commission shall: (a) by order approve 
or disapprove such proposed rule change, or (b) institute proceedings 
to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2013-048 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2013-048. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2013-048 and should 
be submitted on or before April 4, 2013.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-06397 Filed 3-19-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P